KANDIX LIMITED & Anor v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL & COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE, CROSS RIVER STATE & Anor
(2010)LCN/3895(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 24th day of June, 2010
CA/C/200/2009
RATIO
PRECONDITION FOR VALID REVOCATION OF A STATUTORY RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES
It was held per Obaseki, JSC in OSHO v FOREIGN FINANCE CORPORATION (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 157 at 195 following BELLO v THE DIOCESAN SYNOD OF LAGOS & ORS (1973) 3 SC 131; (1973) ALL NLR 196 which dealt with a similar situation as the present case that “To revoke a statutory right of occupancy for public purposes the letter and spirit of the laws must be adhered to. Since revocation of a grant deprives the holder of his proprietary right the terms must be strictly complied with and strict construction of the provisions made.” In his contribution to the judgment on the exercise of the power of revocation of statutory right of occupancy under Section 28 of the Land Use Act, Bello, CJN, said in OSHO v. FOREIGN FINANCE CORPORATION (supra) at page 200:- “Now reverting to the relevant provisions of Section 28, to wit subsections (1) and (2), it is pertinent to observe that since subsection (2) has defined “overriding public interest” the Governor can only exercise the power of revocation within the defined area. Any exercise of the said power outside the defined area would be contrary to the provisions of the Act and unlawful.” PER KUMAI BAYANG AKAAHS, J.C.A
PROVISION OF SECTION 44 OF THE LAND USE ACT AS TO THE DIFFERENT MODES OF EFFECTING SERVICE OF NOTICES TO REVOKE A STATUTORY RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES
Section 44 of the Land Use Act provides for service of notices by different modes. It states-
“44. Any notice required by this Act to be served on any person shall be effectively served on him- a) by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served; or b) by leaving it at the usual or last known place of abode of that person; or c) by sending it in a prepaid registered letter addressed to that person at his usual or last known place of abode; or d) in the case of an incorporated company or body, by delivering it to the Secretary or Clerk of the company or body at its registered or principal office or sending it in a prepaid registered letter addressed to the Secretary or Clerk of the company or body at that office; or e) if it is not practicable after reasonable inquiry to ascertain the name or address of a holder or occupier of land on whom it should be served, by addressing it to him by the description of “holder” or “occupier” of the premises (naming them) to which it relates, and by delivering it to some person on the premises, or, if there is no person on the premises to whom it can be delivered, by affixing it, or a copy of it, to some, conspicuous part of the premises.” PER KUMAI BAYANG AKAAHS, J.C.A
HOW AN EXPROPRIATORY PROVISION IN A STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
In the construction of expropriatory provision in a statute, such statute must be construed by the court fortissime contra preferentes. Such a statute should be construed by the court strictly against the acquiring authority and sympathetically in favour of the complainant or the owner or possessor of the property against any irregularity in the procedure for acquisition as laid down by the enabling statute. See BELLO v DIOCESAN SYNOD OF LAGOS (1973) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 247; PEENOCK INVESTMENTS LTD v HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL (1983) 4 NCLR 122; OSHO v FOREIGN FINANCE CORPORATION (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 157: NIGERIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. v OGUNBIYI (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt.255) 543; C. S. S. BOOKSHOP LTD v THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN RIVERS STATE (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 992) 530. PER KUMAI BAYANG AKAAHS, J.C.A
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF GIVING NOTICE OF REVOCATION OF A RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY
The purpose of giving notice of revocation of a right of occupancy is to duly inform the holder thereof the steps being taken to extinguish his right of occupancy. In the absence of a proper notice of revocation of right of occupancy, the purported revocation of that right of occupancy by the Governor or Officer duly authorized by the Governor is ineffectual. See: NITEL v OGUNBIYI (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 25) 543; ATTORNEY-GENERAL BENDEL STATE v AIDEYAN (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 646; NIGERIAN ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. v DENAP LTD. (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 525)481. PER KUMAI BAYANG AKAAHS, J.C.A
DEFINITION OF “DEVELOPED LAND” ACCORDING TO THE PROVISION OF SECTION 51 OF THE ACT
Section 51 of the Act defines developed land to mean “land where there exists any physical improvement in the nature of road development services, water, electricity, drainage, building, structure or such improvement that may enhance the value of the land for industrial, agricultural or residential purposes. See C.S.S. BOOKSHOPS LTD. v R.T.M.C.R.S. supra at pages 574 – 575. The learned DDCL was hanging on to straw in the argument that the appellants breached a covenant by not developing the whole land. PER KUMAI BAYANG AKAAHS, J.C.A
JUSTICE
KUMAI BAYANG AKAAHS Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JA’AFARU MIKA’ILU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
NWALE SYLVESTER NGWUTA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
Text
1. KANDIX LIMITED
2. PROF. UKANDI GODWIN DAMACHI Appellant(s)
AND
1. ATTORNEY-GENERAL & COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE, CROSS RIVER STATE
2. GOVERNMENT OF CROSS RIVER STATERespondent(s)
KUMAI BAYANG AKAAHS, J.C.A (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Plaintiffs now Appellants took out an Originating Summons in Suit No. HC/370/2007 seeking a determination of the following questions:
1. Whether the publication of the purported revocation notice in the Nigerian Chronicle of 24th January to 28th January, 2002 complied with the mandatory requirement of personal service of the notice as provided in the Land Use Act.
2. Whether the Defendants have power of (sic) legal authority to revoke plaintiff (sic) title for extension of Calabar Free Trade Zone and allocate the said land to their cronies for their personal use.
3. Whether the action of the defendants did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional right as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution. The Plaintiffs then sought the following reliefs:
a) A declaration that the Plaintiff’s are entitled to personal service and notice of the said revocation of their title.
b) A declaration that the defendants have no power or right to revoke their title on the property lying and situate at Northern Industrial Estate, Esuk Utan, Calabar covered by Certificate of Occupancy No. CA/3560/90 and registered as No. 3 at page 3 in volume 9 of Lands Registry Office, Calabar and re-allocate same to cronies and friends.
c) An order setting aside the so-called revocation of plaintiffs title published in the Chronicle of 24th January to 28th January, 2002 for being void.
d) An order directing the Registrar of Deeds in the Calabar Lands Registry to remove the notification of the alleged revocation.
e) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, allottees from trespassing or further trespassing onto the plaintiff (sic) land lying and situate on Northern Industrial Estate, Esuk Utan, Calabar, measuring approximately 2.219 hectares and registered as No. 3 at page 3 in Volume 9 Lands Registry, Calabar and covered by Certificate of Occupancy No. CA/3560/90.
In the affidavit in support of the summons deposed to by Ephraim S. Akpan upon facts made available by the 2nd Plaintiff who is the Chairman of Kandix Limited, it was averred in paragraph 2 as follows:
“2(d) That he immediately put up a fence to secure the land and constructed a factory thereon.
(e) That he obtained a loan of N200 million to import machineries from Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry. The building and machines were mortgage (sic) for N200 million loan and registered as No. 34 at page 34 in Volume 32.
(f) That the factory had been producing and managed to pay off the loan and interest amounting to N540 million resulting in the title deed being released on the 21st September 2006 and registered as No. 36 at page 36 in Volume 102.
(g) That it was during the registration of the deed of release that the plaintiffs were told that their title had been revoked vide Nigerian Chronicle of 24th January to 28th January, 2002.
(h) That no notice of revocation was served on them or pasted in the factory.
(i) That on the 30th April, 2007, some unknown persons broke down parts of the plaintiff fence and drove workers out of the factory and claimed that the whole land had been reallocated following the revocation order. Annexed hereto as Exh ‘B’ is the Chronicle publication.
(j) That the land was reallocated to ten persons and one of them has in the speed of light (sic) constructed his residential house on a portion of plaintiff’s land whilst two others have demarcated their land and started construction.
(k) That all the people reallocated plaintiff’s land are not overriding.
(I) That the plaintiff’s workers have been chased out of site and the factory shut down following treats (sic) of pulling down the factory.”
Mr. Eni Edet Okpo, the Litigation Officer in the Ministry of Justice, Calabar deposed to the following facts in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the 8 paragraph counter-affidavit:
“3. Several years after the 1st Plaintiff was allocated the land comprised in the Certificate of Occupancy No. CA/3560/90 she developed only a small portion of the land, leaving the rest of the land undeveloped.
4. The 1st Plaintiff also defaulted in the payment of ground rent on the land right from 1993 to 2002 when her Right of Occupancy over the land was revoked. This amounted to N227.003.70.
5. In 2002 when the 2nd defendant had need of land for the purpose of extension of the Calabar Free Trade Zone (CFTZ), it acquired the 1st Plaintiff’s undeveloped land, along with some other lands within the vicinity of the CFTZ, and duly published the revocation of the rights over the affected lands in the Nigerian Chronicle Edition of Thursday, January 24th – Monday, January 28th, 2002, exhibited hereto and marked Exhibit ‘MOJ1′.
6. When the extension of the CFTZ became unrealistic, the 2nd defendant re-designed, parcellated (sic) and re-designated the entire area acquired as “Mixed-Use Layout”, Esuk Utan, Calabar Municipality. 2nd Defendant subsequently allocated the plots which resulted from this to members of the public for immediate development.”
The matter was decided on affidavit evidence since there was no dispute as to the revocation and the reason for the revocation.
Learned counsel were ordered to file written addresses. In the judgment delivered on 24/6/2009 the learned trial Judge found that the defendants neither delivered the notice of revocation personally to the plaintiff nor leave the notice at the usual or last known place of abode of the plaintiff but held that the plaintiff was not entitled to notice for having breached a covenant in the Right of Occupancy.
The learned trial judge also held that the Right of the Plaintiff can be revoked for public interest and so dismissed the plaintiffs’ case.
Being dissatisfied with the decision the plaintiffs now appellants appealed against it in their Notice of Appeal dated 4th August, 2009 containing four grounds of appeal and in the brief of argument submitted the following two issues for determination:-
1. Whether the non-compliance with the mandatory provision of the Notice of Revocation did not void the purported revocation of the Appellants Right of Occupancy as published in the Nigerian Chronicle of 24th – 28th January, 2002. (Ground 1)
2. Whether the Appellants’ statutory Right of Occupancy on its property can be revoked for public purposes and re allocated to other private persons. (Grounds 2, 3 and 4).
The Respondents adopted the issues framed by the Appellants.
Following on the arguments presented by the Respondents’ counsel, a Reply Brief was filed by the Appellants’ counsel.
Mr. Agi learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in proffering arguments on Issue 1 referred to the judgment of the learned trial Judge and Section 44(a), (b) & (d) of the Land Use Act and submitted that where the statute provided that notice of a person’s interest in land must be served on him as provided in Section 44 of the Land Use Act, where such notice is not given, the trial judge ought to set aside the revocation for non-compliance with the statutory provision.
He cited a number of cases to support the submission.
Mr. Ikona, learned Deputy Director, Civil Litigation who settled the Respondents brief submitted that the non-compliance with the statutory provision of the Land Use Act did not void the revocation of the Appellants’ Right of Occupancy as published in the Nigerian Chronicle of 24th – 28th January, 2002 because a community reading of Sections 9, 10, 28 and 50 of the Land Use Act vis-a-vis the covenants and conditions of the Certificate of Occupancy justified the actions of the Respondents. He argued that the Appellants did not pay the rents fixed by the Governor in Clause 2(f) of the Certificate of Occupancy issued to them from 1993 to 2002 totalling N227.003.74.
Apart from the failure to pay the ground rent, the appellants did not develop the entire land within 2 years and the appellants were in breach of this covenant for 12 years. It was as a result of the flagrant and deliberate breach of the special covenants and conditions contained in the Certificate of Occupancy that made the Government to revoke the Certificate of Occupancy. The revocation was therefore lawful and Government was justified to re-enter the land.
In reply learned counsel for the appellants contended that where there is a clause for re-entry and forfeiture for non-payment of rent or breach of any special condition or covenant in the certificate of occupancy, this does not give the Governor an automatic right to re-enter the property nor determine the right of the holder. There must be a formal demand on the holder to remedy the default. It is only in the event of a continuous default that the Governor will be entitled to formally revoke the right of the holder which must be in strict compliance with Section 28(4), (6) and (7) of the Land Use Act as well as Section 44 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
The right to own property is a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Sections 43 and 44 (1) of the Constitution provide:-
“43. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution every citizen of Nigeria shall have the right to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria.
44-(1) No moveable property or any interest in an immovable property shall be taken possession of compulsorily and no right over or interest in any such property shall be acquired compulsorily in any part of Nigeria except in the manner and purposes prescribed by a law that, among other things-
a) requires the prompt payment of compensation therefore; and
b) gives to any person claiming such compensation a right of access for the determination of his interest in the property and the amount of compensation to a court of law or tribunal or body having jurisdiction in that part of Nigeria.”
In the Notice of Revocation of Rights of Occupancy which was carried in the Nigerian Chronicle of Thursday, January 24th, 2002 – Monday, January 28th, 2002 which affected the appellants and many others, it was clearly stated that the exercise was carried out for public purpose namely the Extension of the Calabar Free Trade Zone, (underlining mine for emphasis).
Section 28 of the Land Use Act gives the Governor the power to revoke rights of occupancy. It provides in Section 28(1) that –
“It shall be lawful for the Governor to revoke a right of occupancy for overriding public interest” Overriding public interest is defined in Section 28(2)(b) of the Act as –
“the requirement of the land by the Government of the State or by a Local Government in the State, in either case for purposes within the State or the requirement of the land by the Government of the Federation for public purposes of the Federation;”
The respondents admitted in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit that when the extension of the Calabar Free Trade Zone became unrealistic, the 2nd defendant re-designed, parceled and re-designated the entire area as “Mixed-Use Layout” and subsequently allocated the plots which resulted from this to members of the public for immediate development. At the time the Government of Cross River State took the decision to re-design the Industrial Layout and allocate plots to members of the public for development it acted outside the power granted to it by Section 28 of the Land Use Act. It was held per Obaseki, JSC in OSHO v FOREIGN FINANCE CORPORATION (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 157 at 195 following BELLO v THE DIOCESAN SYNOD OF LAGOS & ORS (1973) 3 SC 131; (1973) ALL NLR 196 which dealt with a similar situation as the present case that
“To revoke a statutory right of occupancy for public purposes the letter and spirit of the laws must be adhered to. Since revocation of a grant deprives the holder of his proprietary right the terms must be strictly complied with and strict construction of the provisions made.”
In his contribution to the judgment on the exercise of the power of revocation of statutory right of occupancy under Section 28 of the Land Use Act, Bello, CJN, said in OSHO v. FOREIGN FINANCE CORPORATION (supra) at page 200:-
“Now reverting to the relevant provisions of Section 28, to wit subsections (1) and (2), it is pertinent to observe that since subsection (2) has defined “overriding public interest” the Governor can only exercise the power of revocation within the defined area. Any exercise of the said power outside the defined area would be contrary to the provisions of the Act and unlawful.”
Apart from the fact that the revocation later turned out to be unlawful since the purpose for which the revocation was initially carried out became aborted, there is the issue of the Notice. Again I refer to paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit wherein it was averred-
“5. in 2002 when the 2nd defendant had need of land for the purpose of extension of the Calabar Free Trade Zone (CFTZ), it acquired the 1st plaintiffs undeveloped land along with some other lands within the vicinity of the CFTZ and duly published the revocation of the rights over the affected lands in the Nigerian Chronicle edition of Thursday, January 24th – Monday, January 28th, 2002, exhibited hereto and marked Exh. “MOJ 1”.
The learned trial Judge asked the pertinent question as page 41 of the records whether the newspaper publication constitutes sufficient notice without more. After referring to Section 44 (a) & (b) Land Use Act and the argument of the learned State Counsel that the Plaintiffs were in breach of the covenant to pay ground rents which accumulated over the years totaling N227, 003.07 at the time of the re-entry, the learned trial Judge found that proper notice was not given to the Plaintiffs prior to the re-entry by the defendants. The same arguments were repeated in this court by the learned Deputy Director of Civil Litigation Cross River State to justify the non-issuance of proper notice to the appellants to which learned counsel for the appellants replied that before the respondents can rely on the breach of the covenant to pay the ground rents, a demand must have been made on the appellants to pay the said rents which they persistently ignored.
The finding by the learned trial Judge that proper notice for revocation was not given to the appellants is unassailable. Section 44 of the Land Use Act provides for service of notices by different modes. It states-
“44. Any notice required by this Act to be served on any person shall be effectively served on him-
a) by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served; or
b) by leaving it at the usual or last known place of abode of that person; or
c) by sending it in a prepaid registered letter addressed to that person at his usual or last known place of abode; or
d) in the case of an incorporated company or body, by delivering it to the Secretary or Clerk of the company or body at its registered or principal office or sending it in a prepaid registered letter addressed to the Secretary or Clerk of the company or body at that office; or
e) if it is not practicable after reasonable inquiry to ascertain the name or address of a holder or occupier of land on whom it should be served, by addressing it to him by the description of “holder” or “occupier” of the premises (naming them) to which it relates, and by delivering it to some person on the premises, or, if there is no person on the premises to whom it can be delivered, by affixing it, or a copy of it, to some, conspicuous part of the premises.”
In the construction of expropriatory provision in a statute, such statute must be construed by the court fortissime contra preferentes. Such a statute should be construed by the court strictly against the acquiring authority and sympathetically in favour of the complainant or the owner or possessor of the property against any irregularity in the procedure for acquisition as laid down by the enabling statute. See BELLO v DIOCESAN SYNOD OF LAGOS (1973) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 247; PEENOCK INVESTMENTS LTD v HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL (1983) 4 NCLR 122; OSHO v FOREIGN FINANCE CORPORATION (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 157: NIGERIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. v OGUNBIYI (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt.255) 543; C. S. S. BOOKSHOP LTD v THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN RIVERS STATE (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 992) 530. The Notice of revocation was not served strictly in accordance with Section 44 of the Land Use Act and ought to have been set aside by the learned trial Judge. Neither the breach of the covenant to pay the ground rents nor the purported claim by learned counsel for the respondents that the plot was not fully developed can save the notice of revocation from being declared null and void and consequently setting it aside since the Notice of revocation was not served on the appellants nor adequate compensation paid. See ADOLE v GWAR (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt.1099) 562 at 603 and 607.
The purpose of giving notice of revocation of a right of occupancy is to duly inform the holder thereof the steps being taken to extinguish his right of occupancy. In the absence of a proper notice of revocation of right of occupancy, the purported revocation of that right of occupancy by the Governor or Officer duly authorized by the Governor is ineffectual. See: NITEL v OGUNBIYI (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 25) 543; ATTORNEY-GENERAL BENDEL STATE v AIDEYAN (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 646; NIGERIAN ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. v DENAP LTD. (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 525)481.
It was strenuously argued by the learned Deputy Director Civil Litigation Cross River State that one of the covenants which the appellants breached which entitled the Respondents to re-enter the land even without giving notice since the right had been extinguished by the breach was that the appellants were required to develop the entire land within two years but they developed only a small portion of it. There is nowhere in the Act or Certificate of Occupancy where the appellants are required to develop the whole land. The covenant contained in the Certificate of Occupancy granted to the Appellants was to erect permanent building (s) to the value of not less than N200,000.00 to the satisfaction of and in accordance with plans approved by the relevant authority and the building works were to be completed and fit for habitation within 2 years with effect from 1st January, 1990. The appellants averred that they obtained a loan of N200 million from the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry and the building and machineries were mortgaged for N200 million. After they had repaid the mortgage loan the title deeds were released to them. This fact was not controverted. Section 51 of the Act defines developed land to mean “land where there exists any physical improvement in the nature of road development services, water, electricity, drainage, building, structure or such improvement that may enhance the value of the land for industrial, agricultural or residential purposes. See C.S.S. BOOKSHOPS LTD. v R.T.M.C.R.S. supra at pages 574 – 575. The learned DDCL was hanging on to straw in the argument that the appellants breached a covenant by not developing the whole land.
Viewed from all angles, the exercise carried out by the Cross River State Government in revocating the appellants’ right of occupancy without strictly adhering to the tenets of the Land Use Act cannot be allowed to stand. The situation was worsened by the latter decision to re-allocate the land to private individuals when the initial revocation was done for public purpose. If the revoked land had been developed for the Calabar Free Trade Zone, I would have hastened to allow the revocation to stand and the only issue to be resolved would be as to compensation payable but in the present circumstances, the present allottees have no valid title vested in them since the appellants’ rights to the use and occupation of the land have not been extinguished as envisaged by Section 5(2) Land Use Act.
The appeal has merit and it is accordingly allowed. I hold that the failure to give the mandatory notice of revocation to the appellants as required by law has rendered the purported revocation void. It is hereby declared that the subsequent re-allocation of the appellants’ land to other private persons is illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever and the appellants’ right and title to the revoked land are still subsisting.
JA’AFARU MIKAMLU, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the lead judgment of my brother Kumai Bayang Akaahs, J.C.A. I agree with all the reasons given in it and the conclusion thereof. The purported revocation of the appellant’s certificate of occupancy and the reallocation of the appellant’s land to individual and private members of the Public null and void and no effect.
I endorse the order that the appellant’s rights and title to the land are still subsisting.
NWALI SYLVESTER NGWUTA, J.C.A.: I read in draft the lead judgment of my Learned Brother Akaahs, JCA. His Lordship adequately and decisively dealt with the two issues in the appeal.
I wish to say a few words in support of the lead judgment even at the risk of repetition.
The purported revocation of the Appellant’s right of occupancy was done in violation of S. 44 of the Land Use Act, the provision of which ought to be construed strictly against the Respondent’s intention to deprive the Appellant of the property vested in it.
The Appellant developed the property and development here does not mean setting up structures on every inch of the land.
Even if the Appellant was in breach of a covenant in any manner revocation is not automatic on breach of covenant without more.
The Appellant ought to be heard on the alleged breach of covenant before this right to occupancy can be legally revoked.
Even if the revocation could be justified, the Respondents are strictly bound to use the land for Public Purpose as claimed. They cannot divest the Appellant of its right of occupancy for Public purpose only to parcel out the land for whatever reason to individual members of the Public. Individual interest of members of the Public is not equivalent to Public Interest under the Land Use Act. If for any reason the Respondents were unable to use the land for the Public purpose for which it was taken from the occupier then they have a legal duty to restore the land to the owner rather than robbing Peter to pay his brother Paul.
For the above and the comprehensive reasons adumbrated in the lead judgment, I also declare the purported revocation of the Appellants certificate of occupancy and the purported re-allocation of the Appellant’s land to individual and private members of the Public null and void and of no illegal effect. I also endorse the order that the Appellant’s rights and title to the land are infact and subsisting.
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Appearances
Joe Agi, SAN with Emmanuel SaniFor Appellant
AND
I. E. Ikona, Deputy Director Civil Litigation, Cross River State with O. J. Ajagu, StateFor Respondent
