ZAKARI v. KANO STATE (2022)

ZAKARI v. KANO STATE

(2022)LCN/16656(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(KANO JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, March 18, 2022

CA/KN/184/C/2020

Before Our Lordships:

Ita George Mbaba Justice of the Court of Appeal

Boloukuromo Moses Ugo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Abubakar Muazu Lamido Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

SHU’AIBU ZAKARI APPELANT(S)

And

KANO STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT IS ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH CONVICTION

By law, a confessional statement is enough to establish conviction, when the same is adjudged voluntarily made by the accused person. We have stated this several times, that confessional evidence is the best evidence, being one that the accused person admits the guilt by self-conviction. See the case of Kabiru Bala Vs The State (2022) LPELR – 56737 (CA), where we held:
“By law, a confessional statement is enough evidence, and, in fact the best evidence, to establish commission of offence, coming from the accused person, himself, where the confession is adjudged voluntarily made. See the case of Uhara Vs The State (2021) LPELR-55512 (CA): “We have held several times that a confessional statement alone is a conclusive and sufficient evidence to establish conviction, and, in fact, the best evidence of the commission of the offence, coming directly from the accused person himself, and closing every door of defence against him, except where the issue/defence of provocation can be invoked. See FRN Vs Iweka (2011) LPELR – 9350 SC, where it was held that confessional statement is the best evidence of proof of crime and can be accepted as satisfactory evidence, upon which alone the accused can be convicted. See also Ogoala Vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509 at 534.” PER MBABA, J.C.A.

ITA GEORGE MBABA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the decision of Kano State High Court in Charge No. K/84C/2017, delivered on 4th April, 2019, by Hon. Justice Hadiza Suleiman, wherein the learned trial Judge convicted Appellant for offence of rape, sentenced him to ten (10) years imprisonment and ordered him to pay the sum of Fifty Thousand Naira (₦50,000.00) to the victim, failure of which Appellant would serve additional 6 months imprisonment.

At the lower Court, Appellant was arraigned on 7/2/2018, on the following charge:
“That you Shuaibu Zakari ‘M’ of Badawa Village, Doguwa LGA, Kano on or about the 5th day of November, 2016 at about 10:30hrs at Kagadawa Village Doguwa LGA within Kano judicial Division did commit the offence of rape to wit: you lured one Hauwa Idris aged 5 years into a farm and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her, and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 283 of the Penal Code.”

Appellant (as accused person) had pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charge, upon the same being read and interpreted to him and he appeared to understand the same. At the trial, the prosecution called five (5) witnesses and tendered two (2) exhibits – Exhibit E (Statement of Appellant) and Exhibit F (Medical Report). The Defendant defended himself, and in the course of cross-examination of the prosecution witness, applied to tender Exhibits A, B and C – Exhibit A being the statement of PW1 to the police and Exhibit B and C alleged to be the statement made by PW3 (Hauwa Idris) to the police.

After hearing the case and considering the addresses of counsel, and the evidence, the trial Court convicted the Appellant and said:
“On the 2nd, 3rd and 4th ingredients, the evidence of PW3 is to the effect that the accused pulled her and then had sexual intercourse with her, that she went to a tree and started crying because the accused said he will cut her neck… Her evidence, which I believed and accepted was never, challenged or discredited under cross-examination, (sic) by pulling her and threatening to cut her neck cannot be said to be willingly or with her consent and she has (sic) 5 years of age, she cannot be married to the accused nor give her consent.
On the last ingredient and one of the most important ingredient, penetration, the accused in his confessional statement has stated that, he removed his trouser and inserted his penis into her virgina (sic) but only the head of his penis entered.
In the case of Posu Vs State (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt 546) 501 CA, the Court of Appeal held that sexual intercourse is deemed complete upon proof of penetration of penis into the virgina (sic). Even the slightest penetration will be sufficient to constitute the act of sexual intercourse…” (See page 78 of the Records of Appeal).

That is the decision Appellant appealed against, as per the Notice and Grounds of Appeal, filed on 24/6/2019, on pages 81 to 83 of the Records of Appeal, with three grounds of Appeal. Appellant filed his brief of argument on 25/3/2021 and distilled two issues for the determination of the Appeal, as follows:
1) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in ignoring Exhibits B and C in reaching her decision (Ground 1)
2) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in convicting the Appellant of the offence of rape under Section 283 of the Penal Code? (Grounds 2 and 3) The Respondent filed its brief of arguments on 16/9/2021, which was deemed duly filed and served on 3/12/2021. The Respondent adopted the issues as distilled by the Appellant (but in reverse order).

Arguing the appeal, Appellant’s Counsel, Segun Olabode Esq., on the issue one, said that the Exhibits B and C tendered by the PW3 were denied by PW3; that she denied, under cross-examination, making any statement to the police; that PW4 (IPO) had said that he recorded the Exhibits B and C as statements of the victim (as her nominal complaint) to the police; Counsel said that, having tendered Exhibits B and C, they have become part of the evidence to be considered by the Court; that the trial Court was wrong to decline to consider the said Exhibits, just because the victim (prosecutrix) had denied making them. He relied on the case of Anzaku Vs Gov. Nasarawa State (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt 303) 308 at 351-352. Counsel argued that the non-consideration of the Exhibits B and C affected the decision reached and occasioned miscarriage of justice on Appellant.

On issue 2, Counsel said that prosecution had failed to prove the charge against Appellant; he said that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove:
(1) That the accused had sexual intercourse or unlawful carnal knowledge of the prosecutrix.
(2) That the act of sexual intercourse was done without her consent, or that the consent was obtained by fraud, force, threat, intimidation, deceit or impersonation.
(3) That the prosecutrix was not the wife of the deceased.
(4) That the accused had mens rea, the intention to have sexual intercourse or that the accused acted recklessly, not caring whether the prosecutrix consented or not
(5) That there was penetration.
He relied on the cases of Posu Vs State (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 565) 234 at 250, Isa Vs Kano State (2016) ALL FWLR (Pt 822) 1773 at 1783-1784 and Ezigbo Vs State (2012) ALL FWLR (Pt 638) 847 at 852.

Counsel relied on Section 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) to say that every person charged with criminal offence is presumed to be innocent, until proved guilty, thus, the burden of proof was on the prosecution, to prove the guilt of the Appellant, beyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that the prosecution failed to discharge that burden of proof, that the star witness (PW3) had told the Court:
“Yes, I know the accused person… The accused person took me to a guinea corn farm and removed my pant he then removed his own trouser. The accused called me into the farm and asked that he will put harawa of soya beans on me. The accused said he will cut my neck, the accused said we should have sexual intercourse. The accused then pulled her (sic) and then had sexual intercourse with me, I then went to a tree and started crying. I cried because he said he will cut my neck.”

Counsel said that the above evidence of the PW3 in Court contradicted the statement she made to the police on 5/11/2016 and 17/11/2016 (Exhibits B and C) as to what transpired between her and the Accused Person, Counsel said that the said Exhibits B and C carried what the PW3 stated at the material time, soon after the alleged offence and the same being inconsistent with what PW3 told the Court, should have influenced the mind of the Court. He relied on Akpa Vs State (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt 351) 1560 at 1576, Ikemson Vs State (1989) 20 NSCCC (PT. 11) 471 at 475.

Counsel said that while Exhibits B and C affirmed that PW3 was not raped by Appellant, the PW3’s evidence in Court at the trial was that she was raped by Appellant, that that amounted to material contradiction and fundamental issue in the trial to be resolved for the Appellant. He argued that when a witness is shown to have made previous statements inconsistent with the evidence given at the trial, the evidence of such a witness should be regarded as unreliable. He relied on Ikemson Vs State (supra) at 475, Nnunukwe Vs State (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt 201)1784 and Usufu Vs State (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 405) 1731 at 1750 -1751.

Counsel said that evidence of PW3 in Court had therefore become doubtful and urged us to discountenance the evidence of PW3. He relied on Anyiam Vs Queen (1961) 1 SCNLR 78 and Oshodin Vs State (2002) FWLR (Pt 90) 1336 and urged us to take the evidence favourable to the Appellant as in Exhibits B and C.

Counsel also referred us to the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4 to say that they were contrary to PW3’s statements in Exhibits B and C, on the allegation of rape of PW3, that PW1, in Exhibit A, did not say he met the Appellant tying his trouser, that he admitted under cross-examination, that he did not know what transpired between Appellants and PW3 before he got to the farm, though he said he met PW3, crying. Counsel said that the evidence of PW2 was hearsay and that the evidence of PW4 lacked probative values, that the evidence of PW5 (medical doctor) and Exhibit F (which confirmed loss of hymen by PW3) did not trace it to Appellant. Counsel urged us to resolve the issues for Appellant and allow the Appeal.

Counsel argued that Appellant had questioned the correctness of the recording of his statement (Exhibit D), Counsel relied on the case of Kazeem Vs State (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt 465) 1749 at 1773, to buttress his right to do so. He argued that Appellant was not contesting the voluntariness of the statement he made, but that he was not recorded properly! Counsel, submitted that a Court faced with the kind of situation thrown up in this appeal, has the duty of testing the truth of the confessional statement, by examining it with respect to other credible evidence led and determine whether:
(1) there is anything (evidence) outside the confession to show that it is true;
(2) it is corroborated
(3) the facts in it are true as can be tested
(4) the accused person had the opportunity of committing the crime
(5) the accused person’s confession is possible
(6) the confessional statement is consistent with other facts ascertained and established.

Counsel urged us to answer the prayers in favour of Appellant, that the conviction was not properly founded.

Responding, the Respondent’s Counsel, J. I. Abubakar Esq., who settled the Respondent’s brief, asserted the three different ways of proving commission of crime, namely: by eye witness account; confessional statement; or by circumstantial evidence, and cited Ilodigwe Vs State (2012) 125 CN 134, Yakubu Vs State (2014) 35 CM 254, Igabele Vs The State (2006) 5 LRCNCC 66, State Vs Gbahabo & Ors (2019) LPELR-…

Counsel also relied on the case of Ezigbo Vs The State (2012) 8 SCM 96, on the ingredients of offence of rape, he also relied on Section 282 of the Penal Code – that there was sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix; that the prosecutrix did not give her consent (or consent was obtained by fraud, force, threat or deceit) that prosecutrix was not his wife, and that there was penetration.
Counsel said the testimonies of PW1 and PW3 had satisfied the ingredients of the offence, that PW1 had said:
“…I ran into the farm. I had a hoe in my hand. I found the accused under a tree, he was tying his trouser and my niece was by his side, crying, when I hold (sic) the hand of the accused. I then asked him what he was doing with the victim, whether he went to cut off her head. The accused then told me that he wanted to have sexual intercourse with the victim.” Page 10 of the Records.
The PW3 (the victim) said:
“…The accused took me to a guinea corm farm and removed his own trouser, the accused called me into the farm and asked that he will put Harawa of Soya beans on me. The accused said we should have sexual intercourse, the accused then pulled her (me) and then had sexual intercourse with me. I then went to a tree and started crying. I cried because he said he will cut my neck…” See page 12 of the Records of Appeal.

Counsel also referred us to Exhibit D, where Appellant in the confessional statement, said:
“…I was on my way I saw one small girl age about five (5) years. I called her into corn farm and removed my trouser and brought out my penis and inserted it on the girl virgina (sic), but only the head entered due to the age of the girl till I release semen while I was tying my trouser two men came and arrested me….” (Pages 63-64 of the Records of Appeal)

Counsel also referred us to the Exhibit F (medical report) and the evidence by PW5, where he stated:
“…But my examination of the victim showed that the pressure that was put on the virgina (sic) that led to the breakage of the hymen happen within a short time that the victim was brought to the hospital…” (Page 21 of the Records)

Counsel submitted that the evidence of PW1, PW5 (and the Medical Report – Exhibit F) and the confessional statement of the Appellant (Exhibit D), clearly corroborated the evidence of PW3 – the victim, to establish the commission of the offence. He relied on the case of Posu & Anor Vs The State (supra) on the meaning of corroboration. Counsel added that the Court can convict on the basis of confessional statement, alone. He relied on the case of Ada Vs State (2008) 7 MJSC 63, Nwachukwu Vs State (2007) 11 MJSC 46, Azabada Vs State (2014) 6-7 SC (pt. 1) 55 and Salihu Vs State (2014) 5-6 SC (Pt 1) 26.

Counsel again stated that when the confessional statement (Exhibit D) was tendered, Appellant neither objected to the document nor denied making the exhibit, that under cross-examination, the Appellant had said:
“It is true that I am standing trial on the offence of rape. It is true that I was at Kagama Village, when the incident happened. It is true that I made statement at the police station, without any harassment by the police… It is true that the signature on the statement, made at the police station, is my own…” (Page 24 of the Records of Appeal).

Counsel said that the test of veracity of a confessional statement is to seek corroboration in the other pieces of evidence in the case, and asserted that the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5, have all confirmed the veracity of the confessional statement. He also relied on the medical report and urged us to resolve the issue against the Appellant.

On whether the trial Court was right to ignore the Exhibits B and C, Counsel answered in the affirmative, and said that Counsel’s argument on the issue could not hold water, because the PW3, alleged to have made the Exhibits (B and C), had told the Court that it was not true she went to the police station; she denied making any statement to the police. Counsel said that Appellant’s Counsel did not prove that PW3 made the Exhibits B and C, after she had denied doing so. Counsel urged us to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES
I shall consider this appeal on the two issues distilled by Appellant (which were adopted by the Respondent). But I shall take them together.

Did the Respondent prove the offence of rape against Appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and was the trial Court right to have ignored the Exhibits B and C, purported to have been made by the prosecutrix (PW3) to the police?

The facts of this case are straight forward, as revealed in evidence before the lower Court. Appellant, said to be 18 years old at the time of the offence, had dragged the PW3, a five-year-old girl, into the bush (guinea corn farm) and had carnal knowledge of her (sexual intercourse), after threatening to cut her neck and stripping her. The little girl said in evidence (as PW3):
“The accused said he will cut my neck, the accused said we should have sexual intercourse. The accused then pulled her (me) and then had sexual intercourse with me. I then went to a tree and started crying. I cried because he said he will cut my neck…” (Page 12 of the Records of Appeal).

Appellant in his confessional statement, admitted without objection, as Exhibit D, said:
“I was on my way. I saw one small girl, age about five (5) years. I called her into corn farm and removed my trouser and brought out my penis and inserted it on the girl virgina (sic) but only the head entered due to the age of the girl till I released semen, while I was tying my trouser two men came and arrested me…” (Pages 63-64 of the records)

One of the men who emerged, rather too late, to rescue the little girl was the PW1, Abubakar Abdu, 50 years old. He said:
“I ran into the farm… I found the accused under tree; he was tying his trouser and my niece (PW3) was by his side, crying; when I hold (sic) the hand of the accused, I then asked him what was he doing with the victim, whether he went to cut off her head. The accused then told me that he wanted to have sexual intercourse with the victim…” (Page 10 of the Records)

The little girl was subjected to medical examination, which produced Exhibit F (medical report). The medical personnel, a registered nurse, told the Court (as PW5):
“During my examination, I find out that the hymen was broken and the virgina (sic) was reddish and this indicated that there was pressure around the hyperemia of the virgina (sic) …”
Under cross-examination, PW5 said:
“But by my examination on the victim showed that the pressure that led to the breakage of the hymen happened within a short time, that the victim was brought to the hospital. I don’t know whether it was the accused person that caused the pressure or not. I just examined her based on what she told me…” (See pages 20 and 21 of the Records of Appeal).

With such overwhelming evidence on the sexual assault on and rape of the little girl (PW3) by Appellant, I think the trial Court was properly guided when she held that Appellant was guilty of the offence, that:
“On the 2nd, 3rd and 4th ingredients, the evidence of PW3 is to the effect that the accused pulled her and then had sexual intercourse with her, that she went to a tree and started crying because the accused said he will cut her neck… Her evidence, which I believed and accepted was never, challenged or discredited under cross-examination, (sic) by pulling her and threatening to cut her neck cannot be said to be willingly or with her consent and she has (sic) 5 years of age, she cannot be married to the accused nor give her consent.
On the last ingredient and one of the most important ingredient, penetration, the accused in his confessional statement has stated that, he removed his trouser and inserted his penis into her virgina (sic) but only the head of his penis entered.
In the case of Posu Vs State (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt 546) 501 CA, the Court of Appeal held that sexual intercourse is deemed complete upon proof of penetration of penis into the virgina (sic). Even the slightest penetration will be sufficient to constitute the act of sexual intercourse…” (See pages 78-79 of the Records of Appeal). Appellant’s Counsel had struggled to use the Exhibits B and C, which he succeeded to bring into the case, by way of cross-examination of PW4 (IPO), to create conflict in the evidence of the little girl (PW3), when Counsel claimed that the nominal complaint the girl made to the police was a contradiction of her evidence in Court. Counsel had argued that the girl made the Exhibits B and C, and that in them (Exhibits), she did not say she was raped or had sexual intercourse with Appellant. But the PW3 had said, under cross-examination:
“I did not make any statement to the police.” (Page 13 of the Records)

The evidence shows that the Appellant was arrested by PW1 and taken to the Ward Head, who directed that the case be reported to the police. See pages 8 and 9 of the records of Appeal where PW1 said:
“I saw some children who met me crying, they told me that somebody kidnapped my niece in the name of Hauwa, I was told by the children that Hauwa was taken into a farm by the accused. I ran into the farm; I had a hoe in my hand and I found the accused under tree, he was tying his trouser and my niece was by his side…
Our Village head asked that we be taking (sic) to Sabon Gari Police Station at Doguwa Local Government Area… It true that we were taken to the police station from the village Head. Yes, I made statement at the police station…”

That statement by PW1 was tendered as Exhibit A, under his cross-examination. (Page 10 of the Records).

The PW2 (father of PW3) was also in the company that reported the matter to the police. (Page 11 of the Records). And so, it would not be correct to think and say that the little girl (5-year-old victim of this attack) was the one that lodged complaint with the police and made nominal report to the police. I have also looked at the Exhibits B and C, in the records, and none of them suggests that PW3 made such statements and/or signed any of them. Even then, the contents of the Exhibits B and C do not, in my view, contradict the oral evidence of the PW3, with regards to her evidence that a man (Appellant) dragged her into the bush (guinea corn farm) on 5/11/2016, and that one Abubakar (PW1) came to meet them in the farm and rescued her from the man! The handwriting in Exhibit B is different from that of Exhibit C (see pages 59 to 62 of the Records of Appeal), and none of them was by the PW3!

I think the trial Court was right to have ignored the Exhibits B and C, the same having been disowned by PW3, and incapable of supplanting the sworn evidence of PW3, adduced in Court and corroborated by other pieces of evidence, including the confessional statement of Appellant (Exhibit D).

I am surprised that Appellant’s Counsel had put so much energy and argument to disown Appellant’s confessional statement (Exhibit D), which he voluntarily made, admitting assaulting the little 5-year-old girl, and giving detail of how he had sexual intercourse with the minor, putting his penis in her vagina and releasing sperm (semen)! The medical report had affirmed that the hymen of the little child was broken, possibly due to pressure of inserting the head of his penis in the vagina of the little girl. Appellant himself said:
“I called her in to corn farm and removed my trouser and brought out my penis and inserted it on the girl virgina (sic), but only the head entered due to the age of the girl, till I release semen…” Appellant did not contest the voluntariness of that confessional statement, as he admitted signing the same. Appellant’s Counsel cannot, on appeal, oppose the use of the confessional statement (Exhibit D) by the trial Court, to base the conviction of Appellant, when the document did not pose any issue at the trial, and Appellant had clearly admitted committing the offence.

By law, a confessional statement is enough to establish conviction, when the same is adjudged voluntarily made by the accused person. We have stated this several times, that confessional evidence is the best evidence, being one that the accused person admits the guilt by self-conviction. See the case of Kabiru Bala Vs The State (2022) LPELR – 56737 (CA), where we held:
“By law, a confessional statement is enough evidence, and, in fact the best evidence, to establish commission of offence, coming from the accused person, himself, where the confession is adjudged voluntarily made. See the case of Uhara Vs The State (2021) LPELR-55512 (CA): “We have held several times that a confessional statement alone is a conclusive and sufficient evidence to establish conviction, and, in fact, the best evidence of the commission of the offence, coming directly from the accused person himself, and closing every door of defence against him, except where the issue/defence of provocation can be invoked. See FRN Vs Iweka (2011) LPELR – 9350 SC, where it was held that confessional statement is the best evidence of proof of crime and can be accepted as satisfactory evidence, upon which alone the accused can be convicted. See also Ogoala Vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509 at 534.”
See also the case of Usman VS The State (2022) LPELR – 56762 (CA) where we held:
“In this case, Appellant had however made a confessional statement admitting the commission of the offence and the confessional statement (Exhibits A1 and A2) was admitted without any objection. See the case of Ichita & Anor Vs Ichita (2017) LPELR – 42074 (CA), on the effect of such admission where this Court held: “Can Appellants therefore, raise appeal against the admission of those documents, which they never challenged their admissibility at the Court below? I think not. See the case of John & Anor Vs The State (2011) LPELR – 8152 (SC): “The contention that Exhibit 3 was inadmissible because it was not tendered by the maker is in the circumstance of no moment. Besides, when the said Exhibit 3 was about to be tendered, there was no objection by the learned Counsel for the defence… Having not objected to the admissibility of the confessional statement (Exhibit 3), this omission translates to the fact that the 1st Appellant was comfortable with the admission and saw no reason to challenge its admissibility. In a situation like this, the Court is at liberty to ascribe probative value to the document as succinctly put in the case of Alade Vs Olukade (1976) 2 SC 183…” In the case of Ajibade Vs State (2012) LPELR – 15531 (SC), the Supreme Court held: “Where a confessional statement is therefore admitted without any objection, the irresistible inference is that same was voluntary and a Court can rightly convict on the basis of the admission contained therein.” Per Ogunbiyi JSC.

I agree with the trial Court, that the prosecution had established the commission of the offence of rape of the little girl (PW3) to earn the conviction, and I think Appellant should be grateful to the Respondent for not cross-appealing against the sentence, which some jurisdictions stipulates a life jail for, especially in this situation that a helpless minor is the victim of the sexual attack. See the recent case of this Court in Mato Vs The State (2022) LPELR – 56759 (CA) where we held:
“By the provision of Penal Code (Miscellaneous Amendment) Law, No. 9 of 2014, Section 283 of the Penal Code Law was deleted, and replaced with the following provision: “Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the contrary, but subject to Section 285B, whoever commits rape shall be punished for life or for a term of not less than ten years and, where the rape committed falls under paragraph (e) of Section 282(1), shall be punished with imprisonment for life.” Of course, Section 282(1), (e) of the Penal Code is to the effect that: “A man is said to commit rape when, save in the case referred to in Subsection (2), has sexual intercourse with a woman in any of the following circumstances… (e) with or without her consent, when she is under fourteen years of age or of unsound mind.” Counsel had submitted that, Appellant having been convicted for raping the 10 year old girl, the trial Court had no discretion to exercise in the matter and should have imposed the life jail prescribed by the law on the Appellant. He relied on the case of Muazu Vs State (supra) and Lawrence Vs FRN (2018) LPELR – 44510 CA. I see merit in this cross-appeal, even as the Cross-Respondent’s Counsel, conceded. The trial Court had no room to exercise any discretion in the circumstance, other than impose the mandatory sentence, stated by the law – Penal Code (Miscellaneous Amendment) Law, No. 9 of 2014, which gives life imprisonment for one who rapes or has carnal knowledge of a girl below 14 years of age or of unsound mind. See the case of Lucky Vs State (2016) LPELR – 40541 (SC), where it was held: “Once the Court convicts an accused person for offence of rape, as defined in Section 357 of the Code, it has no discretion but is bound to obey the law by imposing a term of imprisonment, for life.”

I cannot understand what these sex predators see or seek in frail, fragile bodies of little girls, to subject them to all the stress, hazard, mental, emotional and physical tortures, which leave behind wounds and scars in the victims, destroying their self-worth and pride as girls.

In the recent case of Mato Vs The State (supra), I had course to scream as follows:
“In this case at hand, the victim is a 10 year old girl, an unfortunate child on the street, hawking food to earn a living (or sent out to hawk) at such tender age. By law, she cannot even give consent to engage in sexual activities, being under the age of 14 and so was incapable of consenting to any act of sexual intercourse, with anyone. See Section 282 of the Penal Code. In the case of Natsaha Vs State (2017) LPELR – 42359 (SC), the Supreme Court held: “It is important to note that under the Penal Code, a child who is under the age of 14 years is incapable of giving consent. See Section 37(c) and 282 (1) (e) of the Code. See also Shuaibu Isa Vs Kano State (2016) LPELR-40011 SC. Therefore, once it is proved that the accused person had sexual intercourse or unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of 14 years, he is guilty of rape.” Per Kereke-Ekun, JSC.

Also in the case of Ibrahim Yusuf Vs The Sate (2022) LPELR – 56760 (CA) delivered on 28/1/2022, I said:
“I think what the Appellant did to these little children of 4 to 6 years old in the video centre, violating them and leaving them with such cruel and bruised psyche, which tends to see a wicked monster of a male gender, should jolt every sane mind.”

I see no merit in this appeal and so dismiss it and confirm the judgment of the lower Court.

BOLOUKUROMO MOSES UGO, J.C.A.: I read in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, ITA MBABA, J.C.A. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and conclusion. I have nothing useful to add; I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial High Court of Kano State.

ABUBAKAR MU’AZU LAMIDO, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment delivered by my learned brother, ITA G. MBABA, JCA, and I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached that this appeal is without any merit. I too dismiss the appeal and abide by all the consequential orders as contained in the lead judgment.