ZAKARI v. JIBRIN & ORS (2022)

ZAKARI v. JIBRIN & ORS

(2022)LCN/16655(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, March 04, 2022

CA/A/253/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal

Hamma Akawu Barka Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

MR. EMMANUEL ZAKARI APPELANT(S)

And

1. MALLAM JIBRIN 2. BWARI AREA COUNCIL 3. YAHAYA KABIRU 4. OMOTOSHO BABALOLA 5. ETHEBET MOUKA RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT IT IS SUFFICIENT FOR AN APPELLANT TO ALLEGE THAT A TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE PLACED BEFORE IT

It has been numerously without number been held, that it is not sufficient for an appellant to allege that the trial Court failed to evaluate properly the evidence before it, but must go further to pinpoint the error he complains about, by alluding to the area improperly evaluated, and in addition convince the appellate Court that if the error complained about is corrected, the decision of the Court of trial would not stand. Oluyede vs. Access bank Plc (2015) 17NWLR (pt. 1489) 596, Enang vs. Adu (1981) 11-12 SC 25, Okonkwo vs. Onovo (1999) 4 NWLR (pt. 597) 110, Chukwu vs. Nitel (1996) 2 NWLR (pt. 430) 290. PER BARKA, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW WHERE A PERSON PLEADS AND TRACES HIS ROOT OF TITLE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON OR FAMILY TO SUCCEED IN A LAND DISPUTE

The apex Court contending upon a similar issue, and thus putting the issue to rest, stated in the celebrated case of Nwadiogbu & Ors vs. NNadioze & Ors (2001) LPELR- 2088, Per Iguh JSC thus:
“Once, in a land dispute, a party pleads and traces the root of his title to a particular person or family, that party, to succeed, must establish how that person or family derived his or its title to such land. In other words, that party must not only plead and establish his title to the land; he must also plead and prove the title of the person from whom he derived his alleged ownership of the land in dispute pursuant to the maxim, NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET, meaning that no one can give that which he does not have. It is only if the person from whom he derived his title has a valid title to such land that he may lawfully pass on such title to anyone else. If the title of his vendor or grantor is defective and non-existent, then obviously, he will have no valid title to pass to anybody. See Sanyaolu vs Coker (1983) 1 SC. 168; Ugo vs Obiekwe (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 566, Okafor Egbuche vs Chief Idigo (1934) 11 NLR 140 etc. The position will of course be different where the defendant has conceded ownership of the land by the plaintiff’s grantor. In such a case the plaintiff needs only establish his title and exclusive possession to such land. See Ngene vs Chike Igbo and Anor. (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 651) 131, Mogaji and Ors vs Cadbury (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 7) 393 etc. “PER BARKA, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW WHERE A PLAINTIFF CLAIMS DECLARATION OF TITLE TO A PIECE OF LAND, AND THE DEFENDANT COUNTER-CLAIMS FOR TITLE TO THE SAME PIECE OF LAND

The established position of the law is that where a plaintiff claims declaration of title to a piece of land, and the defendant counter-claims for title to the same piece of land, the plaintiff has a duty establishing his title to the stated piece or plot of land, and thereafter the burden shifts to the counter-claimant or defendant to show the contrary, but where the defendant discredits the evidence of the plaintiff with oral or and documentary evidence, the claim of the plaintiff for declaration will be dismissed. See Mary Akpang (nee Abejeshi) vs. Mr. David Amiye & Ors (2015) LPELR – 25842 (CA), Rabiu vs. Adebajo (2012) 50 NSCQR 475 AT 507. PER BARKA, J.C.A.

HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The instant appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, holden at Nyanya, Abuja in suit with number FCT/HC/CV/299/15, between Mr. Emmanuel Zakari and Mallam Jibrin and four others, delivered on the 13th of December, 2018. By the said judgment, the claim instituted by the claimant now appellant was dismissed, the lower Court having held that:
From my consideration above, it is clear that the claimant has failed to prove his case on the preponderance evidence. There is no document to support his claim of owning the said Plot 389 Dutse Alhaji layout Abuja. The claims are hereby dismissed.

In brief, the plaintiff, herein after referred to as appellant caused a writ of summons to issue against three defendants on the 20th of March, 2017. By the amended statement of claim, issued with the leave of Court, appellant claimed against the respondents as follows:
1. A Declaration that the Plaintiff is the beneficial owner of Plot 389, of about 1200m Dutse Alhaji Layout, Abuja vide a Right of Occupancy dated the 28th day of February, 2000 and a Certificate of Occupancy dated 16th day of January 2003.
2. A Declaration that the Plaintiff’s title Plot 389 is valid and subsisting.
3. A declaration that the actions of the 1st & 3rd defendants in this suit amount to trespass against the plaintiff’s constitutional rights to the ownership and use of Plot 389.
4. A ORDER directing the 1st & 3rd Defendants, their agents, privies officers and any person, howsoever described, deriving title, instruction and authority from them to yield up vacant possession of the said property known as Plot 389, Dutse Alhaji Layout, Abuja to the Plaintiff, forthwith.
5. An ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents privies, officers and any person, however described, deriving title, instruction and authority from them from entering, trespassing or continuing to trespass and interfering with or in any way disturbing the Plaintiff’s quite possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the said Plot 389, Dutse Alhaji Layout, Abuja.
6. The sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira only) against the 1st and 3rd Defendants as general damages for trespassing into the plaintiff’s property and depriving him of his fundamental rights to acquire, own of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (As Amended).
7. The cost of this suit.

The 1st – 4th defendants filed a statement of defense, and also counter-claimed as follows:
i. A DECLARATION that the purported change of ownership of conveyance of provisional approval of Plot No. 389 of about 1200 meters square at Dutse Alhaji Abuja to Abdulkadir Abubakar dated the 19th August, 1998 and subsequent further change of ownership of same to the plaintiff-defendant to the counter’s name dated 28th February, 2000 without prior valid revocation of the 6th defendant counter-claimant’s allocation of the said plot via conveyance of provisional approval dated 16/6/1995 is null and void and of no effect.
ii. A DECLARATION that the purported Certificate of Occupancy (Customary) No: FCT/BZTP/LA/KG/2000/979 purportedly issued in favour of the defendant to the counter-claim by Bwari Area Council in respect of Plot No. 389 of about 1200 meters square at Dutse Alhaji Abuja through the office of Rural Land Adjudication Committee of Bwari Area council dated 16th January, 2003 signed by the Chairman Bwari Area Council who have no power to sign same is null and void and of no effect conveys no rights whatsoever on the defendant to counter-claim in respect of the said land.
iii. A DECLARATION that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th counter-claimants’ joint and several possession, occupation, development, management and control of Plot No. 389 of about 1200 meters square at Dutse Alhaji Abuja since 1995 is to the exclusion of defendants to counter-claim who have no better title or claim in respect of the said land from the appropriate authority.
iv. A DECLARATION that the 3rd defendant who is 2nd counter-claimant, that is YAHAYA YAKUBU who has taken over the process of regularization by the Hon. Minister of Federal Capital Territory of the allocation of Plot 389 of about 1200 meters square of Dutse Alhaji Abuja erstwhile done since 1995 by Bwari Area Council, having paid the mandatory sum of N100,00 for the purpose under the Hon Minister of Federal Capital Territory’s Accelerated Area Council and Sectional Title Re-Issuance Scheme (AACTRIS) is the one entitled to the Statutory Right of Occupancy to the exclusion of the defendants to the counter-claim.

v. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants to the counter-claim from disturbing the 3rd defendant/2nd counter-claimant’s (YAHAYA YAKUBU’s) possession and occupation of Plot No. 389 of about 1200 meters square at Dutse Alhaji Abuja or in any way take any step to disturb, impede or clog the processes regularization of Right of Occupancy in favour of the 3rd defendants/2d counter-claimant (YAHAYA YAKUBU) in any office or department of the office of the Hon. Minister of Federal Capital Territory.

vi. The cost of this action in the sum of N10,000,000.

The appellant’s case is that in the year 2000, he purchased a plot of land known as plot No. 389 measuring 1200 meters at Dutse Alhaji layout from one Abdulkadir Abubakar. That he applied for a change of ownership to his name which was effected by the 2nd respondent after the payment of fees, and a letter of allocation issued to him. He also stated that a certificate of occupancy issued in his name was given to him, whereof he commenced the molding of blocks on the site and also planted some crops thereon. That much to his surprise, sometimes in the year 2013, he noticed illegal activities on the said plot of land by the 1st and 3rd defendants, wherefore he reported to the Kubwa Division of the Police Force. That yet again in the year 2016 when he visited the plot of land, he discovered that the 1st and 3rd respondents had erected a building thereon, which prompted him to institute the claim before the lower Court.

The plaintiff/appellant testified and in the process tendered five exhibits marked as Exhibit 1 5 respectively and called a witness in proof of his case, while the 3rd defendant gave evidence for the defense and tendered some exhibits titled as Exhibits D1 – D8. At the close of trial, written addresses were ordered filed and adopted. The vexed judgment was delivered on the 13th day of December, 2018 dismissing the claimants claim as aforestated.

Dissatisfied with the judgment, wherefore his claim was dismissed, appellant on the 11th of February, 2019 filed a notice of appeal predicated on four grounds. The appeal having been entered on the 28th day of March, 2019, parties proceeded to file in their briefs. The appellant filed a brief on the 6th of May, 2019 and also a reply brief on the 20th of November, 2020 deemed properly filed on the 18th of October, 2021. The 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents filed a joint brief on the 11th of November, 2020 deemed properly filed on the 18th of October, 2021. Worthy of note is that the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents on the 11th of November, 2020, but deemed properly filed on the 18th of October, 2021 filed a notice of their intention to contend that the judgment of the trial Court be varied, so that judgment is entered for the counterclaimant as per the counterclaim. On the 9th day of February, 2022, being the date scheduled for the hearing of the appeal, appellant and the learned counsel for the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents identified the processes filed adopted the processes as their submission in the appeal and urged the Court to grant their respective prayers. Respondent counsel also prayed the Court to vary the decision of the lower Court in line with their notice of contention.

The 2nd respondent thou served all the process of Court as well as hearing notice for the hearing of the appeal, did not attend Court, nor did he file any process.

In the brief settled by A.E. Sani for the appellants, and particularly at page 4 of the brief, the following issues were identified for the resolution of the appeal as follows:
i. Whether the Honourable Court was right to have dismissed the claims of the plaintiff/appellant vis a vis the oral and documentary evidence before the Court, particularly the testimonies of PW2, a subpoenaed witness from the office of the Director of Survey and Mapping of the Federal Capital Development Authority.
ii. Whether the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants/appellants placed any material evidence before the Honourable Court to be entitled to an order of non-suiting their counter-claim.

Mr. Ademola Oyedokun who also settled the brief for the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents, formulated the following issues for the resolution of the appeal thus:
i. Whether based on the evidence of PW1 and PW2 and the application statutory and judicial authorities, the appellant is entitled to judgment as per his writ of summons.
ii. Whether order of non-suiting is appropriate in the circumstances when the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondent’s prayer before the Court is not seeking outright declaration of title.
The appeal will therefore be considered based on the issues suggested by the appellant’s counsel. The reason for doing that being that he is the complainant in the appeal.

Issue One
Whether the Honourable Court was right to have dismissed the claims of the plaintiff/appellant vis a vis the oral and documentary evidence before the Court, particularly the testimonies of PW2, a subpoenaed witness from the office of the Director of Survey and Mapping of the Federal Capital Development Authority.

Learned counsel for the appellant started by contending that the judgment or decision of a Court must be based on the pleadings and evidence of the parties before it, citing Ojogbue vs. Nnubia (1972) 1 ALL NLR (pt. 2) 226 and complained that the trial judge failed to consider the pleadings and the evidence of the parties before arriving at the decision to dismiss the appellant’s case. Citing and relying on Omotosho vs. Saka (2015) ALL FWLR (pt. 782) 1686 AT 1702, counsel states that a party claiming declaration of title to a statutory or customary right of occupancy need not plead and prove any more than one of the five methods by which title to land may be proved.

He referred to his testimony as the PW1, and the exhibits tendered, as well as the evidence of the PW2 Mohammed Jimoh Adam, and argued that the Court while evaluating the evidence before it at pages 202 – 204, held that exhibits 2 and D2 had no basis, contending that having pleaded that exhibit 2 was issued to him by the 2nd defendant, and the original certificate of occupancy given to him by Abubakar Abdulkadir, but cancelled by the 2nd defendant, who proceeded to issue Exhibit 1, submitted that Exhibit 1, being the certificate of occupancy issued by the 2nd respondent herein raises a rebuttable presumption of the plaintiffs claim to the disputed plot of land which can only be extinguished by showing a better title, and cited the cases of Olusanya vs. Osibamowo (2012) ALL FWLR (pt. 650) 1375, and Otukpo vs. John (2013) ALL FWLR (pt. 661) 1509 AT 1527 in that regard.

Submitting further, counsel argued that plaintiff also led oral and documentary evidence showing that Exhibits 1 and 2 were duly issued by the 2nd respondent, supported by Exhibit 4, the search report, and contended that when documentary evidence supports oral evidence, then the oral evidence becomes more credible and cited for support the cases of Kimdey & Ors vs. Mil. Gov. of Gongola State & Ors (1988) LPELR – 1692, and Eze vs. The State (2018) LPELR – 43715 (SC). He contended that the findings of the lower Court is perverse having held that PW2 did not tender any report to support his assertion, nor was the policy file or intelligence sheet tendered in evidence, and based his decision on that regard. Quoting extensively from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Otukpo vs. John (supra), counsel complained that the trial Court failed to meet the requirements set out in the case cited, maintaining that plaintiff led credible evidence at the trial Court to be entitled to judgment, and therefore urged the Court to resolve the issue in favor of the appellant.

With regards to the second issue, whether the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents placed any material evidence before the honourable Court to be entitled to an order non-suiting their counterclaim, counsel argued that the trial Court was wrong to have non suited the respondents/counter-claimants having held in the same judgment that the defendants failed to prove their counter-claim. He argued that the law requires that a counterclaimant prove his counterclaim on the balance of probability being a separate, independent and distinct action as held in Kwajaffa & Ors vs. Bank of the North Ltd (1998) LPELR – 6371 (CA), also contending that the counter-claimants failed to adduce such evidence. Alluding to portions in the judgment of the trial Court, counsel wondered if the trial Court was not biased in his decision allowing the defendants/counter-claimant to have a second bite by that decision. He leveraged on the case of Oketola vs. AG Rivers State (2015) ALL FWLR (pt. 804) 2117 AT 2162 on the conditions necessary for the making of an order of non-suit, maintaining that the lower Court was biased in making the said order which enables the respondents to repair their case, and thereby urged the Court to also resolve this issue in favour of the appellants, and to conclusively allow the appeal and dismiss the judgment of the lower Court on that score.

The response of the learned counsel for the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents under the two issues distilled, which for all purposes are similar to those issues formulated by the learned counsel for the appellant from paragraphs 3.0 – 5.0 of their unpaginated brief, called upon the Court to dismiss the appeal, and to vary the judgment of the lower Court calling for address with respect to the counter-claim, pursuant to the notice of contention filed.

With regards to the first issue, whether based on the evidence of the PW1 and PW2, and applying statutory and judicial authorities appellant is entitled to judgment, learned counsel argued that appellant is not entitled to judgment and his appeal before the Court ought not to be allowed. Placing reliance on the case of Nwadiogbu vs. Nnadozie (2001) 12 NWLR (pt. 727) 315, counsel posited that a party seeking a declaration of title to land must be able to trace his title, which appellant failed to do before the lower Court. He also argued that by the authority of Madu vs. Madu (2008) 2-3 SC (pt. II) 109 @ 138-139, the ownership of land within the Federal Capital Territory is vested in the Minister of the Territory, and no question of either urban or rural land which a local government can administer. That notwithstanding, counsel argued that appellant not being the first allotee, and being unable to trace his root of title is not entitled to a certificate of occupancy from the 2nd respondent. He submits also that the evidence of the PW2 does not prove title of the land to the appellant, as all he did was to give evidence of charting which is not a document of title. He urged the Court from the foregoing to resolve the issue against the appellant.

With regards to the second issue, counsel argued that the lower Court did not enter any order of non-suit on the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents counter-claim which forms the basis of the appellant’s complaint under ground four of the grounds of appeal. He alluded to the interlocutory order by the lower Court at pages 204 – 205 of the record, inviting the parties to make submissions on the propriety or otherwise of making an order of non-suit of the counterclaim. Counsel is of the view, that what the Court did does not form the ratio of its decision but rather an orbiter. He emphasized that the 2nd respondent herein had no authority to grant title to any party, and that in pursuance thereof, the Minister of the FCT, had asked all those with defective titles to come forward for regularization which the respondents did. He urged the Court to therefore discountenance the order calling for addresses and to grant their counter-claim.

By way of a reply on points of law, the learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that the act of the 2nd respondent herein, when he changed the name of the appellant’s vendor to his name and issued thereafter a certificate of occupancy raises the presumption of regularity of the appellant’s documents, and called in aid the case of Shitta- Bey vs. AG Federation & Ors (1998) LPELR- 3055 (SC). On exhibit 1, issued by the council chairman, it was contended that by the year 2005, such was practicable, and the appellant had taken steps by Exhibit 5 to re-certify it as directed by the Minister of the FCT. Furthermore, counsel argued that Exhibit 1, was issued by the council chairman in the year 2003, while the Minister of the FCT assumed his responsibility of allocating lands in the year 2005, directing that all allocations made by area councils be regularized, hence Exhibits 5 and D5 at pages 201 – 202. He argued also that a law does not operate retrospectively to invalidate a valid action before its operation as stated in Unilorin vs. Adeniran (2007) 6 NWLR (pt. 1031) 498 AT 541, further submitting that the appellant’s right was never affected by the decision in Madu vs. Madu (supra), having submitted the document for re-certification and adjudged by Exhibit 4 to be authentic.

With respect to issue two, counsel faults the argument made on behalf of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents as misconceived, the respondents having made a claim founded on possession, control, occupation and development. He placed reliance on the decision of Carrena & Ors vs. Arowolo & Ors (2008) LPELR- 833 (SC), which held that a person who has title over a piece of land, though not in defector physical possession is deemed in the eyes of the law to be the person in possession. He urged the Court to discountenance the prayers of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents, seeking for the verification of the judgment, as Exhibit 5 also showed that appellant complied with the process of re-certification having submitted his documents to the requisite authority on the 2nd day of July, 2007 long before the respondents submitted theirs. Finally, appellant prayed the Court to discountenance the submissions of the learned counsel for the 1st, 3rd 4th, and 5th respondents, and to uphold the appellants appeal.

In an effort at resolving this appeal, I have carefully studied the record of proceedings, and the grounds of appeal lodged therein. I have equally studied the submissions of learned counsel on the issues agitated upon, and my humble but firm view is that the substance of this appeal turns on whether appellant, as plaintiff before the lower Court adduced compelling, tangible and satisfactory evidence warranting the lower Court to enter judgment in its favor. And besides that, whether the counter-claim by the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondent was rightly non-suited and if not whether the notice of contention filed by them can be favorably considered.

The learned counsel for the appellant did complain that the lower Court failed to properly evaluate the evidence adduced by the plaintiff before him, the consequence of which the Court rendered a decision which is perverse. In that case, I cannot but agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that a solid judgment of a Court, must demonstrate in full a dispassionate consideration of all the issues properly raised and argued, and further that it must be shown that all the issues that arose for resolution were so resolved with a verdict flowing from the facts pleaded and found proved. The cases of Obulor vs. Oboro (2001) 8NWLR (pt. 714) 25, Ojogbue vs. Nnubia(1972) 1 ALL NLR (pt. 2) 226 and Ogunyade vs. Oshunkeye (2007) 7 SC (pt. 11) 60 are most apposite in that regard.

Thus in evaluating any piece of evidence placed before a trial Court, the Court has a duty to consider the totality of the evidence led, placing same on an imaginary scale of justice with the sole intention of seeing which of the two sides weighs more. The evaluation of evidence must also entail giving or ascribing value or quality to the evidence adduced. Mogaji vs. Odofin (1978) 4SC 91, Eyiboh vs. Abia (2012) 16NWLR (pt. …) 51, Multichoice (Nig.) Ltd vs. MCSN Ltd/GTE (2020) 13 NWLR (pt. 1742) 415 AT 541.

It is only where the appellate Court arrives at the conclusion that the evaluation by the trial Court was defective, that the Court is enabled by virtue of Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act 2004 to undertake the necessary evaluation with the view of arriving at a just conclusion. Bassil vs. Fajebe (2001) 11 NWLR (pt. 430) 290.

In the case at hand, appellant complained that the evidence generated by him in proof of his claim was not properly evaluated, particularly the weight of such evidence was denied Exhibit 2 and D2 as having no basis as well as the evidence adduced by the PW2, thus arriving at a perverse conclusion. He urged the Court to properly look into the evidence adduced by the appellant before the Court below, appraise same and to conclude that appellant had made out his claim before the lower Court. It is on record that appellant gave evidence and also tendered six exhibits namely:
i. Certificate of Occupancy No. FCT/BZTP/LA/KG/2000/979, marked as Exhibit 1, being the certificate issued to the appellant by the second respondent in respect of the disputed land.
ii. Conveyance of approval dated 28th of February, 2000, marked as Exhibit 2.
iii. A memory card Exhibit 3
iv. Some photographs of the property in dispute marked as Exhibit 3a, – 3f.
v. Search report Exhibit 4, and
vi. FCDA acknowledgement dated 2/7/7 as Exhibit 5.

Appellant also called PW2 who testified in respect of the cartography of the plot in contention. The lower Court evaluated and gave consideration to the pieces of evidence adduced by the appellant from pages 202 – 204 of the record, concluding that claimant failed to prove his case on the preponderance of evidence, being that there was no evidence to support the claim that he owns the disputed plot. The question which appellant would want answered is whether that conclusion by the trial Court emanated from a proper evaluation of the evidence led.

It is trite law that a plaintiff in an action for a declaration of title to land succeeds on the strength of his own case, and not on the weakness of the case of the adversary. See Oke vs. Eke (1982) LPELR – 2426 (SC). It becomes clear to me therefore that the onus to so prove his claim, lies on the plaintiff to establish by clear and acceptable evidence to his entitlement to the declaration sought, because it is from the totality of the evidence, oral and documentary that the trial Court evaluates to reach a decision one way or the other being that it is trite law that a declaration will only be made when the Court is satisfied as to the precise nature of the type of interest in respect of which the declaration is being sought and that there is sufficient evidence establishing the claim.

It is in consequence to the above state of the law, that I do agree with Mr. A.E. Sani, the learned counsel for the appellant that in civil trials, where the finding or non-finding of any material fact by the trial Court is being questioned, as in the instant case, the Court sitting on appeal considers the evidence led, whether the trial Court admitted/accepted the evidence or rejected the same upon the correct perception, whether the trial Court correctly approved the assessment of evidence before it and thereby placed the right probative value thereto, whether the Court employed the principle of the imaginary scale of justice, and thereby upon the preponderance of evidence appreciated which side the scale of justice preponderated. See Otukpo vs. John (supra) AT 1529 – 1530.

The record before the Court showed that appellant who testified and was recorded as PW1, did state that he bought the plot, the subject of the appeal from one Abubakar Abdulkadir, and in furtherance of which he was issued Exhibit 2, a right of occupancy, bearing the name of Abubakar Abdulkadir, superimposed on a cancelled earlier name. Evidently, Exhibit 2 was predicated upon in the issuance of Exhibit 1, a certificate of occupancy this time, bearing the name of the appellant, as well as the description of the disputed plot of land. Appellant as plaintiff went further put in evidence exhibit 4, a search report, which confirmed that plot No. 389, Dutse Alhaji Layout was charted in favor of Emmanuel Zakari, the appellant herein. Further to that, Exhibit 4, is to the effect that AGIS did confirm that the Certificate of Occupancy (C of O) with file No. KG-979, and registration No. BAC 48, page 48 vol. 19 bearing Emmanuel Zakari was traced on their record and confirmed authentic and duly processed. There is also the further evidence of PW2, Mohammed Jimoh Adam of the FCDA department of Mapping, Survey, and Cartographic section. His evidence is to the effect that Exhibits P4, and D3, based on the record, plot 389 in Dutse Alhaji Layout is carted in favor of KG 979 bearing Emmanuel Zakari, the appellant.

The trial Court obviously evaluated the evidence rendered by the parties more particularly that adduced by the plaintiff, and concluded that:
“It can be safely said that both Exhibit 2 and D2 have no basis. They are from the blues. In Alh. Amadu Kankia Bello & Ors vs. Alh. Ma’aruf Umar Sanda & Ors (2011) LPELR – 3705, it was held that “a party must not only plead and establish his title to land; he must also plead and prove the title of the person from whom he derived his alleged ownership of the land in dispute.”
The lower Court reasoned that:
“The question is on what basis the chairman Bwari Area Council issued Exhibit 1, the C of O. It is the pleading of the claimant that he bought the plot from one Abdulkadir Abubakar and changed ownership to his name. There is no sale agreement between him and Abdulkadir. Note that the plaintiff is not claiming direct allocation by the Bwari area council. If the plaintiff’s claim is on the fact that he purchased the plot from Abdulkadir there must be evidence of transaction. Curiously in the entire pleading, the plaintiff made no mention of the amount/consideration involved in the transaction between him and Abdulkadir.”
On Exhibit P4 and D3, the Court still proceeded to reason that:
“PW2 told the Court that from Exhibit P4 and D3 from their record plot 389 in Dutse Alhaji Abuji is charted in favor of KG 979 bearing Emmanuel Zakari and he refer to what he called intelligent sheet and policy file. Pw2 did not tender any report to support his assertion. Neither the policy file nor the intelligent sheet was tendered in evidence.”
Still on the issue, the Court below stated that:
“Learned counsel for the claimant further heavily relied on Exhibit P4 and the testimony of PW2 in his argument on the issue raised by this Court. He submitted that PW2 has confirmed that plot 389 Dutse Alhaji Layout was charted in favor of file No. KG 979 for the claimant. Learned counsel for the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants argued on the issue raised by the Court that Exh. P4 states that it is of triple allocation and the name of the applicant could not be traced because he could not produce his first allotees offer.
Under cross-examination, PW2 said that his department is not the office where allocations of lands are made and do not handle case of multiple allocations … From my consideration above, it is clear that the claimant has failed to prove his case on the preponderances evidence (sic).”

The attention of this Court has been drawn to the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of Ogunleye vs. Oni (1990) 2 NWLR (pt. 135) 745, Sanyaolu vs. Coker (1983) 1 SCNLR 168, Ugo vs. Obiekwe (1989) 1 NWLR (pt. 99) 566, Egbuche vs. Idigo (1934) 1 NLR 140, all to the effect that once a party pleads and traces the root of his title to a particular person or family, that party in order to succeed must establish how that person or family derived his or its title to such land. This is the extant established state of the law. Obaseki JSC, in the case of Ogunleye vs. Oni (supra), did not mince words, having stated that, even where a certificate of occupancy is granted to a party that in itself does not confer title, where that party the certificate is granted to had no title to the land. It only raises a presumption in favor of the holder.

From the holding of the trial Court, which I cited extensively, it is evident that appellant was not the person initially allotted the disputed plot of land, having stated that he bought same from one Abubakar Abdulkadir. The document which appellant stated was given to him was Exhibit 2, a document conveying provisional approval. It is also evident from the record that the grant of Exhibit 1 was consequent upon the said Exhibit 2. In his evidence before the lower Court, appellant admitted that he was not the original allotee, but that Exhibit 2 was changed to bear his name, further admitting that the certificate which bore the name of Abubakar Abdulkadir was changed to bear his name. Appellant on being asked the name of the 1st allotee of the disputed plot through whom his vendor Abubakar Abdulkadir must have gotten the title of the plot, answered that he does not him. With respect to the search report Exhibit P4, appellant though admitting that the search report came later after the grant of the Certificate of Occupancy Exhibit 1, admitted that his name could not be traced therein. Furthermore, appellant who stated that he does not know the accelerated area sectional title re-issuance scheme, also admitted to not paying the sums of N100,000.00 as it was not requested of him. Based on that fluid state of events, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that appellant having failed to trace the first allotee, who might have had title to the disputed plot, translates to the fact that claimants claim must fail and the trial Court right to have so declared. I think the learned counsel for the respondent has made a valid point. The apex Court contending upon a similar issue, and thus putting the issue to rest, stated in the celebrated case of Nwadiogbu & Ors vs. NNadioze & Ors (2001) LPELR- 2088, Per Iguh JSC thus:
“Once, in a land dispute, a party pleads and traces the root of his title to a particular person or family, that party, to succeed, must establish how that person or family derived his or its title to such land. In other words, that party must not only plead and establish his title to the land; he must also plead and prove the title of the person from whom he derived his alleged ownership of the land in dispute pursuant to the maxim, NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET, meaning that no one can give that which he does not have. It is only if the person from whom he derived his title has a valid title to such land that he may lawfully pass on such title to anyone else. If the title of his vendor or grantor is defective and non-existent, then obviously, he will have no valid title to pass to anybody. See Sanyaolu vs Coker (1983) 1 SC. 168; Ugo vs Obiekwe (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 566, Okafor Egbuche vs Chief Idigo (1934) 11 NLR 140 etc. The position will of course be different where the defendant has conceded ownership of the land by the plaintiff’s grantor. In such a case the plaintiff needs only establish his title and exclusive possession to such land. See Ngene vs Chike Igbo and Anor. (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 651) 131, Mogaji and Ors vs Cadbury (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 7) 393 etc.”

Buttressing his position further, learned counsel referred to the case of Madu vs. Madu (2008) 2-3 SC (pt. 11) 109 AT 138 – 139, where the Apex Court held thus:
“be it noted that it is well settled that the ownership of land comprised in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja is absolutely vested in the Federal Government of Nigeria vide Ona vs. Atenda (2000) 5 NWLR (pt. 656) 244 AT 267 paragraph c-d.
See also Section 297 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 and Section 1(3) of the Federal Capital Territory Act Cap 503, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 vests power in the Minister for FCT to grant statutory right of occupancy over lands situate in the Federal Capital Territory to any person. By this law ownership of land within the Federal Capital Territory vests in the Federal Government of Nigeria who through the Minister of the FCT vests same to every citizen individually upon application. Thus without the allocation or grant by the Hon. Minister of the FCT, there is no way any person including the respondent could acquire land in the FCT.”
Now argument could be made, that Exhibit 1, the certificate of occupancy granted to the appellant was a product of the Bwari Municipal Council, over a piece of land under its jurisdiction. Further argument could also be made that it was the norm prior to the regularization process embarked by the FCT, that individuals had gotten their certificates of occupancy from similar source (s). That could be so, but it should be noted that the FCT, is a special creation of the constitution, and therefore unlike any other state of the federation governed by Governors and laws made by their respective houses of Assembly, the FCT is under the strict supervision of the Federal Government represented by the Minister of the Capital Territory. The laws governing the territory are those laws made by the National Assembly in that regard, and therefore the entire land comprising the territory vested in the Federal Government. The Court in Ona vs. Atenda (2000) (supra) AT 266, clarified this position having held that:
“By virtue of Section 49(1) of the Land Use Act, nothing in the act shall affect any title to land whether developed or undeveloped held by the Federal Government or any agency of the Federal Government at the commencement of the Act. Accordingly, any such land shall continue to vest in the Federal Government or the agency concerned. The section saves the title to all lands whether developed or undeveloped held by the Federal Government at the commencement of the land use act and expressly provides that any such land shall continue to vest in the Federal Government by the provision there is no question of a customary right of occupancy arising in respect of lands vested in the Federal Government or any of its agencies as Federal lands are designated developed or undeveloped under the act and not urban or non-urban.”

Mr. Oyedekun then argued that from the intendment of the expression of the Court in Ona vs. Atenda (supra), the certificate of occupancy obtained from the 2nd respondent is invalid and cannot confer title. Even then, there is the contention that all lands previously held under the defective titles were called upon to be regularized by having resort to the Accelerated Area sectional Title Re-issuance Scheme under the Minister for the regularization of the defective title. The question arising would be, whether appellant did regularize Exhibit 1, granted to him by the 2nd respondent, in the absence of which, it cannot be said that he is possessed of a valid title to the plot under discussion? The answer to the question is obvious. At page 176 of the record, appellant on being cross-examined, stated that:
Oyedokun – You know that it is the Minister of FCT that issue Certificate that is why you submitted your document for recertification?
PW1 – When everybody was called upon to submit.
Oyedokun – Read paragraph 1 of Exhibit 4. Tell the Court if you are the applicant in this search report.
PW1 – Yes.
Oyedokun – The search report (exh. 4) came later than C of O.
PW1 – Yes.
Oyedokun – Do you know Accelerated Area Sectional Title Re- issuance scheme?
PW1 – I don’t know about it.
Oyedokun – That means you did not pay N100,000.00 to that office.
PW1 – There was never a request for me to pay to that office.

The short of the evidence just re-produced is that appellant did not subscribe to regularizing Exhibit 1 granted him by the 2nd respondent, and before then, appellant also under cross-examination testified as follows:
Oyedokun – In proof of your ownership, do you want to rely on Exhibit 1?
PW1 – Yes.
Oyedokun – Exhibit 1 is given based on Exhibit 2.
PW1 – Yes.
Oyedokun – Ex. 2 show that it was changed to your name; you are not the original allotees.
PW1 – Yes
Oyedokun – The certificate was changed from the name of one Abubakar Abdulkadir to your name.
PW1 – Yes.
Oyedokun – That of Abubakar was cancelled on its face before it was changed to your name.
PW1 – Yes.
Oyedokun – Where is the letter of allocation that was cancelled and changed to your name.
PW1 – It is.
Oyedokun – This Abubakar allocation it is indicated that it was a change of ownership.
PW1 – Yes it indicates.
Oyedokun – From whom was it changed from Abubakar.
PW1 – don’t know.
Oyedokun – What is the name of the 1st allotee
PW1 – I don’t know.

From all of the above, it can safely be deduced, that appellant and two others are being shown to have acquired the same plot of land, and while appellant bought from one Abubakar Abdulkadir, by virtue of Exhibit 2, there was no indication as stated by the lower Court from whom the said Abubakar Abdulkadir got the allocation, since he was not the first person to whom the plot was allocated to, neither did appellant exhibit before the lower Court that link between the said Abubakar his vendor and the original allotee of the plot of land. That being so, the contention by the appellant that Area Councils were issuing out land prior to the year 2003, cannot avail him in the absence of any evidence in respect of the first allotee. This by itself is fatal to the appellant’s claim, and the lower Court cannot be faulted having concluded that appellant’s claim was not proved. This unfortunate state of affairs must have dictated the fact that appellant’s name could not be seen on the records at the point of recertification. I am not unmindful that a document titled FCTA, regularization of land titles and documents of FCT Area Councils dated the 2nd day of July, 2007 submitted by one Abba Musa for which the Photocopy of a Certificate of Occupancy in respect of Plot with Number 389 for Emmanuel Zakari, and for which only the application form and two passport pictures were submitted. The clear import of the document however is that it does not validate nor authenticate the documents described therein which documents are subject to further verification. That not having been done, works against the claimant. Unfortunately, it never occurred to the appellant, having been dealing all this while with an agent, the need to have conducted a search in respect of the plot of land, with a view to discovering the validity of the root of title in respect of the plot before purchasing it. This obviously worked against him before the lower Court, which decision cannot be faulted and even though a Court has the power to examine and to critically appraise evidence led, whether oral or documentary, that duty must be restricted within the parties’ pleadings and the documents demonstrated in Court. Osokoya vs. Onigemo (2018) ALL FWLR (pt 942) 424 AT 458. I am unable to agree with the appellant that the lower Court failed to properly evaluate the evidence before it, and the law having been established that a trial Court which saw, heard and was in the best position to appreciate the credibility of the witnesses before it, is rarely interfered with, its findings cannot be lightly treated. I see no merit in the appeal and it is hereby dismissed by me.

My Lords allow me now to consider the respondents’ Notice of Intention, praying that the judgment of the lower Court be varied, with the ultimate intention of having judgment entered in its favor. The respondents, who were defendants as well as counter-claimants, had their counter-claim dismissed. It is the law that respondent as counter-claimant before the trial Court, the law places on him the burden of proving such counterclaim in the same way as is required of the claimant in the main claim. In an effort at proving the counter-claim, the counter-claimants called the 2nd counter-claimant, Yahaya Yakubu. He gave evidence in defense of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants, as well as in proof of the counter-claim before the lower Court and was recorded as DW1. His written deposition which he adopted can be seen at pages 100 – 107 of the record. He was duly cross-examination and re-examination as can be seen at pages 179 – 186, and the following documents were tendered in evidence through him.
i. Conveyance of approval letter dated 16/6/15
ii. Conveyance of approval letter dated 10/6/16.
iii. Search report dated 1/8/13

iv. Search receipt dated 21/7/12

v. Regularization acknowledgment letter dated 31/12/08
vi. Power of Attorney and deed of assignment both dated 9/12/13
vii. AACSTRISS Receipt dated 6/1/14.

My Lords, before I proceed with assessing the merit of the counter-claim, allow me to deviate and to consider one issue raised by the learned counsel for the respondent at this point. Learned counsel had posited that ground 4 in the appellants Notice of Appeal cannot properly support any issue derivable from it. He argued that appellants submissions from paragraphs 5.01 – 5.13 of the appellants brief which argued against an order of non suit made by the trial Court, was not a finding upon which a ground of appeal can be founded upon being an obiter dictum. I understand the complaint as being against a ground of appeal which ordinarily ought to have been attacked by way of motion brought on notice. That not having been done, can we say the respondent is late in the day raising the issue. To me, to say so would be giving technicality a golden handshake. The issue having been argued by both parties, it is my humble viewpoint that the Court should consider and rule on it one way or the other. It is true that a statement or comment made by the Court not necessarily meant for the determination of the issues between the parties cannot be the subject of an appeal. It is merely a statement made in passing and which does not reflect the reasoning upon which the case is decided. The law is settled that what is challenged in a ground of appeal is the ratio decidendi of the judgment. See Odunukwe vs. Ofomata (2010) LPELR – 2250 (SC), ATS & Sons vs. Ben Electronics co. Nig. Ltd (2019) ALL FWLR (pt 986) 567 AT 618:
“An obiter dictum is an expression of opinion made in the process of writing a judgment by a Court which is not necessary or relevant to the decision and as such cannot form part of the ratio decidendi of the judgment. It does not have the status of a ratio decidendi in a judgment of a Court. It does not decide the live issues in the matter. Put differently, an obiter dictum is a statement made in passing which does not reflect the ratio decidendi, that is the reasoning or ground upon which the case is decided. Obiter dictum is not binding on the Court for though they may have considerable weight are not rationes decidendi and is therefore not conclusive authority, and are not appealable. See Mobil Producing Nig, Unlimited vs. Johnson (2019) ALL FWLR (pt. 975) 811 AT 844. See also Okeke vs. Lawal (2019) ALL FWLR (pt. 993) 462 AT 481, Anyanwu vs. PDP (2020) 3NWLR (pt. 1710) 134 AT 176.”

Certainly, the trial Court at a stage toyed with the idea of inviting parties to address it on whether the counter-claimants should be non-suited, but might have changed its mind, having failed to order same, which amounted to no more than thinking aloud, as the parties were not invited to address it, nor was any such order of non-suit made against the counter-claimants. Mr. Oyedokun is therefore correct to have asserted that since the lower Court did not invite parties to address it on the issue, and furthermore since that order of non-suit was not made by the Court, all arguments canvassed on the issue by the learned counsel for the appellants starting from paragraphs 5.01 – 5.13 of the brief, leaning on ground four of the grounds of appeal is of no consequence and deserved to be discountenanced. I agree with the learned counsel and accordingly discountenance the same. Having settled that pestilence, I now proceed to consider the merit of the respondent’s contention, Mr. Oyedokun having prayed that this Court vary the judgment of the lower Court, and to be influenced by the evidence adduced by the counter-claimants and enter judgment for the respondents. Specifically counsel prays that the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents having regularized their irregular title over the same plot of land with the agency saddled to do so by the Minister of the FCT, through their Exhibit D8, the prayers earlier sought by the counterclaimants ought to be granted.

The established position of the law is that where a plaintiff claims declaration of title to a piece of land, and the defendant counter-claims for title to the same piece of land, the plaintiff has a duty establishing his title to the stated piece or plot of land, and thereafter the burden shifts to the counter-claimant or defendant to show the contrary, but where the defendant discredits the evidence of the plaintiff with oral or and documentary evidence, the claim of the plaintiff for declaration will be dismissed. See Mary Akpang (nee Abejeshi) vs. Mr. David Amiye & Ors (2015) LPELR – 25842 (CA), Rabiu vs. Adebajo (2012) 50 NSCQR 475 AT 507.

I have carefully and meticulously studied the record of proceedings and it appears evident to me, that appellant and the counter-claimant had no dispute on the identity of the plot of land in dispute, and equally trace their entitlement to the plot of land vide a letter of allocation from the Bwari Municipal Council. While the counter-claimant traces his own title to a grant made to the 5th defendant/respondent Etthebeth Mouka, vide a letter of conveyance of provisional Approval dated the 10th of June, 1995, later handed over to Babalola Omotosho in the year 1996, and thence to the 2nd counter-claimant, having stated amongst others that:
23. I know that 4th defendant Babalola Omotosho who took over possession from the 5th defendant Etthebet Mouka remained in unchallenged possession since 1996 and it is the same Babalola Omotosho who permitted one Kabiru Mohammed to continue farming on the said land since 1996.
24. I know that the plaintiff cannot trace his purported title to Plot No. 389 of about 1200 metres square at Dutse Alhaji Abuja but rather claims that there was purported change of ownership or conveyance of provisions, approval of the said plot of land in favor of one Abdulkadir Abubakar, dated the 19th August, 1998.
25. I know that the plaintiff who do not know the original first allotees from whom Abubakar Abdulkadir derived his title from claim to have subsequent change of ownership of same to the plaintiffs name via letter dated 28th February, 2000 without prior valid revocation of the 5th defendants allocation of the said plot via conveyance of provisional approval dated 16/6/1995.
26. I know that the original 1st allotees of plot No. 389 of about 1200 meters square at Dutse Alhaji Abuja by Bwari Area Council is the 5th defendant whose allocation was never revoked, the said 5th defendant never sold or consented to a change to any Abdulkadir Abubakar let alone giving Abdulkadir Abubakar permission or authority to sell or change to the plaintiff.

It is also part of the evidence adduced by the counter-claimants that pursuant to the regularization policy being pursued by the Minister of the FCT, counter-claimants proceeded to apply for and to have fulfilled all the conditions necessary for the re-issuance of title to the plot in dispute having paid all the requisite fees. Furthermore, the 2nd counter-claimant Yahaya Yakubu who bought the said plot of land from the 3rd counter-claimant, at the cost of seven million naira has given evidence of having been in constructive possession ever since, and in consequence of which, I have accorded due consideration to the evidence adduced by the counter-claimant, and my humble but firm view is that the justice of this case tilts or preponderates in favor of the counter-claimant. I say so because, even though the counter-claimants from their reliefs sought for the relief of title to the land, as rightly found by the lower, and thereby reaching the conclusion that counter-claimant did not prove their title to the land, evidence adduced pointed to the fact establishing their root of title, and being defective they now seek to regularize. In the event the counter-claimants are entitled to judgment which I enter as follows:
i. A DECLARATION that the purported change of ownership of conveyance of provisional approval of Plot No. 389 of about 1200 meters square at Dutse Alhaji Abuja to Abdulkadir Abubakar dated the 19th August, 1998 and subsequent further change of ownership of same to the plaintiff-defendant to the counter’s name dated 28th February, 2000 without prior valid revocation of the 6th defendant counter-claimant’s allocation of the said plot via conveyance of provisional approval dated 16/6/1995 is null and void and of no effect.
ii. A DECLARATION that the purported Certificate of Occupancy (Customary) No: FCT/BZTP/LA/KG/2000/979 purportedly issued in favour of the defendant to the counter-claim by Bwari Area Council in respect of Plot No 389 of about 1200 meters square at Dutse Alhaji Abuja through the office of Rural Land Adjudication Committee of Bwari Area council dated 16th January, 2003 signed by the Chairman Bwari Area Council who have no power to sign same is null and void and of no effect conveys no rights whatsoever on the defendant to counter-claim in respect of the said land.
iii. A DECLARATION that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th counter-claimants’ joint and several possession, occupation, development, management and control of Plot No. 389 of about 1200 meters square at Dutse Alhaji Abuja since 1995 is to the exclusion of defendants to counter-claim who have no better title or claim in respect of the said land from the appropriate authority.
iv. A DECLARATION that the 3rd defendant who is the 2nd counter-claimant, that is YAHAYA YAKUBU who has taken over the process of regularization by the Hon. Minister of Federal Capital Territory of the allocation of Plot 389 of about 1200 meters square of Dutse Alhaji Abuja erstwhile done since 1995 by Bwari Area Council, having paid the mandatory sum of N100,00 for the purpose under the Hon. Minister of Federal Capital Territory’s Accelerated Area Council and Sectional Title Re-Issuance Scheme (AACTRIS) is the one entitled to the Statutory Right of Occupancy to the exclusion of the defendants to the counter-claim.
v. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants to the counter-claim from disturbing the 3rd defendant/2nd counter-claimant’s (YAHAYA YAKUBU’s) possession and occupation of Plot No. 389 of about 1200 meters square at Dutse Alhaji Abuja or in any way take any step to disturb, impede or clog the processes regularization of Right of Occupancy in favour of the 3rd defendants/2nd counter-claimant (YAHAYA YAKUBU) in any office or department of the office of the Hon. Minister of Federal Capital Territory.
vi. The cost of this action in the sum of N500,000.00.

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.: I read in draft the Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Hamma Akawu Barka, JCA.

My learned brother has adequately dealt with all the issues raised in this appeal. I am in agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion which I adopt as mine that his appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.

I equally agree that the Respondent’s notice meets the justice of the case and must be allowed to grant the counter-claim of the Respondent. I accordingly abide by the consequential orders as made therein by learned brother in the lead judgment. I also abide by the order as to costs.

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in draft the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Hamma Akawu Barka, JCA. I agree with the indubitable conclusion that while the appeal is devoid of merit and ought to be dismissed, the Respondent’s Notice of Contention for the decision of the lower Court to be varied by an order entering judgment on the counter-claim is immensely meritorious. I however wish to say a few words on the gravamina of this appeal which deal with the evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value thereto.

The judge at nisi prius is a peculiar adjudicator. He is the one in the heat of the battle at the trial. He sees the faces of the witnesses, hears their testimony, feels the tension and observes the demeanour of the witnesses. It is therefore within the province of the trial judge who saw, heard and assessed the witnesses to evaluate and ascribe probative value to the evidence adduced. See ONI vs. JOHNSON (2015) LPELR (24545) 1 at 35-38. Where a trial Court unquestionably evaluates and justifiably appraises the facts, it is not the business of an appellate Court to substitute its own views for the views of the trial Court. The trial Court considers the evidence adduced, decides which evidence to prefer on the basis of how the evidence preponderates, and then makes logical and consequential findings of facts. See ADEYEYE vs. AJIBOYE (1987) 1 NWLR (PT 61) 432 at 451, STEPHEN vs. THE STATE (1986) 5 NWLR (PT 46) 978 at 1005 and UNITED MICROFINANCE BANK LTD EKPAN vs. ADJAKA (2015) LPELR (24541) 1 at 41-43.
The law is that the conclusions of the trial Court on the facts is presumed to be correct, so that presumption must be displaced by the person seeking to upset the judgment on the facts. See WILLIAMS vs. JOHNSON (1937) 2 WACA 253, BALOGUN vs. AGBOOLA (1974) 1 ALL NLR (PT. 2) 66, BAMGBOYE vs. OLAREWAJU (1991) 4 NWLR (PT 184) 132 at 156 and EHOLOR vs. OSAYANDE (1992) LPELR (8053) 1 at 43. Let me iterate that it is an established principle that an appellate Court will not substitute its own views with those of the trial Court, when as in the present case, the trial Court unquestionably evaluated the evidence and justifiably appraised the facts. See NGILLARI vs. NICON (1998) 8 NWLR (PT 560) 1 and AGBABIAKA vs. SAIBU (1998) 10 NWLR (PT 571) 534 or (1998) LPELR (222) 1 at 19-20. Where the findings of the Court have been judicially and judiciously arrived at flowing from the evidence before it, an appellate Court has no jurisdiction to interfere. See OWIE vs. IGHIWI (2005) 5 NWLR (PT. 917) 184 at 217-218. Having insightfully considered the Records of Appeal, I find that the evaluation of evidence and the findings made by the lower Court flows from the evidence on record and were definitely not perverse. Therefore, there is absolutely no basis on which an appellate Court can intervene. In the circumstances, this Court cannot interfere merely to substitute its own views for the views of the lower Court. See ADEBAYO vs. A-G OGUN STATE (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 412) 1193 at 1197 and 1211, SAGAY vs. SAJERE (2000) 4 SC (PT 1) 187 and ODIBA vs. MUEMUE (1999) 10 NWLR (PT 622) 174.

It is for this reason and the more detailed reasoning and conclusion contained in the lead judgment, which reasoning and conclusion I adopt as mine, that I agree, without any hesitation whatsoever, that this appeal is bereft of merit. Therefore, I equally dismiss the appeal. The decision of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja in SUIT NO. FCT/HC/CV/299/2015: MR. EMMANUEL ZAKARI vs. MALLAM JIBRIN & ORS delivered on 13th December, 2018 as varied in the lead judgment is hereby affirmed.