YAHAYA v. HALILU & ORS (2022)

YAHAYA v. HALILU & ORS

(2022)LCN/16629(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, February 11, 2022

CA/ABJ/CV/12/2022

Before Our Lordships:

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Danlami Zama Senchi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

DAHIRU ADAMU YAHAYA APPELANT(S)

And

1. ALHAJI USMAN HALILU 2. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC) 3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE PRINCIPLE GUIDING THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

THE DUTY OF THE COURT WHEN INTERPRETING A STATUTE

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By his Originating Summons dated and filed on the 6th day of June, 2021, the 1st Respondent as Claimant sought for the determination of the following questions:-
1. Whether in view of Section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and having regards to the provisions of Article 20 of the Constitution of the All Progressive Congress, the APC Guidelines for nomination of candidates for the Council Ward Election 2022-Direct Primaries relating to the conduct and result of the APC Primaries and the upholding and declaration at the venue of the election, it was lawful for the 1st Defendant to have forwarded the name of the 2nd Defendant to the 3rd Defendant as the 1st Defendant’s nominated Candidate in respect of the Jiwa Ward Council.
2. Whether in view of Section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and having regards to the provisions of Article 20 of the Constitution of the All Progressive Congress, the APC Guidelines for nomination of candidates for the Council Ward Election 2022-Direct Primaries relating to the conduct and result of the APC Primaries and the upholding and declaration at the venue of the election, it was lawful for the 1st Defendant to change the result of the primary election it conducted for Jiwa ward in which the Claimant emerged winner and was so declared by the election committee of the 1st Defendant.
3. Whether in view of Section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and having regards to the provisions of Article 20 of the Constitution of the All Progressive Congress, the APC Guidelines for nomination of candidates for the Council Ward Election 2022-Direct Primaries relating to the conduct and result of the APC Primaries and the upholding and declaration at the venue of the election, the 1st Defendant was not bound in law to forward the name of the Claimant to the 3rd Defendant as the 1st Defendant’s nominated candidate in respect of Jiwa Ward in the 2022 Council Election.
4. Whether in view of Section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and having regards to the provisions of Article 20 of the Constitution of the All Progressive Congress, the APC Guidelines for nomination of candidates for the Council Ward Election 2022-Direct Primaries relating to the conduct and result of the APC Primaries and the upholding and declaration at the venue of the election, the 3rd Defendant is not bound in law to remove the name of the 2nd Defendant as the nominated candidate of the 1st Defendant and replacing same with the name of the Claimant as the 1st Defendant’s nominated candidate in respect of the Jiwa Ward Council election in the 2022 Election.
5. Whether in view of Section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and having regards to the provisions of Article 20 of the Constitution of the All Progressive Congress, the APC Guidelines for nomination of candidates for the Council Ward Election 2022-Direct Primaries relating to the conduct and result of the APC Primaries and the upholding and declaration of the venue of the election, the forwarding of the name of 2nd Defendant by the 1st Defendant to the 3rd Defendant as the 1st Defendant’s nominated Candidate in respect of Jiwa Ward Council in the 2022 Election is not illegal, null and void.

In anticipation of favourable answers to the above questions, the 1st Respondent asked the lower Court for the following reliefs:-
“RELIEFS SOUGHT FROM THE COURT
1. A DECLARATION that upon the interpretation of Section 87(4)c of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Article 20 iii of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant, the 1st Defendant’s Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2022 Ward Council Election 2022- Direct Primaries, the Result of the 1st Defendant’s Primary Election – for the nomination of the Defendant’s candidate in respect of the Jiwa Ward Councillorship, it was unlawful for the 1st Defendant to have forwarded the name of the 2nd Defendant to the 3rd Defendant as the 1st Defendant’s nominated candidate in respect of the Jiwa Ward Council in the 2022 Council Election.
2. A DECLARATION that upon the interpretation of Section 87(4) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Article 20 iii of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant, the 1st Defendant’s Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2022 Ward Council Election 2022- Direct Primaries, the Result of the 1st Defendant’s Primary Election for the nomination of the 1st Defendant’s candidate in respect of the Jiwa Ward Councillorship, the 1st Defendant was bound in law to forward the name of the Claimant to the 3rd Defendant as the 1st Defendant’s nominated candidate in respect of the Jiwa Ward Council in the 2022 Council Election.
3. A DECLARATION that upon the interpretation of Section 87(4)c of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Article 20 iii of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant, the 1st Defendant’s Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2022 Ward Council Election 2022- Direct Primaries, the Result of the 1st Defendant’s Primary Election for the nomination of the 1st Defendant’s candidate in respect of the Jiwa Ward Councillorship, the 3rd Defendant is bound in law to remove the name of the 2nd Defendant as the nominated candidate of the 1st Defendant and replacing same with the name of the Claimant as the 1st Defendant’s nominated candidate in respect of the Jiwa Ward Council in the 2022 Council Election.
4. A DECLARATION that upon the interpretation of Section 87(4)c of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Article 20 iii of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant, the 1st Defendant’s Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2022 Council Election 2022-Direct Primaries, the Result of the 1st Defendant’s Primary Election for the nomination of the 1st Defendant’s candidate in respect of the Jiwa Ward Councillorship, the forwarding of the name of the 2nd Defendant to the 3rd Defendant by the 1st Defendant as its nominated candidate in respect of Jiwa Ward in the 2022 Council Election is illegal, null and void.
5. A DECLARATION that upon the interpretation of Section 87(4)c of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Article 20 iii of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant, the 1st Defendant’s Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2022 Ward Council Election 2022- Direct Primaries, the Result of the 1st Defendant’s Primary Election for the nomination of the 1st Defendant’s candidate in respect of the Jiwa Ward Councillorship, the publication of the name of the 2nd Defendant as the candidate of the 1st Defendant in respect of Jiwa Ward in the 2022 Council Election by the 3rd Defendant is illegal, null and void.
6. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants to forthwith recognize the Claimant as the duly nominated candidate of the 1st Defendant in respect of the Jiwa Ward in the 2022 Council Election.
7. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the 3rd Defendant to immediately replace and publish the name of the 2nd Defendant with the name of the Claimant as the 1st Defendant’s duly nominated candidate in respect of Jiwa Ward in the 2022 Council Election.
8. AN ORDER of injunction restraining the 2nd Defendant from parading himself as the candidate of the 1st Defendant for the Jiwa Ward at the 2022 Council Election.
9. The cost of this suit.”

The parties duly joined issues on the Originating Summons and the Originating Summons and the various objections of the Appellant were heard together. Objections challenging the 1st Respondent’s suit on ground of incompetence and, for being filed out of time were dismissed by the learned trial Judge. The rulings relating to the objections can be found on pages 234-255 and 256-276 of the Record. They were delivered on 16th December, 2021. On the same date the learned trial Judge delivered a considered judgment wherein he answered all the questions raised on the Originating Summons in the affirmative.

The trial Judge consequently granted all the reliefs sought on the Originating Summons with the sum of N300,000 (Three Hundred Thousand Naira) only awarded against the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent jointly and severally in favour of the 1st Respondent as the cost of the suit.

Naturally, the Appellant was aggrieved and has by his Notice of Appeal dated and filed on the 23rd day of December, 2021 appealed to this Court on three grounds against the ruling and judgment delivered against the Appellant.

The said grounds of appeal and their particulars read thus:-
“2. PART OF THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT COMPLAINED OF:
The whole ruling and judgment delivered by the A. H. Musa J. on the 16th day of December, 2021.
3. GROUNDS OF APPEAL
GROUND 1
The learned trial Judge erred in law and occasioned on the appellant a miscarriage of justice when he assumed jurisdiction over the suit in FCT/CV/1104/2021 and held as follows in his ruling on the Appellant’s notice of preliminary objection.
At page 13 of the ruling:
“The use of the mandatory word “shall” is not lost on this Court. However, this Court is impelled to note that the event complained of id est, the substitution of the name the Claimant with that of the 2nd Defendant and the submission of the 2nd Defendant’s name to the 3rd Defendant took place during the pendency of the industrial action embarked upon by Judiciary workers to press home their demand for financial autonomy of the Judiciary…”
And at pages 15 -16 of the ruling:
“…I therefore found this ground of the 2nd Defendant’s objection as a gross misconception of the law and all the cases cited in support of this ground as inapplicable since none of them touched on the computation of time where there is a force majeure like the JUSUN strike which crippled judicial activities for over two months…”
PARTICULARS
1. That by Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the 1st Respondent had 14 days to file the instant action from the 29th of May, 2021.
2. That the suit was then filed on the 16th of June, 2021.
3. That by Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) the suit was statute barred.
4. That the lower Court failed to follow decided authorities of the Apex Court on the principle that time fixed by the Constitution cannot be extended as they are like the rock of Gibraltar.
5. The lower Court held that the doctrine of ubi jus ibi remedium applied to extend the time fixed by the Constitution.
6. That the lower Court relied on a Practice Direction No. 1 of 2021 on Computation of time and exemption from payment of default fees issued by the Chief Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory in disregarding the constitutional fixed time.
7. The decision of the lower Court is perverse and occasioned a miscarriage of justice on the appellant.
GROUND 2
The lower Court erred in law and occasioned a miscarriage of justice on the appellant when it held that the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN) strike constituted a Force Majeure in this suit.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
1 . That the cause of action as found by the lower Court crystallised on the 29th May, 2021 when INEC received the letter forwarding the name of the Appellant.
2. That there was no affidavit evidence before the lower Court as to why the 1st Respondent did not file his action within the stipulated constitutional time of 14 days.
3. That the lower Court accepted the address of counsel to the 1st Respondent as evidence in arriving at his decision.
4. That a Court is not allowed to speculate.
5. That the decision of the lower Court has occasioned a miscarriage of justice on the Appellant.
GROUND 3
The lower Court erred in law and breached the mandatory provision of Section 285(10) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) when it without, jurisdiction purported to deliver its judgment in a suit filed on 16/06/2021 on 16/12/2021 thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice on the appellant.
1. The 1st Respondent as Plaintiff in the lower Court commenced this action on the 16/0612021 as a pre-election case.
2. The lower Court heard the suit and reserved its judgment which it delivered on 16/12/2021.
3. That on 16/12/2021 when the lower Court purported to deliver its judgment, the 180 days’ time limit fixed by the Constitution had lapsed.
4. That the lower Court’s jurisdiction has ceased by the efluxion of time.
5. That the decision of the lower Court rendered after over 180 days was made without jurisdiction and thereby occasioned on the appellant a miscarriage of justice:
4. RELIEFS SOUGHT FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL:
(a) AN ORDER allowing the appeal.
(b) AN ORDER setting aside the ruling and judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Coram A. H. Musa J. delivered on the 16th day of December, 2021 in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1104/2021; between Alhaji Usman Halilu vs. All Progressives Congress & 2 Ors.
(c) AN ORDER striking out Suit. No. FCT/HC/CV/1104/2021; between Alhaji Usman Halilu vs. All Progressives Congress & 2 Ors. for want of jurisdiction.
(d) The sum of N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira), being the cost of this suit.
(e) ANY FURTHER OR OTHER ORDERS this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this appeal.”

The Appellant’s Brief of Argument settled by CHIKAOSOLU OJUKWU, ESQ was dated and filed on the 10th January, 2022. The 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument settled by M. O. BADA, ESQ was dated and filed the 17th day of January, 2022.

The appeal was heard on 20th January, 2022 when the Appellant’s learned Counsel and 1st Respondent’s learned Counsel adopted their respective Briefs of Argument. The 2nd and 3rd Respondent did not file any Brief of Argument.

The learned Counsel to the Appellant distilled two (2) issues for determination namely:-
“i. Whether the judgment of the lower Court delivered after 184 days from the date of filing of the suit is not a nullity by virtue of Section 285 (11) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) (as amended)? (Distilled from Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal).
ii. Whether the 1st Respondent’s suit was not statute barred. (Distilled from Grounds 1 & 2 of the Notice of Appeal)”

The two (2) issues quoted above were adopted by the learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent.
The appeal will be determined on the two issues nominated by the Appellant’s learned Counsel. They will be taken together.

On issue one as to whether the judgment of the lower Court is not a nullity same having been delivered after the expiration of time stipulated in Section 285(11) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, the Appellant’s learned Counsel relied on Section 285(11) of the Constitution aforesaid to submit that the word “shall” when used in a Statute connotes the intendment of the Legislator, namely that the demands of the law must be complied with as it does not give room for maneuver or evasiveness and it is not negotiable. He relied on the cases of:
1. AMADI V NNPC (2000) 10 NWLR (PART 674) 76;
2. BAMAIYI V A.G. FEDERATION 92001) 12 NWLR (PART 722) 468 and
3. IFEZUE V MBADUCHA (1984) 1 SCNLR 427 among other cases cited.

On how to interpret the provisions of Section 285(10) of the Constitution which provides that:
“A Court in every pre-election matter shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of filing the suit.”
the learned Appellant’s Counsel relied on the cases of A.P.C. V LERE (2020) 1 NWLR (PT. 1705) 254 AT 284 F-G and ARAKA V EGBUE (2003) 17 NWLR (PT. 848) 1 AT 21 B-D.

He contended that the wordings of Section 285(10) of the 1999 Constitution as amended are very clear and unambiguous and as such ought to be accorded ordinary and grammatical meaning. He submitted that the time fixed by the Constitution cannot be elongated under any guise whatsoever. He relied on the cases of MARWA V NYAKO (2012) 6 NWLR (PT. 1296) 286 and UGBA V SUSWAM (2014) 14 NWLR (PT. 1427) 264 AT 311-313 F-B. He informed the Court that the suit herein was filed on 16/6/2021 while the trial Court gave its judgment on 16/12/2021 when it has lost jurisdiction so to do in that the time to hear and determine the action had lapsed being a pre-election matter. According to him, the learned trial Judge delivered its judgment 185 days after the case was filed. That the judgment delivered by the lower Court is a nullity. He relied on the cases of PDP V RAHEEM & ORS (2019) LPELR-48747 CA pages 28-29 and ADELEKE (2019) LPELR-48729 (CA) PAGES 35-37.

The learned Counsel to the Appellant submitted that the reason given by the learned trial Judge to the effect that judgment was not delivered on time due to force majeure caused by “JUSUN strike which crippled judicial activities for over two months” cannot save the judgment in that Rules of Court cannot be used to extend time to deliver judgment in a pre-election matter relying on the cases of;
1. MOHAMMED V APC & 2 ORS (2019) LPELR-48395 (CA) PAGES 40-41;
2. AKPANUDOEDEHE V AKPABIO (2013) 7 NWLR (PART 1354) 485 AT 494 E-G;
3. ABUBAKAR VS NASAMU (2012) 17 NWLR (PT. 1330) 407 AT 459-460 H-A.

He urged the Court to resolve issue 1 in Appellant’s favour.

On issue 2 as to whether 1st Respondent’s suit was not statute barred, the learned Counsel to the Appellant stated that there is no dispute that learned trial Judge was of the view that the suit was filed more than 14 days after the accrual of the cause of action. Attention of the Court was drawn to the findings of the learned trial Judge on pages 246 to 249 of the record of appeal which the learned Counsel to the Appellant reproduced to submit that the findings of the lower Court is not only perverse but worrisome in that the address of learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent explaining reasons for 1st Respondent’s failure to file the action within 14 days was accepted in breach of the trite law that address of Counsel cannot take the place of evidence. He relied on the cases of;
1. AJAYI V TOTAL (NIG) PLC (2013) 15 NWLR (PT. 1378) 423 AT 443 and
2. CHIOKWE V STATE (2013) 5 NWLR (PT. 1347) 205 AT 227.

He accused the lower Court of breaching the provision of Section 287 (1) of the Constitution when it refused to follow decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of:-
1. NWANKWO V YAR’ADUA (2012) 7 NWLR (PART 1263) 81;
2. MARWA V NYAKO (2012) 6 NWLR (PART 1296) 199;
3. APC V UMAR (2019) 8 NWLR (PT. 1675) 564;
4. PDP V CPC (2011) 17 NWLR (PT. 1277) 485 and
5. BELLO V YUSUF (2019) LPELR-47918 (SC).

That this failure has led to miscarriage of justice and that the procedure adopted by the lower Court amounted to judicial legislation. He submitted that by Section 285(9) of the Constitution, the 1st Respondent had only 14 days to file his action from the date the cause of action arose pursuant to Section 285(9) of the Constitution. He relied on AMADI V INEC (2012) LPELR-7831 (SC).

That the lower Court erred in law when he relied on the Practice Direction issued by the Chief Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory to hold that the instant action is novel and that time does not run due to the Practice Direction. In conclusion, he stated that the 1st Respondent’s action is statute barred and the judgment delivered was a nullity. He urged the Court to allow the appeal.

In response to the Appellant’s submissions as to whether the judgment delivered 184 days from the date of filing the suit is not a nullity by virtue of Section 285(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, the 1st Respondent’s learned Counsel urged this Court to hold that under Section 285 of the said Constitution an aspirant who intends to challenge the wrongful substitution of his name having won an election at a primary election has a wider latitude of time to anchor his complaint other that the conduct of the primary election itself. That the Constitution must be liberally construed to carry out its obvious end. He relied on the case of IGP V ANPP & ORS (2008) CHR 131 AT 142 per ADEKEYE, JCA later JSC Rtd. He submitted that the 180 days prescribed by the Constitution is not immutable and that time calculation is not absolute in that public holidays are left out of the account. He stated that the learned trial Judge did not extend time provided by the Constitution in that the 1st Respondent’s case is predominantly about the substitution of his name and not against primary election “so to say”. That the learned trial Judge gave judgment based on credible evidence before him. He relied on CPC V INEC & ORS (2011) 18 NWLR (PT. 1279) 495.

He urged the Court to resolve issue 1 against the Appellant.

On issue two (2) as to whether the 1st Respondent’s suit is statute barred, the learned Counsel to 1st Respondent referred to mode of calculation of the period set by the limitation law depending on whether the action was begun by Writ of Summons or Originating Summons. He relied on the cases of:
1. EGBE VS ADEFARASIN (2002) 14 WRN 57;
2. A.I.C. LTD V GOMBE STATE WATER CORP. (2015) 25 WRN 37 and
3. INEC V AGBAKOBA (2009) 24 WRN 1.

He submitted that the occurrence of the event can only become a reality only when 1st Respondent became aware of it. That the 3rd Respondent was only in receipt of the letter transmitting the name of Appellant to it on 29/5/2021 from 2nd and 3rd Respondents. He submitted that the lower Court was right in relying on JUSUN strike as an important circumstance which was not envisaged under Section 285(9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. That the Judicial Staff Union of Nigeria commenced their strike on 6/4/2021 and did not call off the strike until 14th June, 2021.

To learned Counsel for the Respondent, the above position constitutes a Force Majeure and that the suit was validly filed upon the call off of the strike. He also relied on the Practice Direction made by the Chief Judge of Federal Capital Territory High Court as an authority enabling the filing of the 1st Respondent’s suit out of time.

He also urged the Court to note that “the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended was hurried brain child of the military junta, which explains why the document is riddled with some many lacunas.” (sic).

That the Constitution did not contemplate the possibility of the Registry of the Court being locked up for reason of industrial action. He urged the Court to also resolve issue 2 in 1st Respondent’s favour.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES
The substratum of the vehement submissions of the learned Counsel to the Appellant under issue 1 is that the Respondents’ action which is a pre-election matter as agreed to by the parties was initiated on 16/06/2021 and that judgment ought to have been delivered on 12th December, 2021 that is 180 days from date of filing of the said action. The learned trial Judge delivered judgment 185 days thereafter in favour of the 1st Respondent and that the judgment is a nullity.

The learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent obviously contended the contrary. According to the 1st Respondent’s learned Counsel, there is nothing in Section 285 of the 1999 Constitution as amended preventing a winner of primary election from ventilating his grievance in that a wider latitude of time was accorded to him to anchor his complaint and that the Court must adopt beneficial interpretation approach in construing Section 285(10) of the said Constitution.

To the Respondent, even if the lower Court delivered its judgment outside the 180 days stipulated in the Constitution, the judgment is still valid. The reasoning behind his submission can be found in paragraph 4.5 and 4.6 of his submissions whereat he submitted thus:-
“4.5 We submit with respect My Lords, that assuming the Appellant’s suit was largely based on challenging the outcome of the said 2nd Respondent’s primary election before the lower Court and therefore bound by the extant provision of Section 285(10) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) the correct mathematical calculation of 180 days will commence from the date of filing on the 16th June, 2021 with consideration of the annual vacation period of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory between the 23rd July, 2021 till 6th September 2021 totaling a period of 45 days and such other notables public holidays in between in computing the total period of 180 days stipulated by the Constitution. During the annual vacation, the trial Court was shut down for litigant. And the trial Court was not a vacation Court.
4.6 We submit that the trial Court still had jurisdiction as at the time the judgment was delivered. The period of holidays shall be left out in computing the period stipulated by the constitution in accordance with the interpretation Act.”

The germane issue here is whether the lower Court has lost its jurisdiction to deliver a valid judgment on this pre-election matter after the 180 days prescribed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, Section 285(10) thereof which provides:-
“285(10) A Court in every pre-election matter shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of filing the suit. ” (Underlined mine)

Now the common approach to interpretation of the Constitution or Statute is to adopt the literal rule of interpretation by giving the words in the Constitution or the Statute their ordinary or grammatical meaning in order to bring out the intention of the legislature.
It is also trite law that in the quest to interpret or construe the provisions of a Statute or the Constitution, the Court or Tribunal must construe or interpret the Statute or the Constitution in order to bring out plainly the real intention of the Lawmaker or the framers of the Constitution and thus enhance its purpose. The Court or Tribunal has a bounden duty to consider as a whole the entire provisions of the law or the Constitution involved. The Statute or the Constitution in question must not be construed in a manner that will do violence to the provisions being interpreted and must not be interpreted to defeat the ultimate design or purpose of the Constitution or Statute that calls for interpretation. See:
1. HON. JAMES ABIODUN FALEKE V INEC & ORS (2016) 18 NWLR (PART 1543) 61 AT 117 F- H per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC who said:
“The settled canons of construction of constitutional provision are, inter alia, that the instrument must be considered as a whole, that the language is to be given a reasonable construction and absurd consequences are to be avoided. See: A.G., Bendel State v. A.G., Federation (1981) 10 SC 132-134, (1982) 3 NCLR 1; Ishola v. Ajiboye (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt.352) 506. It is equally well settled that where words used in the Constitution or in a Statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning, unless to do so would lead to absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the statute. See: Ojokolobo v. Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.61) 377 AT 402, F-H; Adisa v. Oyinwola & Ors (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 11) 47, (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) Saraki v. F.R.N (2016) LPELR- 40013 SC. (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531.”
2. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ORS VS. ALHAJI ATIKU ABUBAKAR & ORS (2007) 10 NWLR (PT. 1041) 1; (2007) LPELR-3 (SC) AT 46 per AKINTAN, JSC who said:
“The approach of the Indian Judiciary while interpreting the Indian Constitution is stated as follows in M. P. Jain. Indian Constitutional Law. 3rd edition page 675: “Generally the approach of the Indian Judiciary has been to interpret the Constitution literally and to apply to it more or less the same canons of interpretation as are usually applied to the interpretation of ordinary legislative enactments. This has been characterized as the positivist approach.”
See also Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, A. R. 1951, 41 at 58.
The approach of our Courts in interpreting statutes and the Constitution is the same as declared above.”
ONNOGHEN, JSC later CJN (Rtd.) said on page 104 of the same report thus:
“In the case of I.M.B. v. Tinubu (2001) 45 WRN 1 at 19; (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 740) 670 at 690, Iguh, JSC on interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution stated the position thus:
“In this regard, it will be necessary to recall the general principle of law governing the interpretation of our Constitution. This is that such interpretation as would serve the interest of the Constitution and best carry out its object and purpose should he preferred. Its relevant provisions must be read together and not disjointly and where the words of any section are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning unless this, would lead to absurdity or be in conflict with other provisions of the Constitution. See Chief D. O. Ifezue v. Livinus Mbadugha & Anor. (1984) 1 SCNLR 427, (1984) 5 SC 79 at 101.”
And on page 110 His Lordship continues viz:
“It should always be borne in mind that in constructing the provisions of the Constitution the Court is not to read into any provision or section thereof anything not expressly contained therein or to fashion out another Constitution or provision for the people other than to bring out the true intention of the makers of the Constitution. “
The Court must always strive to side with the intendment of the provision or the provisions of a Constitution or Statute it is called upon to interpret especially where the provisions of the law or the Constitution are very clear and unambiguous. An interpretation that will lead to absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the provisions with the law or the Constitution being construed must be eschewed.

I have no doubt in my mind that the lower Court fell into grave error in delivering its judgment outside the mandatory period or time frame glaringly prescribed or stipulated in Section 285(10) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. The lower Court had already lost jurisdiction to adjudicate on the 1st Respondent’s suit since 13th day of December, 2021. The judgment delivered on 16/12/2021 was/is an absolute nullity.
I agree with learned Counsel to the Appellant that no umbrage can be taken under a Practice Direction to sideline the express provision of the Constitution. Rules of Court or Practice Direction has no place in the computation of time to perform a judicial task or function eminently and mandatorily prescribed under Section 285(10) of the 1999 Constitution. All the decisions cited and relied upon by the Appellant’s learned Counsel are quite apposite and represent the position of the law on the matter.
In Section 285(10) of the Constitution as aforesaid, the framers of the said Constitution minced no word in stating that the decision of the Court in pre-election matter shall be rendered “within 180 days from the date of the filing of the suit. “
The law remains immutable that the express mention of one thing or so many of them in a Constitution or Statue or an enactment is the express exclusion of all other things not mentioned in the Statute or the Constitution. See;
1. GEN. MUHAMMADU BUHARI & ANOR VS ALHAJI MOHAMMED DIKKO YUSUF & ANOR (2003) 14 NWLR (PART 841) 446 AT 499 B- D per UWAIFO, JSC.
2. SUN INSURANCE NIGERIA PLC VS UMEZ ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (2015) 6 SCM 263 AT 277 D-F per FABIYI, JSC who said:-
“At page 83 of the record, Rhodes-Vivour, JCA (as he then was) in a refined manner, stated as follows:
“In the interpretation of such provisions what is not said is not intended.
I wish to further expand same at this auspicious moment. Let me bring to the fore at this point the expressio unius est exclusionalterius Rule which means the express mention of one thing in a statutory provision, as herein – the Constitution – the grundnorm, automatically excludes any other stipulation which would otherwise have been applied by implication. See Ogbunyiya v. Okudo (1979) 6-9 SC 32, PDP v. INEC (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 626) 200; Buhari v. Dikko Yusuf (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt. 841) 446; (2003) 8 SCM, 46; Udoh v. Orthopaedic Hospital Management Board (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 304) 139 and Halsbury’s Law of England 4th Edition, paragraph 876.”
The position was reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of MAHAMMADU ALIYU SHINKAFI & ANOR VS. A. A. YARI & ORS (2016) 3 SCM 135 AT 158 per OKORO, JSC who said:
“Thus, the Constitution as the grundnorm (supreme law of the land), having made such elaborate and all-encompassing provisions for qualification and disqualification of persons seeking the office of Governor of a State, does not leave room for any addition to those conditions already set out. I had held that Section 85 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) does not contemplate any issue relating to qualification or disqualification of a person seeking the office of Governor of a State. Even assuming that it has, by reason of its being subordinate to the Constitution, it cannot override, add to or supplant the express and exhaustive provisions on the subject matter of qualification and disqualification for election into office of Governor of a State. The Latin Maxim “expressio unis est exclusio alterius” meaning: “the express mention of one excludes any other which otherwise would have applied by implication with regard to the same issue applies. See PDP V. INEC (supra).”
It does not lie within the province of the Court to amend the Constitutional provisions under the guise of interpretation or any contrivance as was done by the lower Court in this matter. It is antithesis to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers as erected by Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which is the groundnorm of all laws. If there is any lacuna in the Constitution or its provisions or any Statute the ball is in the Court of the National Assembly of Nigeria to amend the Constitution or such law or Statue. See;
1. PRINCE M. O. O. KASSIM VS PRINCE A. ADESEMOWO & ORS (2021) 18 NWLR (PART 1807) 67 AT 96 C- F per OKORO, JSC who said:-
“The law is trite that where the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous, the Courts are enjoined to interpret the words in their ordinary and natural meanings. And it is basic that one of the vital canons of interpretation of statutes is that a Court of record should be mindful to make broad interpretation or what is sometimes referred to as giving same a liberal approach.

A Court should give a holistic interpretation to a statute as required by law. It should be a purposeful interpretation. See NURTW & Anor v. RTEAN & Ors (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1307) 170, Elabanjo & Anor v. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76, Attorney General of Ogun State & Ors v. Attorney General of the Federation (2002) LPELR-621 (SC), (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 232; Board of Customs v. Barau (1982) 10 SC page 48, (1982) LPELR-786 (SC), Adewunmi & Anor v. Attorney General of Ekiti State (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt. 751) 474.
Let me state clearly that one other cardinal rule of interpretation is to avoid judicial legislation and also avoid making nonsense of the statute in order not to defeat the manifest intention of the legislation. See Olowu v. Abolore & Anor (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 293) 255, Osho v. Philips (1972) 4SC 259.” (Underlined mine).
2. COCA-COLA NIGERIA LTD & ORS VS MRS TITILAYO AKINSANYA (2017) 17 NWLR (PART 1593) 74 AT 121 E-G per EKO, JSC who said:-
“The Courts for a long while now have come to settle on the principle that, if the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous they must be followed even if they lead to manifest absurdity. See Queen v. Judge of The City of London (1892) 1 QB 273 AT 290. It was stated further in this decision, in the manner of positivism, that the Court has nothing to do with question whether the legislature has committed absurdity. It is only when the words of the statute are capable of two interpretations; one leads to absurdity, and the other does not, that the Court will conclude that the legislature does not intend the absurdity and will adopt the other interpretation that does not lead to any absurdity. The judex neither makes laws nor does it possess any power to amend any statute.” (Underlined mine)
JUSUN’s strike, no matter its duration cannot change the express provision contained in Section 285(10) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended or provisions of any Statute. Doctrine of “Force Majure” has no application whatsoever in such a situation. There must be a provision in a Statute or law to accommodate such unforeseen circumstances. There is none in this case.
There is no such law in Nigeria. The submissions of learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent are hereby discountenanced in their entirety.
Issue 1 is resolved in favour of the Appellant.

Issue 2 is as to whether the 1st Respondent’s suit was statute barred.
By the prescription of Section 285(9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.
The parties in this appeal are ad idem that the action leading to this appeal is a pre-election matter and that it was filed outside 14 days stipulated by the Constitution aforesaid. The bone of contention is whether the JUSUN strike that took place in 2021 and Practice Direction made by the Chief Judge of the FCT High Court titled – “computation of Time and Exemption from Payment of Default Fee – Practice Direction No. 1, 2021” revived or extended the 14 days period contained in Section 285(9) of the Constitution and thus validated the suit of the 1st Respondent.

The contention of the learned Counsel to the Appellant is that the lower Court cannot rely on JUSUN’s strike or the Practice Direction to subvert the Constitutional Provisions. He relied on the cases of BRIG. GEN. MOHAMMED MARWA V. ADMIRAL MURTALA NYAKO & ORS. (2012) 6 NWLR (PT. 1296) 199 also reported as (2012) LPELR-7837 SC per ONNOGHEN, JSC later CJN (RTD.) who said:-
“It is clear to me, that the facts in Marwa vs. Nyako (supra), are different from these in the instant appeal. The five governors in Marwa’s case were, after a process of voting, elected as governors of their respective States and took Oaths of Allegiance and office on 29th May 2007. When the elections were nullified, they all stood for the re-run elections and they were again declared elected after voting. They took the Oaths of Allegiance and Office again. The Supreme Court held that their tenure of office commenced on the 29th of May 2007 when they first took the Oaths. So that case, was essentially about determining when their four years tenure commenced. It was not about qualification or disqualification to stand election. Again, the same persons who stood for election as Governors and won and were sworn in, were the same persons who stood for the re-run elections and won and were sworn in.
In the instant appeal, the 1st respondent was not elected President in 2007 and did not take the oaths of Allegiance and Office as President in 2007. He did so as Vice-President…”
2. AMADI & ANOR VS. INEC & ORS (2012) LPELR- 7831 SC where ONNOCHEN, JSC (later CJN Rtd.) also said:-
“The question is whether the application of the provisions of Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended to the facts of this case, or any other case for that matter, can be said to amount to a denial of the right to fair hearing by the Court?
It is very clear that the provisions of Section 285(7) supra is in the mould of a statute of limitation but with a constitutional flavour. Does an application of a statute of limitation to a given factual situation rob the aggrieved party of the right to fair hearing? I do not think so, neither has learned counsel for appellants cited any authority in support of that contention.
This Court has held that the provisions of Section 285(7) supra is like the rock of Gibraltar or Mount Zion which cannot be moved. The time provided therein is sacrosanct in the sense that it cannot be extended. Granted, for the purposes of argument only, that application of the provisions amounts to a denial of the right to fair hearing, which is not admitted by me, what would be the benefit to appellants in view of the fact that the sixty (60) days cannot be extended to accommodate the hearing of their appeal? To me, I hold the considered view that the instant appeal is an exercise in futility in the present circumstances and realities. The Court is not being asked to declare the provisions of Section 285(7) unconstitutional which means it remains valid. As long as it remains the law, appeals relevant to that provision must necessarily be heard and determined within sixty (60) days of the delivery of the judgment on appeal otherwise the appeal would lapse.
The provision does not say that the appeal would not lapse if the inability to hear and determine same was not caused by the appellant or was caused by the Court, or by any person of whatever description. Section 285(7) supra is clearly intended by the legislature to limit time not to extend time and it would be inappropriate, and in fact illegal, to interprete same to attain the effect of extending the time therein allotted which is clearly the intention of the appellants in the instant appeal. See the judgments of the Court in the Consolidated Appeal Nos. SC. 332/2011; SC.333/2011 and SC. 352/2011 – Alh. Kasim Shettima & Ors. v. Alh. Mohammed Goni & Ors. delivered on the 31st day of October, 2011, reported in (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 413 and another Consolidated Appeal Nos. SC.272/2011 and SC.276/2011 between Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) v. Congress for Progressive Change (C.P.C.) & Ors. also delivered on 31st October, 2011, reported in (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1277) 485 and the most recent one delivered on 27th January, 2012 in the Consolidated Appeal Nos. SC.141/2011; SC.266/2011; SC.267/2011; SC.282/2011; SC.356/2011 and SC.357/2011 Brig. General Mohammed B. Marwa Anr. v. Adm Murtala Nyako & Ors., reported in (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1296) 199.
It is very important to note that the provisions of Section 285(7) supra does not deny an appellant the right to fair hearing, just like every statute of limitation. It merely gives all parties and the Court a time frame within which parties are to exercise their right to fair hearing in a relevant appeal. If for whatever reason the appeal is not heard within the allotted time frame it cannot be said that an appellant affected thereby has been denied his right to fair hearing.
The provision is of strict liability a since the Court has not been called upon to declare same unconstitutional it remains the law and binding on all and sundry.” (Underlined mine).

The decision of the lower Court which the Appellant’s learned Counsel described as “not only perverse but worrisome” can be found on pages 246-249 of the Record of Appeal where the lower Court held among others as follows:-
“The use of the mandatory word “shall” is not lost on this Court. However, this Court is impelled to note that the event complained of, id est, the substitution of the name of the Claimant with that of the 2nd Defendant and the submission of the 2nd Defendant’s name to the 3rd Defendant took place during the pendency of the industrial action embarked upon by Judiciary workers to press home their demand for financial autonomy of the Judiciary Exhibit G attached to the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons was dated 25th of May, 2021 and received by the 3rd Defendant on the 29th of May, 2021.

The industrial action embarked upon by the Judiciary Staff Union was called off on the 10th of June, 2021. The Courts were re-opened on the 14th of June, 2021. Yet, because of the public holiday declared by the Federal Government to commemorate Democracy Day which date, 12th of June, 2021 fell on a Saturday, the public holiday was moved to the next working day, which was Monday, 14th of June, 2021. The Courts, therefore, re-opened on the 15th of June, 2021; The Claimant filed this suit on the 16th of June, 2021. To my mind, the Claimant filed this suit at the earliest opportunity he had to challenge the action of the 1st Defendant. Moreover, Section 259 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 empowers the Chief Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja to “make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.” The Honourable Chief Judge of the High Court of Justice of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, the Honourable Justice Salisu Garba, then the Chief Judge, in accordance with this constitutional mandate, issued a Practice Direction suspending the computation of time from the 6th of April, 2021 to the 14th of June, 2021, being the period the Judiciary workers were on strike. The Practice Direction, known as the High Court of the FCT, (Computation of Time and Exemption from Payment of Default Fees) Practice Direction No. 1 2021 stipulated that:
“In reckoning time for filing of Court processes or performing any act including the payment of default fees under the High Court of the FCT (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018 or under any previous directions issued by this Court, the period commencing on 6th April, 2021 and ending on 14th June, 2021 being the period of the JUSUN strike is hereby exempted.”
If I may ask, which Court was the 2nd Defendant expecting the Claimant to file his suit challenging the act of the 1st Defendant? I believe and I strongly hold, that this is one of those examples where the legal principle, ubi jus ibi remedium, is most apposite. See NBC Plc v. Ademeli (2015) LPELR-41851 (CA); Oscar Concord Finance and Securities Ltd v. Ogunleye (2007) LPELR-8719 (CA). In Arulogun v. C.O. P. Lagos & Ors (2016) LPELR-40190 (CA), the Court of Appeal per Iyizoba, JCA held at pp. 19 paras A that:
“It is a basic and elementary principle of the law that wherever there is a wrong there ought to be a remedy to redress the wrong, generally expressed in the Latin phrase ubi jus ibi remedium which we are all very familiar with.”
In BFI Croup Corporation v. B. P.E. (2012) LPELR-11339 (SC), the apex Court held per Fabiyi, JSC at pp. 33 paras A that “Literally, ubi jus ibi remedium means where there is a right, there is a right, there is a remedy. It is said that the rule of primitive law was the reverse, where there is remedy there is a right. The Court is enjoined to provide a remedy where a legal right is established. The Court should look into the substance of the action rather than the form…” I therefore found this ground of the 2nd Defendant’s objection as a gross misconception of the law and all the cases cited in support of this” ground as inapplicable since none of them touched on the computation of time where there is a force mejeure like the JUSUN strike which crippled judicial activities for over two months …”

The lower Court no doubt committed serious errors in relying on JUSUN strike to deliberately change the Constitutional effect of Section 285(9) of the Constitution. The Practice Direction is only relevant to relieve parties from penalty in form of fees for their inability to file their processes within time. The Practice Direction is very clear and it does not profess to be giving any right of filing pre-election matter to any person or to whittle down the effect of Section 285(9) of the Constitution. The lower Court and 1st Respondent’s Counsel clearly misunderstood and misconstrued the provisions of the Practice Direction made by FCT High Count Chief Judge.

In apparent justification of the above findings, the 1st Respondent argued on page 12 of 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument paragraphs 4.18 and 4.19 as follows:-
“4.18 Assuming without conceding to the Appellant counsel submission that the cause of action arose more than 14 days in clear violation of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), we submit with the greatest respect that Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) became obsolete at the time of the Judicial Staff Union of Nigeria, JUSUN strike due to the fact that the intention and contemplation of the draftsmen as envisaged could not be achieved or put in force as at the time the cause of action arouse, as judiciary activities were crippled at the time. We refer my Lord to the cases of ASIMS (NIG) LIMITED VS LOWER BENUE RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (2002) FWLR (Pt. 84) 101 C.A and LIPEDE VS SONEKAN (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 374) 668 AT 698-699
4.19 Following the dicta of the Supreme Court in MARWA VS NYAKO (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1296) 199, we submit with respect that there is no doubt that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 was the hurried brainchild of the military junta, which explains why the document is riddled with so many lacunas. One of these many lacunas is the non-contemplation of the possibility of the Registry of the Court locked up for reason of industrial strike or other natural disaster.”

With profound respect to the 1st Respondent’s learned Counsel, his submissions have no support in law as they are outrightly against the settled position of the apex Court on the interpretation of Section 285(9) of the Constitution. It is a direct invitation to the Court to engage in judicial legislation and to violate the established doctrine of stare decisis contained in Section 287 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). The plethora of authorities from the Supreme Court of Nigeria have consistently made it clear that the time frame of the 14 days stipulation within which a pre-election matter must be filed from the date of accrual of action cannot be avoided or circumvented and the Courts in Nigeria are not vested with powers or jurisdiction to extend the 14 days for any aggrieved person under any guise. The position taken and the submissions of the 1st Respondent are quite outlandish. See; ROE LTD V UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA (2018) 1 SCM 135 AT 151 where GALINJE, JSC said:-

“The issue of whether or not an action is filed within the time stipulated by law goes to the jurisdiction of the Court. Any omission to institute proceedings within the statutory time limit deprives the Court of jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. Jurisdiction being the soul of adjudication, can be raised at any stage of proceedings, and even at the Supreme Court for the first time. “
The position taken by the lower Court cannot be supported. The findings made by him as to the computation of time particularly the 14 days prescribed by the Constitution for the institution of a pre-election matter is patently wrong and grossly perverse. The lower Court has no legal power, capacity or authority to adjudicate on the 1st Respondent’s case because the suit was statue barred ab initio and the entire proceedings conducted by the lower Court was therefore rendered a nullity as the entire action was dead on arrival at the lower Court. The 1st Respondent’s action is statute barred. The lower Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the suit.
1. NRMAFC & ORS V AJIBOLA JOHNSON & ORS (2019) 2 NWLR (PART 1656) 247 AT 270 D-E per ARIWOOLA, JSC is apposite viz:-
“Generally, the law is that where a statute provides for institution of an action within a prescribed period, the proceedings shall not be commenced after the time prescribed by such statute. Any action that is brought after the prescribed period is said to be statute barred.”
2. TIMIPRE SYLVA VS. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS. (2015) 3 SCM 263 at 289 D-G per NCWUTA, JSC who said:
“A suit commenced after the expiration of the time stipulated in the Act cannot be said to have been commenced by due process. Jurisdiction is the power which a Court has to hear and determine the cause or complaint made before it. See Ikine v. Edjerode (2001) (1988) 92 LRCN 3288 at 3316: (2002) 1 SCM, 124, Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31 Jurisdiction is a threshold issue and since it is a sine qua non to adjudication and proceedings taken without jurisdiction is a nullity, the Issue could be raised at any stage by party or by the Court suo motu to avoid an exercise in futility.”
3. ADEBAYO ONI VS JOHN KAYODE FAYEMI & ORS (2020) 15 NWLR (PART 1746) 59 at 80 H to 81 A-D per SANUSI JSC who said:
“It is instructive to note that the Fourth Alteration Act No. 21 of 2017 has amended the provision of Section 285 of the 1999 Constitution by inserting Subsection 9 which provides that:
“any pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of. In other words any suit must be filed within 14 days from the date the cause of action occurred.”
In this instant case, as I stated above, the pre-election which is the cause of action and is also the subject matter of the suit filed at the trial Court, took place on 12th May, 2018. Therefore, for the suit to come within the period specified in the 4th Alteration Act which is 14 days, the suit must have been filed at the trial Court latest by the 26th of May, 2018. The appellant herein, as plaintiff at the trial Court, filed his suit at the trial Court on 22nd of June, 2018. That is to say, it was filed about 42 days after the occurrence of the cause of action on 12th May, 2018. It can therefore be said that by the provisions of the 4th Alteration Act which has its commencement date as 17th day of June, 2018, the suit had become statute barred as at the date it was filed. The trial Court is, right from the outset, in error when it entertained and determined the suit which said suit is incompetent. It is therefore bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the incompetent suit. It also goes without saying, that the Court below and indeed this Court, apex Court, lack jurisdiction to entertain and determine the appeal.”
4. OBAFEMI TOYIN VS PDP & ORS (2019) 9 NWLR (PART 1676) 50 AT 60 E-H per I.T MUHAMMAD, JSC now CJN who said:
“In my consideration of the 3rd and 4th respondents’ preliminary objection, I find it convenient at this initial stage to bring it to the fore that the matter in litigation is a pre-election matter. Election matters are considered special, almost governed by their own special laws. As reflected in the introduction to this judgment, the parties litigated in the Courts below over primary elections conducted by the 1st respondent on the 29th of December, 2014. At the trial Court judgment was delivered in favour of the appellant. At the Court of Appeal (Court below), the trial Court’s judgment was set aside by the Court below when it adopted the judgment of a sister appeal in appeal No. CA/EK/76/20 16. My lords, Section 2(12) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Fourth Alteration No. 21) Act, 2017, provides as follows:
“An appeal from a decision of a Court in a pre-election matter shall be heard and disposed of within 60 days from the date of filing of the appeal.”
My noble lords, the appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on 23/3/18, The appellant’s brief of argument was filed on 16/5/18 but served on the 1st respondent on 7/6/18, Thus, these processes were served and filed outside the required time limited by the law. This Court is certainly divested of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, not having been heard and determined within 60 days of filing of the notice of appeal.”

The Appellant’s challenge to the jurisdiction of lower Court vide a Notice of Preliminary Objection is well founded and ought to have been upheld by the lower Court.

It is not the Rules of a Court or Practice Direction that gives jurisdiction to the lower Court in pre-election matter. It is the Constitution. The lower Court was wrong in hiding under the cloak of Practice Direction that is wholly irrelevant to its jurisdiction in this matter and JUSUN strike which cannot under any figment of imagination whittle down the effect of Section 285(9) of the Constitution. The Court cannot arrogate to itself the jurisdiction it does not possess. See;
1. APC & ORS VS E. S. I. E. C.(2021) 16 NWLR (PART 1801) 1 AT 49 B- H TO 50 A-C per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC who said:-
“Jurisdiction is the lifeblood of any adjudication. It is the foundation of every cause or matter before a Court of law. It is a matter of strict law donated by the Constitution and statutes. Jurisdiction can also be described as the authority of a Court to entertain a matter brought before it. See: Shitta-Bey v. A.G. Federation & Anor. (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 570) 392; Aribisala & Anor. V. Ogunyemi & Ors. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 212; Utih v. Onoyivwe & Ors. (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 166) 166; Umanah v. Attah (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1009) 503. Where the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a cause or matter, any step taken in the proceedings amounts to an exercise in futility. It is null and void. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 387 AT 594, (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; Utih v. Onoyivwe (supra); Estate of Late Chief H.I.S. Idisi v. Ecodril (Nig.) Ltd. & Ors. (2016) All FWLR (Pt. 850) 1016, (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1527) 355; Gwede v. INEC & Ors. (2014) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1438) 56.
Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, provides:
“6(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section-
(b) shall extend to all matters between persons or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person.”
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is conferred by Section 240 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, which provides:
“240. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court of law in Nigeria to hear and determine appeals from the Federal High Court; the National Industrial Court; the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, High Court of State, Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, Sharia Court of Appeal of the State, Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT Abuja, Customary Court of Appeal of a State and from decisions of a Court Martial or other Tribunals as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.”
The law is quite settled that being a creation of the Constitution or a statute, a Court of law can only exercise such jurisdiction as is conferred on it by the law that created it. See National Bank & Anor v. Shoyoye (1977) 5 SC (Reprint) 110; Mobil Producing Nig. Ltd v. L.A.S.E.PA. & Ors. (2002) 14 SCM 167 AT 179, (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1; Nduul v. Wayo(2018) LPELR-4515 (SC) AT 29-30 E-D, (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 548. There is no doubt that it is the duty of a Court of law to interpret and declare the law in accordance with the intention of the lawmaker. See: Eperokun v. University of Lagos (1986) LPELR-1150 (SC) AT 38A, (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 34) 162; Dahiru v. The State (2018) LPELR-44497 (SC) AT A-D, (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1640) 567; Marwa v. Nyako (2012) LPELR-7837 (SC) AT 171 A-C, (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1296) 199.”
2. MS OLUCHI J. ANYANWOKO & ANOR V CHIEF (MRS) CHRISTY O. N. OKOYE & ORS(2010) 5 NWLR (PART 1088) 497 AT 514 A-C per TABAI, JSC who said:-
“In Clement v. Iwuanyanwu ((1989) 3 NWLR (PT. 107) 39 at 50 this Court per Oputa, JSC articulated this principle when he declared:-
“I think it is trite law that Rules of Court are rule of procedure. They do not by themselves and of themselves alone confer jurisdiction. They merely regulate the exercise of a jurisdiction conferred aliunde… “
It is untenable therefore for the appellant to contend that the breach of the provisions of Order 6 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court donated either by the Constitution or by Statute remains unaffected by breaches of Rules of Court. The sustained challenge of this issue of jurisdiction founded on the breach of Order 6 Rule 8 of the Federal Capital Territory High Court Rules, with respect, grossly misplaced, not worth the time and trouble of the Court and even counsel for the parties. “
Issue 2 is hereby resolved in favour of the Appellant.

Where it is shown as in this case that the lower Court lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate on a cause or matter, an Appellate Court will declare such proceedings a nullity. See:-
1. ALHAJI JIBRIN BALA HASSAN VS. DR MUAZU BABANGIDA ALIYU & OTHERS (2010) 11 SCM 69 AT 93 E per ONNOGHEN, JSC, later CJN Rtd. who said:-
“It is trite that jurisdiction is very fundamental to adjudication and that where a Court lacks the competence to hear and determine a matter but proceeds to do so, an appellate Court is duty bound to nullify a decision resulting therefrom.”
I have no doubt in my mind that the 1st Respondent’s action or suit was statute barred and irredeemably incompetent. It did not confer jurisdiction on the lower Court to adjudicate on it. The judgment of the lower Court is also a complete nullity.
The Appellant’s appeal is quite meritorious and it is hereby allowed.

The ruling and the judgment of the Federal Capital Territory High Court Abuja delivered on 16th day of December, 2021 by HON. JUSTICE A. H. MUSA is HEREBY SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower Court.

AN ORDER IS HEREBY MADE STRIKING OUT SUIT NO. FCT/HC/CV/1104/2021: ALHAJI USMAN HALILU VS ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS & ORS for want of jurisdiction on the part of lower Court.

Costs of N200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira) is awarded in favour of the Appellant against the 1st Respondent.

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in draft, the leading judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Peter Olabisi Ige, JCA, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the 1st Respondent’s action was statute barred and that it was a waste of precious judicial time for the lower Court to have exercised jurisdiction to hear the matter. By all odds, the judgment of the lower Court in the diacritical circumstances is a nullity.

Accordingly, having also read the Records of Appeal and the briefs of argument filed and exchanged by the parties, I avouch my concurrence that the appeal is meritorious; I therefore join in allowing the appeal and on the same terms as set out in the leading judgment. I abide by the consequential orders made in the leading judgment, inclusive of the order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.

DANLAMI ZAMA SENCHI, J.C.A.: I was in conference of the Panel of Justices that heard this appeal and I was also privileged to read in draft, the lead judgment of my learned brother, PETER OLABISI IGE, JCA just delivered.

The lead judgment substantially captured all the views I expressed during the conference and I agree with the irresistible conclusion in the lead judgment that the suit at the lower Court was statute barred and the lower Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on same. The appeal therefore succeeds and it is accordingly allowed.

The ruling of the lower Court in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1104/2021 delivered on 16th December, 2021 by A. H. Musa, J. is hereby set aside and struck out for want of jurisdiction.

A cost of N200,000.00 is hereby awarded in favour of the Appellant and against the 1st Respondent.