UMARU v. STATE
(2020)LCN/15732(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(YOLA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Friday, January 10, 2020
CA/YL/06C/19
Before Our Lordships:
Chidi NwaomaUwa Justice of the Court of Appeal
James Shehu Abiriyi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Abdullahi Mahmud Bayero Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
LUKA UMARU APPELANT(S)
And
THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO:
THE PROSECUTION IS NOT DUTY BOUND TO PRODUCE OR TENDER EVIDENCE
See, SIMON VS. STATE (2017) LPELR 41988 (SC), P. 13 – 14, PARA. C and STATE VS. FADEZI (2018) LPELR – 44731 (SC) P. 27 PARAS. D – G. In ESENE VS. STATE (2017) LPELR – 41912 (SC) P. 41, PARAS. A – E, his lordship, Ogunbiyi, JSC held thus:
“Further still and to show that the prosecution is not duty bound to produce the knife, there is no legal obligation on the prosecution to produce or tender the knife in evidence. The lower Court was clear and could not be faulted on this point when it held at page 148 of the record and said: – “Let me mention here and now, that it is not the law that the firearms, or the offensive weapons used must be tendered in proof by prosecution to commission of armed robbery. This issue has since been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of FATAI OLAYINKA VS. THE STATE 130 NSCQB 149 at PAGES 162 – 163.” It is a settled principle thereforethat the failure of the prosecution to tender the knife used by the appellant in attacking PW1 did not in any way water down the credible and unchallenged evidence that the appellant committed armed robbery against PW1 on 23/12/2006.” CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.
THE DUTY OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE ITS CASE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
It is the duty of the prosecution in any and every criminal matter to prove its case “beyond reasonable doubt”. Such proof is not beyond all shadow or iota of doubt. See, SMART VS. STATE (supra), STATE VS. ONYEUKWU (2004) LPELR – 3116 (SC) PP. 44 – 45, PARAS. G – E, EZEANI VS. F.R.N. (2019) LPELR – 46800 (SC) P. 23, PARAS. A – C, NWATURUOCHA VS. THE STATE (2011) 6 NWLR (PT. 1242) 170; (2011) 2 – 3 SC (PT. 1) P. 111; (2012) 6 NWLR (PT. 1242) 170 and AUDU VS. FRN (2018) LPELR – 45642 (CA) PP. 32 – 33, PARAS. D – E. In NWATURUOCHA VS. THE STATE (supra) his lordship, Fabiyi, JSC defined proof beyond reasonable doubt thus:
“Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt, or all shadow of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence. A degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability.” CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.
A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE WITHOUT OBJECTION
The position of the law is that when a confessional statement is admitted in evidence without objection from the appellant or his counsel, the implication is that the maker of the statement agrees with everything in the statement. It also means that the maker made the statement voluntarily and it is the truth on the issue of the role he played in the crime. By the provisions of Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011, a confessional statement is a direct acknowledgment of guilt. CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.
THE VOLUNTARY CONFESSION OF GUILT MADE BY AN ACCUSED PERSON
It is the law that a voluntary confession of guilt made by an accused person if it is direct, positive and proved, is enough to warrant a conviction without any corroboration, contrary to the argument of the learned counsel to the appellant. Exhibit “C – C1” coming from the horse’s mouth so as to say is stronger than the evidence of an eye witness. See, QUEEN VS. ITULE (1961) 2 SC NLR P. 183, AREMU VS. STATE (1991) 7 NWLR (PT. 201) P. 1, JIMOH YESUFU VS. STATE (1976). It is the law that an accused person can be convicted on his confessionalstatement alone, even where retracted without corroboration. See, IDOWU VS. STATE (2000) LPELR – 1429 (SC) PP. 44 – 45, PARAS. F – A, where his lordship, Wali, JSC stated the position of the law thus:
“…a mere retraction of a voluntary confessional statement by an accused person does not render it inadmissible or worthless and untrue in considering his guilt. See, R. V. SYKES (1913) 8 CR. APP. 233 and KANU VS. THE KING 14 WACA 30. If the confessional statement is satisfactorily proved, a conviction founded on it without more, will be sustained by an appellate Court. See, THE QUEEN VS. OBIASA (1962) 1 ALL NLR 645; PAUL ONOCHIE & 7 ORS VS. THE REPUBLIC (1966) NMLR 307; OBUE VS. THE STATE (1976) 2 SC 141 and JIMOH YESUFU VS. THE STATE (1976) 6 SC 167.” CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF THE LAW ON PROVING A VOLUNTARY STATEMENT
The position of the law is that once an extra judicial confession, as in the present has been proved to be made voluntarily; it amounts to the guilt of the accused/appellant. A conviction would be held to be good, irrespective of the fact that the accused person resiled or retracted in his testimony in Court. The retraction is an afterthought. At page 194 of the printed records, the trial Court rightly held thus:
“It is my finding that the narration of events surrounding the commission of the offence as contained in Exhibits A – A1, B – B1 and C – C1 are consistent with the prosecution’s led evidence before this Court.”
CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.
CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appeal is against the judgment of the Adamawa State High Court of Justice in case No. ADSY/17C/2017, delivered by A. WAZIRI, J. (hereafter referred to as the trial Court) on 10th day of April, 2018 wherein the Appellant (as 1st accused) and two others were found guilty of the offences of conspiracy to commit armed robbery while armed with offensive weapon, contrary to Section 6(b), punishable under Section 1(2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, Cap R11 Laws of the Federation 2004, robbery while armed with offensive weapons punishable under Section 1(2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, Cap R11 Laws of the Federation 2004 and culpable homicide punishable with death, contrary to Sections 79 and 221 (a) of the Penal Code respectively.
The appellant being dissatisfied with the judgment, appealed against his conviction and sentence for the offences charged.
The background facts are that the appellant was arraigned with two others (Hamisu Sani and RabiuAlh. Wada) before the trial Court on a three count charge of conspiracy to commit robbery while armed with offensive weapons, robbery while armed with offensive weapons, both punishable under the Robbery and Firearms Act and culpable homicide punishable with death contrary to Sections 79 and 221(a) of the Penal Code.
At the trial, on arraignment the appellant and the two others pleaded not guilty to the three count charge. The prosecution called four witnesses who testified as PW1 – PW4 and tendered three Exhibit (Exhibits “A – A1”, extra judicial statement of the 2nd accused at the trial, Exhibit “B – B1”, the extra judicial statement of the 3rd accused at the trial and Exhibit “C – C1”, the extra judicial statement of the 1st Accused, now appellant. The extra judicial statements of the 2nd and 3rd accused persons were admitted in evidence after a trial within trial while the statement of the Appellant was admitted in evidence without any objection from the defence.
On the part of the defence, the Appellant and the two others each testified in his defence as DW1, DW2 and DW3 respectively, tendered no document and closed his defence.
The Appellant distilled four issues for the determination of the appeal thus:
1. “Was the Trial Court not wrong when it relied solely on Exhibit “C – C1” which was retracted by the Appellant and lacks independent corroboration, in convicting and sentencing the Appellant? (Distilled from Grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal.)
2. Was the Trial Court not wrong when it held that the Respondent proved against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt the offence of Conspiracy to commit Armed Robbery, convicted and sentenced the Appellant to death? (Distilled from Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal.)
3. Was the Trial Court not wrong when it held that the Respondent proved against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt the offence of Culpable Homicide punishable with death, convicted and sentenced the Appellant to death? (Distilled from Grounds 4, 6 and 7 of the Notice of Appeal).
4. Was the trial Court not wrong when it held that the Respondent proved against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt the offence of Armed Robbery, convicted and sentenced the Appellant to death? (Distilled from Ground 5 of the Notice of Appeal.)”
The Respondent on her part formulated two issues for the determination of the appeal thus:
(a) “Whether the learned trial judge was not right to have convicted and sentenced the appellant based on Exhibits C, C1 along with other legal evidence adduced before him. (Distilled from grounds 1 & 2 of the appellant grounds of appeal)
(b) Whether from the totality of evidence adduced by the respondent before the trial high Court in proof of the offences on account of which the appellant was charged, the essential ingredients of the offences had been proved beyond (sic) (Distilled from grounds 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7 of the appellant grounds of appeal)
In arguing the appeal, the learned counsel to the Appellant Fred Onuobia Esq. adopted and relied on his brief of argument filed on 8/2/19, deemed properly filed on 4/4/19 and his reply brief filed on 23/5/19 but, deemed properly filed on 15/10/19 as his argument in the appeal in urging us to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower Court, discharge and acquit the appellant.
In arguing his first issue, the learned counsel to the appellant submitted that the trial Court ought not to have relied on Exhibit C– C1 the retracted statement of the Appellant which was not corroborated in convicting and sentencing the Appellant which led to a miscarriage of justice. See, GABRIEL VS. THE STATE (2010) 6 NWLR (PT. 1190) 280 at 327. It was agreed that a retracted statement made by an accused is admissible. Further, that such admissibility goes to the weight or probative value to be attached to a retracted confession. See, ONAFOWOKAN VS. STATE (1986) 2 NWLR (PT. 23) P. 496, BASIL AKPA VS. THE STATE (2008) LPELR – 368 (SC), OCHE VS. THE STATE (2006) LPELR – 11634 (CA), QUEEN VS. ITULE (1961) 1 ALL NLR 462 and ASANYA VS.STATE (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 180) 422. It was argued that the Court could convict on a confessional statement if it is positive, direct and unequivocal but, where retracted, such statement would require corroboration. See, OKOH VS. THE STATE (2014) LPELR – 22589), IFEDAYO VS. STATE (2018) LPELR – 44378 (SC), AZABADA VS. STATE (2014) LPELR – 23017 (SC) and STATE VS. MUHAMMED MASIGA (TSOLO)(2017) LPELR – 43474 (SC). It was submitted that the evidence of the PW1 and PW2 lacked corroborative value. It was argued that the evidence of the PW1 is hearsay and that PW2 had recorded Exhibit “C – C1”. See, EGBUJI VS. STATE (2014) LPELR – 24092 (CA). Similarly, that the evidence of the PW3 did not contain any allegation against the Appellant. The evidence of the PW4 was also termed as hearsay and lacked corroborative value. Further, that the evidence of the PW1 – PW4 being hearsay cannot provide the independent corroboration of Exhibit “C – C1”. See, UWA VS. STATE (2015) 4 NWLR (PT. 1450) 438 at 471 – 472, G – B. Further, that Exhibits “A – A1” and “B – B1” did not corroborate Exhibit “C – C1” because a confession is only relevant to the maker and not against any other person unless the other person has adopted the statement. See, EMEKA VS. STATE (2001) 14 NWLR (PT. 734) 666, IGAGO VS. STATE (1999) 15 NWLR (PT. 637) 1 and STATE VS. GWANGWAN (2015) 13 NWLR (PT. 1477) 600 at 625 C – E. We were urged to apply the test as laid down in R. VS. SYKES (1913) 8 CAR APPEAL NO. 233, follows:
1. Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true?
2. Whether the statement was corroborated?
3. Whether the statement made in the confessional statement, so far as can be tested from surrounding facts, is true?
4. Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence charged?
5. Whether the confession is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and which have been proved?
See, ODUNAYO VS. THE STATE (2014) 12 NWLR (PT. 1420) 1 and SUBERU VS. STATE (2010) 6 NWLR (PT. 1197) 586 at 614 – 615 G – A. It was argued on the other hand that Exhibit “C – C1” was recorded in English language whereas the appellant gave his statement in Hausa Language and that it is settled that the statement of an accused must be written in the language in which he made it. See, AJIDAHUN VS. STATE (1991) 9 NWLR (PT. 213) 33 at 34, E – G, QUEEN VS. SAPELE (1957) SC NLR 307 and OKORO VS. QUEEN (1960) SC NLR 292 at 136. It was argued that any doubt as to the Appellant’s involvement should be resolved in his favour. See, AZEEZ VS. THE STATE (2005) 8 NWLR (PT. 927) 312at 326, G – H and DURU VS. NWOSU (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 113) 24. It was concluded onthis issue that the trial Court ought not to have relied on Exhibit “C – C1” in convicting the Appellant because it was not recorded by the Appellant but, he was tortured to sign it. Also, no independent corroboration was sought before the trial Court relied on Exhibit “C – C1”, which led to a miscarriage of justice.
On his second issue, the learned counsel to the Appellant submitted that the trial Court was wrong to have held that the Respondent proved the offence of conspiracy to commit Armed Robbery beyond reasonable doubt for which the appellant was convicted and sentenced by the trial Court. The three ingredients that must exist to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit Armed Robbery were given as follows:
1. That there was an agreement or conspiracy between the accused and others to commit the offence.
2. That in furtherance of the agreement or confederacy, the accused took part in the commission of the armed robbery or series of robberies;
3. That the robberies or each robbery was an armed robbery.
It was submitted that the three ingredients must co-exist, see, OKOH VS. THE STATE(supra) and USUFU VS. THE STATE (2007) 3 NWLR (PT. 1020) 94 at 113 – 114 H – I. It was argued that the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt is on the prosecution. See, Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011, STATE VS. ONYEKWU (2004) ALL FWLR (PT. 221) 1388 at 1425 and IGABELE VS. STATE (2004) 15 NWLR (PT. 896) 314 at 344. Further, that the respondent did not prove any of the ingredients enumerated above. Also, that there was no common criminal intention formed with the 2nd and 3rd accused persons. See, MUSTAPHA VS. THE STATE (2016) LPELR – 40081 (CA), AKINKUNMI VS. THE STATE (1987) 3 SC 152 and OGBALI VS. STATE (1983) 1 SC NLR 161. The learned counsel agreed that the law does not require conspirators to physically meet before a common criminal intention can be formed, because it could be inferred from circumstances described in the evidence led before the trial Court. See, ALARAPE VS. THE STATE (2001) LPELR – 412 (SC). It was submitted that the Appellant, 2nd and 3rd accused persons did not know each other. See, IBE VS. IBHAZE (2016) LPELR – 41556 (CA), OLA VS. STATE (2018) LPELR – 44983 (SC). Further, that the evidence of the 2ndAccused was not challenged when he stated that he did not know the Appellant and the 3rd accused, he met them for the first time at SCIID, Yola.
It was submitted that proof of common intention is a condition precedent before an accused could be found guilty of conspiracy. See,ELE VS. THE STATE (2006) LPELR – 11649 (CA)and ODUNAYO VS. STATE (2014) 12 NWLR (PT. 1420) 1. It was concluded on this issue that the trial Court was wrong to have convicted the appellant of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and sentenced him to death by hanging despite the absence of proof of common criminal intention in the evidence led by the Respondent at the trial Court.
In arguing issue three, the learned counsel submitted that the Respondent did not prove the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death for which the Appellant was convicted and sentenced. It was submitted that the following ingredients must be proved to establish the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death:
1. That the deceased died
2. That the death of the deceased resulted from the act of the accused person, and
3. That the act or omission of the accused person,which caused the death of the deceased, was intentional with full knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.
It was submitted that the three ingredients must co-exist. See, MAIYAKI VS. THE STATE (2008) 15 NWLR (PT. 1109) 173 at 192 – 193, G – B. Further, that the death of the deceased was not proved to have been as a result of the act of the Appellant. See, EGBEYOM VS. THE STATE (2000) LPELR – 6790 (CA). Further, that the PW1 – PW4 in their evidence did not establish the death of the deceased. Learned counsel agreed that the cause of death could be inferred from the circumstances of the case. It was argued that there were no peculiar circumstances for the inference but, the Court wrongly relied on Exhibit “C – C1” to convict the appellant.
Further, that the alleged weapon used in committing the alleged crime was not tendered in evidence. It was submitted that none of the Respondent’s witnesses testified that they saw the Appellant kill the deceased. It was submitted that the Court was wrong to have relied on Exhibit “C – C1” the retracted statement ofthe Appellant which was not corroborated. See, AIGUOREGHIAN VS. STATE (2004) 3 NWLR (PT. 680) 367 at 408 – 409, A – A, R. VS. OLEDINMA (1940) 6 WACA 202 and OMOGODO VS. THE STATE (1981) 5 SC 5, at 26 – 27. It was submitted that the Respondent at the trial failed to prove the offence of Culpable Homicide beyond reasonable doubt. See, ADEYEYE VS. STATE (1968) NMLR 48, NJOVENS VS. STATE (1973) 1 NMLR 331 and OLUWATOYIN ABOKOKUYANRO VS. THE STATE (2016) LPELR – 40107 (SC), AIGBADION VS. STATE (2000) 7 NWLR (PT. 666) 686 at 704, B. It was submitted that the Respondent needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the following:
a. The death of a person occurred.
b. The Appellant caused the death of the deceased.
c. There was intention of the Appellant to cause the death of the deceased or the Appellant knew that death would be the probable consequence of his act.
See, BAKARE VS. STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 52) 579.
In arguing his fourth issue, it was submitted that the Respondent did not prove that the Appellant committed the offence of Armed Robbery beyond reasonable doubt. The essential elements that must be established for theoffence of Armed Robbery were given as follows:
1. A robbery took place;
2. The person who committed the offence of robbery was armed; and
3. The Accused was the person or one of the persons who committed the act of Robbery.
See, ADEKOYA VS. STATE (2012) 9 NWLR (PT. 1306), TANKO VS. STATE (2009) 4 NWLR (PT. 1131) 430), ADEBAYO VS. STATE (2014) 12 NWLR (PT. 1424) 613 and IKARIA VS. STATE (2014) 1 NWLR (PT. 1389) 638. It was submitted that from the evidence of the PW3 and PW4, there is nothing to show that twelve (12) cows were stolen by the Appellant and two others. Further, that the PW3 and PW4 did not witness the taking away of the cows, pages 132 and 136 of the printed records of appeal. It was submitted that there is no evidence linking the Appellant to the alleged Armed Robbery. Further, that the Respondent needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was a Robbery. See, IKARIA VS. STATE (2012) LPELR – 15533 (SC). It was submitted that Exhibit “C – C1” has no evidential value and ought not to have been relied upon by the trial Court. It was concluded on this issue that the Respondent did not prove thatthere was an armed robbery. Further, that none of the Respondent’s witnesses was an eye witness and that doubt in the Respondent’s case ought to have been resolved in favour of the appellant. See, ONYENYE VS. THE STATE (2012) LPELR – 7866 (SC), SALE VS. STATE (2016) 3 NWLR (PT. 1499) 392 at 423. D – E and 424 B – C and AJAYI VS. STATE (supra) at PAGES 231 – 232, G – A.
The learned counsel to the Respondent, Z. Y. Usman Esq. Senior State Counsel II, Adamawa State Ministry of Justice, adopted and relied on his brief of argument filed on 2/5/19 as his argument in this appeal. In arguing his issue one, it was submitted that in criminal trials, the guilt of the accused person could be established by the following means:
a. By evidence of eye witnesses.
b. Confessional statement.
c. Circumstantial Evidence.
See, GODWIN IGABELE II VS. THE STATE (2007) 2 NCC, 125, R.6. It was submitted that “proof beyond reasonable doubt” is not proof beyond all iota of doubt. See, EMMANUEL IKE VS. THE STATE (2011) 200 LRCN 143 at 149, RATIO 9, FRIDAY SMART VS. THE STATE (2016) 9 NWLR (PT. 1518) 447 at 479– 480, PARAS. G – B, THE STATE VS. EKANEM (2017) 4 NWLR (PT. 1554) 85 at 105, PARAS. E – F and AKALEZI VS. THE STATE (1993) 2 NWLR (PT. 273) 1 at 13. It was submitted that Exhibit “C – C1” was tendered and admitted in evidence without any objection. Further, that Exhibit “C – C1” linked the Appellant with the cause of death of the deceased, also that the Exhibit was voluntarily made and the best evidence, having been made by the Appellant. See, BASIL AKPA VS. THE STATE (2008) 163 LRCN 186 at 192 R. 9 at 203 – 208.
Further, that corroboration of the confessional statement is desirable not mandatory. See, EGBOGHONOME VS. STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (PT. 309) 383, KIM VS. STATE (1992) 4 NWLR (PT. 233) 17, NNAMDI OSUAGWU VS. STATE (2013) LPELR – 19823 (SC)and KINGSLEY JOE ISONG VS. STATE (2016) LPELR – 40609 (SC). It was stressed that the confessional statement is true since there was no objection when it was tendered and should be treated as the truth of the appellant’s role in the commission of the offences for which he stood trial, convicted and sentenced. See, JOSEPH DANIEL UWA VS. THE STATE (2015) 4 NWLR (PT. 1450) 430 at 458, PARAS. B – G, IKEMSON VS. STATE (1989) 3 NWLR (PT. 110) 455; (1989) 6 S.C. (PT. 1) 114 at 119 – 120 and MBANG VS.STATE (2013) 7 NWLR (PT. 1257) 48 at 71, PARAS. B – C. It was submitted that after retracting his statement the appellant failed to explain the inconsistency between his statement and his evidence in Court. See, SULE MUA VS. THE STATE (2018) 13 NWLR (PT. 1636) 307at 315, PARAS. B – C. We were urged to find the Appellant’s testimony unreliable as it is inconsistent with his statement to the police, Exhibit “C – C1”. See, EGBOGHONOME VS. THE STATE (1993) SC NJ 1 at 21 – 22, IKEMSON VS. THE STATE (1989) 3 NWLR (PT. 110) 455, NSOFOR VS. THE STATE (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 905) 292, DIBIE VS. THE STATE (2007) 9 NWLR (PT. 1083) 30 and SIMON VS. THE STATE (2017) 8 NWLR (PT. 1566) 119 at 140 – 141. Also, STEPHEN OMOGA VS. THE STATE (1997) 7 SC NJ 518 at 529 and ANYASODOR VS.THE STATE (2018) 8 NWLR (PT. 1620) PAGE 107 at 114, PARAS. C – E at 125. The evidence of the PW1 – PW3 was reviewed to the effect that the deceased (Emmanuel Mika) had died and hisremains released to his relatives after a post mortem examination had been carried out to ascertain the cause of death. It was argued that the evidence of the PW1 – PW3 corroborated the contents of Exhibit “C – C1” as to the circumstances leading to the death of the deceased. It was concluded on this issue that the evidence of the PW2 is not hearsay contrary to the submissions of the learned counsel to the Appellant.
On the Respondent’s second issue, on whether the ingredients of the offence of conspiracy were not proved from the evidence adduced at the trial, it was submitted that in Exhibit “C – C1” the appellant’s cautionary statement, the appellant gave details of his level of participation in the offences charged. It was stressed that Exhibit “C – C1” was tendered in evidence without any objection, see, BASIL AKPA VS. THE STATE (2008) 163 LRCN 186 at 192 at 203, PARAS. JJ – 208A. It was submitted that it is difficult to prove the offence of conspiracy by direct evidence; it could be inferred from the criminal acts of the parties in pursuance of a criminal purpose. See,WAHEED BALOGUN VS. THE STATE (2018) 13 NWLR (PT. 1636)321 at 331, PARAS. G – H and ERIM VS. THE STATE (1994) 4 NWLR (PT. 346) 522 at 535. It was submitted that the evidence of the PW1 – PW4 made it clear that the appellant had a hand in the disappearance of Emmanuel Mika, the twelve (12) cows, and the murder of the said Emmanuel. It was argued that the respondent proved the common intention of the appellant alongside his co-accused persons.
On the offence of culpable homicide, it was submitted that the ingredients were proved; reference was made to the evidence of the PW1, page 128 of the printed records of appeal. Similarly, it was argued that the evidence of the PW2, PW3 and PW4 as well as Exhibit C – C1, proved that Emmanuel Mika died and that the appellant and others caused his death with a common intention. See,ALARAPE VS. THE STATE (2001) 5 NWLR (PT. 705) 79 at 102 – 103, PARAS. H – B. It was argued that the trial Court was right to have convicted and sentenced the appellant for culpable homicide punishable with death contrary to Section 221 of the Penal Code same having been proved by the respondent.It was submitted that the ingredients for conviction for the offence of armed robbery were established againstthe appellant. Further, that the prosecution established that there was a robbery or series of robberies, the robbery or each robbery was an armed robbery and that the appellant was one of those that took part in the armed robbery. It was submitted that the evidence of the PW3, PW4 and the contents of Exhibit “C – C1” made it clear that the burden was discharged at the trial Court by the prosecution. See,SUBERU VS. STATE (2010) 8 NWLR (PT. 1197) at 586 and ATTAH VS. STATE (2010) 10 NWLR (PT. 1201) at 190.
In reply, the learned counsel to the Appellant submitted that the trial Court ought not to have relied on Exhibit “C – C1” a retracted confessional statement to convict and sentence the appellant without independent evidence before the trial Court from which a conclusion could be arrived at that the Appellant committed the offences charged. See, R. VS. SKYES (supra) adopted in AKPAN VS. STATE (1992) 6 NWLR (PT. 248) 439 at 460 B – D. It was stressed that PW1 and PW2 (Police Officers) were not at the scene of thecrime. Also, that PW4 a farmer testified that he did not know who killed the deceased. See, IMEPURUNGU VS. THE STATE (2019) LPELR – 47047 (CA), MOHAMMED VS. THE STATE (2019) LPELR – 47045 (CA), GABRIEL VS. THE STATE (2010) 6 NWLR (PT. 1190) 280 at 327 and SUBERU VS. THE STATE (2010) 6 NWLR (PT. 1197) 586 at 614 – 615, G – A. It was argued that the appellant is not required to explain the difference between his testimony and the contents of Exhibit “C – C1”, a statement he denied making.
The issues as formulated by the parties are similar. The Appellant’s issue one (1) is similar to the Respondent’s issue (a) while the Appellant’s issues 2, 3 and 4 are covered by the Respondent’s issue (b). I would resolve the issues as formulated by the Appellant. Exhibit “C – C1” is the Appellant’s retracted confessional statement to the Police which the learned counsel argued that the trial Court ought not to have relied solely on in convicting the Appellant. It is the duty of the prosecution in any and every criminal matter to prove its case “beyond reasonable doubt”.Such proof is not beyond all shadow or iota of doubt. See, SMART VS. STATE (supra), STATE VS. ONYEUKWU (2004) LPELR – 3116 (SC) PP. 44 – 45, PARAS. G – E, EZEANI VS. F.R.N. (2019) LPELR – 46800 (SC) P. 23, PARAS. A – C, NWATURUOCHA VS. THE STATE (2011) 6 NWLR (PT. 1242) 170; (2011) 2 – 3 SC (PT. 1) P. 111; (2012) 6 NWLR (PT. 1242) 170 and AUDU VS. FRN (2018) LPELR – 45642 (CA) PP. 32 – 33, PARAS. D – E. In NWATURUOCHA VS. THE STATE (supra) his lordship, Fabiyi, JSC defined proof beyond reasonable doubt thus:
“Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt, or all shadow of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence. A degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability.”
Exhibit “C – C1” was tendered at the trial Court without objection and linked the Appellant with the cause of death of the deceased. The appellant’s learned counsel has not argued that the statement was objected to when sought to be tendered at the trial Court by the PW2 (Sgt. Amos Ishaku)at page 129 of the printed records of appeal. The position of the law is that when a confessional statement is admitted in evidence without objection from the appellant or his counsel, the implication is that the maker of the statement agrees with everything in the statement. It also means that the maker made the statement voluntarily and it is the truth on the issue of the role he played in the crime. By the provisions of Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011, a confessional statement is a direct acknowledgment of guilt. Once it is a voluntary admission of his participation in crime, it is a confession. It is the law that a voluntary confession of guilt made by an accused person if it is direct, positive and proved, is enough to warrant a conviction without any corroboration, contrary to the argument of the learned counsel to the appellant. Exhibit “C – C1” coming from the horse’s mouth so as to say is stronger than the evidence of an eye witness. See, QUEEN VS. ITULE (1961) 2 SC NLR P. 183, AREMU VS. STATE (1991) 7 NWLR (PT. 201) P. 1, JIMOH YESUFU VS. STATE (1976). It is the law that an accused person can be convicted on his confessionalstatement alone, even where retracted without corroboration. See, IDOWU VS. STATE (2000) LPELR – 1429 (SC) PP. 44 – 45, PARAS. F – A, where his lordship, Wali, JSC stated the position of the law thus:
“…a mere retraction of a voluntary confessional statement by an accused person does not render it inadmissible or worthless and untrue in considering his guilt. See, R. V. SYKES (1913) 8 CR. APP. 233 and KANU VS. THE KING 14 WACA 30. If the confessional statement is satisfactorily proved, a conviction founded on it without more, will be sustained by an appellate Court. See, THE QUEEN VS. OBIASA (1962) 1 ALL NLR 645; PAUL ONOCHIE & 7 ORS VS. THE REPUBLIC (1966) NMLR 307; OBUE VS. THE STATE (1976) 2 SC 141 and JIMOH YESUFU VS. THE STATE (1976) 6 SC 167.”
See, MUMUNI & ORS VS. STATE (1975) LPELR – 1926 (SC) P. 18 PARAS. D – E and DARLINTON VS. FRN (2018) LPELR – 43850 (SC) PP. 17 – 18, PARAS. D – A. The learned Senior State Counsel was right to have submitted that in the present case, the Respondent was not under any legal obligation to elicit any independent evidence to corroborate theconfessional statement of the appellant, Exhibit “C – C1” for a conviction. The important thing is that the confession has been found to be voluntarily made and true. In the present case, it is true in that the appellant and his counsel did not object to its being tendered, therefore it is voluntary and the question of its voluntariness did not arise which would have entailed a trial within trial. See, EGBOGHONOME VS. THE STATE (1993) (supra), DEMO OSENI VS. THE STATE (2012) 5 NWLR (PT. 1293) 351, ACHABUA VS. STATE (1976) LPELR – 63 (SC) P. 8, PARAS. A – C, KOPA VS. STATE (1971) LPELR – 1702 (SC) PP. 3 – 4, PARA. E and JOHN VS. STATE (2019) LPELR – 46936 (SC) P. 17, PARAS. E – G. On the issue of corroboration, or lack of it as argued by the learned counsel to the appellant, it is only desirable and not mandatory, moreso, where the confessional statement has been proved to be true as in the present case where, the statement was tendered without any objection. In Exhibit “C – C1” the appellant in a precise detail clearly stated that he masterminded the act of causing the death of Emmanuel Mika who he knewvery well prior to the incident of 10/1/2016, with his friends. The appellant gave a precise account of the role each of his friends played in hitting the deceased with a stick on his head, he fell, his throat was slit before he was slaughtered while he the appellant was on the lookout/guard and gave cover to his friends incase a passerby came along. The Appellant was armed with a knife which he handed over to his friend JakaRabiu as they approached the scene. The deceased was slaughtered so that the cows he reared could be taken away, which the appellant and his friends succeeded in doing, Pages 97 – 100 of the printed records of appeal. The Appellant admitted that he and his friends killed Emmanuel Mika and that they left his corpse in the bush while they instructed their friend and colleague Hamisu to carry the cows to Mubi from where the cows would be taken to Lagos for sale. The Appellant admitted causing the death of the deceased. The Appellant testified as the DW1 in open Court and resiled from making the statement, which in my humble opinion was belated. If the appellant had reason to fault or challenge his statement, it should have been at thepoint it was sought to be tendered by the prosecution at the trial. On the other hand, the appellant failed to explain to the Court in his evidence at the trial, the reason for the inconsistency or retraction of his statement. At page 138 of the printed records of appeal, the Appellant denied making Exhibit C, his testimony was as follows:
“Exhibit ‘C’ which I deny making to the Police at the SCIID. It was my first time of seeing them. I have never known the other co-accused persons prior to my arrest.”
The above oral testimony in Court is contrary to the contents of Exhibit C, C1 where the appellant confessed to having committed the offences charged with his friends the co-accused persons. He had given a detailed account of how he planned and executed the slaughtering of Emmanuel Micah with his friends, his co-accused persons. The position of the law is that once an extra judicial confession, as in the present has been proved to be made voluntarily; it amounts to the guilt of the accused/appellant. A conviction would be held to be good, irrespective of the fact that the accused person resiled or retracted in his testimony inCourt. The retraction is an afterthought. At page 194 of the printed records, the trial Court rightly held thus:
“It is my finding that the narration of events surrounding the commission of the offence as contained in Exhibits A – A1, B – B1 and C – C1 are consistent with the prosecution’s led evidence before this Court.”
The trial Court was right to have convicted the appellant on his resiled statement. Without sentiment, where a man has confessed to his crime, later at the trial changes his mind about the confession, walks away a free man merely because he had a change of mind, it would surely make a mockery of the trial and the criminal justice system. Allowing such a precedent to extra judicial confession of an accused person would not only be dangerous and make the society to be riddled with unimaginable crime and insecurity, it would open the flood gate of retraction of all confessional statements made by an accused person to the police to ensure his freedom by merely retracting his statement. This would certainly not be good or safe for the society.
Since I have held that a confessional statement whichhas been proved to be positive and true does not need corroboration, there would have been no need to go through the evidence of the PW1 – PW4 as to whether it corroborated the contents of Exhibit “C – C1” as challenged by the learned counsel to the Appellant but, I will briefly touch on it. The PW1 was one of the investigating Police Officers, he gave evidence that he visited the hospital and the deceased body was released to the relatives. The PW2 who obtained Exhibit “C – C1” from the appellant testified that he visited the scene of crime in the farm where there were blood stains, he recovered the body which was taken to the hospital where a post mortem examination was conducted confirming that the deceased was slaughtered and that he was also present when the body was released to the relatives. Similarly, the evidence of the PW3 is to the effect that Emmanuel Mika died. From the evidence of the PW1 – PW3, there is no doubt that Emmanuel Mika died and that his slaughtered body was recovered from the farm where the incident took place. The observation of the PW1 – PW3 clearly corroborated the contents of Exhibit“C – C1” to the effect that Emmanuel Mika was slaughtered in the farm; his body was recovered and later released to his relatives. I am of the view that the prosecution provided corroborative evidence which supported the contents of Exhibit “C – C1”, where the appellant confessed to have slaughtered the deceased in company of his friends. The test in R. VS. SYKES (1913) (supra) was satisfied, which the Courts adopted inKANU VS. R. (1952) 14 WACA P. 30, J. DAWA VS. STATE (1980) 8 – 11 SC P. 236 and KOPA VS. STATE (1971) 1 ALL NLR, P. 150. The PW4 also testified to the fact that his cows were missing and that the deceased that took them to graze never returned. As I stated earlier in this judgment, it is desirable but, not mandatory that some evidence outside the confession is available, however slight, of circumstance which makes it probable that the confession is true. In the present case, the confession is true and I have earlier held so since neither the appellant nor his counsel objected to Exhibit “C – C1” being tendered in evidence at the trial, it was a free and voluntary confession proved to thesatisfaction of the trial Court, which I cannot fault as enough proof of guilt without any corroboration.
It was argued that the PW2 obtained Exhibit “C – C1” under duress. As I stated earlier in this judgment, any objection to the voluntariness or otherwise of Exhibit “C – C1” should have been at the point when it was tendered and not now on appeal. On this note, I discountenance the argument of the learned counsel to the appellant to the effect that the evidence of the PW2 is hearsay and therefore unreliable, instead I find same to be direct and positive having obtained Exhibit “C – C1” directly from the Appellant. Similarly, the evidence of the PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4 is not hearsay as the witnesses gave evidence of what they saw and what they found as a fact. I resolve the appellant’s issue one against him.
The Appellant’s second issue is whether the trial Court was wrong to have held that the Respondent proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the offence of conspiracy to commit Armed Robbery, convicted and sentenced the Appellant to death? In proof of the offenceof conspiracy to commit Armed Robbery, the following ingredients must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
a. That there was an agreement or confederacy between the accused and others to commit the offence.
b. That in furtherance of the agreement or confederacy, the accused took part in the commission of the robbery or series of robberies.
c. That the robbery or each robbery was an armed robbery.
See, USUFU VS. STATE (2007) 3 NWLR (PT. 1020) 94 AT 113 – 114, H – A, OKOH VS. THE STATE (supra), ADEYEMO VS. STATE (2010) LPELR – 3622 (CA) PP. 30 – 31, PARAS. F – B and TAIYE VS. STATE (2018) LPELR – 44466 (SC) PP. 21 – 22, PARA. B. Conspiracy simply is an agreement by two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or an act which is illegal but, by illegal means. The mere agreement alone constitutes the offence of conspiracy and it is therefore immaterial to prove that the act was in fact committed. The essential element here to prove conspiracy to commit armed robbery lies in the agreement and association to do an unlawful thing or act which is forbidden by law. The accused person neednot have knowledge of its unlawfulness. See, OBIAKOR VS. THE STATE (2002) 6 SC PT. II, 33 at 39/40 and BALOGUN VS. AG.OGUN STATE (2002) 2 SC (PT. 11) 89. The Appellant in Exhibit ‘C – C1’ gave a clear account of the role he played by stating clearly how he masterminded and carried out the heinous act of armed robbery with his friends and at pages 97 – 99 of the printed records of appeal stated as follows:
“On the 10/1/2016 at about 0910 hrs, I invited one of my bossom friend by name Ali Bassa ‘M’ who we lived together with at Lagos for the past four years. I met Ali Bassa at Indian Helm Joint (sic) and from there we became friends because am an Indian Helm Smocker also. So that very day I call Ali Bassa, so that we will go into the bush to steal cow, initially there was a boy by name Emmanuel Micah who used to rear cattles for my brother and also our neighbours, so we target the boy to be our prey. My friend Ali Bassa invited (three) two guys by name Hamisu in and Saka Rabiu, we later became four in number, and we all agreed to carry out the stealing operation together. At about 9.30 hrs of the same date we all headto the bush for our operation, as we reached the bush we met the said Emmanuel ‘M’ rearing cattles so being that the said Emmanuel know by face I didn’t go close to him. I allow the three of my friends to go and meet him, and while going to the bush I carry a knife along with me and as we reached bush I gave JakaRabiu the knife, also at the bush Ali Bassa, pick a stick and armed himself with it, as soon as they saw Emmanuel they pretend as if they were there for peace, all of a sudden Ali Bassa ‘M’ hit the said Emmanuel with a stick on his neck and he collapsed immediately, then JakaRabiu ‘M’ decided to slaughter the said Emmanuel while I gave them cover, observing anybody that my pass through that route. We killed the said Emmanuel ‘M’ and left his corpse laying in the bush; while we instruct Hamisu ‘M’ to carry the cows to Mubi in order to convey them to Lagos State to sell. I came back home and kept mute, while Ali Bassa, and JakaRabiu ‘M’ went back to Mubi where they resided. But I fell out of luck when Police arrested Hamisu ‘M’ at Mubi, and from there I was laterarrested by the Police. While Ali Bassa and JakaRabiu flee to unknown destination. To be frank Ali Bassa ‘M’ is my bossom friend, but I have never being to their house at Mubi, but he once told me that he lives at Mundan area in Mubi but honesty I have never being there, defanetly I am the (course) cause of Emmanuel’s death, because I am the one that brought the whole plan, and how we execute it to the full. … And the knife we used in killing Emmanuel ‘M’ JakaRabiu throw it somewhere in the bush.”
As I stated earlier in this judgment in the resolution of issue one, Exhibit “C – C1” was tendered in evidence without any objection from the appellant and/or his counsel which implies that the statement was voluntarily made and the appellant agrees with the contents and the truth of the role he played in committing the offence for which he stood trial. On the other hand, the offence of conspiracy is often not proved through direct evidence but, the agreement or plot could be inferred from the facts of doing things towards achieving a common criminal goal. See, CLARK VS. THE STATE (1986) 4 NWLR (PT. 35)381; ODUNEYE VS. STATE (2001) 1 SC. 1, NWANKWOALA VS. THE STATE (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 339) 801 and TAIYE VS. STATE (2018) LPELR – 44466 (SC) PP. 21 – 22, PARA. B. From the detailed account of the role the appellant played in hatching the idea of the armed robbery as narrated by the appellant himself, it is glaringly clear that the appellant conspired with his friends to commit the offence of armed robbery, in that while armed with offensive weapons made away with twelve cows in the custody of one Emmanuel Mika from a grazing ground having planned and agreed to do so with his friends named in Exhibit “C – C1”. The evidence led by the PW1 – PW4 tallied with the contents of Exhibit “C – C1” to the effect that the appellant was in agreement with others to commit the offence of armed robbery and participated in the armed robbery. The trial Court was right to have held that the prosecution proved the offence of conspiracy to commit armed robbery against the appellant; I cannot fault the trial Court’s reasoning. I resolve issue two against the appellant.
The Appellant’s third issue challenged thetrial Court’s holding that the offence of culpable homicide was proved against the Appellant. The starting point would be: what is required to be proved by the prosecution for a conviction of culpable homicide. The ingredients are as follows:
(a) That the death of a human being has taken place.
(b) That the death has been caused by the accused;
(c) That the act of the accused was done with the intention of causing death or that the accused knew that death would be the probable consequence of his act. See, HARUNA ALHAJI GALADIMA VS. THE STATE (2017) LPELR – 43469 (SC) PP. 19 – 20, PARAGRAPHS B – A, OYAKHERE VS. STATE (2005) LPELR – 11325 (CA) PP. 18 – 19, PARAGRAPHS E – A and SANI VS. STATE (2017) LPELR – 43475 (SC) P.5, PARAGRAPHS C – G.
On whether Emmanuel Mika died, the evidence of the PW1 under cross examination, at page 128 of the printed records of appeal is to the effect that he visited the hospital (Cottage Hospital Uba) where a post mortem examination was carried out on the corpse which was later released to the relatives of the deceased in the presence of his team members.Similarly, the evidence of the PW2 (Sgt. Amos Ishaku) who recorded Exhibit “C – C1” in course of investigation with other members of his team, visited the scene of the crime at the farm where the deceased body was recovered from and taken to the hospital for post mortem examination, he was also present when the body was released to the relatives of the deceased, pages 129 – 130 of the records of appeal. Further, the PW3 (Utama Mika) an elder brother to the deceased testified that the beaten up and slaughtered remains of his brother was released to the family for burial, he gave account of how Emmanuel Mika went to graze the twelve cows and he and the twelve cows went missing before the deceased body was found as well as the missing cows, pages 132 – 134 of the printed records of appeal. The PW4 (Hellamadah Umaru) who owned some of the cows that the deceased went to graze gave evidence similar to that of the PW3 to the effect that Emmanuel Mika who went to graze the cows had died and that the missing cows were recovered.
Apart from the evidence of the PW1 – PW4, the contents of Exhibit ‘C – C1established that Emmanuel Mika died. Further, Exhibit ‘C – C1’ also showed that the Appellant was amongst those that caused the death of Emmanuel Mika. The killing was intentional as it was well planned to achieve a common goal which was executed. The appellant in Exhibit ‘C – C1’ gave account of his role in the death of Emmanuel Mika, his role was to be on the lookout for passersby (since the deceased knew him and would recognize him), while his friends armed with a stick and a knife struck the deceased down before the slaughtering. The Appellant no doubt had a common intention with his friends to carry out their unlawful act and knew that death would be a natural consequence of the execution of their planned act. It is immaterial what role each of the appellant and his friends played, the knocking down with a stick, the slaughtering or a look out so as not to be caught, all these are deemed to have been carried out by each and every one of his friends present at the scene and in this case, also the action of the appellant who was at the scene.
The Appellant who testified as the DW1 also gave evidence that the corpseof Emmanuel Mika was found inside the bush, there is therefore no doubt that the recovered body released to the relatives for burial was that of Emmanuel Mika. The learned trial judge was right to have held that even though there was no eye witness account of the incident but, that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence which was cogent, complete, unequivocal and irresistible leading to the conclusion that the appellant is directly linked to the death of the deceased, which could be inferred by the conduct of the appellant which he confessed to in Exhibit “C – C1”. The view of the learned trial judge cannot be faulted. I resolve issue three against the appellant.
Under the appellant’s issue four, the appellant made out that the trial Court was wrong to have held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the offence of armed robbery for which the appellant was convicted and sentenced to death. It is trite that for the offence of armed robbery to be established, the following ingredients must be proved beyond reasonable doubt:
1. That there was a robbery or series of robberies.
2. That each robbery was anarmed robbery.
3. That the accused took part in the robbery or robberies.
See, BOZIN VS. STATE (1985) LPELR – 799 (SC) P. 6, PARAGRAPHS. B – D, AGUGUA VS. THE STATE (2017) LPELR – 42021 (SC) P. 39, PARAGRAPHS A – C and MOHAMMED VS. STATE (2019) LPELR – 46420 (SC) PP. 6 – 7, PARAGRAPH F. From the contents of Exhibit ‘C – C1’ and the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses, no doubt there was a robbery, the appellant in Exhibit “C – C1” stated clearly how he and others made away with the twelve cows while armed with sticks and a knife. The PW2 who saw the recovered body of the deceased before it was taken for post mortem at the hospital testified as to the condition of the body, as having been slaughtered, the PW3 also testified that the remains of the deceased was slaughtered. The PW3 and PW4 gave evidence as to missing cows. The learned counsel to the Appellant had argued that there was need for the prosecution to have tendered the weapon, this is erroneous considering the evidence led as to the recovered body having been slaughtered and the glaring content of Exhibit“C – C1” where the appellant stated clearly that he and the others were armed with sticks and a knife with which Emmanuel was attacked. In most cases, the culprits would easily dispose of their weapons of attack while on the run. See, SIMON VS. STATE (2017) LPELR 41988 (SC), P. 13 – 14, PARA. C and STATE VS. FADEZI (2018) LPELR – 44731 (SC) P. 27 PARAS. D – G. In ESENE VS. STATE (2017) LPELR – 41912 (SC) P. 41, PARAS. A – E, his lordship, Ogunbiyi, JSC held thus:
“Further still and to show that the prosecution is not duty bound to produce the knife, there is no legal obligation on the prosecution to produce or tender the knife in evidence. The lower Court was clear and could not be faulted on this point when it held at page 148 of the record and said: – “Let me mention here and now, that it is not the law that the firearms, or the offensive weapons used must be tendered in proof by prosecution to commission of armed robbery. This issue has since been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of FATAI OLAYINKA VS. THE STATE 130 NSCQB 149 at PAGES 162 – 163.” It is a settled principle thereforethat the failure of the prosecution to tender the knife used by the appellant in attacking PW1 did not in any way water down the credible and unchallenged evidence that the appellant committed armed robbery against PW1 on 23/12/2006.”
See, also ABDULKABIR VS. STATE (2015) LPELR – 41841 (CA) PP. 36 – 37, PARAS. F – B.
Through the clear evidence of the PW3 and PW4 who were part owners of the missing cows which is in line with the appellant’s confession in Exhibit “C – C1”, I am of the humble view that the prosecution proved the offence of armed robbery against the appellant and the trial Court was right to have held so, which I have no reason to fault. The fourth issue is resolved against the appellant.
Having resolved all the issues against the appellant, I hold that the appeal is unmeritorious, same fails and it is hereby dismissed.
The judgment of the trial Court delivered on 10th April, 2018, conviction and sentence of the Appellant is hereby affirmed.
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.: I agree.
ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO, J.C.A.: I agree.
Appearances:
Fred Onuobia, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Z.Y. Usman, Esq., Senior State Counsel II, Adamawa State Ministry of Justice, with him, Salihu Mohammed, Senior State Counsel. For Respondent(s)
