TAIWO v. FRN
(2022)LCN/5162(SC)
In The Supreme Court
On Friday, April 08, 2022
SC.980C/2018
Before Our Lordships:
Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Kudirat Motonmori Olatokunbo Kekere-Ekun Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
John Inyang Okoro Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Abdu Aboki Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Ibrahim Mohammed Musa Saulawa Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
OKUNOLA TAIWO APPELANT(S)
And
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO:
TRIAL WITHIN TRAIL FOR AN EXTRA CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
The question of whether an extra statement is confessional or not depends on the facts surrounding a given case since the test of voluntariness of a confession must be carried out before its admissibility. That is what informs the necessity of a trial within trial once the voluntariness of the statement is challenged by the accused that makes the word ‘may’ in Section 17(2) of the ACJA permission and not a mandatory word. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.
ADMISSIBILITY OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
Admissibility of a confessional statement is not dependent on the presence of counsel or relation at the time of making the confession, Section 29 (1) of the Evidence Act must be satisfied. The said Section 17 (2) of the ACJCA cannot override the clear provision of the Evidence Act”. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.
MEANING OF “MAY”
“Generally the word ‘may’ always means ‘may’. It has long been settled that may is a permissive or enabling expression. In Messy v Council of the Municipality of Yass (1922) 22 S.R.N.S.W 494 per Cullen, CJ at pp 497, 498 it held that the use of the word ‘may’ prima facie conveys that the authority which has the power to do such an act has an option either to or not to do it. See also Cotton, L.I. in Re Daker, Michell v Baker (1800) 44 CH.D 282 But it has been conceded that the word may acquires mandatory meaning from the context in which it is used. See Johnson’s Tyre Foundary Pty Ltd v Shire of Maffra (1949) A.L.R, 8& The word may also acquires a mandatory meaning from the circumstances in which it is used, Most of the cases in which the word ‘may’ has a mandatory meaning relate to cases in which they are used in penal statutes conferring powers to Courts. In Baker (supra) Cotton L.I. said think great misconception is caused by saying that in some cases “may” means must, It can never mean (must) so long as the English language retains its meaning; but it gives a power, and then it may be a question in what cases where a Judge has a power given him by ‘may’, it becomes his duty to exercise it”. In Over v Felton (1966) A.LR. 1088 Jenkyn J, said that “it lies upon those who contend that an obligation exists to exercise that power to show in the circumstances of the case something which according to the above principles, creates that obligation. ” Per NNAMANI, JSC.
The Court below stated the several options in implementation of Section 17 (2) ACJA and stated that the word ‘may’ used therein cannot by any stretch of the imagination be interpreted to mean mandatoriness, ‘May’ can be interpreted as compulsory in penal provisions and not otherwise, particularly in criminal procedure legislations. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.
WHEN AN ACCUSED PLEADS GUILTY
It is now trite law that when an accused person pleads guilty he can be convicted solely on the plea of guilty as long as the offence is not punishable with death. See Nwachukwu v FRN (2007) 6 NWLR (pt.1029) 1; Nkie v FRN (2014) LPELR-22877.
In reiteration, there is no duty on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt when the accused person pleads guilty. Therefore, a plea of guilty is valid if it made in an unambiguous and unequivocal way and the same is received by the trial Court not disturbing itself under the misapprehension of what the law is. See Emma Amanchukwu v FRN (2009) 2 SCM, (2009) 8 NWLR (pt.144) 475; Adeyemi v The state (2013) 14 NWLR (pt.1373) 129. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.
MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division or lower Court or Court below, Coram: Nimpar, Ogakwu and Obaseki-Adejumo JJCA delivered on the 13th April, 2018 in which the appellant’s conviction and sentence by the trial Court per Ofili-Ajumogobia J. was affirmed by the Court below.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The appellant was charged on a one-count charge of dealing in 2.0 kilograms of Cannabis Sativa (otherwise know as marijuana). The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge. The prosecution tendered a confessional statement from Pidgin English language by one Oligbo Okey, an officer/agent of the NDLEA.
On this basis, the trial Court in its judgment delivered on 2nd March 2016 convicted the appellant of the Charge and sentenced him to 25 years imprisonment with hard labour.
The prosecution called no witness but its Counsel tendered some documents from the Bar which were admitted in evidence as EXHIBITS PD1-PD9. The alleged confessional statement written in the Pidgin English was admitted as EXHIBIT PD3A while the English translation of same was admitted as EXHIBIT PD3B.
Prosecution’s counsel further urged the Court to convict the appellant ” …in accordance with Section 356 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015″. The trial Court then adjourned to 2nd March, 2016 for judgment and same was delivered on that day.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
The appellant was alleged to have dealt in 2.0 kilogrammes of Cannabis Sative (Marijuana) The evidence upon which other exhibits rested was the alleged confessional statement of the appellant. The story therein painted a graphic picture of how the appellant sold Cannabis Sativa at Tipper Garage Ojodu Berger.
The alleged confession which was transcribed from ‘Pidgin English’ to English language showed that the appellant is an illiterate. The confession was written by one Oligbo Okey who works for the NDLEA, in the absence of the appellant’s counsel. Exhibits PDI, PD2, PD4, PD5, PD6, PD7, PD8 and PD9 which emanated from NDLEA and tried to establish the Charge against the appellant are all evidentially premised on his alleged confession.
The alleged confession further represented that he, appellant was taken to the NDLEA office where the substance allegedly recovered was found to be Cannabis Sativa. Armed with the purported confessional statement it obtained from the appellant coupled with the guilty plea of the appellant, the Prosecution urged the Court to convict him in line with Section 356 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015.
In his judgment dated 2nd March 2016, the Learned Trial Judge convicted the appellant of dealing in Cannabis Sativa and sentenced him to 25 years imprisonment with hard labour- Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the appellant appealed to the Court below on five (5) grounds of appeal and on the 13th April, 2018, the Court below dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentencing of the appellant to 25 years imprisonment.
Again, dissatisfied the appellant has come before the Apex Court on a five grounds of appeal.
On the 3/2/2022 date of hearing, respondent and counsel were absent though served on 31/1/2022 and the appeal was heard on appellant’s brief alone by order made on 14/1/2022.
Learned Senior Advocate, C.O.P. Emeka adopted the brief of argument of the appellant filed on 27/12/2018 in which he distilled three issues for determination, viz:
(1) Whether the Court below was right to uphold the appellant’s conviction on the strength of Exhibits PD3A and PD3B having misconceived the issue of its legal validity under Section 17(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 with the issue of admissibility under the Evidence
(2) Whether the Court below was right to have affirmed the appellant’s conviction based on his plea of guilty when the mandatory provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 were not complied with?
(3) Whether the prosecution discharged the burden of proof against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding his purported plea of guilty?
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Court below erred in law when it misconstrued the appellant’s complaint on Exhibits PD3A and PD3B, the alleged confessional statements. That those exhibits having been admitted much weight ought not to be laid on them in the light of Section 17 (1) (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA). He cited Madubigwe Awelle v The People of Lagos State (2016) LPELR-41395 CA; Mkpa v Mkpa (2010) 14 NWLR (pt.1214) 612 at 647 etc.
It was further contended for the appellant that the Court below wrongly affirmed the appellant’s conviction based on his purported plea of guilty when the learned trial Judge failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the ACJA
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was nothing on record to show that the charge was read and explained to the appellant in Pidgin English that he understood and so the conviction should fail. He cited State v Gwonto (1983) 1 SCNLR 142.
That the non-compliance with the statutory provisions on arraignment amounted to denying the appellant of his rights and that led to a miscarriage of justice. He cited Udofia v State (1988) 3 NWLR (pt.84) 533.
For the appellant, it was submitted that the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of the charge beyond reasonable doubt. He cited Udosen v Sate (2007) 4 NWLR (pt.1023) 125 at 161 etc.
RESOLUTION
The appellant was represented by counsel at the stage of arraignment and after the reading and explanation of the charge to the accused/appellant by the Court. The appellant pleaded guilty to the one count charge and the prosecution tendered the substance and other relevant materials as exhibits among which was the confessional statement made by the appellant.
The stance taken by the appellant is that Section 17 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 was not complied with and so the conviction a nullity. To fully appreciate the statutory provision I shall quote the stipulation thus:-
Section 17(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 states thus:
“Such statement may be taken in the presence of a legal practitioner of his choice; or where he has no legal practitioner of his choice, in the presence of an officer of a Civil Society Organisation or justice of the peace or any other person of his choice. Provided that the Legal Practitioner or any other person mentioned in this subsection shall not interfere while the suspect is making his statement, except for the purpose of discharging his role as a Legal Practitioner.”
The appellant contended that the Court below erred in law when it misconstrued the appellant’s complaint on Exhibits PD3A and PD3B, the confessional statements.
That Court had stated thus:
“This furthermore makes the word ‘way’ a permissive word and not a mandatory word as used in the section. Admissibility of a confessional statement is not dependent on the presence of counsel or relation at the time of making the confession, Section 29 (1) of the Evidence Act must be satisfied. The said Section 17 (2) of the ACJCA cannot override the clear provision of the Evidence Act”.
In a statute, when ‘may’ is used it is generally accepted that it is permissive but exceptions exist when ‘may’ could be mandatory. I shall refer to the case of EDEWOR V UWEGBA & ORS (1987) LPELR-1009 (SC) where the apex Court gave this explanation, it said:
“Generally the word ‘may’ always means ‘may’. It has long been settled that may is a permissive or enabling expression. In Messy v Council of the Municipality of Yass (1922) 22 S.R.N.S.W 494 per Cullen, CJ at pp 497, 498 it held that the use of the word ‘may’ prima facie conveys that the authority which has the power to do such an act has an option either to or not to do it. See also Cotton, L.I. in Re Daker, Michell v Baker (1800) 44 CH.D 282 But it has been conceded that the word may acquires mandatory meaning from the context in which it is used. See Johnson’s Tyre Foundary Pty Ltd v Shire of Maffra (1949) A.L.R, 8& The word may also acquires a mandatory meaning from the circumstances in which it is used, Most of the cases in which the word ‘may’ has a mandatory meaning relate to cases in which they are used in penal statutes conferring powers to Courts. In Baker (supra) Cotton L.I. said think great misconception is caused by saying that in some cases “may” means must, It can never mean (must) so long as the English language retains its meaning; but it gives a power, and then it may be a question in what cases where a Judge has a power given him by ‘may’, it becomes his duty to exercise it”. In Over v Felton (1966) A.LR. 1088 Jenkyn J, said that “it lies upon those who contend that an obligation exists to exercise that power to show in the circumstances of the case something which according to the above principles, creates that obligation. ” Per NNAMANI, JSC.
The Court below stated the several options in implementation of Section 17 (2) ACJA and stated that the word ‘may’ used therein cannot by any stretch of the imagination be interpreted to mean mandatoriness, ‘May’ can be interpreted as compulsory in penal provisions and not otherwise, particularly in criminal procedure legislations.
Indeed, the said Section 17(2) of the ACJA is not a penalty section and in any event the issue of evidence is under a substantive law of Evidence and the Evidence Act provides for how to test the voluntariness of a confessional statement. The question may now arise as to whether the Administration of Criminal Justice Act being a Procedural Law can take precedence over the Evidence Act. It is a procedural breach which in most cases would not vitiate the trial. See Emedo v The State (2002) 15 NWLR (pt.789) 196 wherein the Supreme Court held that an irregularity is not a factor that would justify the setting aside of a verdict or decision unless a miscarriage of justice is established as propelling that decision of the Court.
The question of whether an extra statement is confessional or not depends on the facts surrounding a given case since the test of voluntariness of a confession must be carried out before its admissibility. That is what informs the necessity of a trial within trial once the voluntariness of the statement is challenged by the accused that makes the word ‘may’ in Section 17(2) of the ACJA permission and not a mandatory word.
With respect to the posture of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant did not understand the language used in the Court. This point seems to be of no moment since in the realm of criminal justice, it is a cardinal principle of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused or his counsel is duty bound to bring to the notice of the Court the fact that he does not understand the language in which the trial is being conducted, failure to do so will bring about the presumption that he has no cause for complaint. To buttress the point, is that the fact that the accused does not understand the language in which the trial is being conducted is within the knowledge of the accused and it is for him or his counsel to take the initiative to cry out and bring to the notice of the Court at the earliest opportunity or so soon as the situation has arisen. If he lets go of that claim of his right to complain at the appropriate time, he loses the right to complain thereafter. See Francis Durwode v The State (2000) LPELR-972; Ibrahim v The State (2013) LPELR-21883 (SC); Madu v The State (1997) 1 NWLR (pt.482) 386.
The point has to be brought out that the appellant was represented by counsel who did not raise the issue of the appellant not understanding the English language which is the language of the Court. Again to be said is that appellant gave his answers on arraignment in English language and so the current grouse of the appellant’s counsel is strange in the conflicting instance of an accused/appellant answering questions in English language and now turning around to claim a lack of understanding of the Court proceedings.
Another area needing be brought into the fray is the fact that the confessional statement was tendered and admitted without objection. The follow-up result of all these presentations is that it is too late in the day to challenge the document tendered without objection at the trial but now a matter to be brought in as a challenging factor on appeal. I refer to the case of Nwachukwu v The State (2002) 12 NWLR 508 at 542.
The circumstances which prevailed at the trial Court belie the posture of the appellant as accused person pleaded guilty to the charge on arraignment, the burden on the prosecution to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt is lifted. Therefore, the practice of tendering the items recovered during investigation upon that plea of guilt is in fulfilment of the abundance of caution to support the plea of guilty and adds nothing to the requirement upon arraignment and plea of guilty. When there was no objection on any part of the proceedings at that point it is too late to do so later. See Adeleke v State (2013) LPELR-20971 SC.
It is now trite law that when an accused person pleads guilty he can be convicted solely on the plea of guilty as long as the offence is not punishable with death. See Nwachukwu v FRN (2007) 6 NWLR (pt.1029) 1; Nkie v FRN (2014) LPELR-22877.
In reiteration, there is no duty on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt when the accused person pleads guilty. Therefore, a plea of guilty is valid if it made in an unambiguous and unequivocal way and the same is received by the trial Court not disturbing itself under the misapprehension of what the law is. See Emma Amanchukwu v FRN (2009) 2 SCM, (2009) 8 NWLR (pt.144) 475; Adeyemi v The state (2013) 14 NWLR (pt.1373) 129.
The difference in procedure comes in when capital offences are at play whereat an accused person shall not be convicted on a guilty plea. In such a case a “not guilty” plea is stipulated by law to be entered for the accused person.
In the instance, where the accused is not represented by counsel, the Court is expected to inquire more and be assured that the accused knows what he is doing. If he is represented by counsel, that indulgence is not granted. I rely on Omokuwajo v FRN (2013) LPELR-20184 (SC).
In further clarification, I shall cite and quote some guidelines prescribed by the Appellate and Supreme Courts thus:-
See Ibrahim v FRN (2016) LPELR-40059 (CA) as follows:-
“The law therefore provides for conviction upon a guilty plea without any further formality. A plea of guilty can earn a conviction when certain conditions are evident as held in the case of SUMANYA ISSAH TORRI V THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE OF NIGERIA (2008) LPELR-8475 (CA) where the Court held:
“The requirement of the law before there could be a conviction on a plea of guilty are that: i. The Court must be satisfied that the accused understands the charge against him; ii. The Court must be seized of the facts alleged by the prosecution as constituting the offence charged; iii. The Court must ask the accused if he admits all the facts alleged by the prosecution; iv. The Court must be satisfied that the accused intends to admit the commission of the offence charged; v. The facts stated by the prosecution and admitted by the accused must be able to sustain the charge against the accused.
The apex Court on the consequences of a guilty plea held thus:
“It is established law that after a plea of guilty by the accused before the Court exercising jurisdiction in respect of criminal offences, the Court must formally proceed to conviction without calling on the accuser to prove the commission of the offence by establishing the burden of proof by law.” see DONGTOE V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PLATEAU STATE (2001) 4 S.C. (Pt.II) 43. See also NKIE V. FRN (2014) LPELR-22877 (SC).
Generally, a plea of guilty that is unequivocal and a conscious act of the accused who has understood the charge explained can qualify for conviction without more.
Clearly, the Court of trial convicted the appellant properly upon the guilty plea and the other factors mentioned were surplusage and cannot be used as foundation to set aside the judgment. With the trial Judge being satisfied that the plea of guilty was done consciously, the Judge being satisfied, was right to proceed to conviction. The matter of his satisfaction, not being so recorded would not detract from the fact of the appropriateness of the procedure and that is not open to challenge the issue of satisfaction. Therefore, the burden of proof having been obviated by the plea of guilty as the Court below found and stated, there was no burden on the prosecution to prove the allegation. The case of Ochiba v State (2011) 17 NWLR (pta1277) 663 at 694 does not apply to the case in hand, the scenario existing thereby distinct from the one currently under discourse.
In conclusion and the foregoing, this appeal definitely lacks merit and I do not hesitate in dismissing it. I affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal which in turn affirmed the judgment, conviction and sentence of the trial Court.
Appeal dismissed.
KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili, JSC, just delivered. I am at one with His Lordship that the appeal is devoid of merit and should be dismissed.
This is a case in which the appellant was represented by counsel at his arraignment where he pleaded guilty to the one count charge of dealing in cannabis sativa (otherwise known as marijuana) contrary to and punishable under Section 11(c) of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act cap. N30 LFN 2004.
At the trial of the case, the prosecution tendered various exhibits, including the appellant’s confessional statement. His statement made in Pidgin English was admitted and marked Exhibit PD3A, while the English translation was admitted and marked Exhibit PD3B. There was no objection to the tendering of any of the exhibits including Exhibits PD3A and PD3B.
In the appeal before us, it is the appellant’s contention that his arraignment was invalid because the record does not show that the charge was read and explained to him in Pidgin English, which is the language he understands and also that the statement Exhibit PD3A and its translation, Exhibit PD3B were not recorded in compliance with the provisions of Section 17(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA), 2015.
My learned brother has dealt extensively with these issues in the lead judgment. I shall add just a few comments by way of emphasis.
The record of the trial Court on the date of arraignment reads thus:
“KALU: One count charge dated 28/11/14. I apply that the charge be read.
COURT: Charge read and explained to the accused person.
ACCUSED PERSON: I understand (the) charge, I plead guilty.”
As observed earlier, the appellant was represented by counsel. There is nothing on the record to show that he did not understand the charge read to him, Indeed, he stated clearly, “I understand the charge.” As rightly observed by the Court below, if the appellant did not understand the charge, it was his duty or the duty of his counsel to so inform the Court. See: Akeem Vs The State (2017) LPELR-42465(SC) @ 27-30 D-A; 33 C- F; Dibie vs The State (2007) LPELR-941 (SC) @ 7-8 C-A.
In any event, the Court is entitled to take judicial notice of the fact that Pidgin English is a specie of “proper” English freely and commonly used in Nigeria. A person who speaks Pidgin English usually understands “proper” English although he may not be able to communicate effectively in “proper” English, In a recent decision of this Court in Olanipekun vs The State (2016) LPELR-40440 (SC), the statement of the appellant was challenged on the ground that it was recorded in Pidgin English and the prosecution failed to tender the English translation. His Lordship Akaahs, JSC at pages 8-9 D-A (Supra) stated thus:
“It is erroneous for anyone to assume that people who communicate in Pidgin English do not understand proper or Queen’s English, especially in Nigeria. The use of Pidgin English allows for free expression without minding the grammar which is usually employed in the proper English.
Consequently, a statement that was said to have been recorded in Pidgin does not require translation into proper English and any statement made in Pidgin English can be recorded in proper English.
I therefore agree with my learned brother, Peter-Odili, JSC, that the arraignment of the appellant in the circumstances of this case, was proper and in accordance with the law.
The challenge as to the admissibility of Exhibit PD3A and its translation, Exhibit PD3B, is a non-starter in my respectful view. It is very well settled that the appropriate time to raise an objection to the admissibility of a confessional statement on whatever ground, is during the trial at the stage when the prosecution seeks to tender it in evidence. See:Isong vs The State (2016) LPELR-40609 (SC) @ 28 D-F; Oseni vs The State (2012) LPELR-7833 (SC) @ 37-38 B-E; State vs Ibrahim (2019) LPELR-47548 (SC) @ 19 B–F. The compliance or otherwise with Section 17(2) of the ACJA ought to have been raised at the time the statement was tendered in evidence. It is too late to raise the issue on appeal either before the lower Court or before this Court.
Finally, the appellant, duly represented by counsel, having understood the charge read to him and pleaded guilty thereto, the only duty upon the Court was to proceed to conviction. The procedure to be followed where an accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offence is set out in Section 356(2) of the ACJA as follows:
“1356(2) Where the defendant pleads guilty and the Court is satisfied that he intends to admit the offence and shows no cause or sufficient cause why sentence should not be passed, the Court shall proceed to sentence.”
The issue of proof of the charge beyond reasonable doubt no longer arises. See: Sunday Vs FRN (2018) LPELR-46357 (SC) @ 24 C-F; Omoju vs FRN (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 38; (2008) LPELR-2647 (SC) @ 18 E-F.
In Orji vs FRN (2019) LPELR-46534(SC) @ 6-8 F-A, His Lordship, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC held thus:
“A plea of guilty in a criminal charge is made by an accused person who does not contest the charge. This arises where an accused person having committed a crime is simply saying by pleading guilty that he is responsible for the crime. A plea of guilty to a charge is conclusive evidence that the accused committed the offence.
When an accused person is represented by counsel and the charge is read and explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court can proceed to convict forthwith.
There is no better evidence than a plea of guilty, It is even better than eyewitness…
The appellant was convicted on his plea of guilty. Thereafter, any exhibits tendered are surplusage as the plea of guilty is conclusive proof that the accused person (the appellant) committed the offence.”
In light of my findings above and for the more detailed reasoning in the lead judgment, I hold that this appeal lacks merit. It is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court affirming the appellant’s conviction and sentence by the trial Court is hereby affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.
JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.: My learned brother, Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili, JSC obliged me a draft of the lead judgment just delivered and I am in complete agreement with the reasons and conclusion reached therein. The facts giving birth to the appeal has already been summarized in the lead judgment and I shall therefore avoid a repeat of exercise except to recapitulate a point therein as occasion may require in this judgment.
The main issue in this appeal is whether in view of the Appellant’s confessional statement in exhibit PD3A translated in exhibit PD3B and his plea of guilt, the Court was right to convict him summarily. Section 274(1) and (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 provides that:-
“(1) Where a defendant pleads guilty to an offence with which he is charged, the Court shall:-
(a) record his plea as nearly as possible;
(b) invite the prosecution to state the fact of the case; and
(c) enquire from the defendant whether his plea of guilty is to the fact as stated by the prosecution; or
(2) Where the Court is satisfied that the defendant intended to admit the truth of all the essential elements of the offence for which he has pleaded guilty, the Court shall convict and sentence him or make such order as may be necessary, unless there shall appear sufficient reason to the contrary.
(3) …”
From the above provision, it is clear that where an accused person pleads guilty to a charge and the Court is satisfied that he indeed intended to admit all the essentials of the offence, the only option open to the Court is to convict him summarily, except where the offence is a capital offence where death is the penalty prescribed by law, then a plea of guilt would not be recorded. See Olabode v State (2009) 11 NWLR (pt,1152) 254; Paulinus Tobi (Udo Abby) v The State (2001) 4 SC (pt. 11) 160.
In the words of that provision, admitting the truth of all the essential elements of the offence, presupposes to me, that the accused understood the charge read to him and he intended to plead guilty. Construing that language of the statute in Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which is in pari materia with the above provision, Niki Tobi, JSC (of blessed memory) in the case of Omoju v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008) 7 NWLR (pt.1085) 38 (2008) All FWLR (pt,415) 1656 at page 1675-1676 stated as follows:-
“I do not see any language in Section 218 suggesting that the Court must ask the Appellant if he admits all the essentials of the offence of which he pleads guilty. All that the Section requires is that the Court must be satisfied that the accused person intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence. In the language of the section, the exercise is within the mind of the Judge and does not go out to meet the accused, Whether the Judge is satisfied or not remains his subjective judgment. The moment the Judge is so satisfied he can convict and pass the appropriate sentence.”
In the instant case, in view of the Appellant’s confessional statement in exhibits PD3A and PD3B, the learned trial Judge must have been satisfied that the Appellant intended to admit the truth of all the essential elements of the offence. Talking about confessional statement which has generally been referenced as the strongest evidence against an accused person, I have stated before in the case of Nkie v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2014) 13 NWLR (pt1424) 305 and I shall reiterate here that a confessional statement is so considered as the best evidence against an accused person because no man in his right senses will make admissions prejudicial to his interest and safety if the facts are not true and correct. See also Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011, Oseni v State (2012) 5 NWLR (pt.1293) 351; Dibie v State (2007) 9 NWLR (pt.1038) page 30.
The appellant’s contention in this appeal is that there were procedural irregularities before the conviction and sentencing in the sense that his lawyer was not present when he made exhibits PD3A and PD3B as prescribed by Section 17 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act and also that he was not provided with an interpreter during his arraignment for which reasons the conviction should be upturned. The question then is did he object to the charge being read to him at the earliest opportunity?
The law is trite that once an accused person pleads to a charge before the Court without raising any objection, it presupposes that he understands the charge read to him and the plea is valid. Otherwise, he would have objected to the charge or at least indicated to the Court that he does not understand the charge, especially where he is not represented by counsel. See Okewu v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2012) 9 NWLR (pt,1305) page 327.
In this case, the record of appeal shows that the Appellant was represented by counsel and he spoke English language during his arraignment. Having failed to object before his plea, he cannot thereafter complain of any perceived irregularity which occurred before his plea. Again, his plea of guilt foreclosed the procedural step of going into trial. The only thing the Court had to do which it did was to convict and sentence him accordingly. The act of tendering exhibits by the respondent after the plea, was, in my opinion, an exercise in surplusage, to remove any doubt whatsoever in the mind of the trial Court to convict the Appellant.
In the final analysis, I hold that both the appellant’s confessional statement and his plea of guilt obliterates any form of procedural irregularity perceived to have occurred before his arraignment. The Court rightly convicted and sentenced him summarily upon his plea of guilt. This appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the Court below which upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellant is hereby affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.
ABDU ABOKI, J.S.C.: I have had the opportunity of reading in draft, the lead judgment of my Learned Brother, MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, JSC I am in complete agreement with his Lordship’s reasoning and conclusion, and do not wish to add anything more.
Accordingly, the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed.
The conviction and sentence passed on the appellant is affirmed.
MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.: I agree with the reasoning aptly expressed in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, the Hon. Justice M. U. Petey Odili, JSC, that the instant appeal is lacking in merits. Unhesitatingly, I too hereby dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal, coram Nimpar, Ogakwil and Obaseki-Adejumo, JJCA, delivered on 13/4/2018 in appeal No. CA/L/734c/2016.
Appeal dismissed
Appearances:
C.O.P. Emeka SAN with him, C.A. Okafor and B.A. Odonghanro. For Appellant(s)
…For Respondent(s)
