SUNSHINE PROPERTIES LTD v. MARCUS & ANOR (2022)

SUNSHINE PROPERTIES LTD v. MARCUS & ANOR

(2022)LCN/16422(CA)

In The Court of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, June 01, 2022

CA/ABJ/CV/220/2020

Before Our Lordships:

Hamma Akawu Barka Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Bature Isah Gafai Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

SUNSHINE PROPERTIES LTD APPELANT(S)

And

1. FLORENCE MARCUS (Suing as Lawful Attorney Of Saboda-Kia General Ltd 2. BARRISER PETER AKHUETIEMEN RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE POSITION OF LAW ON ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS

Abuse of Court Process simply means the improper use of judicial process by a party in litigation aimed at interfering with the due administration of justice. This may be in the form of instituting multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent, or generally instituting a judicial process to the irritation, annoyance and embarrassment of an opponent. See African Reinsurance Corporation vs. JDP Construction (Nig) Ltd (2003) LPELR—215 (SC); Dingyadi & Anor vs. INEC & Ors (2010) LPELR-40142 (SC); Allanah & Ors vs. Kpolokwu & Ors (2016) LPELR — 40724 (SC). PER GAFAI, J.C.A.

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT WHEN A PLAINTIFF RELIES ON DOCUMENTARY TITLE TO CLAIM LAND

I agree with Mr. Onoja that when a plaintiff relies on documentary title to claim ownership of land, the Court needs to be satisfied of certain facts; namely:
(i) Whether the document is genuine;
(ii) Whether it has been duly executed, stamped and registered;
(iii) Whether the grantor had the authority and capacity to make the grant;
(iv) Whether the grantor had in fact what he purported to grant; and
(v) Whether the document has the effect claimed by its holder.
See ROMAINE V. ROMAINE (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.238) 650 at 662. PER GAFAI, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT AN ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION WHICH DOES NOT ARISE FROM THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL IS INCOMPETENT
However, I am quick to express my reservations on the Respondent’s issue number three, which interrogates whether the appeal is an abuse of process. The Respondent did not file any preliminary objection on the basis of which it could distill the said issue. Furthermore, the said issue does not arise from the grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant. It is rudimentary law that any issue which does not arise from the grounds of appeal is incompetent and that a Respondent who has not filed a cross-appeal, Respondents’ Notice of Preliminary Objection cannot formulate any issue outside the Appellant’s grounds of appeal. See AKINLADE vs. AYINDE (2020) LPELR (49592) 1 at 17-18, FAYEMI vs. ONI (2019) LPELR (49291) 1 at 11-12, APGA vs. UMEH (2011) 8 NWLR (PT 1250) 544 and OTUAGOMA vs. OJAKERE (2016) LPELR (45052) 1 at 7-8. Therefore, on the settled state of the law, the Respondents’ said issue number three is incompetent and I hereby strike the same out. PER OGAKWU, J.CA.

BATURE ISAH GAFAI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal emanated from the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja delivered on the 15th of January 2020 corarn Ebong, J. in which the 1st Respondent’s claims against the Appellant in respect of title to the Plot No. 179 Cadastral Zone C05 Kage District Abuja were granted.

As gleaned from the Amended Statement of Claim in the trial found at pages 4-8 of the Record of Appeal, the 1st Respondent suing as the lawful Attorney of Saboda-Kai then as the Plaintiff sought for declaratory and injunctive Reliefs against the Appellant and 2nd Respondent then as Defendants on her claims to title over the said plot granted to Saboda-Kai General Ltd (the donor of the power of Attorney). Her pleadings before the lower Court reveal that sometime in 2013 one Irmiya Musa a Director of Saboda-Kai General Ltd discovered that someone he later found out to be the 2nd Respondent had erected gigantic structures on the company’s Plot without the company’s knowledge. upon inquiries, he traced the 2nd Respondent who confirmed to him that he was responsible for the structures erected on the Plot having purchased same from the Appellant; a claim later admitted also by the Appellant on the ground that it was granted the plot by the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory.

Pleadings were exchanged between the 1st Respondent and the Appellant only and the trial ensued to conclusion. In its judgment, the lower Court found for the 1st Respondent and granted the Reliefs sought.

Dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellant approached this Court vide its Notice of Appeal filed on the 3rd of February 2020, complaining against the judgment on three Grounds as follows:
“GROUND ONE: ERROR IN LAW
The learned trial Judge erred in law by making the sweeping finding in the considered judgment of the lower Court that:
“on the sheer preponderance of evidence therefore find that the Plaintiff has proved her title to the land in dispute. Issue one for determination is resolved in favour of the Plaintiff”.
Even when it is clear that Exhibit P1, P2, P3 and P5 relied upon by the 1st Respondent are not documents establishing title to land nor are they documents that have the effect of creating entitlement to land within the Federal Capital Territory, and the Court thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
GROUND TWO: ERROR IN LAW
The learned trial Judge erred in law and gravely upturned settled legal principles when his lordship held as follows:
“In my view; Exhibit P2 has passed the test for documentary title set out above. On the evidence before, I have reason to doubt that the offer had been accepted by the Plaintiff as required. I accept the evidence of PW1 in cross-examination that if it were otherwise, Exhibits P3 and P5, particularly Exhibit P5, could not have been issued by the authorities confirming the Plaintiff’s title to the plot two years later.”
Even when Exhibit P2, a mere offer of Statutory Right of Occupancy, was required to be accepted in writing and no written document (or secondary evidence of its contents) was tendered in evidence to prove acceptance within the stipulated period.
GROUND THREE: ERROR IN LAW
The learned trial Judge erred in law by failing to correctly apply the legal principle, that, in an action for a declaration of title to land, the Plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the Defendant’s case, even in cases where the Defendant admits the Plaintiff’s case, when his lordship held a contrary view that:
“where the evidence of a Plaintiff is unchallenged, the Court must accept it hook, line and sinker.”
And went ahead to hold that:
‘This principle applies across board in civil proceedings, including land matters and declaratory actions.’”

The respective Particulars enumerated under these Grounds are noted. See pages 199-206 of the Record.

The Record of Appeal was transmitted to this Court on the 18th of March 2020. The Appellant’s Brief of Argument settled by its learned counsel F. R. Onoja Esq. was filed on the 29th of May 2020 while the 1st Respondent’s Brief settled by her counsel Ezikiel Sabo Gimba Esq. was filed the 17th of July 2020. At the hearing of the appeal on the 24th of March 2020, both learned counsel briefly identified and adopted their respective Briefs; by which they urged this Court to proceed accordingly.

For the Appellant, the sole issue for determination is on:
“Whether the learned trial Judge did not fall into grave error when his lordship declared title over the disputed land in favour of the 1st Respondent on the strength of Exhibit P2 which is a mere ‘offer of Statutory Right of Occupancy; which was not shown to have been accepted in accordance with law and the stipulation clearly set out in clause 4 thereof?”
(Distilled from grounds 1, 2 and 3)”

For the 1st Respondent however, three Issues have been formulated thus:
“1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that exhibit p2 is a document of title known to law.
2. Whether in view of the doctrine of privity of contract, the appellant who is not a party to the contractual relationship created between the 1st respondent and the Hon. Minister of FCT in exhibit p2 can have the locus standi to challenge the compliance of the terms stipulated therein.
3. Whether this appeal is an abuse of Court processes.”

It is to be noted that the 2nd Respondent did not find any reason to file a Brief of Argument in the same way that he found no reason to contest or appear in the suit at the lower Court. It is also to be noted that the Appellant too although had filed a Statement of Defence in the trial, abandoned same and elected to rest its case on that of the 1st Respondent.

Of the four Issues presented by the parties, it is clear that the 1st Respondent’s third Issue (supra) which challenged this appeal as an abuse of Court process deserves more urgent attention as it seeks to terminate the substantive consideration of the appeal in limine.

Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent prefaced his arguments under this issue by a definition and constituents of abuse of Court Process as a term applied to a proceeding which is malafide, frivolous, vexatious and oppressive among others; placing reliance on the decisions in Seven Up Bottling Co. Ltd vs. Abiola & Sons Bottling Co. Ltd (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 463), 714; Ette vs. Edoho (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt.760), 445.

In demonstrating this appeal as an abuse of Court process, learned counsel argued that the Appellant is not by this appeal seeking that it be declared as the owner of the plot in issue but is only aimed at frustrating the 1st Respondent’s success in the suit and to waste the precious time of this Court. Secondly, as argued for the 1st Respondent, the Appellant had the opportunity to defend the suit at the trial but did not provide any because it had none and therefore resorted to employing technicalities aimed at frustrating the trial. Learned counsel referred to judicial authorities in submitting that the law is now settled that substantial justice cannot be sacrificed on the altar of technicalities.

Thirdly, as argued also, the Appellant knew it had no title whatsoever to the plot in issue, trespassed on same, erected structures therein which this appeal is only seeking to shield by using the instrumentality of the appeal to unlawfully sustain the illegal structures erected on the plot; which is a clear indication of perversion of the system by the use of lawful procedure to attain unlawful results. Learned counsel referred to Ette vs. Edoho (supra) to buttress this argument.

Lastly, it is further argued that the Appellant set up a different case in this appeal from what was in the pleadings at the lower Court; to the annoyance of the 1st Respondent. Learned counsel submitted that parties are bound by their pleadings; placing reliance on the decision in Onamede vs. ACB Ltd (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 480) 123 at 145. This Court is thus urged to answer this Issue in the affirmative.

In my considered view however, this issue, in the manner argued, is like an octopus in the sense that it has dipped its hands into virtually all the core aspects of the appeal thereby making it impossible to determine safely either way without determining the core aspects of the other Issues. In effect, it is the consideration of the other three issues that will ultimately reveal the truth or otherwise of the arguments under this issue. Consequently, this issue will be resolved in that order.

As reproduced herein earlier, what the Appellant’s sole Issue heralds is stricto sensu that exhibit 2 is a mere offer of Statutory Right of Occupancy which is not sufficient to prove title to the plot in issue. The 1st Respondent’s first issue is on whether exhibit 2 is a document of title. Thus, the two issues are in reality the same and will accordingly be treated together.

For the Appellant, it is argued that the 1st Respondent cannot validly rely on exhibit P2 having failed to comply with its Clause 4 which requires its acceptance within two months. It is argued that the 1st Respondent’s failure has also made it impossible to determine the commencement date of the right of occupancy contrary to the provisions of Section 8 of the Land Use Act 1978 which provides that a statutory right of occupancy shall be for a definite term. Learned counsel referred to the decisions in Ogunleye vs. Oni (1990) 2 NWLR (Pts 135), 745 and one other on this submission. He listed the criteria for the proof of title to land emphasizing however on the validity of the document of title and the effect of the document on the holder; relying on the decision in Romaine vs. Romaine (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 238), 650 among others.

It is also argued that although the 1st Respondent did not plead facts on the acceptance of exhibit P2, the lower Court proceeded to hold that the 1st Respondent accepted the offer in exhibit P2. Learned counsel argued that the lower Court thereby accepted oral evidence in place of the absent written acceptance to exhibit P2 contrary to established position of the law to the contrary. He referred to Emeka vs. Ikpeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589), 345 at 379 among others. On the rule that parties are bound by their pleadings, he referred to Uredi vs. Dada (1988) LPELR–3425 (SC) among others.

On the whole, it is argued that exhibit P2 did not convey legal or equitable title to the 1st Respondent; in the same way that exhibits P3 and P5 cannot help the 1st Respondent’s case. Other supplementary arguments for the Appellant are noted.

Just as done by the Appellant’s counsel, the 1st Respondent’s learned counsel identified the settled methods of establishing ownership to land and argued that the 1st Respondent had duly satisfied the relevant criteria by the evidence in exhibits P1-P8B which altogether proved that the Statutory Right of Occupancy over the said plot was validly granted by the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory to the 1st Respondent. In particular, he argued that the lower Court was right in relying on exhibit P2 same being a genuine, duly executed and registered document over the plot in issue whose grantor had the authority and power to grant. Learned counsel referred us to the provisions of Section 297 (1) of the Constitution FRN 1999 as amended and Section 1 (3) of the Federal Capital Territory Act to the effect that the ownership of lands within the Federal Capital Territory vests in the Minister of the FCT who alone or by his authority has the power to grant any of it to any citizen. It is also argued that by the provisions of Section 9(3) of the Land Use Act it is the Minister as the grantor of a right of occupancy in the FCT who reserves the power also to revoke same in the event of breach of the terms of the grant to any person. It is submitted that as neither has the Minister revoked the 1st Respondent’s right of occupancy nor even questioned the 1st Respondent’s alleged non-compliance with its terms, the validity of the 1st Respondent’s grant remains extant and effective. Learned counsel referred to the decisions in Madu vs. Madu (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt.1083) 296 at 3325; Romaine vs Romaine (supra); Orient Bank vs Bilante International (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 515) 37 among others to buttress the submission.

To begin with, it should be remembered that the Appellant abandoned its pleadings in the trial and therefore did not call any witness to rebut all the facts in the Written Statements of Oath of the two witnesses called by the 1st Respondent which were adopted as their evidence in chief in the trial. Save for the evidence elicited under cross-examination by the Appellant’s counsel, there was therefore no evidence whatsoever in rebuttal by the Appellant. In effect, the Appellant relied fully on the strength or weakness of the 1st Respondent’s case. See Alao vs. Akano & Ors (2005) LPELR—409 (SC); Sani Abacha Foundation For Peace and Unity & Ors vs. UBA Plc (2010) LPELR 3002 (SC).

At the hearing of the suit before the lower Court on the 15th of October 2018, several documents were tendered in evidence through the 1st Respondent’s PW 1. A run-down of the relevant portion of the proceedings may be apt here as shown herein below:
“In paragraph 4 of my statement of claim and paragraph 4 of my amended witness statement on oath (AWSO), I stated that I was appointed an attorney of the Claimant. I have a power of attorney in this signed between us. This is the document. Tendered, no objection admitted as EXHIBIT P1.
In paragraph 5 of my statement of claim and paragraph 5 of my additional witness statement on oath, I referred to a statutory right of occupancy issued to Saboda-kai General Ltd over the land in dispute dated 13/5/11. This is the document. Tendered (certified true copy) no objection, admitted as EXHIBIT P2.
In paragraph 6 of my statement of claim and paragraph 6 of additional witness statement on oath, I referred to a site plan issued to the Company over the plot in dispute. This is the document. Certified true copy of site plan dated 13/5/15, tendered, no objection, admitted as EXHIBIT P3.
In paragraph 11 of my statement of claim and paragraph 11 of my additional witness statement on oath, I mentioned a solicitor’s letter written by Zakari A. Sogfa to the 1st Defendant dated 20/1/14. This is an acknowledgment of same. Tendered, no objection, admitted as EXHIBIT P3.
In paragraph 16/17 of my statement of claim and 16/17 of my additional witness statement on oath, I mention to a legal search report obtained by my solicitor over the plot dated 21/11/14. This is it. Tendered, no objection, admitted as EXHIBIT P5.
In paragraph 1(d) of my Reply to 1st Defendant’s statement of defence and paragraph 1(d) of my further witness statement on oath. I referred to the satellite images plot 179 Kafe District issued to us by Abuja Geographic Information Systems (AGIS). It is on an A3 paper and is duly certified by AGIS. This is the document. Tendered, no objection, admitted as EXHIBIT P6.
In paragraph 4 of my Reply, I referred to a judgment in suit No. CV/2450/2012 John Behora Holyfield Furniture Ltd and David Garnvwa this is the certified true copy of same. Tendered, no objection, admitted as EXHIBIT P7.”
See pages 170 to 171 of the Record of Appeal.

On the specific issue of the alleged non-acceptance of exhibit P 2, the PW 1, when shown exhibit P2 while under cross-examination stated thus:
“I look at paragraph 4 of the Exhibit, I confirm that from that paragraph the commencement date of the R of O is the state of written acceptance of the offer and that the acceptance is required to be signed within two months of the offer. Yes, we did signify acceptance of the offer in writing as required. I do not have any document right here to confirm that fact, but there are documents in FCDA attesting to that fact also if we had not accepted, they would not have issued a site plan to us.”
See page 174 of the Record.

Although the Written Statement on Oath of the Respondent’s PW2 contained similar averments showing the rightful grant of the statutory right of occupancy on the 1st Respondent and although his said Written Statement on Oath was converted into his evidence in chief by his adoption of same as such in the trial, the short cross-examination on him found at page 176 of the Record dwelt on irrelevant matters such as the seniority or rank of the witness in Zakari A. Sagfa & Co. law firm, his role in the attempts to settle the dispute amicably etc but without any specific or implied cross-examination on the evidence in his Written Statement on Oath touching on exhibit p2.

Before I express my impressions on the evidence, more particularly in relation to exhibit P2 which is the only Issue of the Appellant, I considered the relevant findings and holding of the lower Court on same; found at pages 193 -195 of the Record thus:
“The second point argued by learned counsel for the 1st Defendant relates to the effectiveness of Exhibit P2, the plaintiff’s R of O. It was contended that there is no evidence to show that the plaintiff had accepted the offer of the right of occupancy, hence Exhibit P2 cannot be said to have taken effect to vest title to the land in the plaintiff. In reflecting on this point, I agree with Mr. Onoja that when a plaintiff relies on documentary title to claim ownership of land, the Court needs to be satisfied of certain facts; namely:
(i) Whether the document is genuine;
(ii) Whether it has been duly executed, stamped and registered;
(iii) Whether the grantor had the authority and capacity to make the grant;
(iv) Whether the grantor had in fact what he purported to grant; and
(v) Whether the document has the effect claimed by its holder.
See ROMAINE V. ROMAINE (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.238) 650 at 662.
From the pleading and evidence adduced, Exhibit P2 has been shown to be a Government allocation duly made to the Plaintiff company. The genuineness of the document or the capacity of the grantor was never challenged by the defendants. The only case made by the 1st defendant was on ownership of Plot 64 Kate District (though it later abandoned that claim by not adducing any evidence to prove it), But there was no case made at all to the effect that Plot 179 the subject matter of this suit, does not exist, or that Exhibits P2, P3, P5 and P6 being documents evidencing the existence of the said plot and attesting to its allocation to the plaintiff, are forged or were not issued to the company. As earlier stated, the position of the law where a defendant fails to file a statement of defence or to lead evidence in support of his defence, is that he has admitted the Plaintiff’s case hook, line and sinker. That being the case, there is no foundation for the argument now being advocated by the 1st defendant, after it has by force law wholly admitted the plaintiff’s case as made.

In my view, Exhibit P2 has passed the test for documentary title set out above. On the evidence before me, I have no reason to doubt that the offer had been accepted by the plaintiff as required. I accept the evidence of PW 1 in cross-examination that if it were otherwise, Exhibits P3 and P5, particularly Exhibit P5, could not have been issued by the authorities confirming the Plaintiff’s title to the plot two years later. Learned counsel for the claimant submitted in his reply on points of law that any question as to non-acceptance of Exhibit P2 could only properly be made by the issuing authority, and that no such complaint has emanated from the FCT Administration to date. I agree with the submission. I do not see how any proper finding of non-acceptance of the offer can be made without a complaint to that effect being made by the issuing authority. See OMALE V. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF LANDS, HOUSING URBAN DEVELOPMENT & ORS, supra. The 1st defendant’s argument on this point also fails and is overruled.
The law is settled that a plaintiff whose case is unchallenged ought to succeed on minimum admissible evidence given: MONKOM V. ODILI, supra. When credible evidence is placed before the Court substantiating the plaintiff’s claim, and the evidence is not challenged or in any way controverted, the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment. In NEWBREED ORGANISATION LTD V. ERHOMOSELE (2006) LPELR–1984 (SC) at 26 A-D, Mukhtar, JSC (as he then was) stated this as follows:
“When a defendant refuses to adduce evidence in his defence, and rests his case on the evidence of the plaintiff, he has himself to blame… The position of the law is that where an adversary fails to adduce evidence to put on the other side of the imaginary scale of justice, the minimum evidence adduced by the other side would suffice to prove its case.”
Addressing a similar issue in OBUTE V. ABDULKAREEM (2014) LPELR-23971 (CA) at 18E-19C, the Court of Appeal had this to say:
“It is trite law that where a Court has before it only the unchallenged evidence of a party to consider, the Court is bound to accept the unchallenged evidence… Where a Court had evidence from the defendant to place against that of the plaintiff to see which weighed more, it is expected to decide on the evidence tendered by the plaintiff.”
This principle applies across board in civil proceedings, including land matters and declaratory actions. See BURAIMOH V. BAMGBOSE (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 352; OKOEBOR V. POLICE COUNCIL (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) 444.”

Firstly, the Appellant’s counsel failed to show any manifest contradiction in the pleadings and evidence for the 1st Respondent; because there is none. Secondly, by the implication of abandoning its pleadings and calling no witness in rebuttal, the Appellant is deemed to have fully accepted the evidence adduced by the 1st Respondent.

Thirdly, the cross-examination on the two witnesses for the 1st Respondent only reinforced the admitted facts of the 1st Respondent. Fourthly, while the 1st Respondent tendered exhibits P 1-P 7 in evidence as proof of the grant of the right of occupancy without any fact or evidence to the contrary, the Appellant tendered nothing to prove better or any title over the plot. Fifthly, by the provisions of Section 9(3) of the Land Use Act, in the event of any breach of the terms in the grant of certificate of occupancy, it is the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory that is entitled to take action by revocation of the right of occupancy. It does not lie in the mouth of the Appellant to cry more than the bereaved. In any case, the PW1’s evidence under cross-examination (supra) clearly affirms the 1st Respondent’s case that exhibit P 2 was indeed accepted. Unfortunately for the Appellant, the five criteria listed by its learned counsel for proving title to land as settled in judicial authorities all envisage the proof of one fact or the other; for instance, to prove genuineness, execution, capacity of the grantor (in this case the Minister) to make the grant, whether the Minister had in fact what he granted and whether it had the effect claimed by the holder (in this case the 1st Respondent). While there are no pleadings by the Appellant on these, the 1st Respondent’s case is replete with cogent facts to support a positive consideration of the established criteria for proof of title to land in the 1st Respondent’s favour.

There is something I find very intriguing about the Appellant’s case and it is that throughout the arguments under its lone Issue, the Appellant did not state or hint that any title was granted to it by the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory over the plot in dispute or that it has any or better title to it howsoever derived. Secondly, the Appellant is not seeking that it be declared the rightful owner of the plot in dispute; it is only seeking that the decision of the lower Court upholding the 1st Respondent’s title be set aside, the effect of which is that the 1st Respondent too should lose out on the title to the plot in favour of nobody. With respect, this in effect, is an invitation to anarchy.

The detailed findings and decision of the lower Court on exhibit P2 in particular as reproduced herein earlier are unassailable. This Court will not disturb same. In effect, the Appellant’s sole issue and the 1st Respondent’s first Issue are resolved against the Appellant.

In the manner expressed a moment ago in the resolution of the Appellant’s sole issue, those resolutions amply impacted on the 1st Respondent’s second issue (supra) on whether the Appellant has the locus standi to challenge the 1st Respondent’s alleged non-compliance with exhibit P 2. As may be recalled, I earlier held that in the event of any breach of the terms in the grant of a certificate of occupancy, it is the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory that is entitled to take action; not the Appellant. Having thus held, the 1st Respondent’s second issue too is resolved against the Appellant.

As may be recalled, the 1st Respondent’s third issue is one that challenged the Appellant’s appeal as an abuse of Court process. The arguments of the 1st Respondent have all been summarized earlier herein. There is no word of denial or even a comment by the Appellant. The Appellant did not file a Reply Brief of Argument.

Abuse of Court Process simply means the improper use of judicial process by a party in litigation aimed at interfering with the due administration of justice. This may be in the form of instituting multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent, or generally instituting a judicial process to the irritation, annoyance and embarrassment of an opponent. See African Reinsurance Corporation vs. JDP Construction (Nig) Ltd (2003) LPELR—215 (SC); Dingyadi & Anor vs. INEC & Ors (2010) LPELR-40142 (SC); Allanah & Ors vs. Kpolokwu & Ors (2016) LPELR — 40724 (SC).

In the course of the resolution of the Appellant’s Issue, I expressed my impressions about the aim of the Appellant by this appeal. The entire Grounds and the arguments under same are neatly tailored with the aim of frustrating the due administration of justice although under a process allowed by law. I have not seen one single merit in this appeal. As argued by the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent and I agree with him, the underlying aim of the appeal is no other than resorting to technicalities in order to frustrate substantial justice by the Court process on this appeal to sustain, maintain and shield the two gigantic structures illegally enacted by the Appellant on the 1st Respondent’s plot. I agree with the learned counsel also that this is tantamount to a perversion of the system by the use of lawful procedure for the attainment of an unlawful result. This Issue is also resolved against the Appellant.

On each of the four issues herein determined and on the whole, this appeal is liable to dismissal and it is accordingly dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court delivered on the 15th of January 2020 in suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1276/2015 is hereby affirmed. award cost of N200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira) against the Appellant.

HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, J.C.A.: My learned brother Isa Bature Gafai, JCA, graciously made available to me the judgment just delivered in draft.

Having also studied the grounds of appeal, the issues generated therefrom and the submissions of learned counsel, I am in no doubt that the Appellant failed in convincing this Court to interfere with the decision of the lower Court. The net result is that the appeal is lacking in merit and accordingly dismissed. I abide by order made as to costs.

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.: I read the draft of the leading judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Isah Bature Gafai, JCA I agree with the conclusion that the appeal is without merit and ought to be dismissed.

However, I am quick to express my reservations on the Respondent’s issue number three, which interrogates whether the appeal is an abuse of process. The Respondent did not file any preliminary objection on the basis of which it could distill the said issue. Furthermore, the said issue does not arise from the grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant. It is rudimentary law that any issue which does not arise from the grounds of appeal is incompetent and that a Respondent who has not filed a cross-appeal, Respondents’ Notice of Preliminary Objection cannot formulate any issue outside the Appellant’s grounds of appeal. See AKINLADE vs. AYINDE (2020) LPELR (49592) 1 at 17-18, FAYEMI vs. ONI (2019) LPELR (49291) 1 at 11-12, APGA vs. UMEH (2011) 8 NWLR (PT 1250) 544 and OTUAGOMA vs. OJAKERE (2016) LPELR (45052) 1 at 7-8. Therefore, on the settled state of the law, the Respondents’ said issue number three is incompetent and I hereby strike the same out.

As clearly identified in the leading judgment, the crux of this appeal is on Exhibit P2 the Respondent’s document of title. In the recent decision of this Court in APPEAL NO. CA/A/515/2014: IBRAHIM GARBA vs. MINISTRY OF THE CAPITAL TERRITORY & ANOR. (unreported) delivered on 25th May 2022, I held that for an Offer of Terms of Grant/Conveyance of Approval to crystallise into a contract, it has to be shown that the grantee accepted the offer in writing, in terms of Clause 4 of the letter of offer.
It would seem to be a similar situation in this matter as the Respondent did not tender any written acceptance of the offer as required by Clause 4 of Exhibit P2. However, Section 168 of the Evidence Act enacts a presumption of regularity in respect of judicial and official acts. The presumption is expressed in the Latinism omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarim, which is more often shortened as omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta. It means that everything is presumed to be rightly done until the contrary is shown. See NDUKWE vs. LPDC (2007) LPELR (1978) 1 at 63 and ANYAEGBUNAM vs. ANYAEGBUNAM (1973) LPELR (507) 1 at 15.
I find this rebuttable presumption applicable in the diacritical circumstances of this matter and its applicability was not rebutted. This is on account of the fact that if the Respondent had not accepted the offer in the terms of Exhibit P2, the issuing authority which made the offer to him, would not have had any further dealings with him culminating in the issuance of the documents tendered as Exhibit P3, P5 and P6. Consequently, the finding of the lower Court in this regard at page 194 of the Records is unassailable.

It is predicated on the foregoing and the more elaborate reasoning and conclusion articulated in the leading judgment that I also join in dismissing the appeal and on the same terms as set out in the leading judgment. I abide by the order as to costs.