SOKOLA v. C.O.P GOMBE STATE
(2021)LCN/15581(CA)
In The Court of Appeal
(GOMBE JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Thursday, November 25, 2021
CA/G/361C/2018
Before Our Lordships:
Jummai Hannatu Sankey Justice of the Court of Appeal
Tunde Oyebanji Awotoye Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ebiowei Tobi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
ALI SOKOLA APPELANT(S)
And
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE GOMBE STATE RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO DECIDENDI
JURISDICTION
The law is trite that an Appellant will not be allowed to raise a point or issue that was not raised or argued at the trial Court, except where the issue has to do with the jurisdiction of the Court. In such a case, it can be raised at anytime, without leave and even for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court. PER JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.
EFFECT OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
That said, it is also settled law that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and goes to the entire jurisdiction. Where the Court lacks jurisdiction, any steps taken in the proceedings, including the judgment, no matter how erudite, would be an exercise in futility, for the proceedings are a nullity and liable to be set aside. It is for this reason that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and even for the first time on appeal to this Court. Prior leave is not required to raise an issue of jurisdiction. See … AG Kwara State & anor V Alhaji Saka Adeyemo & ors (2016) LPELR-41147(SC). PER JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.
LEAVE OF COURT TO RAISE FRESH ISSUES IN AN APPEAL
In the case of Mohammed V FRN (2018) LPELR-43908(SC) 4-7, F-D, the Supreme Court, per Kekere-Ekun, JSC, held as follows:
“The general rule is that parties must be consistent in the case they present to the Court. An appeal is a continuation of the trial and therefore a party is not permitted to change his case midstream and argue a completely different case on appeal See… AG Kwara State & anor V Alhaji Saka Adeyemo & ors (2016) LPELR-41147(SC).It is therefore imperative that where a party intends to raise a fresh issue for the first time on appeal, he must seek and obtain the leave of Court to do so. Failure to seek and obtain leave deprives the Court of jurisdiction to determine such issues. See Abdullahi & ors V The State (2013) LPELR-20644 (SC); Shettima & anor. V Goni & ors (2011) LPELR-417 (SC). PER JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.
CLAIM OF RIGHT MADE IN GOOD FAITH
In the case of SPIESS V Oni (2016) LPELR-40502(SC) 96-98, C, the Supreme Court, per Okoro, JSC, held inter alia as follows:
“In Nwakire V COP (supra) this Court adopted with approval the dissenting judgment of Uwaifo, JCA (as he then was) when he said:
“Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Inspector General of Police V Emeozo & Ors (1957) WRNLR 213 where R. V Bernard (1938) 2 KB 264 was approved and Dabierin & Anor. V The State (1968) 1 All NLR 138 where R, V Skivington (1967) 1 All ER 483 was approved, there is no doubt that a claim of right made in good faith is a defence to all offences relating to property. An accused person will not be held criminally liable so long as he asserted that he honestly believed to be a lawful claim of right even though it may be unfounded in law or in fact.” PER JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.
JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This Appeal is against the Judgment of the Gombe State High Court of Justice sitting in its appellate jurisdiction in Suit No. GM/660CA/2017 delivered on April 23, 2018, Coram: J.A. Awak, J. and H.S. Mohammed, J.
The Appellant was charged before the Chief Magistrate Court Boh, Gombe State in Case No. CMC/BOH/19CR/2017 for the offences of criminal trespass and mischief contrary to Sections 346 and 326 of the Penal Code. At the close of trial, the learned trial Chief Magistrate found him guilty as charged, convicted him to a term of one year imprisonment or to pay a fine of N10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Naira only) for criminal trespass; in addition to a term of one year imprisonment or pay a fine of N5,000.00 (Five Thousand Naira only) for mischief. He was also ordered to pay the sum of N120,000.00 (One Hundred and Twenty Thousand Naira only) as compensation for the damage caused to the complainant.
Dissatisfied with the decision, the Appellant filed an appeal to the High Court of Justice, Gombe State on April 23, 2018 wherein he appealed against the sentence imposed on him and the amount of compensation awarded against him. After hearing the Appeal, the lower Court entered Judgment wherein it allowed the Appeal and reduced both the sentence and the award of compensation.
Still unhappy with the decision of the lower Court, the Appellant filed an Appeal to this Court vide his Notice of Appeal dated April 23, 2018. Thereafter, he sought and obtained the leave of this Court on November 2, 2021 to file additional Grounds of Appeal. Thus, by his Amended Notice of Appeal filed on June 1, 2020 and deemed duly filed on November 2, 2020, he complained on the following three Grounds:
“GROUND ONE
The Court below erred in law when it affirmed but reduced the compensation imposed on the Appellant by the trial Magistrate Court, Boh while there was no credible evidence on the issue of compensation before the trial Court.
GROUND TWO
The Court below erred in law when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court convicting the Appellant who claimed title to the disputed farm land at the trial Court and that the title was given to him by a Court of law.
GROUND THREE
The decision of the Court below is against the evidence before the trial Court.”
The Appellant sought the following reliefs set forth therein:
“An order allowing the appeal and discharging and acquitting the Appellant.”
The Appellant filed his Brief of argument on 01-02-21 and it was deemed duly filed and served on 05-07-21. Even though the Respondent was served the Appellant’s Brief, he did not file a Respondent’s Brief of argument in response as required by Order 19 Rule 4(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016.
The Appeal was heard on October 26, 2021 with learned Counsel for the Appellant adopting the submissions in the Appellant’s Brief of argument and urging the Court in line with his sole prayer as stated therein. Once again, the Respondent was neither in Court nor was he represented by Counsel even though there was proof of service of a hearing notice on him.
The Appellant’s Brief of argument was settled by Ibrahim Attahir Esq. Therein, he framed two issues for the determination of the Appeal as follows:
1. “Whether or not in view of the entire circumstances of the case the conviction of the Appellant can stand.” (Grounds 2 and 3)
2. Whether or not there was any justification for [the] award of compensation? (Ground 1)” The two issues distilled from the three Grounds of Appeal are adopted in the determination of the Appeal. They shall therefore be taken together.
ARGUMENTS
Under issue one for determination, learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that from the evidence on Record, the Appellant believed that he was only exercising his bona fide claim of right by placing beacons on the land pursuant to the Judgment of a Court of law, the Area Court Legal, Gombe State, which had issued him a writ of possession. He relied on the evidence of the PW3 and Exhibit CMC1 to contend that the dispute between the PW3 (the complainant) and the Appellant was over title to or ownership of the land. By the contents of Exhibit CMC1 which is a Writ of possession issued by the said Area Court, the disputed farmland was shared between the two parties. Therefore, he argues that there was nothing before the trial Chief Magistrate Court to prove that the Appellant committed the offences charged with the intention to intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession of the disputed land. Counsel submits that the Respondent, having not proved intent, did not establish the offences charged. He relies on Nwakire V COP (1992) LPELR-2097(SC); SPIESS V Oni (2016) LPELR-40502(SC). Counsel submits that the honest and bona fide claim of right by the Appellant was established by Exhibit CMC1.
In respect of issue two on the payment of compensation, learned Counsel submits that while Section 78 of the Penal Code provides for injury or damage caused in the course of committing an offence, Section 365 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the payment of compensation and its enforcement. He submits that the award of compensation is meant to defray the expenses incurred by the prosecution or for the injury caused to the victim or the medical expenses incurred by the victim. It is therefore within the discretionary power of the Court to award compensation. Reliance is placed on Suleiman V FRN (2018) LPELR-46710(CA); Martins V COP (2012) LPELR-9821(SC).
Counsel however submits that there is no evidence on record to show that any expense was incurred by the prosecution or injury caused or expenses incurred for medical treatment. Instead, the evidence shows that the Appellant only erected beacons on the disputed farm to demarcate the boundary between him and the PW3, and as such, it cannot attract damages.
Counsel therefore submits that there was no justification for the compensation awarded. Consequently, he urged the Court to resolve the two issues in favour of the Appellant. Finally, Counsel urged the Court to allow the Appeal, set aside the conviction, sentence, as well as the award of compensation; and also to discharge and acquit the Appellant.
FINDINGS
It must first be stated that the issue of whether the Appellant was rightly tried before the Chief Magistrate Court, Boh for the offence of criminal trespass and mischief, and whether the said Court had jurisdiction or not, was raised before the trial Chief Magistrate but was ignored and not resolved/determined by the Court.
Thereafter, it was not raised before the lower Court on appeal as the Appellant only appealed on sentence. It is therefore now being raised before this Court, leave having been duly sought and granted on 02-11-20 to so raise it.
The law is trite that an Appellant will not be allowed to raise a point or issue that was not raised or argued at the trial Court, except where the issue has to do with the jurisdiction of the Court. In such a case, it can be raised at anytime, without leave and even for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court.
In the case of Mohammed V FRN (2018) LPELR-43908(SC) 4-7, F-D, the Supreme Court, per Kekere-Ekun, JSC, held as follows:
“The general rule is that parties must be consistent in the case they present to the Court. An appeal is a continuation of the trial and therefore a party is not permitted to change his case midstream and argue a completely different case on appeal See…
It is therefore imperative that where a party intends to raise a fresh issue for the first time on appeal, he must seek and obtain the leave of Court to do so. Failure to seek and obtain leave deprives the Court of jurisdiction to determine such issues. See Abdullahi & ors V The State (2013) LPELR-20644 (SC); Shettima & anor. V Goni & ors (2011) LPELR-417 (SC). That said, it is also settled law that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and goes to the entire jurisdiction. Where the Court lacks jurisdiction, any steps taken in the proceedings, including the judgment, no matter how erudite, would be an exercise in futility, for the proceedings are a nullity and liable to be set aside. It is for this reason that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and even for the first time on appeal to this Court. Prior leave is not required to raise an issue of jurisdiction. See … AG Kwara State & anor V Alhaji Saka Adeyemo & ors (2016) LPELR-41147(SC).
The valid arraignment of an accused person touches on the jurisdiction of the Court. An improper arraignment is a breach of the accused’s right to fair hearing guaranteed by Section 36(6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution and is capable of rendering the entire proceedings a nullity. See: Abdullahi Ibrahim V The State (2013) LPELR-21883(SC); State V Oladimeji (2003) FWLR (Pt. 175) 395 @ 406.
Therefore, even though the alleged improper arraignment of the appellant before the trial Court is a fresh issue being raised for the first time here at the Apex Court, being an issue of jurisdiction, it is properly raised and no leave is required.” (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant Appeal, the Appellant had sought the leave of this Court to raise an issue of jurisdiction vide his motion filed on 01-06-20. It is apparent from the Record that whereas the issue on jurisdiction, to wit: that the Appellant had a bona fide title to the land by reason of a Court Judgment and so it was not a matter for a criminal trial, was raised before the trial Chief Magistrate Court, it was ignored by it as no pronouncement was made thereon. The issue was however not canvassed or pursued in the Appeal before the lower Court as the Appellant only appealed against the sentence. Based on these facts, this Court on 02-11-20, granted the Appellant leave to raise the issue of jurisdiction not raised before the lower Court. The issue was therefore raised and captured in Ground two of the Notice of appeal. It complains as follows:
“GROUND TWO
The Court below erred in law when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court convicting the Appellant who claimed title to the disputed farmland at the trial Court and that the title was given to him by a Court of law.”
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
a. Section 45 and Section 47 of the Penal Code Cap 108 Revised Laws of Bauchi State, 1999 (applicable to Gombe State exempt from criminal responsibility any action done by any person who believes himself to be justified by law and any person who acted in pursuance of judgment or order of a Court of Justice.
b. The Appellant claimed, in good faith, that the disputed land belonged to him and that Writ of Possession over the land was issued to him by a Court of law.
c. The act of erecting beacons on the disputed farmland by the Appellant was under the belief that it was his farmland and he was justified by law in so doing.
d. The Writ of Possession issued to him by the Court that he claimed gave him title remain valid.
e. The erection of beacons on the disputed farmland by the Appellant was without the requisite mens rea to constitute the offence of criminal trespass in law.
f. The trial Court ignored and suppressed the crucial issue of title repeatedly raised by the Appellant in the course of his trial.”
From the facts in the Record of Appeal, a criminal action was commenced before the Chief Magistrate Court, Boh by the complainant, Kwarya Tumaki, on 05-07-17 vide a Direct Criminal Complaint. Therein, he complained against the Appellant as follows (page 26 of the Record):
“That on the 5th April, 2017 at about 10:30 am the accused person trespass to the farm land of the complainant at Lalaipido and mischief by digging and putting Beacons. All this act was make without the consent of the complainant. Therefore the complainant file this case before this honourable Court to take cognizance of the said offence and punished as the law stated.”
Subsequently, on 04-05-17, on the direction of the trial Court, the Police took over the prosecution of the case and filed a First Information Report (FIR) on the same facts wherein they arraigned the Appellant alleging the commission of the offences of criminal trespass and mischief under Sections 348 and 327 of the Penal Code. At the trial, the Appellant pleaded guilty to the facts in the FIR (page 31 of the Record). At this stage, it is important to set out the dialogue between the trial Court and the Appellant in order to get a better grasp of the facts in the determination of this issue of jurisdiction. At page 31 of the Record, the following dialogue ensued:
“COURT: Is there any reason or cause why this Court will not convict you and sentence for committing this offences?
ACCUSED: Yes, the reason is that the Court in Lalaipido gave the two of us ownership of the land.
COURT: How can a Court give ownership to two people?
ACCUSED: I was granted ownership in 1996 while the complainer got his ownership on 2000. I don’t know now who is the owner of the land.
COURT: In essence you are telling this Court you trespass by mistake.
ACCUSED: I follow what the Court gave us.
COURT: To avoid confusion in this case I will enter a plea of not guilty for the accused persons. The law is that an accused person is presumed innocent until proved guilty. Therefore, I order the prosecution to lead evidence to proof this allegation against you.” (Emphasis supplied)
With this prompting, the Respondent adduced evidence through four witnesses and two exhibits. In particular, the complainant to the Police, Kwarya Tumaki, testified as PW3 inter alia as follows (at page 35 of the Record):
“Witness: What happen between me and the accused person about the case at Leggal. Alkali divided the pieces of land. My portion is in the north while Ali’s portion is in the south. Ali took blocks and build in my land. I became angry and file a case against him. Alkali gave me certificate of ownership.
… … … … …
Court: Granted. The ownership certificate from Leggal Area Court is hereby admitted and marked Exhibit CMC 1.”
Exhibit CMC 1, which comprises of Form 15 – “Proof of Ownership” issued by the Leggal Area Court, Lalaipido on 26-06-2000, two Proofs of ownership of certain areas of land were issued to both the Appellant and the Respondent. Specifically the first document, which was issued in respect of the Appellant, reads thus –
“Case No. CV/95/96
PROOF OF OWNERSHIP
The Leggal Area Court, Lalaipido, to all bailiffs and messenger.
Upon the order of this Court given on 24th July, 1996, that one was authorized to serve Ali Shokola of Shongom Local Government Gombe State the confirmation of ownership of a landed property.
The Court has confirm to Ali Shokola, a farm land with a measurement as follows:
On the east 208ft, from the west to the east on the southern part in 184ft. The Court has confirmed this farm land to Ali Shokola after their case with Kwaya Turki on 24/7/96.
You are authorized to confer the ownership of the said land is (sic) him.
Ordered by the Leggal Area Court, Lalaipido on 24-day of July, 1996.
(Signed) Area Court Judge
26/6/2000”
At the close of the prosecution’s case, the trial Chief Magistrate framed a two-count charge of criminal trespass and mischief punishable under Section 348 and 327 of the Penal Code (page 39 of the Record) against the Appellant.
When the charge was read and explained to the Appellant, he entered a plea of not guilty. He also adduced evidence in his defence through two witnesses. In his evidence as DW2, the Appellant informed the Court that in entering onto the land to install beacons, he was acting on the Judgment of the trial Area Court, Leggal which had shared the land between the PW3 and himself (see pages 43-44 of the Record). Under re-examination, the Appellant reiterated thus (page 45 of the Record):
“I have a paper confirming me with title on the portion.”
However, the document so tendered was rejected in evidence on the ground that as a photocopy, it was secondary evidence and so was inadmissible. Thereafter, the trial Court visited the farmland in dispute and made some observations.
From all the above, it is evident that the Appellant’s incursion into the land to install beacons was based on his honest and justified belief that he was the owner of the land as determined by a competent Court of law, to wit: the Area Court at Leggal in Gombe State. Exhibit CMC I, a Court document in this regard, confirmed that the land had been shared between the two parties by a Court of law.
These facts having become apparent to the trial Chief Magistrate Boh by the plea of the Appellant and from the evidence of both parties and their witnesses, he should have promptly hands-off the case, by striking same out for the parties to proceed to a civil Court for proper adjudication on the issue of title and/or ownership of the land, which obviously was still in dispute, particularly with regard to the boundaries and/or demarcation of the land. Or in the alternative, he should have found that the crucial element of mens rea being absent, the Appellant was entitled to a discharge and acquittal.
The trial Chief Magistrate clearly appreciated the purport of the facts in evidence placed before him when in his Judgment, (particularly at page 49 of the Record), he stated thus:
“Exhibit CMAI and CMCII proved this allegation and that the accused sued them 22 years ago at Legal Area Court where the Judge came personally and divide the land between them.”
A Court document sharing the land in dispute between the Appellant and PW3 having been brought to the notice of the trial Chief Magistrate Court, in conjunction with the consistent plea and defence of the Appellant that he was acting in compliance with a Court Order, was a red flag that should have caused the trial Court to realize that this was a civil matter and not a criminal case, as had been wrongly presented by the complainant. The law is clearly spelt out in Sections 59 and 60 of the Penal Code Law as follows:
“59. Nothing is an offence which is done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.”
60. Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions hereinafter contained to defend:
a) … … … …
b) The property whether moveable or immovable of himself or of any person against any act, which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.”
I therefore agree with learned Counsel for the Appellant that, the Appellant having acted on the Judgment of a competent Court of law demarcating the land between himself and the complainant, PW3, and in the honest belief that the portion of land he entered into belonged to him, the requisite criminal intent, otherwise referred to in law as mens rea, was absent and not proved.
Having considered the evidence contained in the Record of that Court, I am of the view that the learned Chief Magistrate wrongly charged the Appellant for the offences of criminal trespass and mischief under the provisions of the Penal Code Law in light of the facts disclosed in evidence. It was always a dispute over title which should have been tried in a Civil Court. The Supreme Court has expressly pronounced on situations such as this in a plethora of decisions. I will highlight just two.
In the case of SPIESS V Oni (2016) LPELR-40502(SC) 96-98, C, the Supreme Court, per Okoro, JSC, held inter alia as follows:
“In Nwakire V COP (supra) this Court adopted with approval the dissenting judgment of Uwaifo, JCA (as he then was) when he said:
“Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Inspector General of Police V Emeozo & Ors (1957) WRNLR 213 where R. V Bernard (1938) 2 KB 264 was approved and Dabierin & Anor. V The State (1968) 1 All NLR 138 where R, V Skivington (1967) 1 All ER 483 was approved, there is no doubt that a claim of right made in good faith is a defence to all offences relating to property. An accused person will not be held criminally liable so long as he asserted that he honestly believed to be a lawful claim of right even though it may be unfounded in law or in fact.”
For instance,Section 59 of the Penal Code states:
“59. Nothing is an offence which is done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.”
Also Section 60(b) of the Penal Code strengthens my view that the appellant was wrongly convicted. It states:
“60. Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions hereinafter contained to defend:
a) … … … …
b) The property whether moveable or immovable of himself or of any person against any act, which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.”
For me, the opinion expressed by Uwaifo, JCA (supra) which was adopted by this Court, is very much applicable to this case even though it was decided upon based on Section 23 of the Criminal Code. I say so because under the Penal Code which the appellant was charged, similar provisions like Section 23 of the Criminal Code are present.
There is no doubt that both the Criminal Code and the Penal Code agree that once it is shown that an accused has a bona fide claim of right, the required mens rea is negatived. The extent of the damage done by him, while it may be a factor to take into consideration in determining as a fact whether this claim of right is honest or bona fide, cannot restore the mens rea that is already negatived by the finding that he had the honest belief, the right to do what he did. See Ohonbamu V COP (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 155) 204.” (Emphasis supplied) This position had earlier been taken by the apex Court in the case of Nwakire V COP (1992) LPELR-2097(SC) 20-21, E-B, per Ogundare, JSC, as follows:
“In my respectful view, once it is shown that an accused person has a bona fide claim of right the required mens rea is negatived. The extent of the damage done by him, while it may be a factor to be taken into consideration in determining as a fact whether his claim of right is honest or bona fide, cannot restore the mens rea that is already negatived by the finding that he had the honest belief that he had the right to do what he did.” (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the totality of the facts in evidence placed before the trial Court, it was evident that there was a total absence of mens rea on the part of the Appellant since he claimed a bona fide right to ownership of the portion of land where he entered into in order to fix beacons, in apparent execution of the Judgment given by a Court of law, which Judgment had been placed before the trial Court as Exhibits CMC I and CMC II. This negatived the mens rea of the offences charged and so they were not proved beyond reasonable doubt as required by law. The two issues for determination are therefore resolved in favour of the Appellant.
In consequence of these findings, I find merit in the Appeal. It is allowed.
Accordingly, I set aside the conviction and sentence of the Appellant for the offences of criminal trespass and mischief under Sections 348 and 326 of the Penal Code, as well as the award of the sum of N120, 000.00 as compensation made against him.
In its stead, I enter an Order discharging and acquitting the Appellant of the offences of criminal trespass and mischief under Sections 348 and 326 of the Penal Code Law.
TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY JCA. I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein.
The law is settled on the defence of bone fide claim of right which is available to an accused who sincerely and bona fide asserts his right to a property. A defence of bona fide claim of right is a clear assertion that the accused sincerely asserted his right without a criminal or fraudulent mind. According to OGUNDARE JSC in NWAKIRE VS C.O.P (1992) 5 NWLR PART 241P 289 “in my respectful view, once it is shown that an accused person has a bonafide claim of right the required mens rea is negative. The extent of the damage done by him while it may be a factor to be taken into consideration in determining as a fact, whether his claim of right is honest or bona fide cannot restore the mens era that is already negatived by the finding that he had honest belief that he had the right to do what he did.”
I agree that the defence of bona fide claim of right was available to the appellant.
I also hold that this appeal has merit. It is hereby allowed. I abide by the consequential orders in the leading judgment.
EBIOWEI TOBI, J.C.A.: I read in draft the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, J. H. Sankey, JCA. I agree entirely with the reasoning and the conclusion reached therein. I agree that the appeal has merit and that the Appellant was wrongly tried, Convicted and sentenced by the Magistrate Court as it lacked the jurisdiction. Since the Chief Magistrate lacked jurisdiction, the bottom of the case is broken and nothing can stand on it. The lower Court could not have decided the case since the case was a civil case for which the Magistrate Court had no criminal jurisdiction over. The law is settled that any decision arrived at by a Court when it had no jurisdiction to try, the decision is a nullity. See Egbulefu Onyero & Anor vs Augustine Nwadike (2011) 12 SC (pt 1) 1, Josiah Cornelius Ltd vs Ezenwa (1996) 4 NWLR (pt 443) 391. The apex Court clearly stated in PDP vs Okorocha & Ors (2012) LPELR-7832 (SC) held that a judgment without jurisdiction is no longer alive and no appeal can lie or be heard on it.
In the circumstances of the facts before this Court, ably resolved by my learned brother in favour of the Appellant against the Respondent, I also allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and the sentence of the Appellant. The Appellant is hereby discharge and acquitted.
Appearances:
Dennis Eze Esq. For Appellant(s)
Respondent not represented by Counsel. For Respondent(s)
