OYEWOLE & ORS v. GOV OF OYO STATE & ORS (2020)

OYEWOLE & ORS v. GOV OF OYO STATE & ORS

(2020)LCN/15329(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, July 24, 2020

CA/IB/307/2012

Before Our Lordships:

Jimi Olukayode Bada Justice of the Court of Appeal

Haruna Simon Tsammani Justice of the Court of Appeal

Folasade Ayodeji Ojo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

OBA JACOB OYEROGBA OYEWOLE (THE OLU OF IGBOORA LAND) (FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF OTAOBOLA RULING HOUSE) 2. ALHAJI JIMOH KOLAWOLE BELLO (FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF AYERIMINA FAMILY) 3. PRINCE OLUSEGUN OLANREWAJU (FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF AJIBONA RULING HOUSE) 4. DEACON JOSEPH OYELEKE OYEDIRAN (FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF AJAYI RULING HOUSE) 5. PRINCE USMAN SALMON (FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF AWAYEETI RULING HOUSE) APPELANT(S)

And

THE GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE 2. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF OYO STATE & COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE 3. COMMISSIONER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS 4. SECRETARY TO IBARAPA CENTRAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF OYO STATE 5. MR. TITILOYE BAMIGBOSE (FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF ASORO-OLU FAMILY) RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

DEFINITION OF THE TERM “LOCUS STANDI”

The term “locus standi” literally means a “place to stand”. It is a standing to sue. It is the legal right of a party to an action to be heard in litigation before a Court of law or tribunal. The term entails the legal capacity of instituting, initiating or commencing an action in a competent Court of law or tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever. In other words; locus standi is the right or appearance in a Court of justice or before a legislative body on a given question. See ADESANYA VS. PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (1981) 2 NCLR 358.
It is long settled that for a person(s) such as the Appellants to have locus standi in an action, he/they must be able to show that his/their civil rights and obligations has/have been or is/are in danger of being infringed. The mere fact that a person may not succeed in an action does not have anything to do with whether or not he has standing to bring the action. See A.G. OF KADUNA STATE VS. HASSAN (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 8) PG. 483; AJAGUNGBADE III VS. ADEYELU II (2001) 16 NWLR (PT. 738) 136.
It is further the law that for a person to be entitled to invoke judicial power, he must show that either his personal interest will immediately be or has been adversely affected by the action or that he had sustained an injury to himself and which interest and injury is over and above that of the general public. A Claimant must have sufficient legal interest in seeking redress in Court without which that party cannot completely seek redress in a Court of law. See BADEJO VS. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1990) 4 NWLR PT.143 PG.254. PER OJO, J.C.A.

WHO IS A PUBLIC OFFICER UNDER THE PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT

It is trite that a constitutionally created personality is a Public Officer in Nigeria – See NIGERIAN EMPLOYERS CONSULTATIVE ASSOCIATION & ORS. VS. A.G. FED. & ORS. (2018) LPELR-46861 CA.
The words ‘Public Officer’ or any person for the purpose of the Public Officers protection Act/Law and as stipulated in Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law not only refer to natural persons or persons sued in their personal names but extend to public bodies, initial persons, institutions or persons sued by their official names or titles. See FGN. VS. ZEBRA ENERGY LTD. (2002) 18 NWLR (798) 162 AT 195 and PERMANENT SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF WORKS VS. BALOGUN (1975) 5 SC 57and IBRAHIM VS. JSC KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 584) 1.
Judicial authorities abound to the effect that for a party to be protected by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act/Law it must be established that the party against whom the action was commenced was a Public Officer and that the act done by him in respect of which the action was commenced was an act done in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty. See FAKOLADE VS. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION (1993) 1 NWLR (PT. 271) PG. 639 AT 643-644 AND EKEOGU VS. ALIRI (1990) 1 NWLR (PT. 126) PG. 245.
A Public Officer is any person directly employed in government, public service, civil service or any public agency. See OKOMU OIL PALM CO. VS. ISERHIENRHIEN (2001) 6 NWLR (PT. 710) PG. 660 AND EZE VS. OKECHUKWU (2002) 18 NWLR (PT. 799) PG. 348. The protection offered by the Public Officers Protection Act covers and protects all Public Officers that is all civil servants in their individual capacity and all government bodies, public institutions and agencies, ministries and departments by whatever name called.
In the case of IBRAHIM VS. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION (supra) the Supreme Court per IGUH JSC at pages 37-38 had this to say on the words “Public Officer”, “Public Office” and “Person”:
“With the greatest respect, I cannot pretend that I fully appreciate Learned Counsel’s contention in this area of his argument. In the first place, although the title of the relevant law implies a law to protect “Public Officers” and not “Public Officer”, it is beyond argument that government positions such as Attorney-General, Permanent Secretary or the Inspector General of Police etc. although Public Offices are none-the-less Public Officers in law. I cannot, with respect, accept that an Attorney-General, Permanent Secretary or the Inspector-General of Police is not a “Public Officer” as known to law…” PER OJO, J.C.A.

DEFINITION OF A “CAUSE OF ACTION”

Cause of action is the entire set of circumstances which gives rise to an enforceable claim. They are a combination of facts which confer on a Claimant the right to seek relief and/or remedy in a Court of law. Cause of action is also the wrongful act of the Defendant and consequent damage which gives the Claimant his cause of complaint. See ADEKOYA VS. FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (2008) 11 NWLR (PT. 1099) 539; JULIUS BERGER NIG. PLC. VS. OMOGUI (2001) 15 NWLR (PT. 736) 401; OWODUNNI VS. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF CELESTIAL CHURCH OF CHRIST (2000) 10 NWLR (PT. 675) 315. The law is trite that the formula for determining whether or not a party’s right of action is caught by the provision of a Limitation Law such as the Public Officers Protection Law is a consideration of the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim only. It is determined by taking a critical look at the allegations contained in the Writ of Summons and Statement of claim. See EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 47) 1; WOHEREM VS. EMEREUWA (2004) 13 NWLR (PT. 890) 398 AND HASSAN VS. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (PT. 1223) 547. PER OJO, J.C.A.

FOLASADE AYODEJI OJO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the Ruling of the High Court of Oyo State sitting in Ibadan in SUIT NO:HER/09/2011 delivered on 30/4/2012.

By a Writ of Summons filed on 01/11/2011 and a Statement of Claim filed alongside, the Appellants claimed against the Respondents jointly and severally as follows:
1. DECLARATION that the existing 1957 Baale of Igboora Chieftaincy Declaration dated 4th day of October 1957 is irregular, improper, unconstitutional null, void and does not represent the true history and culture on the selection of Baale of Igboora (now the Olu of Igboora).
2. DECLARATION that according to the native law and custom of Igboora there are five Ruling Houses to the Baale of Igboora (now Olu of Igboora) Chieftaincy, to wit:
i. OTAOBOLA
ii. AYERIMINA
iii. AWAYEETI
iv. AJIBONA
v. AJAYI
3. DECLARATION that according to the native law and custom of Igboora, Asoro-Olu Ayinla is not a known ruling house of the Baale of Igboora (now Olu of Igboora) Chieftaincy.
4. DECLARATION that the unregistered 1976 Adenekan Ademola proposed amendment of the Chieftaincy Declaration for Baale of Igboora, (now Olu of Igboora) chieftaincy was marred with falsification of history of Igboora.
5. AN ORDER setting aside the existing 1957 Baale of Igboora (now Olu of Igboora) Chieftaincy Declaration dated 4th October, 1957.
6. AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION compelling the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants to effect the amendment of the 1957 Baale of Igboora (now Olu of Igboora) Chieftaincy Declaration by setting up a commission of enquiry in accordance with Section 25 of the Chiefs Law Cap. 28, Laws of Oyo State of Nigeria, 2000.
7. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants from registering and/or gazetting the proposed amended 35 year old Justice Adenekan Ademola Chieftaincy Declaration on Baale of Igboora (now Olu of Igboora Chieftaincy) having become otiose, unrepresentative of the history, customs and native law of Igboora Chieftaincy.

The Appellants case before the lower Court as contained in their pleadings is that the Olu of Igboora (formerly titled Baale of Igboora) is a recognized ruling house in Ibarapa Central Local Government of Oyo State to which Part II of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State applies. That in 1957 the Chieftaincy Committee of the then Ibarapa District Council made a Declaration of Customary Law to regulate the nomination and selection of the then Baale of Igboora (now Olu) Chieftaincy which declaration was approved by the Minister of Local Government, Western Region of Nigeria on 25/11/1958. That the declaration recognized only four (4) ruling quarters in Igboora to wit: Agbojojoye, Erubama, Atambala and Ajayi.

They alleged further that the 1957 declaration was flawed and inaccurate for the reasons that it omitted the Omibale Awayeeti ruling house from the Igboora Chieftaincy and failed to resolve the issue of the identity of the common ancestor of the people of Igboora being a crucial factor in determining the legitimacy or otherwise of any claims for recognition as a ruling house in Igboora.

They claimed that in 1976 following a review of the existing Chieftaincy Declaration in Oyo State, the then Military government set up a Commission of Inquiry under the Chairmanship of Hon. Ademola Adenekan to conduct an inquiry into all the recognized Chieftaincies in the State and suggest guidelines for effecting necessary changes. At the end of the day, the Commission of Inquiry submitted a report which was modified and approved by the government but which remained unregistered since 1976.

They stressed that the Hon. Justice Ademola Adenekan report rather than rectify the glaring inaccuracies of the 1957 declaration created further disaffection and uncertainty in the Chieftaincy, Customs and Traditions of Igboora people and that the Agoro-Olu Family (5th Respondent) took undue advantage of the lacuna contained in both documents by inventing a fabricated version of Igboora history, custom and tradition to secure their illegitimate claim to be a ruling house in Igboora.

The Appellants further contend that the registration of the 1976 Hon. Justice Adenekan Ademola report if allowed would violate the contemporary customary practices and create an unnecessary tension and acrimony within Igboora Community.

All the Respondents placed a different set of facts before the trial Court in their statement of defence. They denied the allegations levied in the Appellants statement of claim. They urged the trial Court to dismiss the suit filed by the Appellants with substantial cost for being frivolous and speculative.

The 5th Respondent who was the 5th defendant before the trial Court filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16/11/2011 and filed on 17/11/2011 (see pages 153 – 154 of the record).

The grounds of the Preliminary Objection are as follows:
i. The basis of the claim of the Claimants arose in 1977.
ii. The Claimants’ claim is caught by Statute of Limitation Law of Oyo State, 1978, Edict No. 3 of 1989 and Laws of Oyo State, 2000.
iii. The 2nd – 5th Claimants have no locus standi to institute this action, there being no Ruling Houses outside Atambala and Asoro-Olu Ayinla recognised by the Government and
iv. The action is caught by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law, Law of Oyo State, 2000.

The 1st Claimant filed an affidavit that he did not give his consent to the action instituted by the 2nd – 5th Claimants. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Claimants filed separate counter affidavits to the 5th Defendants’ Preliminary Objection.

The Preliminary Objection was argued on 2/3/2012. Upon a consideration of the Affidavits and Written Addresses of Counsel, the trial judge in a Ruling delivered on 30/4/2010 struck out the Appellants’ suit for want of jurisdiction. He held at page 416 of the Record as follows:
“Consequently I hold that I have no jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate on any of the reliefs being claimed by the Claimants in their Writ of Summons dated 1st November, 2011 and filed on that date and as contained in paragraph 29(1)-(7) of the Statement of Claim dated and filed on 1st day of November, 2011.
The Claimants Suit/Action herein is hereby struck out for want of jurisdiction on the part of this Court.”

I shall endeavor to reproduce some of the findings of the lower Court that led to the above decision. They are:
i) That Order 22 Rules 1- 3 of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules of Oyo State 2010 allow points of law to be raised against a Claimant’s action and also allow for peremptorily disposing of Claimant’s case at the close of the Claimant’s statement of claim or at the close of both the Claimant’s and Defendants pleadings (see page 400 of the Record).
ii) That consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in N.D.I.C. VS. CBN (2002) 7 NWLR (PART 766) 272 AT 296 B – H, a defendant who believes he has a point of law that can dispose the plaintiffs’ case or action in limine is entitled to bring an application to canvass such point of law particularly where it touches and concerns jurisdiction of the Court even without filing his statement of Defence (see page 401 of the record). The trial Court is therefore under a legal obligation to hear and determine questions as to its jurisdiction and competency of the action as raised by the 5th Respondent at the earliest opportunity (see page 402 of the Record).
iii) That when looked at from any angle, the right and cause of action of the Appellants in respect of the Chieftaincy Declaration accrued since 1957, a period of 55 years. That even if it is taken as strenuously argued by Appellants that the cause of action in respect of attempt to register the amended Chieftaincy Declaration of Baale of Igboora as recommended by Adenekan Ademolas’ Commission of Inquiry accrued in August 2009, then the cause of action in respect of proposed amended Declaration to Baale of Igboora accrued in August 2009. (see page 410 of the Record.
(iv) That the Limitation Law of Oyo State obliged a Claimant five years to sue for wrong done to him while the Public Officers Protection Law gives room for only three months to institute an action against a Public Officer. The Appellants action is caught by both the Limitation Law of Oyo State and Public Officers Protection Law of Oyo State (see page 410 of the record).
(v) That there is no judicial authority to the effect that Limitation Law or Public Officers Protection Law would not apply in appropriate cases. The position of the Supreme Court in Military Administrator Ekiti State & Ors. vs. Prince B. A. Aladeyelu & Ors (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) pg. 619 at 641 is that even if it could be said that some of the Claimants’ relief are caught by Limitation Law, the main action is not caught by Limitation Law because it was filed within three (3) months after the wrong complained of occurred. (See page 410 of the record)
(vi) That the Appellants have no reasonable cause of action on the Adenekan Ademola report which has not translated into any registration. Even if the cause of action accrued, the Appellants action has become stale and caught by the Limitation and Public Officers Protection Law. That since the Appellants reliefs 1, 2, 3 and 5 contained in the Writ of Summons as endorsed in paragraph 29 of the Statement of Claim all stem from the 1957 Declaration, they are all caught by the two (2) Limitation Laws. (See pages 411 – 412 of the record)
(vii) That the steps to be taken to have the existing Chieftaincy Declaration in respect of Baale of Igboora (now Olu) Chieftaincy altered are clearly laid out in Sections 10 and 25 of the Chiefs Law. (See page 413 of the record)
(viii) That the Appellants ought to have made representation(s) to the government of Oyo State or the competent council for an amendment to the Chieftaincy Declaration existing in respect of Baale (now Olu of Igboora) to accommodate them. Sections 10 and 25 of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State do not authorize the Court to compel or mandate the Governor of Oyo State or the competent authorities on Chieftaincy matters to cause any commission of Inquiry to be set up with a view to amend the Registered Declaration of Baale of Igboora (now Olu of Igboora) without the Appellants first following the administrative procedure laid down in the Chiefs Law. (See page 414 of the record.
(ix) That assuming jurisdiction on the Appellants suit will amount to usurping the functions of the Governor of Oyo State or the appropriate Chieftaincy Committee (see page 415 of the record).
(x) That the 2nd – 5th Appellants have no locus standi to institute their action and do not have any vested interest due to the Limitation Laws which have extinguished their rights to complain. (See page 416 of the Record)

Dissatisfied with the above findings and the totality of the Ruling of the lower Court, the Appellants filed the instant appeal. The Notice of Appeal filed on 30th May, 2012 is at pages 417 – 420 of the record. The Appellants Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 7/3/2013 and deemed as properly filed and served on 14/4/2014 is predicated on six (6) grounds. The Record of Appeal transmitted on 30/11/2012 was deemed properly transmitted on 10/5/2018.

Parties filed and exchanged Briefs of Arguments as follows:
(i) Appellants’ Brief of Argument settled by Akinyele Sanyaolu Esq. filed on 7th March, 2013 was deemed as properly filed and served on 10th of May, 2018.
(ii) 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ Brief of Argument settled by Adeboyega Salawu Esq. (Chief State Counsel, Oyo State Ministry of Justice) filed on 27th of November, 2014 was refilled on 10th of February, 2020.
(iii) 5th Respondent’s Brief of Argument settled by Kazeem A. Gbadamosi Esq. filed on 25th September, 2018 was deemed as properly filed and served on 7th of November, 2018.
(iv) Appellants’ Reply Brief to 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ Brief of Argument settled by Akinyele Sanyaolu Esq. filed on 17th October, 2014 was deemed as properly filed on 10th May, 2018.
(v) Appellants’ Reply Brief to 5th Respondent’s Brief settled by S. S. Akinyele Esq. was filed on 16th November, 2018.

Four Issues were formulated for the determination of this appeal on behalf of the Appellants in the Appellants’ Brief of Argument. The issues are:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the Claimants have no locus standi to institute this action.
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right not to have applied the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Military Governor of Ekiti State vs. Aladeyelu (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) pg 619 when he struck out this case for want of jurisdiction.
3. Whether Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law of Oyo State is applicable to this Suit.
4. Whether the trial Court can raise the issue of setting up a Commission of Inquiry and the applicability of Sections 10 and 25 of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State without taking evidence and affording Counsel the opportunity to address the Court.

Learned Counsel to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents in the Brief filed on their behalf adopted issues one to three formulated for the Appellants. See page 7 of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents Brief of Argument.

The following issues were distilled for determination on behalf of the 5th Respondent in their Brief of Argument:
1. Whether having regard to the Claimant’s reliefs and the decision in MILAD Ekiti vs Aladeyelu & 3 Ors (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) Page 619 at 653, the trial Judge was right in striking out the Claimant’s suit.
2. Whether the Claimants/Appellants’ Claim is caught by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law as to make the suit unmaintainable.
3. Whether the trial Judge was right in striking out the Claimant/Appellants’ suit on the ground of locus standi having regard to the reliefs and the time the cause of action in this matter occurred.
4. Whether the trial Court was right in considering the provisions of the Chiefs Law more particularly Sections 10 and 25 of the Chiefs Law Cap 28 Law of Oyo State and its applicability to the Claimant’s claim, before striking out the Claimants/Appellants’ suit.

The 4th Respondent did not file any Brief of Argument and was not present at the hearing of this appeal despite been served with hearing notices.

On 3/6/2020 when this appeal was heard, Counsel representing parties adopted and relied on their respective Briefs of Argument. While Appellants’ Counsel argued in favour of allowing the appeal, that of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Respondents submitted to the contrary i.e. in favour of the dismissal of the Appeal.

I note that the issues formulated on behalf of the Appellants and those formulated on behalf of the Respondents are essentially the same. I shall therefore adopt the issues formulated on behalf of the Appellants with some slight modifications as the issues for determination in this Appeal.

The issues are as follows:
1. Was the trial Court right when it held the Appellants lack the requisite locus to institute this action?
2. Was the trial Court right when after considering the decision of the Supreme Court in Military Governor of Ekiti State vs. Aladeyelu (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) pg 619 still proceeded to decline jurisdiction over the Appellants suit.
3. Was the trial Court right when it held that the Appellants suit is caught by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Laws of Oyo State.
4. Was the trial Court right when it relied on Sections 10 and 25 of the Chiefs Law Cap 28 Laws of Oyo State to decline jurisdiction over the Appellants suit.

ISSUE NO.1:
WAS THE TRIAL COURT RIGHT WHEN IT HELD THE APPELLANTS LACK THE REQUISITE LOCUS TO INSTITUTE THE ACTION?
Learned Counsel to the Appellants submitted that the trial Court’s finding on locus standi at its very best apply only to the 2nd to 5th Appellants but not to the 1st Appellant. He contended that the lower Court by its decision striking out the entire suit shut out the 1st Appellant from ventilating his grievances and thus violated his constitutional right as enshrined in Section 6(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. He relied on the cases of BUHARI & ORS VS. HADDY SMART (NIG.) LTD. & ANOR. (2010) WRN 10; AKANNI VS. OLANIYAN (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 380) 1534 AT 1547 AND A.G. FERRERO VS. MR. AFAMEFUNA NWAMANI & ANOR. (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 339) 990 AT 998 to support his submission.

He pointed out that the Appellants clearly stated in their pleadings that they are members of the ruling family who have vested interest in the Chieftaincy title and justified how their interest arose. He also opined that Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Oyo State which the trial Court relied on to find that the Appellants action was brought outside the 5 years period allowed by that law is a law of general application and does not deal specifically with issues of Chieftaincy. He submitted that it is the Chiefs Law of Oyo State that applies to their case and craved in aid the case of SCHROEDER VS. MAJOR (1989) 2 NWLR (PT. 101) PG. 1 AT 21.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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Learned Counsel emphasized that the issue of Limitation Law does not arise at all because the Appellants commenced their action two years after the 5th Respondent began his attempt to register the 1978 Adenekan report and that a proper reckoning of the Limitation period ought to commence from the date the Respondents made the attempt to register the Chieftaincy Declaration and when the Chieftaincy Declaration was published. He emphasized there is nothing in Sections 10 and 25 of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State to justify the decision of the trial Court that the Appellants lack locus standi to institute the action at the lower Court.

For his part, learned Counsel to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents submitted there is no ruling house known as Ayerinima ruling house, Ajibona ruling house and Awayeeti Ruling House within Igboora Chieftaincy Declaration and that the 1st Appellant who has the locus to sue did not consent to the action before the lower Court. He referred us to the 1st Appellant’s Counter Affidavit filed on 22nd November 2011 contained at pages 183 – 184 of the record and urged us to affirm the decision of the trial Court on this issue.
The response of learned counsel to the 5th Respondent to this issue is that the Appellants right to maintain the action before the lower Court has been extinguished by the Limitation Law. He submitted the Appellants lacked locus standi because they are not part of the Chieftaincy family recognized by the registered declaration and urged us to dismiss this issue and the corresponding ground of appeal.

The Learned trial judge while concluding his judgment at page 416 of the record held on the issue of locus standi of the 2nd – 5th Appellants to maintain the action as follows:
“…as to whether the Claimants have locus standi to this action, I am of the view that the 2nd – 5th Claimants have no locus standi to institute this action in view of the findings I have made herein before in this Ruling and because they do not have any vested interest to protect due to the Limitations Laws which have extinguished their rights to now complain.”

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Respondents position is that there was no ruling house as claimed by the 2nd to 5th Appellants. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents averred at paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of their Statement of Defence contained at page 344 of the record as follows:
“(3) With particular reference to paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Claimants Statement of Claim, the defendants aver that there are only two (2) Ruling Houses namely Atambala, the present Ruling House and Asoro-OluAyinla (also known as Arojojoye) for Baale Igboora Chieftaincy now Olu of Igboora Chieftaincy.
4) In addition to paragraph 3 above, the Defendants aver that AYERIMINA FAMILY is a Section of Atambala Ruling House.
5) The Defendants aver that from time immemorial, there has always been two ruling houses for Baale of Igboora Chieftaincy, the history, tradition and custom was further affirmed by a letter written by the eleven (11) traditional Chiefs of Igboora to the Olubadan in Council on 20th July 1941, while the Baale of Igboora Chieftaincy was to be filed. This letter is hereby pleaded and shall be relied upon at the trial of this suit.”

Similarly at paragraphs 23 and 24 of the 5th Respondent’s statement of defence on page 160 of the record, the 5th Respondent averred thus:
“(23) The Defendant will also contend that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Claimants have no locus standi to institute this action as there is no ruling house known as Ayerinma Ruling House, Ajibona Ruling House and Awayeeti Ruling House within Igboora Chieftaincy Declaration.
(24) The Defendant will also contend that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Claimants are not related to any of the 2 Ruling Houses and are therefore not proper parties to this suit”.

The 3rd ground of the Notice of Preliminary Objection as contained on the face of it is as follows:
“(3) The 2nd – 5th Claimants have no locus standi to institute this action there being no ruling houses outside Atambala and Asoro-Olu Ayinla, recognized by the Government.”

The Appellants claim to membership of the recognized ruling houses in Igboora is contained in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the statement of claim. They read thus:
“(2) The 2nd Claimant is a member of the Ayerinma Ruling House of Igboora Community in Oyo State, Nigeria.
(3) The 3rd Claimant is a member of Ajibona Ruling House, Igboora Community of Oyo State, Nigeria.
(4) The 4th Claimant is a member of Ajayi Ruling House, Igboora Community of Oyo State, Nigeria.
(5) The 5th Claimant is a member of Awayeeti Ruling House, Igboora Community of Oyo State, Nigeria.”

It is on record that the Oyo State Government in 1976 set up the Hon. Justice Ademola Adenekan Commission of Inquiry to conduct an inquiry into all the recognized Chieftaincies in Oyo State including that of the then Baale (now Olu) of Igboora Chieftaincy. The recommendation of the commission is that Agbojojoye and Atambala are the only two (2) ruling houses.

The recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry and Government’s decision on the report contained at page 62 of the record is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:
“5. RECOMMENDATION: The commission was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that only two distinct lines had shared the Baale of Igboora Chieftaincy title from its inception i.e. Agbojojoye and Atambala. The Commission therefore recommended that for equity and justice, only those should be the two ruling houses in a revised declaration. For the avoidance of doubt, the Commission recommended that the name Arojojoye which was an appellation describing the installation on a raining day should be changed to the real name of Asoro-Olu Ayinla. That had been because the evidence before the commission suggested that rain fell more than once at the installation of the past Baales of Igboora and rain might fall again in the future thus making for confused identity through raining occasions. The following order of rotation was suggested:
i. Atambala (present ruling house)
ii. Asoro-Olu Ayinla (Alias Arojojoye)
The other sections of the existing declaration have not been in dispute. The commission therefore recommended that such sections should not be altered.
5. GOVERNMENT’S DECISION ON THE REPORT:
The State Executive Council have carefully considered the report, approved that:
i. The Baale of Igboora Chieftaincy Declaration be declared faulty.
ii. The Declaration relating to the Chieftaincy be amended as follows:
(a) Agbojojoye and Atambala should be the two ruling houses in a revised declaration
(b) The name Agbojojoye or Arojojoye, which is an appellation describing the installation of the Oba on a rainy day should be changed to the real name of Asoro-Olu Ayinla.
(c) The order of rotation should be:
i. Atambala (present ruling house)
ii. Asoro-Olu Ayinla (Alias Arojojoye)

It is obvious from all of the above that there is not in existence any such ruling house(s) as claimed by the 2nd – 5th Appellants in Igboora. The Appellants did not dispute that all parties to the Igboora Chieftaincy appeared and testified before the Adenekan Commission of Inquiry, that the report was submitted to the Western State Executive Council and accepted by the Western State Government. It is also not in dispute that the Ruling Houses were notified of the decision of government vide a letter dated 29/11/77 of the existence of only two ruling houses for Baale of Igboora Chieftaincy (now Olu). The Appellants have been aware of the findings and recommendations of the Ademola Adenekan Commission of Inquiry as well as the acceptance of the findings and recommendation by the State Government since 1977. It is significant to note that the 2nd – 5th Appellants did not petition the State Government to set aside its acceptance of Ademola Adenekan Commission Report since 1977.

From all of the above and particularly the Hon. Justice Ademola Adenekan Commission of Inquiry, there is no gainsaying the fact that the 2nd to 5th Appellants Family are not recognized as Ruling Houses in Igboora entitled to the Olu of Igboora Chieftaincy. Furthermore, they are not by the 1957 Declaration recognized as Ruling Houses in Igboora and therefore have no right to maintain this action.

The Appellants Counsel in paragraph 3.03 and 3.04 of the Appellants Brief of Argument argued that by striking out the suit, the lower Court shut out the 1st Appellant from being heard and thereby curtailed his Constitutional rights as entrenched in Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).

I wish to refer to the 1st Appellant’s affidavit at pages 183 – 184 of the record titled “AFFIDAVIT FOR MY NOT CONSENTING TO THE INSTITUTION OF THIS ACTION” wherein the 1st Appellant opposed the suit for the reason that it was filed without his knowledge, consent and authority. The Counter Affidavit at pages 302 – 305 of the record sworn to by one Prince Olaosegba Sikiru cannot by any stretch of imagination be held to be binding on the 1st Appellant who has sworn to an affidavit that he did not give his consent for the filing of the action. The 1st Appellant did not file a counter affidavit to the Preliminary Objection. In the present circumstance, it follows the 1st Appellant lacks the locus standi to institute the action at the lower Court.

Whichever way one looks at it, the inevitable conclusion on this issue is that the trial Court was right when it held that the Appellants lack the requisite locus to institute the action before it. This Issue is resolved in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellants.

ISSUE 2
Was the trial Court right when after considering the decision of the Supreme Court in MILITARY GOVERNOR OF EKITI STATE VS. ALADEYELU (2007) 14 NWLR (PT. 1055) PG. 619 still proceeded to decline jurisdiction over the Appellants’ suit.

Learned Counsel to the Appellant submitted that the facts and legal principles in this appeal are on all fours with that in the Supreme Court case of MILITARY GOVERNOR, EKITI STATE VS. ALADEYELU (supra) in that in both cases attempt was made to register a Chieftaincy Declaration and the defence of limitation was raised in both instances. He argued the trial Court came to a wrong conclusion when it distinguished the case at hand from that of MILITARY GOVERNOR, EKITI STATE VS. ALADEYELU (SUPRA). He submitted that the trial Court was bound to follow the principles established by the Supreme Court in line with the doctrine of stare decisis. He relied on the cases of OWONYIN VS. OMOTOSHO (1961) 1 ALL NLR PG. 304 and AGU VS. IKEWIBE (1991) 4 SCNJ 56 to support his submission and urged us to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellants.

Learned Counsel to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents argued this issue with his issue number three (3) at pages 7 to 10 of his brief. Arguing per contra he submitted in summary that this appeal is clearly distinguishable from the case of MILITARY GOVERNOR, EKITI STATE VS. ALADEYELU (SUPRA).

For his part, Learned Counsel to the 5th Respondent like that of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents submitted and urged us to hold that the trial Court was right when it distinguished the case of MILITARY GOVERNOR, EKITI STATE VS. ALADEYELU (SUPRA) from the facts and circumstances of this case. He submitted the challenge in ALADEYELU case was made within 2 months of the registration of the Chieftaincy Declaration unlike the instant situation. He argued that some of the reliefs claimed by the Appellant directly challenge the Adenekan Ademola Commission of Inquiry and report and that the cause of action in this case has not crystallised. He finally urged us to hold that the facts and principles in this appeal are dissimilar with that of Aladeyelu’s case and resolve this issue against the Appellants.

To bring this issue into proper perspective, I believe there is the need to analyse the Supreme Court’s decision in MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR, EKITI STATE & ORS VS. ALADEYELU & ORS (2007) 14 NWLR (PT. 1055) 619 as this will aid in the coming to a decision on whether or not the facts and circumstance therein are on all fours with those of the present appeal as strenuously argued by Learned Counsel to the Appellants.
The issues considered by the Supreme Court in ALADEYELU’s case are:
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeal was not in error when it held that the Respondents’ action was not caught by the statute of Limitation.
2) Whether the Court of Appeal was not in grave error to have held that the Respondents’ cause of action accrued on 19/9/1995.
3) Whether the Court of Appeal was not in grave error to have on its own volition and without jurisdiction set aside the appointment and installation of the 6th Appellant for setting aside also Edict No. 1 of 4th February 1999.
4) Whether considering the weight of evidence, the Court of Appeal was not in error to have overruled the trial Court.

What happened in that case was that on 17/1/1958, the Chieftaincy Committee of Ekiti State Southern District Council which was the designated authority at that time made a declaration of Customary Law regulating the nomination and selection of the Arajaka of Igbara-Odo Chieftaincy. This declaration was approved by the Minister of Local Government Western Region of Nigeria on 22/05/1958 and was registered on 28/05/1958.

One of the main features of the declaration was that there is only one (1) Ruling House whose identity is Odundun Ruling House. The Respondents in that appeal are members of that ruling house.

Following widespread displeasure of that declaration the then Military Government appointed a four-man Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Honourable Justice Adeyinka Morgan (hereinafter referred to as the Morgan Commission) to conduct an inquiry into all the recognized chieftaincies in Ondo State including the Arajaka of Igbara-Odo chieftaincy and to also suggest guidelines for effecting the necessary changes in chieftaincy declarations of the said recognized chieftaincies.

The Morgan Commission submitted its report on 05/06/1980 specifically, concerning the Arajaka of Igbara-Odo, the commission recommended three (3) ruling houses instead of one (1). The Government white paper accepting the recommendations sometime in 1981 and also set up the necessary machinery for the eventual registration of the new chieftaincy declaration.

At the chieftaincy committee meeting of Ekiti South-West Local Government held on 20/1/1983 at which Oba Aladeyelu II (the then Arajaka) was present as well as representatives from the three ruling houses, the white paper on Morgan Commission was approved and the Chieftaincy declaration of Arajaka of Igbara-Odo) was signed by both the chairman and Secretary of the Chieftaincy Committee. The forms were then sent to the State Government for the approval and registration of the declaration but somehow the forms got missing and the new declaration was not registered.

It was after the death of Oba Aladeyelu II in 1995 that it was discovered that the forms sent to the State Government were returned to the Local Government for Registration. When this was brought to the attention of the Government, another process of ratification of the declaration began on 19/9/1995. This was to enable the nomination and selection of a new Arajaka to fill the vacant stool. The process culminated into the declaration of 3/11/1995. By the promulgation of Edict No. 1 of 1999 entitled “Arajaka of Igbara-Odo Ekiti (Chieftaincy Declaration)” the Chieftaincy declaration of 1958 became repealed. By the new declaration and the laws, there came into existence three (3) ruling houses in Igbara-Odo Ekiti Chieftaincy. Meanwhile, at a meeting held on 19/9/1995, the Respondents’ family denied knowledge of the commission, its recommendation and acceptance of the recommendation as contained in the white paper and walked out of the meeting.

On 2/11/1995, the Respondents filed an action against the first set of Appellants i.e. The Military Administrator Ekiti State, the Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice, Ekiti State, the Secretary, Ekiti South-West Local Government and Ekiti South West Local Government Chieftaincy Committee. On 1/6/1988, the 5th – 7th Appellants (one John Oyedele, Edward Jaiyeola for and on behalf of the Agungun ruling house of Igbara-Odo Ekiti and J. Adu for and on behalf of the Odigede ruling house of Igbara-Odo) claimed a number of declaratory and injunctive reliefs relating to the recommendation of the Morgan Commission of 1980 and approval of same by Government.

By separate applications, the two sets of Appellants protested that the claims of the Respondents were statute barred for the following reasons.
i) That the suit attacked the recommendations of Morgan Committee which had been accepted by the Government some fourteen (14) years prior to the institution of the action and
ii) That the suit attacked the acts done by Public Officers more than 3 months prior to the institution of the action.

The trial Court heard arguments on the applications by the two (2) sets of Appellants. It held the Public Officers protection law did not apply and upheld the objection on the competency of the action. It further held that the cause of action arose in 1981 when the government accepted the recommendation of the Morgan Commission while the suit was instituted in 1995 more than 6 years after the cause of action arose. The action was accordingly struck out.

The Respondents who were unhappy with the ruling appealed to the Court of Appeal which allowed the appeal and remitted the suit back to the high Court for hearing de novo by another Judge. The Appellants aggrieved by that decision appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court identified the main claim in the appeal to be the registration of the Morgan Report. His lordship Musdapher JSC held as follows at Pg. 641 Paras B-D:
“The main case of the Respondents was clearly not based on the challenge to the Recommendations of the Review Commission or the acceptance of the recommendations by the Government in its white paper in 1981, which as shown would not adversely affect the rights of the Respondents but their crucial claims were based on the attempt to register the new Declaration in 1995. So without much ado, the issue of the application of the Limitation Law, even if it affected prayers 1, 2 and 3 as recited above were caught by the Limitation Law when the action was filed.
That, in my view is sufficient to sustain the fundamental and crucial claims of the Respondents. It is of no moment even if reliefs No. 1, 2, and 3 as recited above were caught by the Limitation Law. I am accordingly of the view that all the arguments of counsel are hardly relevant to the main claims of the Respondent which clearly accrue only when the Government commenced to register the amended Declaration in 1995.”

Further at pages 652-653 paras G-D, his lordship Onnoghen JSC held as follows:
“Applying these principles of law to the facts of this case, can it be said that the action of the Respondents as constituted is statute barred?
Both parties agree that though the processes leading to the institution of the action started in 1981, the Chieftaincy Declaration relevant to the facts of this case was never registered until 19th September, 1995. Section 4(1) and (2) of the Ondo State Chiefs Edict, 1984 provides as follows, …
It is therefore my considered view that the lower Court was right in holding that the action was not statute barred the same having been instituted on the 2nd of November 1995 following the registration of the offensive chieftaincy declaration on the 19th of September, 1995 less than a month after the cause of action accrued to the Respondents. The recommendations of the Morgan’s Commission remain a recommendation whether made in 1981 or later just as the government white paper thereon. They remain as paper tigers until registration which gives them life and the Respondents a cause of action by operation of Section 4 (1) and (2) supra.” Finally, at page 643 paragraph D-H, Akintan JSC held thus:
“The main issue raised in the appeal is whether the Court below was right in holding that the Appellants’ claim was not caught by the provisions of Section 4 of the Limitation Law of Ondo State which provides that:
“The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years the cause of action accrued that is to say –
(a) Actions founded on simple contract or tort…”
It is clear from the facts of the case that although the State Government had accepted the recommendations made by the Justice Morgan Commission in his report in 1981, it was still necessary for each chieftaincy recommendation to be adopted and registered before such could come into effect. It was the attempt to accept the recommendation in respect of the Arajaka chieftaincy of Igbara-Odo in 1995 that was in issue.
I agree that the cause of action in the instant case arose in 1995 when efforts were made to register the new declaration in respect of the Arajaka Chieftaincy Declaration and not in 1981 when the Morgan Report was accepted by the defunct Western State Government. I therefore hold that the action filed by the Plaintiff/Appellants was not statute-barred.”

Now, comparing the ALADEYELU case (supra) reviewed above with the instant appeal, there is no gainsaying the fact that even though the Oyo State Government accepted the amended declaration in respect of the Ademola Adenekan report, it was still necessary for that recommendation/report to be adopted and registered before it could come into effect.

The situation in the instant appeal is clearly distinguishable from that in the ALADEYELU case (supra). In the latter case i.e. ALADEYELU (supra) the action was instituted on 2/11/1995 following the registration of the offensive Chieftaincy Declaration, a period less than three (3) months after the cause of action accrued to the Respondents in line with Section 2 of the Public Officers (Protection) Law of Ekiti State. Attempt was made to register the Declaration and it was eventually registered. The relevant principle in the Supreme Court’s decision in MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR, EKITI STATE VS. ALADEYELU (supra) is different and clearly distinguishable from the instant appeal. The doctrine of stare decisis would therefore not apply.

I find no reason whatsoever to disturb the findings of the trial Court at pages 392 to 393 of the record that there is nothing in the case of MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR, EKITI STATE VS. ALADEYELU to suggest the Limitation Law or Public Officers protection Law would not apply in appropriate cases and that even if it could be said that some of the reliefs claimed were caught by Limitation Law, the main action was not caught by Limitations Law as same was filed within three (3) months after the wrongs complained of occurred. The trial Court was therefore right when after a consideration of the Supreme Court decision in MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR, EKITI STATE & ORS VS. ALADEYELU & ORS (2007) 14 NWLR (PT. 1055) pg. 619 proceeded to decline jurisdiction over the Appellants’ suit.
The inevitable conclusion is that this issue is resolved against the Appellants.

ISSUE 3
WAS THE TRIAL COURT RIGHT WHEN IT HELD THAT APPELLANTS SUIT IS CAUGHT BY SECTION 2 OF THE PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION LAW OF OYO STATE.
Learned Counsel to the Appellants submitted the trial Court erred when it extended the protection offered by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law of Oyo State to the 1st to 4th Respondents and did not make any findings on the Appellants objection to the categorization of the 1st Respondent as a Public Officer. He cited the cases of ODUNAYO VS. THE STATE (1972) 8-9 SC 290 AT 296; OWODUNNI VS. REGD. TRUSTEES OF CELESTIAL CHURCH OF CHRIST (2000) 10 NWLR (PT. 675) 325 AT 347; IFEANYCHUKWU (OSONDU) LTD. VS. SOLEH BONEH (NIG.) LTD (2000) 5 NWLR (PT. 656) 322 AT 351 and EYO VS. INYANG (2001) 4 WRN PG. 78 to support his argument that a Court of law must consider all issues raised before it and give a dispassionate opinion.

He emphasized that the 1st to 4th Respondents are not Public Officers to warrant the application of Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law of Oyo State and craved in aid the provision of Section 318 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and the cases of DADA VS. ADEYEYE (2005) 6 NWLR (PT. 920) 1 AT 19; REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF PPFN VS. SHOGBOLA (2004) 11 NWLR (PT. 883) 1 AT 20; ASOGWA VS. CHUKWU (2003) 4 NWLR (PT. 811) 540 AT 576 A-F; MOMOH VS. OKEWALE (1977) 6 SC 81 (1977) 11 NSCC 365; IBAMA VS. S.P.D.C. OF NIGERIA (2006) 7 WRN 160 and ALAPIKI VS. GOVERNOR OF RIVERS STATE (1991) 8 NWLR (PT. 211) PG. 575 AT 599.

Counsel submitted further that even where the 1st to 4th Respondents are found to be Public Officers, the provision of Section 2 (supra) will still not be applicable to them for the reason that there is no complaint of omission or commission made against them by the Appellants. He contended there must have been an act carried out by a Public Officer in his capacity as a Public Officer before the provisions of the Section 2 of the Public Officers protection Law of Oyo State can apply. He cited the case of SULGRAVE HOLDINGS INC. VS. FGN (2012) 17 NWLR (PT. 1329) PAGE. 309 AT 335 in support.

He finally submitted the Public Officers Protection law of Oyo State Cap. 106, Laws of Oyo State 2000 is no longer an existing law having been repealed by Section 27 of the State Proceedings Law Cap. 156, Laws of Oyo State of Nigeria 2000. He cited UWAIFO VS. ATTORNEY GENERAL, BENDEL STATE & ORS (1982) 7 SC 124 in support.

Learned Counsel to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents argued this issue with his issue number two (2) at pages 7 to 10 of his brief. He submitted the Public Officers Protection Law of Oyo State which is now embedded in Cap. 137 of the Laws of Oyo State 2000 give room for only three (3) months to institute an action against a Public Officer. On whether the Public Officers protection law of Oyo State is still in existence, he submitted it has not been abrogated and that Section 27 of the State Proceedings Law Cap 156 Laws of Oyo State of Nigeria relied on by Appellants’ counsel repeal only Cap 88 and Cap 106 of the 1978 Laws of Oyo State and not of that of 2000.

Learned Counsel to the 5th Respondent argued this issue with his issue number one (1) at pages 4 to 11 of the 5th Respondents brief of Argument. His position is that the Appellants suit is statute barred same having been filed outside 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action in contravention of Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law of Oyo State. He cited the cases of IBRAHIM VS. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE, KADUNA STATE & ANOR. (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 584) PG. 1 AND OFFOBOCHE VS. OGOJA LG & ANOR (2001) FWLR (PT. 68) PG. 1051 AT 1070 to 1071 in support.

While stressing that the Appellants action is caught by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection, Act, he submitted the Appellants joined the 1st to 4th Respondents as parties to the action at the lower Court to prevent the intended execution and registration of the law regulating the chieftaincy of Olu of Igboora which duty in itself is of public nature.

Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 137 Laws of Oyo State provides as follows:
“Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect:
(a) “The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.”
Who then is a Public Officer under the Public Officers Protection Act (supra)?
It is trite that a constitutionally created personality is a Public Officer in Nigeria – See NIGERIAN EMPLOYERS CONSULTATIVE ASSOCIATION & ORS. VS. A.G. FED. & ORS. (2018) LPELR-46861 CA.
The words ‘Public Officer’ or any person for the purpose of the Public Officers protection Act/Law and as stipulated in Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law not only refer to natural persons or persons sued in their personal names but extend to public bodies, initial persons, institutions or persons sued by their official names or titles. See FGN. VS. ZEBRA ENERGY LTD. (2002) 18 NWLR (798) 162 AT 195 and PERMANENT SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF WORKS VS. BALOGUN (1975) 5 SC 57and IBRAHIM VS. JSC KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 584) 1.
Judicial authorities abound to the effect that for a party to be protected by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act/Law it must be established that the party against whom the action was commenced was a Public Officer and that the act done by him in respect of which the action was commenced was an act done in pursuance or execution of any law or of any public duty. See FAKOLADE VS. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION (1993) 1 NWLR (PT. 271) PG. 639 AT 643-644 AND EKEOGU VS. ALIRI (1990) 1 NWLR (PT. 126) PG. 245.
A Public Officer is any person directly employed in government, public service, civil service or any public agency. See OKOMU OIL PALM CO. VS. ISERHIENRHIEN (2001) 6 NWLR (PT. 710) PG. 660 AND EZE VS. OKECHUKWU (2002) 18 NWLR (PT. 799) PG. 348. The protection offered by the Public Officers Protection Act covers and protects all Public Officers that is all civil servants in their individual capacity and all government bodies, public institutions and agencies, ministries and departments by whatever name called.
In the case of IBRAHIM VS. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION (supra) the Supreme Court per IGUH JSC at pages 37-38 had this to say on the words “Public Officer”, “Public Office” and “Person”:
“With the greatest respect, I cannot pretend that I fully appreciate Learned Counsel’s contention in this area of his argument. In the first place, although the title of the relevant law implies a law to protect “Public Officers” and not “Public Officer”, it is beyond argument that government positions such as Attorney-General, Permanent Secretary or the Inspector General of Police etc. although Public Offices are none-the-less Public Officers in law. I cannot, with respect, accept that an Attorney-General, Permanent Secretary or the Inspector-General of Police is not a “Public Officer” as known to law…”
Similarly, on whether a Governor or Commissioner is a Public Officer for the purpose of protection under the Public Officers Protection Act/Law, this Court Per Obadina JCA in ABUBAKAR & ANOR. VS. GOVERNOR, GOMBE STATE & ORS (2002) LPELR – 11247 PP 8-17 PARAS D-F had this to say:
“What the Court is being called upon to decide in this issue under consideration is whether the 1st respondent, the executive Governor of Gombe State is a Public Officer or a Person acting in the execution of public duty within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law. Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law, Cap 127 Laws of Bauchi State, 1991, applicable in Gombe State provide as follows…
It is clear from the above provision that Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law aforesaid stipulates three months statutory period of limitation for commencing any action against a Public Officer for acts done in execution of his official duty. The question that arise is who is a Public Officer? Or in other words, is a state Governor a Public Officer? The office of a state governor is a creation of the Constitution. See Section 176 of the Constitution Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 establishes the office of a state Governor…
Similarly, the office of the Attorney-General of a State is also a creation of the Constitution. Section 195 of the 1999 Constitution established the office of Attorney-General for each state of the Federation. It says…
Furthermore, the office of the 3rd -7th Respondents are also creation of the Constitution. Section 197 (1) (a) of the 1999 Constitution establishes for each state of the federation, a state civil service commission, while Part II of the Third Schedule to the said Constitution. Item (A) paragraphs (a) and (b) provide for the Chairman and Members of the Commission. Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act Cap 192, Laws of the Federation, 1990 defines a “Public Officer” as meaning “a member of the public service of the federation within the meaning of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or Public Service of a State ….”. From the above definition, a Public Officer is a member of the Public Service, either of the Federation or of the State in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation or the State as the case may be.
Paragraph 19 of Part I to the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution defines a Public Officer to mean a person holding any of the offices specified in Part II of the Fifth Schedule. Paragraph 4 of Part II lists the Governor of a State as among Public Officers. Paragraph 6 specifies the Attorney-General as a Public Officer, while paragraph 16 names Chairman and Members of Commission or Councils as Public Officers. In that regard Governor of a State is a member of the Public Service of the State in the capacity of a Governor in respect of the Government of the State.
In other words, a State Governor is a Public Officer. The question still arises as to whether a State Governor is a Public Officer within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law. Cap 127 of the Laws of Gombe State 1991.

In other words whether a State Governor is a person within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law aforesaid…
The intention of the legislature is to provide protection for Public Officers, corporate and unincorporated bodies in the discharge of their public assignments. Used in the wide sense, the term any person will cover both natural human being and other bodies, corporate and unincorporated, thus covering the State Executive Governor and the Attorney-General of Gombe State as well as the Members of the State Civil Service Commission. See ALHAJI ALIYU VS. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE KADUNA STATE & ORS (SUPRA) AT PAGE 49. In that regard, Issue Number 1 in the Appellants’ brief and No. 2 raised by the Respondent are resolved and are hereby answered in the affirmative namely, that the 1st Respondent is a Public Officer within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law”.
I adopt the position of my learned brother Obadina JCA reproduced above in toto as mine. I need not say more.
Undoubtedly the effect of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap 137 Laws of Oyo State and the judicial authorities earlier cited by me is that actions against the instant 1st to 4th Respondents must be instituted within three months from the day the cause of action arose which can only be effectively determined by critically considering when the wrong alleged was committed.
Cause of action is the entire set of circumstances which gives rise to an enforceable claim. They are a combination of facts which confer on a Claimant the right to seek relief and/or remedy in a Court of law. Cause of action is also the wrongful act of the Defendant and consequent damage which gives the Claimant his cause of complaint. See ADEKOYA VS. FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (2008) 11 NWLR (PT. 1099) 539; JULIUS BERGER NIG. PLC. VS. OMOGUI (2001) 15 NWLR (PT. 736) 401; OWODUNNI VS. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF CELESTIAL CHURCH OF CHRIST (2000) 10 NWLR (PT. 675) 315. The law is trite that the formula for determining whether or not a party’s right of action is caught by the provision of a Limitation Law such as the Public Officers Protection Law is a consideration of the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim only. It is determined by taking a critical look at the allegations contained in the Writ of Summons and Statement of claim. See EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 47) 1; WOHEREM VS. EMEREUWA (2004) 13 NWLR (PT. 890) 398 AND HASSAN VS. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (PT. 1223) 547.
I have painstakingly considered the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim filed on behalf of the Appellants at pages 15 – 90 of the record particularly, paragraphs 9 – 24 of the Statement of Claim and note that the grouse of the Appellants amongst others is as follows:
1) The extant Baale (now Olu) of Igboora Chieftaincy Declaration made in 1957 and registered in 1958 is flawed and inaccurate for failure to include one of the Ruling Houses from the Igboora Chieftaincy and inclusion of historical distortion of customs and traditions of Igboora.
2) The 1976 Report of Justice Ademola Adenekan Commission of Inquiry is faulty because it recommended there should be only two ruling houses in Igboora and a change in the order of rotation. They further claim that the report created more disaffection and uncertainty over the Chieftaincy customs and traditions of the good people of Igboora.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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It is for the above that the Appellants filed their action which amongst others seek to set aside the 1957 Declaration and compel the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents to amend it.
It is obvious that by the Appellants’ own pleading the cause of action in respect of the Chieftaincy Declaration accrued in the year 1957. Furthermore, in respect of the 5th Respondent’s attempt to register the Hon. Justice Adenekan Ademola’s Amended Chieftaincy Declaration in August 2009, the cause of action accrued in August 2009. This being the case, it is clear beyond any peradventure that the action was filed outside the three months mandatory/maximum period to institute an action against the 1st to 4th Respondents as dictated by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law Cap 137 Laws of Oyo State 2000. The Appellants suit at the lower Court was filed on 01/11/2011 and therefore caught by the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Law of Oyo State and I so hold.
Learned Counsel to the Appellants’ argument that the 1st to 4th Respondents are not Public Officers is grossly misconceived. The 1st to 4th Respondents are entitled to the protection of the Public Officers (Protection) Law of Oyo State as it is clear the intention of the Appellants in joining them in the suit is to prevent the intended execution and registration of the law regulating the Olu of Igboora Chieftaincy. I cannot agree more with Kazeem A. Gbadamosi, learned counsel to the 5th Respondent that this duty is of Public nature that brings the Appellants action within the purview of Section 2 of the Public Officers (Protection) Law of Oyo State.
Finally on this issue, the Appellants’ Counsel in paragraphs 8.02 to 8.03 submitted that the Public Officers (Protection) Law of Oyo State is no longer in existence as it has been repealed by Section 27 of the State Proceedings Law Cap 156 Laws of Oyo State of Nigeria 2000. The law repealed by Section 27 of the State Proceedings Law (supra) is the Public Officers Protection Law Cap 106 Laws of Oyo State. The extant law is the Public Officers Protection Law Cap. 137 Laws of Oyo State 2000 which has not been repealed. There is no merit in this argument of Counsel.

This Issue is again resolved against the Appellants and in favour of the Respondents. ISSUE NO.4
WAS THE TRIAL COURT RIGHT WHEN IT RELIED ON SECTIONS 10 AND 25 OF THE CHIEFS LAW CAP 28, LAWS OF OYO STATE TO DECLINE JURISDICTION OVER THE APPELLANTS SUIT.
In arguing this issue, Learned Counsel to the Appellants submitted the trial Court abdicated its role as an impartial umpire, and stepped into the arena of conflict when it elevated an accessory claim to the status of a main claim. He submitted that contrary to the position of the trial Court, the Appellants main claim was the setting up a Commission of Inquiry to amend or abrogate the existing Chieftaincy Declaration in respect of Baale of Igboora which recognizes four (4) Ruling Houses. He pointed out the Supreme Court has frowned against this style adopted by the trial Court. He relied on the case of NKUMA VS. ODILI (2006) 6 NWLR (PT. 977) PG. 587 AT 599 PARAGRAPHS G – H to support his position. He submitted further that the Appellants’ relief which seek the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry is at best an accessory to the main claim.

It is further the argument of Counsel that Sections 10 and 25 of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State was raised suo motu by the trial Court as there was nothing in the pleadings, or in the Preliminary Objection that deal with the issue of setting up a Commission of Inquiry. He cited the cases of TUKUR VS. GOVERNOR OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 117) 517; A. G. LEVENTIS (NIG.) PLC. VS. AKPU (2007) 17 NWLR (PT. 1063) 416; UZOHO VS. N.C.P. (2007) 10 NWLR (PT. 1042) PG. 320 AT 345 – 346 AND MAIGARI VS. MAILAFIYA (2011) 1 NWLR (PT. 1228) 379 in support of his argument and urged us to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.

Counsel to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents did not canvass any argument on this issue which he formulated as his issue number four at page seven (7) of his brief of argument. Learned Counsel to the 5th Respondent for his part drew our attention to the Appellants relief number six (6) in the Writ of Summons at page 16 and 22 to debunk Appellants’ Counsel submission that the consideration of Sections 10 and 25 of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State was neither relevant nor in issue but was raised suo motu by the trial Court.

He submitted that the Appellants by their relief number six (6) invited the trial Court to consider and/or take judicial notice of Sections 10 and 25 of the Chief Law of Oyo State in urging it to correct the supposed anomaly in the 1957 Declaration. He craved in aid the case of UZOHO VS. N.C.P. (2007) 10 NWLR PT. 1042 PAGE 32 AT 345 -346 to support his submission that the trial Court was right when it considered Sections 10 and 25 (supra). He urged us to resolve the issue against the Appellants.

I find it expedient to reproduce the provisions of Section 10 and 25(a) of the Chiefs Law Cap. 28 Laws of Oyo State for ease of reference. It provides as follows:
“10(1) Where the Governor is satisfied that a registered declaration:
a) does not contain a true or sufficient clear statement of the customary law which regulates the selection of a person to be the holder of a recognized chieftaincy;
b) does not contain a sufficient description of the holder of such chieftaincy; or
c) contains any error whether as to form or substance;
d) is otherwise defective, faulty, or objectionable, having regard to the provisions of this Law;
the Government may require the Chieftaincy Committee which made the declaration to amend such declaration in any respect that it may specify, or to make a new declaration, according as it may consider necessary or desirable in each case.
(2) The Governor may approve or refuse to approve a registered declaration amended or a new declaration made by a Chieftaincy Committee under subsection (1) of this section.
(3) Where a Chieftaincy Committee fails to amend a registered declaration in the respects specified by the Governor, or to make a new declaration within a reasonable period of its being required so to do in accordance with the powers conferred on the Committee under this Law.
(4) The provisions of Section 6 shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of any amendment to a registered declaration or any new declaration made by a Committee under subsection (1) of this section.
25(1) The Governor may cause such inquiries to be held at such times and in such places and by such person or persons as it or he may consider necessary or desirable for the purposes of Part 2 and 3 of this Law”.
I have taken note that the Appellants in the reliefs claimed before the lower Court at pages 16 and 22 of the record sought for an Order setting aside the 1957 existing Baale of Igboora (now Olu of Igboora) Chieftaincy Declaration dated 04/10/1957 and an Order compelling the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents to effect an amendment of the 1957 Baale of Igboora Chieftaincy Declaration by setting up a Commission of Inquiry in accordance with Section 25 of the Chiefs Law Cap 28 Laws of Oyo State of Nigeria 2000. I cannot agree more with the trial Court that what the Appellants seek by their suit is for the 1st to 4th Respondents to set up a Commission of Inquiry to amend or abrogate the existing Chieftaincy Declaration in respect of Baale of Igboora Chieftaincy Declaration of 1957 which recognized only four (4) Ruling Houses viz: (1) Agbojojoye (2) Erubami (3) Atambala and (4) Ajayi.
The Court held at page 412 of the record as follows:
“Now concerning relief No. 1-6 asking the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants be mandatorily ordered and compelled to effect amendment to the 1957 Baale of Igboora Chieftaincy Declaration by setting up a Commission of Enquiry in accordance with Section 25 of the Chiefs Law Cap 28, Laws of Oyo State 2000.
To me the real desire of the Claimants in this action is that a Commission of Inquiry be set up with a view to amending or abrogating the existing Chieftaincy Declaration in respect of Baale of Igboora 1957 which recognizes four (4) Ruling Quarters or Ruling Houses viz (1) Agbojojoye (2) Erubami (3) Atanibala and (4) Ajayi. The Claimants want a departure from the status quo to accommodate them as Ruling Houses. They must follow procedures laid down by the law.”
The Appellants had a duty to comply with the law governing the setting up of such Commission of Inquiry as provided for in Sections 10 and 25(1) of the Chiefs Law Cap 28, Laws of Oyo State 2000 and the trial Court had a duty to take judicial notice of the law. See CHIEF ISRAEL ARIBISALA & ANOR. VS. TALABI OGUNYEMI & ORS. (2005) 6 NWLR (PT. 921) 212 AT 231 PARAS F – H, 232 PARAGRAPHS A – B; EGUAMWENSE VS. AMAGHIZEMWEN (1993) 9 NWLR (PT. 315) 1 AT 25 AND ODUGBO VS. ABU (2001) 14 NWLR (PT. 732) 45 AT 102 – 103 PARAS H – E.
It is the duty of the Appellants to make representation to the Government of Oyo State or to the competent Council for an amendment to the Chieftaincy Declaration as it concerns the Baale of Igboora stool. Sections 10 and 25 (supra) give no such power to the trial Court or any Court in Nigeria to intervene by compelling or mandating the Governor to cause such amendment without the Appellants first complying with the mandatory administrative procedure set out in the law. In T.A.O. WILSON & ANOR. VS. A.B. OSHIN & ORS. (2000) 9 NWLR (PT. 673) 442 AT 464 PARAGRAPHS B – C, Karibi-Whyte JSC said:
“It is clear from the above provisions of the law that certain conditions are prescribed before it can operate. These are that the Executive Council must be satisfied that:
a) There is a defect error or fault in a particular registered declaration.
b) The Executive Council may require the Chieftaincy Committee which made the declaration to amend the declaration, or to make a new declaration according as it may consider necessary or desirable in each case.
It is clear to me from Section 10(2) that the Executive Council has overriding power to approve or refuse to approve a registered declaration whether amended or a new Declaration by a Chieftaincy Committee”.
See also OLUFEMI FASADE & ORS. VS. PRINCE IYIOLA BABALOLA (2003) 11 NWLR (PT. 830) 26 AND AFOLABI VS. GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 9) 734 AT 738.
In the light of all of the above, it is my firm view that all arguments of Appellants’ Counsel in paragraphs 9.02 and 9.03 of the Appellants Brief of Argument relating to accessory and main claim go to no issue and are merely divisionary. The same goes for his argument that the trial Court raised and/or acted suo motu without inviting parties to address it on the issue of setting up of a Commission of Inquiry to amend or abrogate the existing Chieftaincy Declaration which recognized four (4) Ruling Houses in respect of the Baale of Igboora stool. I further hold that the trial Court was right when it relied on Sections 10 and 25 of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State to decline jurisdiction.

This issue is also resolved against the Appellants and in favour of the Respondents.

In the final analysis, having resolved all issues in this appeal against the Appellants, the inevitable conclusion is that this appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. I affirm the judgment of the lower Court in SUIT NO:HER/09/2011 OBA JACOB OYEROGBA OYEWOLE (JP) & 4 ORS. VS. THE GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE & 4 ORS. delivered on 30/4/2012.
Parties should bear their respective costs.

JIMI OLUKAYODE BADA, J.C.A.: I read before now the lead Judgment of my learned brother FOLASADE AYODEJI OJO, JCA, just delivered.
My Lord has dealt with the issues in this appeal adequately and I agree with the reasons given therein as well as the conclusion reached.
I am also of the view that this appeal lacks merit and it is also dismissed by me.

HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A.: I read in advance the draft of the judgment delivered by my learned brother, Folasade Ayodeji Ojo, JCA.

My learned brother has assiduously considered and resolved all the issues in this appeal. I agree with the reasons and conclusions of my learned brother that the appeal is unmeritorious.
Having read the record and briefs filed by the parties, I am also of the view that this appeal lacks merit. It is accordingly dismissed.
I abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.

Appearances:

S.S. Akinyele with him, A. O. Alabi and Babatunde Afolabi For Appellant(s)

Adegboyega Salawu, Chief State Counsel, Oyo State Ministry of Justice – for 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents

P. N. Patrick holding the Brief of B. R. Omotosho – for 4th Respondent

Kazeem A. Gbadamosi with him, Ibrahim Kareem-Ojo and Omolara Odeniyi for the 5th Respondent For Respondent(s)