OJO v. STATE
(2020)LCN/15223(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(AKURE JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Friday, March 20, 2020
CA/AK/68CB/2017
Before Our Lordships:
Mohammed Ambi-Usi Danjuma Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ridwan Maiwada Abdullahi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
TOBI OJO APPELANT(S)
And
THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)
PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): In this case, four persons were tried together, convicted and sentenced. One of the active participants in the crime, Sunday Fagbemi remains at large. The appellant Tobi Ojo was the second accused in the trial. As this is an appeal by only one of the four convicts, I will not constrain myself with setting out all the facts of the case. It will suffice and I will be content with such of the facts as are necessary for the purpose of bringing out the points in the appeal which are material to the issues raised for determination by the appellant herein.
The appellant, Tobi Ojo along with three others were charged, tried and convicted by Hon. Justice K. M. Akano of the Osun State High Court sitting first at Ilesha and later at Oshogbo on a two count charge of conspiracy and murder contrary to SECTIONS 324 and 329 (1) respectively of the Criminal Code Law CAP 34, Laws of Osun State, 2002. In proof of its case the prosecution called three witnesses and tendered about thirteen Exhibits including the extra judicial statements of the accused persons. The accused persons in their own defence each testified for themselves and called no other witness.
At the conclusion of hearing, the learned trial Judge in his judgment delivered on the 8th November, 2016 found the appellant together with the three others guilty of the two count charge, convicted and sentenced them accordingly. It is against this judgment that the appellant by an amended notice of appeal filed on the 08/11/2018 but deemed on the 08/11/2019 appealed to this Court on three grounds and their particulars as follows:-
1) The learned trial judge erred in law when he admitted evidence absolutely without adequately and properly evaluate the extra-judicial evidence and evidence before the Court of the Appellant.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(i) The learned trial judge did not properly evaluate evidence placed before him by the Appellant.
(ii) The learned trial judge failed to consider the extra-judicial statement of 1st and 3rd accused persons which in their entirety exonerated the Appellant of the offence of Conspiracy and Murder for which he was convicted.
2) The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt when in actual fact it did not and thereby came to a wrong decision occasioning miscarriage of justice.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(ii) The evidence of the Investigating Police Office (IPO) did not show in any way that the Appellant did commit the offence of conspiracy and murder.
(iii) The visit of the IPO to the scene of crime did not in any way link the Appellant to the commission of the murder.
(iv) The extra-judicial statement of 1st and 3rd accused persons did copiously establish the innocence of the Appellant of the offence of Conspiracy and Murder for which he was convicted.
3. The learned trial Judge erred in law in holding that there was a conspiracy to commit the offence of murder between the Appellant and Oluwafemi Fagbemi, Famuyiwa Femi and Tope Olatunji without giving reasons for his conclusion that the said conspiracy was actually true and thereby came to a decision occasioning miscarriage of justice.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(i) The trial Judge merely held that the prosecution by the evidence of their witnesses showed that there was conspiracy to kill between the Appellant, Oluwafemi Fagbemi, Famuyiwa Femi and Tope Olatunji without giving proper evaluation of the evidence in that respect.
(ii) The trial Court failed to give a distinct reasoning or ratio decidendi to berth a conviction of the accused person by lumping his findings on the element of murder together with the offence of conspiracy when he held that “while considering the issue of murder, another inference that can be drawn is that all the accused persons conspired to commit the offence of murder and each played his own part as agreed” is not sufficient prove that the Appellant and other convicted persons actually conspired to commit murder.
(iii) The trial Court merely relied on the testimonies of 3rd, 4th and 5th PW without clearly establishing how the Appellant was part of the conspiracy.
Whereof the appellant seeks the order of this Court allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the trial lower Court delivered on the 08/11/2016 and ordering the release of the Appellant.
In prosecuting the appeal the appellant filed his brief of argument on the 21/11/2018. In arguing the appeal, Chief T.A. Obisesan of counsel for the appellant adopted the brief as his legal arguments in support of the appeal. In it, counsel raised two issues for determination as follows:-
1. Whether the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence before it before holding that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant?
2. Whether the learned trial judge was right to have found that there was a conspiracy to commit the offence of Murder between the Appellant and Oluwafemi Fagbemi, Famuyiwa Femi and Tope Adetunji without giving reasons for his conclusion or properly evaluate the evidence before him before coming to conclusion that the appellant was part of the conspiracy to commit murder?
Chief Obisesan argued profusely on both issues as formulated for resolution. I do not consider it germane to the determination of this appeal to detail out the submissions of counsel in this 27 page long brief. It suffices to give only a brief summary of the submissions of counsel and to go back to any detail in the course of this judgment if the need arises. Chief Obisesan submitted that from the evidence led by the prosecution, the Appellant has been able to establish that although he embarked on a mission to get rich quickly with the deceased, he never had the guilty mind and never intended evil either towards the deceased or anybody whatsoever. That the Appellant having no guilty mind in the whole transaction, it is difficult to have any common intention (conspiracy) with other accused persons to kill the deceased. That having failed to establish its case of conspiracy against the Appellant, the Prosecution’s case of murder against the Appellant must fail. Counsel finally argued that this Court must quash the decision of the learned trial judge for his failure to properly evaluate the evidence before him before holding that the Prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and convicting the Appellant thereon.
In opposition to the appeal, the respondent filed their brief of argument on the 26/03/2019 which was deemed on the 27/03/2019. In arguing the appeal, Mr. Abiodun Badiora, AG & PT, MOJ, Osun State, of counsel for the respondent adopted the brief as his legal arguments in opposition to the appeal. In it, counsel raised a sole issue for determination thus:-
“Whether the learned trial Judge was right when it held that the Prosecution had proved the charge against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.”
In summary Mr. Badiora submitted that the evidence led by the prosecution though circumstantial, points irresistibly to the guilt of the appellant and his cohorts. The contention of Mr. Badiora is that the respondent adduced credible evidence to prove its case against the appellant and his co-accused beyond reasonable doubt as required by law. Whereof counsel urged the Court to dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment of the lower Court.
The appellant filed a reply brief on the 02/06/2019 which his counsel also adopted as part of their legal arguments in support of their appeal. I have gone through the said reply brief. I find that it is merely a rehash of the appellant’s brief. It is not in any way an answer to any new points raised in the respondent’s brief pursuant to ORDER 19(5)(1) of The RULES OF COURT, 2016. It is therefore accordingly discountenanced.
The respondent’s sole issue is in pari material with the appellant’s issue (1). I therefore intend to take them together and determine the appeal on the two issues raised by the appellant. These two issues together, i.e. the respondent’s sole issue taken with the appellant’s first interrogate the evidence as to whether it proved the charge(s) against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. There were no eye witnesses to this offence. The case of the prosecution is predicated mainly on circumstantial evidence. Generally in criminal law, the guilt of an accused person can be proved by one of three ways:-
1. The confessional statement of the accused person;
2. Circumstantial evidence and
3. Evidence of eye witness of the crime.
See: IGABELE V STATE (2006) 6 NWLR PT. 975, 100, Circumstantial evidence is defined in MOHAMMED V STATE (2007) 13 NWLR, PT. 1050, 186 AT 204 as “an evidence of surrounding circumstances which by undesigned coincidence is capable of proving a proposition with the ‘accuracy of mathematics…..”
This is perhaps why it is often referred to as the best form of evidence. See also OKPAKO V STATE (2018) LPELR – 43875 (SC) and AMOS V STATE (2018) LPELR – 44694. The grouse of the appellant is that there is no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise linking him with the murder of the deceased. His contention is that indeed the evidence of his co-accused exonerated him.
The question to contend with at this point is whether there is such circumstantial evidence. In answering this question in the affirmative Mr. Badiora referred to the extra judicial statement of Famuyiwa Femi, the 3rd accused person at the trial Court where he said among other things:-
“…Actually, I know Jacob Ajayi through one Tobi Ojo, my friend. We both met Sunday Fagbemi “M” of Stadium Area, Ilesha the said Sunday is a son to Baba Fagbemi who is Herbalist – Actually on Friday 13th April, 2012 at about 18.30hrs I myself and Tobi, Jacob both met at ourselves at Sunday in Baba place at Stadium Area… I, Tobi and Jacob was having intention to do money ritual… On that Friday being 13th April, 2012 at about 6.30pm I was in that house with Sunday and Tobi when Jacob came. Sunday told Tobi to hide so that Jacob will not see him. Tobi now hide and Jacob came into the house when Jacob came in Tobi left the house. Sunday now gave one leave to Tobi to go and put it on top of the well later Sunday asked me to go… Late (sic) Tobi called me and told me that Baba said somebody dead body is inside sockaway… I did join Sunday to kill Jacob…”
Both the appellant and Famuyiwa Femi were co-accused along with two others at the trial in the lower Court. In the case of NWOSU V STATE (2004) 15 NWLR PT. 897, 466, this Court held that “in a conspiracy proceeding, evidence of what one accused says in the absence of the other conspirators is admissible against such others on the basis that, if they are all conspirators what one of them says in furtherance of the conspiracy would be admissible evidence against them, even though it might have been said in the absence of the other conspirators.
It is conceded in the instant appeal, that this case is premised mainly on circumstantial evidence. There was no eye witness to the crime, neither is there a confessional statement by any of the parties. Where a case is based on circumstantial evidence as in the instant case, it is competent for the Court to convict thereon. I must however sound a note of warning like the Supreme Court did in the case of OGUNO & ANOR V STATE (2013) 6 SCM, 145 AT 162 – 163, PARAS I-C: “that there is no yardstick by which any circumstantial evidence can be measured before a conviction can be entered against an accused person charged with the offence for which the circumstantial evidence is the only one available. Each case depends on its own facts but the one test which such evidence must satisfy is that it should lead to the guilt of the accused person and leave no degree of possibility or chance that other person could have been responsible for the commission of the offence.”
I find that the circumstantial evidence in this case is the only available evidence. I am satisfied also that it leaves no chance that other persons other than the appellant and the three co-accused persons could have committed the offence(s). This is reinforced by the provision of SECTION 7 of the Criminal Code Cap Law Cap 34, Laws of Osun State, 2002:-
“When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of offence, and may be charged with actually committing it, that is to say:
(a) Every person who actually does the act or makes the omission which constitutes the offence;
(b) Every person who does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling or aiding another person to commit the offence…”
This provision is akin to common intention in criminal law. Where common intention is established, a fatal blow or gunshot though given by one of the parties is deemed in the eyes of the law to have been given by all those present and participating. See the Supreme Court cases of NWANKWOALA V STATE (2006) 14 NWLR, PT. 1000, 663; ADEKUNLE V STATE (1989) 5 NWLR, PT. 123, 505; OYAKHIRE V STATE (2006) 15 NWLR, PT 1001, 157 and ALARAPE V STATE (2001) 5 NWLR, PT. 705, 79. In this case therefore in the course of the execution of their common intention to do a money ritual, the killing and beheading of the deceased and the removing of his genitals in my view, following this authority is enough proof of the criminal liability of all the four accused persons or convicts as it were, including the appellant to establish that one of them caused the death of the victim. In other words, it is immaterial to prove what each of the accused persons did in the actualization of their pre-conceived common purpose.
See NWANKWOALA V STATE (SUPRA) AND OYAKHIRE V STATE (SUPRA). It is therefore of no moment as submitted by the appellant that his co-accused exonerated him by confirming that he was not at the scene at the time the offence was committed.
In practical terms, it is difficult if not impossible to prove common intention, like it is difficult to prove conspiracy. Its existence can only be inferred from the circumstances disclosed. See again the case of NWANKWOALA V STATE (SUPRA). In the instant case, and as succinctly put by the learned counsel to the respondents, nobody apart from the convicts, including the appellant except the Almighty God knew what happened to the victim, Jacob Ajayi that turned him into a headless corpse without genitals rotting away in the soak away pit in the fenced house where the 1st convict Oluwafemi Fagbemi lived and doubled as the day and night guard. The explanations of the accused persons, appellant inclusive as to what transpired are as contained in their extra judicial statements admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, D & D1, D2, E & E1, F & F1, G, G1 & G2. It can be gleaned from these that the appellant was a close friend to Famuyiwa Femi and both were close friends to Sunday Fagbemi (still at large), the herbalist who allegedly did the money ritual which led to the death of Jacob Ajayi. The said Sunday Fagbemi was living with his father, Oluwafemi Fagbemi the 1st accused/convict. For about three days, the appellant, Famuyiwa Femi and the deceased were always with the said Sunday Fagbemi in his father’s house. The 1st accused is reported to have said that he overhead the four men or boys talking about making ritual money. Both the appellant and Famuyiwa Femi said on a particular day, they saw Sunday Fagbemi put a leaf in the deceased’s mouth and asked him to go to the backyard of the house so that the deceased would not see the appellant when he, the appellant entered the house. After the deceased disappeared, the 1st – 3rd accused/convicts (this included the appellant) were aware that his mutilated body was in the soak away but they continued to assemble in the house as if nothing had happened. The Appellant who was supposed to be the deceased’s friend never looked for him or raised any alarm to his father or the Police that he had disappeared. The 1st accused/convict told some of the other convicts (the appellant and Famuyiwa Femi) to forget about the deceased as “he has gone his own way”. This was a euphemism understood by the duo to mean that the deceased had died. It is also very curious that the appellant was inexplicably in the house where the deceased was killed and dumped in the soak away without any explanation as to what he was hanging around there for. Also curious is that himself and Famuyiwa Femi planned to go away somewhere with Sunday Fagbemi (still at large) before the said Sunday ditched the two of them. There was a sense that both of them were waiting for the outcome of something from the said Sunday Fagbemi. Could it have been the outcome of the money ritual using the deceased’s body parts? While the answer to this question may remain a mere conjecture, the circumstances point irresistibly to the fact that they were aware of what Sunday Fagbemi did to Jacob Ajayi by using him for the ritual money that they were all waiting to get a part of.
I also uphold the submission of Mr. Badiora that these extra judicial statements were tendered without objection from all the convicts. That none of the convicts including the appellant cross examined each other or PW2 and PW3 on the different roles the convicts played in the events that led to the death of Jacob Ajayi. Neither did any of the convicts give contrary evidence to challenge these pieces of evidence on the different roles played by each of them. It follows that the evidence remains uncontroverted and unchallenged. The law is well settled that the trial Court is entitled to act on the evidence of a witness where such evidence is unchallenged and uncontroverted. See the apex Court cases of OMOREGBE V LAWANI (1980) 3-4 SC, 108 and OLUDE V STATE (2018) LPELR – 44070 (SC). NWEZE, JSC in deciding on the effect of unchallenged/uncontroverted evidence held that:
“It is well known that where evidence of a witness is uncontradicted and unchallenged, the Court would relate it to the applicable law…”
Based on this authority, I am emboldened to uphold the submission of Mr. Badiora that the evidence of the role(s) played by each of the convicts contained in the extra judicial statement as against the other convict is admissible against the accused person/appellant. See the case of ADELEKE V STATE (2013) 12 SCM, PT. 2, 1 AT 21-22 PARAS I-A:-
“On the point raised by the Appellant that the evidence of a co-accused is not admissible against other accused persons is not a general rule that is taken hook, line and sinker without exception. This is because where, as in this case, there is a link or nexus from the contents of the statement of a co-accused or even his extrajudicial statement with a strong connection from other independent evidence then the exception is accepted as making that general rule aforesaid give way for the reality on ground. I place reliance on the case of Oyakhire V The State (2006) 12 SCM (Pt. 1) 369 at 380 and 381.”
I also uphold counsel’s submissions that the evidence of the roles played by each of the convicts in the extra judicial statements is consistent with the independent evidence of death of the deceased at the 1st convict’s place of work and abode. I find therefrom that these pieces of evidence or explanations constitute or provide circumstances in which the Court could rightly infer that the convicts were either actively involved in the beheading and removal of the genitals of the deceased and dumping what was left of the corpse in the soak away pit or their action or omission facilitated the killing of the deceased as aforesaid.
The said evidence did put the appellant in the house of the 1st convict where the deceased was with the two other convicts. There was evidence that prior to the killing the appellant was present together with Famuyiwa Femi and the 1st convict throughout in the house where the victim was killed. I have already found in this judgment that by SECTION 7 (b) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap 34 (supra), the appellant by his action/inaction facilitated the herbalists with whom he interacted and in whose house he was together with the victim making it easier for them to kill the deceased, behead him and remove his genitals without reporting his disappearance even after he allegedly saw Sunday Fagbemi lead him away to the back of the house with a leaf in his mouth from which place he never returned to the house. In other words, he never saw him again alive after that. In the eyes of the law, even though the appellant may or may not have participated in the actual commission of the crime he is nonetheless guilty of the offence.
On the contention of the appellant that the circumstantial evidence in the instant case is based on mere speculations and suspicion, the respondent’s counsel submitted that all the inference made by the trial Court was deducible from the evidence before the Court. On the trial Court having a perceived notion of the appellant being a ritualist Mr. Badiora submitted that such fact is borne out of the evidence before the Court.
I have dispassionately considered the submissions of both counsel on some of these issues and the entire evidence available in the records of the trial Court. I must say without a doubt that I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion urged on the Court by the learned counsel to the respondent. That is that circumstantial evidence is not direct evidence; it is often evidence of surrounding circumstances. It is from these circumstances that the Court can draw or make inferences. It is in evidence in this case that the appellant and the deceased were in the house of the first convict for money ritual; that the appellant was told to hide when the deceased was going into the house so that the deceased would not see him or know that he was part of the conspiracy? That the appellant was conveniently also in the house throughout the period that the deceased was killed for money ritual and remained there for a couple more days without batting an eyelid; that the headless body of the deceased was found in the soak way in the said house of the Fagbemis and that the foul odor of the decomposing body did not stop the convicts (1st – 4th, including the appellant) from carrying on with their lives as normal in the house all justify the inferences made by the trial Court. In other words, the suggestion that the inferences were made based on misconceived notion and not on surrounding circumstances from the case is completely misconceived. See the case of OKETAOLEGUN V THE STATE (2015) 13 NWLR, PT 1477, 538. The locus classicus on this is the case of UKORAH V THE STATE (1977) 4 SC (REPRINT), 111. In that case the apex Court, per Idigbe, JSC, held as follows: “Circumstantial evidence is as good as, sometimes better than, any other sort of evidence, and what is meant by it is that there is a number of circumstances which are accepted so as to make a complete and unbroken chain of evidence. If that is established to the satisfaction of the jury they may well and properly act upon such circumstantial evidence.” See also the more recent decision of the Supreme Court on the issue, in the case of OKPAKO V STATE (2018) 9 NWLR, PT. 1624, 213.
Assuming that I have not been dispassionate enough in the consideration of the issues raised particularly as to whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to ground the conviction of the appellant, I am guided by the doctrine of ‘last seen’. This doctrine presumes that any person last seen with a deceased bears full responsibility for his death. The doctrine has no statutory flavor but it’s a creation of case law. See the case ofKOLADE V THE STATE (2017) LPELR – 42362 (SC). See also the cases of MADU V THE STATE (2012) 15 NWLR, PT. 1324, 405, ANYASODOR V THE STATE (2018) LPELR – 43720 (SC), UMAR V STATE (2018) LPELR – 43719 (SC) and of course OKETAOLEGUN V THE STATE (SUPRA) cited by respondent’s counsel.
In the present case, the statements of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th accused persons show that the deceased was last known to be alive in their company in the same house where his beheaded body was found in the soak away. Even the appellant was in the house when the deceased was there and he was asked to and he did in fact hide from the deceased. He cannot reasonably in the circumstances escape from the application of this doctrine leaving his other three co-accused persons. He is caught up by the principle of joint act. The doctrine therefore applies to all four of them. It is instructive that there is no evidence of a break in into the house to dump the corpse in their soak away. I have found that these statements of the accused persons are admissible against the other. They are also credible. From the surrounding circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that there is enough circumstantial evidence in this case. And it points unmistakably to only one conclusion; to the appellant together with his co-accused as the killers of Jacob Ajayi. There is no evidence that other person(s) had access to the building or house where the incident happened. There is no evidence that the corpse found in the soak away could have been brought into the place by any other person. Also instructive is the attempt by the accused persons to hide the deceased’s death which I find amounts to a grand plan to cover up the crime. I am also satisfied that from the available evidence on record, there is no defence open to the appellant. The position of the appellant in these proceedings is that he did not commit the offence charged. Where an accused claims that he did not commit the offence with which he is charged, I hold that no defence will be open to him. This is because there is no offence upon which the defence will rest. See the decision of this Court in OKEKE V STATE (1999) 2 NWLR, PT. 590, 246.
The appellant made heavy weather of the failure of the trial judge in evaluating the evidence or doing so inadequately. The law is firmly settled that it is the primary duty of the trial Court to evaluate the evidence adduced before her by the contending parties. The Court does this by putting the totality of the two sets of admissible evidence on an imaginary scale to see which is heavier, not by the number of witnesses called by each party but by the quality which has become more regularly referred to as probative value. See the case of AYUYA & ORS V YONRIN & ORS (2011)10 NWLR, PT. 1254, 135; MKPINANG & ORS V NDEM & ORS (2013) 4 NWLR, PT. 1344,302 and SAIDU V STATE (2013) AFWLR, PT. 849, 899. There is no dispute that where there is improper evaluation of documentary evidence or a judgment of the trial Court is perverse due to improper evaluation of the evidence by the trial Court, the appellate Court can step in and evaluate the evidence. It is important to make a distinction between this kind of evidence that comes from direct testimony of witnesses and circumstantial evidence which is what is applicable in the instant case. Circumstantial evidence has already been defined in this judgment. One of the important features and therefore differences between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence is that in the latter the Court is not expected to evaluate the evidence. What the Court is expected to do is draw presumptions or inferences. Where the circumstantial evidence is positive, unequivocal, conclusive and points to the accused as one of the perpetrators of the alleged offence as in the instant case, the trial Court is entitled to infer from such circumstances or evidence. It will therefore be insignificant that there was no eye witness or no confessional statement. See the cases of ISMAIL V STATE (2008) 15 NWLR, PT 1111, 593 and ADEGBOYE V STATE (2015) LPELR-41723(CA). The contention of the learned counsel to the appellant on lack of evaluation of evidence in the context of the instant case is therefore misconceived. It is accordingly discountenanced. Suffice it to reiterate however that circumstantial evidence is one of the three ways in which the prosecution can prove its case. It is rightly referred to as the best evidence. The appellant has not in any way challenged the circumstantial evidence that the trial Court used to convict the appellant as mistaken, indirect, inconclusive, equivocal and not positive enough as pointing to the appellant as among the perpetrators of the death of the deceased.
I therefore hold that the learned trial judge was perfectly right to have made the necessary inferences from all the surrounding circumstances of this case to convict the appellant and his co-accused persons. I see no justification in disturbing the judgment of the Court below. I am an advocate of the legal maxim that it is better for ten guilty people to be set free than for one innocent person to be convicted. I however cannot lose sight of the fact that in criminal matters, justice is not only to the accused but also to the victim who cries feebly from his grave for justice. In the instant case, justice not only for his murder but for desecrating his body by beheading him and cutting off his genitals. Justice is a two – way traffic and it should always work that way for it and equity to thrive.
I find no merit in this appeal. It fails and I accordingly dismiss it. I affirm the decision of the trial Court which convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death for the murder of Jacob Ajayi.
I cannot end this judgment without thinking aloud of the nature of greed that will make one human being kill another for ‘ritual money’. That for doing no work, one is prepared to sacrifice the life of another often in the most brutal and inhumane way as it involves the removal of vital body organs/parts to satisfy this greed. A lot of the times the victim, is either a close friend or family member of the perpetrator. It is my view that the legal jurisprudence as it relates to killing for “money ritual” be overhauled. Advisedly the burden of proof should shift to the accused to prove that he did not kill the victim and for ‘money ritual’. Whatever direction this pendulum swings the situation requires a drastic measure to check this ugly monster before it consumes our society and country. May God have mercy on our country, Nigeria.
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.: I have, before now read the impressively articulated draft of this lead Judgment just delivered by my Learned brother, Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud, JCA and concur in the reasoning and conclusions thereat that this appeal be dismissed.
This gruesome and sardonic murder for which the trial Judge convicted the Appellant was clearly proved by the circumstantial evidence from the statements of the Appellant’s co-accused person and the discovery of the corpse in the premises occupied by the Appellant and his cohorts.
The inferences to draw from the discovery of the beheaded and mutilated body of the victim in a pit toilet behind a house occupied by the Appellant and his co-accused at the relevant time when no evidence in rebuttal was led showing that a total stranger had come into the house; and also the disappearance of one of the co-accused soon before the discovery of the heinous act, left the irresistible inference of guilt as the only conclusion.
I concur that the appeal be dismissed and the decision of the trial judge be affirmed.
RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud, JCA. The resolutions of issues therein as per the reasoning and conclusion are agreed by me with nothing to add thereto.
The appeal is bereft of merit and bound to fail. It fails and accordingly dismissed with consequent affirmation of the conviction and sentence of the Lower Court.
Appearances:
CHIEF T. A. OBISESAN For Appellant(s)
ABIODUN BADIORA, AG & PT, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, OSUN STATE For Respondent(s)
