OIL AND INDUSTRIAL SERVICES LTD v. OGUNTUASE & ORS (2020)

OIL AND INDUSTRIAL SERVICES LTD v. OGUNTUASE & ORS

(2020)LCN/15345(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(BENIN JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, July 17, 2020

CA/B/343/2009

RATIO

COMPETENCE OF COURT: RELEVANCE OF THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT

It is settled law that where the principal claim or relief in the Suit of a Claimant is not within the competence and jurisdiction of a Court, then such a Court would lack the competence and jurisdiction to entertain such a Suit even where there may be an ancillary claim within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court. Simply put, it is the Court that has the competence and jurisdiction to entertain the principal claims that is and should be the appropriate Court to entertain such a Suit. See Tukur V. Govt of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549 @ pp. 576 – 577. See also Emeka V. Okoroafor & Ors (2017) LPELR – 41738 (SC); Nwokoleme V. Ajaero & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40073 (CA); Alhaji Umaru Abba Tukur V. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; Mrs. Comfort Alagba Kolo V. Nigeria Police Force & Ors (2018) LPELR – 43635 (CA); Dr. Okoroma & Anor V. Chief Christian Uba & Ors (1998) LPELR – 6405 (CA); Nwokoleme V. Ajaero & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40073 (CA). PER BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

COMPETENCE OF COURT: CONDITIONS TO BE SATISFIED FOR A COURT OF LAW TO BE COMPETENT

Now, in law when a Court of law would be said to be competent to hear and determine a cause or matter or action is no longer an issue for argument as it has been well settled. Thus, for a Court of law to be competent, the following conditions must be fulfilled, namely: a) it is properly constituted as regards members and qualification of the members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; b) the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and c) the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. See alsoBenin Rubber Producers Ltd V. Ojo (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 521) 388 @ p. 403; Sunday Eguamwense V. James Amaghizemwen (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 315) 1 @ p. 25; Gbadamosi Lahan V. AG of Western Region (1963) 1 All NLR 226.

Thus, the issue of jurisdiction is very fundamental to adjudication because it goes to the foundation and competence of any cause or matter or action before the Court. It is indeed the epicenter of the entire litigation process and thus without it there can be no validity in any proceedings or resultant judgment of the Court. It is thus the law that once an issue of jurisdiction is raised it must be determined first one way or the other by the Court because jurisdiction is radical and sine quo non to adjudication of any matter or action or cause in a Court of law. Thus, without jurisdiction there can be no competence in the Court. See Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) SCNLR 341. See also Elugbe V. Omokhafe (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 319 @ p. 334; Ansa V. RTPCN (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1086) 421 @ p. 448; Gaji V. Paye (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 823) 583 @ pp. 599 – 600; Fashogbon V. Adeogun (No. 1) (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 396) 644 @ p. 658; Tukur V. Gongola State Government (No. 2) (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; Western Steel Works Ltd. V. Iron & Steel Workers Union (1987) 1NWLR (Pt. 49) 284; Adeyemi V. Opeyori (1976) 9 – 10 SC 31; Omaghoni V. Nigeria Airways Ltd. (2006) 16 NWLR (pt. 1101) 310; Equity Bank of Nigeria Ltd. V. Halilco Nig Ltd. (2006) NWLR (Pt. 980) 568; NDIC V. CBN (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 766) 272. PER BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Samuel Chukwudumebi Oseji Justice of the Court of Appeal

Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein Justice of the Court of Appeal

Biobele Abraham Georgewill Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

OIL AND INDUSTRIAL SERVICES LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

1. BOLA OGUNTUASE 2. ESIEBUMA CHRISTOPHER 3. IGBUKU LAWRENCE 4. LORI HENRY 5. IKAYEA ABRAHAM 6. JOHN OKECHUKWU ENEMUO 7. BLESSING BRATTE 8. NATIONAL UNION OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS WORKERS RESPONDENT(S)

BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Ruling of the Federal High Court, Benin Judicial Division; Coram: Chukwura Nnamani J., in Suit No. FHC/B/CS/67/2008 Oil and Industrial Services Ltd. V. Bola Oguntuase delivered on 10/2/2009, in which the Court below declined jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the Appellant as Claimant against the Respondents as Defendants and ordered the transfer of the Appellant’s Suit to the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Calabar Judicial Division for trial.

The Appellant was peeved with the said ruling and had appealed against it to this Court vide a Notice of Appeal filed on 20/2/2009 on two grounds at pages 214 -216 of the Record of Appeal. The Record of Appeal was transmitted to this Court on 3/10/2009 but deemed as properly transmitted on 8/12/2011. The Appellant’s brief was filed on 25/1/2012 but deemed as properly filed on 22/3/2013. The Respondents’ brief was filed on 17/9/2019 but deemed properly filed on 8/7/2020. The Appellant did not file a reply brief.

At the hearing of this appeal on 8/7/2020, T.A. Idelegbagbon Esq., learned counsel for the Appellant adopted the Appellant’s brief and urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the ruling of the Court below. On his part, E. Odenwingia Esq., learned counsel for the Respondents adopted the Respondents’ brief and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit and affirm the ruling of the Court below.

By an Originating Summons filed on 14/4/2008 before the Court below by the Appellant as Claimant against the Respondents as Defendants, the Appellant sought answers to the following questions, namely:
1. Whether or not by the provisions of the Third Schedule (Parts A and B) Trade Unions Act Cap T14, Laws of the Federation or Nigeria 2004, the nature or the business or the Plaintiff, and in particular, the nature/scope of contract No. OPR2005- 40040778 for which the Plaintiff has engaged the individual capacities/vocations of the 1st – 7th Defendants (Not as workers of the plaintiff), falls within the jurisdictional scope of coverage of the 8th Defendant as a trade Union.
2. Whether or not going by the combined provisions of S. 12 (4) and S.17 Trade Unions Act Cap T14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, it shall not be necessary to obtain the direct consent/confirmation of each individual worker as to his/her purported voluntary membership of a trade union before the Plaintiff can effect deductions from such a worker’s salary for the purpose of making payments on his/her behalf on account of union dues as demanded by the x” Defendant.
3. Whether or not the action of only a handful of staff, even where they happen to be proven or acknowledged as workers, but which is not even the position in this case, in purporting to join a trade union, can compel all other workers to join the same trade union, going by the combined provisions of Section 12(4) and Section 17 Trade Unions Act, Cap. T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
3. Whether or not in consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, a trade dispute can in law be said to have arisen between the plaintiff and the 1st-7th/8th Defendants, in view of the combined effect of the provisions of Section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap T8, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 and Section 54 of the Trade Unions Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

Whether or not the 8th Defendant hereof is entitled in law to make direct contacts with the Plaintiff’s employers in this contract No. OPR2005 – 40040778 (Messrs Chevron Nigeria Limited) in the circumstances of this case.
5. Whether or not it is compulsory for a company to engage in every business that is contained in the objects’ clause of its memorandum or association, and whether if it does not, it shall be deemed in law to be engaged in every such clause which it is not actually engaged in.

On the above questions, the Appellant as Claimant claimed against the Respondents as Defendants the following reliefs, namely:
1. A Declaration of Court that by the interpretation of the combined provisions of Sections 1 and 54, Trade Unions Act Cap. T 14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, the 1st– 7th Defendants do not qualify to be addressed as “Workers” and therefore, shall not qualify to be compulsorily recognized by the Plaintiff within its organization as members of/officials of a registered trade Union/Branch of a registered trade Union.
2. A Declaration of Court that, going by the provisions of the Third Schedule(Parts A and B), Trade Unions Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, the nature of the business of the Plaintiff, and in particular, the nature of the contract No. OPR2005-4004077S for which the Plaintiff has engaged the individual capacities/vocations of the 1st – 7th Defendants (not as workers of the Plaintiff), do not fall within the jurisdictional scope of coverage of the 8th Defendant as a trade Union.
3. A Declaration of Court that going by the combined provisions of Section 12(4) and Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act, Cap, T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 it is necessary, and in fact, imperative for the Plaintiff to obtain the confirmation/consent of each individual actual worker as to his/her purported voluntary membership of a trade union before arrangements may be made to effect deductions from such a worker’s salary for the purpose of making payments on his/her behalf on account of union dues as requested by the 8th Defendant.
4. A Declaration of Court that the action of only a handful of staff, even when they happen to be proven in law to be or acknowledged as workers (but which is not even the position in this matter) in purporting to join a trade union, cannot by such action compel all other workers to join the same trade union, going by the combined provisions of Sections 12(4) and 17, Trade Unions Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
5. A Declaration of Court that, in consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, a trade dispute cannot in law, be said to have arisen between the Plaintiff and the 1st – 7th/8th Defendants, in view of the combined effect of the provisions of S.48 of the Trade Disputes Act, Cap TS, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 and Section 54, Trade Unions Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
6. A Declaration of Court that, there being no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and the 8th Defendant in respect of contract No. OPR2005-4004077S, the 8th Defendant is not entitled in law to interfere with the management of the contract thereof by making direct contact with the Plaintiff’s employers being Messrs. Chevron Nigeria Limited in respect thereof.
7. A Declaration of Court that it is not compulsory for a company to engage in every business contained in the objects’ clause of its memorandum of association, and that it shall not be deemed in law to practice every such business that may be contained in the objects clause of its memorandum of association, when it does not in actual fact practice or engage in it.
8. An Order of Perpetual Injunction, restraining the 1st – 7th Defendants hereof whether by their names, agents or privies from further parading themselves as workers of the Plaintiff.
9. An Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendant from further recognizing/presenting/parading the 1st-7th Defendants as workers/employees of the Plaintiff. See pages 1 – 4 of the Record of Appeal

BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
The gist of the case of the Appellant in this Appeal as can be gleaned from the record of appeal is that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues raised in its Originating Summons filed on 14/4/2008 against the Respondents before the Court below pertaining and or arising from the interpretation/operations of the Companies and Allied Matters Act and that no trade dispute, whatsoever, had arisen between it and the 1st– 7th/8th Respondents, as to vest jurisdiction in the National Industrial Court. It is also the case of the Appellant that it is neither a company engaged in oil well and natural gas well operations, nor does it carry on businesses as oil and natural gas refining, distribution and marketing company and that its contract with the 1st- 7th is a contract for service with timeline and not a contract of service.

The case of the Appellant against the Respondents before the Court below was that it had engaged the services of the 1st-7th Respondents as independent contractors in respect of Contract No. OPR2005-40040778 for crane maintenance, rigging, lifting and training and which contract was to terminate in the year 2010 but that all the individuals who were engaged to participate in the execution of the said contract apart from the 1st -7th Respondents are being purportedly presented as belonging to a body known as “Maintenance Planners” by one of them known as Alexander Obieruwou, who purports to be acting on their behalf, and which said group is requesting for a “Harmonized Contract Document” to cater for their respective/collective interest(s).<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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However, on 22/11/2007 the 8th Respondent wrote a letter to the Appellant that on 15/11/2007 the 1st – 7th Respondents have been elected as their officers pursuant to a general meeting/resolution of all the Appellant’s workers in their zonal office in Warri, Delta State to run the affairs of the Appellant’s branch. The Appellant then contacted several of its workers to confirm the authenticity of the 8th Respondent’s claims aforesaid, which claims the workers vehemently denied. Moreso, the 8th Respondent’s area of jurisdiction covers only workers in oil well and natural gas well operations including prospecting, drilling, refining, distribution and marketing and that at any rate the Appellant, though in principle has by its articles and memorandum of association, but in practice, by the economic activities is not engaged in and does not prospect, drill, refine, distribute and market natural gas and petroleum products as to bring in under the area of coverage of the 8th Respondent. In support of its claims against the Respondents before the Court below, the Appellant as Claimant filed a supporting affidavit of 28 paragraphs, attached to which was a bundle of documents marked as exhibits A – J respectively. See pages 5 – 9; 10 – 23; 88 – 96 and 24 – 183 of the Record of Appeal.

Upon service of the originating processes on the Respondents, they filed a Notice of Preliminary objecting and challenging the competence of the Appellant’s Suit on the ground that the Court below lacked the jurisdiction to entertain it in that the subject matter of the claim relates to interpretation of some Sections of both the Trade Union Act and the Trade Disputes Act outside the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court but squarely within the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria and therefore, incompetent before the Court below.

On 10/2/2009, the issue being one of jurisdiction, the Court below proceeded to hear the parties on the Respondents’ preliminary objection and in a very terse bench ruling upheld the Respondents’ notice of preliminary objection, declined jurisdiction and transferred the Appellant’s Suit to the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Calabar Division for hearing and determination, hence this appeal by the Appellant. See pages 212 – 213 of the Record of Appeal.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
In the Appellant’s brief, two issues were distilled as arising for determination from the two grounds of appeal, namely:
1. Whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine issues pertaining and or arising from the interpretation/operations of the Companies and Allied Matters Act?
2. Whether a dispute between the appellant and the 8th Respondent, over the eligibility of the 1st – 7th Respondents who were specifically engaged in respect of the Contract NO. OPR2005 – 4004778, as independent contractors, is a trade dispute within the contemplation of Section 48 of the Trade Dispute Act, considering the jurisdictional scope of the 8th Respondent?

In the Respondents’ brief, a sole issue was distilled as arising for determination in this appeal, namely:
Whether from the facts and surrounding circumstances of this case as disclosed by the plaintiff/appellant in its originating summons and the supporting affidavit and by virtue of extant laws the learned trial judge was right in declining jurisdiction to hear this matter?

My lords, having looked closely at the claims as endorsed on the Originating Summons of the Appellant as Claimant together with the depositions in the supporting affidavit and attached documents as well as the grounds of the Respondents’ preliminary objection before the Court below as in the record of appeal, and having calmly reviewed the submissions of learned counsel for the Appellant and the Respondents in their respective briefs, in the light of the decision contained in the ruling of the Court below, I think the only proper issue for determination in this appeal is the sole issue as distilled in the Respondents’ brief. It is my humble but firm view that a consideration of the sole issue would variably involve the due consideration of the two issues as distilled in the Appellant’s brief.

SOLE ISSUE
Whether from the facts and surrounding circumstances of this case as disclosed by the plaintiff/appellant in its originating summons and the supporting affidavit and by virtue of extant laws the learned trial judge was right in declining jurisdiction to hear this matter?

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
On his issue one, learned counsel for the Appellant had submitted that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine issues pertaining and or arising from the interpretation/operations of the Companies and Allied Matters Act and contended that the jurisdiction of the Court below, being a superior Court of record, to entertain the Appellant’s Suit is constitutional, and therefore cannot be circumscribed or limited by any statute, rules or practice direction and urged the Court to hold that going by reliefs no. 7 and 2 on the Originating Summons, which pertain to the interpretation/operations of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, the Federal High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and determine the Appellant’s Suit and to set aside the perverse decision of the Court below to the contrary and to allow the appeal. Counsel referred to Section 251 (1) (e) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and relied on Okereke V. Yar’ Adua (2008) All FWLR 626 @ p. 660.

It was also submitted that the nature of the business of the Appellant, and in particular, the nature of Contract No OPR 2005- 40040778, for which the Appellant had engaged the individual capacities of the 1st – 7th Respondents do not fall within the jurisdictional scope of coverage of the 8th Respondents as a Trade Union and contended that the Appellant neither carries on business as oil and natural gas company, nor ordinarily engages in oil well and natural gas well operations, even though it is permitted to so engaged and urged the Court to hold in the circumstances the Appellant is not under any obligation to carry out all the businesses as set out in its objects clause in its memorandum of association and to set aside the perverse findings of the Court below and allow the appeal. Counsel referred to Number 13 of Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act; Section 27 (1) (c) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act; the book entitled, “Company Law and Practice in Nigeria,” 3rd Edition, 1992 by Justice Olakunle Orojo (Rtd) @ p. 60 paragraph 4, and relied on Edokpolor & Co. Ltd. V. Sem – Edo Wire Ind. Ltd. (1984) 7 SC 119; Skenconsult V. Ukey (ILC) 656 @ p. 677.

It was further submitted that by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and the Companies and Allied Matters Act, the proper Court with the requisite jurisdiction in relation to a company’s management activities or decision or the interpretation/operations of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, as in the instant appeal, is the Federal High Court and not the National Industrial Court of Nigeria as erroneously held by the Court below and urged the Court to so hold and to set aside the perverse ruling of the Court below and allow the appeal. Counsel referred to Section 251(1) (e) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), and Section 567 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act.

On his issue two, learned counsel for the Appellant adopted some of his submissions on issue one and submitted that there exists no trade dispute between the Appellant and the 1st- 7th Respondents/8th Respondent and contended that the dispute in issue which is not a trade dispute as contemplated within the provisions of the Trade Dispute Act is clearly between the Appellant and the 8th Respondent as was rightly found by the Court below in its ruling appealed against, and urged the Court to hold that in the absence of any trade dispute since the 8th Respondent is neither an employee of the Appellant nor is the Appellant a Trade Union or a member of the 8th Respondent, there is in law no jurisdiction vested in the National Industrial Court of Nigeria over the claims of the Appellant as was wrongly held by the Court below and to set aside the erroneous decision of the Court below and allow the appeal. Counsel referred to Section 48 of Trade Disputes Act; Sections 2 (1) and 21 (1) of the Trade Disputes Act, and relied on Ekong V. Oside (2004) All of FWLR 563 @ pp. 57 – 571; R.T.E.A.N v. N.U.R.T.W (2005) All FWLR 920 @ pp. 930 – 931.

RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
On his sole issue, learned counsel for the Respondents had submitted that from the facts and surrounding circumstances of this appeal as presented by the Appellant as Claimant before the Court below in its originating summons as well as the affidavit in support and by extant laws, the Court below was right in declining jurisdiction to hear the Appellant’s Suit as it is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria and contended that in law to ascertain whether a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a Suit or not, it is the Claimant’s claims as endorsed on the Writ of Summons or the Statement of Claim that is to be considered and urged the Court to hold once it is shown, as in the instant appeal, that the claims as endorsed on the Writ of Summons or Originating Summons or as claimed in the Statement of Claim is outside the jurisdiction of the Court before which it was commenced, then the Court would lack the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and determine such a Suit and to affirm the correct decision of the Court below and dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit. Counsel relied on Nkuma V. Odili (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 977) 587 @ p. 591.

It was also submitted that a thorough study of the Originating Summons filed by the Appellant shows that issues 1-5 raised by the Appellant for determination are basically on the interpretations of different Sections of the Trade Unions Act, Cap T14 and the Trade Disputes Act, Cap T8, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and contended that even the main reliefs 1-5 claimed by the Appellant, while relief 7 is an ancillary relief, were predicated on the interpretations of the provisions of the said Acts as to the rights of the parties herein and urged the Court to hold that in the circumstances of the proved facts it is the National Industrial Court of Nigeria that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and determine the claims of the Appellant as was rightly held by the Court below and to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit and affirm the correct decision of the Court below.

It was further submitted that there is no extant law, including any of the provisions of Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) which vest on the Federal High Court the jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the Trade Unions Act and the Trade Disputes Act or to look into matters arising from, connected with, pertaining or relating to labor, industrial relationships and or trade unions activities and contended that the issues and claims of the Appellant fell squarely within these matters which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria outside the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court by the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and or under any other extant law and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the correct decision of the Court below. Counsel referred to Section 251(1)(a) – (e) of the Constitution of the Nigeria 1999 (as amended). It was also further submitted that relief 6 as endorsed on the Appellant’s Originating Summons involves the interpretation of a contractual relationship between the parties which in law is outside the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and contended that the proper Court with the requisite jurisdiction over the totality of the claims of the Appellant as endorsed on the Originating Summons is the National Industrial Court of Nigeria as was rightly held by the Court below in the ruling appealed against and urge the Court to so hold and to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit, more so when at the time of the ruling appealed against, the case was yet to proceed to hearing on the merit and ought therefore, to abate in the Court below and be taken up before the National Industrial Court of Nigeria as required by law. Counsel referred to Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006; Section 254C (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999, as amended by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 on the 4th day of March, 2011 and relied onOnuorah V. Kaduna Refining &Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 593.

RESOLUTION OF SOLE ISSUE
My lords, in considering the sole issue on both the claims as endorsed on the Appellant’s Originating processes and the facts as averred in the supporting affidavit and attached documents and in the light of the decision in the ruling of the Court below now appealed against, I bear in mind that in law it is the claim of a Claimant that denotes the jurisdiction of the Court and therefore, whenever the issue of whether or not a claim is within the jurisdiction of a Court is raised, it is the claim of the Claimant as endorsed on the Originating processes that must be looked at and critically scrutinized to see whether or not it falls within the jurisdictional limit of the powers of the Court before which it was commenced. In so doing, the defence of the Defendant no matter how strong, is really of no moment and thus goes to no issue in the determination of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the claim of the Claimant if it is found to be within the ambit of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by law. See Tukur V. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; Orthopaedic Hospital Management Board V. Garba (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 788) 538 @ p. 563.

In the instant appeal, the Appellant as Claimant had approached the Court below to ventilate its perceived grievances against the Respondents by means of an Originating Summons seeking some declaratory reliefs and orders of injunctions against the Respondents. The Respondents upon service of the Originating processes on them promptly raised a preliminary objection against the competence of the Appellant’s Suit. Being an issue of jurisdiction, the Court below aptly considered it first before any further steps were taken by the parties.

In the preliminary objection, the Respondents stated inter alia as follows, namely:
“This Hon Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this action in that the subject matter of this action does not fall within the items enumerated in Section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 which exclusively spells out the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court of Nigeria. The jurisdiction of this Hon Court to entertain this action is ousted by Sections 7 and 11 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 that expressly vest exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters relating to labor, including trade unions and industrial relations etc., on the National Industrial Court to the exclusion of the Federal High Court of Nigeria.” See pages 195 to 196 of the Record of Appeal.

On 10/2/2009, the parties were duly heard on the Respondents’ preliminary objection by the Court below, which in a very terse bench ruling upheld the preliminary objection, holding inter alia thus:
“The Originating Summons reveals that there is a dispute between Plaintiff and 8th Defendant. Plaintiff claims that 1st- 7th Defendants are independent contractors while 8th defendant is of the view that 8th Defendants are employees of Plaintiff who are mandatorily required to register with 8th Defendant. This dispute in question whether it actually exists or is apprehended is not the kind of matters contemplated in Section 251 of 1999 Constitution but matters which in my opinion the National Industrial Court are best suited to adjudicate. In the light of the above I do not hesitate in declining jurisdiction to hear this matter. Even though there is no express provision in the Federal High Court Act or rules permitting transfer of cases to NIC as is provided for State High Court, in the interest of justice exploring Order 54 Federal High Court Rules 2000 case is transferred to National Industrial Court, Calabar.” See pages 212 – 213 of the Record of Appeal.

My lords, since in law it is the claims of the Claimants that would be scrutinized by the Court to see whether or not it falls within the jurisdiction of the Court, I have taken a calm look once again at the reliefs claimed by the Appellant together with the supporting affidavits as well as the attached documents and it does appear to me that the crux of the sole issue is, not so much as to the powers of the Court below to entertain and determine matters bordering on or touching on the provision of Section 251(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) but rather, whether the claims of the Appellant against the Respondents, as can be gleaned from the totality of the reliefs claimed by it and the supporting affidavit before the Court below was within or outside the jurisdictional competence of the Court below to be heard and determined by it under the provisions of the Trade Dispute Act and Trade Union Act?
In other words, and simply put, whether the principal claims of the Appellant were for the interpretation of Section 251(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court as contended by the Appellant or rather was for interpretation and determination of dispute touching on the Trade Dispute Act and Trade Union Act conferring jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court as contended by the Respondents and upheld by the Court below in its ruling now being appealed against by the Appellant?
To this end, I have taken a further look at and thoroughly scrutinized the copious affidavit and attached documents of the Appellant before the Court below as in the record of appeal and I have taken note of the main or principal reliefs sought by the Appellant against the Respondents before the Court below.
Now, on the nature and state of the above claims or reliefs of the Appellant against the Respondents, can it rightly be said, as strenuously contended in this appeal by the Appellant, that the Appellant’s Suit was one for the interpretation of Section 251(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 as amended and thus within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain and determine? I think not.
On the face of the claims and or reliefs of the Appellant against the Respondents as endorsed on the Originating processes of the Appellant and as rightly found by the Court below, I find and I so hold that the principal claims or reliefs of the Appellant, as very plain and not under any disguise, were for determination of issues bordering on trade disputes within the provisions of Section 48 of the Trade Dispute Act and Sections 12 & 17 of the Trade Union Act as copiously averred to and relied upon by the Appellant itself in its Originating process and it is thus too late in the day in my view and I so hold, for the Appellant to now seek refuge under relief 7 only to take the case out of the Trade Union Act and the Trade Dispute Act so heavily relied upon by it and within the competence and jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court to rely on Section 251(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) within the competence and jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
The Appellant which had of its own volition crafted its own principal reliefs and heavily relied on the provisions of the Trade Union Act and the Trade Dispute Act must sail in victory or sink in defeat on the strength of its choice of reliefs and would not be allowed to change its claim mid – sail when the storm of defeat stares it at his face over the proper constitutional venue for the proper and competent ventilation of the nature of reliefs and grievances it alleged against the Respondents!
Now, by Section 251 (1) (e) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that:-
“…the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters (e) arising from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other enactment replacing that Act or regulating the operation of companies incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act.”
I agree with the apt submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant that it is the law that the jurisdiction of all superior Courts of record is constitutional, same having been donated by the Constitution therefore, cannot be circumscribed or limited by any other Statute, or Practice Directions. Thus, in law the issue of jurisdiction, being fundamental, sacrosanct and a pivot to adjudication, and where vested by the Constitution, the apex law of the land, cannot be subjected to the dictates of any statute, including rules of Court. SeeOkereke V. Yar’ Adua (2008) All FWLR 626 @ p. 660.
Now, it is true and incontestable that by virtue of Section 567 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, the Federal High Court is the appropriate Court in matter pertaining to company’s management activities or decision, or the interpretation/operations of the Companies and Allied Matters Act. See Section 251(1) (e) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). But are the claims of the Appellant as endorsed on the Originating Summons one pertaining to company management activities or decisions and or interpretations and or operation of the Company and Allied Matters Act as would bring the Appellant’s Suit squarely within the ambit of and jurisdictional competence of the Federal High Court as vehemently contended in this appeal by the Appellant? I certainly do not think so!
At the time of the filing of the Appellant’s Suit up to the time of the delivery of the ruling of the Court below appealed against by the Appellant, the powers of the National Industrial Court were clearly derived from and vested on that Court by the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Trade Dispute Act. See Section 2 (1) and 21 (1) of the Trade Disputes Act which provides thus:
(1) “Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 21 of this Act, no person shall commence an action, the subject matter of the trade dispute or any inter or intra union dispute in a Court of Law and accordingly, any action which, prior to the commencement of this section is pending in any Court shall abate and be null and void.”
Again in Section 21 (1) of the Trade Disputes Act, it is provided inter alia thus:
“The Court shall, to the exclusion of any Court, have jurisdiction
(a) To make award for the purpose of settling trade disputes; and
(b) To determine questions as to the interpretation of-

(i) Any collective agreement;
(ii) Any award made by an arbitration tribunal or by the Court under part 1 of this Act;
(iii) The terms of settlement of any trade dispute as recorded in any memorandum under Section 8 of this Act.”
Happily, the scope and effect of the above provisions in law have since been aptly pronounced upon by the Courts. See Ekong V. Oside (2004) All FWLR 563 @ pp. 57 – 571. See alsoR.T.E.A.N V. N.U.R.T.W (2005) All FWLR 920 @ pp. 930 – 931.
My lords, a calm study of the Originating Summons and the supporting affidavit as well as the attached documents filed by the Appellant as Claimant against the Respondents as Defendants on 14/4/2008 shows that while questions number 1-5 raised by the Appellant for determination were clearly on the interpretations of the relevant Sections of the Trade Unions Act, Cap T14 and the Trade Disputes Act, Cap T8, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, reliefs number 1-5 which are the main reliefs claimed by the Appellant were also clearly predicated on the interpretations of the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, Cap T14 and the Trade Disputes Act, Cap T8, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. I take the liberty to reproduce the main reliefs 1 – 5 for emphasis and proper analysis, as follows:
1. A Declaration of Court that by the interpretation of the combined provisions of S.S. 1 and 54, Trade Unions Act Cap. T 14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, the 1st – 7th Defendants do not qualify to be addressed as “Workers” and therefore, shall not qualify to be compulsorily recognized by the Plaintiff within its’ organization as members of/officials of a registered trade Union/Branch of a registered trade Union,
2. A Declaration of Court that, going by the provisions of the Third Schedule(Parts A and B), Trade Unions Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, the nature of the business of the Plaintiff, and in particular, the nature of the contract No. OPR2005-4004077S for which the Plaintiff has engaged the individual capacities/vocations of the 1st– 7th Defendants (not as workers of the Plaintiff), do not fall within the jurisdictional scope of coverage of the 8th Defendant as a Trade Union.
3. A Declaration of Court that going by the combined provisions of Section 12(4) and S.17 of the Trade Unions, Act, Cap, T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 it is necessary, and in fact, imperative for the Plaintiff to obtain the confirmation/consent of each individual actual worker as to his/her purported voluntary membership of a trade union before arrangements may be made to effect deductions from such a worker’s salary for the purpose of making payments on his/her behalf on account of union dues as requested by the 8th Defendant.
4. A Declaration of Court that the action of only a handful of staff, even when they happen to be proven in law to be or acknowledged as workers (but which is not even the position in this matter) in purporting to join a trade union, cannot by such action compel all other workers to join the same trade union, going by the combined provisions of S.S. 12(4) and 17, Trade Unions Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
5. A Declaration of Court that, in consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, a trade dispute cannot in law, be said to have arisen between the Plaintiff and the 1st – 7th /8th Defendants, in view of the combined effect of the provisions of S.48 of the Trade Disputes Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 and Section 54, Trade Unions Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
Now, it is true in law and as submitted unassailably by the learned counsel for the Respondents that it is the National Industrial Court of Nigeria that is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to delve into the determinations of the questions number 1 – 5 and the principal reliefs number 1 – 5 as claimed by the Appellant against the Respondents and not the Federal High Court as vehemently but erroneously submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant.
It seems clear to me, having taken time to study the questions, issues and reliefs as put forward by the Appellant on its own volition in its Originating Summons filed on 14/4/2008 against the Respondents, that the Appellant’s case has to do with or pertains to some form of trade disputes as to whether some persons engaged by it were under contract of service or contract of service with timeline as submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant, or whether the persons so engaged by the Appellants, including the 1st- 7th Respondents could be addressed as “workers” or not, and also whether the employees of the Appellant could join the membership of the 8th Respondent, indisputably a Trade Union and so recognized under the law. These clearly are issues definitely outside the jurisdictional competence of the Federal High Court but obviously within the exclusive domain and confines of the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria as both impeccably and unimpeachably held by the Court below.
Now, the Appellant had also claimed relief number 7 against the Respondents, which relief is hereby reproduced as follows:
7. A Declaration of Court that it is not compulsory for a company to engage in every business contained in the objects’ clause of its memorandum of association, and that it shall not be deemed in law to practice every such business that may be contained in the objects clause of its memorandum of association, when it does not in actual fact practice or engage in it.
The purport of the above relief is very clear and unambiguous. It is undoubtedly an ancillary relief to relief numbers 1 – 5. In my view it is certainly and clearly not the main or principal reliefs of the Appellant against the Respondents. I therefore, consider the attempt by the Appellant’s counsel in his brief of argument to lay emphasis solely on the Appellant’s relief number 7, which is clearly an ancillary relief, as vesting jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in total disregard or indifference to reliefs numbers 1 – 5, which are clearly the principal reliefs of the Appellant as endorsed on the Appellant’s Originating Summons, as a futile bid and subterfuge to cloak the Federal High Court with jurisdiction where it has none according to law!
In law, the Federal High Court, whose jurisdiction ordinarily is so vast and thus not ever hungry to assume jurisdiction where none exists, does not have the jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the Trade Unions Act and the Trade Disputes Act or to look into matters arising from, connected with, pertaining or relating to labor, industrial relationships and or trade unions activities, which are the exclusive domain of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. See Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. See also Section 254C (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 as amended by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 on the 4th Day of March, 2011.
My lords, it is my view therefore, that relief number 7, now sought to be made the saving rock by the Appellant in order to forcefully or rather craftily bring its case within the competence of the Court below, was not only nebulous but also nothing more than a mere ancillary relief to the principal reliefs of the Appellant against the Respondents. It is settled law that where the principal claim or relief in the Suit of a Claimant is not within the competence and jurisdiction of a Court, then such a Court would lack the competence and jurisdiction to entertain such a Suit even where there may be an ancillary claim within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court. Simply put, it is the Court that has the competence and jurisdiction to entertain the principal claims that is and should be the appropriate Court to entertain such a Suit. See Tukur V. Govt of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549 @ pp. 576 – 577. See also Emeka V. Okoroafor & Ors (2017) LPELR – 41738 (SC); Nwokoleme V. Ajaero & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40073 (CA); Alhaji Umaru Abba Tukur V. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517; Mrs. Comfort Alagba Kolo V. Nigeria Police Force & Ors (2018) LPELR – 43635 (CA); Dr. Okoroma & Anor V. Chief Christian Uba & Ors (1998) LPELR – 6405 (CA); Nwokoleme V. Ajaero & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40073 (CA).
It follows therefore, for a Suit to be competently before the Federal High Court to be heard and determined by that Court, it must be one whose principal claims or reliefs fall squarely within the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and or under any other extant law conferring jurisdiction on the Federal High Court. Thus, where the principal relief, as in the instant appeal, is one outside the provisions of Section 251(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) or under any other extant law conferring jurisdiction on the Court below but rather one under the jurisdictional competence of the National Industrial Court, as was rightly found by the Court below, then the Federal High Court would lack the jurisdictional competence to entertain the said Suit, such as the Appellant’s Suit. The Court below cannot therefore, assume jurisdiction over a Suit in which only an ancillary relief claimed therein is probably within its jurisdictional competence to entertain and determine. See WAEC V. Adeyanju (2008) LPELR-3467 (SC). See also Tukur V. Govt of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549; Egbuonu V. Borno Radio and Television Corp. (1997) 12 NWLR (Pt. 531) 29; Sea Trucks Nig. Ltd V. Anigboro (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 159; Jack V. University of Agriculture (2004) 1 SC (Reprint) (Pt. 11) 100.
Interestingly, even Section 251(1)(e) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) apparently being relied upon by the Appellant in reference to its relief number 7 is of no avail to the Appellant since the said that Section 251(1) (e) is duly concerned with matters arising from the Operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act and does not preclude other Courts from ascertaining the actual business line of a company and also to properly determine the Trade Union to which its workers can freely join in the exercise of their Constitutional rights of Freedom of Association. See Section 40 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).

My lords, I now come to relief number 6 as endorsed on the Appellant’s Originating Summons. The relief number 6 is herein reproduced as follows:
6. A Declaration of Court that, there being no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and the 8th Defendant in respect of contract No. OPR2005 4004077S, the 8th Defendant is not entitled in law to interfere with the management of the contract thereof by making direct contact with the Plaintiff’s employers being Messrs. Chevron Nigeria Limited in respect thereof.
On a calm look at relief number 6 as above, it does appear certain to me that it does and indeed at best pertains to and involves the interpretation of the simple contractual relation between the parties, if any. Here again, the law is that the Federal High Court does not have the jurisdiction to dabble into claims bordering merely on simple contracts of service, notwithstanding whether with timeline or not, between the parties in this appeal.
In Onuorah V. Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Co. Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 593, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the Appellant in a matter pertaining to simple contract against the Respondent, a subsidiary of Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, in which the matter was commence before the Federal High Court instead of it being commenced before the State High Court merely because the Respondent was an agent of the Federal Government of Nigeria. The Supreme Court emphatically made it loud and clear that Section 230(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1979 (as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993), which is the equivalent of Section 251(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), does not confer the Federal High Court with jurisdiction over matters of simple contract. Thus, even on this score, the Appellant’s claim in relief number 6 is clearly outside the jurisdictional competence of the Federal High Court.
My lords, as I bring this judgment to a close, I thought I should pause here to observe that the 8th Respondent, which the Appellant had on its own volition made a party to the Suit before the Court below, has by virtue of Number 13 of Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, the jurisdictional coverage to include:
“Workers in oil well and natural gas well operation including prospecting, drilling, crude oil and natural gas pipelines, Refining, distribution and marketing of natural gas, extraction oil and natural gas and petroleum products including petrol filing stations, petroleum tanker drivers, but excluding the construction of oil and gas pipelines.”
Now, whether the 1st – 7th Respondents fall within the above category or not, which in reality is the real crux of the Appellant’s Suit, no matter how disguised it may appear, is not one within the jurisdictional competence of the Federal High Court but rather, in my finding, one squarely within the jurisdictional competence of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria.
On the totality of the findings and the state of the law as stated above, and as also rightly found by the Court below in its ruling appealed against by the Appellant, I hold that the Appellant’s Suit in which the principal reliefs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Appellant were founded mainly or principally on issues of disputes bordering on the Trade Union Act and the Trade Disputes Act is not one which in law falls within the parameters of an action to be entertained and determined by the Federal High Court under Section 251 (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 as amended or under any other extant law conferring jurisdiction on the Court below as erroneously but vehemently contended by the Appellant in this appeal.
In the light of all the findings above, the sole issue is hereby resolved against the Appellant in favor of the Respondents and I hold firmly that the Appellant’s Suit was clearly incompetent, notwithstanding whether or not it would have been meritorious if considered and determined on the merit. However, the Court below having exercised its discretion, which is correct now in law vide Section 22 of the Federal High Court Act, to transfer the Appellant’s Suit to the National Industrial Court, Calabar Division and at any rate in the absence of any appeal or complaint against the said order of transfer, which thus remains valid, subsisting and binding on both the parties and this Court, I hold that this Appeal is devoid of any merit and is thus liable to be dismissed in its entirety. Consequently, I hereby so dismiss it!
My lords, regrettably, had the Appellant, whose Suit was neither struck out nor dismissed by the Court below but merely transferred to the National Industrial Court, Calabar Division, perhaps due to the absence of a Division of that Court in Benin City then, proceeded to ventilate its grievances against the Respondents before the National Industrial Court as ordered by the Court below, the substantive Suit would have since been determined one way or the other with a sense of finality at the level of hierarchy of that Court. But alas, it has taken the parties all of eleven years to get to this point of a return to ground zero to proceed to the National Industrial Court as ordered by the Curt below on 10/2/2009. What an irony and contribution to delay in the dispensation of justice by a party, such as the Appellant who being the Claimant ought to have been more desirous of expeditious determination of its Suit! Too bad!
In the result, the Ruling of the Federal High Court, Benin Judicial Division; Coram: Chukwura Nnamani J., in Suit No. FHC/B/CS/67/2008 Oil and Industrial Services Ltd. V. Bola Oguntuase delivered on 10/2/2009, in which the Court below declined jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the Appellant as Claimant against the Respondents as Defendants and ordered its transfer to the National Industrial Court, Calabar Judicial Division for trial is hereby affirmed.
However, I take Judicial notice of the fact of the establishment of a Division of the National Industrial Court in Benin. Consequently, the Appellant’s Suit is hereby remitted to the Benin Division of the National Industrial Court for expeditious hearing and determination.
I make no order as to cost.

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading the draft copy of the judgment just delivered by learned brother, Biobele Abraham Georgewill, JCA.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusion to the effect that the appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed.
I too dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential orders made in the leading judgment including the order as to costs.

MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Biobele Abraham Georgewill, JCA. I agree with the elaborate reasons given by my learned brother for dismissing the appeal and, for those reasons, I also dismiss the appeal.
I abide by all the orders in the leading judgment, including the order relating to costs.

Appearances:

A. Idelegbagbon, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Odenwingia, Esq. For Respondent(s)