OGBODO & ORS v. OMOKHUDU & ORS (2020)

OGBODO & ORS v. OMOKHUDU & ORS

(2020)LCN/15484(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(BENIN JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Monday, December 14, 2020

CA/B/475/2016

RATIO

DUTY OF COURT: WHETHER AN APPELLATE COURT MAY RE-EVALUATE THE FINDINGS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT

It is the law that an appellate Court which had not seen the witnesses testify and observed their demeanor in the witness stand should respect the views of the trial Court and not to readily substitute its own views for that of the trial Court except where it is shown that the conclusion or finding reached by the trial Court was perverse and for this an appellate Court will readily intervene to re-evaluate the evidence in the printed record if it is shown that the conclusions reached or findings made by the trial Court on the proved evidence before it do not flow from such proved facts or runs contrary to such proved facts and thus perverse. In such a case, the appellate Court is in good a position as the trial Court to intervene to re-evaluate the evidence in the printed record to draw necessary inference and make proper findings on the proved and admitted facts in the record as the justice of the case requires but which the trial Court had failed to do. See Obajimi V. Adediji (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1073) 1 @ P. 19. See also Owor V. Christopher (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 511) 962 @ 992; Sogbamu V. Odunaiya (2013) All FWLR (pt. 700) 1249 @ P. 1302; Mini Lodge V. Ngei (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 506) 1806 @ Pp. 1820 -1821; Sa’eed V. Yakowa (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 692) 1650 @ P. 1681. PER BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

TITLE TO LAND: RELEVANCE OF A COGENT AND CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF TRADITIONAL HISTORY

DUTY OF COURT: CONDITIONS TO DETERMINE A PROPER EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

Now, for evaluation of evidence by a trial Court to be proper, it must have met the threshold of proper evaluation of evidence by taking into account the following factors (a) whether the evidence is admissible; (b) whether the evidence is relevant; (c) whether it is credible; (d) Whether it is conclusive; (e) whether it is more probable than that given by the other party; and (f) finally after invoking the law, if any, that is applicable to the case, and then come to his final conclusion based on the evidence which it has accepted. I find the judgment of the Court below squarely meeting this threshold and hold therefore, that the vehement contention by the learned counsel for the Appellants that the Court below merely reproduced without any proper evaluation the evidence led by the parties is not correct and is hereby discountenanced. SeeZenith Bank Plc V. Alhaji Titilayo (2015) LPELR-24782 (CA). See alsoZang & Anor V. Emmanuel Ituma & Ors (2014) LPELR-23521 (CA); Iriri & Ors V Erhurhobara & Anor (1991) LPELR-1536 (SC); Odunukwe V Ofomata (1999) LPELR-13055 (CA). PER BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

CIVIL PROCEEDINGS: BURDEN OF PROOF

In considering these pertinent questions on the pleadings and evidence as led by the parties and in the light of the findings of the Court below, I bear in mind that generally in civil proceedings the burden of proof, though said not to be static, is on the Claimant who usually asserts his rights and who may lose if no evidence was called. Incidentally, in the instant appeal it was the Respondents who as Claimants bear the burden to lead credible evidence in proof of the title they claim to the land in dispute. See Ewo V. Ani (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 861) 610. See also Osawaru V. Ezeiruka (1978) 7 – 9 SC 135; Onwuama V. Ezeokoli (2002) 94 LRCN 246; Enekwe V. IMB Ltd. (146) LRCN 842; Garba V. Yahya (2007) 145 LRCN 549.

It is the law that in a claim for declaration of title to land, a party claiming title to land must do so by proving with credible evidence one or more of the five methods of proving title to land, namely: A. Evidence of traditional history of title; B. Production of genuine and valid documents of title; C. Acts of Ownership numerous enough; D. Acts of possession over a long period of time and E. Act of possession of adjacent land long enough to make it probable that the owner of the adjacent land is also the owner of the land in dispute. Thus, the Appellants had open to them one or more of the above five methods to prove their title to the land in dispute. The law is that proof of any of these methods by credible evidence would be sufficient to ground an action for declaration of title to land. See Idundun V. Okumagba (1976) 6 – 10 SC 48. See also Arum V. Nwobodo (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 688) 870 @ p. 893; Ani V. Ewo (2004) 1 SC (Pt. 11) 115 @ p. 133; Romaine V. Romaine (1992) NWLR (Pt. 238) 650.
In Ezuchukwu V. Ukachukwu (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt 642) 657 @ p. 679 it was reiterated inter alia thus:
“A Claimant of title to land, of course, need not rely on more than one of the five methods. Where however, he relies on a pleaded method or way as a root of his title, then, if the pleaded root fails, the alleged acts of ownership or possession derivative of the root necessarily ought to fail. Why? Because the title or the root title needs must be, firstly established before the exercise of the rights of ownership may exercisable…”

Interestingly, when it comes to the issue of possession of land in dispute, the law is well settled that he who proves title to land is equally entitled to possession of the land in dispute. The is that a person with a valid and better title to land is by law deemed to be in possession even where he is not in de – facto physical possession of the land as against a person without any color of right to the land. See Gankon V. Ugochukwu Chemical Ind. Ltd (1993) 6NWLR (Pt. 297) 55. See also Shogo V. Adebayo (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt 686) 121: Ezeanah V. Atta (2004) 7 NWLR (Pt. 873) 468.
In Carrena V. Akinlase (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1107) @ p. 262, the Supreme Court emphatically pronounced inter alia thus:
“A person who has title over a piece of land, though not in de – facto physical possession, is deemed, in law, to be the person in possession. This is because the law attaches possession to title and ascribes it to the person who has title. Such possession is the legal possession, which is sometimes also called constructive possession.”
In law therefore, where two parties claim to be in possession of land in dispute, the law ascribes possession to the party with the better title and similarly where rival titles are being relied upon by rival claimants, the party with a better title is entitled to succeed. Thus, if there be dispute as to which of two persons is in possession, the presumption is that the person having the better title to the land is in lawful possession and thus no matter the length of time of unlawful and or unauthorized entry and occupation of land, it cannot in law metamorphose or ripen into legal possession of the land. See Oyadare V. Chief Keji (supra) @ p. 571. See also Bennet Ude Agu V. Ozo Moses Nnadi ((1999) 2 NWLR (Pt. 589) 131; Ojomo V. Olaide Ibrahim (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) 415; Solomon V. Mogaji (1982) 11 SC 1. PER BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein Justice of the Court of Appeal

Biobele Abraham Georgewill Justice of the Court of Appeal

Gabriel Omoniyi Kolawole Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. S. A. OGBODO 2. CHIEF S. A. EMAH 3. S. A. AMANA (For Themselves And On Behalf Of The Entire People Of Igarra Community Akoko – Edo L.G.A.) 4. S. A. EGURE 5. CHIEF OKOMAYIN ADEBAYO OBARO (For Themselves And On Behalf Of Ezibemi Branch Of The Eshinavaka Royal Family Of Igarra) APPELANT(S)

And

1. CHIEF HENRY OMOKHUDU 2. CHIEF FESTUS ODARUME 3. CHIEF PETER ADIDI 4. MR. OKHUMEODE IKHIDEO (For Themselves And On Behalf Of The Entire People Of Igue Community, Igue Clan, Owan East L.G.A.) RESPONDENT(S)

BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Edo State, Coram: H. A. Courage – Ogbebor J., in Suit No. HAF/6/2006: Chief Henry O. Omokhudu & Ors V. S. A. Ogbodo & Ors delivered on 28/7/2016, wherein some of the Claims of the Respondents as Claimants against the Appellants as Defendants were granted.

The Appellants were dissatisfied with the said judgment and promptly appealed against it vide a Notice of Appeal filed on 20/9/2016 on thirteen grounds of appeal at pages 439 -444 of the Record of Appeal. The Record of Appeal was duly transmitted to this Court on 2/12/2016. Subsequently, an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on 1/6/2017 on fourteen grounds of appeal but was deemed duly filed on 26/2/2019. The Appellants’ Brief was filed on 1/6/2017 but was deemed as properly filed on 26/2/2019. The Respondents brief was filed on 15/3/2019. The Appellants’ reply brief was on 30/4/2020 but was deemed properly filed on 23/11/2020.

At the hearing of this appeal on 23/11/2020, Prof. Ambrose O. Ekpu, learned counsel for the Appellants, appearing with Idowu Adeniyi Esq., S. I. Avbuluinga Esq., and Mrs. H. E. Akpasubi Esq., adopted the Appellants’ brief and reply brief and their arguments and urged the Court to allow the Appeal and set aside the judgment of the Court below and grant the Claims of the Appellants against the Respondent. On his part, C. Ogudugu Esq., learned counsel for the Respondents, adopted the Respondents’ brief as his arguments and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the Court below.

By a Writ of Summons filed on 26/2/2007 and 6th Amended Statement of Claim filed on 25/1/2014, the Respondents as Claimants claimed against the Appellants as Defendants the following reliefs, to wit:
1. A Declaration that the Claimants are entitled to a Customary Right of Occupancy over ALL THAT parcel of land known as Ohenoga Land lying and situate South of river Onyami, the boundary features of which are shown in claimants survey plan No GOA/ED11/07 dated 15th May, 2012 filed along with the 4th Amended Statement of Claim.
2. A declaration that river Onyami is the traditional or natural boundary feature demarcating Owan East Local Government Area from lgarra Clan in Akoko-Edo Local Government Area.
3. A declaration that same river Onyami is the traditional or natural boundary feature demarcating Igue Clan in Owan East Local Government Area from lgarra Clan in Akoko- Edo Local Government Area.
4. A perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents and privies from trespassing on the Claimants’ Ohonoga Land in dispute.
5. N5,000,000.00 being damages for trespass. See pages 104 – 105 of the Record of Appeal.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents as Claimants originally took out this action against the 1st set of Defendants before the 2nd set of Defendants applied to be joined and were joined by Order of the Court below. The case of the Respondents as can be gleaned from the averments in their pleadings and the evidence, both oral and documentary, as in the Record of Appeal was that they are the owner of a vast land known as Ohenoga land which is delineated in a survey Plan admitted in Evidence and that the said Ohenoga land was founded by their ancestor, one Anama or Igue a migrant son of Oba Eweka of Benin who first settled on the land. It is on this land that his Children further settled on part of the land before coming together to settle jointly at Otuo/Sebe Ogben Road of that said same Ohenoga land. That since the joint settlement they have been in possession of the entire land called Ohenoga land sharing boundaries with neighbouring communities like Ikao, Ake, Sasaro and Uokha and exercising various act of possession over the land include farming and having tenants, the 1st Set of Appellants who they granted permission to farm on the Ago Uneme land but who went out of the area given to them by the Respondents to trespass into other areas not within the said Ago Uneme land. See pages 240 – 291 of the Record of Appeal.

On the other hand, the case of the Appellants as Defendants before the Court below as can be gleaned from the averments in their pleadings and evidence, both oral and documentary as in the Record of Appeal was that the land in dispute forms part of a vast expanse of land which the Appellants’ ancestors deforested so many years ago by first settlement on the Kukuruku Hills and while there, they would come down to the plain, the land in dispute, at the foot of the Hills to farm and hunt for games, thereby deforesting vast areas of land, including the land in dispute, which had belonged to the Igarra people for many generations and without any challenge, let or hindrance from anybody until the recent trespass by the Respondents in 2004 by laying a false claim to the land in dispute to the recent discovery of solid minerals thereon.

The Appellants tendered several documents which were admitted on evidence as Exhibits D1, Letter dated 15/10/1992 from L.G. Council to Otaru of Igarra asking for consent to allow miners into the land in dispute; Exhibit D2, Letter dated 22/10/1992 conveying Otaru’s reply to Exhibit D1; Exhibits D3-D6, Miners’ letters of Applications dated 4/11/1993, 22/11/1993, 6/6/1994, 22/3/1994 respectively addressed to Igarra Community for permission to mine on the land in dispute; Exhibit D7, Letter of Consent dated by Anoyiete Family of Igarra to miners signed on 23/1/1993; Exhibit D8, Otaru’s Letter to the Council Chairman date25/6/1992; Exhibit D9, Council’s letter to Otaru dated 17/6/1992; Exhibits D10-D10A, Letters dated 9/10/1992, 14/10/1992 from Council to the Otaru and Reply by Otaru; Exhibit D11, Survey Plan No. DCS/ED/LD/001/2009; Exhibit D12, Otaru’s Letter/Petition dated 20/4/2006, addressed to the Edo State Governor against the attacks of the Respondents on the Appellants on the disputed land; Exhibit D13, Sketch Map of Afemai Division, Benin Province printed in 1954; Exhibit D14, Map of Midwestern Nigeria of 1965. See pages 291 – 314 of the Record of Appeal.

The parties filed and exchanged pleadings and the matter proceeded to trial. The Respondents as Claimants before the Court below called nine witnesses, who testified as PW1, Samuel Ohiobode Imuokhuede; PW2, Matthew Balogun; PW3, Greg Osagie Akhigbe; PW4, Ohumeode Ikhiedeo; PW5, Samson Ojo Edeifo; PW6, Festus Odarume; PW7, Usma Jimoh; PW8, Oba Azutoromhe Unuokhazor; and PW9, Omokafe Omokhudu, and tendered some documents which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits. In their defense, the 1st set of Appellants as First set of Defendants called eight witnesses, who testified as DW1, Stephen Ogbodo; DW2, Stephen Ezimede; DW3, Micahel Makanju Ofei; DW4, Olatunji Oboro; DW5, Michael Omolaiye Okomayin; DW6, Dele Ochi; DW7, Samuel Ayo Amana; and DW9, Ogbewea Akhenamen, and tendered some documents which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits. On their part, the 2nd Set of Appellants as 2nd set of Defendants called one witness, DW8, Stephen Asuru Egure and tendered some documents which were in evidence as Exhibits. At the close of the cases for the respective parties, they filed and exchanges written addresses which were duly adopted by their counsel. On 28/7/2016, the Court below delivered its judgment wherein it granted some of the Claims of the Respondents against the Appellants, hence this appeal. See pages 414 -438, 439 – 444 of the Record of Appeal.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
In the Appellants’ brief, five issues were distilled as arising for determination from the fourteen grounds of appeal, to wit:
1. Whether the Lower Court was right when it upheld the evidence of traditional history put forward by the Respondents despite yawning gaps, conflict and in consistencies inherent in the Respondents’ pleadings and evidence as to the name, location and identity of the land in dispute? (Distilled from Grounds 1,2 and 3)
2. Whether the Lower Court was on the right footing when it merely summarized the evidence of parties without properly evaluating same before coming to conclusion by granting declaratory reliefs against the Appellants? (Distilled from Grounds 4, 5 and 6)
3. Whether there was evidence before the Lower Court to warrant its pronouncement that Igue Community was entitled, jointly or communally, to a grant of customary right of occupancy over the land in dispute? (Distilled from Grounds 6, 7 and 8)
4. Whether the Lower Court was not wrong when it held the Claimants liable for trespass and granted an order of injunction and damages against them? (Distilled from Grounds 9, 10,11 &12)
5. Whether the action as constituted was competent? (Distilled from Ground 14)

In the Respondents’ brief, the five issues as distilled in the Appellants’ brief were adopted as the issues arising for determination in this appeal.

My lords, upon due consideration of the pleadings on the issues as joined and the evidence as led by the parties before the Court below as can be gleamed from the Record of Appeal in the light of the findings in the judgment of the Court below, it does appear to me that parties are on firm ground in agreeing to the five issues as distilled in the Appellants’ brief as the issues arising for determination in this appeal. I hereby adopt these five issues as the issues for determination. However, I shall consider issues one, two, three and four together and resolve them in one fell swoop, while issue five shall be considered on its own.

ISSUES ONE, TWO, THREE AND FOUR
Whether the Court below was right when it upheld the evidence of traditional history put forward by the Respondents despite yawning gaps, conflict and inconsistencies inherent in the Respondents’ pleadings and evidence as to the name, location and identity of the land in dispute, AND Whether the Court below was on the right footing when it merely summarised the evidence of parties without properly evaluating same before coming to conclusion by granting declaratory reliefs against the Appellants, AND Whether there was evidence before the Court below to warrant its pronouncement that Igue Community was entitled, jointly or communally, to a grant of customary right of occupancy over the land in dispute, AND Whether the Court below was not wrong when it held the Claimants liable for trespass and granted an order of injunction and damages against them?

APPELLANTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
On issue one, learned counsel for the Appellants had submitted that the Court below was wrong when it upheld the evidence of traditional history put forward by the Respondents despite the irreconcilable conflicts inherent therein and contended that in law, a party who relies on traditional evidence has the bounden duty of pleading and leading credible evidence as to the location and identity of the land as well as the founder and an unbroken chain of successive owners through whom he claims and urged the Court to hold that the Respondents failed to discharge this duty with their evidence replete with terrible inconsistencies as to the name, location and identity of the land they claim and to allow the appeal and set aside the perverse findings of the Court below. Counsel relied onDansol Org. Limited V. NTC Limited (2001) FWLR (Pt. 59)1267 @ p. 1280.

It was also submitted that the evidence led by Respondents through their surveyor did not tally with the description of the boundaries of the land in their conflicting Survey Plans which conflicted with one another in terms of size, boundaries and features and contended that the Court below was in grave error when on the face of these conflicts it proceeded to grant title to the land in dispute to the Respondents and urged the Court to set aside the perverse finding and allow the appeal and dismiss the claims of the Respondents. Counsel relied on Ukaegbu V Nwololo (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 466) 1852 @ p. 1884; Adeleke V. Asani (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt. 768) 26.

It was further submitted that in law a party who seeks declarative reliefs must lead credible evidence to secure same and must succeed on the strength of his case, not on the weakness of the defendant’s case and contended that the only facts of the traditional history of the land in dispute of the Respondents was pleaded in paragraph 11 of their 6th Amended Statement of Claim devoid of the manner of founding, the name of the founder and his successors in an unbroken chain and urged the Court to hold that the Respondents failed to meet the criteria for successful pleading and evidence of traditional history of title to land and their claims ought to have been dismissed and urged the Court to so hold and allow the appeal and set aside the perverse judgment of the Court below. Counsel relied on Onovo V. Mba (2014) 14 NWLR (1427) 391 @ pp. 414 -442; Aiyeola V. Pedro (2014) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1424) 409 @ p. 443; Bukar V. Bashir (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt.1417) 68 @ p. 89; Akanbi V. Salawu (2003) 112 LRCN 2147@ pp. 2155-2156

It was also submitted that since the Appellants did not file any counter claim for title to the land in dispute the burden was heavier on the Respondents to prove their title to the land in dispute since in law the Appellants had no duty at all to prove their title to the land in dispute and contended that the Court below ignored this principle of law and thereby misdirected herself in comparing the traditional histories of the parties and then finding that the evidence of traditional history of the Respondents was more credible and/or plausible and urged the Court to hold that the misdirection resulted into the perverse finding of title in favor of the Respondents by the Court below and to allow the appeal and set aside the perverse findings and to dismiss the claims of the Respondents for lacking in merit.

On issue two, learned counsel for the Appellants had submitted that the Court below merely summarised the evidence of parties without carrying out any proper evaluation of same before coming to its wrong conclusions and contended that in law, a trial Court must consider the evidence before it and properly evaluate same before drawing conclusions by ascribing probative value to the evidence and give reason for its belief or disbelief in the version or case of the parties and urged the Court to hold that this failure had occasioned gross miscarriage of justice and rendered the conclusions of the Court below perverse and same should be set aside and proper evaluation carried out by this Court to arrive at the correct conclusions and to allow the appeal in the interest of justice. Counsel relied on Olonade V. Sowemimo (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1428) 469 @ p. 496; Alelu V. Eze (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1475) 74 @ p. 116; Jegede V. Oluwasesan [2013] All FWLR (Pt. 671) 1484@ p. 1487; Oke V. Nwizi (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 757) 695 @ p. 707; Akintola V. Balogun (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 642) 533; F.C.D.A. V. Unique Future Leaders Int’l Ltd (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1436) 213 @ p. 245; Osaghae V. Amadasun (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt.1433) 346 @ pp. 369–370.

It was also submitted that had the Court below carried out proper consideration and evaluation of the pleadings and evidence, it would have discovered that there were no pleadings or evidence that was supportive of its decisions and contended that at nowhere did the Respondents plead or lead evidence that there is a joint ownership of the land in dispute by the Igue Community and urge the Court to set aside this perverse findings and to allow the appeal and dismiss the claims of the Respondents for lacking in merit. Counsel relied on Chukwu V. INEC (2014) 10 NWLR (Ppt. 1415) 385 @ p. 416; Isu V. Uche (2009) LPELR-8855 (CA).

On issue three, learned counsel for the Appellants had submitted that there was no evidence to warrant the finding by the Court below of title to the Igue Community, jointly or communally, over the land in dispute and contended that there was no sufficient oral or documentary evidence from the Respondents to justify such findings and urged the Court to hold that the Wilkes Intelligence Report, Exhibit P13), heavily relied upon by the Court below rather supports the Appellants’ case to the effect that the Respondents were recent settlers who only came into the disputed land in 1929 after the Appellants’ forefathers had long settled in the said land and to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Court which merely attempted to read into Exhibit P13 what was not contained therein. Counsel relied on Auta V. Ibe (2003) All FWLR (Pt. 173)87 @ p. 99.

On issue four, learned counsel for the Appellants had submitted that the Court below erred when it held the Appellants liable for trespass and granted an Order of injunction and damages against them in favor of the Respondents and contended that in law an Order of injunction is only granted based on the Claimant’s or Applicant’s ability to place sufficient material before the Court to show the Defendant’s acts of trespass and urged the Court to hold that there was no sufficient material from the Respondents to justify the Order of perpetual injunction granted by the Court below against the Appellants since the Respondents had conceded that they were the ones who put the Appellants in possession of the land in dispute and therefore, the relief of injunction cannot lie.

It was also submitted that assuming without conceding the land indeed belonged to the Respondents, there was no pleading or admissible evidence indicating that the Appellants went beyond the land that the Respondents purportedly gave out to them and contended that in law there cannot be a claim for trespass or injunction against a tenant by his overlord and urge the Court to hold at best the remedy in such a case lies in forfeiture and to set aside the perverse finding on trespass as well as the Order of perpetual injunction granted by the Court below. Counsel relied on Oladipupo V. Olaniyan (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 642) 556.

It was further submitted that assuming without conceding that the Appellants trespassed on the Respondents’ land, the award of N500,000.00 as damages for trespass against the Appellants in favor of the Respondents was in the circumstance excessive and contended that the Respondents neither pleaded nor proved any special damages to warrant such an excessive award of damages and urged the Court to hold that at best only nominal damages ought to have been awarded.

RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
On issue one, learned counsel for the Respondents had submitted that the root of title of the Respondents was settlement as pleaded in paragraph 11 of the 6th Amended Statement of Claim and contended that the evidence in support was not successfully impeached under cross examination and urged the Court to hold that the Court below was perfectly right when on the unchallenged evidence of the Respondents, it held that the evidence of traditional history of the Appellants were conflicting and inconclusive and preferred the unchallenged evidence of traditional history of the Respondents which was more credible and/or plausible and to dismiss the appeal and affirm the correct finding by the Court below. Counsel relied onOnadehin & Ors V Sonuga & Anor (1974) All NLR 936 @ p. 943.

It was also submitted that the Court below carne to the correct decision that the evidence of traditional history given by the Respondents of their title to the land is more credible because it was supported by Exhibit P13 and contended that in law the unchallenged evidence of first settlement on the land by Anama which was continued by his children on different parts of the original settlement is evidence of continuous possession of the land up to their descendants and urged the Court to hold that the Court below did a great job of comparing the features, size, similarities and shape in the survey plans of the land in dispute and came to the correct finding that it was well known to both parties and was the same land referred to by the parties and to affirm this correct finding and to dismiss the appeal. Counsel relied on Simeon Amaefuna V. Jonathan Okoli (2014) LPELR-23755(CA); Onuoha Nwokorobia V. Desmond Uchechi Nwogu & Ors (2009) LPELR-2127 (SC); Aruwa V. Ogunsola (1938) 4 WACA 159.

It was further submitted that the Court below was right to compare the evidence of traditional history adduced by both parties to determine which is more plausible to arrive at a decision and contended that the Court below was under a duty to evaluate the evidence led by both sides to the dispute, including evidence of traditional history of title to land, before arriving at its finding and urged the Court to hold that in law the that the burden of proof rests on a Claimant does not discharge the trial Court from its duty to consider the evidence of both parties and ascribe probative value or weight to each of them as was correctly done by the Court below and to affirm the correct findings of the Court below on the title to the land in dispute band to dismiss the Appeal for lacking in merit. Counsel relied on Adamu Erinle & Ors V. Alhaji Busari Aluko & Ors (2013) LPER-22157(CA); Osu V. Igiri (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.69) 221; Akinola & Anor V. Oluwo & Ors. (1981) All NLR 224 @ p. 227; Woluchem V. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291; Kimdey V. Military Governor, Gongola State (1988) NWLR (Pt.77) 445; Registered -Trustees of Apostolic Faith Mission V. James (1987) NWLR (Pt.61)5S6; Teriba V. Adeyemo (2010) NWLR (Pt.1211) 242; Layinka V. Makinde (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt.77S) 358; Ita V. Ekpenyong (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt.69S)87.

It was also further submitted that the Court below by making reference to the evidence of traditional history tendered by the two sets of defendants as conflicting and inconclusive did not thereby shift the onus of proof of traditional history to the Respondents and contended that in law as long as a trial Court does not arrive at his judgment simply by considering the case of one party and not the other but properly evaluate both sides, the decision will not be set aside merely because he adopts a method that is novel to the usual system and urged the Court to hold that the Court did carried out proper evaluation and arrived at correct findings which should be affirmed and the appeal dismissed. Counsel relied on Chief D.S. Ajibulu V. Major General D.O. Ajayi (2013) LPELR-21860 (SC); Chief Nlemchukwu Nwanosike & Anor V. Cyril Udenze & Anor (2016) LPELR-40505 (SC); Mogaji V. Odofin (1978) 3-4 SC 91.

It was also submitted that the Court below in its evaluation of the evidence by the parties took into account all the necessary factors, including (a) whether the evidence is admissible (b) whether the evidence is relevant (c) whether itiscredible (d) Whether it is conclusive (e) whether it is more probable than that given by the other party and finally after invoking the law, if any, that is applicable to the case, and then come to his final conclusion based on the evidence which he has accepted and urged the Court to so hold and to discountenance the submissions by the Appellants that the Court below did not carry out proper evaluation of the evidence led by the parties and to dismiss the appeal.

Counsel relied on Zenith Bank Plc V. Alhaji TITILAYO (2015) LPELR-24782 (CA); Zang & Anor V. Emmanuel Ituma & Ors (2014) LPELR-23521 (CA); Iriri & Ors V Erhurhobara & Anor (1991) LPELR-1536 (SC); Odunukwe V Ofomata (1999) LPELR-13055 (CA).

On issue three, learned counsel for the Respondents had submitted that by the oral and documentary evidence led by the Respondents in proof of their settlement on the land in dispute, the Court below upon due consideration of the evidence of settlement of the parties and on the strength of the relevant contents of Exhibit P13 was a firm ground to grant the Customary right of Occupancy over the land known and called Ohenoga to the Respondents and contended that in law document is admissible for the purpose for which it was pleaded and urged the Court to hold that in law where there is legal documentary evidence which can tilt the contradictory oral evidence one way or the other, the Court will rely on same in resolving the contradiction in place of calling further oral evidence and to affirm the finding of first settlement in favor of the Respondent and to dismiss the appeal. Counsel relied on Emeka S. Enemchukwu V. Chimaroke Okoye & Anor (2016) LPELR-40027 (CA); Onochie V Ikem (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.116) 458 @ p. 466; Akinduro V. Alaya All FWLR (pt.381) 1653 @ p. 1674; Obmiami Bricks and Stones Ltd V. ACB (1992) 3 SCNJ 1 @ p. 35; Uwegba V. Attorney-General of Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.16) 303 @ p. 317; Wuyah V. Jama’a Local Govt., Kafanchan (2011) LPELR-9078 (CA).

On issue four, learned counsel for the Respondents had submitted that by the granting of title to the land in dispute to the Respondents by the Court of Appeal, it has in law the same effect as forfeiture and contended that the Respondents having by credible evidence proved their title to the land in dispute the Court below was right to grant the reliefs of damages for trespass and the consequential Order of perpetual injunction to protect their right over the land against the Appellants and urged the Court to affirm the finding of the Court below that the Respondents being in possession of other parts of Ohenoga land can maintain a claim in trespass against the Appellants as they have alleged trespass to those areas excluding the Uneme Camp area where they granted permission to farmers to prevent further trespass. Counsel relied on Chief Olokunlade & Anor V. Mr Abegunde Samuel & Ors (2010) LPELR-3942 (CA).

It was also submitted by Exhibit P1 that it clearly shows the location of Uneme Camp while by Exhibits D1 – D10 and D11 relied upon by the Appellant it clearly showed that the Appellants had gone outside the Uneme Camp where the Respondents had granted them permission to farm to grant consent to miners and quarry companies without the consent of the Respondents and contended that such unauthorized acts of the Appellants in law clearly constituted acts of trespass since they have not shown any better or superior title to those land against the Respondents and to affirm the finding of the Court below on trespass and the Order of perpetual injunction granted against the Appellants in favor of the Respondents, the established owners of the land in dispute to prevent further infringement of their rights to the land in title by the Appellants. Counsel relied on Saibu Ajagbe & Ors V Alhaji MUSTAFA Oyekola & ANOR (2013) LPELR-19840(CA); Anyanwu & Ors V. Uzowuaka & Ors (2009) LPELR-515 (SC); Gold Mark Nigeria Limited & Ors V. Ibafon Company Limited & Ors (2012) LPELR- 9349 (SC).

On the issue of N500, 000.00 damages, it was submitted that when a Claimant claims damages without specifying if it is special damages what it meant by such head of claim is general damages and contended that in law the award of general damages is at the discretion of the Court which must be judiciously and judicially exercised and urged the Court to hold that the award of N500, 000.00 to the Respondents against the Appellants as general damages was not ridiculously too high to warrant any interference taking into account the period of ten years the case lasted from June 2006 when it was filed to July 2016 when judgment was delivered by the Court below. Counsel relied on Nigeria Ports Authority V Rahman Brothers Limited (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt 1221) 100; Ahuruonye V Ikonne (2015) LPELR-25609 (CA); Edawaderhie & Ors V. Mr Francis Enude (2013) LPELR-21842 (CA); Shell Pet. Dev. Co. V, Tiebo VII (2005) 9 MJSC 158 @ pp. 187-188; Mr Felix Nwoye Adim V. Nigeria Bottling Company & Anor (2010) LPER-181 (SC)

APPELLANTS’ COUNSEL REPLY SUBMISSIONS
In his reply, learned counsel for the Appellants had reiterated and virtually repeated his earlier submissions and had further submitted that the Respondents’ Counsel submissions cannot take the place of the evidence not led by the Respondents to fill in the gaps in the case, beautifying the case to appear to be what it was actually not and contended that in law counsel’s address does not take the place of the evidence. Counsel relied on AIE V. Adebayo (2006) 134 LRCN 455.

It was also submitted that the criteria for the proof of ownership of land by evidence of traditional history were not satisfied by the Respondents and contended that having not met the threshold requirements their claims ought to have been dismissed by the Court below and to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment. Counsel relied on Akanbi V. Salawu (2003)112 LRCN 2147 @ p. 2156; Elegushi V. Oseni (2006) 133 LRCN 263 at 284 and Uchendu V. Ogboni (1999) 68 LRCN 925 at 943D.

It was further submitted that the R.I.V. Wilkes Intelligence Report of 1940 relied upon by the Court below in giving judgment to the Respondents rather supports the case of the Appellants’ case and contended that a Court of law cannot shut its eyes to a part of a document that is before it because it does not favour the party who tendered it and urged the Court set aside the one sided usage of Exhibit P13 and to allow the appeal. Counsel relied onNnachi V. Onuorah (2011) LPELR-4626 (CA).

It was also further submitted in law even if it is only a part of one side or boundary of the land in dispute that was not proved, the claim for declaration of title to land is bound to fail and contended that where a Claimant concedes that a Defendant was on the land in dispute with his permission, he cannot successfully claim for damages for trespass and injunction as the only remedy available is an order of forfeiture. Counsel relied on Imah V. Okogbe (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 316) 159 @ p. 179; Udofe V. Aqusisua (1973) NSCQR 1068 @ p. 1071; Atolagbe V. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR (PT. 2) 360.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES ONE, TWO, THREE AND FOUR
My lords, a due consideration of issues one, two, three, and four would involve the consideration of some pertinent questions as to who between the Respondents and the Appellants are entitled to the ownership of the land in dispute and was the Court below right when it held that it was the Respondent, who by evidence of traditional history of title, proved their right to the title to the land in dispute and were therefore entitled to some of the reliefs granted by the Court below against the Appellants?

Now, what were the pieces of evidence, oral and documentary on which the parties fought their case before the Court below leading to the judgment appealed against?

The 1st- 4th Respondents called 9 witnesses and tendered 14 Exhibits. Their case was that Igue Community is the owner of the vast parcel of land known as Ohenoga land, South of River Onyami and as shown in litigation Survey plan No GOA/ED11/07 dated 25/5/2012. The said land was founded by their ancestor, one Anama or lgue, a son of Oba Eweka I of Benin who migrated from Benin and settled in Ohenoga land as the first settler and on his death he was succeeded by his children, Onegah, Ugbekpen, Orefa and Osa who also settled separately in various parts of the said Ohenoga land, before they jointly settled along Otuo/Sebe-Ogben Road in Ohenoga land, now in dispute.

It was also their case that the Ohenoga Laud has shares boundaries with lgarra in the North with River Onyami as boundary with Ikao Community, with Ghikpe Hill, Oma Stream and Ighagba Stream and boundaries with Ake with river Eweva as boundary, Sasaro with the Ogbabade stream which flows from Adamishogbe hills into Onyami as boundary and Uokha with Eke stream as boundary. The Igue people had been in possession of the land in dispute and have exercised acts of possession by farming on the land and putting tenants thereon and strange elements farming in and around Ago Uneme as their tenants who pay royalties to them and had since 1991 granted consent to miners to obtain mining licenses on parts of the land in dispute.

However, the original 1st Defendant now late was their tenant in Ago Uneme but who started claiming ownership of the said land and granting consent to miners to explore minerals from the land in dispute without the consent of the Respondents. The Ohenoga land was previously subject of litigation between Otuo Community and the Respondents’ Community in suit No B/27/58 which went on appeal to the Supreme Court and the Otuo Community lost in all to the Respondents’ Community. The Appellants had initially trespassed on the Ago Uneme Area but are now laying claims to the whole of Ohenoga land as in Exhibits P1 and P2 contrary to the right of ownership of the Respondents and that the River Onyami is the natural boundary between the Respondents and the Appellants. See pages 240 – 290of the Record of Appeal.

On their part, the 1st – 3rd Appellants as 1st Set of Defendants gave evidence, oral and documentary through their witnesses and denied the claims of the Respondents and stated that they inherited their farm lands from their ancestors who deforested the land and have been farming on the land from time immemorial without any challenge, let or hindrance from any quarters, including the Respondents. It was also their case they have never been tenants or stranger of the Respondents on the land in dispute and have numerous members of their Igarra community farming on the land in dispute as owners. They also permitted several companies carrying out quarry operations as shown in Exhibits D3 – D11. They do not any land called Ohenoga but that various areas of the land in dispute are called by different names such as lrikura, Ogurabe, Onfere, Otupa by the lgarra people and they do not share boundary with Igue but with Otuo. They maintained that Age Uneme is in Igarra land. One Aigbogbo was an Otaru of Igarra between 1919-1921 long after the land in dispute had been deforested and acquired by the ancestors of the 1st – 4th Appellants. See pages 291 – 309, 312 – 314 of the Record of Appeal

On their part, the 4th- 5th Appellants as 1st Set of Defendants gave evidence, oral and documentary through their witnesses to the effect that each family owns land in lgarra Community and that the numerous Igarra farmers on the land in dispute derive their possessory title as customary tenants of HRH Otaru Aigbogbo of lgarra, and his descendants, who deforested the said land and were farming and hunting on the land in dispute from time immemorial without any challenge from any quarters, including the Respondents. It was also their case that they do not know Ohenoga land but know the land in dispute as Irikura/Ogurabe land, which extends from their undisputed land of babada land after River Onyami in the North down to Eyinreta stream in the South as shown in Exhibit D11, the litigation Survey plan of the 1st – 3rd Appellants. They maintained that any land acquired by Anama of the Respondents’ family, if any, did not extend to the land in dispute. The Ago Unerne Camp was founded by one cook, an Uneme man was brought to the land by one Oshireku Oketa, an Igarra man who was their customary tenant. They are the descendents of Otaru Aigbogbo and have over the years put on customary tenants such as lgarra People, lgbiras, Akuku people on the land and from whom they receive annual royalties. See pages 309 – 310 of the Record of Appeal It was on the strength of the above pieces of evidence in line with the pleadings of the parties that the Court below had in its judgment delivered on 28/7/2016, while granting some of the claims of the Respondents as Claimants against the Appellants as Defendants, held inter alia thus:
“The Claimants in this case adduced evidence of traditional history in proof of their title to the land in dispute that one Anama the son of Oba Eweka I migrated from Benin in the 15th century and settled in Ohenoga land as first settler and on his death his four children settled on various parts of Ohenoga land… Exhibit “P13” on which both parties relied, stated that the founder of Igue was Anama and he settled in Ohenoga, a hills seven miles South of Igarra… The defendants on their part are not agreeable amongst themselves as to their root of title… The evidence of the two sets of defendants of traditional history is conflicting and inconclusive having regard to the fact that both are of the same Igarra Community. The evidence of traditional history of the claimants is more credible and/or plausible….I have seen the two survey plans relied on by the parties in this case. The Claimants are relying on Exhibit ‘P1’, while the 1st set of defendants filed Exhibit ‘D11’ and Exhibit ‘P2’… It is true that the shape and size of the land shown in the two plans do not seem to be the same, but with these common features, the two plans are talking about the same land… It is my humble view that with these common features on Exhibits ‘P1’ and ‘D11′ tendered by both parties, the identity f the land in dispute was established as both parties know the land in dispute… I have held above that the traditional history of the claimant is more plausible and I accept the traditional evidence as sufficient to sustain the claim of title to the land in dispute and I hold that from the totality of the evidence before the Court, the claimants have shown a better title to the land in dispute and therefore they are in possession… The Claimants stated that the defendants that have farms on the land in dispute are farming on the land with the permission of Igue People. Tunji James was one of such Igarra People allowed by Igue to farm. It was Uneme Camp area of Ohenoga where Tunji James and some other farmers were permitted to farm but it was later discovered that Tunji James was granting consent to persons for quarry licenses and the defendants extended their claim over other parts of Ohenoga land. The said Tunji James [now deceased) was the original 1st defendant… In land cases, where a customary tenant turns round not only to dispute the ownership of the title holder but goes out of his way to claim title, he forfeits his rights as a tenant and his possession of land… In this case, the claimants stated that they granted permission for the Igarra farmers to farm in Ago Uneme farm areas. But it was later realized that the defendants have intensified their trespass to other areas of Ohenoga land…The Claimants being in possession of other parts of Ohenoga land can maintain a claim in trespass against the defendants as they have alleged trespass to those areas excluding the Uneme Camp area where they granted permission to farmers… The 1st set defendants on their own showing in Exhibit D11 and oral evidence adduced, are on the land in dispute and tendered Exhibits D3 to D10A to show that they have been granting consent to miners and quarry companies over the land in dispute. These have become acts of trespass which remedy will be an order of injunction since they have not been able to show better or more superior title to the land in dispute.” See pages 414 – 438 of the Record of Appeal.

My lords, since the most crucial question in this appeal turns on whether or not the conclusions reached by the Court below on the pleadings and evidence led by the parties was correct, I intend to consider the totality of evidence as led by the parties and the findings of the Court below to look critically at these pieces of evidence to see whether or not the Court below had properly appraised and adequately evaluated these pieces of evidence in coming to its conclusions. However, I bear in mind that in doing so, any unchallenged evidence would be good evidence on which a Court should act to make findings of facts. See Nwabuoku V. Ottih (1961) 1 All NLR 487 @ p. 490. See also Odulaja V. Haddad (1973) 11 SC 357; Isaac Omoregbe V. Daniel Lawani (1980) 3 – 4 SC 108 @. p. 117; Olohunde & Anor V. Prof. Adeyoju (2000) 14 WRN 160.

My lords, in every civil action in which a declaration is sought from the Court, a Claimant who seeks the declaratory relief must succeed on the strength of his own case as made out creditably in the evidence put forward by him in support of his case and not to merely rely on the weakness or even absence of the Defendant’s case. However, where the evidence of the Defendant supports the case of the Claimant, he is perfectly entitled to rely on such evidence. See Nsirim V. Nsirim (2002) FWLR (Pt. 96) 433 @ p. 441.

I subscribe fully to the well settled position of the law that an appellate Court which had not seen the witnesses testify and observed their demeanour in the witness stand, should respect the views of a trial Court and should not readily substitute its own views except where it is shown that the conclusion reached by the trial Court was perverse. An appellate Court or any Court exercising appellate jurisdiction must always bear in mind that the primary function of assessing the quality of evidence and ascribing probative value thereto is that of the trial Court, which heard and saw the witnesses testify. Thus, it is only when the findings of the trial Court have been demonstrated to be perverse as not flowing from the established and proved evidence or hinged on extraneous matters or for whatever other reasons not correct that an appellate Court would intervene to disturb such findings of facts and to re – evaluate the evidence on the printed record, if so called upon by the Appellant, in order to make proper findings in accordance with the dictates of justice. See Sa’eed V. Yakowa (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 692) 1650 @ p.1681. See also Layinka V. Makinde (2002) FWLR (Pt. 109) 1557 @ p. 1570; Martins V. C.O.P. (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 666) 446 @ p. 460; Obajimi V. Adediji (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1075) 1 @ p. 19. See also Owor V. Christopher (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 511) 962 @ p. 992; Sogbamu V. Odunaiya (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 700) 1247 @ p. 1307.

I had earlier set out the pieces of evidence led by the parties. It is very clear that they relied on evidence of traditional history of title by means of first settlement as their root of title to the land in dispute of the Respondents as pleaded in paragraph 11 of the 6th Amended Statement of Claim. I have looked at the evidence led in support of this averments, noting particularly the cross examination by the Appellants and I cannot but agree with the learned counsel for the Appellants that the evidence in support was not in any material particulars successfully impeached. I have also looked at the evidence of traditional history of title to the land in dispute as led by the Appellants and they are certainly very contradictory and conflicting for persons who claim to be relying on the same traditional history of title. The Court was therefore perfectly right when it held that the evidence of traditional history of the Appellants were conflicting and inconclusive and preferred the unchallenged evidence of traditional history of the Respondents which was more credible and or plausible.
In Onadehin & Ors V Sonuga & Anor (1974) All NLR 936 @ p. 943, Fatayi – Williams JSC, had succinctly expounded on the law as it relates to settlement as evidence of traditional history in proof of title to land inter alia thus:
“After all, the traditional history given in support of the title of a family to its land usually traces the title to an individual founder who first acquired the land. This acquisition might be by settlement which, in that context, is no more than a permanent occupation of the land by the founder and the clearing of part of it for his own use and, if he has family, for the use of his family as well. Consequently, when the Plaintiffs averred in their statement of claim that their ancestor, Ogbodo “had settled on and farmed the land for many years before his death” and that “the family have been in possession of the whole land since it was settled upon by their ancestor” all they meant was that the Ogbodo family had been in continuous possession of the land since it was occupied by their ancestor Ogbodo. Therefore, any finding as to the Plaintiffs’ Possession of the land in dispute would, in these circumstances, obviously include a finding as to the title.”
Now, the parties had both made reference to Exhibit P13, which is the Wilkes Intelligence Report of 1940. In law, whenever documentary Exhibit is available it is usually used as hangers to assess the veracity of oral evidence. The Court had made reference to Exhibit P13 in arriving at its conclusion that it supports the evidence of traditional history of title as given by the Respondents and thus rendered their evidence more credible. I agree! This is so because not only was the evidence of first settlement on the land by Anama, which was continued by his children on different parts of the original settlement was unchallenged but it also amounted evidence of continuous possession of the land up by the Respondents through the first settlor through his children to their descendants. See Emeka S. Enemchukwu V, Chimaroke Okoye & Anor (2016) LPELR-40027 (CA); Onochie V Ikem (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.116) 458 @ p. 466; Akinduro V. Alaya All FWLR (pt.381) 1653 @ p. 1674; Obmiami Bricks and Stones Ltd V. ACB (1992) 3 SCNJ 1 @ p. 35; Uwegba V. Attorney-General of Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.16) 303 @ p. 317; Wuyah V. Jama’a Local Govt., Kafanchan (2011) LPELR-9078 (CA).
In Exhibit P13, the Wilkes Intelligence Report, it was clearly stated inter alia that “Iqua people are descendants of Anama,” which is clearly in line with the case of the Respondents. In law, when documentary evidence supports oral evidence it becomes more credible. See Mr. Ademola Adewunmi Odutola & Ors V. Professor Akin Mabogunje & Ors(2013) LPELR-19909 (SC).

See also Kimdey v. A.G. Gongola State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.77) 473; Omoregbe V. Lawani (1980) 3-4 SC 117.
On the legal status and place of intelligence reports, the Supreme Court had this to say in Chief Kalada R. I. Nteogwuile V. Chief Israel U. Otuo (2001) LPELR- 2071(SC):
“An intelligence Report is a public document made by a public officer and is presumed to contain a true information and is admissible in evidence.”
See also Irish Society V. The Bishop Of Derry 8 E.R. 1561 @ P. 15731, where Mr. Baron Parke said inter alia thus:
“In public documents made for the information of the crown, or all the Kings subjects who may require the information they contain, the entry by a public officer is presumed to be true when it is made, and is for that reason receivable in all cases, whether the officer or his successor may be concerned in such cases or not.”

I have also taken time to look at the several litigation Survey Plans relied upon by the parties. The Respondents had relied on Exhibit P1, while the Appellants had relied on Exhibit D11, having also tendered Exhibit P2 through cross examination of the Respondents’ witness. I have considered the comparison of these Survey Plans as carried out by the Court below and I find that the Court below did a great job of comparing the features, size, similarities and shape in the survey plans of the land in dispute and came to the correct finding that the land in dispute was very well known to both parties and was the same land referred to by the parties. I affirm the finding as correct in the absence of any valid reason for us to interfere with it. See Simeon Amaefuna V. Jonathan Okoli (2014) LPELR- 23755(CA), where this Court held inter alia thus:
“…It is not correct for a trial Court to look at two or more plans and state that the plans refer to the same piece of land without stating any reason for such conclusion. Mere looking at or examining the plans without reference to the specific contents of each survey plan that justify the inference that they refer to or do not refer to the same land, cannot amount to a comparison of the plans. A comparison of two or more things involves an analysis or a consideration of the similar and dissimilar features between the two or more things after examining them.”

See also Onuoha Nwokorobia V. Desmond Uchechi Nwogu & Ors (2009) LPELR-2127(SC); Aruwa V. Ogunsola (1938) 4 WACA 159.
I think I should point it out here and now that the Court below was also right to have compared the evidence of traditional history adduced by both parties to determine which is more plausible in order to arrive at a decision one way or the other. It had the sacred duty to evaluate the evidence led by both parties, including evidence of traditional history of title to land, before arriving at its finding. It cannot do so by just evaluating the evidence led by one of the parties alone to arrive at any just findings and/or conclusions. I therefore agree with the apt submissions of learned counsel for the Respondents that when it is said in law that the burden of proof rests on a Claimant does not necessarily mean it discharges a trial Court from its duty to consider the evidence of both parties and ascribe probative value or weight to each of them. This was all that the Court below both admirably and correctly in the judgment appealed against and therefore, rather than be condemned as urged upon us by the learned counsel for the Appellant, deserves to be commended.

I hereby so commend the Court below for the great job of evaluation carried out by it in its judgment appealed against. SeeAdamu Erinle & Ors V. Alhaji Busari Aluko & Ors (2013) LPER-22157(CA), where this Court had stated inter alia thus:
” …In the appraisal and evaluation of the evidence led in the case, the trial Court should bear in mind that, where both sides to the dispute claim ownership to the land based on traditional or ancestral history, it is the party that advances better evidence of traditional history or ownership that will be entitled to the judgment of the Court.”

I have considered the averments of the parties, particularly Exhibit P13, the Wilkes Intelligence Report of 1940 and it does appear to me that in law a document is usually admissible and used for the purpose for which it was pleaded and relied upon by the parties. In other words, neither a party nor a Court has the liberty to use a document admitted in evidence for one purpose for another purpose for which it was neither pleaded nor admitted in evidence. It is never a carte blank or pen sesame that once a document is admitted it becomes relevant for use for every purpose even outside the pleadings and evidence of the party that tendered it. At any rate, in law where there is legally admissible documentary evidence which can tilt the two contradictory oral evidence one way or the other, a Court will be perfectly in order to rely on such admitted document to resolve the contradictions. Thus, Exhibit P13, perfectly fits the bill in confirming as between the Appellants’ ancestors and the Respondents’ ancestors who was the first settler on the land in dispute in favor of the Respondents’ ancestor, the purpose for which it was pleaded and tendered in evidence by the Respondents and used accordingly by the Court below in its judgment.

The Respondents clearly pleaded the boundaries of the land in dispute in paragraph 9 of the 6th Amended Statement of Claim and relied on their litigation survey plan showing the boundaries of the land in dispute. The Court below made a very clear finding of fact that the Respondents have shown by their survey plan the area to which their claim relates which they call Ohenoga. I have also seen the fact of the certainty of the dimension, size and features of the land in dispute as claimed by the Respondents and as rightly found by the Court below in line with both the pleadings and evidence as led by the Respondents. I do not see any reason to interfere with this finding of facts by the Court below which is borne out by the pleadings, evidence and the survey plan relied upon by the Respondents. At any rate, even if there be some discrepancies, which I find are very minor, in law it is not every inconsistency or discrepancies in the evidence of features on a land in dispute that is fatal to the case of a Claimant in a claim for declaration of title to land. See Ogedengbe V. Balogun (2007) LPELR-2297 (SC), where the Supreme Court had stated inter alia thus:
“…from the passage reproduced from the judgment of the lower Court, it is very clear that the Court, though found the existence of apparent contradiction in the evidence as regards features on the land, concluded that the said inconsistency is not such as would lead to a reversal of the finding of fact on the identity of the disputed land having regard to the fact that other features co-exist along the stretch of boundary in issue, which have been properly established in evidence and can sustain the finding by the trial judge on the matter….I hold that it is not every inconsistency in evidence that would lead to a reversal of the decision of a lower Court on a matter and that for the inconsistency to have effect of reversal, it must be on a material fact relevant to the issue in controversy between the parties.”

I now come to the issue of trespass, damages for trespass and forfeiture, on which both parties made extensive but seemingly very conflicting submissions. So, was the Court below right, on the pleadings and evidence led, when it found the Appellants liable in trespass at the suit of the Respondents? The Appellants had both vehemently and vociferously contended that they were never in trespass on their own land put in dispute by the Respondents and at any rate if the Respondents had permitted them, as they purportedly claimed, then the relief of trespass was not available to the Respondents as erroneously held by the Court below. On the other hand, it was also vehemently contended for the Respondents that they having established a better title to the land in dispute were equally in consequence thereof entitled to the relief of damages for trespass against the Appellants for all unauthorized action on the land in dispute and at any rate a declaration of title in favor of the Respondents, on the proved evidence, has in law the same effect as forfeiture.
My lords, I have earlier held that the Court below was right, on the preponderance of the evidence led, to find for the Respondents in respect of the title to the land in dispute as against the Appellants. Indeed, and in my finding too, the Respondents proved by very credible evidence their title to the land in dispute. Having proved their title to the land in dispute, they become in law in de – facto possession of the land in dispute the Court below as against the Appellants without any color of right to the land in dispute. In law, being entitled to both title to land coupled with de – facto possession of land would equally entitle such an owner of land against a person without any better title the remedy of damages for trespass if so asked for. The relief of perpetual injunction is usually consequential upon a finding of trespass to land and may be so granted if asked for by the person who proves title to land in dispute to protect the established right over the land in dispute against the Appellants. I agree with the submissions of learned counsel to the Respondents that the Respondents having proved to be in unchallenged possession of other parts of their Ohenoga land can in law maintain a claim in trespass against the Appellants for the alleged and subsequently proved trespass to those areas outside the Uneme Camp, where the Respondents as overlords had granted permission to the Appellants to farm thereon, in order to prevent further trespass by the Appellants.
The above facts were very obvious from Exhibit P1 tendered by the Respondents as well as Exhibits D1 – D11 tendered by the Appellants to the clear effect, and as found rightly by the Court below, that the Appellants had gone outside the Uneme Camp area for which they were granted permission by the Respondent to farm thereon to grant, without the permission of the Respondents, consent to miners and quarry companies. In law, all such unauthorized acts in the Appellants forage into areas over which they were not granted permission by the Respondents amounted to acts of trespass. See Chief Olokunlade & Anor V. Mr Abegunde Samuel & Ors (2010) LPELR-3942 (CA). See alsoSaibu Ajagbe & Ors V Alhaji MUSTAFA Oyekola & ANOR (2013) LPELR-19840(CA); Anyanwu & Ors V. Uzowuaka & Ors (2009) LPELR-515 (SC); Gold Mark Nigeria Limited & Ors V. Ibafon Company Limited & Ors (2012) LPELR- 9349 (SC).

There is no valid argument by the Appellants that upon proof of trespass to land, a person so entitled to title to land is further entitled to damages for trespass if he so asks. In law, damages may be general or special depending on the heads of claim made by the successful party. Thus, where a claim is made for damages for trespass and it is neither particularized as special damages nor claimed as such, the damages so claimed would clearly amount to a claim in general damages. I have looked at the pleadings of the Respondents in their 6th Amended Statement of Claim and it certainly appears to me, and I so hold, is a claim in general damages for trespass, which in law is entirely at the discretion of the Court below to consider and grant since in law it need even neither be pleaded nor proved to be entitled to it by the successful party.
The only contentious issue therefore, is as to the quantum of general damages as granted by the Court below in favor of the Respondents against the Appellants. The Court below had assessed and awarded the sum of N500,000.00 as damages. The only question is whether this amount was excessive or ridiculously too high in the proved circumstances of this case? Now, while the Appellants are crying blue murder that the amount was ridiculously high as only nominal damages ought to have been awarded by the Court below, the Respondents are in unmitigated joyous mood that they received a princely sum as damages which is neither excessive nor ridiculously too high.
I have considered the position of the law when this Court can legitimately interfere with award of damages. I have also taken into consideration the proved circumstances of this case between overlords against their customary tenants at the Uneme Camp who have trespassed into areas of the land of the overlords without permission of the overlords to carry on various acts of trespass, coupled with the duration of the case from when it was filed in June 2006 to when judgment of the Court below was delivered in July 2016, amounting to all of ten solid years, and I am so truly satisfied that an award of N500, 000 as damages for trespass against the Appellants in favour of the Respondents was not an amount that was ridiculously too high to warrant any interference of any sort by this Court. An award of general damages by the Court below in the sum of N500, 000 out of a claim for N5, 000, 000 as damages for trespass seems very reasonable to me and must be allowed to stand. SeeNigeria Ports Authority V Rahman Brothers Limited (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt 1221) 100; Ahuruonye V Ikonne (2015) LPELR-25609 (CA); Edawaderhie & Ors V. Mr Francis Enude (2013) LPELR-21842 (CA); Shell Pet. Dev. Co. V. Tiebo VII (2005) 9 MJSC 158 @ pp. 187 – 188; Mr Felix Nwoye Adim V. Nigeria Bottling Company & Anor (2010) LPER-181 (SC).

In law, trespass is constituted by the slightest disturbance to the possession of land by a person who cannot show a better right to possession and thus even where the entry into possession is under a transaction which has been declared void or found to be void ab initio, the entry itself becomes void ab initio and its lawful character loses its lawfulness and acquires an illegal or unlawful character from the very moment the entry was made. So it is with the Appellants who, by the finding of the Court below had trespassed into areas outside the Ago – Uneme Camp, over which they were permitted by the Respondents to farm thereon, without any interest or permission from the Respondents, the bona fide owners thereof, were clearly trespassers on the land in dispute. I so firmly hold. See Ojomo V. Ibrahim (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) 415. See also Solomon V. Mogaji (1982) 11 SC 1 @ p. 37.

My lord, I find that stand of the Appellants as simply mind boggling that they are not saying they own the land in dispute since they had not counterclaimed for title to the land and therefore, there was even no need to consider their case before the Court below since they had no duty to prove any ownership of the land in dispute. Furthermore, that all that the Court below ought to have considered was whether or not the Respondents owned the land in dispute since the Appellants have said the Respondents do not own the land and there is nothing further for the Appellants to prove. To the Appellants, the Court below was therefore wrong considering their case along with the case of the Respondents.

No wonder it seems even rather difficult to see from the gamut of the Appellants’ brief what was even their defense to the Claims of the Respondents. In one breadth, they say that the Respondents are not the owners of the land in dispute and having not counter claimed they had no duty to show any ownership of the land in dispute, yet in another breadth they say that even if the land in dispute was given to them by the Respondents, they having been on the said land with the consent of the Respondents cannot be in trespass on the land on which they are with the permission of the Respondent and that at worst the proper remedy was one for forfeiture.

I think the above contention by the Appellants goes further to show that the Appellants, due to the lackadaisical way they defended the claims against them by the Respondent, believing erroneously that since they had no counter claim they need not bother countering the claim of the Respondents whose only evidence should be scrutinized to see if indeed they are the owners of the land in dispute or not, they did not even appreciate and understand the finer aspects of the claims of the Respondents against them, which claims the Court below clearly understood as can be seen glaringly in its judgment. The claims of the Respondents was very specific and it was in respect of land outside the Ago Uneme Camp area they had permitted the Appellants to occupy. The Appellants, going by the succinct claims of the Respondent are on the area of their land called the ‘Ago Uneme Farm’ over which the Appellants had been granted permission to farm by the Respondents while the land in dispute is the other parts of the Respondents’ land called Ohenoga into which the Appellants had without any permission of the Respondent trespassed into to grant permission to miners and quarries.
In the circumstances of the pleadings therefore, and the proved facts on the largely unchallenged evidence of the Respondents, the remedy of forfeiture would have been very inappropriate since their claim did not relate to the ‘Ago Uneme” Farm of which the Appellants are in occupation for farming purposes with the permission of the Respondents. In law, the relief of forfeiture comes into play only when a customary tenant had in respect of such land held by him of his overlord done anything capable of challenging the right of the overlord or other acts capable of grounding a claim for forfeiture against the terms of his customary tenancy. On the other hand, in cases, as in the instant case, where a customary tenant is proved to have gone outside the area he was permitted by the overlord to be and had gone into other areas of the land of the overlord without the permission and or consent of the overlord, the proper remedy is one of claim for damages for trespass and injunction as was rightly claimed by the Respondents against the Appellants and was correctly found as proved by the Court below.

Now, if the Court below were to consider only the case of the Respondents, as being contended in this appeal by the Appellants, I have no doubt it would have been the very first grouse against the judgment of the Court below on grounds of lack of fair hearing. I think I should state it at once that there is no way a Court in a civil trial, at the conclusion of such copious evidence by the parties, would close its eyes to the evidence led by any of the parties and consider only the evidence led by a Claimant, particularly in a declaration of title to land in dispute, as in the instant case, where both parties pleaded and relied on evidence of traditional history of title to the land in dispute merely because the Defendant did not counter claim for title to the land in dispute. I find this proposition of the law by the Appellants’ counsel as very strange and indeed unknown to our law. The Court below, faced with conflicting evidence of traditional history of title from the parties was under a duty to consider all the versions of traditional history and if none was more probable than the other, then to resort to the ‘Rule inKojo 11 V. Bonsie’ (1957) 1 WLR 1223, to consider recent acts of ownership within living memory to resolve the logjam.

In law, where the root of title relied upon is traditional history of title, then evidence of traditional history of title if conclusive is sufficient to ground a claim of title to land. Thus, where the evidence of traditional history of title is cogent, conclusive and without any unexplained gaps, it will not only suffice to establish title to land in dispute, but there would also be no need for the Court to further consider recent acts of ownership within living memory as enunciated in the locus classicus of Kojo 11 V. Bonsie (1957) 1 WLR 1223. See also Alade V. Awo (1975) 1 SC 215; Falomo V. Onakanmi (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 935) 126 @ p. 158.
However, where, as in the instant case, the Court below finds that the evidence of traditional history of title of the Respondents, who were the Claimants before the Court below was more probable than that of the 1st and 2nd Set of Defendants, who are now the Appellants, then that is the end of the matter. The Court below would act on the more probable of the versions of evidence of traditional history of title and make the appropriate findings as to the ownership of the land in dispute. Thus, a Court that does that has done nothing wrong to be deprecated for but should rather be commended and I hereby so commend the Court below.

It was obvious to the Court below, and now obvious to me too, that the witnesses to the Appellants were not witnesses of truth and thus the Court below was right to have discountenanced their lies and disbelieve them since a Court of law should act only on credible and probable evidence. The law is well settled that notwithstanding the difficulty of discerning absolute truth by the mechanism of litigation and judicial discernment hinged upon evidence before the Court and irrespective of the imperfections of men, the litigation process is aimed at finding out the truth according to law and therefore, a party worthy of favourable consideration of the Court must endeavour to be consistent in both the facts he pleads and the evidence he leads in proof of those facts. A party will not therefore be allowed to present at the trial, evidence which are inconsistent with the case he has pleaded. See Ajide V. Kelani (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 248; Ezemba V. Ibeneme (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 894) 623.

I find the decision by the Court below that the Respondents proved their title to the land in dispute by a more plausible and preferable evidence of traditional history of title to the land in dispute and were therefore entitled to damages for trespass as well as an Order of perpetual injunction to forestall any further trespass against the Appellant was correct. I have no reason whatsoever therefore, since none has been made out by the Appellants, to interfere with and disturb the correct findings of the Court below. Indeed, in law an appellate Court does not have the power to interfere with and disturb a correct finding by a trial Court. It is certainly neither the duty nor business of an appellate Court to so do. SeeAlhaji Ndayako & Ors. V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 @ p. 198, where Edozie, JSC., had pronounced with finality on this vexed issue, thus:
“An appellate Court is only concerned with whether the judgment appealed against is right or wrong not whether the reasons given are right or wrong. Where the judgment is right but the reasons given are wrong, the appellate Court does not interfere. It is only where the misdirection has caused the Court to come to a wrong conclusion that the appellate Court will interfere….”
See alsoAbaye V. Ofili (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 134; Ukejianya V. Uchendu 18 WACA 46.

In the light of all I have said and found above, issues one, two, three and four are hereby resolved against the Appellants in favour of the Respondents.

ISSUE FIVE
Whether the action as constituted was competent?

APPELLANTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
On issue five, learned counsel for the Appellants had submitted that the case as constituted before the Court below was incompetent and was therefore liable to be struck out and/or dismissed and contended that the Respondents could not have instituted the action jointly as their evidence and pleadings showed that Igue Clan which they purport to represent had no common or joint interest in the land in dispute since it was their case that when Anama died, each of his four sons went to create settlements on different parts of Ohenoga land and urged the Court to hold that the overall effect of these pleadings and evidence from the Respondents is that title to land in Igue or at least the area in contention is in the different quarters in Igue and not in Igue as a clan and that the Respondents’ Suit fought in the name of Igue Clan is incompetent. Counsel relied on Ofia V. Ejem & Ors (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 324) 1816; Oragbaide V. Onitiju (1962) 1 SCNLR 70.

It was also submitted that the evidence shows that Igue Oke and Igue Clan are not one and the same and Igue Clan is made up of two sections, namely Igue Oke and Igue Sale and contended that the identity or status of parties to a Suit is very fundamental in any proceedings and urged the Court to hold that the parties can only be changed by a proper Order of substitution made by the Court to strike out the Respondents’ Suit in the absence of any evidence that any such Order was asked for or granted by the Court below since changing Igue Oke to Igue Clan is not a misnomer that can be corrected by an amendment. Counsel relied on Ibrahim V. Kachia LG (1998) 4NWLR (Pt. 546) 471.

RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
On issue five, learned counsel for the Respondents had submitted that Respondents’ Suit was a representative action by the entire Igue community, Igue Oke against the Appellants which after amendment was later referred to as the entire people of Igue Community of Igue clan and contended that the Appellants defended the Suit in the amended capacity of the Respondents and the Respondents having given evidence of title to the land by first settlement on Ohenoga land by Anama and his four children who settled on different parts of the land, there were no different settlements created by children of Anama but a continuous possession of the settlement founded by Anama and urged the Court to hold that the interest of the entire Igue on Ohenoga land is an interest common to all the descendants of Anama who are members of Igue community in possession of the land situate within Igue land mass. Counsel relied on Lawani Alli V Chief Gbadamosi Abasi Alesinloye & Ors (2000) LPELR – 427.

It was also submitted that it is the Respondents’ common interest in the Ohenoga land that propelled them to commence this action in a representative capacity to protect the said interest in their ancestral land against the entire people of Igarra and Ezibemi branch of the Eshinavaka Royal family of Igarra and contended that both by the pleadings and evidence both parties fought the case in a representative capacity and urged the Court to hold that the Respondents’ Suit was competent. Counsel relied on Olubodun V. Lawal (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1115) 1; Adedibu & Anor V. Olofo (1968) NMLR 468; Idise V. Williams International (1995) LPELR-1424 (SC); Kyari V Alkali & Ors (2001) LPELR 1728(SC), Oseni V Dawodu (1994) LPELR-2795 (SC).

APPELLEANTS’ COUNSEL REPLY SUBMISSIONS
In his reply, learned counsel for the Appellants had submitted that there was no amendment granted by the Court below to reflect any change in the status of the parties and contended that parties to an action cannot even be changed by an amendment as same can only be done by an Order for substitution or joinder. Counsel relied onPfizer Inc. V. Mohammed (2013) LPELR- 22354 (CA); Commerce Assurance Ltd V. Ali (1992) NWLR (PT. 232) 710.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE FIVE
My lords, issue five deals with the questions of when a matter can be brought in a representative capacity and whether a claim brought in a representative capacity can be defeated by way of incompetence where the parties thereto have no common interest in the res, the subject matter of litigation.

I have taken time to read the entire pleadings of the Respondents and considered the evidence led in support by them through their nine witnesses, and it does appear very strange to me that the Appellants who knew, fought and lost the case in representative capacity of both parties would now turn round to say it ought not to have been filed or fought, and perhaps never won, in a representative capacity, by the Respondents.

On the pleadings alone, none of the parties had any personal exclusive interest to the exclusion of their respective communities and families. This was a clear case fought on behalf of their respective communities and whose evidence of traditional history clearly showed communal and or family ownership of the land in dispute. The Respondents filed and fought the case in both their pleadings and evidence for their community and none personal to any of them. They share common interest and heritage in both the first settlement and continued possession through their ancestors of the land in dispute, Anama and his four children and their descendants. The Appellant also defended the Suit in a representative capacity for their Igbarra community. In my finding therefore, both parties knew and were absolutely not in doubt as to the capacities in which the Respondents’ Suit was filed, fought, won and lost.

The Respondents’ Suit was clearly a representative action by the entire Igue Community of Igue Clan by the amendment from Igue Oke and was fought in that capacity against the Appellants, in which amended capacity the Appellants defended the Suit and lost. The evidence led by the Respondents was to the effect that the land in dispute called Ohenoga land was first settled upon by one Anama, their ancestor and his four children, who later settled on different parts of the same land. Thus, they neither pleaded nor led any evidence of any different settlements created by the four children of Anama but what was proved was a continuous possession of the settlement founded by Anama.

In the circumstances of the averments in the pleadings and evidence led by the Respondents, I find that the interest of the entire Igue Clan on the Ohenoga land in dispute is an interest common to all the descendants of Anama who are members of Igue community in possession of the land in dispute. I hold therefore, that the Respondents’ Suit was properly constituted in a representative capacity as required by law and is not by any means incompetent but rather very competent to be heard and determined on the merit as was done by the Court below. See Lawani Alli V Chief Gbadamosi Abasi Alesinloye & Ors (2000) LPELR – 427. See also Olubodun V. Lawal (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1115) 1; Kyari V Alkali & Ors (2001) LPELR 1728(SC), Oseni V Dawodu(1994) LPELR-2795 (SC) ; Adedibu & Anor V. Olofo(1968) NMLR 468.
In Idise V. Williams International (1995) LPELR-1424 (SC), where the Supreme Court held inter alia thus:
“The essential condition for sustaining a representative action is that the persons who are to be represented have the same interest as the plaintiff in one and the same cause or matter. There must therefore be a common interest alike in the sense that its subject or its relation to that subject must be the same”.
My lords, in law once the pleading and the evidence of a party conclusively discloses a representative capacity and it is clear that the case was fought in that capacity, a trial Court can properly and justifiably enter judgment for and/or against the party concerned in such capacity. This is so even where no amendment to reflect that capacity had not been applied for and obtained. I therefore find the Respondents’ Suit filed, pleaded, supported by evidence, fought and won in a very clear representative capacity as competent and not in any way defeated or rendered incompetent as contended vehemently but quite erroneously by the Appellants in this appeal, which contention is hereby discountenanced. SeeKyari V Alkali & Ors (2001) LPELR 1728(SC), Oseni V Dawodu(1994) LPELR-2795 (SC).

In the light of all I have said and found above, issue five is hereby resolved against the Appellants in favor of the Respondents.
On the whole therefore, having resolved the issues one, two, three, four and five against the Appellants in favour of the Respondents, I hold that the Appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed. Consequently, I hereby so dismiss it.

In the result, the Judgment of the High Court of Edo State, Coram: H. A. Courage – Ogbebor J., in Suit No. HAF/6/2006: Chief Henry O. Omokhudu & Ors V. S. A. Ogbodo & Ors delivered on 28/7/2016, wherein some of the Claims of the Respondents as Claimants against the Appellants as Defendants were granted, is hereby affirmed.
There shall be cost of N200,000.00 against the Appellants in favour of the Respondents.

MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I read before now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, JCA. I agree that this appeal lacks merit and I also dismiss it. I abide by all the orders made by my learned brother.

GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE, J.C.A.: I have had privilege to read the draft of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, the HON. JUSTICE BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, JCA; wherein the appeal was held to lack merit and was consequently dismissed.

I agree with the analysis and resolution of the issues in the appeal and I adopt same as mine. I have nothing more to add.
I too find that the appeal lacks merit and hereby dismiss it.
I abide with the consequential orders made as to cost.
The appeal is dismissed.

Appearances:

Prof. Ambrose O. Ekpu, with him, Idowu Adeniyi, Esq., S. I. Avbuluinga, Esq. and Mrs. H. E. Akpasubi, Esq. For Appellant(s)

C. Ogudugu, Esq. For Respondent(s)