NYAM v. STATE (2020)

NYAM v. STATE

(2020)LCN/15392(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(KANO JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, September 25, 2020

CA/KN/365/C/2018

RATIO

DUTY OF COURT: EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

It is the duty of the trial Judge to evaluate evidence led before him and make findings of facts. He does this by watching the demeanour of witnesses in the box and forming an impression about them. Where he discharges this duty credibly, an appellate Court which did not have the advantage of seeing the witnesses, cannot interfere. An Appellant can however invite an appellate Court to interfere with findings of a trial Court, where he is able to impeach it and show that it occasioned a miscarriage of justice, such as the admission of inadmissible evidence which resulted in the decision, or a violation of some principles of law – OYEDELE VS. STATE (2019) 6 NWLR (PT. 1667) 74 AND ANEKWE VS. STATE (2014) 5 SCNJ (PT.1) 52 AT 82. PER ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.

CORROBORATION: IMPLICATION OF CORROBORATION IN EVIDENCE

When corroboration is required in respect of evidence, it simply means that fresh evidence of another witness is required to support or strengthen the evidence given by the witness whose evidence requires corroboration. The fresh evidence does not have to be in the exact words of the evidence requiring corroboration, unless it is an exact science like arithmetic. See DAGAYYA VS. STATE (2006) 7 NWLR (PT. 980) 637, AND AFOLALU VS. STATE (2009) 3 NWLR (PT. 1127)160. PER ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.

CRIMINAL LAW: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE OF RAPE

Section 282 (1) of the Penal Code defines rape to mean where a man has sexual intercourse with a woman or girl, save as in Subsection (2), in the following circumstances:-
a. against her will;
b. without her consent;
c. with her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her in fear of death or hurt;
d. with her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
e. with or without her consent, when she is under fourteen years of age or of unsound mind.
The essential elements of the offence of rape which the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt include –

that the accused person had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix;
b. that the act of sexual intercourse was done without consent or that the consent(if any) was obtained by fraud, force, threat, intimidation, deceit or impersonation;
c. that the prosecutrix was not the wife of the accused;
d. that the accused had the mens rea, the intention to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix without her consent or that the accused acted recklessly not caring whether the prosecutrix consented or not; and
e. that there was penetration no matter how slight.
See MUHAMMADU VS. STATE (2020) 2 SCNJ 175 AT 194; LUCKY VS. STATE (2016) LPELR – 40541 (SC) AND MUSA VS. STATE (2013) 9 NWLR (PT. 1359) 214. PER ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.

CRIMINAL LAW: BURDEN OF PROOF

In all criminal cases, the burden of proof is squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution and it must discharge this burden beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond all doubt. See Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011 and ISMA’IL VS. F.R. N. (2020) 2 NWLR (PT. 1707) 85 AT 119C; ANEKWE VS. THE STATE (2014) 5 SCNJ 52 AT 73 – 74 AND OKECHUKWU VS. STATE (1993) 9 NWLR (PT. 315) 78. It is not a requirement to call any copious number of witnesses to discharge the burden, as even one credible and qualitative witness in terms of the ingredients of the offence, can suffice – AKALEZI VS. THE STATE (1993) 2 NWLR (PT. 273) 1 AT 13. So proof beyond reasonable doubt entails the proof of all the ingredients of the offence as charged – DIBIE VS. STATE (2007) 3 SCNJ 160. The burden is on the prosecution to prove the offence and it does not shift, meaning that the accused person is never required to establish or prove his innocence. It is only when a prima facie case is made, that an accused person, will be required to explain away the allegations made. PER ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Abubakar Datti Yahaya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru Justice of the Court of Appeal

Amina Audi Wambai Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

JOSEPH NYAM APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is from the Judgment of the High Court of Jigawa State delivered on 28th March, 2018 by Hon. Justice Umar M. Sadiq.

The Appellant herein, was the accused person before the trial High Court. He was charged with the offence of rape contrary to Section 282(1)(e) of the Penal Code and Punishable under Section 3 of the Penal Code (Miscellaneous Amendment) Law No. 9 of 2014. He was said to have invited Lawisa Adamu, a girl of less than fourteen years into his room, covered her mouth and have sexual intercourse with her. On his denial of the charge, the case went to trial. In a bid to prove its case, the prosecution called five witnesses and tendered two exhibits. The Appellant testified for himself and called one other witness. At the end of the trial, the trial Court convicted the Appellant of the offence charged and sentenced him to ten-years imprisonment. Being dissatisfied with the Judgment, he appealed to this Court on five grounds of appeal as per the Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 11th April, 2019 but deemed filed on 28th January, 2020. The said five grounds of appeal without their particulars read:-
GROUND 1
The noble trial Judge erred in law when His Lordship held thus:-
“In the light of the above, the Prosecution has through the evidence of PW1, PW4 and PW5 proved the ingredients of the offence of rape beyond reasonable doubt as required under Section 282 and Section 135(1) of the Penal Code and the Evidence Act, 2011 respectively.”
GROUND 2
The learned trial Judge erred in law when His Lordship convicted the Appellant for the offence of Rape, despite the apparent inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case.
GROUND 3
The noble trial Judge erred in law when his Lordship accepted and accorded probative value to the evidence of PW4 and Exhibit B.
GROUND 4
The noble trial Judge erred in law when his Lordship relied on the evidence of PW4 and Exhibit B to convict the Appellant.
GROUND 5
The Judgment of the noble trial Court is unreasonable and unwarranted and cannot be supported by the evidence adduced.

Mr. Musibau Adetunbi settled the Appellant’s brief which was filed on 11th April, 2019 but deemed filed on 28th January 2020.

The lone issue for determination he identified is:-
“In the entire circumstances of this case and more particularly in the face of the defence of the Appellant, can it be said that the prosecution has successfully established all the ingredients of the offence of rape to warrant the conviction of the Appellant.”

Mr. Imam, Director of Public Prosecution Ministry of Justice Jigawa filed the Respondent’s brief on 1st August, 2019 but deemed filed on 28th January, 2020. His lone issue for determination reads:-
“Whether from the totality of facts and overwhelming evidence before the trial Court, the prosecution has proved the case of rape against the Appellant to warrant his conviction.”

In arguing this issue, learned counsel for the Appellant referred to the case of ALABI VS. STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (PT. 307) 511 AT 523 F to submit that when the prosecution is to prove an offence beyond reasonable doubt, it must prove every ingredient of the offence. He also referred to BUBA VS. STATE (1992) 1 NWLR (PT. 215) 1 AT 10 AND OKECHUKWU VS. STATE (1993) 9 NWLR (PT. 315) 78 AT 93. He referred to the judgment of the trial Court at page 41 lines 17-24 and page 42 lines 1-2 on the elements of the charge. He then submitted that for the purpose of the brief in this case, the three elements which the prosecution is required to establish are:- (1) that the Appellant had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix; (2) that the prosecutrix is under fourteen years of age and (3) that there was penetration. Learned counsel then referred to the evidence of PW2 and submitted that it is hearsay evidence in its totality and therefore inadmissible – Section 38 of the Evidence Act and OSUOHA VS. STATE (2010) 16 NWLR (PT. 1219) 364 AT 400. On the evidence of PW3, learned counsel submitted that his evidence, apart from tendering Exhibit A, the extra-judicial statement of the Appellant, has no value as to whether the Appellant had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix or whether there was penetration. As to the evidence of PW4, a Nurse/Midwife, counsel argued that although she was presented as an expert witness by the prosecution, her qualifications had not been stated and so her competence to carry out clinical and physical examination of the victim is not known. Relying on TUAH VS. STATE (2010) NWLR (PT. 1203) 519 AT 533-534 AND AZU VS. STATE (1993) 6 NWLR (PT. 299) 303 AT 311-312, counsel submitted that no evidence was elicited from PW4 in her examination-in-chief as regards her expertise upon which the trial Court could reach an opinion as to her expertise. He urged us to reject her evidence and Exhibit B, her medical report as she lacks the expertise of a medical officer to carry out investigations on a rape victim. Counsel also posited that her evidence did not establish any of the elements of rape and did not also show that it was the Appellant who penetrated the prosecutrix. Her evidence could therefore not corroborate other evidence, he argued. This is because he argued, her evidence points to one conclusion, that the hymen of the prosecutrix may have been broken by a finger or by accident and not by sexual intercourse with any man, needless to say when the hymen of the prosecutrix may have been broken, in order to link that event with the alleged act of the Appellant – OKOYOMON VS. STATE (1973) NSCC VOL. 8, 9 AT 13.

Learned counsel submitted that the prosecutrix was under fourteen years of age whose unsworn evidence requires corroboration – Section 209 (1) and (3) Evidence Act 2011 – IKO VS. STATE (2001) 14 NWLR (PT. 732) 221 AT 245-246. He then argued that the evidence of PW5 required corroboration which could not said to have been done through the evidence of PW1 as it did not establish penetration, and is not credible evidence in itself – EZIGBO VS. STATE (2012) 16 NWLR (PT. 1326) 318 AT 329 AND IKO VS. STATE (SUPRA) AT PAGE 244 F which held that corroboration must be an independent testimony, direct or circumstantial which confirms in some materials particular, not only that an offence has been committed but that it was the accused who committed it. He emphasized that the evidence of PW3 did not establish the offence against the Appellant. He then turned his attention to the evidence of the Appellant and the statement he made – Exhibit A. He pointed out that the Appellant was consistent that he did not have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix and his evidence was not impugned under cross-examination. He contended that the evidence of the Appellant and Exhibit A, form part of the case of the prosecution – EGBOGHONOME VS. STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (PT. 306) 383 AT 436 where the Court held that:-
“….The voluntary statement of the accused person is a part of the case for the prosecution whether it contains confession or not and whether the accused resiles it or not during trial.”
He further referred to SULE VS. STATE (2009) 17 NWLR (PT. 1169) 33 AT 60; EJINIMA VS. STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (PT. 200) 627 AND IKEMSON & 2 ORS. VS. THE STATE (1989) 3 NWLR (PT. 110) 455 AT 467-468. Since that is the case he argued, the prosecution is compelled by law to present consistent evidence or resolve all contradictions that emerge, before it can secure a conviction. He placed reliance in IBEH VS. STATE (1997) 1 NWLR (PT. 484) 632 AT 651. He submitted that the evidence of the Appellant does not establish the elements of the offence of rape, since Exhibit A is not a confirmation of the offence, but is evidence that reinforces the inconsistency in the prosecution case and strengthens the Appellant’s defence. As there is nothing in the record, to sustain the conviction of the Appellant, he urged us to allow the appeal.

In his Reply to the submissions, learned counsel for the Respondent Mr. Imam, after stating the requirements to prove the offence charged, submitted that the prosecution had discharged its responsibilities in proving the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He referred to the evidence of the prosecutrix at page 42 of the record on sexual intercourse and argued that it was not challenged under cross-examination and should be accepted by the Court. Further, that it was buttressed by the evidence of PW4 and PW1, which enabled the trial Court to make the findings at page 52 of the record.

Counsel took up the issue of penetration as an important ingredient of the offence of rape and submitted on the authority of ADONIKE VS. STATE (2015) 318 AND RABIU VS. STATE (2005) 7 NWLR (PT. 925) 491, that slightest form of penetration proved, is enough. He referred to the findings of the Court at page 54. He referred to the submission of counsel for the Appellant to the effect that PW4 admitted that the use of finger was the cause of the broken hymen as misleading as she said nothing of the sort. He contended that PW4 only gave instances as to how a hymen may be broken. That however she concluded by stating that she found that the prosecutrix was sexually abused. He posited that the evidence of the prosecutrix was corroborated by that of PW1, PW4 and Exhibit B which were not discredited during cross-examination. He argued that PW4 never contradicted herself and that her evidence is not meant to show that it was the Appellant who had the intercourse with the prosecutrix or that he was the one who broke her hymen. He urged us to dismiss the appeal.

The Appellant was charged for the offence of rape on the prosecutrix Lawisa. In all criminal cases, the burden of proof is squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution and it must discharge this burden beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond all doubt. See Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011 and ISMA’IL VS. F.R. N. (2020) 2 NWLR (PT. 1707) 85 AT 119C; ANEKWE VS. THE STATE (2014) 5 SCNJ 52 AT 73 – 74 AND OKECHUKWU VS. STATE (1993) 9 NWLR (PT. 315) 78. It is not a requirement to call any copious number of witnesses to discharge the burden, as even one credible and qualitative witness in terms of the ingredients of the offence, can suffice – AKALEZI VS. THE STATE (1993) 2 NWLR (PT. 273) 1 AT 13. So proof beyond reasonable doubt entails the proof of all the ingredients of the offence as charged – DIBIE VS. STATE (2007) 3 SCNJ 160. The burden is on the prosecution to prove the offence and it does not shift, meaning that the accused person is never required to establish or prove his innocence. It is only when a prima facie case is made, that an accused person, will be required to explain away the allegations made.

a. that the accused person had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix;
b. that the act of sexual intercourse was done without consent or that the consent(if any) was obtained by fraud, force, threat, intimidation, deceit or impersonation;
c. that the prosecutrix was not the wife of the accused;
d. that the accused had the mens rea, the intention to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix without her consent or that the accused acted recklessly not caring whether the prosecutrix consented or not; and
e. that there was penetration no matter how slight.
See MUHAMMADU VS. STATE (2020) 2 SCNJ 175 AT 194; LUCKY VS. STATE (2016) LPELR – 40541 (SC) AND MUSA VS. STATE (2013) 9 NWLR (PT. 1359) 214.

The whole gamut of the Appellant’s arguments, are based on the lack of evidence of penetration of the prosecutrix by the Appellant. He concentrated on this element only and attacked the Judgment based on the evidence the trial Judge relied upon to find that there was evidence of penetration and it was by the Appellant. It is not controverted, that the prosecutrix (PW5) was under the age of fourteen years of age at the time of the rape.

It is also not controverted that she gave an unsworn testimony which requires corroboration – Section 209(1) Evidence Act 2011, and that due to her age, she was not capable of giving consent to sexual intercourse – Section 282 (1) (e) of the Penal Code.

In the instant appeal, the Appellant was charged with the offence of raping Lawisa Adamu, a girl of less than fourteen years of age, who gave unsworn evidence as PW5. She stated that whilst she was sitting, the Appellant went to her, took her to his room, removed her pant, laid her down and put his penis inside her vagina. It was while this was happening, that her elder sister, PW1 went and found the Appellant on top of her.

Under cross examination, she was not challenged on the crux of her evidence – that it was the Appellant who put his penis in her vagina. She was not challenged as to whether PW1 came and met the Appellant on top of her in his room. Infact her cross-examination has not resulted in any contradiction of her evidence. The trial Court at page 52 of the record, found that the evidence of PW5
“was neither contradicted, controverted or challenged during cross-examination. I agree with the call by the prosecution that it should be accepted as gospel truth.”

PW1, the sister of the prosecutrix, when she could not see her in their room, went out in search of her. She met the prosecutrix in the room of the Appellant, and he was on top of the prosecutrix, having sexual intercourse with her. It is also instructive, that she was not cross-examined on the crucial aspect of her testimony i.e. that she saw the Appellant on top of her sister the prosecutrix, having sexual intercourse with her. Her evidence in this regard remains unchallenged and uncontroverted. The evidence of PW5 the prosecutrix, had thus been corroborated in materials particular to the offence charged, by the unchallenged evidence of PW1. The evidence is weighty, believable and leads to an irresistible conclusion that the Appellant had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. Whether she infact consented or not, is immaterial as she was below the age of fourteen years at the time of the incident. The submission of counsel that PW1 had contradicted herself is not borne by the record. The evidence of the Appellant was only to deny involvement in the rape of the prosecutrix and throw a bait that the prosecutrix was a promiscuous person. Well her antecedents are not on trial. Whoever she had sexual intercourse with prior to the stated incident (if any) is not on trial. It is the Appellant that is on trial and he is the one who has evidence well and truly stacked against him.

Counsel for the Appellant has referred to the cases of IKO VS. STATE (2001) 14 NWLR (PT.732) 221 AT 245 – 246 AND OKOYOMON VS. STATE (SUPRA) which relied on JOS N. A POLICE VS. ALLAH NA GANI (1968) NMLR 8 which established that it is not enough in proving penetration, to say that the prosecution has led evidence through the prosecutrix saying that the accused person inserted his penis into her vagina or that he lay on her. Well this was the position in 1968 up to 2001. The law then must have been a harsh construction of the requirement of penetration. Keeping it as it was, will no longer protect this Nation which has become more sophisticated and the criminals more daring. The Supreme Court therefore rose up to the occasion and developed it in such a way that even the smallest fish cannot go through the net. In MAGAJI VS. NIGERIAN ARMY (2008) 8 NWLR (PT. 1089) AT 338 also relied upon by the trial Court, Niki Tobi JSC held on penetration, that-
“…..where there is a hole or opening, there will be the possibility of penetration being the ability to make a way into or through. While the common usage of the word means putting of the male organ into the female sex organ when having sex.” (Emphasis mine).
This case was followed and applied in the recent decision of the Supreme Court inYAHAYA BAUSHE MUHAMMAD VS. STATE (2020) 2 SCNJ 175 AT 195, where the prosecutrix said the Appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. A doctor examined her and said there was evidence of recent violation of the prosecutrix’s vagina. The Supreme Court held at page 196 of the report, per Okoro JSC, that “the above pieces of evidence in any opinion, are weighty and credible enough to lead to the irresistible conclusion that the Appellant had carnal knowledge of the prosecutrix without her consent. And even if she consented, such consent was unlawful, being a girl of just nine years of age.” In that case, there was no other eye witness and the doctor’s evidence, did not show categorically, as he could not have, since he was not present at the scene, that it was the Appellant who violated the prosecutrix. But in the instant appeal, apart from the uncontroverted evidence of the prosecutrix that the Appellant put his penis in her vagina, her sister PW1, saw him on top of the prosecutrix having sexual intercourse with her. She was not controverted under cross-examination. Instead, the Appellant waited until he was giving evidence, to merely deny the offence. The trial Court which saw him and watched his demeanour, did not believe him. We cannot fault it in that. The trial Judge was therefore right when he found penetration from the evidence of PW5, corroborated by the evidence of PW1, an eye witness to the event, the best evidence that can be led; and that it was the Appellant who raped the prosecutrix. As regards the evidence of PW4, even if she is not regarded as an expert witness in its full meaning, since she did not give out her qualification, it shows at least, that the prosecutrix had her hymen broken. The evidence of PW4 did not establish that it was the Appellant who broke it. But the fact that two fingers went in, following a physical examination which could be carried out by almost any one, least of all a Nurse/Midwife working in a General Hospital at the Sexual Assault Center, is a strong indication that having sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix could not be an ordeal for the prosecutrix if it was not her first time, or for the Appellant, as a penis can easily slide through. Any slight penetration is enough even if the hymen was not raptured or there was no emission of semen – ADONIKE VS. STATE (2015) 1 SCNJ 182; RABIU VS. STATE (2005) 7 NWLR (PT. 925) 491 AT 508; MUHAMMADU VS. STATE (SUPRA) AT 205, AND IGBINE VS. STATE (1997) 9 NWLR (PT.519) 101.

The evidence that the hymen had been broken shows why there was no injury seen. It is not necessary for emission of semen to occur before the offence can be proved. A slight penetration is enough, as emission of semen does not always occur in sexual intercourse. Could the Appellant have been interrupted by the repeated name calling of Lewisa, the prosecutrix, by the PW1, preventing him to continue with the rape until he emitted semen? It makes no difference that the prosecutrix has had sexual intercourse prior to the stated incident with the Appellant. If others had done so earlier and had escaped, the axe has now fallen on the Appellant at this particular time. A girl of thirteen years! Whether she struggled or not is not material, if that is a sign of consent, since at the age of thirteen, she cannot give a legal consent. So even without the evidence of PW4, there is credible evidence which had been corroborated, that established that the Appellant had penetrated the prosecutrix sexually, amounting to the offence of rape. I agree with learned counsel for the Appellant, that the evidence of PW2 is not helpful in establishing the offence, since he did not witness it. As for PW3, the IPO, all he did was take down the statement of the Appellant. His evidence has not added value to the case of the prosecution.

As earlier stated, the Appellant only denied the offence and sought to show that the prosecutrix has had prior record of sex escapades. Well, his evidence in that respect is hearsay, since he was only told about it and he did not say that he was part of those who had been helping themselves to the poor girl. His evidence was not believed by the trial Judge. It is the duty of the trial Judge to evaluate evidence led before him and make findings of facts. He does this by watching the demeanour of witnesses in the box and forming an impression about them. Where he discharges this duty credibly, an appellate Court which did not have the advantage of seeing the witnesses, cannot interfere. An Appellant can however invite an appellate Court to interfere with findings of a trial Court, where he is able to impeach it and show that it occasioned a miscarriage of justice, such as the admission of inadmissible evidence which resulted in the decision, or a violation of some principles of law – OYEDELE VS. STATE (2019) 6 NWLR (PT. 1667) 74 AND ANEKWE VS. STATE (2014) 5 SCNJ (PT.1) 52 AT 82. The evidence of DW2 is likewise, almost irrelevant regarding the ingredients of the offence of rape with which the Appellant was found guilty of. No perversity has been established in the finding of the trial Judge. We therefore cannot interfere.

Learned counsel has submitted that the evidence of the Appellant and Exhibit A, his extra-judicial statement, are part of the case of the prosecution. This is legally true. It is also correct, that the prosecution has to present consistent evidence or resolve conflicts or contradictions emanating from its case, before it can secure a conviction in respect of the offence charged. His reliance on the case of IBEH VS. STATE (SUPRA) however, does not avail him because that case is specifically on WITNESSES called by the prosecution, not the case presented by the prosecution. It was held therein, that:-
“In our law, the prosecution in calling ALL THEIR WITNESSES (emphasis mine) as to the substance of the offence must have certainty and unanimity in what they testify; if there are divergent testimonies in this regard, by these WITNESSES such divergent testimonies will result in what is known as contradictions. Unless such contradictions are resolved they lead to doubt, the benefit of which must be given to the accused person.”
The emphasis on the position of the law is therefore on the WITNESSES called by the prosecution. In the instant appeal, the Appellant was not called by the prosecution as a witness, even if his evidence is part of the prosecution’s case. It is because it is part of the prosecution’s case, that the trial Court is bound to consider it before arriving at a decision. The evidence of the Appellant or any other accused person for that matter, is not part of the witnesses called by the prosecution. That is why infact Wali JSC of blessed memory, in his contribution at page 655 G of the report, brought it out clearly when he held that a Court “is not to pick and choose which set of the prosecution’s WITNESSES to believe and which to reject, but must evaluate the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.” After all, when there are two different facts, one from witnesses called by the prosecution, and the other by witnesses of the defence, the Court is enjoined to evaluate both and prefer one over the other. It does not mean that in that scenario, the prosecution must reconcile the evidence of the witnesses it called and the evidence of the witnesses called by the defence, before it could get conviction. It is not its duty to do that. It cannot even do that since its witnesses would invariably say different facts from the witnesses of the defence. It is then for the Court to prefer one over the other.
It is our considered opinion that the evidence of the prosecutrix has established that the Appellant had sexual intercourse with her by putting his penis in her female organ and had penetrated it. Her unsworn testimony has been corroborated by the evidence of an eye witness to the gruesome act, PW1, as it is an independent testimony which confirms in material particular, not only that the crime was committed but also that the Appellant was the one who perpetrated it – IKO VS. STATE (2001) 14 NWLR (PT. 732) 21. The Judgment of the trial Court has not been impeached in this regard. The lone issue identified is thus resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.
This appeal is adjudged as lacking in merit and I hereby dismiss it. I affirm the Judgment of the trial High Court Dutse, Jigawa State, delivered on 28th March, 2018 in SUIT NO. JDU/38C/2018 which convicted the Appellant of the offence of rape and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment.

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUWUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Abubakar Datti Yahaya, His Lordship has ably considered and resolved all the issues in contention in the appeal. I agree with the reasoning and abide by the conclusions reached therein.

I too find no merit in the appeal and I hereby dismiss same. I affirm the judgment of the High Court of Jigawa State in Suit No JDC/38C/2018 delivered by Honorable Justice Umar M. Sadiq on the 28th of March, 2018, along with the conviction of and the sentence passed on the Appellant therein.

AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A.: I have read the lead judgment of my brother A.D. YAHAYA JCA. I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the appeal lacks merit. I adopt his reasoning therein and the conclusion threat that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court delivered on 28/03/2018 by Hon. Justice M. Sadiq of the Jigawa State High Court

Appearances:

Bashir Salihu
For Appellant(s)

Jamilu Mohammed, Deputy Director Civil Litigation with him, Umar Ja’afar, Assistant Director Citizen’s Rights For Respondent(s)