MRS. JESSIE BALONWU v. DR. CHIKE CHINYELU & ORS
(1991)LCN/0109(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Friday, the 8th day of March, 1991
Case Number: CA/E/7/91
RATIO
APPEAL: WHETHER AN APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
An appellate Court is concerned mainly with the decision arrived at by the lower court which an appellant is challenging on appeal. If a trial court had come to the right decision but for the wrong reason, the appellate court will not disturb the decision of the trial court. PER OGUNTADE, J.C.A.
JUSTICES:
GEORGE ADESOLA OGUNTADE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SAMSON ODEMWINGIE UWAIFO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
VICTOR JAMES OBANUA CHIGBUE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MRS. JESSIE BALONWU Appellant(s)
AND
- DR. CHIKE CHINYELU
2. CHIEF ALPHONSUS OBIDIKE
3. JOE AMENE
4. DR. OKEY ODUNZE
(Anambra State Chairman of Social Democratic Party)
5. ALHAJI A.J.K. IMAM
6. NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER, ANAMBRA STATE. Respondent(s)
OGUNTADE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant in this appeal was the plaintiff at the Onitsha High Court where she brought a suit against the respondents (as defendants) claiming the following reliefs:
“(i) A declaration that the 1st defendant was not validly elected as the candidate to contest the election for the Chairmanship of the Onitsha Local Government Council under the Platform of the Social Democratic Party.
(ii) A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to contest the election for the Chairmanship of the Onitsha Local Government Council under the ticket of the Social Democratic Party.
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE:
(iii) A declaration that the election conducted on the 3rd day of October, 1990 by the Social Democratic Party to select a flag bearer to contest for the Chairmanship of the Onitsha Local Government Council was irregular, rigged, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(iv) In the event of a fresh election an Order of the Court that the result collated by each of the agents of the Party contesting the election should be verified with the Presiding Officer and countersigned by him.
(v) A perpetual injunction to restrain the 1st defendant from continuing to parade himself as the flag bearer of the Social Democratic Party to contest the election for the Chairmanship of the Onitsha Local Government Council.
(vi) A further injunction to restrain the 2nd defendant in the event of a fresh election from taking any part in the conduct of such an election.
(vii) An Order of Court for the 3rd – 6th defendants to provide a proper guideline for the conduct of the election.
(viii) An injunction to restrain the 2nd & 4th defendants from submitting the name of the 1st defendant as the candidate who has won the election to contest under the S.D.P. for the Chairmanship of the Onitsha Local Government Council.
(ix) N1,000,000.00 damages against the defendants jointly and severally.”
The appellant (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff filed her statement of claim. The 1st defendant filed his statement of defence while a joint statement of defence was filed by the 2nd to 4th defendants. The 5th and 6th defendants did not file a statement of defence.
The trial of the suit commenced on 24 October, 1990 and closed on 26/11/90 with counsel’s addresses. Nweje J. delivered judgment on 27th November, 1990. In his judgment, the trial judge concluded as follows:
“The Complaints raised by the plaintiff are breaches or alleged breaches of that Constitution by fellow members of the S.D.P. who like the plaintiff, are amenable to those provisions for discipline. The situation in this case looks to me like the case of two sons of one father who each wants to go out wearing their father’s hat. These children quarrel and fight over who wears the hat while their father is sitting in the house holding his hat. Common sense dictates that the proper person to decide which one wears that hat is their father, not any outsider.
It is my view that what the plaintiff needed was to take up the alleged misdeeds of 2nd defendant and his collaborators with the provisions of the Party’s constitution, and not to bring in the Court-an outsider to run for the Party its private and internal affairs. The candidate for the election still has to be chosen by the party and not by the Court and imposed on the party.
On the aforegoing considerations, I uphold the submission of learned Counsel for the defence that the plaintiff’s claim is not competent before this Court. In view of the stage of the proceedings at which this decision is made, the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed. In consequence, the Order of injunction made on 8th October, 1990 is hereby discharged.”
A few submissions on points of law were addressed to the trial judge. The trial judge in the concluding part of the judgment expressed that he was upholding the submission of the learned counsel for the defence to the effect that the plaintiff’s claim was not competent before the court. It is not quite clear which of the defence counsel’s submission that the lower court accepted for concluding that the plaintiff’s suit was not competent. But from the allegorical reference made by the trial judge to the case of two children quarrelling over who should wear the father’s hat, while the father is at home holding the hat. it would seem that the trial judge was saying that the action was not properly constituted in that the proper parties were not before it or that the plaintiff lacked locus standi to bring the action.
The plaintiff was aggrieved by the decision of the lower court and has come before us on appeal against it. She filed two grounds of appeal originally and one additional ground of appeal. All these grounds in substance complain that the lower court was wrong to say that it had no jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs action.
In the appellant’s brief filed, the issues for determination in this appeal were stated as follows:
“3-1. Whether the trial court was right in deciding that it had no jurisdiction to decide all the issues before it relying on Onuoha v. Okafor (1983)Vol.14 N.S.C.C. at page 494; (1983) 2 SCNLR 244.
3-2 Whether the trial court after declining jurisdiction was right to dismiss the appeal.”
The respondents in their brief raised a set of issues for determination slightly different from the appellant’s. The first of respondents’ issues queried whether in fact the trial judge had declined jurisdiction on the authority of Onuoha v. Okafor (supra). The second raised the question whether or not the trial judge was correct in holding that the issues raised in appellant’s claims were matters within the internal administration of the Social Democratic Party. (S.D.P.)
It must be pointed out that the first issue raised by the appellant as to whether or not the trial judge was right in declining jurisdiction on the authority of Onuoho v. Okafor (supra) is inappropriate and a clear attempt to run away from one basic fact. An appellate Court is concerned mainly with the decision arrived at by the lower court which an appellant is challenging on appeal. If a trial court had come to the right decision but for the wrong reason, the appellate court will not disturb the decision of the trial court. The first issue of the appellant should appropriately be – ‘Whether or not the lower court was right in declining jurisdiction.
This is so because it would not matter whether the court had relied on Onuoha v. Okafor or any other case in coming to its decision, if I am able to say that the lower court was guided by established principles of law in coming to its decision I think that a convenient starting point to a consideration of the issues posed by this appeal is to understand the nature of the claim put before the Court by the plaintiff. The summary of the averments contained in the plaintiff’s statement of claim is as follows:
The plaintiff, a legal practitioner and member of the Social Democratic Party had stood for the primary election in her party so that she could be nominated to contest for the Chairmanship of Onitsha Local Government under the S.D.P. There were five other contestants with plaintiff in the race. The 1st defendant was one of them. The plaintiff alleged that the nomination process was improperly manipulated by the 2nd defendant, the Chairman of the Onitsha branch of the S.D.P. and that the manipulation was directed at ensuring that the 1st defendant win the nomination. It was alleged the selection returns were altered and the results heavily rigged and that the 1st defendant was fraudulently declared the winner. The plaintiff therefore brought her action claiming as earlier stated in this judgment.
Now, does a court of law have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the claims put forward by the plaintiff? The lower court answered that question in the negative and the result is the appeal now before us. In Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244 the facts as set in the judgment of the court of appeal by Olatawura J.C.A. (as he then was) are these:
“The plaintiff, Honourable P.C. Onuoha and the 3rd defendant, Chief the Honourable Isidore are members of the same political party -the Nigerian People’s Party. Both of them applied to their party (N.P.P.) to be nominated for Owerri Senatorial District seat. They both paid N5,000.0 non-refundable deposit for the said Owerri Senatorial District. There was a body set up to select a candidate who will represent the Party. The plaintiff was chosen. There was a petition by the 3rd defendant against the selection of the plaintiff and consequently, the State Working Committee of the Party (N.P.P.) appointed a panel to look into this complaint.
The plaintiff and the 3rd defendant were each given an opportunity to state his case. This panel nullified the selection of the plaintiff and went on to choose the 3rd Defendant to represent the Party at the forthcoming Senatorial Election. The plaintiff then went to court on the grounds disclosed in his writ and statement of claim. It is the case of the plaintiff however, that he never look part in the election after the nullification and that the Nomination Election petition Panel did not meet to select a candidate. The third defendant was according to the plaintiff’s counsel merely joined because he was a candidate whose interest was likely to be affected. This third defendant participated in the election which the plaintiff won”.
The Supreme Court in its judgment per Obaseki, J.S.C. at page 262 said:
“The rights and obligations of members are set out in article 8 of the Party’s Constitution (see exhibit 3) and the right to be sponsored is not one of them. No where in the 1979 Constitution is a right to sponsorship by the N.P.P. guaranteed to the members of the party. It is only the right to contest nomination that is guaranteed by the Party’s constitution see Exhibit 3 – Article 36 0fthe N.P.P. Constitution. The right to sponsorship can be acquired under a valid contract the breach of which entitles the members to damages. This is not the case here and no contract or the breach thereof has been pleaded.”
And at page 265 the Supreme Court per Irikefe J.S.C. (as he then was) said:
“The matter in controversy in the appeal is whether a court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim whereby it can compel a political party to sponsor one candidate in preference for another candidate of the self-same political party. If a court could do this, it would in effect be managing the political party for the members thereof. The issue of who should be a candidate of a given political party at any election is clearly a political one, to be determined by the rules and constitution of the said party. It is thus a domestic issue and not such as would be justiciable in a
court of law. The Federal Court of appeal was thus right to decline jurisdiction and nothing that was urged before us was capable of deflecting me from this view.”
In his argument before us Senator N.N. Anah S.A.N. for the appellant argued that the facts in the instant appeal were different from those in Onuoha v. Okafor (supra). The difference according to counsel was to be found in the fact that whereas in Onuoha v. Okafor (supra), the plaintiff was asking the Court to pronounce him the official candidate of the N.P.P., the plaintiff in this case had not asked to be pronounced the candidate. She had merely asked that the primary election nomination process be nullified as it was interfered with fraudulently so as to produce a wrong result.
In his written brief, the respondents’ counsel strained himself to show that the lower court in coming to the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff’s claim had not relied on the authority of Onuoha v. Okafor (supra).
I think that the facts in Onuoha v. Okafor (supra) are broadly similar to those in the instant case such that the principle of law settled in Onuoha v. Okafor (supra) ought to be applied here. The plaintiff had in her claim (II) asked to be declared the candidate to contest the election for the Chairmanship of the Onitsha Local Government Council under the ticket of the Social Democratic Party. While the appeal was being argued, before us. Senator N. N. Anah indicated that the plaintiff was no longer pursuing her claim that she be declared the official candidate of the S.D.P. But that is a concession that does not take plaintiff’s case out of the purview of the authority in Onuoha v. Okafor (supra). With respect to the first claim for a declaration that the 1st defendant was not validly elected the candidate for the Social Democratic Party, the plaintiff was asking the court to take over an internal matter of the management of the Social Democratic Party. If a candidate was not validly nominated to contest on the ticket of the S.D.P., it was for that party to effect a correction through its own internal machinery and not for the court to decide the question. The plaintiff had no right cognisable by law to say that a candidate who has not been rejected by the S.D.P. should not be allowed to contest the elections on the platform of the S.D.P. By virtue of Decree No. 26 of 1989 i.e. Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) (Amendment) Decree 1989, there was established for the country only two political parties; and for the purpose of the Local Government elections of 1990 out of which this suit arose, only a political party can sponsor a candidate to contest in the elections. It is exclusively the responsibility of each of the two parties to lay down a procedure by which its members can gain each party’s favour or privilege to contest the elections. An aspirant may by virtue of his party’s Constitution be free to contest the nomination election in order to be able to contest against the candidate of the other party in the election, but such aspirant cannot usurp the right of the party to decide whom it will sponser as a candidate.
The plaintiff in this case was not sponsered as the official candidate of the S.D.P. That might have been the result of some dishonest or improper conduct by some persons. The remedy of the plaintiff was to report to her party which is the body with the right to sponsor a candidate so that her (the plaintiff’s) complaints might be looked into. It may be that if the plaintiff had given the S.D.P. the opportunity to look into her complaints, the problems might have been resolved in a manner satisfactory to the plaintiff. Even if the problem was settled in a manner the plaintiff found unsatisfactory, she might have a cause of action founded on a breach of contract (i.e. the Constitution of the Party) that she was not allowed to run as the Party’s candidate when she had fulfilled the requirements laid down by the Party’s Constitution. Such action can only be one in damages. Not one for specific performance. The court will not and ought not to choose a candidate for a political party.
This in my view explains why the lower court said that the matters leading to the dispute in this case were the internal affairs of the S.D.P. They are not justiciable by the court. The principle in Onuoha v. Okafor (supra) clearly applies here.
I think that the plaintiff’s suit ought to have been struck out. This is because the lower court expressed that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. It ought not to have been dismissed. This appeal fails. The judgment of the lower court is amended as indicated above. In substitution for the order dismissing plaintiff’s suit, I make an order striking out the suit.
I award in favour of 1st to 4th respondents costs assessed and fixed at N100.00.
UWAIFO, J.C.A.: Having read in advance the judgment of my learned brother Oguntade J.C.A. just delivered. I am satisfied that he has ably dealt with the issues involved. As the reasoning, incidentally, reflects my thinking on the matter I readily adopt it I wish only to add a few comments.
When this appeal was argued on 27 February, 1991, Senator Anah for the appellant conceded that the appellant would not pursue one of her claims in which she had asked for a declaration that she was entitled to contest the election for the Chairmanship of the Onitsha Local Government Council under the sponsorship of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). He did this in order to be able to press forcefully, as he thought, that the decision in Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244 did not apply to the present case and that the lower court, to use his words, “hid under the cloud of’ it (i.e. Onuoha ‘s case) “to decline jurisdiction to investigate on the evidence before it whether the primary election was rigged, irregularly conducted, null and void.”
On a proper understanding of Onuoha v. Okafor (supra) there is no amount of re-arrangement of the facts of this case, no magnanimity in conceding some of the reliefs sought and no display of any ingenuity in legal argument can take this case out of Onuoha v. Okafor (supra).
By the Constitution of the SDP (article 7 paragraph 7 (h), it is the Local Government Executive Committee which is responsible for organising primaries for elective offices in the Local Government Areas. Under paragraph 14 (iii), it is the Local Government Congress that ratifies the results of the Local Government Area primaries, which, under paragraph 23 (d), go forward to be ratified by the State Congress. The National Executive Committee under paragraph 27 (ii) (d) has the power to deal with appeals and other problems referred to it by or coming from the State or other levels of the Party whose decision shall be binding on all organs and members of the Parry under paragraph 27 (iii).
It is thus clear to me that the intention is to keep the domestic affairs of the Party, particularly the final decision in primaries, exclusively within the Party.
One of the principal objectives of the Party (any political party) is to attain political power through election into public offices. The Courts cannot be seen to be involved in how the Party makes its own internal arrangement to achieve this objective. It is as well that they should not as events and circumstances which have characterized election processes in this country in the past have been such that none of the disbanded Parties had ever been short of invectives and excuses in blaming any of its election misfortunes on some person, body or institution or the other. For the Courts to take part in any manner to decide which member of a Party is properly nominated for election or not is to put themselves in the thick of an undesirable political imbroglio. It is likely to destabilise the judiciary.
In his argument in the appellant’s brief of argument, Senator Anah said nothing in regard to the relief seeking N 1,000,000.00 damages as to whether there was any intention to pursue it. In fact he did not focus any attention on that in discussing jurisdiction but only on two declaratory and two injunctive reliefs.
In the circumstances I too dismiss the appeal and strike out the action with costs of N100.00 in favour of the 1st 4th defendants/respondents.
CHIGBUE, J.C.A.: I have the advantage of reading in draft the copy of the lead judgment of my learned brother, Oguntade, J.C.A in which he has exhaustively and lucidly set out the facts of the case. I am satisfied with his reasoning and conclusion and whatever addition or contribution I may make would be by way of laying further emphasis. I will commence by referring to the portion of the judgment of the trial court where the following analogy was made:
“The situation in this case looks to me like the case of two sons of one father who each wants to go out wearing their father’s hat. These children quarrel and fight over who wears the hat while their father is sitting in the house holding his hat. Common sense dictates that the proper person to decide which one wears that hat is their father, not any outsider.”
Suffice it to say that the above analogous story fits the present case. Besides the 5th and 6th Defendants/respondents, the rest of the parties in this case are members of the Political Party. The Social Democratic Party, which by all intent and purposes is a creation of Statute – Decree No. 26 of 1989 – The Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) Amendment) Decree, 1989. To function within the legal concepts the party has its own Constitution, Exh. F in this case. It contains among other things the aims and objectives of the party. Article 4 (ii) (c) stipulates:
“To sponsor candidates for election into the Local Government Councils and similar councils in the Federal Capital Territory, Legislative houses and to the Offices of Governor and Deputy Governor, and of the President and Vice President.”
(The Italics is mine).
The present dispute stems from the Local Government Primaries as to who would be elected eligible to contest election into the Local Government Council held through out the country last December. Such exercise was expressly intra vires the party as provided by Articles (iii) (c) – supra. In regulating the conduct of such exercise, articles 8 of the Party Constitution provides disciplinary measures against erring members. It provides as follows:
(1) Discipline of Party members shall be exercised by the respective Executive Committee or Disciplinary Committee of the Party depending on the level at which disciplinary measures is called for.”
And (II) (d) provides punishment for breaches against engaging in dishonest practices. Such dishonest practices fanned some of the basis of complaint in this case and the modes of punishment against such practices are set out under (i) and (ii) of Articles 8.
The reliefs sought by the appellant in (i) (iii) of the suit are declaratory; the others are ancillary. All are nor granted as of course. In order to succeed the appellant has to establish competence to prefer the action and that the court has jurisdiction to grant them. If the main three reliefs fail the rest ancillary reliefs would fall like pack of cards.
To me the acts complained of by the appellant amounted to indiscipline among party members. They border on irregularities in the internal affairs of the party. To me they are not justiciable in any court of law as the action could not be sustained see the case of Foss v. Harbottle. (1843) 2 Hare 461 or 67 E.R 189.
I therefore agree with the conclusion of my learned brother Oguntade, J .C.A. that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that action ought to have been struck out. The appeal fails and in the place of dismissal I strike out the action. I too, will award N100.00 costs to the 1st-4th Defendants/Respondents.
Appeal dismissed.
Appearances
N.N. Anah, SAN (with him, J.O. Onwujekwe) For Appellant
AND
Arinze Abua, Holding brief for Dr. Onyechi Ikpeazu For Respondent
