KASU & ORS v. JOSHUA (2022)

KASU & ORS v. JOSHUA

(2022)LCN/16988(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, April 29, 2022

CA/K/08/2021

Before Our Lordships:

Mojeed Adekunle Owoade Justice of the Court of Appeal

Bitrus Gyarazama Sanga Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. KADUNA STATE UNIVERSITY 2. THE GOVERNING COUNCIL, KADUNA STATE UNIVERSITY 3. THE VICE CHANCELLOR, KADUNA STATE UNIVERSITY APPELANT(S)

And

OBADIAH JOSHUA RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

INTERPRETATION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SEMANTIC CANONS OF INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND STATUTES

Talking about holistic interpretation of letters or holistic evaluation of evidence, the learned counsel for the Appellants ought to be reminded of the basic principles of semantic canons of interpretation of words and statutes.
1. Ordinary-Meaning Canon – Words are to be understood in their ordinary everyday meanings – unless the content indicates that they bear a technical sense.
2. Fixed-Meaning Canon – Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted.
3. Omitted-case canon. Nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso habendus est).
4. General-Terms Canons – General terms are to be given their general meaning (generaliter intelligenda).
If I must add, the ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation. It governs constitutions, statutes, rules and private instruments. See e.g James Kint, Commentaries on American Law 432 (1826) quoted in Scalia & Garner: Readings in Law: Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) U.S.A.
In this respect, the terms of writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation. PER OWOADE, J.C.A

MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal by the Appellants (who were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively before the lower Court), against the final judgment of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Kaduna Judicial Division, Coram: S. O. Adeniyi J., (hereinafter called the “lower court”) delivered on the 20/05/2020 in Suit No. NIC/KD/10/2017. (See pages 237 – 258 of the Record of Appeal)

The facts that gave rise to the instant appeal are that the Respondent was before the purported termination of his appointment the Deputy Registrar (Academic Affairs) of the 1st Appellant. By virtue of a Letter of Appointment dated 09/03/2005 with Reference No. KASU/GEN/18/VOL.I/20 emanating from the 2nd Appellant and signed on its behalf by its Secretary, the Respondent was offered appointment as a Senior Assistant Registrar on HATISS 11/1. The appointment of the Respondent is based on the Staff Conditions of Service of the 1st Appellant as approved by the 2nd Appellant.

By virtue of a Letter entitled: “Confirmation of Appointment” dated 28/03/2008 with Reference No. KASU/SP/017, the appointment of the Respondent was confirmed with effect from 01/04/2007 and by virtue of a Letter entitled: “Promotion as Principal Assistant Registrar” dated 22/12/2008 with Reference No. KASU/GEN/18/VOL.I/1, the Respondent was promoted from Senior Assistant Registrar to Principal Assistant Registrar on CONTISS 13/05 with effect from 01/10/2008.

By virtue of the Respondent’s promotion to Principal Assistant Registrar, he was redeployed vide an internal memorandum dated 11/10/2011 from his schedule as Faculty Officer, Faculty of Arts to the Registry Department to be in charge of the Academic Office of the 1st Appellant with schedule of duties as follows: preparation and issuance of certificates after having been sealed and signed by the Vice-Chancellor and Registrar; preparation and issuance of academic records; notification of results once they are approved by the Senate that are given to students before certificates are ready; preparation, collation and dispatch of papers and minutes of the Senate; implementation of the decision of the Senate; dealing with all matters relating to inter-University and intra-University transfer; confirming the status of certificates of the University upon inquiry by outside bodies; maintaining up-to-date students records; Assistant Secretary of the Senate; Secretary of Admission Committee; and Secretary of Post Graduate School. In addition to his schedule of duties, the Respondent was also assigned with the responsibility of the Senate Meetings vide an internal memorandum dated 13/10/2011.

By virtue of a letter entitled: “Promotion from Principal Assistant Registrar to Deputy Registrar” dated 15/03/2012 with Reference No. KASU/SP/017/VOL.I, the Respondent was promoted from Principal Assistant Registrar to Deputy Registrar on CONUNASS 14/03 with effect from 01/10/2011.

Sometimes in February, 2016, the Respondent observed some irregularities in payment and issuance of academic transcripts of the 1st Appellant from the period of December, 2015 and January, 2016 onward. After conducting an investigation, he found out that one, Musa Abba Adamu, who was the Transcript Issuing Officer under the Academic Affairs office of the 1st Appellant was the one involved in the irregularities and on that basis, the Respondent wrote an internal memorandum dated 04/04/2016 to the Registrar of the 1st Appellant (the officer he directly reports to) informing him of the above fact for his further necessary action. In response to the said internal memorandum written by the Respondent, the said Musa Abba Adamu was issued a query by the Registrar and the Registrar also set up a committee vide an internal memorandum dated 20/05/2016, to investigate the alleged irregularity in the payment and issuance of academic transcripts.

Vide an internal memorandum dated 09/06/2016, the Respondent was invited by the Committee to appear before it on 13/06/2016 for an interaction with it with a view to briefing the committee on the procedures and processes of payments and issuance of transcripts in the University and the Respondent appeared before the Committee accordingly and gave them an original copy of his written submission dated 13/06/2016 on the procedure, processes of payments and issuance of transcripts of examinations of the University and retained a copy.

On 05/01/2017, the Respondent was invited by Appointment & Promotion Sub-Committee on Disciplinary Matters to appear before it on 09/01/2017 for an interaction. At the interactive session with the Appointment & Promotion Sub-Committee on Disciplinary Matters on 09/01/2017, the Respondent was asked to further explain the procedures and processes of payments and issuance of transcripts in the University which he did orally. Thereafter, he was asked to go.

On 27/01/2017, to the Respondent’s surprise, he was served with a letter entitled: “Removal from Office” dated 25/01/2017 with Reference No. KASU/REG/185/VOL.I. In the said letter, the Respondent was informed that at the 65th meeting of the 2nd Appellant held on 19/01/2017, the 2nd Appellant approved that his services were no longer required in line with Section 15 (1) (5) of the Staff Conditions of Service.

Before the said purported termination of the Respondent’s appointment, he was never issued with any query or given any notice of allegation against him or called upon to defend himself against any allegation of misconduct levelled against him by the Appellants. The purported termination of the Respondent’s appointment was done in flagrant disregard to the mandatory statutory procedure and process to be followed by the Appellants which are provided for under the Kaduna State University Law No. 3 of 2004 and the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service before his appointment can be terminated as such the Respondent initiated an action as Claimant at the lower court against the Appellants as Defendants via a Writ of Complaint and Statement of Facts, filed originally on the 27/02/2017; and by an Amended Statement of Facts filed on 31/03/2017, pursuant to an order of court made on 05/06/2017 seeking the following reliefs jointly and severally against the Appellants:
“a. A DECLARATION that the purported termination of appointment of the Claimant by the Defendants was done in breach of the procedure laid down under the Kaduna State University Law No 3 of 2004, and the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service.
b. A DECLARATION that the purported termination of appointment of the Claimant by the Defendants is wrongful and unlawful.
c. AN ORDER reinstating the Claimant to his rank as Deputy Registrar with the 1st Defendant without loss of seniority or rank.
d. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to his salaries, allowances and other emoluments due to him by virtue of his rank as Deputy Registrar.
e. AN ORDER compelling the Defendants to pay the Claimant all the salaries, allowances and other emoluments due to him by virtue of his rank as Deputy Registrar.
f. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to the payment of the sum of N418,840.76k (Four Hundred and Eighteen Thousand, Eight Hundred and Forty Naira, Seventy-Six kobo only) as his gross salary by virtue of his rank, less all the statutory deductible taxes and other statutory deductions.
g. AN ORDER compelling the Defendants to pay the Claimant the sum of N418,840.76k (Four Hundred and Eighteen Thousand, Eight Hundred and Forty Naira, Seventy-Six kobo only) as his gross salary by virtue of his rank, less all the statutory deductible taxes and other statutory deductions from the date of the purported termination of his appointment till the date of reinstatement.
h. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants, either by themselves, or through any officer, agent or proxy howsoever called acting or purporting to act on their behalf, from terminating or purporting to terminate the appointment of the Claimant without following the due process and procedure laid down by law.
i. GENERAL DAMAGES for unlawful termination of appointment.
j. COST of this suit.
(See pages 1-72, 164-179 of the Record of Appeal)

The Appellants in response to the Respondent’s suit filed a joint statement of Defence on the 23/02/2017. At the trial, the Respondent testified as a sole witness and tendered in evidence sixteen (16) documents which were admitted as exhibits. The Appellants on the other hand called two (2) witnesses, namely, Mr. Bulus Zanden as DW1 and Dr. Abubakar S. Magaji as DW2 after which parties filed and exchanged their respective Written addresses. (pages 224 – 235 of the Record of Appeal).

At the end of the trial, the learned trial judge found in favour of the Respondent Claimant as follows:
“It is glaringly clear that the Defendants blatantly violated the procedure for the termination of appointment provided in Section 20 of the Law (supra) applicable to the Claimant in terminating his appointment. The Defendants did not strictly and fully comply with the provisions of the Kaduna State University Law (supra) and was therefore in breach thereof. And I so hold.
Having held that the Defendants did not strictly and fully comply with the provisions of the Kaduna University Law, the purported termination of the Claimant is hereby set aside as same is unlawful, null, void and of no effect whatsoever. I so hold.”

He concluded the judgment by granting the following reliefs to the Respondent Claimant:
“1. A Declaration that the termination of the Claimant by the Defendants was made in breach of the process and procedure as stated under the Kaduna State University Law No. 3 of 2004 and the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service.
2. A Declaration that the termination of appointment of the Claimant by the Defendants is unlawful.
3. An Order of this Honourable Court setting aside the letter terminating the Claimant’s appointment dated 25th January, 2017.
4. An Order of this Honourable Court reinstating the Claimant as a Senior Staff of the 1st Defendant.
5. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants to pay the sum of Four Hundred and Eighteen Thousand, Eight Hundred and Forty Naira, Seventy-Six Kobo (N418,840.76) only as his gross salary, less all statutorily deductable taxes and deductions from the date of the termination of appointment (25/01/2017) till date.
The Defendants shall within 30 days of this judgment pay to the Claimant the said salaries and allowances.
Parties shall bear their respective costs.”

Dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal containing three (3) grounds of Appeal in this Court on 19-11-2020.

Appellants brief of Argument was filed on 8/02/2021. It is settled by M. B. Tanko Esq. Respondents’ brief of argument was filed on 3/03/2021. It is settled by James Kanyip Esq.

Appellants reply brief of argument was filed on 17/03/2021. It is settled by M. B. Tanko Esq.

Learned counsel for the Appellants nominated three (3) issues for the determination of the appeal. They are:
“I. Whether in consideration of the facts, circumstances of this case, and in particular the evidence led at trial, was the lower Court right or justified howsoever to hold that the termination of the Respondent’s appointment with the 1st Appellant did not comply with the Kaduna State University Law, No. 3, 2004, and there was no fair hearing and adequate opportunity given to the Respondent for making representation on the offences levelled against him? (Culled from Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal)
II. Whether in the circumstances of this case, the Appellants can terminate the appointment of the Respondent on ground of misconduct, despite enjoyment of statutory flavour and the trial Court’s decision to raise the issue of 30-days compliance with its judgment suo motu on the payment of Respondent’s salaries and allowances thereby limiting the Appellants’ time to appeal, amount to a direct breach of the Appellants’ right to fair hearing? (Culled from Ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal)
III. Whether in consideration of all the facts, circumstances of this suit and indeed the evidence led before the lower court, are there proper and holistic evaluation of the content of exhibits tendered at the trial by the lower court? (Culled from Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal)”

Learned counsel for the Respondent adopted the three (3) issues nominated by the Appellant for determination of the appeal.

On issue 1, learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that the Appellants’ conduct leading to the termination of the Respondent employment complied with Section 20 of the Kaduna State University Law 2004 and Section 15 of the Staff Condition of Service of the 1st Appellant. He reproduced the provision of Section 20(1)(a) & (b) which he said is in pari materia with Section 15 Staff Condition of Service of the 1st Appellant thus:
“If the Council has reason for good cause to believe that any person who is employed as a member of staff of the University other than the Vice-Chancellor, should be removed from office or employment, the Council shall –
(a) Give notice of those reasons to the member in question;
(b) Afford the member an opportunity of making representation in person on the matter to the Council.”

He submitted that in compliance with the above provisions, the Appellants set up two investigative committees who invited the Respondent on three occasions, wherein the Respondent made representations.

He submitted that the Respondent made representations before the two committees and cross-examined witnesses on alleged irregularity in payment and issuance of academic transcripts.

After, said counsel, the Appellants without any request by the Respondent under Section 20(2) of KASU Law set up the joint committee of Council Appointment and Promotion Sub-Committee on disciplinary matters which in turn afforded the Respondent all opportunities to make representation and to defend himself.

The above Committee’s report was considered by the Appellants and Promotions Committee at the 51st meeting of 12th January, 2017 and finally, Governing Council approval for termination of Respondent’s appointment with the 1st Appellant at its 65th meeting of 19th January, 2017.

These procedure, said counsel were in conformity with the provision of Section 20(3) of the Kaduna State University Law in pari materia with Section 15(3) Staff Condition of Service which authorises the Council (2nd Appellant) to cause termination of appointment of a member of staff upon satisfaction with the report of investigation committee.

He submitted that the grounds upon which the Council (2nd Appellant) can terminate appointment is wide and the provision of Section 20(5) KASU Law is an open ended provision which gives Council (2nd Appellant) wide discretion to consider any factor or thing as a “good cause” to terminate appointment of any employee.

Therefore, said counsel, learned trial judge erred in law to have held that the alleged offences established against the Respondent does not fall under the categories of “good cause” as stated in the law.

He further submitted that the offences established against the Respondent “Negligence of duty and Financial impropriety” were within the discretionary powers of Council to consider, as good cause, any conduct of staff under Section 20(6)(c)(d) to terminate his appointment.

On the finding of the court below that “the claimant was not given the opportunity of making representation in person on the offences he was alleged to have committed and the Defendants violated the provision of Section 20 of the Defendant’s law.”

Appellants’ counsel submitted relying on the cases of Raji v. Wema Bank Plc (2013) 39 N.L.L.R. (Pt. 120) 29 NIC at 40 – 42, Suleiman v. Master Stroke Packages Ltd. (2013) 39 N.L.L.R. (Pt. 120) 132 at 155, Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550 that fair hearing simply means an opportunity to be heard. And, that where a party has been served with notice to appear before a committee and given adequate opportunity to defend himself such a party is said to have been given fair hearing.

Learned counsel for the Appellants concluded on issue 1 by relying on the case of Jibril v. The Military Administrator, Kwara State & Ors. (2013) 37 N.L.L.R. (Pt. 113) 167 at 178.

Submit that a purely administrative Tribunal with duties of investigation only has no duty to give right or cross-examination to the accused. It is only required to act fairly and hear all sides before arriving at its decision. Thus, the determination of whether a body or panel gives fair hearing or observes the rules of natural justice depends on the intention or expected result.

Learned counsel for the Respondent introduced his response to Appellants issue 1 that the Respondent’s employment and conditions of service are primarily governed by the Kaduna State University Law No 3 of 2004, and the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service. And in both legislations, the mandatory procedure and mode of termination of his appointment are clearly contained in Section 20 of the Kaduna State University Law No 3 of 2004, and Section 15 (1) of the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service. Section 20 of the Kaduna State University Law No 3 of 2004 which is in pari materia with Section 15 (1) of the Staff Conditions of Service expressly provides that:
(1) if the Council has reason for good cause to believe that any person who is employed as a member of the staff of the University other than the Vice-Chancellor, should be removed from office or employment, the Council shall:-
a. Give Notice of those reasons to the member in question;
b. Afford the member an opportunity of making representation in person on the matter to the Council.
(underline for emphasis)

He submitted that the use of the word “SHALL” in the above provisions makes the said provisions mandatory and thus a condition precedent for setting disciplinary actions in motion, which condition must co-exist and be strictly complied with conjunctively in terminating the appointment of the Respondent herein. That the crux of the Respondent’s case at the lower Court is that the Appellants blatantly failed to comply with these provisions in terminating his appointment.

The lower Court said counsel, rightly held that the provisions of Section 20 (1) (a) and (b) of the Kaduna State University Law No. 3, 2004 and Section 15 (1) of the Appellants’ Staff Conditions of Service were not in any way complied with by the Appellants in terminating the Respondent’s appointment. The Respondent was never given any notice of allegations against him upon which his appointment was terminated neither did the Council afforded him the opportunity of making representation in person to it as required by the law. Exhibits C9, C11 and C13 (pages 63 and 65 of the Record of Appeal and page 2 of the Supplementary Record of Appeal) are clearly mere letters of invitation given by a committee inviting the Respondent to appear for an interaction to brief members on the procedures and processes of payments and issuance of transcripts in Kaduna State University. The said letters of invitation were not given by the Council and they do not contain any allegation(s) of misconduct or impropriety against the Respondent which required the Respondent to make any representation on them. This facts according to counsel were clearly reinforced by both DW1 and DW2 in their testimony under cross-examination (pages 229 – 231, 234 – 235 of the Record of Appeal) to the effect that no notice was given to the Respondent and that neither the Council nor the joint Committee of Council and Senate investigated the Respondent as required by both section 20 of the 1st Appellant’s law and Section 15 (1) of the 1st Appellant’s Staff Conditions of Service before his appointment was terminated.

On the submission that the Appellants complied with the above provisions by setting up Investigative Committees which invited the Respondent and that the letters of invitation (Exhibits C9, 11 and C13) were the notices of allegation given to the Respondent on which basis he appeared before those committees and made representations. Respondent’s counsel submitted that the Appellants’ witnesses under cross-examination testified on oath that the committees that invited the Respondent were not specifically set up to investigate the Respondent; that the letters of invitation given to the Respondent inviting him to appear before the Committees did not state the purpose of the invitation or contained any allegations of misconduct against the Respondent. He added that setting up the committees that purportedly investigated the Respondent cannot be said to have been in compliance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Kaduna State University Law No 3 of 2004, and Section 15 (1) of the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service and the letters of invitation given to the Respondent cannot by any stretch of imagination qualify as notice required by both Section 20 (1) (a) of the Kaduna State University Law No 3 of 2004, and Section 15 (1) (1) (a) of the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service.

He submitted that going by the unambiguous provisions of Section 20 (1) (a) and (b) of the Kaduna State University Law No 3 of 2004, and Section 15 (1) (1) (a) of the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service, it is the Council that have the power to give the Respondent the requisite notice stating in the said notice the reason for the decision to terminate the Respondent’s appointment after which the law makes it mandatory for the Council to afford the Respondent the opportunity to make representation in person on those reasons to it (the Council). He submitted that the Notice is what sets in motion the machinery for disciplinary measure/action to be taken and so where there is failure in giving of the requisite notice as it is in this case, whatever disciplinary measure/action is taken in default of such notice lacks the necessary foundation and so cannot stand. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand.

Respondent’s counsel reasoned that the law is settled that where a statute as in this case expressly provides for the means of doing a thing, only that means provided for in the statute is permitted for doing that thing. He referred to the cases of Nwankwo v. Yar’adua (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209), 518, 589, Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1080) 227, 318. That in the same vein, in Ogualaji v. A.G. Rivers State (1997) 5 SCNJ 240, the Supreme Court held that “where a law prescribes a particular method of exercising statutory power, any other method of exercise of it is excluded”. He submitted that in matters of discipline, as it is in this case, where the law clearly provides for disciplinary procedure, the laid down procedure must be strictly adhered to, otherwise any decision affecting the right or repudiation of tenure of office of the employee will be declared null and void. He referred to U.N.T.H.M.B & Ors v. Nnoli (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 363) 376; Raji v. University of Ilorin (1999) ALL FWLR (Pt. 345) 325; Ahmed v. Ahmadu Bello University Zaria & Anor (2016) LPELR 40261.

He submitted that by both the provisions of Section 20 (2) of the Kaduna State University Law No 3 of 2004, and paragraphs 15 (1) (2) of the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service, the investigation committee empowered to investigate the Respondent before the decision to terminate his appointment is reached is the “Joint Committee of the Council and the Senate” and not the Committees that sat and purportedly investigated the Respondent. During cross-examination, both DW1 and DW2 acknowledged the fact that the Joint Committee of the Council and the Senate which is the appropriate committee empowered to investigate the Respondent, never sat to investigate the Respondent, rather, it was a Committee on investigation of alleged irregularity in payment and issuance of academic transcript and Appointment and Promotion Committee Sub-Committee on Disciplinary Matters. He submitted further assuming but without conceding that the committees that sat and purportedly investigated the Respondent were the appropriate committees empowered to do so, two Committees cannot for all intent and purposes be said to have complied with the requirement of the law as to fair hearing. This is because even though the Respondent was invited by the two committees, the Respondent was merely invited for interactive sessions only by the Investigation Committee on Alleged Irregularity in Payment and Issuance of Academic Transcripts, and the Appointment & Promotion Sub-Committee on Disciplinary Matters to brief the both Committees on the procedures and processes of payments and issuance of transcripts in the University based on the strength of the internal memorandum dated 04/04/2016 which he wrote to the Registrar of the 1st Appellant, the Respondent’s immediate superior officer in hierarchy.

He submitted that both Committees did not invite the Respondent Claimant on the basis of any allegations of misconduct, or query, or disciplinary action to be taken against him. In fact, during cross-examination, DW1 acknowledged that the committee which he chaired was not specifically established to investigate the Respondent Claimant. This fact is also clearly contained in Exhibit C8 (page 62 of the Record of Appeal) the terms of reference given to the Committee. The Respondent’s invitation as contained in the various letters of invitation did not contain any specific allegation leveled against the Respondent for which he is required to appear and defend himself. That the notice or invitation required by both the University Law and the Staff Conditions of Service to be given to the Respondent must clearly state the alleged offence on the face of the notice or letter of invitation and same shall be given to the Respondent by the Council not by the committee that allegedly gave the letter of invitation. Consequently, the Respondent cannot be said to have been afforded an opportunity to defend himself as he merely appeared and briefed the committees on the procedures and processes of payments and issuance of transcripts only.

He submitted that the grounds upon which the Appellants may terminate the Respondent’s appointment for good cause are as clearly contained and well defined in both Section 20 (6) of the University Law and Section 15 (1) (6) of the Staff Conditions of Service. Same is not open ended as wrongly submitted by learned Appellants’ Counsel and same leaves no room for wide discretions or whims and caprices of the 2nd Appellant. The 2nd Appellant is a creation of the law and thus is subject to the provisions of the Law that established it in all its actions.

He argued that the definition of “for good cause” referred to in both Section 20 (6) of the Kaduna State University Law and Section 15 (1) (6) of the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service is exhaustive as can be seen from the use of the word “means” which connotes exhaustiveness. He further submit that where the Council have good cause to terminate the appointment of a staff, same must be in accordance with the laid down procedure in both Section 20 (1) (2) of the Kaduna State University Law No 3 of 2004, and Section 15 (1) (1) (2) of the Kaduna State University Staff Conditions of Service.

He submitted that the various invitation letters given to the Respondent did not contain any allegation of negligence and financial impropriety or any offence at all against the Respondent for which he was required to make representation and on which basis recommendation for termination of his appointment was made by the committee. The lower Court said counsel rightly held that the Respondent was not given notice by the Appellants, as required by the law and the Staff Conditions of Service, before terminating his appointment; that the letters of invitation did not contain any allegations against the Respondent as such he could not be said to have been given fair hearing as required by Section 20(1) and (2) of the Law and Section 15 (1) of the University Staff Conditions of Service. That the cases of Raji v. Wema Bank Plc (supra), Suleiman v. Master Stroke Packages Ltd. (supra), Garba v. University of Maiduguri (supra) and Jibril v. The Military Administrator, Kwara State & Ors (supra) all cited and relied upon by the Appellants are not on all fours with this case and thus not applicable herein.

He urged us to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellants and hold that the lower court was justified in holding that the termination of appointment of the Respondent by the Appellants did not comply strictly and fully with the procedure as provided in Section 20 of the Kaduna State University Law, No. 3, 2004 for the termination of the Respondent’s appointment.

In determining issue no.1, it is clear paradventure and in agreement with the learned counsel for the Respondent that the learned trial judge was justified in holding that the termination of appointment of the Respondent by the Appellants-
i. Did not comply strictly and fully with the procedure as provided in Section 20 of the Kaduna State University Law, No.3, 2004 for the termination of the Respondent’s appointment.
ii. That from the evidence on record the Respondent was not given the opportunity of making representation in person on the offences he was alleged to have committed and the Appellants violated the provisions of Section 20 of the Appellants Law.
iii. That the alleged offences established against the Respondent does not fall under the categories of good cause as stated in Section 15(1) – (6) of the Staff Conditions of Service. There is no provision for the alleged case of financial impropriety for which the Respondent’s appointment was terminated.
iv. The evidence of the Appellants’ witnesses under cross-examination is that the investigating committee was not specifically set up to investigate the Respondent.
v. That the letters inviting the Respondent to appear before the committee did not indicate the purpose of the invitations.
vi. That the report of the investigation committee was forwarded to the sub-committee of Appointment and Promotions Committee and that the Council did not investigate the Respondent.

At this juncture, it is pertinent to reproduce the provision of Section 20 of the Kaduna State University Law thus:
“Section 20:
(1) If the Council has reasons for good cause to believe that any person who is employed as a member of staff of the University other the Vice Chancellor should be removed from office or employment, the Council shall:
(a) Give notice of those reasons to the member in question;
(b) Afford the member an opportunity of making representation in person on the matter to the Council;
(2) If the member of staff in question or any three members request within the period of one month from the date of the notice, Council shall make arrangements for –
i) For a joint committee of the Council and the Senate to investigate the matter and to report on it to the Council; or
ii) For a Committee of the Senate to investigate the matter where it relates to an academic matter and to report on it to the Senate which will then report to Council, and
iii) For the member of staff in question to be afforded the opportunity of appearing before and being heard by an investigating committee with respect to the matter;
(3) If the Council, after considering the report of the Investigating Committee, is satisfied that the member in question should be removed, the Council may cause the removal of the member in writing. (Underlining for emphasis)
(5) For the purposes of this Section “good cause” means:
(a) Conviction for any offence which Council considers to be such as to render the person concerned unfit for the discharge of the functions of his office; or
(b) Any physical or mental incapacity which the Council after obtaining medical advice, considers to be such as to render the person concerned unfit to continue to hold his office; or
(c) Conduct of a scandalous or other disgraceful nature which the Council considers to be such as to render the person concerned unfit to continue to hold his office; or
(d) Conduct which the Council considers to be such as to constitute failure or inability of the person concerned to discharge the functions of his office or comply with the terms and conditions of his services.”
From the above provision, it is obvious that the notice to set in motion disciplinary action against the Respondent ought to be given by the Council itself. That was not done in this case. Even if the member or any three members of Council so request as in Section 20(2) of the relevant law, the Council ought to make arrangement for a joint committee of the Council and the Senate to investigate the matter. Again, the procedure stated in Section 20(2) was not followed in this case.

The Committees that purportedly investigated the case of the Respondent was not the joint committee of Council and the Senate as stipulated under Section 20(2) of the Law.
Still on the provision of Section 20 (5) (a) – (d) “good cause” was specifically defined yet the allegations against the Respondent could not be found and/or accommodated within the meaning of “good cause” under the provision of Section 20 (5) of the KASU Law.
An equally glaring breach of fair hearing against the Respondent is the fact that none of the letters of invitation ever stated that the Respondent was to make representations or defend himself for any misconduct constituting “good cause” under Section 20 (5) of the KASU Law.
An invitation to give evidence or to interact cannot be tantamount or be equated with an accusation to defend or make representation to a disciplinary committee.
In all of these circumstances, the learned trial judge was right to have held that it is now firmly established that in matters of discipline, the laid down procedure must be strictly adhered to otherwise any decision affecting the right, or repudiation or tenure, of office of the employee will be declared null and void.

Issue No. 1 is resolved against the Appellants.

Learned counsel for the Appellants raised two unrelated sub-issues in relation to issue No. 2.

The first is the submission premised on the cases of Raji v. Wema Bank Plc (2013) 39 N.I.L.R. (Pt. 120) 29 NIC at 90 – 91 and Jibril v. The Military Administrator Kwara State & Ors. (2013) 37 N.I.L.R. (Pt. 113) 167 at 193 – 194 that where there is allegation of misconduct involving dishonesty or misappropriation of fund against an employee, an employer can summarily dismiss such employee for gross misconduct without the necessity of a prior conviction in a court of law.

Also, that offences of negligence of duty and financial impropriety were established against the Respondent by the two committees of the Appellants and that the Respondent can therefore be summarily dismissed.

In quick response to the above sub-issue in Appellants issue 2, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellants counsel has failed to appreciate the fact that there is a wide difference between a normal master servant contractual relationship and a contract of service with statutory flavour. That where the terms of employment are governed by laws, rules and regulations that is having statutory flavour, the employee’s employment cannot be terminated except in accordance with such rules and regulations.

That in the instant case, Section 20 of the University Law and Section 15 of the Staff Conditions of Service confers on the Respondent a status over and above the normal contractual relationship of master and servant.

Consequently, said counsel, the only way to terminate such a contract of service with statutory flavour is to adhere strictly to the procedure laid down in the statute i.e. Kaduna State University Law and Staff Conditions of Service.

On this, Respondent’s counsel referred to the cases of F.C.S.C. v. Laoye (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 652 at 714, Olaniyan v. UNILAG (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599, Iderima v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 951) 378, (2005) 9 SC (Pt. 111) 135 at 14.

He concluded on this that the cases of Raji v. Wema Bank Plc (supra), Yusuf v. Union Bank (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 632, Jibril v. Military Administrator, Kwara State & Ors (supra) amongst others referred to by the learned counsel for the Appellants on this point are completely different and unrelated to the facts of the instant case, as such these cases are in applicable to the instant case.

The second point raised by the Appellants still under issue 2 is in relation to the consequential order of the trial court thus:
“The Defendants shall within 30 days of this judgment pay to the claimant the said salaries and allowances.”

This, the Appellants interpreted as an issue raised suo motu without calling the parties to address on it and thereby the trial court breached the Appellants’ right to fair hearing and right of appeal. Ordinarily, Appellants issue 2 and ground 2 of the Notices and grounds of appeal ought to have been discountenanced and struck out for the reason that the ground and the issue therefrom did not arise as a ratio decidendi from the judgment of the court.

However, and for whatever it is worth, it must be stated for the umpteenth time that counsel must appreciate the wide difference between a master and servant contractual relationship and a contract of service with statutory flavour.

As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the Respondent, the suggestion of dismissing the Respondent summarily does not arise in the instant case. The only way to terminate a contract with statutory flavour as in this case is to adhere strictly to the procedure laid down in the statute.

In relation to the second sub-issue on issue No. 2, it is difficult to understand the idea of the Appellants’ counsel that a consequential order was an issue raised suo motu by the learned trial Judge and how such an order by the court affects the Appellants’ right of fair hearing and/or right of appeal. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the Respondent, Order 47 Rule 7 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 clearly provides that “the Court may at the time of delivering the judgment or making the order give direction as to the period within which payment is to be made or other act is to be performed.” And that the said consequential order is without prejudice to the Appellants’ right of appeal which they have exercised without any hindrance.

In the circumstance, the gamut of issue 2 is resolved against the Appellants.

On issue 3, learned counsel for the Appellants stated the contents of the three letters of invitation sent to the Respondent thus:
“1. Exhibit C9 dated 23rd June, 2016 reads:
“LETTER OF INVITATION
I have been directed to invite you for an interaction with the investigation committee on Alleged Irregularity in Payment and Issuance of Academic Transcripts…” See page 2 of the additional record of proceedings.
2. Exhibit C11 dated 9th June, 2016 reads:
“LETTER OF INVITATION
I have been directed to invite you for an interaction with the Investigative Committee on Alleged Irregularity in Payment and Issuance of Academic Transcripts to brief members on the procedures and processes of payments and issuance of transcripts in Kaduna State University ….” See pages 63 and 94 of the record of proceedings.
3. Exhibit C12 dated 5th January, 2017
“LETTER OF INVITATION
I have been directed to invite you for an interaction with the Appointments & Promotions Sub-Committee on Disciplinary Matters…” See pages 65 and 137 of the record of proceedings.”

He submitted that the Respondent was invited not as a witness to the two Committees but as someone expected to offer explanation on the allegation of irregularity in payment and issuance of academic transcripts. That on that basis, the Respondent made representation 3 times, cross-examined witnesses who testified against him and entered his defence on the allegation before the Committees.

He submitted further that the learned trial Judge did not look and evaluate the entire content of the exhibits tendered at the trial such as letters of invitation, reports of various Committees set up to investigate and recommend disciplinary measures against the Respondent. That the learned trial Judge chose the phrase “an interaction” and “to brief members” which appeared in one of the letters of invitation as the only reason for inviting the Respondents by the Appellants.

He concluded that the trial court did not holistically evaluate the content of exhibits and therefore violated a cardinal principle of interpretation.

In response to issue 3, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the content of Exhibits C9, C11 and C13 merely shows that the Respondent was invited by both Committees to “brief both Committees on the procedures and processes of payments and issuance of transcripts in the University” which he did three (3) times.

That the Respondent never cross-examined any witness and was never confronted with any allegation by any of the Committees.

He concluded that the Appellants have not in any way shown any failure on the part of the lower court to holistically evaluate the evidence and exhibits before it.

In deciding Appellants issue 3, the content of Exhibits C9, C11 and C13 clearly and unambiguously reveal that the Respondent was never confronted with any allegation of wrongdoing or misconduct before the Appellants wrongfully and unlawfully terminated the Respondent’s appointment.

Talking about holistic interpretation of letters or holistic evaluation of evidence, the learned counsel for the Appellants ought to be reminded of the basic principles of semantic canons of interpretation of words and statutes.
1. Ordinary-Meaning Canon – Words are to be understood in their ordinary everyday meanings – unless the content indicates that they bear a technical sense.
2. Fixed-Meaning Canon – Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted.
3. Omitted-case canon. Nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso habendus est).
4. General-Terms Canons – General terms are to be given their general meaning (generaliter intelligenda).
If I must add, the ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation. It governs constitutions, statutes, rules and private instruments. See e.g James Kint, Commentaries on American Law 432 (1826) quoted in Scalia & Garner: Readings in Law: Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) U.S.A.
In this respect, the terms of writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation.

In relation to Appellants’ issue 3, the words in Exhibits C9, C11 and C13 are clear and unambiguous and they show clearly that the Respondent was expected to appear and interact with the Committees set up by the Appellants without any reference to his having to defend any allegation of wrong doing or misconduct against him.

The learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence, oral and documentary in coming to the conclusion that none of the exhibits invited him to make representations or defend himself on any misconduct.

Issue 3 is resolved against the Appellants.

In this appeal, the Appellants nominated three (3) issues, the three (3) issues were resolved against the Appellants. In consequence, this appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed. N100,000 cost of this appeal is awarded in favour of the Respondent against the Appellants.

BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA, J.C.A.: I read a draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Owoade, JCA. My Lord in the lead judgment narrated the facts that lead to filing this suit by the Respondent against the Appellants before the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Kaduna Judicial Division and the trial before the lower Court which led to a finding in favour of the said Respondent. The Appellants filed this appeal and in their brief canvassed three issues for determination which were adopted by the Respondent’s Counsel. My brother in the lead judgment considered the argument of counsel to the parties in their respective briefs and resolved all the three issues against the Appellants, thus rendering this appeal devoid of merit.

I adopt the finding and conclusion in the lead judgment and pronounce that this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed. The decision by the lower Court delivered on 20th May, 2020 in Suit No. NIC/KD/10/2017 is affirmed by me. I also abide with the award of N100,000.00 cost in favour of the Respondent.

MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, Mojeed A. Owoade, JCA, just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached. I do not have anything useful to add. I abide by all the orders made therein.