JATAU v. AUTA
(2022)LCN/16934(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(MAKURDI JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Friday, March 25, 2022
CA/MK/252/2017
Before Our Lordships:
Ignatius Igwe Agube Justice of the Court of Appeal
Cordelia Ifeoma Jombo-Ofo Justice of the Court of Appeal
Muslim Sule Hassan Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
OSU (DR) AUGUSTINE JATAU APPELANT(S)
And
PRINCE ISHAKU DAHILO AUTA RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE POSITION OF LAW ON LOCUS STANDI
The law regarding locus standi is settled having regard to the plethora of decided cases on the matter, this Court in Engineer Kene Ikedife v. All Progressive Grand Alliance & Ors (2014) LPELR-22921 (CA) Per AGUBE, JCA at page 54, paragraphs B-F stated:
‘’The term ‘’locus standi’’ has been simply defined at page 952 of Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition by Bryan A. Garner et al as ‘’1. Latin ‘’place of standing’’ The right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum. STANDING.’’ As rightly argued by the learned counsel on both sides on the authorities they have rightly cited and relied upon, which authorities are in tandem with the above definition, locus standi in law denotes the legal capacity to initiate proceedings in a Court of law and as far as this country is concerned, it is a constitutional requirement for any person(s), group of persons or authority or Government to be able to seek for either the protection or enforcement of their rights or obligations in the Courts established either by the constitution or statutes.’ PER HASSAN, J.C.A.
DEFINITION OF AN “AGGRIEVED PERSON”
According to James L.J. in Ex-parte Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch.D 458 a ‘’person aggrieved’’ must be a man ‘’who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something,’’ ex-parte Sidebotham (supra). This Jamesonian definition was approvingly, adopted in In Re Reed Bowen and Co (1887) 19 QBD 174. The learned Master of the Rolls, Lord Esher, emphasized that ‘’when James, L.J. said that a person aggrieved must be a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully refused him of something, he obviously meant that the person aggrieved must be a man who has been which he had a right to demand.” PER HASSAN, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW WHERE A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION CHALLANGINGA COURT’S JURISDICTION IS HEARD WITH A SUBSTANTIVE SUITE OR APPLICATION
It is trite law that where a preliminary objection challenging the Court’s jurisdiction is heard along with the substantive suit or application, the Court must give a ruling on the objection before proceeding to determine the substantive suit. See General Mohammed A. Garba v. Mustapha Sani Mohammed & Ors (2016) LPELR-40612 (SC). PER HASSAN, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT A QUESTION WHICH WAS NOT RAISED AT THE LOWER COURT CAN BE RAISED IN THE APPELLANT COURT
The law is settled that a question which was not raised at the lower Court cannot be raised in the appellant Court for the first time without leave. See Agedah vs Nkwocha (2002) 9 NWLR Pt. 771 Pg 113, Customary Court of Appeal, Benue State v. Abura Tsegba & Ors (2010) LPELR-4009 (CA).
In the instant appeal, I have searched through the record including the pleadings and the reliefs of the plaintiff this issue was not pleaded by the Appellant. The Judgment of the lower Court at page 317 of the Record of Appeal is very explicit he stated ‘’I have heard the arguments on both sides and having perused the pleadings and the reliefs of the plaintiff, I do not find anything on this issue. I agree with the defence counsel that no issue of such was raised by the plaintiff neither were issues joined. I therefore discountenance same as of no moment.’’ In my humble view failure of the Appellant to obtain leave of this Court to argue this fresh issue renders such an issue incompetent. This principle is predicated on the fact that this Court is not the trial Court and as such once a case has been tried and concluded, the case should not be re-opened on appeal to enable a party to improve on his case at the trial Court by allowing him to introduce new issue without leave of this Court. The introduction of new issue raised in the instant appeal is likely to alter the basis for the decision and seeks to reopen the decision appealed against on the new issue raised. I am guided by the explanation of per Okoro, JCA in New Resources International Limited & Anor v. Ejike Oranusi, Esq (2010) LPELR-4592 (CA) Page 5 Where he said:
‘’Quite apart from that, the issue is new or fresh and by the practice in this Court, the party raising a fresh issue must first seek and obtain the leave of Court before such an issue can be considered by the Court. Failure to seek and obtain leave as in the instant case renders such an issue incompetent and liable to be struck out.” PER HASSAN, J.C.A.
MUSLIM SULE HASSAN, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Judgment of the High Court of Justice of Nasarawa State sitting at New Karu delivered on 28th July, 2016 by Hon. Justice Rose G. Soji. The Appellant dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned trial Judge filed the original Notice of Appeal on the 26th September, 2017 see pages 319-324 of the records. He subsequently filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on 4th October, 2021 and deemed filed on 18th October, 2021.
The brief facts of the case is that the Appellant (then Plaintiff) commenced this action on the 10th day of April, 2014 initially against six Defendants at the High Court of Nasarawa State Holden at New Karu by Writ of Summons. The Appellant’s claims at the trial Court is a declaration that it is now the turn of Zone B to produce the next Dadayako of Dadayako Chiefdom after the death of His Royal Highness, Osu Dahilo Auta, who died on the 3rd day of February, 2014. See page 2 of the Record.
The Defendants were served with the Writ of Summons on the 16th and 17th of April, 2014 and by leave of the Court below they filed their memorandum of appearance. At the hearing the 1st – 5th Defendants filed notice of preliminary objection which was upheld by the trial Court and the names of the 1st – 5th Defendants were struck out from the suit and the 6th Defendant then became the sole defendant (now the Respondent in this Appeal). After the conclusion of trial the Court below delivered its Judgment on the 28th day of July, 2016 against the Plaintiff by dismissing his claim. The Appellant aggrieved by the decision filed the original Notice of Appeal on 26th September, 2017. He subsequently filed an amended Notice of Appeal on 4th October, 2021 and deemed filed on 18th October, 2021.
The Appellant’s brief of argument was filed on 12th day of July, 2021 wherein he identified five issues for determination thus:
1. Whether considering the facts and the circumstances of this case the trial Court was right when it held that the Appellant is not from Dadayako Chiefdom. (Distilled from ground one).
2. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the Appellant has no locus standing to institute this action. (Distilled from ground two).
3. Whether the trial Court was right when it proceeded to determine the substantive matter when it held that the Appellant have no locus standi but entered Judgment for the Respondent and dismissed the Appellant’s case instead of striking out. (Distilled from ground three).
4. Whether considering the circumstances of this case, the trial Court did not misdirected itself when it relied heavily on the 2011 Law in reaching or arriving at its conclusions despite the existence of the extant law of 2013 applicable to Dadayako Chiefdom. (Distilled from ground four).
5. Whether the trial Court did not misdirected itself when it relied heavily on and attached evidential value to documents that were not pleaded and not duly certified to arrive at its conclusion. (Distilled from ground five).
Learned Counsel for the Respondent upon been served with the Appellant brief filed his brief of argument on 12th August, 2021. He adopted the issues for determination as formulated by the Appellants for ease of argument and sequence of submissions.
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSION:
ISSUE ONE
Arguing issue one, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the trial Court erred when it held that the Appellant is not from Dadayako Chiefdom because the Appellant by his pleadings failed to show his sufficient interest in the stool by evidence.
According to Counsel the Appellant unequivocally stated in his evidence that he is presently the Osu of kolu of Gadabuke and hailed from Zone B of the Dadayako Chiefdom. He referred to paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of his witness statement at page 8 of the record.
He submitted that Kolu is one of the villages in Gadabuke and in turn Gadabuke is one of the Districts in Zone B of the Dadayako Chiefdom. He relied on Serial Number 26, Second Schedule to Section 3 (VI, VII & VIII) of the Nasarawa State Creation of Additional Chiefdoms (Amendment) Law 2013.
It was submitted that the eligibility to contest for the stool is open to all Gbiji (Gbagyi) Sons not below the age of 25 from the following villages on rational basis. He stated that Zone A comprises of Nakuse, Madaki and Karmo District while Zone B consist of Araba, Gadabuke and Gwargwada Districts.
According to Counsel by way of evidence the Appellant stated that he hailed from Zone B of the Dadayako. He submitted that the Appellant has shown sufficient interest and traced his membership to the Dadayako Chiefdom. He urged the Court to so hold.
Reliance was placed on the following cases Ladejobi & Ors v. Oguntayo & Ors (2004) LPELR-1734 SC and EMEZI v. Osuagwu (2005) LPELR-1130 SC.
He maintained that the Appellant has shown his interest that he is the Osu Kulo which is one of the villages within Gadabuke District of Dadayako Chiefdom and that he is interested in contesting for the stool. He urged the Court to so hold.
RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSION:
Learned Counsel for the Respondent in answer to issue one submitted that this issue as argued was misplaced. He stated that the complaint in the ground of appeal was on the basis of ‘’pleadings’’ alone and not ‘’the facts and circumstances in this case’’ as added to the issue for determination.
For ease of reference learned Counsel reproduce ground one of the Appellant grounds of appeal thus:
‘’The learned trial judge erred in law in her judgment of 28th July, 2016 when she held that the Appellant was not from the Dadayako Kingdom, despite the averments in pleadings’.”
It was submitted that the Appellant did not raise the issue of evidence or ‘’facts and circumstances”. He stated that the particulars in the ground alluding to evidence are irrelevant to the complaint in the ground and should be discountenanced since they do not relate to narrow complaint on the ‘’pleadings’’ only.
He submitted further that the Appellant is not contending or raising complaint on the evidence in his ground of appeal, but on the basis of pleadings only. He argued that it is wrong to formulate issues on ‘’facts and circumstances’’ when the ground of appeal was only on pleadings. He urged this Court to discountenance the issue as formulated and strike out same along with all arguments/submissions thereon contained at paragraphs 4.1 to 4.13 of the Appellant’s brief.
He argued that in the absence of an issue properly formulated in ground 1 same is deemed abandoned and ought to be struck out.
Learned Counsel submitted further that in the event the Court is inclined to consider the issue and arguments on this ground. He stated that this can only be confined to the Appellant’s pleadings and to see if issues were joined on this allegation in the Respondent’s pleadings. He referred to paragraph 2 of the Respondent’s Statement of Defence at page 32 of the record wherein Respondent denied that the Appellant on the Appellant’s averment that he hails from Dadayako Chiefdom. He stated that the Respondent pleaded thus:
‘’The 6th Defendant states that Kulo, where the Plaintiff hails from in as contained in paragraphs 1 and 8 of the Statement of Claim is not part of Dadayako Chiefdom.’’
It was submitted that having regard to the state of pleading then, issues were joined and the Appellant’s complaint that the pleadings alone should support his claim cannot be right in law. He stated that issues joined, evidence was required. He stated further that it has to be evidence and not pleadings.
He maintained that the Appellant chose to complain on the state of pleadings only that he cannot be heard to argue evidence.
According to counsel assuming without conceding that the Appellant could argue evidence under this issue.
He submitted that the cases the Appellant cited in paragraphs 4.11 and 4.12 at pages 6 and 7 of his Appellant’s brief are guides to the mandatory nature of the evidence he ought to have pleaded and led in line with the cases he cited. He stated that he needed to lead evidence to show that he is from Dadayako Kingdom in line with the cases he cited.
It was further submitted as follows:
(a) Such evidence must be evidence showing his ‘’family’’ roots and/or ‘’hereditary’’ lineage to the Dadayako Chiefdom. He stated that the Appellant neither pleaded nor led any evidence regarding his family or hereditary lineage or even a ruling family.
(b) Only the family can sue and lead evidence since it is the family rights that have been breached. He stated that in the instant case the Appellant filed the action at the trial Court as an individual, that it was not a representative action.
He submitted further that the Respondent’s DW1 is next in rank to the Traditional Head of Kulo where the Appellant himself claim to hail from. He stated that his testimony is contained in his witness statement at pages 50 and 51 of the record. He said DW1 stated clearly that kulo is not part of Dadayako Chiefdom but of Gome Baye Chiefdom.
According to counsel, the Appellant saw the Statement of Defence and witness statements, but he failed to call any witness (apart from himself as his own sole witness) by way of reply to the Statement of Defence along with additional witness statement to lead evidence to contradict his own traditional head from kulo.
He argued further that the law is settled that the case of a Plaintiff must be the strength of his evidence and not the weakness of the defence. He therefore, had the burden to lead cogent evidence of his root and entitlement to the chieftaincy stool.
He submitted that there is no pleaded facts or evidence this Court can rely on that the Appellant is from a specific ruling house and from Dadayako Chiefdom. He stated that the barely 2 page Statement of Claim at pages 4 and 5 of the record is vague, particularly in chieftaincy matters.
He posited that how can anyone be a candidate or eligible to contest without first pleading that he was put forward or nominated by his own ruling house. He said the answer is in the negative.
He urged us to hold in favour of the Respondent and dismiss this appeal.
ISSUE TWO
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSION
Learned Counsel submitted that the trial Court was not right when it held that the Appellant has no locus standi. He relied on the cases of Akomolafe v. Ilesanmi (2015) LPELR-25664 (CA), Thomas & Ors v. Olufosoye (1986) LPELR-3237 (SC) and A.G. FED v. A.G. OF ABIA STATE & ORS (2001) LPELR-24862 (SC).
It was further submitted that to resolve the issue of locus standi of the Plaintiff, it is his statement of claim that should be considered. He said that the Appellant stated his capacity to sue at paragraphs 1, 8 and 11 of the Statement of Claim contained at page 5 of the record. On this, he relied on the case of A.G. Anambra v. A.G. Federation (2007) LPELR-2434 (SC).
RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSION
In answer to issue two learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the context of the action and the main claims of the Plaintiff/Applicant in his writ of Summons rob him of locus standi to institute the action. He stated that his reliefs contained at page 2 of the record further affirm that he has no locus standi.
It was further submitted that his first relief for a declaration that it was ‘’the turn of Zone B to produce the Dadayako of Dadayako Chiefdom’’ clearly shows that it was Zone B that should have filed the action, at least, in a representative capacity. He stated that the right of Zone B was not personal to the Appellant.
According to counsel, the second and third reliefs for declaration that he (and not the Respondent) was eligible to contest for the chieftaincy stool is a matter for Zone B and not his ruling house. He stated that there is a world of difference between eligibility and candidacy. He said being denied opportunity to contest is a challenge that the ruling house wrongfully refused to nominate him (in which case, the action should have been against the ruling house) or that the ruling house (not the Appellant personally) was denied opportunity to nominate a candidate (in which case, it is the ruling house that has the locus to complain).
He maintained that the fourth and fifth reliefs are consequential orders arising from the first, second and third reliefs and can only be granted if he had locus standi to claim the first, second and third reliefs.
Learned Counsel further submitted that the claim and reliefs were personal to the Plaintiff and he decided to sue in his individual capacity. For him to succeed according to Counsel he should have adhered to the warning of the Supreme Court when it held thus in:
“Osagunna v. Military Gov. of Ekiti State (2001) LPELR-8058 (SC) page 22E to 23A ‘’It is clear from the pleadings and the claims that the main goal of the plaintiff was to gain the office of the Olupoti for himself. And in so doing he had to show that he was duly selected by the family entitled so to do and was appointed by the right customary kingmakers.’’ (Per Ogundare, JSC).
The Appellant according to counsel ignored this.
It was further submitted that the law on locus standi was laid down by the Supreme Court in the following cases: Adesanya v. The President (1981) 5 SC. 69, Adekunle v. Adelugba (2011) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1272) 154, Adewumi v. A.G. Ekiti State (2002) FWLR (Pt. 92) 1835 and Ebong v. Uwemedimo (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 411) 22.
It was submitted that if the Appellant had pleaded and led evidence that he is a member of a ruling house (which he did not). He stated that in chieftaincy matters, it is not enough for a Plaintiff to merely state that he is a member of a family or ruling House. He must state his interest and how that interest accrued (such as being member of the father’s lineage in the family or being the first Son of a former ruler etc). He stated that this point was emphasised in the case of Daniyan v. Iyagin (2002) FWLR (Pt. 120) page 185 at 1826 where Oduyemi, JCA stated that:
‘’Membership of a family is not enough. Not all members of a chieftaincy family are eligible for chieftaincy.”
According to Counsel the mere assertion that he belongs to a Zone of ruling houses does not meet this requirement. He stated that it is legally impossible to prove that he belongs to Zone B as he claims without stating the ruling house within Zone B that he claims he belong to.
It was further contended that the Appellant did not plead and lead evidence that he was a candidate and was voted for, or that his ruling house nominated him as a candidate. Nor did he plead evidence of his eligibility to contest in terms of naming specific ruling house or minimum age required. He stated that the learned trial Judge took pains to explain the Plaintiff/Appellant’s dilemma in page 306 lines 16-21 of the record.
He argued that the Appellant did not also sue in a representative capacity on behalf of the ruling house. He urged us to hold that the Appellant did not show sufficient personal interest to file this action and lacks locus standi.
ISSUE THREE
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSION:
On issue three, learned counsel submitted that the trial Court having held that the Appellant has no locus standi to initiate this action it ought to have declined jurisdiction without proceeding into the substantive matter because it goes to the root of the matter. He relied on Nyesom v. Peterside & Ors (2016) LPELR-40036 (SC).
He contended that where the Court arrive at a conclusion that the plaintiff lacks locus to file the matter the most appropriate order to make is striking out of the case not dismissal. He referred to RTEAN v. NURTW (1992) LPELR-3200 (SC).
He maintained that the trial Court having found that the Appellant has no locus standing to question the stool of Dadayako Chiefdom, it ought not to have proceeded into determining other substantive issues because the trial Court lacks the jurisdiction to do so. He stated that the proper order to be made in such a situation is to strike out the claim not dismissal. He relied on Emezi v. Osuagwu & Ors (2005) LPELR-1130 (SC). He urged us to set aside the judgment in the best interest of justice.
RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSION
On this issue, he submitted that they are in agreement with the Appellant to some extent, on the proposition of the law that where a Court finds that a Plaintiff has no locus standi, the proper order to make is to strike out the suit.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted further that this issue and ground on which it is based must fail also.
He stated that the ground of appeal did not arise from the ruling and judgment of the lower Court and is therefore in competent. He argued that the decision of the lower Court in regard to the preliminary objection on locus standi is contained in the second to the last paragraph at page 306 of the record. He said the Hon. Judge neither dismissed nor struck out the Plaintiff/Appellant’s claims for lack of standing to sue. He argued that no order was made. The dismissal of the suit according to Counsel was based on the substantive suit. He said this is contained in the last paragraph of the judgment at page 317 of the record.
It was further submitted that having agreed to argue the preliminary objection and the substantive matter at final address, the lower Court was entitled to proceed to determine the main suit and dismiss same where it finds (as in the instant case), that the substantive suit also lacks merit. He argued that this ground does not challenge any order made by the lower Court and ought to be struck out. He stated that issue three formulated is incompetent and all arguments thereunder ought to be discountenanced.
He submitted that this issue must fail because the relief in the Notice of Appeal is for the grant of the Appellant’s reliefs as contained in his writ of Summons. He stated that there is no alternative prayer in the reliefs sought at the Court of Appeal for the suit to be struck out in the event that this Court affirms that the Appellant lacks locus standi. He referred to Order 7 Rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016 and further submitted that this Court cannot donate a relief not claimed.
According to Counsel the submission of the Appellant that the suit could be struck out by this Court as argued under this issue, is inconsistent with his reliefs in his Notice of Appeal in that the same claims he is seeking to strike out should also be granted. He said a litigant cannot approbate and reprobate.
It was further submitted that a finding that a Plaintiff lacks locus standi is a finding that the Court has no jurisdiction. He stated that an order striking out is appropriate mainly in cases where, for instance, there was no reasonable cause of action disclosed and a Plaintiff is entitled to put his house in order and file another action. He stated that in matters which cannot be re-litigated or initiated afresh as between the parties. It makes no difference whether the matter was struck out or dismissed. He said this issue is academic and ought not to be entertained. He urge the Court to hold in favour of the Respondent on this issue and to dismiss the appeal.
ISSUE FOUR
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSION:
On issue four, learned counsel submitted that by virtue of the circumstances of this suit the trial Court misdirected itself when its relied heavily on 2011 law in reaching or arriving at it conclusions despite the extant law of 2013 applicable to Dadayako chiefdom.
It was submitted that on the strength of the record of appeal particularly pages 41 to 51 which contained the witness statements of the Defendant’s witnesses shows that they are witnesses pursuant to the Nasarawa State Legal Notice No 1 of 2011. He said the said 2011 law is contained at pages 132 to 135 of the records.
He stated that the Defendant’s witnesses were extracted as follows: Thomas Gbedazo from Jawun at pages 41 to 43 of the record of appeal; Alhaji Yakubu Haruna from Dazhi at pages 44 to 46 and Joshua Shigusna from Madella at pages 47 to 49 purported to be kingmakers of Dadayako stool of Dadayako Chiefdom pursuant to the Nasarawa State Legal Notice No. 1 of 2011. He said the trial Court relied on the evidence of these witnesses to arrive at its conclusion.
According to counsel on the contrary, the extant law applicable to Dadayako Chiefdom is the Nasarawa State Creation of Additional Chiefdoms (Amendment) Law, 2013 which amended the Nasarawa State (Creation of Additional Chiefdoms) Law, 2003. He referred to pages 170 to 178 of the record.
It was submitted that the Nasarawa State (Creation of Additional Chiefdoms) Law, 2003 created the Dadayako Chiefdom. At the Serial No 26, Schedule one, Section 3 of the Nasarawa State (Creation of Additional Chiefdoms) Law, 2003. He stated further that the college of selectors/kingmakers are the District Heads of Madaki, Nakuse, Araba and the Village Heads of Sa’gbagyi, Gadabuke, Osutudu Uku, Osu Kpenbo and Osu Sangyiga.
It was argued that a meticulous perusal of the laws shows that the college of selectors and kingmakers are quite different but the trial Court misdirected itself by relying on the 2011 law which was not pleaded. He relied on the case of Emegokwue v. Okadigbo (1973) LPELR-1124 (SC). He urged the Court to so hold in best interest of justice.
RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSION:
In answer to this issue learned counsel submitted that this issue did not arise from the judgment of the lower Court. He submitted that the review of arguments on the gazette and the substantive law was done by the learned trial Judge in lines 7 to 14 page 311 of the record. He stated that the decision of the Court is in lines 15 to 18 page 311 of the record. He said there was no decision based on the gazette or the substantive law. He submitted that what the learned trial Judge said in the paragraphs of the judgment referred to above was that:
‘’I have heard the arguments on both sides and haven perused the pleadings and the reliefs of the plaintiff. I do not find anything on this issue. I agree with the defence counsel that no issue was raised by the Plaintiff neither were issues joined. I therefore discountenanced same as of no moment.’’
It was submitted that the trial Court never made any pronouncement that the applicable law is the gazette and not the substantive law. He argued that ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal is extraneous to the judgment, as is the issue formulated thereunder.
He submitted further that an appeal ought to challenge the decision of the lower Court. He said there was no such decision by the lower Court.
According to learned counsel, this ground and the issue argued thereunder do not. He urged the Court to strike out this ground as incompetent and to discountenance the issue formulated thereunder as well as the arguments canvassed pursuant thereto.
It was further submitted that in the event that this Court is inclined to consider the issue as formulated by the Appellants, he stated that the complaint in the ground that the lower Court ‘’relied heavily on the 2011 law’’ cannot be true. He said there was no such decision that the learned trial Judge relied heavily on such law. He maintained that there was no decision or part of the judgment wherein the learned trial Judge made any reference to or comparisons between the 2011 law and the gazette.
It is the position of the learned counsel that the learned trial Judge was right in saying no such fact was pleaded and no issue was raised in the Appellant’s Statement of claim or in the Respondent’s Statement of Defence regarding any gazette or any law, or infraction of any law or gazette, or the nature of any infraction at all. He urged us to dismiss the appeal.
ISSUE FIVE:
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSION:
Learned Counsel submitted that the trial Court misdirected itself when it relied heavily on and attached evidential value to documents that were not pleaded and not duly certified in compliance with Section 104 of the Evidence Act 2011 to arrive at its conclusion.
It was submitted that throughout the length and breadth of the Defendant’s pleadings at the trial Court, there was no paragraph whereat he pleaded the documents that were admitted by the trial Court as Exhibit. He stated that the statement of defence is contained at pages 32 to 35 of the records.
He contended that the effect of leading evidence on unpleaded documents is that it goes to no issue. He stated that parties to action before the Court are bound by their pleadings. He relied on the cases of Mazeli v. Mazeli (2012) LPELR- 19945 (CA), Oko v. Ntaji & Ors (2014) LPELR-24248 (CA).
He submitted that the learned trial Court misdirected itself when at page 305 of the record, it held that ‘’The documents are CTC and relevant. I find Exhibits ID1-ID5 carries weight as it supports the case of the defendant as they have evidential value and so I hold.”
In further submission he stated that Exhibits ID1-ID5 are bereft of evidential value. He stated that a cursory perusal of the Exhibits as contained at pages 132 to 163 of the record are not in compliance with the stipulations of the law under Section 104 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
He contended that the certification as required by Section 104 of the Evidence Act is that the name of the certifying officer’s and his official title shall be inscribed or contained on the certified Exhibit(s). He stated that the Exhibits does not bear the name and the official title of the officer. He stated that the failure and the absence of the name and the official title of the official or authorised person on the Exhibits ID1 to ID5 render it inadmissible. Reliance was placed on the case of Omisore & Anor v. Aregbesola & Ors (2015) LPELR-24803 (SC).
He urged us to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial Court.
RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL SUBMISSION:
In answer to issue five, learned counsel submitted that the scope of the issue as formulated is inconsistent with the complaint in ground 5 of the Notice of Appeal. According to him this issue does not arise from the grounds of appeal and ought to be struck out along with the Appellant’s ground 5 upon which issue no. 5 is based.
It was submitted that ground 5 of the Notice of Appeal is a complaint that the documents ‘’were not pleaded’’. He stated that there was no complaint of error or misdirection regarding the ‘’certification’’ of the documents in that ground not even in the particulars.
He contended that since no issue was formulated on the actual complaint in the ground, ground 5 ought to be deemed as abandoned and struck out.
He submitted that in the event the Court prefers to consider the issue and the argument as formulated by the Appellant. He contended that pleading documents is done by pleading the facts which the documents would support. This issue according to him have been decided by the Supreme Court in Monier Construction Co. Ltd v. Azubuike (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.136) 74 at page 88.
He contended that these documents were pleaded. He referred to paragraphs 7 to 10 of the Statement of Defence at page 33 of the record where the Respondent stated that he was ‘’nominated in writing’’ and selected by ‘’secret ballot’’ and his name was forwarded to the Governor (who was original 1st Defendant that was later struck out).
It was further submitted that the documents were also listed in the mandatory list of documents (contained at page 36 of the record of appeal).
He argued further that by Order 19 Rule 2 of the Nasarawa State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2010, it is sufficient to plead the material facts but not the evidence (documents in support).
According to Counsel, the issue on certification did not arise from the ground of appeal, the documents were duly pleaded and the issue ought to be decided in favour of the Respondent.
He urged the Court to dismiss this appeal and affirmed the Judgment of the lower Court delivered on 28th July, 2016.
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF:
Learned Counsel for the Appellant filed reply brief on 4th October, 2021. I have again read the Appellant reply brief which ordinarily should be a reply on points of law. This reply brief made very lengthy and copies submissions in answer to the Respondent’s Brief of Argument. This is not right as the object of reply brief is to give an Appellant the opportunity of replying to new points of law raised in the respondent’s brief of argument and not to repeat or re-argue his case. Most of the arguments canvassed in the Appellant’s reply brief are mere repetitions of points already argued in the Appellants’ brief apparently for the purpose of reinforcing the arguments in the appeal. That is an abuse of the right to file a reply brief. On this, see MV ‘’WESTERN STAR’’ & ORS V. B.L. LIZARD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (2013) LPELR-21470 (CA).
In the determination of this appeal, I will adopt the five issues formulated by the Appellant bearing in mind that the Respondent also adopted the same issues in his brief of argument.
ISSUE ONE:
Whether considering the facts and the circumstances of the case, the trial Court was right when it held that the Appellant is not from Dadayako Chiefdom.
The Apex Court has laid down condition precedent for instituting an action on a chieftaincy dispute in the case of the case of PRINCE DURO ADEREMI LADEJOBI & ORS V. OTUNBA AINOFI AFOLORUNSHO OGUNTAYO & ORS (2004) LPELR-1734 (SC) Per Pats-Acholonu, JSC at page 26 Stated:
‘’In Odeneye v. Efunuga (supra), this Court enunciated the following condition or parameters for instituting an action in chieftaincy matters: ‘’(a) A party may by his statement of claim and evidence show that the right that is being asserted is that of his family by reason of say their hereditary interests. In such a case, it is the family usually through their representatives who can bring the action on the premises that it is the civil right of the family that has been breached. (b) A party may be asserting his own right to the chieftaincy stool. What is required in that case is that his statement of claim and evidence that has been called should show the nature of his interest and his entitlements to the stool. In such a case, what he is asserting is his own civil right to the stool and not that of his family and Section 6 (6) (b) of 1979 Constitution has expressly given him a locus standi in such a case.”
In the instant appeal, it has not been shown by the Appellant from his pleadings and evidence at the lower Court that his family roots and/or hereditary lineage to the Dadayako Chiefdom and as rightly pointed out by the Respondent that the Appellant neither pleaded nor led any evidence regarding his family or hereditary lineage or a ruling family. See pages 4 to 10 of the records. The Appellant by his pleadings and evidence also failed to show that he was a candidate or eligible to contest and he was put forward or nominated by his own ruling house, no such evidence was presented by the Appellant at the trial Court.
The evidence of Respondent’s DW1 Danlami Maiyaki at the trial Court who was next in rank to the traditional head of Kulo where the Appellant himself claims. His evidence is contained in pages 50 and 51 of the records. He stated that kulo is not part of Dadayako Chiefdom but Gomo Baye Chiefdom. I agree with the learned trial Judge where he stated at page 307 of the records that the evidence of DW1 puts to rest the fact that Kulo where the plaintiff hails from is not part of the Dadatako chiefdom but is part of Gomo Baye Chiefdom, that his evidence was not successfully challenged under cross-examination and so I believe it is the truth, credible and convincing and I rely on same.
The learned trial Judge is entitled to drew inference from the demeanor of witnesses and is entitled to comment on same from the observation of the witness. It is settled law that the trial Court who saw and heard witnesses are in a better position to comment on the demeanor of witnesses in the instant case the statement of the learned trial Judge that she believe the evidence of DW1 to be truth, credible and convincing and rely on same is within the bounds of the law. See Ugochukwu Ngorka v. The Attorney General, Imo Sate (2014) LPELR-22532 (CA).
The evidence of the Appellant is not supported or corroborated by an independent witness. The Appellant have failed to prove with cogent evidence of his root and entitlement to the Chieftaincy stool of Dadayako Chiefdom. Thus issues one is resolved against the Appellant.
ISSUE TWO:
Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the Appellant has no locus standing to institute this action.
The law regarding locus standi is settled having regard to the plethora of decided cases on the matter, this Court in Engineer Kene Ikedife v. All Progressive Grand Alliance & Ors (2014) LPELR-22921 (CA) Per AGUBE, JCA at page 54, paragraphs B-F stated:
‘’The term ‘’locus standi’’ has been simply defined at page 952 of Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition by Bryan A. Garner et al as ‘’1. Latin ‘’place of standing’’ The right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum. STANDING.’’ As rightly argued by the learned counsel on both sides on the authorities they have rightly cited and relied upon, which authorities are in tandem with the above definition, locus standi in law denotes the legal capacity to initiate proceedings in a Court of law and as far as this country is concerned, it is a constitutional requirement for any person(s), group of persons or authority or Government to be able to seek for either the protection or enforcement of their rights or obligations in the Courts established either by the constitution or statutes.’’
According to James L.J. in Ex-parte Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch.D 458 a ‘’person aggrieved’’ must be a man ‘’who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something,’’ ex-parte Sidebotham (supra). This Jamesonian definition was approvingly, adopted in In Re Reed Bowen and Co (1887) 19 QBD 174. The learned Master of the Rolls, Lord Esher, emphasized that ‘’when James, L.J. said that a person aggrieved must be a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully refused him of something, he obviously meant that the person aggrieved must be a man who has been which he had a right to demand.”
The question of locus standi is merged in the issue of cause of action. For instance, a plaintiff who has no privity of contract with the defendant will fail to establish a cause of action for breach of the contract as he will simply not have a locus standi to sue the defendant on the contract.
Our law reports are replete with authorities that show that in chieftaincy cases, all a plaintiff is required to do is to show in his statement of claim his interest and his entitlement to the chieftaincy title. See CENTRE FOR OIL POLLUTION WATCH V. NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (2018) LPELR-50830 (SC).
In the instant case, the Appellant by his pleadings did not plead and lead evidence that he was a candidate and was voted for or that his ruling house nominated him as a candidate. Nor did the Plaintiff now Appellant plead evidence of his eligibility to contest in terms of naming specific ruling house or minimum age required. A decision of a Court cannot be arrived at by conjecture or on mere whims or caprices, there is no room for sentiments, decisions of Court are based on law, facts and circumstances which the Court considers without being emotional, sensitive and sentimental. I am in complete agreement with the learned trial Judge on the position of the Plaintiff/Appellant at page 306 of the record he stated: ‘’By his reliefs, he has not shown by evidence that he hails from Zone B of the chiefdom. He has not shown from which ruling house he hails from or sub-division of the chiefdom. He has not shown that it was his ruling house that nominated him to contest or that he contested for the stool but was excluded wrongly or that he contested and lost. So the question then is, on what basis did he filed this case or in what capacity did he come to Court. There is no evidence to answer these questions.’’
I am of the humble view that the Appellant from the record never proved by evidence that he has sufficient interest in the stool. He did not present any evidence that he is eligible to contest the stool of Dadayako Chiefdom. He called on witness to support his claim that he is part of the Dadayako Chiefdom and is entitled to contest for the stool. The Appellant has not been able to prove a personal grievance to warrant judicial intervention in terms of the questions raised and reliefs sought and this issue must be resolved against the Appellant.
ISSUE THREE:
Whether the trial Court was right when it proceeded to determine the substantive matter when it held that the Appellant have no locus standi but entered judgment for the Respondent and dismissed the Appellant’s case instead of striking out.
The summary of argument of the Appellant on this issue is that the trial Court having found that the Appellant has no locus standing to question the stool of Dadayako Chiefdom, the trial Court should not have proceeded into determining other substantive issues because the trial Court lacks the jurisdiction to do so.
It is trite law that where a preliminary objection challenging the Court’s jurisdiction is heard along with the substantive suit or application, the Court must give a ruling on the objection before proceeding to determine the substantive suit. See General Mohammed A. Garba v. Mustapha Sani Mohammed & Ors (2016) LPELR-40612 (SC).
In the instant appeal, in resolving the jurisdictional issue raise by the Respondents in their notice of preliminary objection, the trial Court is at liberty to consolidate all the processes filed by the parties and hear them along with the substantive suit and deliver its judgment thereon. The parties having agreed to argue the preliminary objection and the substantive matter at the final address, it is my firm view that the discretion of the Court below is well founded, it was exercised in line with the attitude of the Appellate Courts that an appeal challenging jurisdiction and the substantive matter can be heard together, each maintaining its distinct status with the issue of competency of the action being considered first. The learned trial Judge was entitled to proceed to determine the main suit after its decision on the preliminary objection that the Plaintiff/Appellant has no locus standi. This removes the necessity for two appeals-one as to jurisdiction and the other as to the merit of the case. The inherent power to combine hearing of the interlocutory application and the substantive suit cannot be faulted. It was a discretion bordering on case management. What is paramount is that once there is an application challenging competency of an action or jurisdiction of the Court, the issue of jurisdiction must be considered first and a view pronounced before consideration of the substantive matter. I am well guided by the Statement of Oguntade JCA (as he then was) in SENATE PRESIDENT v. NZERIBE (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt. 878) CA 251. Where he said:
‘’Saying that the issue of jurisdiction should be resolved first however does not mean that it should be resolved separately. It can be taken along with arguments on the merits of the case. The important thing is that the Court should first express its views on jurisdiction before considering the merit. The advantage of so proceeding is that in the event of an appeal by any of the parties, it is easy for the appellate Court to express its views on the decision of the lower Court as to jurisdiction and the merit of the case. This removes the necessity for two appeals – one as to jurisdiction and the other as the merit of the case.’’
In the light of the above, I harbour no hesitation in resolving this issue against the Appellant.
ISSUE FOUR:
Whether considering the circumstances of this case the trial Court did not misdirected itself when it relied heavily on the 2011 Law in reaching or arriving at its conclusions despite the existence of the extant Law of 2013 applicable to Dadayako Chiefdom.
The settled position of the law which remains inviolate is that a Court is strictly bound by the case presented to it as postulated on the pleading of the parties. Thus parties are bound by their pleadings just as the Court seized of the matter is bound to make its findings only within the scope of the parties’ case as pleaded. It does not lie in the province or powers of the Court to make case for the parties.
The law is settled that a question which was not raised at the lower Court cannot be raised in the appellant Court for the first time without leave. See Agedah vs Nkwocha (2002) 9 NWLR Pt. 771 Pg 113, Customary Court of Appeal, Benue State v. Abura Tsegba & Ors (2010) LPELR-4009 (CA).
In the instant appeal, I have searched through the record including the pleadings and the reliefs of the plaintiff this issue was not pleaded by the Appellant. The Judgment of the lower Court at page 317 of the Record of Appeal is very explicit he stated ‘’I have heard the arguments on both sides and having perused the pleadings and the reliefs of the plaintiff, I do not find anything on this issue. I agree with the defence counsel that no issue of such was raised by the plaintiff neither were issues joined. I therefore discountenance same as of no moment.’’ In my humble view failure of the Appellant to obtain leave of this Court to argue this fresh issue renders such an issue incompetent. This principle is predicated on the fact that this Court is not the trial Court and as such once a case has been tried and concluded, the case should not be re-opened on appeal to enable a party to improve on his case at the trial Court by allowing him to introduce new issue without leave of this Court. The introduction of new issue raised in the instant appeal is likely to alter the basis for the decision and seeks to reopen the decision appealed against on the new issue raised. I am guided by the explanation of per Okoro, JCA in New Resources International Limited & Anor v. Ejike Oranusi, Esq (2010) LPELR-4592 (CA) Page 5 Where he said:
‘’Quite apart from that, the issue is new or fresh and by the practice in this Court, the party raising a fresh issue must first seek and obtain the leave of Court before such an issue can be considered by the Court. Failure to seek and obtain leave as in the instant case renders such an issue incompetent and liable to be struck out.”
I agree with the Respondent that an appeal ought to challenge the decision of the lower Court, that there was no decision or part of the judgment wherein the learned trial Judge make comparisons between the 2011 law and the gazette. In the light of this, issue four is incompetent and is hereby struck out.
ISSUE FIVE:
Whether the trial Court did not misdirect itself when it relied heavily on and attached evidential value to documents that were not pleaded and not duly certified to arrive at its conclusion.
The complaint of the Appellant on this issue is that the Respondent’s pleadings at the trial Court there was no paragraph where he pleaded the documents that were admitted by the trial Court as exhibits and are not duly certified.
The law is trite that documentary evidence need not be specifically pleaded to be admissible in evidence as long as facts and not the evidence by which such a document is covered are expressly pleaded. See Arabambi v. Advance Beverage Ind. Ltd (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 1 SC, Ipinlaiye II v. Olukotun (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 453) 148 SC, Brawal Shipping (Nig.) Ltd v. F.I. Onwadike Co. Ltd. (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 678) 387 SC.
Similarly, Court can rely on facts contained in an exhibit which was pleaded in making findings of fact notwithstanding that the facts in the exhibits were not independently pleaded. See Akinola v. V.C. Unilorin (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 885) 616 CA.
A search in the record revealed that the documents in question were pleaded by the Respondent in paragraphs 7- 10 of the Statement of Defence filed on 26th May, 2014 at the Court below see pages 32-33 of the record, these documents were also listed in the mandatory list of documents filed along with the Statement of Defence see page 36 of the record. The Appellant did not object to the admissibility of these documents at the trial Court. See pages 293-294 of the record where the learned trial Judge stated in his ruling thus:
‘’The following documents being produced and tendered by the defence counsel at the bar in evidence without any objection are hereby admitted in evidence and marked as follows:
1. 4 Form EC 1 – Nomination form for selection of Dadayako, head of Dadayako chiefdoms marked Exhibit ID. 1i-iv.
2. Form EC 3-selection of Dadayako Ballot paper is marked Exhibit Id 2i-iv.
3. Form EC 2- selection of Dadayako, declaration of result form is marked Exhibit ID3.
4. Letter of appointment dated 18/2/14 is marked Exhibit ID4
5. Memorandum from Commissioner Ministry of L.G. & Chieftaincy Affairs to the Governor on the subject. Appointment of Ishaku Dahilo as Dadayako Head of Dadayako chiefdom dated 17/2/14 is marked Exhibit ID 5.’’
Learned Counsel for the Appellant having not objected to the admissibility of these documents when it was tendered at the trial Court cannot raise an objection at this stage. A party cannot approbate and reprobate. It does not make good sense. See Anyaduba v. Nigerian Renowned Trading Company (1990) LPELR-SC. Having said that, this issue is resolved against the Appellant.
Having resolved the five issues against the Appellant, it means that this appeal is lacking in merit and is hereby dismissed.
The judgment of the lower Court Coram R.G. SOJI, J. delivered on the 28th day of July, 2016 in Suit No. NSD/MG88/14 is HEREBY AFFIRMED.
Cost of Fifty Thousand Naira (N50,000.00) is awarded against the Appellant in Respondent’s favour.
IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Hon. Justice Muslim Sule Hassan, JCA, and I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of my Lord in his lead judgment on all the issues raised.
On the whole, I adopt them as mine to also hold that the Appellant’s appeal is unmeritorious and same is accordingly dismissed. I also abide by the consequential orders.
CORDELIA IFEOMA JOMBO-OFO, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the leading judgment delivered by my learned brother, HON. JUSTICE MUSLIM SULE HASSAN, JCA. I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein. He has properly in my respected view dealt with the issues relevant to the determination of the appeal and I agree with him that there is no merit in the appeal. I shall make few comments for the sake of emphasis particularly on the issue as to whether considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial Court was right when it held that the Appellant has no locus standi to institute this appeal.
The term “locus standi” denotes the legal capacity of a person to institute proceedings in a Court of law and it is used interchangeably with terms like “standing” or ‘title to sue”. It is the right or competence to initiate proceedings in a Court of law for redress or assertion of a right enforceable at law. See ADEFULU VS. OYESILE (1989) 5 NWLR (PT. 122) 377, INAKOJU & 19 ORS VS. ADELEKE & 3 ORS (2007) 1 S.C. (PT 11)179, LADEJOBI V OGUNTAYO (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 904) 149 AND OWODUNNI V REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF CCC (2000) 10 NWLR (PT. 678) 315.
The onus is on the plaintiff to prove his standing if it is called in question and he must show that his civil right and obligation have been violated or are in danger of being violated or adversely affected by the act complained of. There must be a nexus between the claimant and the disclosed cause of action concerning his right and obligations, and locus standi is determined by examining only the statement of claim. The statement of claim must disclose a cause of action vested in the plaintiff. The test to be applied are; (1) That the action must be justiceable. (2) There must be a dispute between the parties. See ADESANYA V PRESIDENT OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (1981) 2 NCLR 358 AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CROSS-RIVER STATE V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2019) 16 NWLR (PT. 1681) 401.
The rule about the locus standi development is primarily to protect the Court from being used as a playground by professional litigants, or meddlesome interlopers, busy bodies that really have no real stake of the litigation.
The position of the law on the subject is that the right of a plaintiff to sue in a chieftaincy matter may arise in two ways (i) he may establish in his statement of claim and lead evidence to show that the right that is being asserted is that of his family by reason of any hereditary interest. In such a situation, the action should be by the family through their representatives and it must be clearly pleaded. (ii) the plaintiff may assert his own right to the chieftaincy stool if he could show from his pleadings and evidence, if evidence has been led, the nature of his interest and his entitlement to the stool. It is not enough for him to say that he is a member of the family. He had to state further that he had an interest in the chieftaincy title and plead same in his statement of claim. See MOMOH & ANOR VS OLOTU (1970) 1 ALL NLR 117 AND DANIYAN VS. IYAGIN (2002) FWLR (PT. 120) 185.
I have carefully considered the statement of claim of the Appellant, particularly paragraph 11 of his statement of claim which read thus “the plaintiff avers that he hails from zone B of the Dadayako chiefdom” the word ‘zone’ or ‘chiefdom’ as used by the Appellant connotes a specified or classified group of people entitled to an interest. Within the zone B or chiefdom there exist numerous families with interest, the Nukese, Madaki and Karmo. It is therefore not enough for the Appellant to state that he hails from the zone or chiefdom. He ought to have shown that he had an interest in the chieftaincy title and how his interest arose from either genealogy or heredity from any of the named families or chiefdoms.
Again, the Appellant did not seek any relief that conferred any direct benefit on him. It seems to me that the Appellant who elected to sue in a personal action ended up praying for representative reliefs. Paragraph 18 (a) and (b) of the reliefs sought against the Respondent read thus:
(a) A declaration that it is now the turn of Zone B to produce the next Dadayako of the Dadayako Chiefdom after the death of High Royal Highness, Osu Danhila Auta who died on the 3rd day of February, 2014.
(b) A declaration that the plaintiff is entitle to contest for the stool of Dadayako of Dadayako chiefdom since it is turn of Zone B to produce the next Dadayako after the death of High Royal Highnes, Ostl Danhila Auta who died on the 3rd day of February 2014.
The appellant in paragraphs (a) is making a claim for zone B as he did not ask the Court to declare that he was entitled to be so selected or installed as the Dadayako. The right to sue belongs to zone B and not the Appellant even though he is a member of that zone. Assuming the Court grants the said relief, would the other chiefdom from the said Zone B who did not contest the stool like the Appellant also hold claims for the stool? Again, all that the Appellant is seeking for in paragraph (b) is for the Court to declare that he is entitled to contest. The Appellant need to show, apart from stating that he is from Zone B which is not enough, but that he had direct personal interest as a candidate for the stool. He needs to show that he was indeed selected, nominated and became a candidate, this has not been shown by the Appellant.
It appears clearly to me that, the result of this suit would not incur to the Appellant or his family any of the reliefs sought. Obviously the Appellant failed to satisfy the required conditions that could confer on him the locus standi to institute this suit, thereby constituting himself into a litigation nuisance.
It has been established in plethora of cases that, where the trial Court finds and arrived at a conclusion that the Appellant lacks the locus standi to initiate the action, it has expressly declined jurisdiction, and there would be no need to proceed further with the other substantive issues raised. See MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341, OLORIODE V. OYEBI (1984) 1 SCNLR, ATTORNEY- GENERAL OF EKITI STATE V. DARAMOLA (2003) 10 NWLR (PT.827) 104 AND ADESOKAN V. ADETUNJI (1994) 5 NWLR (PT. 346).
Nevertheless, it does not mean that the issue of jurisdiction must be resolved separately. The trial Court can consider the issue of jurisdiction with other substantive issues on the merit of the case. The important and most appropriate thing is for the Court to first express its view on the issue of jurisdiction before considering the merits of the case.
It is for this reason and others set out in greater details that I also reach the necessary conclusion that this appeal is lacking in merit and I dismiss same. I also abide by the order made as to costs.
Appearances:
YAKUBU MOSES EDE, ESQ. For Appellant(s)
ISRAEL USMAN, ESQ. For Respondent(s)
