INT’L PAGEANTS & FILMS LTD & ANOR v. NIGERIAN COPYRIGHT COMMISSION & ORS (2022)

INT’L PAGEANTS & FILMS LTD & ANOR v. NIGERIAN COPYRIGHT COMMISSION & ORS

(2022)LCN/16871(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, May 05, 2022

CA/A/44/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Hamma Akawu Barka Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mohammed Mustapha Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. INTERNATIONAL PAGEANTS & FILMS LIMITED 2. PRINCE CHUDI CHARLES CHUKWUANI APPELANT(S)

And

1. NIGERIAN COPYRIGHT COMMISSION 2. BRITISH COUNCIL 3. MTN NIGERIAN COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED 4. STYLE HOUSE FILES LIMITED RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE ESSENCE OF A REPLY BRIEF

I must state at the outset, that Appellants’ counsel needs to be reminded that a reply brief is basically meant to address new issues that arose from the Respondents’ brief. See Kanu vs. A.G Imo State (2014) 6 NWLR (pt. 1402) 1, and not to canvass new issues or to re-argue the earlier arguments in the brief. See Okpala vs. Ibeme (1989) NWLR (pt. 102) 208. The Apex Court reemphasized this point in Nwankwo Oguanuhu & Ors vs. Dr Emmanuel I. Chiegboka (2013) LPELR–19980 (SC), stating that:
“A reply brief is not meant to be a repetition of the arguments in the appellant’s brief. It is not an opportunity to re emphasize the arguments in the appellant’s brief. On the contrary, a reply brief as the term implies, replies to the respondent’s brief”
A reply brief deals with only new points arising from the Respondents’ brief. Okenwa vs. Military Governor Imo State (1996) LPELR–2440 (SC), Compact Manifold & Energy Services Ltd vs. Pazan Services Nig. Ltd (2019) LPELR–49221 (SC).
This Court also rightly observed in living Mitin vs. Commissioner of Police Bayelsa State & Ors (2017) LPELR–43064 (CA), that:
“What is required of the appellant who is desirous to file a reply brief is for him to direct his mind and attention to new points raised by the respondent in his brief of argument. It is not a forum for the appellant to canvass new or fresh issues not raised at the trial Court (or in the respondents’ brief) in the guise of a reply to new point raised by the respondent in their brief”. PER BARKA, J.CA.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS

It remains to point out, as stated by Ogunbiyi, JSC in Chief Great Ogboru vs. Emmanuel Uduaghan & sons (supra) that the concept of abuse of Court process entails:
“The concept of abuse of Court process has been given a precise definition which is to say where the process of the Court has not been used bona fide and properly. See CBN vs. Ahmed & Ors (2001) 5SC (pt. ii) 146; Ediorode vs. Ikine (2001) 12 SC (pt. 11) 125. It involves an improper use of judicial process by a party in litigation, see Agwasim vs. Ojichie (2004) 10 NWLR (pt. 682) 613 AT 624-625. Furthermore, the concept is also characterized as an action initiated without a just or reasonable cause. It merely takes an undue advantage of the reason that the process is available for indulgence. It is also a situation where the law is wrongly interpreted for the purpose of accommodating actions in bad faith. It impugns the dignity of the Court, further still and in the legal parlance, the phrase abuse of judicial process is generally employed when a party improperly uses to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent the efficient and effective administration of justice. An example is where a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter are instituted against the same opponents on the same issues. See Okorodudu vs. Okoromadu (1977) 3SC 21, Okafor vs. AG Anambra State (1991) 6 NWLR (pt. 200) 659 and ACB vs. Nwaigwe (2011) 7 NWLR (pt. 1246) 380. The concept of abuse therefore lies in the multiplicity and the manner employed for the exercise of the right. See Saraki vs. Kotoye (supra).
See also Society Bic SA vs. Charzin Ind. Ltd (supra), Ogoejeofo vs. Ogoejeofo (supra), Dana Airlines Ltd vs. Bamaiyi & Anor (2017) LPELR 43054 (CA) and Central Bank of Nigeria vs. Saidu H. Ahmed & Ors (2001) FWLR (pt. 56) 670, where the Apex Court did state that:
I venture to state quite concisely and clearly that an abuse of the process of Court is only possible by improper use of the issue of the judicial process or process already issued to the irritation and annoyance of the opponent. It is the law that multiplicity of actions on the same matter may constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. But it is so only where the action is between the same parties with respect to the same subject matter. The Court has a duty in such situation to interfere to stop an abuse of its process. See Okorodudu vs. Okoromadu (1977) 3SC 21.” PER BARKA, J.CA.

HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The instant appeal is a challenge to the decision or ruling of Hon. Justice A.I. Chikere, of the Federal High Court Abuja Judicial Division, made on the 30th day of January, 2017. By the said ruling located at pages 598–611 of the record, the learned trial Judge conclusively held that:
“the abuse in the present suit consists in the intention, purpose and aim of the plaintiffs exercising the rights to harass, irritate and annoy the Defendants and interfere with the administration of justice by instituting multiplicity/different actions between same parties simultaneously in different Courts even though on different grounds.
The plaintiffs have duplicate Court processes, hence the abuse agrees with the 4th Defendant/Applicant that there is an abuse of Court process.
Counsel has urged this Court to strike out suit in limine. Where an abuse of the process of the Court is established, the peremptory order is the striking out of suit. No reason is required.
That ground alone is sufficient. See case of NV SCHEEP vs MV’S’ ARAZ (SUPRA) PAGE 636 R 12 The defendant/applicant has established abuse of Court process by Plaintiff/respondent.
Accordingly, suit is hereby struck out.
No order as to cost.

The germane facts which generated the instant action have been fully captured by the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent in the brief settled on his behalf as follows:

That the subject matter in the suit before the lower Court, Lagos Fashion and Week is an annual event organized by the 4th Respondent with different corporate organizations acting as sponsors each year. Consequently, the 2011 edition titled MTN LAGOS FASHION AND DESIGN WEEK which is the crux of this action had the 3rd Respondents as its headline sponsor which is the reason it was dubbed MTN LAGOS FASHION WEEK.

The plaintiff’s claim titled LAGOS FASHION WEEK which according to the statement of claim, was first published in the year 1993 and reproduced in 2011, and deposited at the National Library in 2011 subsequently submitted to the 1st Respondent in the same 2011 for which the 1st Respondent issued a Notification Certificate. The Plaintiffs further claim that the organization of LAGOS FASHION AND DESIGN WEEK by the 4th Respondent amounted to an infringement of their alleged copyright in the book LAGOS FASHION WEEK.

Subsequently, according to the 1st Respondent, editions of Lagos FASHION AND DESIGN WEEK were held in 2013, 2014 and 2016 respectively following which the Plaintiffs again filed three separate actions for copyright infringement viz: FHC/ABJ/CS/686/2013, FCH/ABJ/CS/467/2014 and FHC/ABJ/CS/470/2016 claiming that the Defendants had by the organization of LAGOS FASHION AND DESIGN WEEK, infringed on their alleged right in the book LAGOS FASHION WEEK.

Regarding this present suit (FHC/ABJ/CS/848/2011), the 1st and 4th Defendants filled separate notices of preliminary objection on grounds of jurisdiction, and by a ruling delivered by Honourable Justice D.U Okorowo made on the 12th of March 2012, the applications were dismissed. The 1st and 4th Respondents being dissatisfied with the ruling filed separate appeals (CA/A/284/M/2012 and CA/A/175/M/2012) against same, and while the appeals were still pending, the Appellants (as Plaintiffs) filed a fresh action FCH/ABJ/CS/686/2013 with the same subject matter and same parties.

Following a preliminary objection raised by the defendants on the ground that suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/686/2013 constituted an abuse of Court process, the reason being that the Appellants(as Plaintiffs) despite being aware of the pending appeals, went ahead to file FHC/ABJ/CS/686/2013. In response to the preliminary objections raised, plaintiff filed counter-affidavits in opposition, and after hearing argument from parties, Honourable Justice A.F.A. ADEMOLA (as he then was) in a ruling delivered on the 26th of February 2013, struck out the Appellants’ action in FHC/ABJ/CS/686/2013 for abuse of Court processes. It is against the said decision that Appellants now appealed against same, and while the appeal was still pending, Appellants filed yet another action in respect of the same subject matter “LAGOS FASHION WEEK’’ at the Federal High Court, Abuja in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/467/41. The 4th Respondent being the 3rd Respondent in that action, filed a preliminary objection on the ground that the institution of the case amounted to an abuse of Court process, to which the Appellants (as Plaintiff) filed a counter-affidavit in response, and after taking arguments of parties on the application, the Court per Honourable Justice A.F.A. ADEMOLA (as he then was), in his ruling of 30th September, 2015, dismissed the action on the ground that it amounted to an abuse of Court process, and in the course of delivering the ruling, the learned trial Judge admonished Appellants (Plaintiff) not to file any fresh action in respect of LAGOS FASHION WEEK until all the actions including appeals are disposed of.

In utter disobedience to the Court’s order, Appellants filed a fresh action in suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/470/2016 and surreptitiously left out the 4th Respondent as a party. The 4th Respondent, applied to be joined as a party being the organizers of the event LAGOS FASHION AND WEEK while every other Defendant were mere sponsors. The Court granted the application for joinder on the ground that the suit could not be properly determined without the 4th Respondent being the organizer of the work whose ownership was being contested, since without the 4th Respondent hosting or organizing the event, there will be no event to sponsor, consequent upon which the learned trial Judge, Honourable Justice Nyako in a ruling delivered in 2019, struck out the suit on the ground of abuse of Court process.

The appellants were seriously aggrieved by the ruling of the lower Court, and thereby showed their displeasure by filing a notice of appeal on the 21st day of December, 2017 predicated on a lone ground of appeal, which shorn of its particulars reads as follows:
The lower Court erred in law when it held at page 12 of his ruling as follows:
“In present suit and FHC/ABJ/CS/470/2016, pending in Court before Hon. Justice BFM Nyako, the following are true.
i. The plaintiffs are same.
ii. The defendants are same
iii. The cause of action and/or subject matter are same i.e. Lagos Fashion Week
iv. The claims are same.

Learned counsel from the lone ground of appeal, and in the brief settled by Frank Ikpe, and filed on the 15th of July, 2021, formulated a lone issue to wit;
Whether suit No; FHC/ABJ/CS/848/2011 which was filed earlier in time can be said to be an abuse of Court process of suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/470/2016 which was filed later in time or put differently whether a subject matter that was infringed upon on different dates by different and distinct parties constitute abuse of Court process.

The 1st Respondent in the brief settled by Emeka D. Agbonna also filed on the 15th of July, 2021, listed one issue capable of determining the appeal before the Court as follows:
Whether the Appellant’s suit as constituted in the lower Court amounts to an abuse of Court process.

The 2nd Respondent also filed a brief in opposition to the appeal settled by Patrick A. Osu, and at page 5 of the brief, the following issue was proposed for determination: whether the Appellants’ suit as constituted before the lower Court is an abuse of Court process.

Even though the 3rd Respondent intimated the Court of its desire of filing no brief, the 4th Respondent in the amended brief filed on the 16th of February, 2022, but deemed properly filed on the 21st of February, 2022, by Mutiu Akinrinmade, of counsel, and specifically at page 6 thereof, crafted the following issue for resolution: whether the lower Court was right for striking out the Appellant’s suit as abuse of Court process.

It seems clear to me that whereas, the lone issues identified by the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent had been adopted by the learned counsel for the 2nd and 4th Respondents’ word for word, the lone issue distilled by the learned Appellant’s counsel is for all purpose not dissimilar. For the resolution of the appeal therefore, I find it expedient adopting that issue identified by the Appellants, which in any case is not different to that identified by the learned Respondents’ counsel.
Whether suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/848/2011 which was filed earlier in time can be said to be an abuse of Court process of suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/470/2016 which was filed later in time or put differently whether a subject matter that was infringed upon on different dates by different and distinct parties constitutes abuse of Court process.

Learned counsel argued this lone issue from page 8–22 of the brief settled on behalf of the Appellants, submitting that the two suits mentioned above cannot and do not constitute an abuse of Court process. He drew the attention of the Court to the Court’s record, pointing out that suit with No. FHC/ABJ/CS/848/2011 was filed earlier in time than suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/470/2016, to the knowledge of the Court, and while positing that the concept of abuse of judicial process is in precise, involving circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions, further argued that the employment of the judicial process is only regarded as an abuse where a party improperly uses same to the irritation or annoyance of the opponent. Alluding to the holding of the lower Court at paragraph 4 of page 609 of the record, counsel insists that the defendants in the two cases of FHC/ABJ/CS/848/2011 and FHC/ABJ/CS/470/2016 are not the same. He also argued that the cause of action/subject matter and the claim are not the same, insisting that it was the lower Court which refused to obey the orders of this Court made on the 20th day of May, 2015 and on the 3rd of February, 2016, directing that suit with No. FHC/ABJ/CS/848/2011 be determined on the merit, and argued that by so doing the lower Court denied him fair hearing having failed in the consideration of his counter-affidavit to the 4th Respondent’s motion on notice dated the 14th of September, 2016. Counsel also sought the aid of the decision in Ugboji vs. The State (2017) LPELR–43427 (SC) on what constitutes a perverse decision, maintaining that the decision that the two cases under reference constituted an abuse of Court process is perverse and thus occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Still alluding to the holding of the lower Court at pages 610 of the record, to the effect that:
“the abuse in the present suit consists in the intention, purpose and aim of the plaintiffs exercising the right to harass, irritate and annoy the defendants and interfere with the administration of justice by instituting multiplicity/different actions between same parties simultaneously in different Courts even though on different grounds”,
insisted that the decision was made in error, contending that the two suits from their year of filing, showed that they were not filed simultaneously and therefore dissimilar. Analyzing the two cases aforementioned, counsel insists that though the plaintiffs are the same, the defendants are not the same.

In the determination of whether a process amounts to an abuse of Court process, counsel relying on Society Bic SA vs. Charzin Ind. Ltd (2014) 4 NWLR (pt. 1398) 497 AT 547, argued that the parties, the subject matter and the issues must be the same, and the absence of any of the ingredients disqualifies a case from being an abuse of Court process. He argued that the cases in the case at hand are dissimilar and distinctively different, with dissimilar issues and reliefs sought, based upon which counsel urged the Court to uphold the appeal and to order for accelerated re-trial of the case before a different Judge.

It is his response on the issue, Mr. Ogbonna for the 1st Respondent submitting on whether the Appellants’ suits before the lower Court amounted to an abuse of Court process, submitted that the suits under reference have the same reliefs, issues, subject matter claims and parties with the 4th Respondent being the main party. He maintained that the decision by the lower Court per B F M Nyako J, to the effect that the plaintiffs were the same, the defendants the same, the cause of action and/or subject matter the same was correct, in that the abuse in the present suit consists in the intention, purpose and aim of the plaintiffs exercise the right to harass, initiate and annoy the defendants and thereby interfere with the administration of justice by instituting multiplicity of different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different Courts. He urged the Court based on the principle exposed in Arisons Trading & Engineering Company Limited vs. Military Governor, Ogun State & 2 Ors (2009) 15NWLR (pt. 1163) 26 per Tobi JSC, not to disturb or interfere with the findings of the lower Court as a matter of routine or parading appellate power, and to thereby dismiss the appeal.

Mr Osu the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal cautioned in line with the admonition by Rhodes-Vivour JSC in Dumez Nigeria Limited vs. UBA Plc (2006) 14NWLR (pt. 1000) 515 AT 527, to the effect that:
“Once a judge is aware of a case in his or other jurisdiction on the same subject matter as the one before him such situation calls for caution. Nowadays this is common and judges should not allow it to occur. If they do and proceed with the trial as if all is well, there is a real likelihood of two conflicting decisions at the end of the trial which would end up polluting the streams of justice which ought to be kept pure at all times”.

His submissions which are in line with the submissions offered by the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent maintained that the Appellants’ suit as constituted before the lower Court is an abuse of the Court process.

Mr. Akinrinmade, the learned counsel for the fourth Respondent, towing the path established by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, submitted from pages 6-10 of the brief settled by him and in conclusion of the view that the lower Court rightly held that the suit before it, i.e suit with No. FHC/ABJA/CS/848/2011 was filed in abuse of Court process based on proper evaluation of the evidence before it, that there was avalanche of evidence establishing that multiple actions filed by the Appellants were indeed in abuse of Court process and that all the elements required to sustain an objection on the ground of abuse of Court process were well established and present in the case before it, i.e, the same cause of action, the same parties and the same reliefs sought in Suit with No. FHC/ABJ/CS/470/2016, and finally that the decision of the lower Court was right, thereby urging the Court to strike out the instant suit.

The learned counsel for the Appellants filed response to the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondent’s brief. Responding to the 1st Respondent’s brief, Mr. Frank Ikpe posited that 1st Respondents willfully and deliberately withheld and concealed from the Court material facts respecting the judgments, orders and rulings variously made by this Court on the 20th of May, 2015 and the 3rd of February, 2016 in respect of appeals with No.CA/A/284/M/2012 and CA/A/175/M/2012. The material facts concealed according to the learned counsel related to the deliberate disobedience of the orders of this Court in the appeals mentioned. Positing the issue, whether the lower Court was right to strike out the Appellants’ suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/848/2014 on the basis of the 4th Respondent’s application filed on the 14th day of September, 2016 in disobedience of the judgment and orders of this honourable Court made on the 20th day of May, 2015, and 3rd day of February, 2016 respectively that ordered that suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/848/2011 be tried on its merit and in defiance of the abolition of demurrer, which said application was relied upon by the 1st Respondent, contended that orders of Court are meant to be obeyed, and the 1st – 4th Respondents not entitled to the exercise of the Court’s discretion while in disobedience in their favor, and the case of Ekpemupolo vs. FRN (2019) 11 NWLR (pt. 1684) 483 relied upon. The consequence of this disobedience according to the learned counsel robs on the dignity and honor of the Court, and thereby impedes the course of justice and ought in the circumstance not to be heard until the impediment is removed. The cases of J.B. Estate Development & Prop. Ltd vs. Nzegwu (2016) 6 NWLR (pt. 1507) 135–136, and INEC vs. Oguebego (2018) 8 NWLR (pt. 1620) 102 AT 103 were cited in that regard. Furthermore, learned counsel argued that the 4th Respondent’s application was in flagrant defiance of Order 23 of the rules of the lower Court which abolished demurrer proceedings. On the whole, counsel prayed the Court to allow the appeal and to order for accelerated hearing of the suit on the merit. The same response was equally extended to the 4th Respondent word for word. With respect to the 2nd Respondent, it was submitted therein that 2nd Respondent was a proper, desirable and necessary party to the instant suit and not a nominal party as erroneously argued, relying on PP&P Ltd vs. Olaghere (2019) 2 NWLR (pt. 1657) 541 AT 561, and thereby urged the Court to so hold.

I must state at the outset, that Appellants’ counsel needs to be reminded that a reply brief is basically meant to address new issues that arose from the Respondents’ brief. See Kanu vs. A.G Imo State (2014) 6 NWLR (pt. 1402) 1, and not to canvass new issues or to re-argue the earlier arguments in the brief. See Okpala vs. Ibeme (1989) NWLR (pt. 102) 208. The Apex Court reemphasized this point in Nwankwo Oguanuhu & Ors vs. Dr Emmanuel I. Chiegboka (2013) LPELR–19980 (SC), stating that:
“A reply brief is not meant to be a repetition of the arguments in the appellant’s brief. It is not an opportunity to re emphasize the arguments in the appellant’s brief. On the contrary, a reply brief as the term implies, replies to the respondent’s brief”
A reply brief deals with only new points arising from the Respondents’ brief. Okenwa vs. Military Governor Imo State (1996) LPELR–2440 (SC), Compact Manifold & Energy Services Ltd vs. Pazan Services Nig. Ltd (2019) LPELR–49221 (SC).
This Court also rightly observed in living Mitin vs. Commissioner of Police Bayelsa State & Ors (2017) LPELR–43064 (CA), that:
“What is required of the appellant who is desirous to file a reply brief is for him to direct his mind and attention to new points raised by the respondent in his brief of argument. It is not a forum for the appellant to canvass new or fresh issues not raised at the trial Court (or in the respondents’ brief) in the guise of a reply to new point raised by the respondent in their brief”.

It is obvious that the issues canvassed by the Appellants in the supposedly replies to the 1st 2nd and 4th Respondents are no more, than efforts to smuggle in new issues all in the guise of a reply. That in itself is an abuse of the essence and concept of a reply brief, which ought not be attended to and liable to be discountenanced, which I now do.

The question then remains whether the Appellants’ suit as constituted before the lower Court can rightly be said to amount to an abuse of the Court process? In an attempt to answer the question posed, it is necessary to briefly chronicle the events that led the lower Court finding to the effect that the suit before it amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court.

The records, as pointed out by the 1st Respondent in their brief, earlier reproduced in the judgment, alluded to series of suits filed in different Courts, appeals there from as well as the pendency of orders and decisions of the Courts mentioned. At the risk of being repetitive, it was stated that editions of Lagos FASHION AND DESIGN WEEK were held in 2013, 2014 and 2016 respectively following which the Plaintiffs filed three separate actions for copyright infringement viz: FHC/ABJ/CS/686/2013, FCH/ABJ/CS/467/2014 and FHC/ABJ/CS/470/2016 claiming that the Defendants had by the organization of LAGOS FASHION AND DESIGN WEEK, infringed on their alleged right in the book LAGOS FASHION WEEK.

Regarding this present suit (FHC/ABJ/CS/848/2011), the 1st and 4th Defendants filed separate notices of preliminary objection on grounds of jurisdiction, and by a ruling delivered by Honourable Justice D.U Okorowo made on the 12th of March 2012, the applications were dismissed. The 1st and 4th Respondents being dissatisfied with the ruling filed separate appeals (CA/A/284/M/2012 and CA/A/175/M/2012) against same, and while the appeals were still pending, the Appellants (as Plaintiffs) filed a fresh action FCH/ABJ/CS/686/2013 with the same subject matter and same parties.

Following a preliminary objection raised by the defendants on the ground that suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/686/2013 constituted an abuse of Court process, the reason being that the Appellants (as Plaintiffs) despite being aware of the pending appeals, went ahead to file FHC/ABJ/CS/686/2013, and in response to the preliminary objections raised, plaintiff filed counter-affidavits in opposition, and after hearing argument from parties, Honourable Justice A.F.A. ADEMOLA (as he then was) in a ruling delivered on the 26th of February 2013, struck out the Appellants’ action in FHC/ABJ/CS/686/2013 for abuse of Court processes. It is against the said decision that Appellants now, appealed against same, and while the appeal was still pending, Appellants filed yet another action in respect of the same subject matter’’ LAGOS FASHION WEEK’’ at the Federal High Court, Abuja in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/467/41. The 4th Respondent being the 3rd Respondent in that action, filed a preliminary objection on the ground that the institution of the case amounted to an abuse of Court process, to which the appellants (as Plaintiff) filed a counted affidavit in response, and after taking arguments of parties on the application, the Court per Honourable Justice A.F.A. ADEMOLA (as he then was ), in his ruling of 30th September, 2015, dismissed the action on the ground that it amounted to an abuse of Court process, and in the course of delivering the ruling, the learned trial Judge admonished Appellants (Plaintiff) not to file any fresh action in respect of LAGOS FASHION WEEK until all the actions including appeals are disposed of.

In utter disobedience to the Court’s order, Appellants filed a fresh action in suit no. FHC/ABJ/CS/470/2016 and surreptitiously left out the 4th Respondent as a party. The 4th Respondent, applied to be joined as a party being the organizers of the event LAGOS FASHION AND WEEK while every other Defendant were mere sponsors. The Court granted the application for joinder on the ground that the suit could not be properly determined without the 4th Respondent being the organizer of the work whose ownership was being contested, since without the 4th Respondent hosting or organizing the event, there will be no event to sponsor, consequent upon which the learned trial Judge, Honourable Justice Nyako in a ruling delivered in 2019, struck out the suit on the ground of abuse of Court process.

It remains to point out, as stated by Ogunbiyi, JSC in Chief Great Ogboru vs. Emmanuel Uduaghan & sons (supra) that the concept of abuse of Court process entails:
“The concept of abuse of Court process has been given a precise definition which is to say where the process of the Court has not been used bona fide and properly. See CBN vs. Ahmed & Ors (2001) 5SC (pt. ii) 146; Ediorode vs. Ikine (2001) 12 SC (pt. 11) 125. It involves an improper use of judicial process by a party in litigation, see Agwasim vs. Ojichie (2004) 10 NWLR (pt. 682) 613 AT 624-625. Furthermore, the concept is also characterized as an action initiated without a just or reasonable cause. It merely takes an undue advantage of the reason that the process is available for indulgence. It is also a situation where the law is wrongly interpreted for the purpose of accommodating actions in bad faith. It impugns the dignity of the Court, further still and in the legal parlance, the phrase abuse of judicial process is generally employed when a party improperly uses to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent the efficient and effective administration of justice. An example is where a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter are instituted against the same opponents on the same issues. See Okorodudu vs. Okoromadu (1977) 3SC 21, Okafor vs. AG Anambra State (1991) 6 NWLR (pt. 200) 659 and ACB vs. Nwaigwe (2011) 7 NWLR (pt. 1246) 380. The concept of abuse therefore lies in the multiplicity and the manner employed for the exercise of the right. See Saraki vs. Kotoye (supra).
See also Society Bic SA vs. Charzin Ind. Ltd (supra), Ogoejeofo vs. Ogoejeofo (supra), Dana Airlines Ltd vs. Bamaiyi & Anor (2017) LPELR 43054 (CA) and Central Bank of Nigeria vs. Saidu H. Ahmed & Ors (2001) FWLR (pt. 56) 670, where the Apex Court did state that:
I venture to state quite concisely and clearly that an abuse of the process of Court is only possible by improper use of the issue of the judicial process or process already issued to the irritation and annoyance of the opponent. It is the law that multiplicity of actions on the same matter may constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. But it is so only where the action is between the same parties with respect to the same subject matter. The Court has a duty in such situation to interfere to stop an abuse of its process. See Okorodudu vs. Okoromadu (1977) 3SC 21.”
The Apex Court had earlier clarified this position in Saraki vs. Kotoye (1992) 9NWLR (pt. 156), which I find quite illuminating, having stated therein that:
“This Court dealt extensively with what constitutes abuse of process of Court. In his lead judgment in the case, Karibi – Whyte observed at pages 18 – 189 that “the concept of the abuse of judicial process is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. Its one common feature is the improper use of the judicial process by a party in litigation to interfere with the due administration of justice. It is recognized that the abuse of process may lie in both a proper or improper use of the judicial process in litigation. But the employment of judicial process is only regarded as an abuse when a party improperly uses the issue of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent and the efficient and effective administration of justice. This will arise in instituting multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues…. The abuse lies in the multiplicity and manner of the exercise of the right, rather than the exercise of the right parse.”
It is therefore plain that Appellants by filing all the suits chronicled above, including the action before the lower Court, and in view of the pendency of the other suits on the same issue and parties, the holding by the lower Court that an abuse of the process of Court was occasioned cannot be faulted. I fail to see any substance in the Appellants’ argument that the parties, as well as the period of filing of the different actions excused the cases from being an abuse of the process of Court. In Minister for Works and Housing vs. Tomas & Ors (2002) 2 NWLR (pt. 752) 740, it was held that where the end result of the two cases is the same, the slight difference in the parties is of no importance. It has been held that the argument that an abuse of the Court process must in all cases relate to where there is multiplicity of action between the same parties and on the same issues is not altogether correct. In Dana Airlines Ltd vs. Bamaiyi & Anor (2017) LPELR–43054 (CA), per Abubakar, JCA, now a Justice of the Supreme Court, held that:
“Now, the term ‘abuse of Court process’ is often seen to be synonymous with multiplicity of suits or of Court Processes, but through that in a way is a correct preposition of the law yet abuse of Court process is much more than mere multiplicity of suits or process is not the only way by which abuse of Court process could be constituted.
… what would constitute or amount to abuse of Court process is very diverse, imprecise and thus subject to infinite or indefinite considerations. In considering whether or not an action constitutes an abuse of Court process, the Court is critically consideration (sic) the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case in which the abuse of Court process is raised to determine whether in the peculiar circumstance of the affected case the act of the party complained of constitute an abuse of Court process includes but is not limited to situations where the same issues and subject matter are re-litigated.”

The finding of the lower Court on there being multiplicity of suits which constituted an abuse of Court process is well founded, and this Court cannot interfere with it. It is not an excuse filing multiple suits because a Court refused and/or failed to obey or is in contempt of the orders of this Court as argued. In the whole, I see no merit in the appeal as it is hereby dismissed by me.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the leading judgment just delivered by my learned brother BARKA, JCA.

I agree with the finding and conclusion of my noble Lord. I adopt them as mine. I too agree that the Appellant’s appeal lacks merit and it is also dismissed by me.

MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in advance, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, JCA.

I equally agree with the reasoning and the conclusion that the appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.