HUSSAINI v. C.O.P. GOMBE STATE (2022)

HUSSAINI v. C.O.P. GOMBE STATE

(2022)LCN/16809(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(GOMBE JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Monday, July 04, 2022

CA/G/13C/2021

Before Our Lordships:

Jummai Hannatu Sankey Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ibrahim Shata Bdliya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ebiowei Tobi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

ADAMU HUSSAINI APPELANT(S)

And

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, GOMBE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT A CHARGE THAT DOES NOT DISCLOSE AN OFFENCE CHARGED IS VALID

It is trite law that any information or charge preferred against an accused person, must not only disclose an offence created by law, but must link the accused person to the offence. If no offence is disclosed in the information or charge upon which an accused person is convicted, then such conviction is liable to be quashed –Igwe V State (2021) LPELR-55336(SC) 27-28, F-A, per Kekere-Ekun, JSC; Akachi V State (2019) LPELR-49545(CA); Agboola V FRN (2014) LPELR(CA); Oni V FRN (2012) LPELR-9839(CA) 32-33, B-A; Ogudo V State (2011) LPELR-860(SC) 57, C-F; Uket V FRN (2007) LPELR-3693(CA) 11-12, D-C; Abacha V State (2002) 7 SC (Pt. 1) 1; Ikomi V State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 28) 340, 356. PER SANKEY, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON TAKING THE PLEA OF AN ACCUSED PERSON

When a person takes a plea, he must be clear as to his plea. The charge must be read over to him and explained and when he says he understands same, he will be called upon to take his plea. If he pleads guilty to the offence he is charged, the Court must be sure and clear that the plea is unequivocal and that actually is what the accused intend to say. When the plea is followed with some explanation that is more like a defence, the Court should not enter a plea of guilty but rather not guilty. This is because by the explanation, the accused is trying to state his innocence. The plea of guilty must be unequivocal, precise and direct to be valid. Let me just add a case to the line of cases on this point my lord referred to in the leading judgment. This is the case of Offor & Anor v. State (2012) LPELR-19658 (SC) where the apex Court held:
“… The authority enunciated in the case of Amanchukwu v. FRN (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt.1144) 475 is relevant in support wherein this Court per Ogbuagu, JSC had this to say at page 488: “It is now settled that a plea of guilty is valid if made (as in the instant case leading to this appeal) in a very unambiguous and unequivocal way and the same is received by a trial Court/Tribunal not labouring under the apprehension of what the law is. “Per OGUNBIYI, J.S.C. PER TOBI, J.C.A.

JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Justice Gombe State, sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, in Suit No. GM/85C/2014 delivered on 19th May 2015, Coram: J.A. Awak J., and P.I. Apollos J.

The basic facts leading to the appeal are as follows: the Appellant was arraigned by the Respondent before the Chief Magistrate Court, Pantami in Gombe State on a First Information Report (F.I.R.) which alleged thus:
“Nature of offence: Cheating: That you Mallam Adamu Hussaini ‘m’ of Pantami quarters Gombe sometimes in July 2012 within Gombe Magisterial District did sold a plot of property of one Hassan Ahmadu to one Kabiru Moh’d ‘m’ of the same address located at G.R.A. Gombe behind Ministry of Education at cost of five million naira N5,000,000.00k thereby committed offence contrary to Sections 323 of the Penal Code Law.”

When the FIR was read to the Appellant, he is said to have admitted the facts contained therein. He was therefore summarily convicted for the offence of cheating by the learned Chief Magistrate pursuant to Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code and sentenced to one year imprisonment, with an option of fine in the sum of N3,000.00 (Three Thousand Naira), and payment of compensation to the tune of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) being money which he collected from the nominal complainant without justification.

Dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellant appealed to the High Court of Justice, Gombe State vide his Notice of Appeal dated 24-04-15. The appeal was duly heard. Judgment was delivered on 19-05-2015 wherein the lower Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the trial Chief Magistrate Court.

Still dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to this Court vide his Notice of Appeal filed on 13-07-20, wherein he complained on three grounds. The Grounds of Appeal without their particulars state –
“GROUND ONE
The lower Court erred in law and occasioned on the Appellant a serious miscarriage of justice when it affirmed the decision of the trial Magistrate Court convicting the Appellant for the offence of cheating pursuant to Section 323 of the Penal Code in a First Information Report (F.I.R.) which did not disclose the ingredients of the offence charged.
GROUND TWO
The lower Court erred in law which error occasioned a miscarriage of justice on the Appellant when it affirmed the decision of the trial Magistrate Court summarily convicting the Appellant pursuant to Section 157 of the CPC when in essence there was no admission of guilt by the Appellant in accordance with the law.
GROUND THREE
The lower Court erred in law and occasioned on the Appellant a serious miscarriage of justice when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court convicting the Appellant for the offence charged notwithstanding the fact that the Appellant advanced a reason for selling the property to the Respondent based on the evidence of title given to him by a Court of law.”

In the event that the appeal succeeds, the Appellant seeks the following reliefs from this Court:
a. “An order allowing the appeal by setting aside the decision of the lower Court in Appeal No. GM/85CA/2014 delivered on the 19/5/2015 by Justice J.A. AWAK and Justice P.I. APOLLOS.
b. An order upholding the Appellant’s appeal before the lower Court against the decision of the trial Court convicting him summarily for the offence of cheating pursuant to Section 323 of the Penal Code.
c. Cost of prosecuting this appeal.”

At the hearing of the appeal on 25-05-22, learned Counsel for the Appellant, Dahiru Abdulhameed Esq., adopted the submissions in the Appellant’s Brief of argument filed on 17-06-21, deemed filed on 09-02-22 and settled by the same Counsel, in urging the Court to allow the appeal. On the part of the Respondent, notwithstanding the fact that he was served with the Appellant’s Brief of argument on 01-02-22 and a hearing notice for the hearing of the appeal, he neither filed a Brief of argument nor did he appear in Court, either in person or through Counsel, to respond to the appeal.

In the Appellant’s Brief of argument, learned Counsel for the Appellant crafted two issues for determination from the three Grounds of Appeal, as follows:
1. “Whether the lower Court was not wrong when it affirmed the conviction of the Appellant on the First Information Report (F.I.R.) that failed to disclose all the ingredients of the offence charged. (Ground 1)
2. Whether the lower Court was not wrong when it affirmed the conviction of the Appellant by the trial Magistrate Court pursuant to Section 157 of the C.P.C. when there was no admission of guilt as required by law? (Grounds 2 and 3)”

The two issues are adopted in the determination of the Appeal and they shall be taken together.

ARGUMENTS
In arguing the appeal, learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the Appellant was arraigned before the trial Chief Magistrate Court on a First Information Report (FIR) for the offence of cheating contrary to Section 323 of the Penal Code. For such a conviction to be sustained, all the ingredients of the offence under Section 323 of the Penal Code must be disclosed in the FIR. He however contends that, although none of the ingredients set out under the law were disclosed, yet the Appellant was summarily convicted of the offence.

Counsel submits that the facts supplied in the FIR, having failed to disclose the essential elements of the offence as required by law, the conviction was not warranted and the lower Court was wrong to have affirmed the conviction, as the conviction is untenable and unfounded.

Counsel also submits that from the FIR, the Appellant was only said to have sold the property to someone. It was not stated that he acted dishonestly, fraudulently or with the intention to cheat, deceive or defraud any person by the act. He contends that the Appellant, in pleading to the FIR before the trial Chief Magistrate Court, further said that the property in question belongs to him, having previously obtained a Court judgment in his favour over the ownership of the property which he subsequently sold. Counsel also submits that the Appellant, having been arraigned under Section 323 of the Penal Code, and not Section 320 thereof for the offence of cheating, it must be spelt out in the FIR that he had a duty to protect the person involved, either in law or under a contract, leading to the commission of the offence.

In addition, Counsel submits that there was no clear admission of guilt by the Appellant as required by law and procedure, to warrant his conviction summarily by the trial Chief Magistrate and the subsequent affirmation of the conviction by the lower Court. He argues that for a summary conviction under Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) to stand, the admission of guilt by the accused person must be direct, positive and unequivocal. Where the admission is not direct, as in the instant case, the Court is under a duty not to convict the accused person. Counsel submits that in the instant case, whereas the record of appeal discloses that the Appellant admitted selling the land in question, he explained his reason for doing so, showing that it was not with the intention of cheating the purchaser of the property.

Counsel submits that from the dialogue between the trial Court and the Appellant as reflected at pages 12 & 14 of the record of appeal, the following is evident:
a. The Appellant sold the land to the purchaser relying on the title given to him by a competent Court of law.
b. The Appellant stated that if the purchaser was not satisfied with the purchase, he would give him one of his houses.
c. The Appellant also stated that the purchaser’s money was still in his possession; therefore, he clearly did not admit that he intended to cheat the purchaser of his money.

Hence, Counsel submits that in the circumstances of the plea, the Appellant cannot be said to have admitted guilt in respect of the offence of cheating under Section 323 of the Penal Code as alleged, that would have warranted his summary conviction under Section 157 of the Penal Code. Additionally, he submits that since the Appellant contended that the ownership of the property was awarded to him by the judgment of a Court, the trial Chief Magistrate was under a duty to consider it as a defence available to the Appellant, even if it was not raised by him. As a corollary, he argues that since the Appellant claimed that he sold the property believing that it was awarded to him by a Court of law, no intention to cheat or to commit any crime was established. He relied on a host of decisions to buttress all the above submissions. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to allow the appeal as its wrong affirmation by the lower Court was perverse and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES ONE AND TWO
The first complaint of the Appellant against the decision of the lower Court was its affirmation of the Appellant’s conviction for the offence of cheating under Section 323 of the Penal Code Law when the facts contained in the First Information Report (FIR) did not disclose the ingredients of the offence. Thus, that the admission of the Appellant to the facts stated therein did not amount to a plea of guilty for an offence under Section 323 of the Penal Code. Therefore, he should not have been summarily convicted by the trial Court.

As mentioned earlier in this judgment, the Respondent did not bother to respond in any way to the appeal, notwithstanding that he was duly served with all the processes of this Court. I have therefore considered the complaints of the Appellant on the decision of the lower Court and the arguments proffered in this regard by learned Counsel for the Appellant in the Appellant’s Brief of argument vis-à-vis the proceedings in the record of appeal, inclusive of the judgment of the lower Court.

The contents of the FIR which contains the facts which allegedly constituted the criminal offence of cheating punishable under Section 323 of the Penal Code Law, have already been set out earlier in the body of this judgment. The side notes for the offence under Section 323 of the Penal Code Law describes it as “Cheating person whose interest offender is bound to protect”. The provision itself penalizes this offence as follows:
“323. Whoever cheats with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause wrongful loss to a person whose interest in the transaction, to which the cheating relates, he was bound either by law or by a legal contract to protect, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or with fine or with both.”
At page 254 of the Penal Code Law right below the said provision, the ingredients the prosecution is required to prove in order to establish the offence sanctioned by Section 323 (supra), are spelt out as follows:
1. “Prove
(a) that the accused cheated some person (see Section 322).
(b) that he was under a legal obligation to protect the interests of that person.
(c) that the cheating was related to the legal obligation.
(d) that the accused knew that he was likely to cause wrongful loss to such person.”
Section 321 of the Penal Code which defines the term ‘cheating’, and the provision which provides the punishment for cheating, Section 322 thereof, (the latter which is referred to above as the first ingredient to be established in proof of the offence under Section 323 of the Penal Code), provide thus:
“321. A person is said to cheat by personation if he cheats by pretending to be some other person or by knowingly substituting one person for another or representing that he or another person is a person other than he or such other person really is.”
“322. Whoever cheats shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.”
The ingredients to be proved by the prosecution to establish the offence of cheating under Section 322 of the Penal Code above are set down below the provision, as follows:
1. “Prove:
(a) that the person deceived, delivered to someone or consented that some person shall retain certain property.
(b) that the person deceived was induced by the accused to do as above.
(c) that the person acted upon the inducement in consequence of his having been deceived by the accused.
(d) that the accused acted fraudulently or dishonestly when so inducing that person.
or Prove:
(a) that the person deceived did, or omitted to do something which he was not bound to do or omit to do.
(b) and (c) as above.
(c) that the accused so induced that person intentionally.
(d) that the act or omission caused or was likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.”
From these provisions, it is evident that, in order to prove or establish the offence of cheating under Section 323 of the Penal Code Law (under which the Appellant was convicted), the ingredients of the offence do not only consist of alleging and/or establishing that an accused person took property from one person and sold it to another in a manner that has caused offence to that person, as was merely alleged in the First Information Report (FIR). For ease of reference and the avoidance of any doubt, these are the exact words used in the FIR at page 11 of the record of appeal:

“That you Mallam Adamu Hussaini… did sold a plot of property of one Hassan Ahmadu to one Kabiru Moh’d … located at G.R.A. Gombe behind Ministry of Education at cost of five million naira N5,000,000.00k thereby committed offence contrary to Section 323 of the penal code law.”
That is the entire allegation against the Appellant. From Section 323 of the Penal Code Law which provided for the offence of “Cheating person whose interest offender is bound to protect”, the essential ingredients constituting the criminal element of the offence are visibly absent in the FIR. In particular, the elements of dishonesty, deception and fraud knowingly committed by him, are conspicuous by their absence. This is what constitutes the mens rea of the offence, in the absence of which an accused person cannot be held liable, even if the actus reus, to wit: selling the property without the consent of the owner, is present.
Secondly, the FIR did not disclose that the Appellant owed a duty to protect the purchaser of the property. This, again is an essential ingredient of the offence. All that the Appellant admitted from the face of the FIR is that he took the property of one Hassan Ahmadu and sold it to one Kabiru Moh’d. There is absolutely no iota of a criminal element disclosed in these facts. Therefore, since the facts contained in the FIR did not disclose any offence known to law, and the Appellant was not put on notice of all the ingredients of the offence which he was going to meet at the trial Court, his so-called admission of guilt, was not an admission to any offence known to law. The conviction was therefore completely unwarranted and unjustified.

In addition, I agree with learned Counsel for the Appellant that the so-called admission in Court to the facts contained in the FIR was not direct, positive and unequivocal because he clearly explained in his own words what he meant. For ease of reference, the dialogue between the learned trial Judge and the Appellant culled from pages 12, 13 and 24 of the record of appeal, are reproduced hereunder:
“Crt: How do you plead to the allegation against you?
Accd: Yes I have committed the offence. I sold the land to him. It was Court that gave the land to me but if he did agree I am ready to give him one of my houses…
Pros: … The norminal (sic) complainant has approached me and informed me that the parties a (sic) discussing the possibility of settlement out of Court. We therefore apply for a date to enable us came forward with the term of settlement.
Crt to the accused person: how do you react to what the prosecution is saying.
Accd: Yes, we are discussing with Kabiru if he will accept the house which I bought with part of his money. I bought the house for N1,800,000.00…
Pros: … The accused person and the norminal (sic) complainant are yet to conclude the settlement terms…
Pros: … “it does seem that the settlement effort has failed and we want to proceed with the case. The accused person having pleaded guilty to the charge read against him, we hereby apply for summary trial if the accused still stands by his plea.
Crt to the accused person. Do you still stand by your plea of admission of guilty earlier plead (sic by you?
Accd: Yes I adm’t the fact that his money is with me.
Judgment
In view of the admission by the accused person based on the allegation of cheating against him as the content of the FIR state and in view of the application by the prosecution for the Court to proceed under Section 157 C.P.C. for summary trial of the accused person. The Court hereby find the accused person guilty on the strength of his plea of guilty and he is accordingly convicted.” (Emphasis supplied)

When the lower Court was presented with the appeal of the Appellant against this conviction, and after reviewing the proceedings as set out above, the learned Judges of the lower Court surprisingly upheld the conviction. Relevant portions of its judgment at pages 13-35 of the record of appeal are reproduced below:
“… we agree entirely with the submission of learned counsel to the respondent that where the appellant expressly admit that he has committed the offence alleged against him as in the instant case as contained on page 1 lines 22-24 of the printed record of proceedings, the trial Court is at liberty to conduct a summary trial as provided under Chapter XVI of the CPC more particularly Section 157 thereof… the appellant clearly admitted committing the alleged offence as read and explained to him from the content of the First information Report. The learned Magistrate is only required by law to be satisfied with his plea or explanation as in the instant case that the alleged offence convicted against the appellant has in fact been committed having regard to his admissions through his plea or explanations… We are of the humble opinion that the trial Magistrate has complied with the provisions of Section 156 of the CPC… We are of the view that the further explanation of the appellant did not vitiate the admission of guilt …”

I have already found that the facts contained in the FIR did not disclose any offence known to law, and in particular, did not disclose the offence alleged in Section 323 of the Penal Code Law. Therefore, the Appellant’s admission to the facts contained in the FIR did not constitute an admission to any offence known to law. That being so, his conviction on his so-called admission was unwarranted, undeserved, unsustainable and untenable in law.

It is trite law that any information or charge preferred against an accused person, must not only disclose an offence created by law, but must link the accused person to the offence. If no offence is disclosed in the information or charge upon which an accused person is convicted, then such conviction is liable to be quashed –Igwe V State (2021) LPELR-55336(SC) 27-28, F-A, per Kekere-Ekun, JSC; Akachi V State (2019) LPELR-49545(CA); Agboola V FRN (2014) LPELR(CA); Oni V FRN (2012) LPELR-9839(CA) 32-33, B-A; Ogudo V State (2011) LPELR-860(SC) 57, C-F; Uket V FRN (2007) LPELR-3693(CA) 11-12, D-C; Abacha V State (2002) 7 SC (Pt. 1) 1; Ikomi V State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 28) 340, 356.

Secondly, the content of the Appellant’s so-called admission was neither direct nor positive nor unequivocal. Rather, it disclosed the Appellant’s position that he was awarded the property in question by a Court of law, which he subsequently sold to Kabiru Moh’d, the complainant to the Police. Clearly, the sum of the Appellant’s statement at the trial Court is that the ownership of the property was vested in him by a Court of law, and that is the reason for his subsequent sale of the property to Kabiru Moh’d. To further buttress his lack of mens rea, the Appellant admitted that he was still in possession of the purchase money, which he even offered to return to the purchaser. These explanatory statements certainly were not tantamount to an admission of guilt to the allegation that the Appellant cheated the complainant in any way or manner. Rather, his statement at the trial Court suggested that he sold the property to the complainant because believed that the property belonged to him. This totally negates the element of dishonesty, deceit or fraud, which is a crucial element of cheating under Section 323 of the Penal Code Law.

Thus, since it was apparent from the record that the admission or plea of the Appellant was not direct, positive and unequivocal, the trial Court should rightly have entered a plea of not guilty or nor admitted, as the case may be, and instead, should have invited the prosecution to adduce evidence in support of the allegation in the FIR, if it disclosed an offence known to law, which it did not. Thus, the ideal thing would have been to quash or throw out the FIR for its failure to disclose any offence against the Appellant.

Consequently, the lower Court erred in law when it affirmed the conviction of the Appellant (i) when the FIR did not disclose any criminal offence, (ii) when the Appellant’s answer to the facts contained in the FIR was not direct and unequivocal, and (iii) when he did not admit to all the elements which constitute the offence of cheating under Section 323 of the Penal Code Law –Okereke V IGP (2021) LPELR-55763(CA) 22, D-E; Okewu V FRN (2012) 7834(SC) 19, B-E, per Ariwoola, JSC; Akanni V FRN (2012) LPELR-19949(CA) 22-24, E-C; Amanchukwu V FRN (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1144) 474, per Ogbuagu, JSC; Chukwu V State (1994) LPELR-855(SC) 10, B-F, per Adio, JSC.

Thus, if both the trial Court and the lower Court had been painstaking in scrutinizing the facts contained in the First Information Report (FIR), they would easily have reached the conclusion that it disclosed no offence known to law. Rather, if anything, it was in the realm of a civil matter. It is therefore my considered view that the lower Court ought to have been more diligent and circumspect in the determination of the appeal. It should have thoroughly examined the information placed before the trial Court, as well as the responses of the Appellant to same. This is because the deficiencies contained in the FIR and the so-called admission of the Appellant, were too glaring to be missed by both lower Courts. The FIR ought to have been quashed and the conviction ought to have been promptly set aside. Consequently, it is for these reasons that I resolve the two issues for determination in favour of the Appellant.
As a result of the above findings, I find merit in the appeal. It succeeds and is allowed.

Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court of Justice Gombe State in Appeal No. GM/85CA/2014, delivered on 19th May 2015, Coram: J.A. Awak J. and P.I Apollos J., is set aside.

In consequence, I quash the conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the Chief Magistrate Court, Pantami in Gombe State for the offence of cheating under Section 323 of the Penal Code Law.
In its stead, I enter an Order of discharge and acquittal in the Appellant’s favour.
No costs are awarded.

IBRAHIM SHATA BDLIYA, J.C.A.: I read in draft, the lead judgment delivered by My Lord, JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA. I am in full agreement with the reasoning and decision arrived at that, the appeal has merit. I too, allow the appeal. The judgment of the lower Court in appeal No. GM/85CA/2014, delivered on the 19th of May 2015 is hereby set aside. I abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.

EBIOWEI TOBI, J.C.A.: My lord and learned brother, Jummai Hannatu Sankey, JCA in the leading judgment which I had the privilege to read in draft allowed this appeal, acquitting and discharging the Appellant for the offence of cheating. I agree with the judgment entirely as the law is settled that no one can be convicted for an offence not known to law. See Omatseye v. FRN (2017) LPELR-42719(CA); Ifeanyi vs FRN (2018) 11 NWLR (1632)164; Nyame vs FRN (2021) 6 NWLR (pt 1772) 289.

In reading the judgment of the lower Court contained in the record at pages 13-35 that the Judges at the lower Court is inspired by their decision by what they perceived as the plea of guilty by the Appellant. I reproduce the aspect of the judgment in these words:
“… we agree entirely with the submission of learned counsel to the respondent that where the appellant expressly admit that he has committed the offence alleged against him as in the instant case as contained on page 1 lines 22-24 of the printed record of proceedings, the trial Court is at liberty to conduct a summary trial as provided under Chapter XVI of the CPC more particularly Section 157 thereof… the appellant clearly admitted committing the alleged offence as read and explained to him from the content of the First Information Report. The learned Magistrate is only required by law to be satisfied with his plea or explanation as in the instant case that the alleged offence convicted against the appellant has in fact been committed having regard to his admissions through his plea or explanations… We are of the humble opinion that the trial Magistrate has complied with the provisions of Section 156 of the CPC… We are of the view that the further explanation of the appellant did not vitiate the admission of guilt.”

The implication of this will be that, if the plea does not meet the requirement of the law, the conviction is likely to be set aside. My learned brother in the lead judgment has set out how the plea was taken. Permit me to repeat it here for proper flow of this contribution.
“Crt: How do you plead to the allegation against you?
Accd: Yes I have committed the offence. I sold the land to him. It was Court that gave the land to me but if he did agree I am ready to give him one of my houses…
Pros: … The norminal (sic) complainant has approached me and informed me that the parties a (sic) discussing the possibility of settlement out of Court. We therefore apply for a date to enable us come forward with the term of settlement.
Crt to the accused person: how do you react to what the prosecution is saying.
Accd: Yes, we are discussing with Kabiru if he will accept the house which I bought with part of his money. I bought the house for N1,800,000.00…
Pros: … The accused person and the norminal (sic) complainant are yet to conclude the settlement terms…
Pros: … “it does seem that the settlement effort has failed and we want to proceed with the case. The accused person having pleaded guilty to the charge read against him, we hereby apply for summary trial if the accused still stands by his plea.
Crt to the accused person. Do you still stand by your plea of admission of guilty earlier plead (sic) by you?
Accd: Yes I admit the fact that his money is with me.
Judgment
In view of the admission by the accused person based on the allegation of cheating against him as the content of the FIR state and in view of the application by the prosecution for the Court to proceed under Section 157 C.P.C. for summary trial of the accused person. The Court hereby finds the accused person guilty on the strength of his plea of guilty and he is accordingly convicted.”

When a person takes a plea, he must be clear as to his plea. The charge must be read over to him and explained and when he says he understands same, he will be called upon to take his plea. If he pleads guilty to the offence he is charged, the Court must be sure and clear that the plea is unequivocal and that actually is what the accused intend to say. When the plea is followed with some explanation that is more like a defence, the Court should not enter a plea of guilty but rather not guilty. This is because by the explanation, the accused is trying to state his innocence. The plea of guilty must be unequivocal, precise and direct to be valid. Let me just add a case to the line of cases on this point my lord referred to in the leading judgment. This is the case of Offor & Anor v. State (2012) LPELR-19658 (SC) where the apex Court held:
“… The authority enunciated in the case of Amanchukwu v. FRN (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt.1144) 475 is relevant in support wherein this Court per Ogbuagu, JSC had this to say at page 488: “It is now settled that a plea of guilty is valid if made (as in the instant case leading to this appeal) in a very unambiguous and unequivocal way and the same is received by a trial Court/Tribunal not labouring under the apprehension of what the law is. “Per OGUNBIYI, J.S.C
An unequivocal, unambiguous and direct plea is such that in every hearing, the plea of guilty is not mistaken as to what the accused means. He is direct without explanation that he is guilty. The question is, can the plea the Appellant took be said to be direct, unambiguous and unequivocal. I do not think so, in fact, I make bold to say, it is not so.

By the plea of the Appellant, it cannot be said that he had any dishonest intention. He said he had power to sell because the Court gave it to him. His explanation in my opinion is a red flag for the trial Court not to see his plea as a plea of guilty. The lower Court should not have fallen for the error of the trial Court.

In the circumstance, I agree with the leading judgment in allowing the appeal and consequently discharge and acquit the Appellant.