HERITAGE BANK (NIG) LTD v. DON & CHYKE (NIG) LTD & ANOR (2020)

HERITAGE BANK (NIG) LTD v. DON & CHYKE (NIG) LTD & ANOR

(2020)LCN/14851(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, December 31, 2020

CA/J/324/2018

RATIO

DISCRETION: ATTITUDE OF THE APPELLATE COURT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

The exercise of discretion was the exclusive preserve of the learned trial Judge. See Obasi v Mikson Est. Industries Ltd (2016)16 NWLR (Pt.1539) 335 and Pemu v NDIC (2016) NWLR (Pt.1507) 175. A Court of Appeal will not reverse a discretionary order of a trial Court merely because it would have exercised its discretion differently. See Obasi v Mikson Est. Ind. Ltd (2016)16 NWLR (Pt.1539) 338 @ 369 Paras A-B and Ogolo v Ogolo (2006)5 NWLR (Pt.972) 163. PER GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A.

PRAYERS: BINDINGNESS OF PRAYERS OF A PARTY

The position of the law is that a party is bound by his prayers on his motion paper before the Court. See Commissioner for Works v Devcon Construction Co. Ltd (1988)3 NWLR (Pt.83) 407 @ 428. PER GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Adzira Gana Mshelia Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mudashiru Nasiru Oniyangi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Boloukuromo Moses Ugo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

HERITAGE BANK (NIG.) LTD APPELANT(S)

And

1. DON & CHYKE (NIG.) LTD 2. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE RESPONDENT(S)

ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Ruling of the Plateau State High Court delivered on the 27th of April, 2016 by Justice D.D. Longji in Suit No. PLD/J48/2015.

By a writ of summons dated 30th day of July, 2015 Plaintiff now 1st Respondent commenced an action before the High Court against the defendant now Appellant seeking for five (5) reliefs. By a Motion on Notice dated 01/03/2016, Appellant sought for an order striking out suit No. PLD/J48/2015 for being incompetent. In a Ruling delivered on the 27th day of April, 2016 the lower Court dismissed the objection of the Appellant and proceeded to hear and determine the matter before it. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower Court the Appellant filed its Notice and grounds of Appeal to this Court containing four (4) grounds of appeal.

In compliance with the rules of Court, parties exchanged their respective Briefs of Argument. Appellant’s Brief of Argument settled by V.M.G. Pwul, Esq was dated 7th day of December, 2018 and filed on 10/12/2018. While 1st respondent’s Brief settled by R.C. Nwaiwu Esq,

was dated 23rd day of January, 2020 and filed same date but deemed properly filed on 02/07/2020. The 2nd Respondent did not file any brief of Argument though served. Appellant filed a reply brief on 02/07/2020. When the Appeal came up for hearing both counsel adopted their respective briefs of argument.

Appellant distilled four issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether by failing totally to look into and determine the appellant’s motion of 1st March, 2016 on the merit the lower Court did not breach the appellant’s constitutional right to fair hearing and whether such breach does not render its decision of 27th of April, 2016 null and void and liable to be set aside (Ground 1).
2. Whether, having failed to determine on the merit the appellant’s motion of 1st March, 2016, which challenged the lower Court’s jurisdiction, the learned trial Judge did not entertain and determine this matter in the absence of the requisite jurisdiction, thereby nullifying the entire proceedings and eventual decision therein (Grounds 2).
3. Whether having regard to the valid and subsisting order of the Federal High Court, Lagos (a Court of

coordinate jurisdiction with the lower Court) freezing the 1st Respondent’s dollar account with the appellant the lower Court was not robbed of its jurisdiction and therefore wrong in refusing to refrain from determining the substantive suit and eventually ordering the release of the same account (Ground 3).
4. Whether, having regard to the failure of the learned trial Judge in his Ruling of 27th April, 2016 to do the following.
i. Set out the nature of the Appellant’s objection before him;
ii. Identifying the issue in controversy between the parties in the Appellant’s objection;
iii. Review the case of each party before it;
iv. Consider the relevant laws cited by the parties as well as their application or applicability to the appellant’s objection;
v. Make specific findings of fact and draw conclusions therefrom the Ruling of the 27th of April, 2016 did not fail to meet the requirements of a good Judgment, rendering it null and void and liable to be set aside (Ground 4).

The 1st Respondent on the other hand formulated three issues for determination thus:
i. Did the learned trial Judge breach the

appellant right to fair hearing when he heard the appellant’s motion and in the exercise of his discretion came to the conclusion that same was premature and that the issue of the Federal High Court order raised in the motion must be heard on the merit. (Ground 1 & 3).
ii. Whether by the tenor of the prayers, contained in the Appellant’s Motion dated 1st March, 2016 the lower Court was obligated to first make a determination whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain the 1st Respondents suit which commenced without any such challenge or do so after examining the competence of the suit vis-a-vis the Lagos Federal High Court Order made on the 6th day of October, 2015? (Ground 2).
iii. Whether the learned trial Judge was under obligation to write a full and detailed Ruling/Judgment after coming to the conclusion that the motion before him was premature and that the issue raised thereby must be heard on the merit? (Ground 4).

I have examined the issues raised by Appellant and 1st Respondent. I will adopt the issues raised by Appellant since Appellant filed the appeal.

Learned counsel in arguing the appeal treated issues

one, two, three and four together. It was the contention of learned counsel that the lower Court failed completely to determine the motion on the merit breaching the appellant constitutional right to fair hearing. Counsel submitted that by pronouncing the motion premature, the lower Court cannot have gone into the merit to ascertain whether it holds water or not. Learned counsel also argued that despite holding that the motion was premature, the lower Court proceeded to dismiss it, as opposed to striking out. That by the singular act of failing to determine the motion on the merit on the misconceived ground that the same was premature, the lower Court breached the appellant’s right to fair hearing and unlawfully proceeded with the matter without mandatorily pronouncing or otherwise deciding that it had the requisite jurisdiction. See Governor of Abia State & Ors v Anawanti & Ors (2007) LPELR-5014. Learned counsel referred to the case of EFCC v Fayose & Anor (2018) LPELR -44131 (CA) to submit that there is an obvious conflict between the Order of the federal High Court and the lower Court’s Judgment which the law prohibits. That the lower

Court erred in failing to abstain from making an order contradicting and conflicting with the order, in spite of the motion urging to do so. According to counsel, the suit ought not to have been heard on merit, while the order still subsists. Reliance placed onNIMB LTD v UBN LTD & Ors (2004) LPELR – 2003 (SC). In line with the above case counsel urged the Court to set aside the erroneous, volatile Ruling and strike out the 1st Respondent’s suit in the light of the subsisting order of the Federal High Court.

Furthermore, counsel submitted that the issue of the order being obtained ex parte and its duration was raised suo motu by learned trial Judge, he contended that both parties ought to have been called to address the Court on this issue. Counsel contended that, that was a breach of the appellant’s fundamental right to fair hearing and the learned trial Judge’s decision is liable to be set aside for being a nullity. See Egbuchu v Continental Merchant Bank Plc. & Ors. (2016) LPELR – 40053 (CA). That the exparte order was made by the Federal High Court, Lagos and so the applicable Rules thereto are the Federal High

Court Rules and not the lower Court’s rules.

It is trite that the Rules of one Court cannot regulate another Court. See Nneji & Ors v Chukwu & Ors (1988) LPELR-2058. Learned counsel submitted that assuming without conceding that the Rules of the Federal High Court and the lower Court were mutually applicable, going by the Rules of the Federal High Court, an ex parte order lapses strictly based on an application to set aside same, he opined. That it does not automatically lapse after seven days. Reference made to Order 26, Rule 12 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. According to counsel from the above, it is clear that an ex parte order will lapse only upon an application by a party to vary or discharge it. That upon the application an ex parte Order will lapse after fourteen days not seven. That in the case at hand respondent never applied to have the order varied or discharged. Counsel therefore, contended that the respondent did not satisfy the condition precedent to having the order lapse. That the order is still subsisting in absence of an application to vary or discharge it. It is trite that no party can be conferred with

or enjoy a right without satisfying the condition(s) precedent thereto. See Dakour & Ors. v Lagos State Urban Renewal Board & Ors (2015) LPELR – 24806 (CA); Virgin Nigeria Airways Ltd v Roijien (2013) LPELR -22044 (CA).

Counsel further made submission on the holding of the lower Court that the order, made in October, 2015 had nothing to do with the cause of action, which accrued in May, 2015. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the order not only had everything to do with it but actually rendered the cause of action impotent and undeterminable. Learned counsel conceded the fact that the order was not part of the appellant’s defence, had no retrospective effect and was not pleaded. He contended that the learned trial Judge was in gross error to have dismissed the appellant’s application on such basis. That the Appellant’s contention was that the order precluded the lower Court from releasing the account and not that the order justified its freezing the account. That the order robbed the lower Court of the jurisdiction to make an order on the account under reference, especially one releasing it. That the lower Court erred in

proceeding to order the release of the said account.

It was also the contention of learned counsel that the Judge’s Ruling of 27th April, 2016 failed to meet the requirements of a good decision. Counsel referred to the case of Ogboru & Anor v Uduaghan & Ors. (2012) LPELR -8287 (SC) wherein the apex Court laid down standard for a good Judgment of Court. See alsoMbanefo v Molokwu (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt.1403) 377 at 415-416 paras H-D. That Rulings and Judgments of Court are equally decisions of Court to be treated alike. See Contract Resources Nigeria Limited v Standard Trust Bank Limited (2013) LPELR -19934 (SC). He urged the Court to resolve the issues in favour of the Appellant.

In response, 1st Respondent responded by formulating three issues which are similar to that of Appellant. I will summarize the three issues and treat them together as done by the Appellant. While arguing issue one, learned counsel set out the motion on notice dated 1st March, 2016 and prayers sought. According to counsel, the motion was heard via affidavit evidence, a further affidavit, a counter-affidavit and written addresses of counsel on both sides. That the

motion was one which sought the discretion of the lower Court in terms of the order it would make. He argued that in the exercise of that discretion, the lower Court hold that the motion was premature and dismissed it having earlier taken cognizance of the concessions made by the Appellant’s counsel. That the concessions are: that the Federal High Court order in question was not pleaded in the suit. That the Federal High Court order did not have retrospective effect and that the Appellant was not relying on the Federal High Court order as a defence to the 1st Respondent’s suit. That the lower Court directed the issue of the Federal High Court order must be heard on merit. Counsel argued that it is not correct as contended by the Appellant that its motion was not heard. According to counsel by the discretion that the issue of the Federal High Court order must be heard on the merit the said order was still intact, not destroyed or set aside. Counsel contended that all it meant was that the Appellant should properly; bring it into the pending suit to be heard along with the facts of the case, particularly the alleged existing order of Senior District

Judge 1, Abuja which the Appellant had pleaded in its statement of defence as the basis for the freezing of the account. That was a proper exercise of judicial and judicious discretion on the part of the learned trial Judge. According to counsel the Appellant’s right to fair hearing was not breached by the exercise of the discretion rather it was preserved. That no miscarriage of justice was caused to the Appellant by that discretion the matter must be heard on the merit. That fair hearing in this circumstance is not only to the Appellant but also to the 1st Respondent. He urged the Court to uphold the exercise of discretion which was the exclusive preserve of the learned trial Judge. Reliance placed onObasi v Mikson Est. Industries Ltd (2016)16 NWLR (pt.1539) 335 @ 369, paras A-B, Pemu v N.D.I.C (2016) (Pt.1507) 175 @ 214 para E-F. Counsel reproduced part of the Ruling appearing at page 10 of the Supplementary Record, according to counsel the reasons for the exercise of the discretion to hear the matter on the merit is clearly justifiable more so when pleadings have been filed and issues already joined in the suit. That Appellant did not appeal against

the Ruling made on 27th April, 2016 by the learned trial Judge until after the final Judgment delivered on the 25th October, 2016. That since the Appellant failed to immediately appeal against the discretion exercised by the lower Court to hear the matter on the merit at that stage it was for the Appellant to ensure that the matter was heard on the merit by pleading the order of the Federal High Court and canvassing it to any possible length in the suit, but it failed to do so. Learned counsel therefore contended that Appellant cannot complain of lack of fair hearing when it failed and neglected to take proper steps to ensure that the matter was heard on the merit as directed. That Appellant was offered opportunity at a time it had not opened its defence that the question is not whether injustice has been done because of lack of fair hearing but whether a party entitled to be heard before a decision, had in fact been given had the opportunity of being heard. See Oyeyemi v Owoeye (2017)12 NWLR (Pt.1580) 364 @ 416-417 paras A-B. Reference was also made to the case of the Ardo v I.N.E.C (2017)13 NWLR (Pt.1583) 450 @ 496-497 paras H-A wherein the Supreme Court

held that “Where a party in a suit refused or failed to take advantage of the fair hearing process created by the Court, he cannot later turn round to accuse the Court of denying him of justice”. See also Jadcom Ltd v Oguns Electrical (2003) FWLR (Pt.183) 165 @ 188 Para E-F, Barr (Mrs.) Amanda Peters Pam v Nasiru Mohammed & 1 or (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt.436) 1868 @ 1872 ratio 3. Counsel contended that the learned trial Judge was the master of his Court and had jurisdiction to adopt a procedure that serves the end of justice. See Assams v Ararume (2016)1 NWLR (Pt.1493) 368 @ 389 paras B-D. He urged the Court to resolve issue in favour of the 1st Respondent.

On issue two, learned counsel submitted that a case where the jurisdiction of a Court is directly challenged (which is not the case here) the Court does not just throw up its hands, it would have the jurisdiction to decide if it has jurisdiction to deal with the particular case. SeeBarclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd v Central Bank of Nigeria (1978)1 ALL NLR (Pt.1) 409 @ 421 reference made to the recent Supreme Court case of Chief Orlando Ojo & 1 Or v National Pension Commission (2019)14 NWLR

(Pt.1693) 547. Counsel commended the above recent case in particular.

Counsel further submitted that a decision could not be made via the motion whether the 1st Respondent’s suit is incompetent until the matter of the Federal High Court order is heard on the merit, placed side by side with the 1st Respondents claim. That it will be premature for the lower Court to determine if it had main prayer in the motion called for a decision on the competence of the 1st Respondent’s suit in which issues have been joined on pleadings as against a Lagos Federal High Court order made on 6th October, 2015. Counsel argued that the position of the law is that a party is bound by his prayers on his Motion Paper before the Court. SeeCommissioner for Works Benue State v Devcon Construction Co. Ltd (1988)3 NWLR (Pt.83) 407 @ 428; Government of Gongola State v Tukur (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) 592 @ 603, Paras C-D.

Learned counsel further submitted that it is only when a decision is made that the 1st Respondents suit is incompetent that the lower Court would cease to have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and certainly not before such decision of the incompetence

of the suit is made. That appellant did not comply with the order to hear the matter of the Federal High Court order on the merit by taking necessary action to that effect. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the issue of jurisdiction was not properly raised in this appeal and resolve issue 2 in favour the Respondent.

As regards issue 3 counsel submitted that the Ruling of the lower Court on the motion was clear and unambiguous. That Appellant criticized the Ruling of the learned trial Judge delivered in this matter as not meeting the standard of an ideal Judgment. Counsel contended that it is very unfair to the learned trial Judge having regard to his findings on the concessions made by counsel to the appellant and narrowing of the issue attributed to counsel. Reference made to the portion of the Ruling at paragraph 19 of the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument. According to counsel the Federal High Court order was the centre-point of the appellant’s motion in the Court below, but appellant’s counsel in moving the motion took the slime off the order by admitting as true that the order was not pleaded and that the order was not relied

upon as a defence to the respondent’s suit and finally that the order has no retrospective effect. That under the circumstances the depth of the Ruling has been circumscribed and removed, and the learned trial Judge could not have gone behind to formulate a Judgment on Federal High Court order which the appellant itself conceded was not placed before the learned trial Judge in the suit that was being challenged and which order the appellant admitted had no retrospective effect to the time the suit began. That those concessions were far reaching, but that notwithstanding, the learned trial Judge directed that the matter be heard on merit. According to counsel a full Ruling/Judgment which the Appellant advocated at that stage would negate and make nonsense of the direction to hear the matter on the merit. That the learned trial Judge was conscious of this and that is why he rhetorically asked the question whether the Court should jump the gun? That he should be commended not criticized.

On the complaint that the learned trial Judge raised issue of the Federal High Court order made ex-parte suo motu, counsel submitted that the order on its face shows

that it was made ex-parte. That it is far from a matter that can be said to be raised suo motu by a Court. That the matter of the order being ex-parte already existed in the case as expressed on the order itself. See B.N. Ltd v ATT. GEN Rivers State (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt.417)1 @ 26 Para A-C. According to counsel though the learned trial Judge remarked by way of an obiter that by our rules an ex-parte order lasts for seven days, he did not use the tenor of our rules to set aside the order. That Appellant suffered no miscarriage of justice by the remark made by the learned trial Judge. That he did not interfere but only directed that the matter be heard on the merit, where the appellant would be at liberty to canvass even the issue of number of days. Reliance placed onElias v Ecobank (Nig.) Plc. (2017)2 NWLR (Pt.1549) 175 @ 202-203. He urged Court to resolve issue in favour of 1st Respondent.

Appellant filed a reply brief. The arguments canvased therein will be considered where necessary in the course of writing the Judgment.

As for the Respondent’s Notice, it appears 1st Respondent’s counsel has abandoned it. Nothing was said about it when

counsel adopted the brief of argument on 12/10/2020. Same is deemed abandoned.
I have considered the submission of respective counsel. All the three issues were argued together.

Before I proceed to resolve the issues, I find it necessary to comment on issue 3 formulated by Appellant from ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal. The Appellant did not limit issue 3 to the Ruling delivered on 27th of April, 2016 but the main Judgment delivered on 25th of October, 2016 in Suit No. PLD/J48/2015. I find this issue incompetent because Appellant is supposed to direct its complaint against the Ruling not the Judgment. (i.e. reference to the order releasing the account). Combining the Ruling and the Judgment in my view renders issue 3 and argument canvassed therein incompetent as such I will discountenance same. I will only treat issues 1, 2 and 4.

After pleadings have been filed and exchanged by parties and issues joined, Appellant filed a Motion on Notice dated 1st day of March, 2016 seeking for an Order to strike out suit No. PLD/J48/2015 for being incompetent. Applicant also asked for such further order or orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make

in the circumstances. Four grounds are set out in support of the application. The motion was heard via affidavit evidence, a further affidavit, a counter-affidavit and written addresses of counsel on both sides. In the course of hearing the application, counsel for the applicant now appellant conceded that the Federal High Court order does not have a retrospective action. That applicant is not relying on the order as a defence as such same was not pleaded.

I find it necessary to reproduce part of the Ruling appearing at page 10 of the Supplementary record wherein the lower Court stated thus:
“I have carefully perused the affidavit supporting the application, the further affidavit and the counter-affidavit in opposition and I have considered the written addresses for and against the application and I think that learned counsel for the applicant has narrowed the issue and made it simpler for me. Learned counsel conceded that the order of the Federal High Court in issue could not take a retrospective effect, and that the applicant was not relying on the order as a defence, hence it was not pleaded. What then? Should the Court jump the gun? The

plaintiff’s claim hinges on an act purportedly done in May, 2005. What has the order of the Federal High Court issued in October, 2015 to do with the present case? If it does then the matter must be heard on the merit, particularly seeing that the order was made Exparte and by our Rules, Exparte Orders last 7 days. I hold that the objection is premature and does not hold water. It is hereby dismissed.”

I agree with the argument of learned counsel for the 1st Respondent that it is not correct as argued by the Appellant that its motion was not heard on the merit. Due to the concessions made by counsel to the appellant, the learned trial Judge exercised his discretion and ordered that the issue relating to the Federal High Court order must be heard on the merit. By this pronouncement the order was intact and not set aside. All that it meant was that the Appellant should properly bring it into the pending suit to be heard along with the facts of the case particularly the alleged existing order of Senior District Judge I, Abuja which the Appellant had pleaded in its statement of defence as the basis for the freezing of the account. The concessions

made by Appellant’s counsel prompted the approach made by the learned trial Judge. If the Appellant will not rely on the Federal High Court order as a defence, then why asking the Court to use it and strike out the main suit? I think the trial Court was right to ask the appellant to present the order in the main suit so that it will be determined on merit with other pleaded facts. I agree that the Appellant’s right to fair hearing was not breached by the exercise of the discretion. Appellant cannot say that he was not heard before the order was made, and no miscarriage of justice was caused to the appellant.
The exercise of discretion was the exclusive preserve of the learned trial Judge. See Obasi v Mikson Est. Industries Ltd (2016)16 NWLR (Pt.1539) 335 and Pemu v NDIC (2016) NWLR (Pt.1507) 175. A Court of Appeal will not reverse a discretionary order of a trial Court merely because it would have exercised its discretion differently. See Obasi v Mikson Est. Ind. Ltd (2016)16 NWLR (Pt.1539) 338 @ 369 Paras A-B and Ogolo v Ogolo (2006)5 NWLR (Pt.972) 163. Appellant did not immediately appeal against the exercise of discretion until after the

substantive suit was determined.
From the record, Appellant was yet to open his defence when the directives was given, so he could have taken steps to amend his statement of defence to plead the Federal High Court Order but he failed or neglected to take steps. Appellant was given opportunity so he cannot complain of lack of fair hearing. In Ardo v INEC (supra) cited by 1st Respondent’s counsel, the Supreme Court held that “Where a party in a suit refused or failed to take advantage of fair hearing process created by the Court, he cannot later turn round to accuse the Court of denying him of justice.”
The learned trial Judge was the master of his Court and had the jurisdiction to adopt a procedure that serves the end of justice. See Assams v Ararume (2016)1 NWLR (Pt.1493) 368 @ 389 paras B-D. Issue one is resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.

As regards issue two, I agree with the submission of 1st Respondent’s counsel that a decision could not be made via the motion, whether the 1st Respondent’s suit is incompetent until the matter of the Federal High Court Order is heard on the merit, placed side by side with

the 1st Respondent’s claim. I agree with learned counsel for the 1st Respondent that it would be premature for the lower Court to determine if it had main prayers in the motion and called for a decision on the competence of the 1st Respondent’s suit in which issues have been joined on pleadings against a Lagos Federal High Court Order made on 6th October, 2015. The position of the law is that a party is bound by his prayers on his motion paper before the Court. See Commissioner for Works v Devcon Construction Co. Ltd (1988)3 NWLR (Pt.83) 407 @ 428. It is only when a decision is made that 1st Respondent’s suit is incompetent that the lower Court would cease to have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and certainly not before such decision of the incompetence of the suit is made. Appellant did not comply with the order to hear the matter of the Federal High Court Order on the merit by taking necessary action to that effect. It is my humble view that issue of jurisdiction was not properly raised in this appeal. I will resolve issue two in favour of the 1st Respondent.

Issue 4 relates to the manner the Ruling was delivered, that it did not meet

the standard of an ideal Judgment. I have examined the Ruling delivered on 27th day of April, 2015. The Federal High Court Order was the centre point of the Appellant’s Motion in the Court below. Appellant’s counsel in moving the motion made concessions that the said order was not pleaded and would not be relied upon as a defence. The same order also has no retrospective effect. The concessions were far reaching. Despite the concessions the learned trial Judge exercised his discretion by directing that the matter relating to the Federal High Court Order be heard on merit. Having come to that conclusion, it was not necessary in my view for the learned trial Judge to write a detailed Ruling. When the matter is heard on merit as directed, the trial Court would be in a better position to make detailed reasoning on the matter. As argued by 1st Respondent’s counsel a full Ruling/Judgment which the Appellant advocated at that stage would negate and make nonsense of the direction to hear the matter on the merit. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, I hold the view that the Ruling delivered on 27/04/2015 is in order. The order of dismissal

will be taken as a striking out under the circumstances. Issue 4 is also resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.

Having resolved all the issues against the Appellant, I find the appeal unmeritorious. Appeal dismissed. The Ruling of the Plateau State High Court delivered on 27th day of April, 2016 by D.D. Longji J in Suit No. PLD/J48/2015 is hereby affirmed. Parties to bear their respective costs.

MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, PJCA.
I am at one with the reasoning and conclusions arrived thereat and I abide with the consequential orders made therein.

BOLOUKUROMO MOSES UGO, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the lead judgment of my learned brother ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A., (PJ) and I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusion, including orders as to costs. I have nothing useful to add.

Appearances:

Nantok Dashuwar For Appellant(s)

C. Nwaiwu, with him, J. N. Jack, Esq. – for 1st Respondent.
I. I. Bless, with him, J. P. Mahwel Esq. – for 2nd Respondent
For Respondent(s)