HADEJIA v. DANKOLI (2022)

HADEJIA v. DANKOLI

(2022)LCN/16770(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(KANO JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, August 25, 2022

CA/K/221/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Boloukuromo Moses Ugo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Abubakar Muazu Lamido Justice of the Court of Appeal

Usman Alhaji Musale Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

USMAN UBALE HADEJIA APPELANT(S)

And

ALHAJI SUNUSI DANKOLI RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT ISSUES IN AN APPEAL MUST BE FORMULATED FROM THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

I must reiterate that issues in an appeal ought only to be formulated to be at par with, or better still even less than, the grounds of appeal and not more than the grounds as appellant did in this in this case. See Dr. Arthur Aguncha Nwankwo & Ors v. Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua & Ors (2010) LPELR-2109(SC) p. 75, Unilorin v. Oluwadare (2003) 3 NWLR 808 at 557, Padawa v. Yatau (2003) 3 NWLR (pt 813) 247 at 557, Sogbesan v. Ogunbiyi (2006) 4 NWLR (pt 969) 19, Teriba v. Adeyemo (2010) LPELR-3143(SC) p. 10, (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1211) 242. PER UGO, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS BY ORIGINATING SUMMONS

Now, Order 3 Rules 5, 6 and 7 of the Jigawa State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2008 relating to commencement of proceedings by originating summons reads thus:
5. Any person claiming to be interested under a Will, enactment or other written instrument may apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested.
6. Any person claiming any legal or equitable right in a case where the determination of the question whether he is entitled to the right depends upon a question of construction of an enactment may apply originating summons for the determination of such question for a declaration as to the right claimed.
7. A judge shall not be bound to determine any such question of construction if in his opinion it ought not to be determined on originating summons but may make any such order as he deems fit.
That is the guiding light. Originating summons is only resorted to for determination of shorts issues of law and interpretation of documents where facts are not in dispute; meaning that originating summons ought not to be resorted to where facts are likely to be in dispute or are actually in dispute on the affidavits filed by parties. See Ossai v. Wakwah (2006) ALL FWLR (PT 303) 239. PER UGO, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT MERE FILING OF A COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT IN RESPONSE OF A SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT OF AN ORIGINATING SUMMONS AUTOMATICALLY MAKES THE MATTER ONE IN WHICH ORAL EVIDENCE MUST BE ADDUCED

BOLOUKUROMO MOSES UGO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The primary question for consideration in this appeal is whether the trial judge, Abubakar Sambo, J. of the High Court of Jigawa State, was right in his decision that originating summons was, in the circumstances of this case an appropriate mode for commencing the instant action before him and whether it was right in determining the said originating summons on affidavit evidence alone without calling oral evidence.

Respondent in his said originating summons sought the pronouncement and orders of the Court enforcing a Sales Agreement said to have been executed in his favour by appellant on 23rd October, 2017 wherein appellant was said to have sold his property known and called Plot No 13B measuring 50×50, located at Garun Gabas Road, Hadejia, in Jigawa State, to him. His case in the originating summons was that appellant was bound by the said Sales Agreement and cannot renege. He thus sought determination of the following three questions from the High Court:
1. Whether by virtue of the agreement, Affidavit for loss of Plot Allocation and a Police Report both dated 23rd October, 2017 issued to the Claimant by the Defendant (Usman Ubali Hadejia) signed by the Claimant the contract of the parties contemplates that the claimant is bona fide purchaser of all the defendant’s landed property having been engaged by the defendant to purchase the said property.
2. Whether the action of the defendant by neglecting the terms of the agreement is correct in law.
3. Whether by virtue of the breach by the defendant of the terms of Sales Agreement as contained in the Sales Agreement dated 23rd October, 2017 and the conditions of agreement therein amounts to breach of contract.

He sought the following relief should the said questions be answered by the Court in his favour:
1. A declaration that the defendant (appellant) is bound to abide by and uphold the terms and conditions in the said Sales Agreement dated 23rd October, 2017 and the Defendant at the back of the Sales Agreement to vacate the premises including but not limited to the enjoyment of the benefits accruable thereto.
2. A declaration that the defendant is contractually bound by the terms and conditions in the said Sales Agreement dated 23rd October, 2017 and cannot take advantage of its breach and refuse to implement its obligations.
3. A declaration that the defendant acted in bad faith in breaching its obligations to the claimant’s under the contract of sale with the claimant/applicant.
4. A declaration that the defendant is stopped from subsequently denying the existence of such relationship with the Claimant.
5. A declaration that the failure of the defendant to harmonize and regulate the agreement as contained in the Sales Agreement with the claimant without any justification known to law is unlawful, ultra vires the Sale Agreement both dated 23rd October, 2017 and the defendant’s failure to comply to the claimant’s and is demands as illegal, oppressive, uncivilized, vicious, unconstitutional and null and void and of no effect.
6. A declaration that the Claimant is the bona fide Purchaser of the defendant’s whole landed property without any exception as stated in the Sales Agreement.
7. An interpretation of the Sale Agreement dated 23rd October, 2017 by the Court.
8. An order of Court compelling the defendant to vacate the premises to the claimant forthwith following the binding agreement between them.
9. Any other or order as the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.
10. Cost of filing this suit to be assessed by this Court.
11. Solicitor’s fees in the sum of Three Hundred Thousand Naira only (₦300,000.00).

The gist of Respondent’s case in his 21-paragraph affidavit supporting the summons is contained at paragraphs 2-16 therein where he averred thus:
2. That the defendant met me sometime in the month of September 2017 and informed me of his intent to sale (sic) his plot of land for residential purpose which price was agreed at Six Hundred Thousand Naira (N600, 000.00) which I paid in full.
3. That upon inquiry at the Urban Development Board, it was found that the said land and the Allocation Paper were not original and the original allottee had already instituted an action in Court suing me (the claimant) and the defendant, where upon inquiry he reinstated the position of the claimant as the real owner of land and the document issued to me by Usman Ubali (the Defendant) were counterfeit.
4. That after the said action instituted against us was finally decided not in our favour I asked the defendant about my money who then informed me that he doesn’t (sic) have money but he intend to sell his house.
5. That the Defendant then called some local estate valuers who valued the Defendant’s house at Two Million Six Hundred Thousand (₦2,600,000.00).
6. That the Defendant said he is not going to sell his house at that amount and that the least he will sell his House is Three Million Naira (₦3,000,000.00) and because I want to recover my money, I agreed to buy the house at the said Three Million Naira even though I may likely loose (sic).
7. That when I asked for the documents of the House, he informed me that the documents were not readily available but he had a Court affidavit and a Police Report indicating that the papers were missing. The said Court Affidavit and Police Report are hereto attached and marked as exhibits A & B respectively.
8. That upon hearing that, I informed him that I will not give him the money until he has given me a formal sale agreement after which I will issue him his money and as well deducting my Six Hundred Thousand Naira (₦600,000.00). That he pleaded with me and I gave him One Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira only inclusive of my Six Hundred Thousand Naira after which he gave me a Sale Agreement in Hausa dated 21st October, 2017 indicating that I have given him One Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira which is duly signed by the Defendant and all his witnesses and my humble self as the purchaser with my witnesses indicating as well that I will balance him up his Money when he bring forward a Formal Sale Agreement. The said Sale Agreement in Hausa Language and its certified English translation are hereby attached and marked as exhibits C & D respectively.
9. That on the 23rd Day of October, 2017, the Defendant brought forward a Sale Agreement prepared by a Legal Practitioner in person of Abdullahi Adamu Esq., solicitor to the Defendant who wrote the agreement with the defendant’s instruction stating the terms and conditions of the Sale. The Said Sale Agreement of 23rd October, 2017 is hereto attached for interpretation by this Honorable Court and marked as Exhibits E.
10. That after the issuance of the Sale Agreement, the Defendant pleaded with me that I should allow him the grace of Three Month (3 month) for him to vacate the premises which I oblige him.
11. That the said agreement was inscribed at the back of the Sale Agreement of 23rd October, 2017.
12. That the 3 month grace was to expire on the 22nd day of January 2018 but when the due date approached, the defendant issued me with a Summons from Shariah Court Auyo and in it he claimed that the sale was obtained by fraud and that there is a particular portion on the land which he purportedly exclude and that he will vacate the compound except that particular portion.
13. That I answered the call and engaged the services of Garba Abubakar Esq., who field in witnesses to the transaction who all informed the Court that there was no any exception or agreement in that regard.
14. That after hearing the witnesses, I challenged the jurisdiction of the Court as the Subject matter is in Hadejia and it borders on land which within the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court of the State.
15. That the Sharia Court in Auyo declined jurisdiction.
16. That after the said Court has declined jurisdiction, I instituted this action for the interpretation of the terms as contained in the Sale Agreement.

I deem it necessary to mention that the First Schedule of the said almighty Sales Agreement, Exhibit E, the subject of the originating summons, described the property in issue thus:
All that property situated at Gundun Sarki LGA center with Plan No.TP/KASEPPA/HAD/plot No 13B measures 50ft x 50ft.

Appellant, in response, first sought, vainly, to terminate the summons with a preliminary objection wherein he contended that the summons constituted abuse of process of Court because he already had a suit against respondent regarding the same property at Hadejia Upper Sharia Court. In support of his objection, appellant swore to an affidavit and annexed to it the proceedings of the said Hadejia Upper Sharia Court. He also annexed in addition an earlier proceeding commenced against the same respondent by him. In the said processes, I must state, as it will be soon shown, appellant admitted the fact that he actually sold the property in question to the respondent. The High Court of Jigawa State took account of that document presented by appellant himself in its final judgment after dismissing the preliminary objection. I also intend to look at it later in this judgment.

Appellant, contemporaneously with his preliminary objection, filed a 22-paragraph affidavit opposing the summons on its merits and there admitted that he had an agreement with respondent for the sale of his said house to respondent for the sum of ₦3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira) but that respondent was only able to pay him ₦950,000.00. On respondent’s assertion that he signed Exhibit E (Sale Agreement of the house) and even initially agreed to vacate the house for him, appellant denied it expressly thus at paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of his counter-affidavit (see p.70 of the records):
“14. That paragraph 9 of the claimant affidavit is not true as I have never sign (sic) nor handed over any sale agreement in respect of this particular transaction neither contracted any legal practitioner to prepare any sake agreement for me in respect of this transaction and even the signature on the purported sale agreement is not mine.
15. That paragraph 9 of the claimant affidavit is not true as there was no any point throughout this transaction where I pleaded with him to give me three months to vacate my house, because despite agreeing with me to pay the complete price in full, the claimant has not yet pay (sic) up to half of the price of the house let alone claiming any legal right over it.
16. That paragraph 11 of the claimant’s affidavit is not true as I have never enter (sic) into any agreement with the claimant whether verbal or written to vacate my house after three months.”

Ruling on the summons on 13/11/2018, the High Court of Jigawa State meticulously evaluated the evidence available to it, rejected appellant’s contention, found merit in the summons after labeling as ‘misnomer’ the location of the disputed property as stated in the First Schedule of the Sales Agreement (Exhibit E) and granted the summons. It had this to say among others in that ruling:
“It is equally my findings from the affidavit evidence and other documentary evidence in support of this application that any misleading description about the location and size of the property described in the First Schedule to Exhibit E has been cured by the Plan No and Plot Number of the property as admitted by the defendant in Exhibit A, B, UB6 and L coupled with the admissions of the defendant contained in the record of proceedings of Upper Sharia Court Hadejia.”

On whether the said Sale Agreement was binding on parties, it held thus:
“A fortiori, it is my further interpretation of Exhibit E that the terms and conditions of the sale contract enumerated therein from 1-10 prevails and binds the parties (claimant and defendant) without any exception.”

Piqued by that decision, appellant on 23/11/2018 filed a two-ground Notice of Appeal against it to this Court. He however managed to formulate in his brief of argument a whole three issues from his two grounds of appeal thus:
1. Whether the trial Court was right in entertaining the suit by way of originating summons.
2. Whether the trial Court was right in determining the suit without calling for oral evidence to resolve the conflicts in the affidavits of the parties.
3. Whether the trial Court was right in bringing extraneous matters to alter the clear, obvious and plain wordings of Exhibit E.

I must reiterate that issues in an appeal ought only to be formulated to be at par with, or better still even less than, the grounds of appeal and not more than the grounds as appellant did in this in this case. See Dr. Arthur Aguncha Nwankwo & Ors v. Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua & Ors (2010) LPELR-2109(SC) p. 75, Unilorin v. Oluwadare (2003) 3 NWLR 808 at 557, Padawa v. Yatau (2003) 3 NWLR (pt 813) 247 at 557, Sogbesan v. Ogunbiyi (2006) 4 NWLR (pt 969) 19, Teriba v. Adeyemo (2010) LPELR-3143(SC) p. 10, (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1211) 242.

I also note that appellant did not even tie his three issues to his two grounds of appeal, thus leaving that job to the Court. While not being oblivious of a number of decisions of this Court and a even a few from the apex Court stating that the Court cannot do surgical work for appellant where his Issues for Determination outnumber the grounds of appeal (see for instance Gbenga Adekoya v. State (2014) LPELR- 22933(CA), I am inclined to follow the example set by the same Court in cases like Agbaisi v. Ebikorefe (1997) LPELR-228(SC) P.16-17, Labiyi v. Anretiola (1992) LPELR-1730 (SC), Egbirika v. The State (2014) LPELR (SC) P.14-16, Teriba v. Adeyemo (2010) LPELR-3143(SC) P. 10 among several others where the apex Court while emphasizing the need for appellants to keep within their grounds of appeal and not proliferate issues, nevertheless proceeded in the modern spirit of doing substantial justice and determined such appeals on their merits of the basis of the complaints raised by appellants in the grounds of appeal. In fact, that is the point also made by all learned Justices of the apex Court – Nnaemaka-Agu, Karibi-Whyte, Oputa, Nnamani, Belgore, JJ.S.C – in Adejumo v. Ayantegbe (1989) LPELR-100 (SC) with all of their Lordships making very adverse remarks on the briefs filed by appellant and respondent’s counsel. The following remark of Oputa J.S.C. contained at p.50 of the case sums up the attitude of the apex Court:
“The most important element in any brief is the critical appreciation and consequently correct formulation of the issues for determination based of course on the relevant facts of the case and on the grounds of appeal filed. A good brief is like a mirror reflecting the strong as well as the weak points in the appeal, as well as indicating the points to be emphasized. In this appeal, learned counsel for the defendants/appellants did not seem to have grasped either the formal or the essential requirements of a good brief. After setting out the case for the parties, which I think, would have been his statement of facts in 3 pages, the brief listed 3 issues for determination at P. 4 and concluded at P. 5 without arguing any Issues. The plaintiff/Respondent’s brief showed a slight improvement in that it ran up to 9 pages. But there too, 2 issues for determination were listed. These were neither argued nor developed. Rather, grounds of appeal were listed and a Reply to each ground appended. If this Court will resort to striking out appeals where briefs filed are deficient, the poor litigants will be the ones to suffer. Learned counsel will therefore, in conscientious and careful obedience to the duties they owe to their clients, endeavour to study the format and substance of a good brief. There is no shame in approaching learned Senior Advocates for assistance. Learned counsel will also do well to read the remarks of this Court on Brief Writing in some of our recent cases like ……
“A good brief helps both counsel and the Court immensely.” (Italics mine)

Despite those remarks, the apex Court, in tandem with the modern approach of the Courts to do substantial justice, proceeded to identify the real complaints of appellant from his grounds of appeal and determined the appeal on its merits, interestingly in appellant’s favour, too.

It appears respondent here also believes in that liberal approach too, for he did not seek striking out of the appeal on the basis of this procedural lapse of appellant, but rather submitted in his Brief of Argument that all three issues of appellant could be subsumed in one single issue thus:
“Whether having regard to the various admissions and appellant, documentary evidence before the lower Court as well as the conduct of the appellant, technicalities would be allowed to defeat the course of justice in relation to the rights and liabilities of the parties already established.”

I commend him for this approach.

I now return to the arguments of appellants which can be summarized thus: One, that from the affidavits exchanged by parties facts were in dispute so originating summons procedure, which is only employable to interpret documents and short questions of law, where facts are not in dispute, was inappropriate in commencing this action or resolving the issues raised by respondent in his summons. Secondly, that since parties were in dispute on facts in their affidavits it was incumbent on the lower Court, following Section 116 of the Evidence Act 2011, to call for oral evidence to resolve that conflict and its failure to so do occasioned miscarriage of justice, thus requiring our intervention. Thirdly, that the subject of the alleged transaction depicted in the Sale Agreement (Exhibit E) is different from what is contained in Exhibits A, B and C; that whereas Exhibits A, B and C states that the property in dispute is situate at NTA Quarters in Hadejia in Hadejia Local Government, Exhibit E states that it is situate in Gadun Sarki Local Government Area, yet the lower Court held that Exhibit E also refers to the same piece of land situate at NTA Quarters Hadejia referred to in Exhibits A, B and C and entered judgment for respondent. By that finding, it was argued, the lower Court offended Section 128 of the Evidence Act 2011 stating that contracts reduced to documents should be given their ordinary meaning; that they can neither be altered nor varied. Appellant thus urged us to resolve all three issues in his favour and set aside the decision of the lower Court in favour of Respondent.

Respondent labeled all these arguments of appellant technicalities which have no basis in our modern system of adjudication.

Resolution of issue(s)
Now, Order 3 Rules 5, 6 and 7 of the Jigawa State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2008 relating to commencement of proceedings by originating summons reads thus:
5. Any person claiming to be interested under a Will, enactment or other written instrument may apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested.
6. Any person claiming any legal or equitable right in a case where the determination of the question whether he is entitled to the right depends upon a question of construction of an enactment may apply originating summons for the determination of such question for a declaration as to the right claimed.
7. A judge shall not be bound to determine any such question of construction if in his opinion it ought not to be determined on originating summons but may make any such order as he deems fit.
That is the guiding light. Originating summons is only resorted to for determination of shorts issues of law and interpretation of documents where facts are not in dispute; meaning that originating summons ought not to be resorted to where facts are likely to be in dispute or are actually in dispute on the affidavits filed by parties. See Ossai v. Wakwah (2006) ALL FWLR (PT 303) 239.

It is settled, however, too, that the mere filing of a counter-affidavit in response to the supporting affidavit of an originating summons does not automatically make the matter one in which oral evidence need be adduced; for where the conflicts in the affidavit evidence of the parties are not material to the case, or where facts deposed therein are inadmissible, the Court is not saddled with the responsibility of calling oral evidence. Equally, the need to call oral evidence would not arise where the areas of conflict are narrow and insignificant. See Attorney General of Adamawa State v. Attorney General of the Federation (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 958) 581.

Appellant’s argument in this appeal is two-fold: First, that there were irreconcilable conflicts in the affidavits of parties as to whether he signed the Sale Agreement (Exhibit E) sought to be interpreted, and secondly, whether the trial judge did not err in giving a different meaning to the First Schedule of Exhibit E outside what is contained in it. I am inclined to answer both limbs of appellant’s argument against him. As regards the first limb of his argument that there was dispute as to his signing Exhibit ‘E’ so originating summons was improper and pleadings ought to have been ordered, it is not in every instance where there is a conflict in affidavit evidence that oral evidence must be called to resolve it. Where the conflict can be resolved on authentic documentary evidence available to the Court, oral evidence need not be called as such documentary evidence would be the yardstick to assess oral evidence. See Peoples Democratic Party v. Ya’ud Mohammed (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 289) 1322, Nwosu v. Imo State Environmental Sanitation Authority & Ors (1990) LPELR-2129 (SC), Bob v. Akpan (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt. 501) 896 at 947-948. In this case, Exhibit UB2 (the copy of the proceedings of appellant’s own previous Suit No CV/90/18 at the Upper Sharia Court Hadejia) annexed to appellant’s preliminary objection before the High Court made it very clear that, contrary to appellant’s present stance, he, appellant, also admitted signing the said Sales Agreement and its efficacy. In fact, the first page of Exhibit UB2 (p.35 of the proceedings) produced by appellant to the lower Court confirms that with its entry thus:
“Statement of claim: Today being 1st March, 2018 one man called Usman Ubali [appellant] came to this Honourable Court and sued one Alhaji Sunusi Dankoli [respondent] requesting this Hon. Court to declare their sales agreement made between them to be true and binding by all the parties.” (Emphasis mine)

The same document goes on to also show appellant’s lawyer (one Ibrahim Salisu Esq.) confirming to the same Court at page 37 to 38 of the records thus:
“My client Usman Ubali (Sheu) sued the defendant Alhaji Sunusi Dankoli in respect of sales transaction made between them on the 22/10/2017 in respect of a house at Unguwar Tintin Garun Gabas where a transaction was made at the cost of ₦3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira). And the said house shares boundary as follows East – Mohd Shagali, West – TITI (Road), South –Mai’Unguwar Lara, North – Street.
“After the transaction was conducted with the defendant Alhaji Sunusi Dankoli who purchased the house, they made an agreement that the claimant will remain in one side/compartment of the house of the house up to some time he will vacate the house. … and based on the above, we are urging this Honourable Court to set aside this sale agreement because there was a problem of the exact subject matter of the sale between the claimant and the defendant.” (Italics mine)

Appellant cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold on the same issue.

Appellant cannot also be seriously heard to raise Section 128 of the Evidence Act against the lower Court’s decision on the apparent mistake of parties in describing the subject of their agreement in the First Schedule of their Agreement (Exhibit E), where though the property was correctly described in Exhibit E as being contained in Plan No TP/KASEPPA/HAD plot No 13B and measuring 50 x 50ft, it was evidently wrongly described in the First Schedule of the same Agreement as being ‘situated in Gudun Sarki LGA’ instead of Garun Gabas Road in Hadejia Local Government Area where it is actually situated. That there was a mistake in the said First Schedule is further confirmed by Exhibits A, B, C and D where the same property was described with the same plan but consistently said to be located in Hadejia and not Gudun Sarki Local Government.

It has to noted that the authenticity of Exhibits A, B and C is not doubted by any of the parties. In fact, appellant in citing Section 128 of the Evidence Act 2011 in support of his contention that terms of contract for disposition of property contained in documents constitute exclusive evidence of such transaction seems to have failed to advert his mind to the proviso to the same Section contained in paragraph (1) (a) thereof stating that ‘mistake in fact or law’, among other factors like fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, the fact that the document was wrongly dated, etc) may be proved even where a contract has been documented. Mistake made by parties in the First Schedule of Exhibit E as regards the correct location of the disputed property in Hadejia instead of Gudun Sarki Local Government is exactly what respondent tried to show and the lower Court accepted when it relied on Exhibits A, B, C, D and UB2 to hold that there was a misnomer in the said 1st Schedule of Exhibit E. It was correct in the course it took and did not violate Section 128 of the Evidence Act 2011.

In summary, I fail to see any merit in this appeal and hereby dismiss it and uphold the ruling of the High Court of Jigawa State in favour of respondent.
Cost of ₦100,000.00 is awarded against appellant.

ABUBAKAR MU’AZU LAMIDO, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment delivered by my learned brother, BOLOUKUROMO MOSES EGO, JCA, and I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached that this appeal is without any merit and ought to be dismissed. I too dismiss the appeal and abide by all the consequential orders as contained in the lead judgment.

USMAN ALHAJI MUSALE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment by my learned brother, BOLOUKUROMO MOSES UGO, JCA. The stand of my brother on the issues raised and dealt with before us and the reasoning and conclusion reached by my Lord tallied with mine and found that the appeal is unmeritorious. The appeal is equally dismissed by me and I abide by the consequential orders made therein.

Appearances:

I.H. Abdullahi, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Mubarak Abubakar, Esq. For Respondent(s)