LawCare Nigeria

Nigeria Legal Information & Law Reports

GTB PLC v. ADEGOKE (2022)

GTB PLC v. ADEGOKE

(2022)LCN/16760(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, November 18, 2022

CA/ABJ/CV/951/2021

Before Our Lordships:

Misitura Omodere Bolaji-Yusuff Justice of the Court of Appeal

James Gambo Abundaga Justice of the Court of Appeal

Abdul-Azeez Waziri Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

GUARANTY TRUST BANK PLC APPELANT(S)

And

MR. KOLA ADEGOKE RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO

THE POSITION OF LAW IN RELATING TO THE POWER OF THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION

I wish to examine the provisions of the law relating to the power of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission to issue instructions to bank to freeze/restrict bank accounts of customers. Section 34(1) of the Act 2004 provides 34(1):
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment of law, the Chairman of the Commission or any officer authorized by him may, if satisfied that the money in the account of a person is made through the Commission of an offence under the Act and/or enactments specified under Section 7(2) (a)-(f) of this Act apply to the Court exparte for power to issue or instruct a bank examiner or such other appropriate regulatory authority to issue an order as specified in Form B of the schedule to this act, addressed to the Manager of the bank of any person in control of the Financial Institution where the account is or believed by him to be or the Head Office of the bank or other Financial Institution to freeze the account?”
The above provisions are in accord with the decision of the lower Court before freezing customers account or placing any form of restrain on any bank account, the bank must be satisfied that there is an order of Court. With the affidavit evidence before the lower Court, it is beyond any equivocation that the Appellant unilaterally restrained the account number of the Appellant and thereby deprived him of the hard-earned money in its custody. Assuming, without conceding that it was the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission that instructed her to restrain the Respondent’s account, still the result would have been same as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission is not a Court of competent jurisdiction.
PER WAZIRI, J.C.A.

THE PRINCIPLE OF FUNCTUS OFFICIO

I wish to state here that the lower Court by refusing to grant the motion for joinder became functus officio in respect of it and cannot fold back to it and render a decision. The principle of “functus officio” is not just a principle: of procedure. It is more of a question of jurisdiction and competence of a Court of law. The question therefore is whether a Court can completely assume jurisdiction over a case it had concluded? This can only be resuscitated by an Appellate Court. See the cases of Sanusi vs. Ayoola (1992) 9 NWLR 11-12 SNJ 142 (1992) LPELR-3009 (SC), INEC vs. Nnaji (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 900) 473. The apex Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC stated at page 19 thereof that “There is the well settled elementary and fundamental principle of law that a Court on disposing of a cause before it renders itself functus officio.” It ceases to have jurisdiction in respect of such case. See Mohammed vs. Husseini (1998) LPELR-1896 (SC) per Mohammed, JSC defined the principle thus: “The Latin expression “functus officio” simply means “task performed.” Therefore, applying it to the judiciary, it means that a Judge cannot give a decision or make an order on a matter twice. In other words, once a Judge gives a decision or makes an order on a matter he no longer has the competence or jurisdiction to give another decision or order on the same subject matter.” PER WAZIRI, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT GENERAL DAMAGES NEED TO BE PLEADED AND PROVED

Let me state that the law is settled beyond peradventure that general damages are always made as a claim at large. The quantum need not be pleaded and proved. The award is quantified by what in the opinion of a reasonable person, is considered adequate loss, or inconvenience which flows naturally as generally presumed by law, from the act of the Defendant. It does not depend upon calculation made and figure arrived at from specific items. 

The issue of award of damages in any given case is a matter based on the discretion of the trial Court. See Yalaju-Amaye vs. Associated Registered Engineering Contractors Ltd (1990) LPELR (3511) 1 at 47, Rockonoh Property Co. Ltd. vs. NITEL Plc (2001) LPELR (2951) 1 at 11-12, Hamza vs. Kure (2010) LPELR (1351) 1 AT 28-29, Okoko vs. Dakolo (2006) LPELR (2461) 1 at 39.
In Diamond Bank Plc vs. Wellcare Alliance Ltd (2015) LPELR (40762) at 27-28 this Court, per Abba Aji, JCA (Now JSC) stated:
“The law, is trite that where general damages are claiming if the issue of liability is established as in the present case, the trial judge is entitled to make his own assessment of the quantum of such general damages and on appeal, such damages will only be altered or varied if they were shown to be either so manifestly too high or so extremely too low or that they were awarded on an entirely erroneous estimate of the damages to which the Plaintiff is entitled.PER WAZIRI, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION OF THE LOWER COURT

The Courts do not make it a practice to lay down rules and principles that would fetter the exercise of its discretion of the lower Courts. In matters of discretion, no one case is an authority for the other. Also, the fact that the Appellate Court would have exercised its discretion differently from that of the lower Court is not sufficient reason to interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Lower Court.
Howbeit, the fact that the award of damages is at the discretion of the Court does not mean that there are no circumstances when an Appellate Court would interfere with the award of damages. An Appellate Court will interfere with the award of damages by a lower Court in situations which include:
(a) Where the Court acted under wrong principles of law,
(b) Where the Court acted in disregard of applicable principles of law,
(c) Where the Court acted in misapprehension of facts,
(d) Where the Court took into consideration irrelevant matters and disregarded matters while considering its award,
(e) Where injustice will result if the Appellate Court does not act,
(f) Where the amount awarded is ridiculously low or ridiculously high that it must have been an erroneous estimate of the damages. See ACB Ltd vs. Apugo (supra), Sahara Energy Resources Ltd. vs. Oyebola (2020) LPELR (52806) 1 at 56-60.
PER WAZIRI, J.C.A.

ABDUL-AZEEZ WAZIRI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the ruling of the Federal Capital Territory High Court (the lower Court) delivered on the 5th October, 2021, Coram Justice Modube R. Osho Adebiyi J. in Suit No. CV/2888/2020 wherein the learned lower Judge gave ruling in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant. The Respondent in this appeal commenced action against the Appellant by way of application for enforcement of his fundamental rights as encapsulated in Sections 34, 35, 36 and 44 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The reliefs sought by the Applicant at the Lower Court read as follows:-
“1. A declaration that the unwanted and unjustifiable restriction(s) placed on the Applicant’s account with Account No. 002110176 domiciled in the Respondent’s Bank and being operated by Applicant since December, 2018 and January, 2019 is unlawful, illegal and a gross violation of the Fundamental Human Rights of the Applicant as enshrined under Sections 34, 35, 36 and 44 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
​2. An Order directing the Respondent to lift any restriction or embargo whatsoever placed on the Applicant’s Account No: 0021101796 domiciled in the Respondent’s Bank without a valid Court order with immediate effect and without further delay.
3. An Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Respondent from further placing any restriction or embargo on operation of the Applicant’s account without following due process of law.
4. An Order for the payment of the sum of N300,000,000.00 (Three Hundred Million Naira) only by the Respondent as compensation for continuous violation of the Applicant’s Fundamental Human Rights since December, 2018 and January, 2019 as well as the rendering of an unreserved apology to the Applicant for the infringement of the aforesaid rights.
5. And for such further order or orders as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance in this case.

Parties filed all relevant processes at the lower Court and upon hearing the application of the Respondent in this appeal, the lower Court found in favour of the Applicant and awarded damages for breach of the Applicant’s fundamental rights in the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only. The ruling did not go down well with the Appellant who now filed Notice of Appeal on the 7th October, 2021 containing four grounds of appeal shorn of their particulars. I need not reproduce the said grounds. The brief of the Appellant was filed by learned Counsel Chief C. P. Oli on the 25/2/22 and deemed on the 14/9/2022. The Respondent’s Brief was filed by Eburuekwe B. O. Esq., on 5/5/2022 and deemed on 14/9/2022.

In the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, learned Counsel C. P. Oli decoded the four following issues:-
1. Whether the trial Court was right to holding that the Respondent’s account number 0021101796 was restricted without any total of proof evidencing same. (Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether the trial Court was right to rely on an application that was refused and struck out in holding that the Respondent’s account was restricted. (Ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal)
3. Whether the trial Court was right to make a declaratory relief against the Appellant where there was no single evidence adduced in support of such reliefs. (Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal)
4. Whether the trial Court rightly exercised its discretion judicially and judiciously in awarding the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only as damages against the Appellant where its principal claims were not proved. (Ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal)

On the part of the Respondent’s learned Counsel Eburuekwe B. O. Esq., he also adopted the four issues decoded by the Appellant as issues for determination in this appeal.

As I stated earlier in this judgment, counsel representing the parties’ proffered arguments on the issues decoded and adopted. I will take the arguments as canvassed before I proceed to resolve the said issues.

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT
Submitting on Appellant’s issue one, learned Counsel cited numerous judicial authorities to buttress his argument that the Respondent did not discharge the burden of proof of breach of his Fundamental Human Rights as no evidence whatsoever was adduced. The following cases were relied on William & Anor vs. Usen & Ors (2018) LPELR-46163 (CA), Ibanga & Ors. Akpan & Ors (2018) LPELR-46167 (CA). He submitted the Appellant had shown that it received two letters from the Economic and Financial Crime Commission dated 7th and 25th January, 2019 which never included the account subject of this appeal.

He contended that the Respondent must only succeed on the strength of his own case notwithstanding the weakness of the Defendant. He called in aid the following cases Ashiru vs. Olukoya (2016) LPELR-580 (SC), Archibong vs. Ita (2011) 2 NWLR vs. Asou Raheem & Ors (2009) LPELR-2013 (SC) (Pp. 40-4) Paras. C-D.

He further posited that to succeed in his claims, the Respondent must discharge the minimum burden relying in the following cases. Akanbi Agbaje vs. Chief Agba Akin & Ors. (2002) 9 NSCGR 1 at 91, Malle vs. Abubakar (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 360) 15691, Larmie vs. DPMS Ltd. (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt. 955) 438.

He urged us to hold that the Respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof placed on him so the claim ought to have failed.

Submitting on Appellant’s issue two, learned Counsel said that the lower Court was wrong to have utilized the affidavit accompanying the Motion for Joinder of EFCC, which the Court refused to grant. He contended that the lower Court was “functus officio” as that process was concerned relying in the following cases: Ukpong & Ors vs. Traditional Rulers In Local Government Area (2012) LPELR-19707 (CA) (Pp 15-16 Paras F-A), Shagaya & Anor vs. Useni & Ors (2015) LPELR-25 & 22 (CA), Ediru vs. FRSC & Ors (2015) LPELR-8848 (CA) (Pp 32-32 Paras. AD). He urged us to resolve this issue.

On issue three, learned Counsel submitted that a Court cannot and should not grant declaratory reliefs upon the weakness of the dependant’s case as the parties seeking same must establish their entitlements to the reliefs. He further submitted that declaratory reliefs should not even be granted even on admission made. He called in aid the following cases:- Nduul vs. Wayo & Ors (2018) LPELR- 45151 (SC), GE International Operation (Nig) Ltd vs. Q Oil & Gas Services Ltd (2016) LPELR-47999 (SC), Chidebelu & Anor vs. Probate Registrar High Court of Anambra State & Ors. (2013) LPELR-21215 (CA), Ifediora & Ors vs. Okafor & Ors. (2019) LPELR-49518 (SC), Mohammed vs. Wammako & Ors. (2017) LPELR-42667 (SC).

We were urged to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent.

On issue four, learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that the lower Court did not exercise her discretion judicially and judiciously in awarding the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only as damages as no evidence was adduced.

He further submitted that the lower Court did not evaluate the evidence before it calling in aid the following cases to support his submission. F.B.N. Ltd vs. Resort Int’l Ltd (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1718) CA 391, Akinyemi vs. Odua Investment Co. Ltd (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 209, First Fuels Ltd vs. NNPC (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1018) 276; Nigeria Laboratory Corporation vs. Pacific Merchant Bank Ltd (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1324) 505, Ibe vs. Ajise (2020) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1731) CA 19, Learn Africa Plc vs. Oko (2015) LPELR-45181, Bello vs. Yakubu (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1106) 104, Ifao (Nig) Plc vs. Awu (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. 11090) 1, Kupolati vs. MTN (Nig) Comms. Ltd (2020) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1740) CA, Multi-Choice (Nig) Ltd. vs. MCSN Ltd/GTE (2020) B NWLR (Pt. 1742) CA 4.5, Shittu vs. Pan Ltd (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1642) 195, APGA vs. Oye (2019) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 472, Adeniyi vs. Tina H. George Ind. Ltd (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 560, Babatunde vs. Pas & TA Ltd. (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1050) M113.

He further submitted that the lower Court failed to act properly but based its decision on mere speculations, allegations or conjectures relying on Section 131 of the Evidence Act 2011. Archibong vs. Itah (2004) of NSCQR 295 at 320, Trade Bank Plc vs. Dele Morenkeji (Nig) Ltd & Anor (2005) 6 NWL (Pt. 921) 130.

He posited that the Respondent did not furnish the lower Court with cogent evidence that Account No. 0021101796 was ever restricted leading to the award of damages made. He placed reliance on the following cases Ogbiri vs. NAOC (Supra) at 225 G.H. 2273 B-C, Dumez vs. Ogboli (1972), WAEC vs. Koroye (1977) SC 45, Chevron (Nig) Ltd vs. Omoregha (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1479) 231 at 263 Paras. B-D, NCC vs. Motophone Ltd. (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1691) 1 SC, Odulaja vs. Haddad (1973) 11 SC 357. It is his submission that where a judicial discretion is wrongly exercised by the lower Court, an Appellate Court may interfere with the exercise of such discretion placing reliance in the following cases. Kupolati vs. MTN (Nig) Comms. Ltd (Supra), ACB Ltd vs. Apugo (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 707) 653, UBN Ltd vs. Odusote Book Stores Ltd (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 558, B.B. Apugo son Ltd. vs. OHMB (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 529) (Pt. 1529) 206, SPDC Ltd vs. Tiebo (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 931) 439, Oduwole vs. West (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1098) 375, UBA Plc vs. BTL Ind. Ltd (2004) 18 NWLR (P. 1098) 375, University of Lagos vs. Aigoro (1985) 1 SC 265 at 221, Akun O. vs. Guiness (Nig) Plc (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1322) 150, Union Bank Plc vs. Chimaeze (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt. 166).

We were urged to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant. On the whole, he urged us to allow the appeal and set aside the ruling of the lower Court.

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT ON THE ISSUES
Submitting on issue one, learned Counsel for the Respondent urged on us to hold that he discharged the burden of proof that his Fundamental Human Rights were breached by the Appellant by the restriction of his Account No. 0021117596 so the lower Court was right. He concluded that Exhibit K8 attached to his application was sufficient proof to show that the said account to his application was sufficient proof to show that the said account was restricted breaching Section 44 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). He further submitted that the letter written by his solicitor to the Respondent now Appellant was not replied to. He placed reliance in the cases of Trade Bank Plc vs. Chami (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 836) pg. 158, Zenon Petroleum vs. Idrisiyya (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 982) Pg 221 relying on its case of Gwani vs. Ebule (1990).

He further relied on paragraph 4 of the Respondent/Applicant/Appellant motion for joinder which the Hon. Court referred to in its ruling. He further submitted that the evaluation of evidence is the function of the trial Court/judge and it is not the business of this Court except where it is shown that it was reached perversely. In aid, he placed reliance on the following cases: Enwerem vs Abubakar & Anor (A351 of 2013) (2016) NGCA 58 demand on 18/4/2016, Mini Lodge Ltd vs. Ngei (2010) NSCOR Vol. 41 Pg. 1 at page 3 ratio 1. He posited that the finding made by the lower Court cannot be faulted.

On issue two, learned Counsel for the Respondent held a contrary view to the submission made by the Appellant’s Counsel that the lower Court ought not to have utilized the motion it refused in its ruling. He opined that it is not proper to place reliance on it. Relying on Adebiyi vs. Umar (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1305) at 229, Onujabe vs. Idris (2012) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1284) at Pg. 288.

He posited that in the instant appeal, the trial Court was right to have utilized the motion filed for joinder which was refused in order to resolve all issues before it placing reliance in the case of Chima Ume & Ors vs. Christian Uchechukwu Ibe (2016) NGCA Pg. 129 on 21st February, 2016 where the Court of Appeal held thus:
“A trial Judge is entitled to draw an inference from facts that emerge from documents or oral evidence before him. We were urged to resolve issue two in favour of the Respondent.”

On issue three, learned Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s Counsel Submission to the effect that the Court cannot and should not grant Declaratory Reliefs upon the weakness of the Defendant’s case is totally misconceived and lacking in merit placing reliance in the case of CBN vs. Amao & 2 Ors (2010) 57 SC (Pt. 1) Pg. 1 of 30 Onnoghen JSC (as he then was). He further submitted that the suit was rightly commenced by way of Originating Summons to which the Appellant filed its Counter-Affidavit. That the lower Court found for the Respondent based on affidavit evidence before it. He called in aid the following cases Akande vs. Adisa (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1324) Pg. 538, Adigun vs. A.G. Oyo State (No. 1) 11987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) Pg. 678, lyere vs. B.F.F.M (2007) NSCOR Vol. 37 Pg. 290 at 300 ratio 15 at 342.

He also referred to Order XI of the Fundamental Right Procedure Rules, 2009. He posited that by the nature of the proceedings and through documentary evidence the Applicant/Respondent had established his case and ought to be granted the declaratory reliefs as found by the lower Court. We were urged to resolve issue three in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.

On issue four, learned Counsel for the Respondent contrary to the submission made by the Appellant’s Counsel that the lower Court injudiciously awarded damage of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only in favour of the Respondent without evidence adduced to that end it did not exercise her discretion judicially and judiciously. He posited that the submission is totally misconceived and devoid of merit citing the cases of Taylor vs. Ogheneovo (2020) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1316) at Pg. 16, Garba vs. Kur (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 83) at pg. 280, lyere vs. B.I.F.M. (Supra) at page 302.

On the whole, we were urged to resolve all the issues in the Appellant’s Brief in favour of the Respondent, affirm the decision of the trial Court delivered on the 5th October, 2021 by dismissing the Appellant’s appeal.

RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES SERIATIM
On Issue One:
I have given an insightful and analytical consideration to the legal submissions proffered alongside the statutory and decided cases being relied upon by the line of divide. 

The Appellant on it part contended that the Applicant/Respondent was not able to proof by evidence that his Fundamental Human Rights were violated by the Respondent/Appellant to warrant the lower Court to have granted the reliefs sought by him. This the Respondent herein held otherwise that it did prove by affidavit evidence being accompanied by Exhibit K8 that the Appellant had breached his Fundamental Rights by the restriction of his Account No.: 0021101796 without any lawful order made by the Court. This issue is to the effect that whether the Appellant as a banker committed breach of Fundamental Rights of the Respondent by restraining his bank account. The compressed facts constituting basis for placing restriction on the account of the Respondent was not justified as a letter written by the Solicitor of the Respondent Exhibit K8 was not replied to by the Respondent. It is trite law that an official letter/business letter written to either a person/body/organization which is not responded to is deemed to be admitted by the adverse party and he/she ought to be bound by the said content therein. 

The Appellant herein admitted receiving two letters from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission dated 7th and 25th January, 2020 to place restrictions on the accounts of the Respondent herein. The question to ask did such letters cover the account subject of this appeal? 

I wish to examine the provisions of the law relating to the power of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission to issue instructions to bank to freeze/restrict bank accounts of customers. Section 34(1) of the Act 2004 provides 34(1):
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment of law, the Chairman of the Commission or any officer authorized by him may, if satisfied that the money in the account of a person is made through the Commission of an offence under the Act and/or enactments specified under Section 7(2) (a)-(f) of this Act apply to the Court exparte for power to issue or instruct a bank examiner or such other appropriate regulatory authority to issue an order as specified in Form B of the schedule to this act, addressed to the Manager of the bank of any person in control of the Financial Institution where the account is or believed by him to be or the Head Office of the bank or other Financial Institution to freeze the account?”
The above provisions are in accord with the decision of the lower Court before freezing customers account or placing any form of restrain on any bank account, the bank must be satisfied that there is an order of Court. With the affidavit evidence before the lower Court, it is beyond any equivocation that the Appellant unilaterally restrained the account number of the Appellant and thereby deprived him of the hard-earned money in its custody. Assuming, without conceding that it was the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission that instructed her to restrain the Respondent’s account, still the result would have been same as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission is not a Court of competent jurisdiction. 

In the final analysis, Issue one stands resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.

On Issue Two:
I have dutifully considered the submission rendered by the line of divide with the relevant authorities being relied upon. Appellants’ grouse here is that the lower Court ought not to have placed reliance on the motion for joinder of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission that was refused but only to fold back unto in its ruling where paragraph 4 of the supporting affidavit was relied upon. The Respondent held a contrary opinion that the Court was entitled to refer to it with a view to arriving at a just decision. 

I wish to state here that the lower Court by refusing to grant the motion for joinder became functus officio in respect of it and cannot fold back to it and render a decision. The principle of “functus officio” is not just a principle: of procedure. It is more of a question of jurisdiction and competence of a Court of law. The question therefore is whether a Court can completely assume jurisdiction over a case it had concluded? This can only be resuscitated by an Appellate Court. See the cases of Sanusi vs. Ayoola (1992) 9 NWLR 11-12 SNJ 142 (1992) LPELR-3009 (SC), INEC vs. Nnaji (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 900) 473. The apex Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC stated at page 19 thereof that “There is the well settled elementary and fundamental principle of law that a Court on disposing of a cause before it renders itself functus officio.” It ceases to have jurisdiction in respect of such case. See Mohammed vs. Husseini (1998) LPELR-1896 (SC) per Mohammed, JSC defined the principle thus: “The Latin expression “functus officio” simply means “task performed.” Therefore, applying it to the judiciary, it means that a Judge cannot give a decision or make an order on a matter twice. In other words, once a Judge gives a decision or makes an order on a matter he no longer has the competence or jurisdiction to give another decision or order on the same subject matter.” 

To this end, the issue is resolved against the Respondent and in favour of the Appellant.

On Issue Three:
I have carefully considered the legal arguments canvassed, the legion of judicial authorities cited by the contending learned Counsel to the parties. The Appellant posited that the Respondent did not establish his claims by evidence to entitle the lower Court to have granted them. This, the Respondent holds a contrary opinion that he had proffered affidavit evidence and tendered documentary evidence to be entitled to the reliefs granted. 

I quite agree with the Appellant’s counsel submissions that declaratory reliefs are not due granted on admission made by a party. That is the general position of the law. 

Coming back to the instant appeal, how did the Respondent fare before the trial Court? To answer this posed question it would not be out of place to refer to the reliefs sought, the grounds upon which they were sought, the facts in support of the application, the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, the annexed Exhibits and the written address in support. Having perused Exhibits R7 Statement of Account of the Respondent in respect of Account No. 0021101796 contained at pages 26-32 of the Record of Appeal, Exhibit K8 Letter of Compliant over the unwanted Restriction(s) placed on Account No. 0021101796 contained at pages 26-32 of the Record of Appeal, Exhibit K8 Letter of Complaint over the unwarranted Restriction(s) placed on Account No. 0021101796 belonging to the Appellant’s Bank found at pages 33-34 of the Record of Appeal. It is beyond any equivocation that the lower Court had sufficient evidence to grant the declaratory reliefs. Exhibit K10 which was a letter of reference written on behalf of the Respondent dated 10/9/2018 addressed to the visa officer, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) P.O. Box 1013, Nairobi Kenya has shown the existence of the aforesaid Account No. 0021101796 with the Appellant’s bank. By Exhibits A and B dated 7th January and 25th January, 2019 written by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission addressed to the Managing Director of the Appellant’s bank captioned ‘Investigation Activities’ wherein it directed to place post-no-debit status, effect the arrest of the account holder and inform this office. The accounts were:
(1) Account Name: – Adegoke Kola – 0123115152
(2) Account Name: – Adegoke Kola – 0123115080
(3) Account Name: – Adegoke Kola – 0123370684

There was no mention of Account No. subject of this appeal. The only logical conclusion is that the Appellant’s bank acted unlawfully to have restricted the said account number.

In the light of all, I have adumbrated in this discourse in respect of this issue, same ought to fail, and it stands resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.

On Issue Four:
I have taken a hard, but a calm look at the canvassed arguments in respect of this issue. I have equally considered the legion of judicial authorities being relied upon in respect of this issue. It is the submission of the Appellant’s Counsel that there was no basis or evidence led by the Respondent to warrant the award of damages of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only. This the Respondent’s Counsel held otherwise. 

Let me state that the law is settled beyond peradventure that general damages are always made as a claim at large. The quantum need not be pleaded and proved. The award is quantified by what in the opinion of a reasonable person, is considered adequate loss, or inconvenience which flows naturally as generally presumed by law, from the act of the Defendant. It does not depend upon calculation made and figure arrived at from specific items. 

The issue of award of damages in any given case is a matter based on the discretion of the trial Court. See Yalaju-Amaye vs. Associated Registered Engineering Contractors Ltd (1990) LPELR (3511) 1 at 47, Rockonoh Property Co. Ltd. vs. NITEL Plc (2001) LPELR (2951) 1 at 11-12, Hamza vs. Kure (2010) LPELR (1351) 1 AT 28-29, Okoko vs. Dakolo (2006) LPELR (2461) 1 at 39.
In Diamond Bank Plc vs. Wellcare Alliance Ltd (2015) LPELR (40762) at 27-28 this Court, per Abba Aji, JCA (Now JSC) stated:
“The law, is trite that where general damages are claiming if the issue of liability is established as in the present case, the trial judge is entitled to make his own assessment of the quantum of such general damages and on appeal, such damages will only be altered or varied if they were shown to be either so manifestly too high or so extremely too low or that they were awarded on an entirely erroneous estimate of the damages to which the Plaintiff is entitled.”
The assessment of the general damages to award is at the discretion of the Court. Judicial discretion is a vital tool in the administration of justice. Judicial discretion is a sacred power, which inures to a Judge. In matters of judicial discretion, since the facts of two cases are not always the same. The Courts do not make it a practice to lay down rules and principles that would fetter the exercise of its discretion of the lower Courts. In matters of discretion, no one case is an authority for the other. Also, the fact that the Appellate Court would have exercised its discretion differently from that of the lower Court is not sufficient reason to interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Lower Court.
Howbeit, the fact that the award of damages is at the discretion of the Court does not mean that there are no circumstances when an Appellate Court would interfere with the award of damages. An Appellate Court will interfere with the award of damages by a lower Court in situations which include:
(a) Where the Court acted under wrong principles of law,
(b) Where the Court acted in disregard of applicable principles of law,
(c) Where the Court acted in misapprehension of facts,
(d) Where the Court took into consideration irrelevant matters and disregarded matters while considering its award,
(e) Where injustice will result if the Appellate Court does not act,
(f) Where the amount awarded is ridiculously low or ridiculously high that it must have been an erroneous estimate of the damages. See ACB Ltd vs. Apugo (supra), Sahara Energy Resources Ltd. vs. Oyebola (2020) LPELR (52806) 1 at 56-60.
I have insightfully considered the entire circumstances of this matter as can be gleaned from the Records of Appeal and I am of the view that the lower Court did not make a proper assessment of the damages it awarded to the Respondent. The lower Court did not as rightly argued by the Appellant’s counsel considered the circumstances surrounding the case as the Plaintiff/Respondent only placed reliance on Exhibit 7 (Statement of Account). (See pages 26- 31 of the Records of Appeal). The closing balance at 01/02/2018 to 07/09/2018 was One Million, One Hundred and Seventy-four, One Hundred and Forty-nine Naira, Seventy-three Kobo (N 1,174,149.73) The Respondent did not go beyond that.
In the light of the above, this Court is satisfied that this is a proper case for it to interfere with the award made. See the following cases Overseas Construction Co. (Nig) Ltd vs. Creek Ent. (Nig) Ltd & Anor (1985) LPELR-2835 (SC); (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 13) 407 where the Court held that:
“Where the Court of trial has assessed damages, then an appellate Court can either agree with the assessment or in an appropriate case vary the amount. Where the trial Court made no assessment an appellate Court can undertake to make the assessment itself If there exists on the record enough material, enough evidence on which such assessment can be based. The appellate Court will also consider all the surrounding circumstances including the period of time the case has lasted and the urgent need to bring the litigation to finality. I am satisfied that this is a proper case for this Court to make the assessment itself.”
Having reviewed the entire facts and the injury suffered, I am of the opinion and rightly too that the lower Judge awarded damages without assessing the circumstances of the entire case and thus the award is excessive and this Court shall interfere by reducing the sum awarded. 

I now reduce the sum from N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) to N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only. Issue four is resolved In favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent in part.

In conflation, even though there is merit in the Appellant’s contention on issues 2 and 4, the resolution of issues 1 and 3 in favour of the Respondent, signposts that this appeal is devoid of merit.

Accordingly, it fails and is hereby dismissed. There should be costs of N200,000.00 against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.

MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, ABDUL AZEEZ WAZIR, JCA.

I agree with His Lordship’s reasoning and conclusion therein including the quantum of damages awarded in favour of the respondent. 

One of the instances when an appellate Court will interfere with the discretion of a trial Court on the quantum of damages to award in a claim such as the instant case is where the amount awarded is ridiculously low or ridiculously high that must have been an erroneous estimate of the damages. See OYENEYIN & ANOR V. AKINKUGBE & ANOR (2010) LPELR – 2875 (SC) At 19 – 20 (C – D), (2010) 4 NWLR (PT. 1184) 265, ADIM V. NBC LTD & ANOR (2010) LPELR – 181 (SC) AT 17-18 (E-A).

There is no doubt that the restriction placed or the respondent’s account by the appellant is unjustified. However, there is no basis whatsoever for the humongous award of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as damages in favour of the respondent. On the entire facts on record, the amount of N50,000,000.00 is excessive. This Court is thus entitled to intervene on the interest of justice. I abide by the consequential orders made therein including the order for costs.

JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.: I have been availed a draft of the judgment delivered by my learned brother, Abdul Azeez Waziri, JCA. I agree with him in the reasoning and conclusion arrived at on all the issues.

I shall however fortify my decision to agree with my learned brother with the following comments.

The Appellant owes the Respondent, being its customer unbridled duty to safeguard his money under its custody subject to obedience to only lawful orders which are against his interest. 

In this case, the Appellant in a frenzy decided to obey the order of the EFCC to place a restriction on the account of the Respondent in flagrant disregard to extant law, and even worse, on an account that was not mentioned.

By Section 34(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act 2004, the Chairman of the Commission or anyone authorised by him, before freezing the account of any person under investigation may obtain an ex-parte order of Court to do so.  In this case, the Appellant blocked the account of the Respondent without an order of Court. Section 97 of the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act, 2020 has provision similar to Section 34(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act, 2004. See also the case of Arogundade v. Skye Bank (2020) LPELR – 52304 (CA) PP 32-41 Paras A-C. The Appellant in this appeal did not exercise due diligence, and therefore cannot escape the harsh hammer of the law.

It is for this reason and the well-articulated reasoning of my learned brother in the leading judgment that I find this appeal totally devoid of merit. I hereby dismiss it.

Appearances:

Rodilinye Arinze, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Adetola Olulemu, Esq. with him, Chimbroma Owhor, Esq. For Respondent(s)