GONI v. HARUNA & ORS (2022)

GONI v. HARUNA & ORS

(2022)LCN/16744(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(KANO JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Tuesday, May 17, 2022

CA/K/291/C/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Ita George Mbaba Justice of the Court of Appeal

Abubakar Muazu Lamido Justice of the Court of Appeal

Usman Alhaji Musale Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

MUSA LAWAN GONI APPELANT(S)

And

ALHAJI ISAH HARUNA 2. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICEKANO STATE 3. THE AIG ZONE I, KANO 4. THE HEAD OPERATIONS, EFCC, KANO RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT THE POLICE CAN ENFORCE DEBT OBLIGATIONS OR CAN HELP PARTIES SETTLE OR RECOVER DEBT

Now, is the Police a debt collection outfit/centre?
In AIGP & ORS Vs. GOMBE (2016) LPELR-40816 (CA), this Court per Georgewill, JCA at pages 30-32 held:
“The powers of the Police going by the combined effect of the succinct provisions of Section 214 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 as amended and Section 4 of the Police Act 2004 and all other laws enabling the Police to act, are indeed very enormous but yet not left at large and in my view does not cover intermeddling or interfering with the judicial powers of a Court of law.”
Similarly, in ABAH Vs. UBN PLC. & ORS (2015) LPELR-24758 (CA) Mbaba, JCA at pages 97-99 held:
“We have stated repeatedly that the police (or any Law Enforcement Agency, for that matter, including the Economic and Financial Crimes Commissions (EFCC) is not allowed to dabble into enforcement of civil contracts and agreements, or to engage in recovery of debts, under the pretext of doing lawful duties.”
See the case of OCEANIC SECURITIES INTERNATIONAL LTD Vs. BALOGUN & ORS (2013) ALL FWLR (Pt. 677) 653; (2012) LPELR 9218 CA where it was held:
“Appellant could not therefore hide under the cover of reporting the 1st Respondent for issuance of dishonoured cheques, to subject him to the ordeal of arrest and detention… and escape the wrath of the law. He was pursuing the recovery of the alleged debt and resorted to the use of the Police…”
In IBIYEYE & ANOR Vs. GOLD & ORS (2012) ALL FWLR (Pt. 659) 1074, this Court also held:
“The resort to the police by parties for recovery of debts, outstanding under contractual relationship, has been repeatedly deprecated by the Courts. The Police have also been condemned, and rebuked, several times, for abandoning its primary duties of crime detection, prevention and control, to dabbling in enforcement or settlement of debts and contracts between quarreling parties, and for using its coercive powers to breach citizen’s rights and/or promote illegalities and oppression. See generally OKAFOR & ANR Vs. AIG POLICE ZONE 11, ONIKAN & ORS (2019) LPELR – 46505 (CA), OHANEDUM & ANOR Vs. C.O.P. IMO STATE & ORS (2015) LPELR – 24318 (CA) and KURE Vs C.O.P. (2020) LPELR – 49378 (CA).” This Court and the apex Court had maintained the same stand regarding abusive use of Police powers. In IGWE & ORS Vs. EZEANOCHIE & ORS (2009) LPELR – 11885 re-echoed thus;
“The Police are not and should not in any community of civilized people be used as debt or levy collectors. The Courts have in strong terms condemned the use of Policemen and Soldiers in the resolution or settlement of disputes amongst people, as such use of policemen often lead to infringement on the fundamental rights of others. See AGBAI Vs. OKOGBUE (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt 391) and NKPA Vs. NKUME (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 543 AT 561.” PER MUSALE, J.C.A

WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY IS AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT

Every citizen has his Right to Personal Liberty guaranteed by Section 35 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. No doubt the right is not absolute. The Constitution that gives the right also provided how such right can be tempered with. Tsammani, JCA in AKEEM Vs. F.R.N. (2016) LPELR – 41120 (CA) held that;
“35(1) Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law – (a) (c) For the purpose of bringing him before a Court in execution of the order of Court or reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence.”
It is clear therefore that, though the Constitution guarantees to every person the right to his personal liberty, there are instances or circumstances where such right may be taken away or derogated from. Those instances are as stated in Paragraphs (a) – (f) (b) Section 35(1) of the Constitution.
One of such instances where the right to personal liberty may be derogated from, is for the purpose of bringing him before a Court in execution of the order of Court or where he is reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal offence. In any of such instances as enumerated under Section 35(1) of the 1999 Constitution therefore, the authorities have been constitutionally empowered to take away or derogate from such persons right to personal liberty. See EZEADUKWA Vs. MADUKA (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt.518) p.635. Thus My Lord, I. T. Muhammad JSC clearly stated the position in the case of DOKUBO-ASARI Vs. F.R.N. (2007) ALL FWLR (pt. 375) at 586-587, as follows:
“The above provisions of Section 35 of the Constitution leave no one in doubt that the section is not absolute personal liberty of an individual within the contemplation of Section 35(1) of the Constitution is a qualified right. In the context of this particular case and by virtue Subsection 1(c) thereof which permits restriction on individual liberty in the course of Judicial inquiry or where, rightly as in this case, the Appellant was arrested and put under detention upon reasonable suspicion of having committed a felony. A person’s liberty, as in this case, can also be curtailed in order to prevent him from committing further offence(s). It is my belief as well, that if every person accused of a felony can hide under the canopy of Section 35 of the Constitution to escape lawful detention then an escape route to freedom is easily and richly made available to persons suspected to have committed serious crimes and that will not augur well for peace, the progress, prosperity and tranquility of the society I find support in so saying from Irikefe’s, JSC (as he then was) earlier pronouncement in the case of ECHEAZU Vs. COMMISSIONER of POLICE (1974) NLR 308 of page 314.”
It is therefore beyond dispute that, the fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed by Section 35(1) of the 1999 Constitution is not absolute; as its existence is subject to certain exceptions as stipulated in Subsections (a) (f) of the Section. As stated earlier, one of the exception in Subsection (c) thereto is that, a person may be lawfully arrested and/or detained upon suspicion of having committed a criminal offence. However, even at that, the constitution has put in place certain safeguards, so that a person may not be arrested and/or detained indefinitely or for an indeterminable period. Thus, the proviso. PER MUSALE, J.C.A

USMAN ALHAJI MUSALE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of Kano State High Court No.1 in Suit No. K/M987/2018 delivered on the 21st February, 2019 by, Honourable Justice N.S Umar dismissing the appellant’s application for the enforcement of his fundamental rights.

Briefly put, the facts of the case before the lower Court are:
The appellant as applicant before the lower Court filed a Motion on Notice seeking for the Enforcement of his Fundamental Rights. In the supporting affidavit, he deposed that the 1st respondent and himself went into a business transaction, wherein the applicant invested the sum of N3,500,000 (Three Million and Five Hundred Thousand Naira only) while the 1st respondent invested the sum of N1,360,000 (One Million Three Hundred and Sixty Thousand Naira only) with which the applicant bought cattle and sent same to Port-Harcourt for sale. That the butchers to whom the cattle were sent refused to pay for them. That six years after the transaction, the 1st respondent reported the applicant to the 2nd respondent where he was detained for a whole day and released on bail upon writing an undertaking that he owed the 1st respondent the sum of N1,360,000 (One Million Three Hundred and Sixty Thousand Naira only) and that he will pay the sum by installment payment plan.

For the fear of further breach of his fundamental rights, the appellant applied to the lower Court, wherein he sought for the following reliefs;
1. A declaration that the 1st respondent, by threatening to deal with the applicant, without any legal right whatsoever, considering the general circumstances of this case constitutes an imminent breach/infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights, particularly, his right to personal liberty and freedom from arbitrary arrest/detention, therefore contrary to the provisions and intendment of the CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1999 (AS AMENDED) AND THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS (RATIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT) ACT.
2. A DECLARATION that the RESPONDENTS 1st – 4th have no legal right or power either constitutionally or statutory to arrest, detain or subject the applicant to torture actual or psychological, degrading and inhuman treatment in the circumstance of this case and in relation to the transaction subject matter of this suit.
3. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the respondents either by themselves, agents, servants or privies with whatever name or style called from arbitrarily arresting, detaining, subjecting the applicant to torture actual or psychological or degrading and inhuman treatment and/or inviting, intimidating, harassing, threatening to arrest or detain the applicant in the circumstances of this case and in relation or connection to the business transaction subject matter of this application between the APPLICANT and the 1st RESPONDENT.
4. AN ORDER OF COMPENSATION/GENERAL DAMAGES for the sum of N10,000,000:00 (Ten Million Naira only) against the 1st respondent for arbitrarily detaining and subjecting the applicant to humiliation and psychological trauma.
5. AN ORDER directing the 1st RESPONDENT to pay the sum of N250,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira only) as cost for filling and prosecuting this suit.
6. AND for such order or further orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.
See pages 18 – 19 of the record.

In opposing the application, the 1st respondent filed counter-affidavit, in which he denied the depositions contained in the appellant’s affidavit and stated that he is a businessmen dealing in currency exchange while the appellant is a cattle dealer buying cattle from Chadians. By the nature of his business, the applicant needs SEPA currency which the 1st respondent gives him and the applicant thereafter pays the 1st respondent in Naira currency with his share of profit.

The 1st respondent stated that sometime in 2014, the appellant informed him that some very cheap cattle were supplied to him and therefore required the 1st respondent to give him SEPA currency worth N8,000,000 (Eight Million Naira only).

The 1st respondent further stated that he advanced the sum of N8,000,000 to the applicant with the understanding that the applicant will pay back in three days. However, on the expiration of the 3 days, when the 1st respondent demanded his money, the appellant refused to pay him. That after investigating the matter the 1st respondent found that nobody supplied cattle to the appellant. In view of this, the 1st respondent reported the applicant to the Police wherein he admitted to have converted the 1st respondent’s money. That the appellant surrendered a plot of land and some amount of money to the 1st respondent, all of which stood at N6,640,000:00 (Six Million, Six Hundred and Forty Thousand Naira only), leaving a balance of N1,360,000:00 (One Million, Three hundred and Sixty Thousand Naira only).

That the appellant’s failure to pay the 1st respondent the outstanding balance of N1,360,000:00 (One Million, Three Hundred and Sixty Thousand Naira only), prompted the 1st respondent to report him to the 2nd respondent, where the appellant wrote an undertaking to pay the amount within 3 months. This suit was filed before the expiration of the grace period at the lower Court.
See pages 63 – 64 of the record.

From the record, the application was heard by the lower Court on 21st /02/2019 and ruling delivered immediately after. The learned trial Judge ruled as follows;
“This application for the Enforcement of the Applicants Fundamental Right lacks merit. See paragraph 7 to 11 of the counter-affidavit of the 1st respondent dated 18/12/2018.

Having said that this motion on notice dated 18/12/2018 for the enforcement of the applicant fundamental right is refused and is dismissed.”

Dissatisfied with the said ruling, the applicant appealed to this Court. His Notice of Appeal, dated and filed on the 4th of March, 2019 has three grounds of appeal. The grounds without particulars are hereunder reproduced:
1. The learned trial Judge of the lower Court erred in law and misdirected himself in fact thereby coming to a wrong conclusion by solely basing his ruling on paragraphs 7 – 11 of the 1st respondent’s counter-affidavit (same having been controverted by the Applicant/Appellant in his further and better Affidavit dated and filed the 21st Day of January, 2019).
2. The learned trial Judge erred in law when he refused and dismissed the Applicant/Appellant’s application for the enforcement of his fundamental right based on paragraphs 7 to 11 of the 1st Respondent’s counter-affidavit dated 18th February, 2018.
3. The judgment is against the weight of evidence before the lower Court.”

In the brief of argument filed on 12th day of November, 2021, learned counsel to the appellant, Falade, Esq., distilled one issue for the determination of the appeal;
“Whether the learned trial Court was right when it arrived at its ruling/judgment without evaluating the evidence adduced by the parties before it and if the learned trial Court was not right in arriving at its ruling/judgment without evaluating the evidence before it, can this honourable Court review and properly evaluate the said evidence?
Distilled from Grounds 1 – 3 of the grounds of appeal.

It was the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court was wrong when it failed to evaluate the affidavit evidence of the parties placed before it, before arriving at the above conclusion, worse of it all, was the fact that the learned trial Court predicated its judgment on paragraphs 7 to 11 of the respondent’s counter-affidavit and even at that, the learned trial Court did so by mere reference. The Court failed to state why it elected to accept the averments in the paragraphs under reference and disregarded or disbelieved the entire affidavit of the appellant by a wave of the hand. Counsel further submitted that, it is trite that in delivering a judgment in accordance with the laid down principle of law, the Court is enjoined to review and properly evaluate the evidence adduced by both parties at the trial, be it oral, documentary or affidavit evidence and then make its findings on the issues in controversy based on the applicable principles of law, as anything short of this, will occasion a grave miscarriage of justice as in the instant case. The learned counsel relied on, CCB (NIG) PLC Vs. OKPALA (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 518) 673 AT 693 wherein the Court inter alia held:
“A trial Court will be much incapacitated to determine the point in controversy which rests wholly on the evidence adduced at the trial, if it fails to actually review and properly evaluate in detail the evidence placed before it. The test for deciding whether a trial Court evaluated evidence placed before it, is whether a third party perusing the ruling or judgment of the Court who has reached such a decision on any matter in controversy is placed in a position ordinarily to appreciate the assessment or evaluation made by the trial Court and which made its conclusion either irresistible or unanswerable. Nothing short of such analysis will make the decision reached by the Court with regard to the point that was called for determination.”

The learned counsel continued that the affidavit evidence of the appellant, corroborated by that of the 1st respondent clearly shows that the appellant was arrested and detained by the Police at the instance of the 1st respondent for a whole day for a transaction that was purely civil in nature, therefore outside the statutory competence of the Police. As if that was not bad enough, the police further extracted an undertaking from the appellant as a condition for his release on bail.

Counsel further continued that the 2nd respondent against whom the above allegations were made, never filed any counter-affidavit to controvert that paragraph or the entire content of the appellant’s affidavit. Needless to say that the position of the law in the circumstance is that the averment is deemed admitted, the learned counsel argued.

The learned counsel submitted that Exhibits “A” and “B” referred to in the 1st respondent counter-affidavit simply talk of “debt” and did not make reference to any “Trust” money that would have warranted the 2nd respondent’s arrest and detention of the appellant. Needless to say that by those Exhibits, the relationship between the appellant and the 1st respondent is that of debtor and creditor and that the police are not debt collectors.

Learned counsel for the appellant cited and relied on the case of ISYAKU Vs. MASTER (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 184) 443 where this Court held as follows:
“The judgment or order of every Court must demonstrate in full a dispassionate consideration of the issues properly raised and heard by the Court. Where it fails to do so and a miscarriage of justice is occasioned, such judgment or order would be set aside by an appellate Court. In the instant case, the trial Court did not evaluate the evidence adduced by the parties and it did not consider the relevant legal principles relating to the grant in interlocutory injunction before it made the order against the applicants. The ruling was very short, scanty and devoid of any legal or logical reasoning or substance. In the circumstance, the trial Court’s order of interlocutory injunction ought to be set aside.”

The learned counsel finally urged this Court to resolve this appeal in favour of the appellant, set aside the ruling/judgment the learned trial Court and enter judgment in favour of the appellant on his application for the enforcement of his fundamental rights.

RESOLUTION OF THE SOLE ISSUE.
From the outset, let me observe that this appeal is determined on the brief of only the appellant, as none of the respondents filed any.

The ruling of the learned trial judge simpliciter was;
“This application for the Enforcement of the Applicants Fundamental Rights lacks merit. See paragraph 7 to 11 of the counter-affidavit of the 1st respondent dated 18/12/2018.”
In my view, the learned trial judge in his wisdom has adopted the averments deposed to by 1st respondent in his counter-affidavit as the ruling of the lower Court. To say the least, that was unfortunate.
The Supreme Court in AHMED Vs. CBN (2013) LPELR – 20744 (SC) per Peter-Odili, JSC held;
The applicants’ copious supporting affidavit which had been quoted verbatim earlier was not countered by the respondent by affidavit holding, the view which I agree with that whether or not there was a counter affidavit this Court is still duty bound to evaluate the contents of the only deposition available as in the case at hand. This responsibility is to ascertain the veracity or authenticity of the facts alleged therein. The other aspect being whether the depositions are in compliance with Sections 115(1) – (3) of the Evidence Act 2011. The reason for this is the fact that if the depositions do not meet with the conditions stipulated in that relevant Evidence Act provision then the paragraphs containing those offending averments go to no issue since they would be incurably defective and unusable. I shall quote some of these relevant sections of the Evidence Act which are thus:
“115 (1) Every affidavit used in the Court shall contain only a statement of fact and circumstances to which the witness deposes either of his own personal knowledge or from information which he believes to be true.”
“2 An affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter, by way of objection, prayer or legal argument or conclusion”
“3. When a person deposes to his belief in any matter of tact, and his belief is derived from any source other than his own personal knowledge, he shall set forth explicitly the facts and circumstances forming the ground of his belief.”
“4. when such belief is derived from information received from another person, the name of his informant shall be stated and reasonable particulars shall be given respecting the informant and the time, place and circumstances of the information.”
The learned trial in my view abdicated from his responsibility by refusing to evaluate the affidavit evidence before him. Since he did not do it, I will.

In the counter-affidavit, the 1st respondent relied on Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B’ wherein the appellant accepted being indebted to the 1st respondent. In paragraphs 12 and 13 of the counter-affidavit, the 1st respondent averred that he reported the appellant to the Police. This had corroborated the averments of the appellant that he was arrested by the police and detained for a day. It further corroborated the issue of Police force the appellant to write an agreement that he was/is indebted to the 1st respondent. In the agreement written at the Police Station, the issue agreed upon was ‘debt’.

Now, is the Police a debt collection outfit/centre?
In AIGP & ORS Vs. GOMBE (2016) LPELR-40816 (CA), this Court per Georgewill, JCA at pages 30-32 held:
“The powers of the Police going by the combined effect of the succinct provisions of Section 214 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 as amended and Section 4 of the Police Act 2004 and all other laws enabling the Police to act, are indeed very enormous but yet not left at large and in my view does not cover intermeddling or interfering with the judicial powers of a Court of law.”
Similarly, in ABAH Vs. UBN PLC. & ORS (2015) LPELR-24758 (CA) Mbaba, JCA at pages 97-99 held:
“We have stated repeatedly that the police (or any Law Enforcement Agency, for that matter, including the Economic and Financial Crimes Commissions (EFCC) is not allowed to dabble into enforcement of civil contracts and agreements, or to engage in recovery of debts, under the pretext of doing lawful duties.”
See the case of OCEANIC SECURITIES INTERNATIONAL LTD Vs. BALOGUN & ORS (2013) ALL FWLR (Pt. 677) 653; (2012) LPELR 9218 CA where it was held:
“Appellant could not therefore hide under the cover of reporting the 1st Respondent for issuance of dishonoured cheques, to subject him to the ordeal of arrest and detention… and escape the wrath of the law. He was pursuing the recovery of the alleged debt and resorted to the use of the Police…”
In IBIYEYE & ANOR Vs. GOLD & ORS (2012) ALL FWLR (Pt. 659) 1074, this Court also held:
“The resort to the police by parties for recovery of debts, outstanding under contractual relationship, has been repeatedly deprecated by the Courts. The Police have also been condemned, and rebuked, several times, for abandoning its primary duties of crime detection, prevention and control, to dabbling in enforcement or settlement of debts and contracts between quarreling parties, and for using its coercive powers to breach citizen’s rights and/or promote illegalities and oppression. See generally OKAFOR & ANR Vs. AIG POLICE ZONE 11, ONIKAN & ORS (2019) LPELR – 46505 (CA), OHANEDUM & ANOR Vs. C.O.P. IMO STATE & ORS (2015) LPELR – 24318 (CA) and KURE Vs C.O.P. (2020) LPELR – 49378 (CA).” This Court and the apex Court had maintained the same stand regarding abusive use of Police powers. In IGWE & ORS Vs. EZEANOCHIE & ORS (2009) LPELR – 11885 re-echoed thus;
“The Police are not and should not in any community of civilized people be used as debt or levy collectors. The Courts have in strong terms condemned the use of Policemen and Soldiers in the resolution or settlement of disputes amongst people, as such use of policemen often lead to infringement on the fundamental rights of others. See AGBAI Vs. OKOGBUE (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt 391) and NKPA Vs. NKUME (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 543 AT 561.”

Every citizen has his Right to Personal Liberty guaranteed by Section 35 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. No doubt the right is not absolute. The Constitution that gives the right also provided how such right can be tempered with. Tsammani, JCA in AKEEM Vs. F.R.N. (2016) LPELR – 41120 (CA) held that;
“35(1) Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law – (a) (c) For the purpose of bringing him before a Court in execution of the order of Court or reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence.”
It is clear therefore that, though the Constitution guarantees to every person the right to his personal liberty, there are instances or circumstances where such right may be taken away or derogated from. Those instances are as stated in Paragraphs (a) – (f) (b) Section 35(1) of the Constitution.
One of such instances where the right to personal liberty may be derogated from, is for the purpose of bringing him before a Court in execution of the order of Court or where he is reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal offence. In any of such instances as enumerated under Section 35(1) of the 1999 Constitution therefore, the authorities have been constitutionally empowered to take away or derogate from such persons right to personal liberty. See EZEADUKWA Vs. MADUKA (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt.518) p.635. Thus My Lord, I. T. Muhammad JSC clearly stated the position in the case of DOKUBO-ASARI Vs. F.R.N. (2007) ALL FWLR (pt. 375) at 586-587, as follows:
“The above provisions of Section 35 of the Constitution leave no one in doubt that the section is not absolute personal liberty of an individual within the contemplation of Section 35(1) of the Constitution is a qualified right. In the context of this particular case and by virtue Subsection 1(c) thereof which permits restriction on individual liberty in the course of Judicial inquiry or where, rightly as in this case, the Appellant was arrested and put under detention upon reasonable suspicion of having committed a felony. A person’s liberty, as in this case, can also be curtailed in order to prevent him from committing further offence(s). It is my belief as well, that if every person accused of a felony can hide under the canopy of Section 35 of the Constitution to escape lawful detention then an escape route to freedom is easily and richly made available to persons suspected to have committed serious crimes and that will not augur well for peace, the progress, prosperity and tranquility of the society I find support in so saying from Irikefe’s, JSC (as he then was) earlier pronouncement in the case of ECHEAZU Vs. COMMISSIONER of POLICE (1974) NLR 308 of page 314.”
It is therefore beyond dispute that, the fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed by Section 35(1) of the 1999 Constitution is not absolute; as its existence is subject to certain exceptions as stipulated in Subsections (a) (f) of the Section. As stated earlier, one of the exception in Subsection (c) thereto is that, a person may be lawfully arrested and/or detained upon suspicion of having committed a criminal offence. However, even at that, the constitution has put in place certain safeguards, so that a person may not be arrested and/or detained indefinitely or for an indeterminable period. Thus, the proviso.

The learned trial judge did not say how he came to the conclusion he did in his ruling. For his failure to adhere to the laid dawn criteria in this circumstance, the appeal is meritorious. The Ruling in Suit No. K/M987/2018 is vacated. The rights of the appellant having being infringed, entitled him to damages. Appellant is awarded N500,000:00 damages against the 1st respondent.
Appeal allowed.

ITA GEORGE MBABA, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading the draft of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, U.A. Musale JCA, that this appeal is meritorious, and I think it is proper to set aside the decision of the trial Court and enter judgment for the Appellant (as Applicant).

This is because Appellant had established his claim against Respondents for violation of his fundamental rights. What transpired between the Appellant and 1st Respondent was a purely civil/contractual matter, whereof remedy lied in civil claims against the Appellant. 1st Respondent had even admitted that he reported the Appellant to the 2nd Respondent as a result of Appellant’s failure to pay the balance of N136,000.00 outstanding on their contract agreement, and that Appellant wrote the undertaking to pay the same, on being arrested and detained by the law enforcement agencies.
I think that was a gross violation of Appellant’s fundamental rights as 1st Respondent cannot resort to the use of the Police (or EFCC or any law enforcement agencies) to recover a debt, accruing from contractual transaction. See the case of Ohanedum & Anor Vs C.O.P. Imo State & Ors (2015) LPELR – 24318 (CA), where we held:
Appellant could not therefore hide under the cover of reporting the 1st Respondent for issuance of dishonoured cheques, to subject him to the ordeal of arrest and detention… and escape the wrath of the law. He was pursuing the recovery of the alleged debt and resorted to the use of the Police…” In Ibiyeye & Anor vs. Gold & Ors (2012) ALL FWLR (Pt. 659) 1074, this Court also held: “…The resort to the police by parties for recovery of debts, outstanding under contractual relationship has been repeatedly deprecated by the Courts. The Police have also been condemned, and rebuked, several times, for abandoning its primary duties of crime detection, prevention and control, to dabbling in enforcement or settlement of debts and contracts between quarrelling parties, and for using its coercive powers to breach citizen’s rights and/or promote illegalities and oppression.”
See also the reasoning and holding of this Court in the case of Abah Vs Union Bank of Nig. Plc (2015) LPELR – 24758 (CA), where we held:
“We have stated repeatedly that the Police has no business in enforcing debt obligations or helping parties to settle or recover debts. See the case of Oceanic Securities International Ltd vs Balogun & Ors (2013) ALL FWLR (pt. 677) 633. See also the case of Ibiyeye & Anor vs Gold & Ors (2012) ALLFWLR (pt.659) 1074, where this Court said: “I have to add that the resort to the Police by parties for recovery of debts outstanding under contractual relationship has been repeatedly deprecated by the Court. The police have also been condemned and rebuked several times, for abandoning its primary duties of crime detection, prevention and control to dabbling in enforcement or settlement of debts and contracts between quarrelling parties, and for using its coercive powers to breach citizen’s rights and/or promote illegalities and oppression. Unfortunately, despite all the decided cases on this issue, the problem persists and the unholy alliance between aggrieved contractors/creditors with the Police remains at the root of many fundamental rights breaches in our Courts.” See also Yusuf Umar vs Salam & Ors (2001) 1 CHR 413.”
See also Kure Vs C.O.P. (2020) LPELR – 49378 (SC), where the Apex Court said:
“As I went through the facts of this case, I was wondering how a purely civil matter could easily metamorphose and transubstantiate into a purely criminal case. The end result now is that the Appellant has suffered irreparable damage, disgrace, shame, odiousness and untold hardship in the hand of the Police that is constitutionally and legally saddled with prosecution of criminal offences. The police have muzzled the rights and freedom of Nigerians even where cases are clearly outside their jurisdiction, power or corridor. If this is not curbed, everybody including the judicial officers will suffer always from floodgates of civil matters being hijacked by the police and transmuted into crimes. If this is not tackled, everybody would have suffered in the merciless hand of the police who has become a law unto itself in this country. The primary duty of the Police by Section 4 of the Police Act is the prevention of crime, investigation and detection of crime and the prosecution of offenders. See IBIYEYE V. GOLD (2012) ALL FWLR (PT 659) 1074. The Police is not a debt recovery agency and has no business to dabble into contractual disputes between parties arising from purely civil transactions. See MCLAREN V. JENNINGS (2003) FWLR (PT 154) 528. When, as in the circumstances of this action, a purely civil matter is reported to the Police, such a person cannot go scot-free as the report ought not to have been made at all since it is not within the purview of Police duties. It is a report made malafide and he will be equally liable for the action taken by the Police irrespective of whether he actively instigated them or not, since he had no business involving the Police in a purely civil matter in the first place. Such conduct which portrays disregard of the law and is aimed at using the coercive powers of the State to punish a contracting party in a purely civil matter ought to be mulcted in exemplary damages. See OKAFOR & ANOR V. AIG POLICE ZONE II ONIKAN & ORS (2019) LPELR- 46505.” Per ABBA AJI, JSC

I therefore think Appellant was entitled to damages for infringement of his fundamental rights. I abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.

ABUBAKAR MU’AZU LAMIDO, J.C.A.: I have read the judgment of my learned brother, USMAN ALHAJI MUSALE, JCA. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning which I adopt as mine and the conclusion that the appeal is meritorious and ought to be allowed. I too allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the trial Court. I also abide by all other consequential orders in the lead judgment including order as to cost.