G.A.A ENTERPRISES LTD v. FCT MINISTER
(2022)LCN/16706(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Friday, December 09, 2022
CA/A/479/2012
Before Our Lordships:
Hamma Akawu Barka Justice of the Court of Appeal
Elfrieda Oluwayemisi Williams-Dawodu Justice of the Court of Appeal
Danlami Zama Senchi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
G.A.A ENTERPRISES LIMITED APPELANT(S)
And
FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY MINISTER RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE ESSENCE OF THE COURT DEMANDING FOR A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT
The essence for demanding for a certified true copy of a public document is to ensure the authenticity of the document vis a vis the original. See, Goodwill & Trust Investment Ltd vs. Witt & Bush Ltd (2011) LPELR-1333 (SC). Therefore, when the original is available, the need for the certified copy thereof is not only unnecessary, since the said original of the public document can be admitted without any certification. See Kassim vs. The State (2017) LPELR-42586 (SC), and GTB Plc vs. Bendu Peter Services (NIG) Ltd & Anor (2022) LPELR – 57064 (CA). The appellant’s counsel is perfectly correct in stating that the documents tendered being originals of the public documents the question of certification does not arise, and the lower Court in utter error holding otherwise.
That however is not the end of the equation, as it has to be determined whether the admission of the three documents under contemplation can sustain the prayers sought by the appellant. I agree that this Court and the trial Court have equal rights in the evaluation of documentary evidence. The cases of Arije vs. Arije (2018) 16 NWLR (pt. 1644) 67 AT 83, Gonzee (Nig) Ltd vs. NERDC (2005) 13 NWLR (pt. 943) 634 Ezeuko vs. The State (2016) 6 NWLR (pt. 1509) 529 and Ogunleye vs. Oni (1990) 2 NWLR (pt. 822) 308 all cited by learned counsel are apposite on the point. PER BARKA, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE NEED FOR THE PROOF OF THE ROOT OF TITLE TO A LAND IN DISPUTE
The Apex Court proceeded to state the need for the proof of the root of title:
“The root of title in cases like the one now on appeal, once pleaded as raison d’etre for the presence of the person pleading must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. Because if the root of title depended upon is defective or remains unproven, the possession claimed would be illusionary, and may be in the end an act of trespass”.
See, Lawal vs. Olufowobi (1996) 10 NWLR (pt. 477) 177 AT 188, Jibril Bala Adamu (RTD) vs. Nigerian Airforce & Anor (2022) LPELR – 56587 (SC). PER BARKA, J.CA.
HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The instant appeal germinated from the decision of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory sitting in Abuja, the Nation’s capital in suit with No: FCT/HC/CV/2136/2010, between G.A.A Enterprises Limited Vs. Federal Capital Territory Minister, delivered on 31/01/2012, wherewith the appellant’s claim was dismissed for lack of merit.
It should be recalled that appellant as Plaintiff on 5/9/2012 caused a writ of summons to issue against the respondent claiming as follows:
i. A Declaration that the defendant is duty bound under the law to properly revoke an existing title over land before making another grant to another person over the same land.
ii. A Declaration that the subsequent re-allocation of the Plaintiff’s holding in Plot 1807, Cadastral Zone B13, Gaduwa District, FCT, Abuja to other persons without first revoking the Plaintiff’s holding in the aforementioned is wrongful, illegal and an abuse of office.
iii. An Order of Court setting aside all the allocations or re-allocations the Defendant has made to other persons in respect of the Statutory Right of Occupancy in Plot 1807, Cadastral Zone B13, Gaduwa District, Abuja.
iv. A Declaration of Court that the Plaintiff is the subsisting and effectual title holder in Plot 1807, Cadastral Zone B13, Gaduwa District, Abuja granted to the Plaintiff by the Defendant through a letter of Offer of Terms of Grant/conveyance of Approval dated the 17th day of May, 2001.
v. An Order of Court mandating the Defendant to issue the Plaintiff forthwith with a Certificate of Occupancy over all that piece of land measuring 4,000 Sq.m. known as Plot 1807, Cadastral Zone B13, Gaduwa District, Abuja and to grant to the Plaintiff all land rights including but not limited to approving building designs for the plaintiff to bring into consummation the purpose for which the plot of land was allocated to the Plaintiff.
vi. An Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendant whether by himself or through any of his agents or agency, particularly, the Abuja Geographic Information Systems (AGIS), the Abuja Metropolitan Management Agency, the Federal Capital Development Authority or howsoever known from failing to give effect to any aspect of the judgment of the Honourable Court as it relates to the Plaintiff’s title, issuing the Plaintiff with a Certificate of Occupancy and building plans or on their own obstructing, disturbing or in any way, howsoever, refusing the Plaintiff the enjoyment and use of Plot 1807, Cadastral Zone B13, Gaduwa District, Abuja.
On being served the writ of summons, Defendant filed a statement of defense on 7/12/2010 wherein, he denied the entirety of the claim, urging the Court to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims in its entirety. Issues having been joined, the case proceeded to a protracted trial at the end of which written addresses were ordered, filed and exchanged, culminating to the vexed judgment delivered on 31/01/2012.
In brief, and according to the appellant, which is an artificial person incorporated in Nigeria, successfully applied for a piece of land from the respondent and was granted a plot named as plot 1807 Cadastral Zone B13 Gaduwa district Abuja. Appellant is said to have accepted the grant and proceeded to pay all the bills required of her. That she then approached the development control department of the respondent in the year 2003, with an application seeking to commence development of the plot of land allocated to her, but was advised to exercise patience as the necessary infrastructure was yet to be put in place. That two years thereafter the respondent introduced a policy known as recertification policy of all land titles in an effort at sorting out double or multiple title file numbers, meant to weed out forged titles, and to also stop Area councils from allocating land, to which the appellant complied with and was issued with an acknowledgment indicating that she participated in the recertification exercise, but when the appellant visited the land registry thereafter, she was informed that the land registry discovered that four other persons were equally allocated the same plot of land, and that was after the land was allocated to her. That appellant wrote to the respondent asking that it correct the anomaly, but no response was received from them, and upon conducting a search on the property it was discovered that the land registry of the respondent issued a statement to the effect that appellant’s title was submitted late for recertification and the appellant’s title information not having been submitted into the database of the respondent’s land records, caused the respondents to re-issue the land to a third party. Appellant was dissatisfied and thereby proceeded to Court, where the respondents still contended that there was no information of the respondent’s grant in the database, to warrant the issue of a Certificate of Occupancy in favor of the appellant.
The respondent on its part from pages 3 – 13 of the brief alluded to the facts stated by the appellant in its brief of argument, picking holes with the facts as narrated, and on the 31st of January, 2012, the lower Court delivered the vexed judgment holding that appellant failed to lead credible evidence to substantiate his claim of having been awarded the plot in contention and proceeded to dismiss the claim.
Totally dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on 31/1/12, predicated on three grounds of appeal. On 5/9/2012, the appeal was entered to this Court with the leave of Court granted on 13/10/22. Appellant filed a brief on 9/12/21, also with the leave of Court, and on receipt of the respondent’s brief, which was filed on 16/2/22 proceeded to file a reply brief on 11/10/22.
In the brief settled for the appellant by O. J. Oboje, of learned counsel, the following issues were identified for the resolution of the appeal as follows:
i. Whether Exhibits “A”, “B” and “C” which are original copies of public documents need to be certified for them to be admissible and accorded probative weight and value as determined by the Court below?
ii. Whether the lower Court was right when it, suo motu, raised the issue of date of acceptance of Exhibit “A” and the acceptance of the grant which was not a ground upon which issues were joined without first inviting the Appellant and the Respondent to address the Court on same?
The Respondent on the other hand also distilled two issues in the brief settled on its behalf as follows.
i. Whether exhibits A, B and C which are original copies of public documents need to be certified for them to be admissible and accorded probative weight and value as determined by the Court below.
ii. Whether the lower Court was right when it suo motu raised the issue of date of acceptance of exhibit A, and the acceptance of the grant which was not a ground upon which issues were joined without first inviting the appellant and respondent to address the Court on same.
Looking at the two sets of issues, it is apparent that the learned counsel for the respondent adopted the issues framed by the Learned Appellant’s counsel word for word. In the circumstance therefore, this appeal would be determined anchored by the issues framed by the learned counsel for the appellant and adopted by the respondent’s counsel at the same time, being that the issues run into each other.
Issue One.
i. Whether Exhibits “A”, “B” and “C” which are original copies of public documents need to be certified for them to be admissible and accorded probative weight and value as determined by the Court below?
It was submitted by the learned counsel that the trial Court erred in holding that exhibits A, B and C which were original copies of public documents needed to be certified for them to be admissible, as it is only secondary documents that needed to be certified. Counsel referred the Court to its pleadings, wherein it was pleaded that she was issued a letter of offer and the original acknowledgement in respect of the land application which were tendered and marked as exhibits A, B and C, respectively. He argued that the issue pertaining to the admissibility of the documents was raised at the point of address having been admitted initially without objection. By the said address, the learned counsel submitted that though the documents were original copies of the documents, however argued that the documents needed to be certified to give it admissibility. He complained that the lower Court swallowed the submission made and proceeded to expunge the documents from the evidence led, and even then went beyond the prayer sought by the respondent. He referred to sections of the Evidence Act 2011, dealing with the certification of documents, and leveraged on the case of Iteogu vs. LPDC (2009) 17 NWLR (pt. 1171) 614 to contend that the only secondary evidence of a public document admissible in evidence is the certified true copy contending that exhibits A, B and C having been duly pleaded and tendered without objection in proof of the fact that the respondent granted to the appellant the disputed plot, but that no certificate of occupancy was issued to her thereafter, the lower Court was wrong to have expunged the said documents and declared that appellant failed to prove its case. He urged the Court to invoke the provisions of Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, and to evaluate the documentary evidence adduced, relying on Arije vs. Arije (2018) 16 NWLR (pt. 1644) 67 AT 83, and to resolve the issue in its favor. Counsel further cited to the Court the case of Kassim vs. The State (2017) LPELR-42586) on the purport of certifying a public document.
Responding on the issue, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the order of the lower Court in expunging exhibits A, B and C tendered by the appellant after the evaluation of the evidence adduced, predicated on declaratory reliefs did not occasion any miscarriage of justice on the appellant. He argued that there is a difference between admissibility and the probative value or weight to be attached to such documents. He argued that the trial Court evaluated the documents to the conclusion that they did not substantiate the claims of the appellant on the grounds that the appellant failed to accept exhibit A, and relied on Okonji vs. Njokanma (1999) LPELR – 2477 (SC) to buttress that point.
Also relying on Omisore vs. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (pt. 1482) 2005, Umar vs. Geidam (2019) 1 NWLR (pt. 1652) 29 and Obe vs. MTN (NIG) Communications Ltd (2021) 18 NWLR (pt. 1809) 415 @ 447, argued that the burden of proof on the plaintiff in establishing declaratory reliefs to the satisfaction of the Court is quite heavy in the sense that they are not granted even on admission. Learned counsel then drew the Court’s attention to clause 3 of the offer dated the 17th of May 2001, contending that the appellant failed woefully to tender the letter of acceptance which was pleaded, in view of the mandatory requirement that the acceptance letter be within two months of the grant. On this counsel alluded to the holding of the lower Court on the issue, and urged the Court to sustain the said holding.
On the second issue which is;
Whether the lower Court was right when it, suo motu, raised the issue of date of acceptance of Exhibit “A” and the acceptance of the grant which was not a ground upon which issues were joined without first inviting the Appellant and the Respondent to address the Court on same?
Learned counsel alluded to page 125, lines 1-9 of the record, to the effect that:
“From the plaintiff’s pleadings and evidence, which is short of the letter of acceptance, bill of charges and payments made, particularly paragraph 3 of exhibit A, the date of commencement of the right of occupancy had since expired.
Plaintiff did not state in evidence when he accepted the offer, while the letter of acceptance was not tendered. In the circumstances, the right of occupancy which is exhibit A, relied upon by the plaintiff in proof of his title has no life in it. It is dead because plaintiff failed to activate same within two months”.
Learned counsel now argues that a perusal of the statement of defense of the respondent before the lower Court failed to rebut and/or join issues on the point. Relying on Balogun vs. Labiran (1988) 3NWLR (pt. 80) 66, counsel states that the primary onus on the plaintiff is discharged in the pleadings as by the rules of pleadings. He argued also that issues having not been joined at all on the fact, the respondent is deemed to have admitted the same as parties and indeed the Court are bound by the pleadings.
He went further to posit on the authority of Chabasaya vs. Anwasi (2010) 10 NWLR (pt. 1201) 163 AT 181, that it is not the business of the Court to set up a case for the parties, maintaining that a Judge should not descend on to the arena of conflict.
Also responding on the issue, counsel alluded to the pleadings of the Appellant particularly paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof, stating that it was the plaintiff that brought to the trial through his pleadings the issue of acceptance of the offer of the terms of the grant. He denied the contention that issues were not joined thereon and that all the lower Court did was the evaluation of the evidence oral and documentary, and alluded to the examination of the lower Court with respect to exhibit A, at pages 123 – 125 of the record, stating that the evaluation was apt and a good example of evaluation of evidence carried out by the lower Court. The case of Ajagbe vs. Idowu (2011) LPELR – 279 (SC) per Muktar CJN, was cited and relied upon. Conclusively, counsel urged the Court to determine the issue against the appellant and thereby dismiss the appeal in its entirety.
It appears clear to me that the plaintiff’s claim before the lower Court is anchored on declaratory and other sundry reliefs. For instance, the appellant from his relief D, in the statement of claim sought for a declaration that he is the subsisting and effectual title holder in Plot 1807, Cadastral Zone B13, Gaduwa District Abuja granted to the Plaintiff by the Defendant through a letter of offer of terms of grant/conveyance of Approval dated the 17th of May, 2001. All other reliefs sought are hinged on this main relief. The position of the law therefore is that, being a declaratory relief it is not granted on admission or the implied admission of a defendant, but must be predicated on the Court being satisfied and convinced of the strength of the case made by the Plaintiff or party seeking for the relief. See, Tukuru & Ors vs. Sabi & Ors (2013) LPELR – 20176 (SC), Adepetun vs. Fasimoye (2022) LPELR – 56632 (CA), as expressed in the case of Chukwumah vs. Shell petroleum (NIG) Ltd (1993) LPELR-864 (SC), a declaratory relief will be granted only where the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief in the fullest meaning of the word. Furthermore, the relief claimed must be something which it would not be unlawful or unconstitutional or inequitable from the Court to grant. It should also not be contrary to the accepted principles upon which the Court exercises its jurisdiction, and to so grant, all the facts must be taken into consideration, in the exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers. See, Ladoja vs. INEC (2007) LPELR – 1738 (SC).
The Appellant before the lower Court predicated his case on the grant of a letter of offer of Grant/Conveyance of Approval dated the 17th of May, 2001, exhibit A to substantiate his claim that the defendant had on the 17th of May, 2001 allocated plot 1807, cadastral Zone B13, Gaduwa District Abuja, consequent to an application for same made vide exhibit C, and therefore entitled to the award of all the declaratory reliefs borne out in the statement of claim. He complains that the lower Court denied him the reliefs sought, having erroneously expunged the said documents from evidence.
In conclusion, counsel holds the view that the lower Court proceeded wrongly when it dismissed the appellant’s case on the basis that exhibits A, B and C, which are originals of public documents ought to have been certified before it can be admitted in evidence, and further that the Court erred having raised the issue of acceptance of the offer of allocation which was not a ground upon which issues were joined, and therefore urged the Court to allow the appeal and to enter judgment in favor of the appellant. One pertinent question arising from the complaint of the appellant is whether the three exhibits titled as exhibits A, B and C being the original copies of public documents needs to be certified so as to enable them to be admitted and accorded probative weight and value in the determination of the case before the trial Court.
The lower Court at page 128 of the record did hold that by virtue of Section 90 (c) of the Evidence Act only a certified true copy of a public document is allowed in evidence. The Court went further to hold that exhibits A, B and C being public documents needed certification without which they cannot be admitted. I think the learned trial Judge missed the point. The essence for demanding for a certified true copy of a public document is to ensure the authenticity of the document vis a vis the original. See, Goodwill & Trust Investment Ltd vs. Witt & Bush Ltd (2011) LPELR-1333 (SC). Therefore, when the original is available, the need for the certified copy thereof is not only unnecessary, since the said original of the public document can be admitted without any certification. See Kassim vs. The State (2017) LPELR-42586 (SC), and GTB Plc vs. Bendu Peter Services (NIG) Ltd & Anor (2022) LPELR – 57064 (CA). The appellant’s counsel is perfectly correct in stating that the documents tendered being originals of the public documents the question of certification does not arise, and the lower Court in utter error holding otherwise.
That however is not the end of the equation, as it has to be determined whether the admission of the three documents under contemplation can sustain the prayers sought by the appellant. I agree that this Court and the trial Court have equal rights in the evaluation of documentary evidence. The cases of Arije vs. Arije (2018) 16 NWLR (pt. 1644) 67 AT 83, Gonzee (Nig) Ltd vs. NERDC (2005) 13 NWLR (pt. 943) 634 Ezeuko vs. The State (2016) 6 NWLR (pt. 1509) 529 and Ogunleye vs. Oni (1990) 2 NWLR (pt. 822) 308 all cited by learned counsel are apposite on the point.
I equally agree that there is a fundamental difference between the admission of documents per se, and the probative value/weight to be attached to such documents. The case of Okonji vs. Njokanma (1999) LPELR-2477 (SC) admirably supports that legal position.
Let me then reiterate as argued that the appellant’s claim at the Court below was to the effect that he was by dint of exhibit C, a letter of application for a plot of land made to the respondent, successfully yielded exhibit A, a letter for the grant of the parcel of land, now subject of the instant action. That appellant in obedience to the policy of the Respondents re-certifying all lands within its domain took part in the recertification exercise evidenced by exhibit B. The Appellant based on the above cited documents, maintains that he is entitled to the declaratory reliefs sought.
The lower Court in my view, properly appreciated the correct legal position having stated that admissibility is one thing, attaching probative value to the documents admitted is another. That there is a distinction between admissibility and the weight to be attached to the said admitted document, and finally that an admitted document upon proper perusal and ascription of probative value might be found to be worthless after all. He leveraged on the cases of Buraimoh vs. Karimu (1999) 9 NWLR (pt. 618) 310 amongst others.
Mr. Ikeji rightly pointed out, that since the totality of the appellant’s case was predicated and based on declaratory reliefs, in order to succeed he must go further to satisfy the Court of the entitlement to the declaration sought. The recent position of the Apex Court in that regard is as stated in Obe vs. MTN (Nig) Communications Ltd (2021) 18NWLR (pt. 1809) 415 AT 447:
“The burden of proof on the plaintiff in establishing declaratory reliefs to the satisfaction of the Court is quite heavy in the sense that declaratory reliefs are not granted even on admission by the defendant in the event that the plaintiff fails to establish her entitlements to the declaration through his own evidence.”
Mr. Aboje, the learned counsel for the appellant had argued relying on Balogun vs. Labiran (1988) 3NWLR (pt. 80) 66, that the primary onus on the plaintiff proving his case may be discharged in the pleadings, where issues were not joined on the material issue, and that issues having not been joined on that particular issue, the lower Court was precluded from examining same. With much respect to the learned counsel, that does not seem to be the position of the law. As recent as in Luke vs. Rivers State Housing & Property Development Authority (2022) LPELR – 57580 (SC), it was held that in all cases of declaration of title to land, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff who must prove his case in line with his pleadings failing which his case collapses. This he must do relying on the strength of his case, and not on the weakness of the defense case. The Apex Court proceeded to state the need for the proof of the root of title:
“The root of title in cases like the one now on appeal, once pleaded as raison d’etre for the presence of the person pleading must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. Because if the root of title depended upon is defective or remains unproven, the possession claimed would be illusionary, and may be in the end an act of trespass”.
See, Lawal vs. Olufowobi (1996) 10 NWLR (pt. 477) 177 AT 188, Jibril Bala Adamu (RTD) vs. Nigerian Airforce & Anor (2022) LPELR – 56587 (SC). Appellant wants to impress on the Court that, that having been granted exhibit A, a letter of offer of grant of title, and the letter indicating that it participated in the recertification exercise of the respondent qualifies as a document of title, thus one of the ways of proving title established in the cases of Idundun vs. Okumagba (1976) 6-10 SC 48, Kano vs. Maikaji (2013) ALL FWLR (pt. 673) 1856, Romaine vs. Romaine (1992) NWLR (pt. 235) 650, Owakah vs. RSHPDA (supra) amongst so many others. It is the law, that for a document to qualify as such document contemplated as one of the five ways of establishing title, the title documents produced must have been duly authenticated and executed. The material question which must then be asked is whether exhibit A, satisfies as a document of title duly executed and authenticated? The lower Court at pages 123 – 125 of the record examined exhibit A, the letter of offer, to the conclusion that by clause 3, therein, the date of commencement of the right of occupancy will be the date of acceptance as signified and within the period of two months. The Court proceeded to observe that the letter indicating acceptance of the offer within the time frame stated therein was not in evidence and accordingly, the offer expired, and his claim predicated on exhibit A, unavailing. Now if I may interpose, a letter of offer as the name indicates, presupposes that there must be an acceptance, and where no acceptance is indicated as stipulated in the offer letter, the offer lapses, and no contract can be founded thereon. This much is elementary. See, Babatunde Lawal vs. Hon. Commissioner for Lands, Housing and Survey, Oyo State (2013) LPELR – 21114 (CA).
The learned counsel for the appellant unfairly in my view, accused the lower Court of descending into the arena, and thereby setting up a case for the parties without calling upon the parties to address on it, when all the Court did was the exercise of its duty of evaluation. Whereas the decisions in Geneva vs. Afribank (Nig) Plc (2013) ALL FWLR (pt. 702) 1652 and Chabasaya vs. Anwasi (supra), remain good law for those cases in which they were decided, as well as that of Suberu vs. The State (2010) 8 NWLR (pt. 1197) 586, nothing precludes a Court in the evaluation of the case before him to scrutinize every little aspect of it, as well as the surrounding factors, and where necessary to draw inferences from facts established in arriving at a just decision. It is not for the Judge to accept evidence hook line and sinker without weighing its preponderance and probability, more so in cases predicated on declaratory reliefs. See, Elvins Ezeani vs. FRN (2019) LPELR – 46800 (SC), Ajagbe vs. Layiwola Idowu (2011) LPELR – 279 (SC).
From all of the above, and even though the lower Court erred in expunging exhibits A, B and C, a careful interrogation of the exhibits, particularly, exhibit A, the letter of offer having not been accepted translates to having no root of title upon which to found his claim, and accordingly the claim must fail. In the event, the appeal is wanting in merit and it is hereby dismissed by me. The judgment of U.P. Kekemeke J, of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja in suit with No. FCT/HC/CV/2136/2010 delivered on the 31st day of January, 2012 is hereby affirmed.
Costs of N100,000.00 awarded to the respondent.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
ELFRIEDA OLUWAYEMISI WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft, the lead judgment of my learned brother, Hamma Akawu Barka, JCA. I am in total agreement with the reasoning and conclusion made therein.
I therefore also find the appeal lacking in merit and it is hereby dismissed. I affirm the judgment of Justice U. P. Kekemeke J, of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/2136//2010 delivered on the 31st day of January, 2012 and abide by order as to costs.
DANLAMI ZAMA SENCHI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft before now, the lead judgment of my learned brother, HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, JCA just delivered and I agree with the finding and conclusion reached therein that this appeal lacks merit and it is dismissed by me as well.
Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja in suit No. FCT/HC/CV/2136/2010 delivered on 31st day of January, 2012 is hereby affirmed.
I abide by the order as to costs in the lead judgment and I adopt same as mine.
Appearances:
O. J. Oboje For Appellant(s)
E. C. Ikeji For Respondent(s)
