EXTENSION PUBLICATION LTD v. OYEDEPO (2022)

EXTENSION PUBLICATION LTD v. OYEDEPO

(2022)LCN/16502(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, March 25, 2022

CA/IB/23/2017

Before Our Lordships:

Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein Justice of the Court of Appeal

Yargata Byenchit Nimpar Justice of the Court of Appeal

Folasade Ayodeji Ojo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

EXTENSION PUBLICATION LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

SUNDAY OYEDEPO RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO:

THE FOUNDATION OF A COURT’S COMPETENCE

It is now an axiom that jurisdiction of a Court to entertain any cause or matter is a threshold issue which penetrates the very foundation of the Court’s competence. It is regarded as the blood and air which can sustain the action. Therefore, where a Court embarks on a voyage of exercising jurisdiction which it does not possess, its proceedings and decision amount to nothing. See the cases of Attorney General for Trinidad & Tobago v. Erichie (1893) AC 518; Timitimi v. Amabebe (1953) 4 WACA 374; Ekulo Farms Ltd. & Anor. v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. (2006) 6 SCM 78 and Bashir Gidan Kanawa v. Alhaji Sani Maikaset (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1042) 283 at 297, per Ariwoola, JCA (as he then was). MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.

THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION CAN BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE

The issue of jurisdiction, because of its strategic significance in the adjudication process, can be raised at any stage or time. See Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 SCNLR 296; African Newspapers Nigeria Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 6) 137 and Mrs. Esther I. Adesigbin & Ors. v. Military Governor of Lagos State & Anor. (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1574) 442. It can be so raised either by the parties or suomotu by the Court. See Obiuweubi v. Central Bank of Nigeria (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465 and Senator Christiana N. D. Anyanwu v. Independent C. Ogunewe & Ors. (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1410) 337. MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.

THE SETTLED LAW ON THE CONDUCT OF A PARTY REPORTING A PURELY CIVIL CASE OR MATTER TO THE POLICE

The law is settled that the conduct of a party reporting a purely civil case or matter to the Police is not only condemnable, it is also wrong. See the case of Iliya Golpub v. The State (Unreported Appeal No:CA/J/372/C/2019) delivered by this Court on Friday, the 10th day of September, 2021. Inthe case of Theophilus Kure v. Commissioner of Police (2020) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1729) 298 at 326, per Abba Aji, JSC; the Supreme Court stated as follows:
“When, as in the circumstances of this action, a purely civil matter is reported to the Police, such a person cannot go scot-free as the report ought not to have been made at all since it is not within the purview of Police duties”.
In this case, the contractual agreement between the appellant and the respondent was purely a civil matter between them and the alleged breaches of that relationship, by the respondent’s failure to ‘zero’ his account and pay his debt(s), are matters which fall squarely with the realm of civil disputes which ought to be resolved, in a civilized manner, only through a civil action, cause, matter or suit and not through the initiation of a criminal allegation to the Police, which were then used to breach the respondent’s fundamental rights. MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.

A PERSON WHOM IS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT HAS BEEN BREACHED IS ENTITLED TO GENERAL DAMAGES

MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): Mr. Sunday Oyedepo the respondent in this Court, was the applicant in Suit No: FHC/IB/CS/87/2015 which was a motion on notice for the enforcement of his fundamental rights against the following persons, as the respondents thereto:
1. The Commissioner of Police, Oyo State.
2. The Area Commander, Iyaganku, Ibadan.
3. Woman Insp. Yakub (IPO)
4. Extension Publications Limited.

In the trial Court, the respondent sought the following relief:
1. “A DECLARATION that the brutalization, harassment, intimidation and inhuman treatment of the applicant on the 2nd April, 2015 at Area Command, Iyaganku, Ibadan, and at Oluyole Police Station, by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents under the instruction of the 4th respondent is wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional as it is a gross violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights as guaranteed by Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Articles 5, 6 and 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. A9 Laws of Federation of Nigeria,2004.
2. A DECLARATION that the arrest of the applicant on the 2nd day of April, 2015 to Area Command, Iyaganku, Ibadan, by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd respondents under the supervision and instruction of the 4th respondent is wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional as it is a gross violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights as guaranteed by Sections 34, 44 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Articles 5, and 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. A9 Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
3. A DECLARATION that the detention of the applicant at Area Command, Iyaganku, Ibadan, and at Oluyole Police Station, Ibadan, Oyo State, by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents is wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional as it is a gross violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights as guaranteed by Sections 34 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Articles 6 and 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. A9, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
10,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) being aggravated damages against the respondents for the wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional arrest, detention, denudation, degradation and invasion of privacy of the appellant.
4. AN ORDER directing the respondents to tender unreserved public apologies to the applicant same to be published in at least three (3) National Dailies to wit: (i) The Guardian (ii) The Nation (iii) Nigeria Tribune, and/or The Punch.”

The claim was opposed by the respondents thereto who filed counter affidavits and written addresses in opposition. The Commissioner of Police, Oyo State; the Area Commander, Iyaganku, Ibadan; and Women Inspector Yakub (IPO) filed a joint counter affidavit and written address. Extension Publications Limited – the appellant in this Court filed a separate counter affidavit which was supported with a written address.

After hearing the parties, the trial Court – Federal High Court, holden at Ibadan, delivered a reserved judgment on 05/12/2016 whereby it concluded as follows:
“In conclusion, the applicant has proved his case and I find respondents in breach of his fundamental human rights as adumbrated on the application dated 12th of May, 2015.

Consequently, prayers 1 to 3 are hereby granted. Prayer 5 refused.
On the issue of damages, the Court is empowered to award damages amongst others once it is proved that a fundamental right has been violated in relation to any person. In this regard, I will award damages in the sum of ₦1,500,000.00 (One Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only against the respondents jointly and severally. This is the judgment of the Court.”

Being dissatisfied with the judgment the appellant filed an appeal against Mr. Sunday Oyedepo and the Commissioner of Police of Oyo State, as 1st and 2nd respondent, respectively. At the hearing the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant withdrew the appeal against The Commissioner of Police and its name was struck out as a party.
The appeal was then heard on the appellant’s brief filed on 09/03/2017 and the amended respondent’s brief filed on 13/11/2020 but deemed as filed on 15/07/2021.

In the appellant’s brief signed by O. A. Adegoroye, Esq., the following three issues were raised for determination:
“ISSUE 1
Whether the learned trial judge has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit?
ISSUE 2
Whether the appellant’s complaint of stealing of its money by the 1st respondent to the 2nd respondent without more would constitute a breach of the fundamental human rights of the 1st respondent to make the appellant liable in damages.
ISSUE 3
Whether the award of damages in the sum of ₦1,500,000.00 (One Million five Hundred Thousand Naira) only, jointly and severally against the appellant and the 2nd and 3rd respondents was not excessive?”

J. D. Olaniyan, Esq., learned counsel for the respondent also identified three issues for determination which he framed as follows:
ISSUE 1
1. Whether the lower Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit having regard to the declarations sought before the lower Court in circumstance of Constitutional Breach of the 1st Respondent’s Fundamental Human Right. Ground one of the Notice of Appeal as contained on pages 135 and 165 of Record of Appeal.
2. Whether the arrest, detention, harassment, assault and degrading inhuman treatment meted out to the 1st Respondent is not in contravention of the 1st Respondent’s Fundamental Rights as enshrined in Sections 34, 35, 37 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as Amended)and Articles 5, 6, and 10 and 11 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. 10, Laws Federation of Nigerian 1990. Ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal as contained on page 164 of Records of Appeal.
3. Whether the lower Court was right to have awarded damages in the sum of N1,500,000.00 (One Million and Five Hundred Thousand Naira) jointly and severally against the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent having held that the Fundamental Rights of the 1st Respondent was gravely breached. Grounds 3 and 4 of the Notice of Appeal as contained on page 165 of Record of Appeal.

The issues formulated by the opposing parties are the same in content and essence. However, the issues as formulated by the learned counsel for the appellant are very concise and precise and I adopt them to determine the appeal. The issues will be taken and treated seriatim verbatim.
ISSUE 1
Whether or not the trial Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the respondent’s suit?

Learned counsel for the appellant cited and relied on Section 254 (C) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and argued that the National Industrial Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the respondent’s action since his motion “at the lower Court was predicated upon alleged infringement of his fundamental human rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, which alleged infringement arose out of the employer/employee relationship” between the parties.

He urged the Court to give the words used in Section 254 (C) (1) (d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) their “ordinary and unambiguous meaning” and cited the case of A.N.P.P. v. Goni (2012) 42 WRN 1 at 34 to buttress his argument.

Relying on the case of Elelu-Habeeb v. A-G Federation (2012) 40 WRN 1, learned counsel submitted that jurisdiction is determined by the plaintiff’s claim. On the definition of jurisdiction, he referred the Court to the case of Society Bic S. A. v. Chazin Industries Ltd. (2014) 3 SCM 208 at 230.

Replying on behalf of the respondent, learned counsel referred to the cases of Madukolu v. Nkemdili (1962) 1 All NLR (Pt. 4) 587 and Okoya v. Santilli (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 131) 172 in arguing that jurisdiction is a threshold matter as it goes to the competence of the Court to hear and determine a case and where the Court does not have jurisdiction, the entire proceedings amount to a nullity.

Learned counsel for the respondent argued that “the issues of breach of fundamental human rights cannot be joined with an action for wrongful dismissal at the National Industrial Court” and in support of this argument, he cited the cases of Grace Jack v. University of Agric, Makurdi (2004) LPELR – SC 262/2000; (2004) 1 SC (Pt. II) 100; Tukur v. Government of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 541;Egbuonu v. Borno Radio Television Corporation (1997) 12 NWLR (Pt. 53?) 29 and Sea Trucks Ltd. v. Anigboro (2001) FWLR (Pt.37) 1000; (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 159.

Learned counsel for the respondent argued that by virtue of Sections 46 and 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the trial Federal High Court had the jurisdiction to hear and determine the respondent’s case.

The pre-conditions for a Court to exercise jurisdiction were solidly laid down in the often-cited case of Gabriel Madukolu & Ors. v. Johnson Nkemdilim (1962) NSCC (Vol.2) 374 at 379 as follows:
“Put briefly, a Court is competent when;
1. It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and
2. The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
3. the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Any defect in competence is fatal, for the proceedings are a nullity however well conducted and decided: the defect is extrinsic to the adjudication.
See also the case of Alhaji Umaru Abba Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517.

To “fulfill all righteousness”, as the ancient saying goes, I need to re-emphasize the trite principle of law that jurisdiction is determined by the plaintiff’s claim and not by the defendant’s answer to the claim. See the cases of Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 539; Hon. Justice Kalu Anyah v. Dr. Festus Iyayi (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 306) 290; Jimoh Akinfolarin v. Solomon Oluwole Akinnola (1994) 4 SCNJ 30; RTEAN v. NURTW (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 469) 737 and Ubaka Ifeajuna v. James Ifeajuna & Ors. (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 671) 107.
As stated above, it is not the defence that determines whether or not a Court has jurisdiction. Therefore, the following guidelines have been recognized for the processes to be examined in determining jurisdiction:-
1. In suits fought on pleadings, the jurisdiction of the Court is to be determined by examining the plaintiff’s claim alone.
2. In actions commenced by originating motions or petitions, the applicants’ or petitioners’ claims and the affidavit in support of the motions or petitions.

See Western Steel Works Ltd. v. Iron & Steel Workers Union (No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.49) 284; Chief James Onanefe Ibori v. Engineer Goodnews Agbi & Anor. (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt.868) 78; Oba J. A. Aremo II v. S. F. Adekanye & Ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 572; Vivian Clems Akpamgbo – Okadigbo & 4 Ors. v. Egbe Theo Chidi & 6 Ors. (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 124 and Barrister Ismaeel Ahmed v. Alhaji Nasiru Ahmed &Ors. (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 274.

Having regard to the respondent’s claims and the provisions of Section 46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules – the National Industrial Court does share current jurisdiction on fundamental rights cases with the High Courts – Federal High Court, High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja or the High Court of a State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Earlier in this judgment, I reproduced the respondent’s claims, as endorsed on his originating motion on notice. None of the respondent’s claims is ex facie related to any employer/employee or labour relations. All the respondent’s claims relate to alleged breaches of fundamental rights – brutalization, harassment, intimidation, inhuman treatment, wrongful arrest; and the claim for damages and unreserved public apology are incidental to the claims of breaches of his fundamental rights.
Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), comprising of Sections 33 to 46 of the Constitution, deals with fundamental rights. Section 46 specifically deals with enforcement of fundamental rights and the special jurisdiction of the High Court in relation thereto. For the avoidance of any doubt, Section 46 of the Constitution (as amended) provides as follows:
(1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any state in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that state for redress.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of this sections and may make such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that State of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this chapter.
(3) The Chief Justice of Nigeria may rule with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purposes of this section.
Section 46 Subsections (1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), provide for the Court which can exercise jurisdiction in cases of enforcement of fundamental rights to be a “High Court”. Under Order 1 Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, made by the Honourable Chief Justice of Nigeria, pursuant to His Lordship’s powers under Section 46 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the word “Court” is defined to mean:
“the Federal High Court or High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.”
So in cases, strictly for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the Federal High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja as well as the High Court of any of the 36 States of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, such as Osunde v. Nasiru Shaibu Baba(2014) 44 WRN 65 and Nigeria Tobacco Plc. v. Osifeso (2000) 14 WRN 37, are grossly inapplicable to this case because the claims therein were not totally or strictly for the enforcement of fundamental rights. In those cases the claims for enforcement of fundamental rights were merely ancillary reliefs to other main claims.
Having regard to the respondent’s claims in this case and the clear and unambiguous provisions of Section 46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, made thereunder, the National Industrial Court did not have nor share concurrent jurisdiction – whether full or partial – with the Federal High Court over the suit.
Without any further ado, I hereby resolve this issue in favour of the respondent and against the appellant.

ISSUE 2
Whether or not the circumstances surrounding the respondent’s arrest and detention did not constitute a breach of his fundamental rights.
The above issue is a reformulation of the second issue identified by each of the parties.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that “there is evidence before the lower Court that all the entire (sic) appellant did was to lodge a written complaint in form of a petition against the …respondent” to the Police “and nothing more”. Relying on the case of FCMB v. Ette (2008) 22 WRN 63 at 70-72, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that “it is the civic duty and right of every citizen of bringing to the notice of the Police against persons who are suspected or alleged to have committed an offence”.

Also placing reliance on the cases of Duru v. Nwagwu (2006) 5 SCNJ 394 at 402 and Sewell v. National Telephone Co. (1907) 1 KB 557; learned counsel argued that since the only thing done by the appellant was to lodge a complaint, then the other acts – arrest and detention, were by the Police. Counsel submitted that the trial Court erred in law when it held at page 161 of the record: “that the arrest of the applicant was with the active support and participation” of the Commissioner of Police, Oyo State.

In response, the learned counsel for the respondent referred to the case of Chief (Mrs.) Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti&Ors. v. Attorney General of the Federation (1985) 6 SC 245 at 276-277 on “the description of what amount to a human right” and that, in this case, the “respondent was subjected to arrest, assaults, humiliation, detention and verbal abuse by the appellant” and the Police, and such heinous and brutal acts – acts of torture have been condemned by the Courts in Nigeria in cases which include OmuUzoukwu & Ors. v. Igwe Chukwudebelu Ezikwe Ezeonu II &Ors. (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) 708.

Earlier in this judgment, I had reproduced the relief sought by the respondent in the lower Court. In his statement, filed pursuant to Order 2 Rule 3 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 the respondent set out the grounds for his relief as follows:
a. “That by virtue of Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution and Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, every person is entitled not to be deprived of his/her liberty without regards to the Constitution and due process of law.
b. That the Respondents cannot reasonably suppose that the Applicant is reasonably suspected of having committed any criminal offence in flagrant violation of the said Constitution to warrant their acts of harassment, intimidation detention of the Applicant.
c. That the harassment, intimidation, detention, inhuman treatment, arrest and detention of the Applicant by the 1st – 4th Respondents are not in accordance with the procedure permitted by law and are not justified by any or circumstances stated in Sections 34(1), 35(1) (a-f), 35(2) (3), 37, 38,39, 41 and 44 of the 1999 Constitution as amended, and Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Environment) Act Cap. A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
d. That the action of the 2nd – 4th Respondents are only motivated by bad faith against the Applicant out of their resolve to oppress him.”

In paragraphs 1 to 19 of the affidavit in support of his application, the respondent deposed as follows:
1. “That I am the Applicant in this Suit and by virtue of my position, I am conversant with the facts herein depose to.
2. That the 1st Respondent is at the helm of affairs of the Oyo State Police Command.
3. That the 2nd Respondent is the Area Commander of the Police at Area Command, Iyanganku, Ibadan.
4. That the 3rd Respondent is the Investigating Police Officer in charge of the matter at the Area Command, Iyaganku, Ibadan.
5. That the 4th Respondent is a publishing company and my employer and at its instance, I was arrested, harassed, intimidated, assaulted and detained by the 2nd and the 3rd Respondents.
6. That I am employee of the 4th Respondent since 1st May, 2008 whose head office is at 32, Ososami Road, Oke-Ado, Ibadan.
7. That sometimes in the month of March 2015, I received a letter at the office by the 4th Respondent dated 10th March, 2015 which was addressed to the Area Command, Iyaganku, with the oral instruction to go and report at the station. The letter is herewith attached and marked Exhibit “A”.
8. That thereafter, I received a notice of meeting through a text message scheduled for the 2nd April, 2015. I was in attendance at the said meeting and during the course of the said meeting on the 2nd April, 2015, myself and some other staff numbering about thirteen (13) were arrested after being given a letter of termination of appointment dated 26th March, 2015. The said letter is herewith attached and marked Exhibit “B”.
9. That I was taken with others to the Area Command, Iyaganku, Ibadan, where my phones were ceased. My statement and an undertaking were later obtained under serious threat, humiliation and harassment from around 2pm that I was arrested till 8pm.
10. That I was later told around 8pm by the 3rd Respondent to remove my tie, belt and shoes which I obeyed.
11. That I was thereafter taking to the cell by the 3rd Respondent without telling me anything where I was to be detained. When she noticed the cell was full I was transferred to Oluyole Police Station where I was detained from Thursday 2nd April, 2015 till Sunday 5th April, 2015.
12. That on Sunday 5th April, 2015, the 3rd Respondent suddenly came to the cell where I was and gave me my phone that I should call whoever is going to bail me.
13. That upon sighting my phone I discovered it has been tampered with and some messages deleted on my phone.
14. That I called my wife who has been seriously worried not knowing my where about, she came immediately with my younger brother, who bailed me on that Sunday 5th April, 2015.
15. That upon the release of my phones to me after the bail, I discovered my phones have been tampered with.
16. That as a result of my arrest and detention without the knowledge of any member of my family, the Easter which we had fully prepared for was celebrated amiss tension and sadness by myself and all the members of my family.
17. That I am a loyal employee of the 4th Respondent since I joined the Company in 2008.
18. That as a result of my harassment, intimidation arrest and detention I have suffered irreparable damage, financial, physical and psychological trauma and dehumanization.
19. That the 2nd – 4th Respondents harassed, intimidated, humiliated, arrested and detained me without any cause except to oppress me because I am an employee of the 4th Respondent.”

It should be noted, as stated earlier, that the 1st respondent, the 2nd respondent and the 3rd respondents in the trial Court were: 1. Commissioner of Police, Oyo State; 2. Area Commander, Iyaganku, Ibadan; and 3. Woman Insp. Yakub (IPO), respectively. The 4th respondent in the lower Court is the appellant in this Court.

The appellant deposed in paragraphs 4 to 23 of its counter affidavit as follows:
4.“That paragraphs 1,2,3,7 and 8 of the supporting affidavit are true.
5. That paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the supporting affidavit are false.
6. That paragraphs 5 of the supporting affidavit is only correct to the extent that the 4th respondent is a publishing company but the applicant used to be a sales representative to the 4th respondent till 30th day of April, 2015 when his appointment was terminated by the 4th respondent.
7. That the applicant was employed by the 4th respondent on 13th May, 2008 and his letter of appointment contained the terms and conditions of his appointment. Attached herewith as Exhibit EP1 is a copy of his letter of appointment and the terms and conditions.
8. That the applicant used to be the sales representative of the 4th respondent for Kano and Jigawa State where he sold the stock of books he collected from the 4th respondent to customers generated by him.
9. That as a sales representative of the 4th respondent the applicant was to balance his account with the company on 31st March of every year but the applicant did not at any time during the period he was under the 4th respondent’s requests. Attached herewith as Exhibits EP2-EP3 are internal memos to the applicant on this issue.
10. That the applicant’s indebtedness to the 4th respondent by 31st March, 2015 is the sum of ₦2,896,065.62k (Two Million Eight Hundred and Ninety Six Thousand Sixty-Five Naira Sixty-Two Kobo) being unpaid sums of stocks of books supplied to the applicant by the 4th respondent which sum the applicant refused to pay to the company.
11. That the management of the 4th respondent had written letters and issued several internal memos to the applicant on the non-payment of his indebtedness to the company. Attached herewith are some copies of letters and internal memos written to the applicant by the 4th respondent and they are marked as Exhibits EP4and EP5.
12. That the applicant had on several occasions promised to settle his indebtedness to the 4th respondent but had failed to settle his debt to the company. Attached herewith are letters and copies of letters of undertaking written by the application to the 4th respondent which are marked as Exhibits EP6 and EP7, EP8.
13. That it was the applicant that knew the customers to whom the books of the 4th respondent were sold and he failed to pay the money due to the 4th respondent and failed to return the stock of books of the 4th respondent.
14. The applicant had been promising to zero his account and pay off all his indebtedness to the 4th respondent but had failed and neglected to do so until his appointment was terminated in April, 2015.
15. That the management of the 4th respondent wrote a letter to the Police on 10th March, 2015 lodging a complaint against the applicant’s inability to account for a sum of ₦2,896,065.62k (Two Million Eight Hundred and Ninety Six Thousand Sixty-Five Naira Sixty-Two Kobo) of the 4th respondent money with the applicant.
16. That I do not know anything about the averment contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the supporting affidavit.
17. That I know of fact that the management of the 4th defendant has only lodged its complaint against the applicant to the Police.
18. That I know that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents are not agents of the 4th respondent but agents of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
19. That the 4th respondent only reported the applicant to the 2nd respondent awaiting the outcome of the investigation of the Police.
20. That the 4th respondent did not teach the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents on how to go about their investigation.
21. That paragraph 17 of the supporting affidavit is not true; the applicant had never been a loyal employee but a liability to the 4th respondent.
22. That paragraphs 18 and 19 of the supporting affidavit are false, the applicant has not suffered any irreparable damage and the 4th respondent has not in anyway oppressed him.
23. That paragraphs 14, 15, 16, and 18 of the supporting affidavit are false as the relations of the applicant knew where the applicant was.”

As can be seen from the depositions in the appellants’ counter affidavit, their grouse against the respondent was that the respondent was their employee who could not balance his account with it and that he was indebted to it in the sum of ₦2,896, 065.62K (Two million, eight hundred and ninety-six thousand, sixty-five naira and sixty-two kobo) but who “had been promising to zero his account and pay off all his indebtedness” and had failed to do so.

The trial Court, in its judgment, found and held as follows:
“The 4th Respondent admitted by this paragraphs that the Applicant was indebted to it to the tune ₦2,896,065.62K and the Applicant amongst others could not give satisfactory explanation as to when this debt would be zeroed down. What agitated my mind is that at what point in time was the Applicant’s debt converted to stealing? The Applicant has been having carryover of his indebtedness to the 4th Respondent since February, 2009 as evidenced by an Internal Memo dated 20th of February, 2009 exhibited as Exhibit ‘EP3’. Despite this, the business relationship between the Applicant and the 4th Respondent continued. By a letter dated 26th of March, 2015, Exhibit‘B’ titled “Termination of Appointment” addressed to the Applicant by the 4th Respondent the Applicant was given up to the 15th of April, 2015 to liquidate his debt with the 4th Respondent.
The date has not expired when the 1st Respondent forwarded his letter dated 10th of March, 2015 (Exhibit ‘A’) titled “Case of Stealing of Company’s Money” to the Police against the Applicant amongst others. The question again is; why is it that the Respondent did not wait for the expiration of the time given to liquidate the debt before forwarding his complaint to the Police? The 4th Respondent was rash in forwarding Exhibit ‘A’ to the Police when he did. A debt properly incurred can only be recovered by civil suit and no more.”
(underlining mine for the sake of emphasis)

The appellant has not been able to fault the trial Court’s finding that in the circumstances of this case, the remedy available to the appellant was “only” a “civil suit and no more” to recover the alleged debt from the respondent. In fact, the appellant did not appeal against this vitalfinding or decision of the trial Court. All that the appellant has done is to lay the blame for the alleged violation of the respondent’s rights on the Nigeria Police and its officers. It is settled law that a decision or finding by a competent Court, such as the trial Court, which is not appealed against, is deemed to be correct and it binds the parties. See the cases of:Obasi v. Onwuka (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 364; Adejumo v. Olawaiye (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt.1421) 252; Wike E. Nyesom v. Dakuku A. Peterside (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 71 and Col. Mohammed S. Dasuki v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1627) 320.
In this case, therefore, the decision of the trial Court that the only remedy available to the appellant on the alleged indebtedness of the respondent is through a civil action in a Court of law, subsists and remains binding on both parties.

The law is settled that the conduct of a party reporting a purely civil case or matter to the Police is not only condemnable, it is also wrong. See the case of IliyaGolpub v. The State (Unreported Appeal No:CA/J/372/C/2019) delivered by this Court on Friday, the 10th day of September, 2021. Inthe case of Theophilus Kure v. Commissioner of Police (2020) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1729) 298 at 326, per Abba Aji, JSC; the Supreme Court stated as follows:
“When, as in the circumstances of this action, a purely civil matter is reported to the Police, such a person cannot go scot-free as the report ought not to have been made at all since it is not within the purview of Police duties”.
In this case, the contractual agreement between the appellant and the respondent was purely a civil matter between them and the alleged breaches of that relationship, by the respondent’s failure to ‘zero’ his account and pay his debt(s), are matters which fall squarely with the realm of civil disputes which ought to be resolved, in a civilized manner, only through a civil action, cause, matter or suit and not through the initiation of a criminal allegation to the Police, which were then used to breach the respondent’s fundamental rights.
This issue ought to be resolved against the appellant and it is so resolved.

ISSUE 3
Whether or not the award of ₦1,500,000.00 (One Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as damages infavour of the respondents was not excessive?”

Learned counsel for the appellant concisely contended as follows:
“We concede that the learned trial judge had the discretion to award damages as he deemed fit but we submit with respect that the award of the staggering sum of ₦1,500,000.00 (One Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only, in the circumstance of the facts of this case was arbitrary and excessive and we urge your lordships to so hold.”

As can be seen from the appellant’s contention, reproduced above, no reason has been given why the damages awarded in this case should be considered by this Court to be “arbitrary and excessive”.

The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the cases of Eliochin v. Mbadiwe (1986) NWLR (Pt. 14) 47 and Okonkwo v. Ogbodu (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 499) 420 on the principles governing award of damages in cases of alleged breach of fundamental rights. It should be noted that in the case of Eliochin (Nigeria) Limited & 2 Ors. v. Victor Ngozi Mbadiwe (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.14) 47 the relevant claim was for exemplary damages for trespass. However, in the case ofDaniel Okonkwo v. Fred Ogbogu& Anor.(1996)5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 420 at 435 the claim was for damages in that the defendant, in the trial Court (later appellant in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court), allegedly falsely and maliciously preferred a charge of willful and unlawful damage to his property to the Nigeria Police and falsely procured the arrest of the plaintiff (later the 1st respondent in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court); the apex Court, per Ogwuegbu, JSC; held as follows:
“Any trespass to the person, however slight, gives a right of action to recover at any rate nominal damages. Even where there has been no physical injury, substantial damage may be awarded for the injury to the man’s dignity or for discomfort or inconvenience. Where liberty has been interfered with, damages are given to vindicate the plaintiff’s rights even though he has not suffered any pecuniary damage. It is also not necessary for the plaintiff to give evidence of damage to establish his cause of action or to claim any specific amount of damage.”
In the case of Chief Dr. (Mrs.) OlufunmilayoRansome-Kuti& 3 Ors. v. The Attorney-General of the Federation & 8 Ors. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 6) 211, the Supreme Court also held that breach of a party’s fundamental rights, as in this case, would entitle that party to seek damages.

As a general rule, therefore, a person, such as the respondent in this case, whose fundamental rights had been breached in the sense he was unlawfully arrested and detained, is entitled to general damages. And, according to Femi Falana (SAN), such a person may be further entitled to a “public apology from the appropriate authority or person” – See page 177 of “FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN NIGERIA, SECOND EDITION” by Femi Falana (SAN). To be brief, that the respondent is entitled to be compensated by monetary damages is not in doubt in this case. And the appellant has not given any reason why the damages awarded by the trial Court in favour of the respondent should be disturbed. In the case of Daniel Okonkwo v. Fred Ogbogu& Anor. (supra), the Supreme Court relied on the cases of Nance v. British Columbia Rly. Co. Ltd. (1951) A.C. 601; Thompson &Ors. v. Adefope (1969) 1 All NLR 322 and Ekpe v. Fagbemi(1978) 3 SC 209 to hold as follows:
“An appellate Court is not justified in substituting a figure of its own for that awarded by the Court below simply because it could have awarded a different figure if it had tried the case at first instance. Before it can properly intervene, it must be satisfied either that the Judge, in addressing the damages applied a wrong principle of law (as by taking into account some irrelevant factor or leaving out of account some relevant one); or that the amount awarded is either so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of damage.”

The mere fact that the appellant has argued that the amount awarded as damages is “excessive” is not a good reason for this Court to interfere with the decision of the trial Court. The appellant ought to have demonstrated how the sum awarded is either arbitrary or excessive. I do not think that any reasonable person, the respondent inclusive, will permit himself to be unlawfully arrested, detained and maltreated in Police cell for more than three days merely because he would be paid the sum of ₦1,500,000.00 (One Million,Five Hundred Thousand Naira only) after spending more than seven years in Court pursuing the enforcement of his fundamental rights.
Without more, this issue is also resolved in favour of the respondent and against the appellant.

CONCLUSION
Having resolved the three issues against the appellant, I find no merit in this appeal.
This appeal is hereby dismissed, as it is bereft of any merit.
The judgment of the trial Court, per Hon. Justice N. Ayo-Emmanuel, delivered in Suit No: FHC/IB/CS/87/2015 on the 5th day of December, 2016 is hereby affirmed.
The sum of ₦400,000.00 (Four Hundred Thousand Naira only) is hereby awarded as costs in favour of the respondent and against the appellant.

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother – MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, PJCA and I agree with the conclusion of my learned brother that the appeal has no merit and should be dismissed. To add my voice, the Respondent was the Applicant at the Federal High Court, Ibadan wherein he sought for a declaration for the enforcement of his fundamental right in respect of alleged brutalization,harassment, inhuman treatment by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents under the instruction of the 4th Respondent, which led to this instant appeal. The Appellant who is the 4th Respondent is challenging the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain the Respondent’s case.

The Appellant contended that it is the National Industrial Court that has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the Respondent’s case since the alleged infringement arose out of employer/employee relationship. I respectfully do not agree or subscribe to this submission on the grounds that there is nothing in our statutes that preclude the Federal High Court from adjudicating on fundamental right matters because under Section 46(3) of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 and Order 1 Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, the word “Court” includes the Federal High Court.

Secondly, the reliefs sought in the suit are anchored squarely on the alleged breach of fundamental right which the trial Court determined without the production of or relating to the employer/employee relationship and the law is trite that where the main claim is notfundamental right then the Court lacks jurisdiction to determine it, see GAFAR V. THE GOVERNMENT OF KWARA STATE & ORS (2007) LPELR-8073(SC) wherein the Apex Court held thusly:
“…It is the law as decided by this Court in a long line of cases on the subject that when an application is brought under the rule, a condition precedent to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction is that the enforcement of fundamental rights or the securing of the enforcement thereof should be the main claim and not an accessory claim. That where the main or principal claim is not the enforcement or securing the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be properly exercised as it will be incompetent. See Madukolu&Ors. v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; (1962) 1 All NLR 587 at 595; Borno Radio Television Corporation v. Basil Egbuonu (1997) 12 WLR (Pt. 531) 29: and Tukur v. Government of Taraba (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549.” Per MOHAMMED
However, where the main Claim is based on fundamental right, then the Court has jurisdiction, see EMEKA V. OKOROAFOR & ORS (2017) LPELR-41738(SC) wherein the Court held thusly: “…Reference was made to the decision of this Court in Tukur Vs Govt. of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt.510) 549 where it was held that in an application for the enforcement of fundamental rights, it is a condition precedent that the enforcement of the fundamental right should be the main claim and not an accessory claim. It was further held per Ogundare, JSC at 576 – 577 H – F (supra) that where the main or principal claim is not the enforcement or securing the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be properly invoked, as the suit would be incompetent.” Per KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.

Before concluding this judgment, I wish to stress by way of emphasis, that jurisdiction, implies the power or authority of a Court, to adjudicate over a particular subject matter. As already stated in this judgment, the nature of the claim determines the jurisdiction of the Court. Since the main claim before the trial Court is simple fundamental right, the Federal High has concurrent jurisdiction with the State High Court and National Industrial Court.
I too, affirm the decision of the trial Court. This appeal fails and isdismissed. I abide by the consequential orders made in respect of costs.

FOLASADE AYODEJI OJO, J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, JCA. His Lordship has dealt exhaustively and admirably with all the issues formulated for determination in this appeal. The arrest and confinement of the Respondent over a complaint arising from a civil transaction was a complete deprivation of his right to personal liberty. His inability to discharge his debt obligations to the Appellant does not constitute a criminal offence. I am therefore at one with his Lordship’s reasoning and conclusion for dismissing the appeal.

For those same reasons which I hereby adopt as mine, I also find this appeal lacking in merit and I dismiss it. I also affirm the decision of the lower Court.

Appearances:

O. A. Adegoroye, Esq. For Appellant(s)

J. D. Olaniyan, Esq. – for 1st Respondent For Respondent(s)