EDUN v. NERDC & ANOR
(2022)LCN/16410(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Monday, July 04, 2022
CA/ABJ/CV/944/2020
Before Our Lordships:
Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal
ElfriedaOluwayemisi Williams-Dawodu Justice of the Court of Appeal
Biobele Abraham Georgewill Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
MR. MARCELLIN AKANDE EDUN APPELANT(S)
And
1. NIGERIAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL 2. BUREAU OF PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM (B.P.S.R) RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO:
THE COURT BECOMES FUNCTUS-OFFICIO ONCE AN ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE OF LAW HAS BEEN DETERMINED BY A COURT
It is trite and an established principle of law that once an issue is determined by a Court; the Court becomes functus-officio and cannot re-entertain the same issue between the same parties, but an appellate Court is the appropriate Court to re-visit the issue. Counsel relied on the cases of RE: Apeh & Ors (2017) LPELR-42035 – (SC). Dingyadi & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2010) LPELR-951 (SC), Olowu v. Abolore (1993) 1 SCNJ (Pt. 1) at Pp. 10-11, Ikpong v. Udobong (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1017) 84, Mohammed v. Hussein (1998) 11-12 SCNJ 136 at 163-164, Nigerian Army v. lyela (2008) LPELR-2014 (SC), Intercontractors Nig. Ltd v. UAC of Nigeria Ltd (1988) 1 NSC (737 at 752),Bank of West Africa v. NIPC Ltd (1962) LLR31, Olayinka v. Elesanmi (1971) 1 NMLR 227, Thynne v. Thynne(1995) All ER 129 at 146, Julius Berger Nig. Ltd v. Omogui (2001) LPELR-1638 (SC), Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Part 47) 1 at Page 20 Paras. D-E Omotayo v. NRC (1992) 7 NWLR (Part 234) Page 471 at 483 Paras. A-B, Nasiru Bello v. Attorney General of Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Part 45) 828,Afolayan v. Ogunrinde(1990) 1 NWLR (Part 127) 369 at 373, Akilu v. Fawehinmi No. 2 (1989) 2 NWLR (Part 1012) 122 (1989) 3 SC (Pt. 1.1) 1, Sodipo v. Lemninkainen (1992) 8 NWLR (Part 258). STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.S
THE ENTITLEMENT OF TRIAL COURT TO FOLLOW ITS OWN METHOD OF CONSIDERING THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE
See Eyo V. Inyang (2001) 1 N WLR (Pt. 715) l, where it was reiterated inter alia thus:
“A trial Court is entitled to follow its own method of considering or weighing the totality of the evidence before it provided the final decision arrived at by whatever method conform with principles laid down in the case and the justice of the case.”
See also Jekpe V. Alokwe (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 715) 252, where Ogwuegbu JSC., had opined inter alia thus:
“It must be emphasized that there is no set style which must be followed by trial Courts when writing judgments. Judges must no doubt differ in the procedure and style, which they adopt in their consideration of the entire evidence. It is not very material whether the Judge starts with the consideration of the defendant’s case before that of the plaintiff and vice versa. What is important is that he should first of all put the whole evidence led by the parties on that imaginary scale. He will put the evidence adduce by the plaintiff on one side of the scale and that of the defendant on the other side and weigh them together. He will then see which is heavier by the quality or probative value of the testimony as against the quality or number of the witnesses. After this, the judge applies the law, if any, before he comes to his final conclusion based on the accepted evidence.”
The Supreme Court in Adeyeye & Anor v. Ajiboye& ORS (1987) LPELR- 175 (SC) held per Oputa, JSC, on approach to judgment writing as follows:
“The proper approach for any trial Court is to first set out the claim of the claims; then the pleadings; then the issues arising from those pleadings. Having decided on the issues in dispute the trial Judge will then consider the evidence in proof of each issue, then decide on which side to believe and this has got to be a belief based on the preponderance of credible evidence and the probabilities of the case. After this the trial Judge will record his logical and consequential findings of fact. It is after such findings, that the trial Court can then discuss the applicable law against the background of his findings of fact.
In the same vein, Nnaemeka-Agu J.S.C in Duru& V Nwosu (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 113) 24, 55, gave a guide as to proper method of writing judgment. He said:- “Every good judgment begins with an introduction of the parties and the nature of the action, states the issues in controversy, sums up the evidence called by each party, resolves the issues in controversy, and, based upon such resolution of, issues, reaches a verdict and makes consequential orders.” STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.
THE SETTLED LAW ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS
The law is that when a party receives his retirement benefits from the employers who retired him, the appellant ceases to have any right to challenge such retirement. The issue is that no one is allowed to approbate and reprobate in any given matter. It is incredible and inequitable to accept payment from the Respondents as retirement benefits and still maintain that the retirement was wrong. The acceptance of the payment of the retirement benefits renders the retirement mutual and an estoppel by conduct. See the cases of Ekeagwu v. Nigerian Army & Anor(2006) 11 NWLR (Part 991) 382, Gerawa Oil Mills Ltd v. Babura (2018), Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc v. Nwagwu (2006) 12 NWLR (Part 995) 518. STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.
STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By a Writ of Complaint filed on the 28th of November, 2012 the appellant herein, as Claimant at the National Industrial Court, Abuja, claimed against the Respondents as Defendants, the following reliefs:
1. A declaration that the retirement of the claimant by Defendant from the Public Service of Nigeria vide the Defendant’s letter of 27th December, 2006 is unlawful, unconstitutional, malafide, null and void.
2. An order of this Honourable Court that the Defendant should reinstate the Claimant to the employment of the Defendant.
The case of the appellant as Claimant is that he was a staff of the 1st Defendant and sometimes in 2006, he was purportedly retired from public service of Nigeria by the 2nd Defendant on the recommendation of the 1st Defendant. He maintained that he had not reached retirement age neither had he spent the length of service in employment.
In proof of his case, the appellant testified on his behalf and tendered several documents in evidence, which were admitted and marked respectively.
In response, the 1st Defendant denied the claims of the Claimant and made a counter-claim against the Claimant as follows:
1. A declaration that the appointment of the claimant with IBB University on the 18th September, 2006 is illegal and serious misconduct
2. That all the monies, salaries and allowances paid to the claimant by the 1st Defendant from 18th September to December, 2006 be refunded as follows:-
a.) September 2006 salary -N134,961.34
b.) October 2006 salary -N95,385.34
c.) November 2006 salary -N95,385.34
d.) December 2006salary -N95,385.34
e.) One Month salary in lieu of notice -N95 385.34
Total -N516 502.70
3. The sum of N3, 000,000.00 (Three Million Naira) as exemplary damages and 15% interest monthly until the sum are liquidated.
In proof of his counter-claim, the 1st Defendant called one witness and tendered several documents in evidence, which were admitted and marked respectively.
The 2nd Respondent also denied the claims of the claimant and filed a counter-claim against the Claimant as follows:-
i.) A declaration that the claimant who was retired from the service of the 1st Defendant, accepted same and resumed enjoyment of his pension cannot validly seek reinstatement into another pensionable service with the 1st Defendant through seeking the intervention of the 2nd Defendant or other arms of government.
ii.) A Declaration that there is no law in Nigeria including the law establishing the 1st Defendant that has provisions for officer who has retired from same organization, resumed the enjoyment of the pension arising from the retirement to be reinstated into another pensionable service of the same organization.
iii.) A declaration that the only form of service – appointment available to the claimant in the service of the 1st Defendant after the retirement of the claimant from the service of the 1st Defendant is contract appointment.
iv.) A declaration that there is no record at the time material to this case that the claimant has applied to the 1st Defendant for contract appointment neither is such application made through the 2nd Defendant nor through the medium of this Honourable Court.
v.) A declaration that the grant of the request for contract appointment with 1st Defendant is not automatic but dependent on the needs within the service of the 1st Defendant and the refusal of such application is not a violation of any enforceable rights of the Claimant known to law.
vi.) A declaration that by Annexures 2 & 4 attached to the 2nd Defendant’s defense before the Court the claimant was simultaneously on two pensionable salaried appointments to the detriment of the interest of the employers between 18th September, 2006 and 27th December, 2006.
vii.) A Declaration that it is a gross misconduct and unethical practices frown at by this Honourable Court in the discharge of its unique judicial function of upholding the best qualities of Labor practices in Nigeria for a public officer like the claimant to be on two pensionable salaried appointments at the same time between 18th September, 2006 and 27th December, 2006 as disclosed by Annexures 2 and 4 attached to the 2nd Defendant’s defense.
viii.) A Declaration that this Honourable Court does not reinstate an officer into a pensionable service of an organization after the same officer has retired several years previously from the same organization and was on pension arising from that retirement while simultaneously on another salaried appointment elsewhere as the claimant was in this case.
ix.) A declaration that this suit commenced by the claimant on 28th November, 2013 to challenge the retirement effected in 2006 after the expiration of more than six years, the fact of which the claimant admitted in paragraph 1 of his statement of claim, is statute barred, incompetent and not maintainable before this Honourable Court.
x.) An order dismissing this suit with substantial cost in favor of the 2nd Defendant on the ground that the matter is vexatious, an abuse of the judicial process, contrary to the principles of labor practices and manifestly statute barred.
In proof of his case, the 2nd Defendant called one witness, but did not tender any document in evidence before the trial Court.
However, the 1st Defendant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on the ground that the action is incompetent as same is caught by the provision of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and therefore statute barred. The objection was moved before the substantive suit at the trial Court. The learned trial judge in considering the Preliminary Objection deferred the determination of the Preliminary Objection of the 1st Respondent and proceeded to hear the matter on the merit.
The parties joined issues, and the lower Court on the 12th April, 2019 entered judgment for the Respondents, dismissing the claims of the appellant before the trial Court.
Aggrieved by the decision, the appellant filed this instant appeal vide the notice of appeal dated and filed on the 15th October, 2020. There are four grounds of appeal listed in the notice of appeal. The Record of Appeal was transmitted to this Court on the 9th November, 2020.
In line with the rules and practice of this Court, parties filed and exchanged their Brief of Arguments in the following manner, the Appellant’s Brief of Argument was filed on 9th December, 2020. The 2nd Respondent’s brief of argument was filed 18th December, 2020.
Counsel for the appellant distilled two issues for the determination of this appeal. These issues are:
1. Whether the learned trial Court was right was right in holding that the Appellant’s case is statute barred (Culled from Grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether the Appellant has proved his case before the trial Court to be entitled to the reliefs sought before it (Culled from Grounds 3 and 4 of the Notice of Appeal).
In response, the learned counsel for the 2nd Respondent distilled a lone issue for the determination of this appeal, thus:
Whether considering the claim of the Claimant/Appellant, the trial Court erred in holding that the claims of the Claimant/Appellant was statute barred and whether the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Abuja, was right in striking out the suit?
I shall adopt the issues as submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant in considering this appeal. I shall now take both issues together.
Issues One and Two:
These issues are – Whether the learned trial Court was right in holding that the appellant’s case is statute barred; and
Whether the appellant has proved his case before the trial Court to be entitled to the reliefs sought before it.
Counsel for the appellant while canvassing these issues pointed out that the said Preliminary Objection was determined at the interlocutory stage and was accordingly dismissed by the learned trial Judge (we refer my Lords to pages 112-114 of the records of appeal). It is trite and an established principle of law that once an issue is determined by a Court; the Court becomes functus-officio and cannot re-entertain the same issue between the same parties, but an appellate Court is the appropriate Court to re-visit the issue. Counsel relied on the cases of RE: Apeh & Ors (2017) LPELR-42035 – (SC). Dingyadi & Anor v. INEC & Ors(2010) LPELR-951 (SC), Olowu v. Abolore (1993) 1 SCNJ (Pt. 1) at Pp. 10-11, Ikpong v. Udobong(2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1017) 84, Mohammed v. Hussein (1998) 11-12 SCNJ 136 at 163-164, Nigerian Army v. lyela (2008) LPELR-2014 (SC), Intercontractors Nig. Ltd v. UAC of Nigeria Ltd (1988) 1 NSC (737 at 752),Bank of West Africa v. NIPC Ltd (1962) LLR31, Olayinka v. Elesanmi (1971) 1 NMLR 227, Thynne v. Thynne(1995) All ER 129 at 146, Julius Berger Nig. Ltd v. Omogui (2001) LPELR-1638 (SC), Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Part 47) 1 at Page 20 Paras. D-E Omotayo v. NRC (1992) 7 NWLR (Part 234) Page 471 at 483 Paras. A-B, Nasiru Bello v. Attorney General of Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Part 45) 828,Afolayan v. Ogunrinde (1990) 1 NWLR (Part 127) 369 at 373, Akilu v. Fawehinmi No. 2 (1989) 2 NWLR (Part 1012) 122 (1989) 3 SC (Pt. 1.1) 1, Sodipo v. Lemninkainen (1992) 8 NWLR (Part 258).
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that if there is no subsisting appointment/employment, can the appellant be invited for promotion? He answered the question in the negative that “EXHIBITS C1 and C2” are written documents, which oral evidence is excluded therefrom. Counsel relied on Section 125 and 128 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. See Baliol (Nig.) Ltd v. Navcon (Nig.) Ltd (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1220) 619; Eboni Finance & Sec v. Wole-Ojo Tech Services (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 461) 464; Section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011; Iga & Ors v. Amakiri & Ors (1976) 11 SC 1 at 12-13, Lawal v. Union Bank (1995) 2 SCNJ 132 at 145, Onamade v. ACBC (1997) 1 SCNJ 65 at 83; Ude v. Osuji (1998) 10 SCNJ 75 at 82. Counsel urged the Court to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial Court and grant the reliefs sought by the appellant at the trial Court.
In response, learned counsel for the 2nd Respondent cited the cases of Chief O.N Nsirim v. E.A Nsirim(1990) 2 NWLR (Part138) 285 at 299,Paragraph A, Uredi v. Dada (1988) LPELR-3425, P. 12, Paras. D-E (SC), UBN Plc & Anor v. Ayodare & Sons (Nig.) Ltd. & Anor (2007) LPELR-3391, Paras. E-F, (SC) and submitted that parties are bound by their pleadings as evidenced in their processes placed before the Court. Learned counsel further submitted that the 2nd Defendant/Respondent is a public officer in law and civil suit(s) against the 2nd Defendant for acts or omissions allegedly done in the course of duty commenced outside three (3) months from the date the cause of action arose, is statute barred and not maintainable before any Court. Counsel relied on the cases of Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission(1998) 12 SCNJ 225 at 279; Francis Ofili v. Civil Service Commission (2008) 2 NWLR (Part 1071) 238 at 254 Paragraphs F-G; Mr. Poopola Elabanjo & 1 Or v. Chief (Mrs.) Ganiat Dowodu (2006) 27 NSCQR 318 at 353 Paras. D-E, Egbe v. Adefarasin (No. 2) (1985) 1 NWLR (Part 3) 549, Mrs. Mary Nkemdili Oranyeli v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2001) 6 NWLR (Part 710) 572 at 578, Paras. C-D, Obande Obeya v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2010) NGSC 11, Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Part 47)1 at Para. B; Woherem v. Emereuwa (2004) 13 NWLR (Part 890) Page 406. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the arguments of the appellant, affirm the judgment of the lower Court and dismiss this appeal with substantial cost.
My Lords, I have in an in depth manner scrutinized the pleadings, the evidence and the submissions of Counsel in this case. The crux of this case has to do with the contract of employment of the Appellant. The learned trial Judge in his judgment concluded at Pages 241-243 of the Record of Appeal as follows:
“l have indeed gone through the whole gamut of this case at hand carefully reading through the written addresses of the parties and it is best in the face of the admissions of the claimant that he was paid his terminal benefits by the defendants and still enjoys monthly pensions to hold that his case against the 1st Defendants wholly lacks merit.
From the evidence before the Court, it was only after the claimant had been relieved of his job at IBB University Lapai that his suit against the 1st Defendant suddenly resurrected, six years after he had been disengaged in the face of which I also find and hold that the matter athand is equally statute barred. Not to have proceeded to hearing the claimant’s case would have as it seemed at the time of dismissing the preliminary objection filed unfair to the claimant. But now having heard the case of the claimant I need not to say anything further other that what I held earlier that it lacks merit completely and it is accordingly dismissed without costs.
As to the counter-claim of the 1st Defendant’s counter-claim for salaries and allowances paid to the claimant between September, 2006 to December, 2006. I hold that this counter-claim too must fail as the monies claimed against the claimant was legitimately earned by him while still a bonafide staff of the 1st Defendant. It matters little whether he had secured employment elsewhere; it is for that other employer to react and not for the 1st Defendant.
Judgment is entered accordingly there are no awards as to costs.”
The trial Court’s judgment particularly as captured above shows the learned trial judge with due respects appearing to be unusually sketchy and drab. The Supreme Court in Adeyeye & Anor v. Ajiboye & ORS (1987) LPELR- 175 (SC) held per Oputa, JSC, on approach to judgment writing as follows:
“The proper approach for any trial Court is to first set out the claim of the claims; then the pleadings; then the issues arising from those pleadings. Having decided on the issues in dispute the trial Judge will then consider the evidence in proof of each issue, then decide on which side to believe and this has got to be a belief based on the preponderance of credible evidence and the probabilities of the case. After this the trial Judge will record his logical and consequential findings of fact. It is after such findings, that the trial Court can then discuss the applicable law against the background of his findings of fact.
In the same vein, Nnaemeka-Agu J.S.C in Duru & V Nwosu (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 113) 24, 55, gave a guide as to proper method of writing judgment. He said:- “Every good judgment begins with an introduction of the parties and the nature of the action, states the issues in controversy, sums up the evidence called by each party, resolves the issues in controversy, and, based upon such resolution of, issues, reaches a verdict and makes consequential orders.”
It should be appreciated that there is no particular way or route to judgment writing of a judge or an Appellate Court so long as what is before the Court is shown, the materials before the Court put across even if so summarized as to form a single sentence and the reason for the Court coming to the conclusion it did. Each judge is allowed his own style of placing before all and sundry in his judgment what the claimant is and the reason for the decision. See AJIBOYE v. FRN (2018) 13 NWLR (PT. 1637) 430.
It is not infrequent that you find different judges with different styles of writing judgment. Some are so brief in nature, other are (verbose) and some may decide to take a middle course. Whichever style a judge adopts, what is important is clarity in the language in which the judgment is written and delivered and the justice should be seen by all to have been done to the parties in dispute.”
In the instant case, the learned trial Judge regardless of the sketchy judgment identified the issues, evaluated the evidence and made a definite conclusion. What matters most is the contents of the Judgment. The judge should show a clear understanding of the facts and issues raisedin the case, the law applicable from where he could arrive at a conclusion deciding all the issues in controversy in the case before him, and of course a balance of justice met. The learned trial judge in the instant case certainly was clear in his reasoning and conclusion.
The learned trial Judge had found that the claimant (appellant) admitted that he was paid his terminal benefits by the Defendants (Respondents), and that he still was enjoying monthly pensions. He found both the claim and the counter-claims of the Respondents as lacking in merit.
The appellant did not all through the case deny the fact that he collected his retirement benefits and his pensions are being enjoyed by him. The law is that when a party receives his retirement benefits from the employers who retired him, the appellant ceases to have any right to challenge such retirement. The issue is that no one is allowed to approbate and reprobate in any given matter. It is incredible and inequitable to accept payment from the Respondents as retirement benefits and still maintain that the retirement was wrong. The acceptance of the payment of the retirement benefits renders the retirement mutual and an estoppel by conduct. See the cases of Ekeagwu v. Nigerian Army & Anor(2006) 11 NWLR (Part 991) 382, Gerawa Oil Mills Ltd v. Babura (2018), Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc v. Nwagwu (2006) 12 NWLR (Part 995) 518.
In the instant case, the appellant accepted receiving the retirement benefits but contended that others in the service that were so retired and who also collected retirement benefits were recalled back. The appellant did not name or submit the particulars of the said others. He also did not tender the letter of instruction from the Service, granting the appellant opportunity of recalling the appellant and others. Moreover, the contract of the appellant definitely differs from those other staff. Apart from that, it is not in any Rule of Law that the Respondents cannot take any decisions on other staff of their organization different from the Appellant. What is paramount is the fact that the appellant has collected all his benefits pursuant to the retirement and had started drawing pensions before filing this action to challenge his retirement from service. This, the appellant cannot justify in this claim. The appellant truly did not prove his claim as required by the law. The trial Court was therefore, right to hold that the case was without merit.
Furthermore, the learned trial Judge held that the claim was statute barred. There was a vehement clash on this issue by all parties. The trial Judge considered the Preliminary Objection and he took time to say that he would not decide the allegation until he has heard the evidence in the case. The statute was said to be the Public Officers Protection Act.
The appellant gave the impression that the trial judge had by the ruling on the preliminary objection dismissed the claim that the matter was not statute barred before changing gear in his judgment to say the claim was statute barred. This position of the appellant is contrary to the Record of the ruling transmitted at pages 111 to 113 of the Record. In the ruling the learned trial Judge at page 113 concluded as follows:
“In their statement of claim of 9 paragraphs, the Claimant gives details of his claim. Both Defendants hotly deny every allegation in the statement of claim and as with the 2nd Defendant several annexure (sic) are pleaded. The 1st Defendant even has a counter-claim.
I find that the Preliminary Objection cannot properly be taken.
It is best that the suits proceeds to hearing, and I so hold. See the Supreme Court case of WOHEREM V. EMEREUWA (2004) 13 NWLR Part 890 page 406 at ratio 6 where it is held that a matter which is raised by Preliminary Objection. Such a matter is more properly answered by evidence during the trial and shall constitute an issue for determination at trial.”
The learned trial Judge left the determination of whether the claim was statute barred for determination at the trial. The learned trial judge did determine it at the trial and he expressly held that it was statute barred in the judgment.
The appellant’s employment was determined with the letter of the Respondent dated 27th December, 2006. The appellant came to Court on 28th November, 2013.
The appellant’s excuse for coming to Court late is that he was appealing to the Respondents to reconsider the situation. He claimed that it was when the appeal was determined that he came to the Court in 2013. This is not true. The appellant placed before the Court the letters of the Respondents to the letters written to them by his counsel. The letter of 18th July, 2013 from the 2nd Respondent to Chief Rotimi Williams indicated at Paragraph 2 thereof as follows:
“I am to add that, your client’s appeal was among the hundreds of aggrieved Nigerians that had been treated by the Steering Committee on Reforms in 2007 and was found to lack merit…”
The appellant did not prove where he had the authority under his contract of employment to arrest the time set for action by the statute neither could he justify what stopped him from coming to Court after he was communicated from his own showing that his appeal was rejected as far back as 2007. It follows therefore that the appellant cannot from the foregoing fault the decision of the trial Court. This issue is equally resolved against the appellant.
From the foregoing consideration, this appeal is grossly lacking in merit. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
The judgment of the trial Court delivered on the 12th day of April, 2019 in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/321/2013 is affirmed. The parties are to bear their respective costs.
ELFRIEDA OLUWAYEMISI WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, Stephen Jonah Adah, JCA, and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion made therein.
I therefore also find the appeal lacking in merit and it is hereby dismissed. I affirm the judgment of the Court below delivered on the 12th day of April, 2019 in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/321/2013.
I make no order as to costs.
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.: I have been privileged to read in advance a draft copy of the leading judgment just delivered by my noble Lord, Stephen Jonah Adah JCA., and I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein to the effect that the appeal lacks merit and is thus, liable to be dismissed.
My Lords, in the leading judgment the judgment of the lower Court had been described in a simple three words, though with deference, as unusually sketchy and drab. I agree! However, while it is true that the judgment lower Court was unusually sketchy and may therefore, not have been elegant and even if the way and manner a trial Court considers and arrives at its decision may not be appealing or drab, as the judgment of the lower Court, yet it is of no serious moment and thus ceases to be of any importance once the decision reached by’ the trial Court is correct in conformity with laid down principles, the facts and the dictates of justice of the case. See Eyo V. Inyang (2001) 1 N WLR (Pt. 715) l, where it was reiterated inter alia thus:
“A trial Court is entitled to follow its own method of considering or weighing the totality of the evidence before it provided the final decision arrived at by whatever method conform with principles laid down in the case and the justice of the case.”
See also Jekpe V. Alokwe (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 715) 252, where Ogwuegbu JSC., had opined inter alia thus:
“It must be emphasized that there is no set style which must be followed by trial Courts when writing judgments. Judges must no doubt differ in the procedure and style, which they adopt in their consideration of the entire evidence. It is not very material whether the Judge starts with the consideration of the defendant’s case before that of the plaintiff and vice versa. What is important is that he should first of all put the whole evidence led by the parties on that imaginary scale. He will put the evidence adduce by the plaintiff on one side of the scale and that of the defendant on the other side and weigh them together. He will then see which is heavier by the quality or probative value of the testimony as against the quality or number of the witnesses. After this, the judge applies the law, if any, before he comes to his final conclusion based on the accepted evidence.”
My Lords, it would thus be safe to opine that in law there is no specific format for Judges to follow in writing their judgments as they are each entitled to adopt their individual style in writing their Judgments so long as such a judgment contains the issues or questions to be decided in the case; the essential facts of the case of each party and the evidence led in support; the resolution of the issues of fact and law raised in the case; the conclusion or general inference drawn from facts and law as resolved; and the verdict and orders made by the Court, it is a good judgment. Some judges write in flowery languages while others write in simple languages but in all. notwithstanding the style employed, once the constituents of a good judgment are manifest the judge has discharged his duty of writing a good judgment.
The judgment of the lower Court having considered the crucial issues in the matter as presented before it and arrived at the correct finding to the effect that the Appellant’s suit was statute barred, that is the end of the matter. It is hoped that the judge of the lower Court would put more effort in writing his other judgments to add some flesh to this unusually sketchy judgment in the future. I shall say no more!
It is for the above few comments of mine and for the fuller reasoning in the leading judgment that I too hold that the appeal lacks merit and is thus, liable to be dismissed. I too hereby dismiss this appeal for lacking in merit and shall abide by the consequential order made in the leading judgment, including the order as to no cost.
Appearances:
DeboIkuesan Esq. For Appellant(s)
R.S. El-Usman for the 2nd Respondent For Respondent(s)
