CBN v. OCHIFE & ORS (2020)

CBN v. OCHIFE & ORS

(2020)LCN/14879(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, December 04, 2020

CA/A/111/2019

RATIO

APPEAL: DUTY OF A RESPONDENT IN AN APPEAL

It is not meant for a Respondent who ordinarily should be supporting the judgment given in his favor to raise every kind of inconceivable issues or contention against the decision of the lower Court. PER BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS: PROCEDURE OF GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS AT THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT

Garnishee proceedings at the lower Court (Federal High Court) is governed in the main by Order 37 of the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2009. This rule did not set the time within which a garnishee needs to file any cause he wants to show. The regulation relating to time is as relates to the service of the order of the service of the order of the Court to show cause. The person who ordinarily need to complain of time of such service is the person to be served such as the Appellant. The provision for service is as specified in Order 37 Rule 3. This rule provides:
3. (1) unless the Court otherwise directs, an order under Rule 1 of this order to show cause shall be served.
(a) On the garnishee personally, at least, fifteen days before the day appointed thereby for the further consideration of the matter; and

(b) On the judgment debtor, at least seven days after the order has been served on the garnishee and at least seven days before the day appointed for the further consideration of the matter.
(2) An order under Rule 1 of this order shall bind in the hands of the garnishee as from the service of the order on him any debt specified in the order or so much thereof as may be so specified.
It is very clear here that it is the service of the order to show cause on the garnishee and the judgment debtor that is regulated. There is no law specifying the time the Appellant should turn in its affidavit to show cause. It is only conscionable to know that filing of processes meant for hearing of the Court must have due regards to the convenience of the Court and the return or due date set for Consideration of the case by the Court. PER BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

APPEAL: COMBINED EFFECT OF SECTION 15 AND ORDER 20 RULE 11 OF THE COURT OF APPEAL RULES 2016

The combined effect of Section 15 (Supra) and O.20 R. 11 is that in Civil Appeals, this Court has all the powers of the lower Court in any matter in which it has jurisdiction. See Olutola v. Unilorin (2004) 11-12 SC 214. And in order to completely settle any matters in controversy between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of legal proceedings, this Court has power to grant any relief or make any orders to which any of the parties before it may appear entitled to. This power is not restricted by the relief specifically sought in the notice of appeal, provided that they are necessary for the final determination of appeal before it as was decided in the case of Bunyan v. Akingboye (1999) 5 SC (Pt. 11) 91. See the case of Havilah Motors Ltd v. Attorney General Bayelsa & Anor (2019) LPELR- 48942 (CA) per Gumel, JCA PER BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

GARNISHEE PROCEEDING: INTENTION OF GARNISHEE PROCEEDING

At this point, let me clearly state that garnishee proceeding is that which intends to achieve the result of enforcing judgment of the trial Court by paying the judgment debt ordered by the trial Court to the judgment creditor. The law which is the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, had laid out the mode of enforcing the judgment of the trial Court, the mode of enforcement through garnishee proceeding appears to be more effective and potent for monetary judgment debts. In the case of CBN V. Interstella Communications Ltd & Ors (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294, 350, Ogunyibi, JSC, explained the role of a garnishee proceedings as follows:
The role of Garnishee in any Garnishee proceeding is delimited. As rightly argued by the counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents, it is not envisaged that after a judgment creditor has gone through the rigors to establish his right through the legal system, that the garnishee, who is asked to surrender the judgment debtor’s money in its possession should engage the judgment creditor in another bout of legal battle. See Order Vlll Part II of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules. Basically, the restrictive role and legal duty of a garnishee in the judgment enforcement proceeding is to conscientiously and truthfully appear before the Court in order to disclose the Judgment Debtor’s state of account in its custody. It is no wonder therefore that the lower Court while quoting the Court of Appeal case of Oceanic Bank Plc v. Oladepo & ANOR (2012) LPELR – 19670 held the view that it is not the business of a Garnishee to undertake to play the role of an advocate for a judgment debtor by trying to shield and protect the money of the judgment debtor… By the rule of jurisprudence, no justice will be done to a garnishee, neither will it be denied any legal right when made to give up the judgment debtor’s money in its custody. It is also inequitable for a garnishee to continue to latch on to the money that does not belong to it when the judgment debtor has conceded the judgment. PER BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal

Yargata Byenchit Nimpar Justice of the Court of Appeal

Elfrieda Oluwayemisi Williams-Dawodu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA APPELANT(S)

And

INALEGWU FRANKLIN OCHIFE 2. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE 3. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, FCT 4. O/C INTELLIGENCE RESPONSE TEAM SPECIAL ANTI ROBBERY SQUAD (SARS), NIGERIAN POLICE FORCE RESPONDENT(S)

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal by the appellant, who was the Garnishee, against the decision of the Federal High Court, sitting in Abuja, in Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/156/2018, delivered on the 21st day of January, 2019; Coram: J. T. Tsoho, J. (now Chief Judge). Wherein the lower Court made a garnishee order absolute against the appellant.

By a Motion Exparte dated 12th November, 2018, the Garnishor/Applicant (now the 1st Respondent) prayed the trial Court as follows:
1. An Order to issue a garnishee order nisi attaching the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only, being the judgment sum (debt) award in Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/156/2018, by the Federal High Court sitting in Abuja Coram: J. T. Tsoho, on the 10th day of October, 2018 (being the date the said judgment was delivered) due to the judgment creditor and standing to the credit of the judgment Debtor in their accounts with the Garnishee Bank, being the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) under the Treasury Single Accounts (TSA) policy and under the Garnishee’s banking network system respectively.

An Order directing the garnishee to appeal before this Honourable Court and to show cause why it should not pay over to the judgment creditor the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only in satisfaction of the entire judgment debt in suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/156/2018.
3. AND for such further or other order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this application.

Dissatisfied with the said ruling, the appellant initiated this appeal vide Three (3) Grounds Notice of Appeal filed on the 6th day of February, 2019. The record of appeal was transmitted to this Court on 13/02/2019.

In line with the rules of this Court, parties filed and exchanged their respective briefs of arguments. Appellant’s brief was filed on 19/02/2019 while the 1st Respondent’s brief incorporating Respondents’ Notice was filed on 17/07/2019, but deemed properly filed and served on the 10/03/2020. Appellant’s Reply Brief was filed on 09/03/2020 but deemed properly filed and served on 10/02/2020.

The appellant in his brief distilled three issues for determination of this appeal, thus:
1. Whether the trial Court was right to have held that

Appellant’s affidavit to show cause was filed out of time and to have disregarded it for being incompetent.
2. Was the Appellant’s right to fair hearing not breached and a miscarriage of justice occasioned when the trial Court made the garnishee order nisi absolute against the appellant without considering its affidavit to show cause.
3. Whether the trial Court was vested with jurisdiction to entertain the garnishee proceedings and make the order absolute against the Appellant.

In response, counsel for the 1st Respondent distilled two issues for the determination of this appeal, as follows:
1. Whether the trial Court was right to have held that the Appellant’s affidavit to show cause was filed out of time and/or whether the 1st Respondent was entitled to the judgment of the trial Court making the garnishee order absolute. (Distilled from Grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether the trial Court was competent and/or properly constituted to have heard the garnishee proceedings. (Distilled from Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal).

RESPONDENTS’ NOTICE:
TAKE NOTICE that the 1st Respondents intends to contend that

the decision of the Federal High Court 2, Abuja dated the 21st January 2018 be affirmed on grounds other than those relied on by the Court below, pursuant to Order 9, Rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016.

GROUNDS FOR THE APPLICATION:
The grounds for the 1st Respondent’s Notice are as follows:
i. That the Affidavit depositions and evidence of the Garnishor/Applicant in support of the order Nisi showed clearly that under the Treasury Single Account (TSA) policy the garnishee maintains the accounts of the judgment debtors who are judgment debtors.
ii. That the affidavit depositions and evidence of the Garnishor/Applicant in support of the Order Nisi showed clearly that garnishee is the banker to all the judgment debtors.
iii. That all the judgment debtors are agencies of the Federal Government of Nigeria and the garnishee bank is the banker to all the agencies of the Federal Government of Nigeria.

Issue For Determination:
Whether the Garnishor/Applicant was entitled to the judgment of the trial Court on the basis of the evidence before the Court. (Distilled from the Respondent’s Notice)

Counsel for the Respondent while arguing this issue pointed out that the contention of the 1st Respondents, that the prayers made by the counsel to the 1st Respondent (then Applicant) to the trial Court were alternative; one was to discountenance the affidavit showing cause of the garnishee bank having been filed out of time and in contravention of the Federal High Court Rules; while the alternative prayer was that looking at the affidavit to show cause of the garnishee, it neither denied liability nor did it meet any of the statutory requirements to entitle the garnishee to be discharged from the proceedings (page 34-39 of the record of Appeal). He relied on the case of Heritage Bank Ltd v. Interlagos Oil Ltd & Anor. (2018) LPELR- 44801 (CA) at p. 23 paras D-G.

Counsel submitted that the Appellant had not denied any of the material points raised by the 1st Respondent in its affidavit in support of the Garnishee Order Nisi. That the Appellant was in custody of funds belonging to the judgment debtors by virtue of the Treasury Single Accounts (TSA). He cited the following cases – Iden v. State (1994) LPELR-14608 (CA), p.18 paras D-G; Keystone Bank Ltd v. A.O.S. Practice

(2013) LPELR-20357 (CA). He contended that it is not the duty of the garnishee to fight a proxy war on behalf of the judgment debtors as its been done by the Appellant in this matter. The Treasury Single Accounts (TSA) policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria (the Nigerian police force and its affiliates and agents) being agencies of the Federal Government of Nigeria are kept and maintained by the Central Bank of Nigeria. He cited the case of Gtb v. Innoson Nigeria Ltd (2017) LPELR-42368 (SC) p. 25 paras. B-D and also at page 19-20 paras F-D.

He maintained that it is not in doubt that the Appellant are bankers to the judgment debtors and rather than perform their statutory duty only as required as garnishee and failed to do so. That the Appellants are by statutory ordinance a banker to all the judgment debtors and by virtue of which funds in their custody are liable to be garnished. SECTION 2 and 36 of the Central Bank Act, gives the bank the statutory power to act as a banker to government agencies. Therefore, the only relationship between the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Government Agencies is that of a Banker-customer simpliciter. He

cited the case ofCentral Bank of Nigeria v. Interstella Communications Limited & Ors (2017) LPELR-43940 (SC).

Counsel finally submitted that the judgment debtors are all government agencies and that the Appellant is their Banker. These facts are all contained in the Affidavit in support of the application for Order Nisi which the Appellant never contravened. The Appellant had abandoned its duty and role as a garnishee in the matter and instead went on in frustrating the garnishee procedure and nothing else. Counsel urged this Court to dismiss this appeal and uphold the decision of the trial Court on grounds as contained in the Respondent’s Notice. The Respondent notice from the provisions of Order 9 of the rules of this Court 2016 in the Respondent’s notice of contention. The import of this notice is well captured in Order 9 Rules 1 & 2 as follows:
1. A Respondent who not having appealed from the decision of the Court below, desires to contend on the appeal that the decision of that Court should be varied, either in any event or in the event of the appeal being allowed in whole or in part, must give notice to that effect, specifying the

grounds of that contention and the precise form of the order which he proposes to ask the Court to make, or to make in that event, as the case may be.
2. A Respondent who desires to contend on the appeal that the decision of the Court below should be affirmed on grounds, other than those relied upon by that Court, must give notice to that effect specifying grounds of that contention.
From the express provision of the rules, it is very clear that the provision is aimed at fine tuning the victory and not to destroy it. It is meant to essentially show or appeal and convince the Appellate Court to affirm the decision appealed against upon grounds other than the grounds relied upon by the trial Court. It is not meant for a Respondent who ordinarily should be supporting the judgment given in his favor to raise every kind of inconceivable issues or contention against the decision of the lower Court. In the instant case, the 1st Respondent veered off with outmost respect, to layout as grounds for the notice of contention, issues of depositions in the affidavit evidence of the Garnishor. This no doubt cannot sync with the import and principles governing a

Respondents notice where a Respondent has in mind issues of raising or evaluating evidence left out in the judgment of the lower Court, he may choose the option of a cross appeal. See Eze & Ors v. Obiefuna & Ors. (1995) LPELR-1191 (SC); PML (Nig.) Ltd v. FRN (2017) LPELR-43480(SC); Ozurumba Nsirim v. Amadi (2016) LPELR- 26053 (SC). The Respondent’s notice in the instant appeal not only lacks focus, it lacks merit, it is hereby dismissed. I shall now access the merit of the substantive appeal.

The issues submitted by parties is virtually same. I shall adopt the three (3) issues submitted by the appellant in considering this appeal. I now start with issues one and two as argued together by the appellant.

Issues One & Two:
These issues are – whether the trial Court was right to have held that Appellant’s affidavit to show cause was filed out of time and to have disregarded it for being incompetent; and
Was the Appellant’s right to fair hearing not breached and a miscarriage of justice occasioned when the trial Court made the garnishee order nisi absolute against the appellant without considering its affidavit to show cause.

Counsel for the appellant argued issues one and two together and submitted that the trial Court fell into grave error when it held that appellant’s affidavit to show cause was incompetent and disregarded same on the ground that it was filed out of time and that no step was taken to regularize it. That the decision of the trial Court is flawed as it shows an alarming misconception of the law on garnishee proceedings. That it is settled that garnishee proceedings are separate and distinct proceedings though they flowed from the judgment that pronounced the debt. That they are of a special kind with special procedure. He referred to — CBN v. Auto Import Export (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1337) 78 @ 125 – 126, CBN v. Okefe (2015) LPELR – 24825 (CA) @ 43. While referring to Part V of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap S. 56, LFN, 2004 (SCPA) and Order of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules (JER) and Order 37 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009, counsel submitted that there is no provision setting time limit for the garnishee to dispute liability or to file his affidavit to show cause before the return date. That by the provisions of Section 87 SCPA

and Order Vlll Rules 8 JER, that a garnishee who wishes to dispute liability upon service of order nisi on him is only required to appear and dispute liability before an order of execution is issued. That the trial Court inexplicably misapprehended the law when it held that appellant’s affidavit to show cause was filed outside the time stipulated by the Rules of Court. That decision was as a result of the endorsement of the flawed submission by the 1st Respondent’s counsel. He maintained contrary to the stance of the trial Court, that the appellant’s affidavit to show cause was competent and required no step to regularize it. As such that the trial Court ought not to have disregarded it for being incompetent and that doing so was a very grave error.

On issue of fair hearing, counsel submitted that the trial Court’s decision not to consider its affidavit to show cause before pronouncing the order absolute violated its right to fair hearing as guaranteed by Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). That the mistrial occurred when the learned trial judge shut his eyes to the appellant’s affidavit to show

cause which was competently before him. That by so doing the trial judge gave the 1st Respondent undue advantage over the appellant and therefore, failed in his primary function to do justice between the parties before him. He maintained that the approach adopted by the learned trial Judge evidently gave the lie to the basic and fundamental principle in our system of administration of justice that no one can have a decision entered against him without him being heard. He referred to Atano v. A.G. Bendel State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 75) 132, Bakare v. L.S.C.S.C (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 262) 641 @ 665, Adigun v. A.G. Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 530) 678, Def-Lam & Co. Ltd. v. Osun State Govt. (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt. 964) 211 @ 220.

On miscarriage of justice, counsel contended that the failure of the trial Court to accord it fair hearing is one that has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. That the appellant’s affidavit to show cause was not in any way contradicted by the 1st Respondent. That there is nothing on record to show that having been served with the appellant’s affidavit to show cause the 1st Respondent filed a counter affidavit to challenge or controvert

or dispute appellant’s deposition that it maintained no accounts in the name of 2nd — 4th Respondents. That unchallenged depositions of facts in an affidavit are deemed admitted by the opposing party. That such facts would require no further proof and that the Court is enjoined to accept, consider and act on them as correct, true and established. He referred the Court to State v. Commissioner for Boundaries (1996) 37 LRCN 603 @ 613. He maintained that the garnishee order absolute in the circumstance that it was made was completely deprived of the character of a legitimate adjudication and thus a nullity. That it was nothing but a dismal fiasco.

Counsel further canvassed and submitted that the inescapable conclusion from the totality of the foregoing is that the learned trial judge erred by disregarding the appellant’s uncontroverted affidavit to show cause, as the reason for doing so has no foundation in law. That such error by the learned trial judge was a violation of the appellant’s right to fair hearing which occasioned a miscarriage of justice as the appellant ought to have been discharged from the proceedings on the basis of its

uncontroverted affidavit to show cause. He urged the Court to so hold and resolve issues 1 and 2 in favour of the appellant.

In response, counsel for the 1st Respondent while arguing the issue contended that it is trite law that the rules of Court guide the practice and mode of implementation of substantive law through litigation. That rules of Court are meant to be obeyed by parties in any matter before a particular Court. He cited: Mohammed & Ors. v. Minister Federal Ministry of Environment, Housing & Urban Development & Ors. (2014) LPELR – 24228 (CA), Per Oseji, JCA (as he then was). He contended further that the Sheriff and Civil Processes Act is silent as to the period within which a party is to file its affidavit to show cause, and in a situation such as that the rules of the Court within which the matter is holding will come into play and dictate the seeming vacuum. That the trial Court only adopted a procedure to do substantial justice to the matter between parties and nothing more. That the affidavit to show cause of the garnishee in a garnishee proceeding is with the same character as a counter affidavit in the proceedings, and that

in a situation where the substantive statute is silent as to time period regulating its filing then, the provision of the procedural law in this case being the Federal High Court Rules will apply. He referred to Order II Rule (1) and Order 2 Rule10 of the Judgment Enforcement Procedure Rules. He maintained that the trial Court was within the limits of its jurisdictive candor when it held that the affidavit to show cause of the appellant having been filed outside limited period set by the rules of its Court and in the absence of any application to regularize same was incompetent. He referred to the case of Central Bank of Nigeria v. Interstella Communications Ltd & Ors. (2017) LPELR- 43940 (SC).

On the issue of fair hearing, counsel submitted that the right to fair hearing in any matter means in simple terms that a party should be afforded all opportunities to defend himself, but when a party choose not to do so within the statutory provided means, he cannot turn around on appeal and cry denial of fair hearing. That the appellant was served with the Order Nisi to show cause on the 17th day of December, 2018 that he (the appellant) chose not to file his

affidavit showing till the 07/01/2019 and when he eventually filed, he decided not to serve the 1st Respondent with the process filed till the 11/01/2019 in open Court on the day when the matter came up for hearing in a bid to waylay, delay and ambush the 1st Respondent, when same backfired, he has run to this Court claiming denial of fair hearing. Counsel canvassed that litigation is not a game of hide and seek and that the right to fair hearing carries with it the duty to make use of all avenue statutorily provided for your defence. He cited the case of Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Interlagos Oil Ltd. & Anor. (2018) LPELR-44801 (CA).

He argued further that the affidavit in support of the Motion exparte seeking the grant of the Order Nisi stated clearly that the garnishee was the banker to the judgment debtors whom are all agencies of the Federal Government of Nigeria and that the said affidavit went further to state that accounts of the judgment debtors were all being managed by the garnishee bank being the Central Bank of Nigeria under the Treasury Single Account (TSA) policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria. That specifically paragraphs 7,

8, 9 and 11 of the affidavit in support of the application exparte for the grant of an Order Nisi were never controverted in any way or manner by the Appellant then garnishee. He relied on Heritage Bank Ltd v. Interlagos Oil Ltd & Anor(2018) (supra). He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the 1st Respondent.

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the open Court on the date of hearing is highly reprehensible. But this with due respect does not justify the action of the Learned trial chief judge in not considering the cause shown. The cause shown was not by any law or rules of Court time barred. The Learned trial chief judge was clearly in error by holding that the affidavit to show cause was filed by the appellant considering the facts and circumstances of this case being a case of enforcement of a judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction, this Court will not send the case back to the trial Court as this will orchestrate another inordinate delay in the enforcement of the said judge. Since the cause shown was filed and it was before the trial Court, this Court is well endowed with the power to review the said cause shown and appropriately give the decision in the interest of justice. This step is peculiarly necessary in this case to stem the rising tide of garnishee proceeding remaining endlessly in the Court longer than the time it took the Court to determine the substantive claim of the litigants. We shall therefore act under our laws to deal with the substantive application of the Appellant.

Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act and Order 20 Rule 11 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016 are applicable here. The combined effect of Section 15 (Supra) and O.20 R. 11 is that in Civil Appeals, this Court has all the powers of the lower Court in any matter in which it has jurisdiction. See Olutola v. Unilorin (2004) 11-12 SC 214. And in order to completely settle any matters in controversy between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of legal proceedings, this Court has power to grant any relief or make any orders to which any of the parties before it may appear entitled to. This power is not restricted by the relief specifically sought in the notice of appeal, provided that they are necessary for the final determination of appeal before it as was decided in the case of Bunyan v. Akingboye (1999) 5 SC (Pt. 11) 91. See the case of Havilah Motors Ltd v. Attorney General Bayelsa & Anor (2019) LPELR- 48942 (CA) per Gumel, JCA

Let me therefore look at the affidavit of the appellant to show cause. The Garnishee’s affidavit to show cause filed on 7/01/2019 is at pages 32 to 33 of the Record of Appeal. The affidavit is deposed to by Abdulbasit

Musa Ismail, a staff of the appellant at paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8. The deponent deposed is as follows:-
5. The Order directed the Bank to appear before the Honorable Court to show cause why an Order should not be made upon the Bank for the payment to the Judgment Creditor of the amount of the debts due and owing or accruing to the Judgment Debtors in the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira Only) or so much therefore as will satisfy the debt due under the judgment delivered on the 10th October, 2018 and the costs entered on the summons.
6. That I was informed by Mr. Hussain Kagarai Sani, a Relationship Manager in the Client Service Office of the Banking Services Department (the department in charge of managing the accounts of customers of the Bank) on the 27th December, 2018 in the office at about 3:18pm, in the course of official briefing in respect of this matter, that the Central Bank of Nigeria does not maintain account(s) in the name of the judgment Debtors.
7. That pursuant to the deposition in paragraph 6 above, the Bank is unable to comply with the Order Nisi.
8. That it is in the interest of justice to discharge the Bank

from this garnishee proceeding and for the Court not to make the Garnishee Order Absolute against the Bank.

The deposition here simply denied the fact of the account of the judgment debtor with the appellant. No other defence was offered from the affidavit to show cause. It is patently mischievous and an affront to the administration of justice for the appellant to bare facedly allege that it is not maintaining account(s) in the name of the Judgment Debtors. This Court cannot but act under Section 124 of the Evidence Act, take judicial notice of the fact that under the Federal Government Single Treasury Account (TSA), policy for reaching all the Government Ministries MDAS accounts are now with the Central Bank of Nigeria. It cannot therefore be an acceptable defense for the appellant to simply deny that it is not maintaining any account for the Judgment Debtors who are MDAS. This defense therefore is not satisfactory and it is hereby rejected.

Issue Three:
This issue is – whether the trial Court was vested with jurisdiction to entertain the garnishee proceedings and make the order absolute against the Appellant.

Counsel for the appellant while arguing this issue canvassed that the law is settled beyond prevarication that a Court of law must have jurisdiction before it can entertain any cause or matter and make a binding order or orders. That a Court of law is only competent to exercise jurisdiction in respect of any cause or matter if, inter alia, the case comes by the due process of ale and upon the fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction. He relied on the cases of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 S.C.N.L.R 341, Kotoye v. Saraki (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 357) 414, Nwankwo v. Yar’Adua (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209) 518. That by virtue of Section 84 SCPA, the prior consent of the relevant Attorney-General to attach by garnishee order the funds held in the custody of a public officer is a condition precedent to the validity of the garnishee proceedings and the valid exercise of jurisdiction over same. He cited: CBN v. Kakuri (2016) LPELR-41468. He maintained that the 1st Respondent ought to have obtained the prior consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation before commencing the garnishee proceedings against the appellant in line with Section 84 of SCPA. That

the case is now in a state of surfeit which has put beyond prevarication the status of the Appellant as a public officer within the meaning and intendment of Section 84 of SCPA. He further relied on the cases of CBN v. Zakari (2018) LPELR – 44751 (CA), CBN v. AMCON (2017) LPELR -42986 (CA), CBN v. Hydro Air Pty Ltd. (2014) LPELR-22587, CBN v. J.I. Nwanyanwu & Sons Enterprises Nig. Ltd (2014) LPELR – 22745, CBN v. Shipping Co. Sara B.V. (2015) 11 NWLR (Pt. 891) 882, CBN v. Okefe (supra), among others, wherein the appellant is held as a public officer within the context of Section 84 of SCPA either by regarding it as being part of the public service of the Federation under Section 318 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) or by employing purposive interpretation of Section 84 SCPA to discover the legislative intent and to come to the conclusion that public officer refers not only to natural persons sued in their personal names but extends to public bodies, artificial persons, institutions or person sued by their official names.

Counsel further submitted that failure to obtain the requisite consent of the Attorney General of the Federation robbed the

trial Court of jurisdiction and dealt a fatal blow to the competence of the entire garnishee proceedings against the appellant and rendered the order that emanated therefore a nullity and that the appellant is competent to raise this issue on appeal for the first time and requires no leave to do so considering that it is an issue that borders on jurisdiction. He referred to the cases of NNPC v. Sele (2013) 4 -5 SC (Pt. 11) 1 at 13 – 14, A.G Benue State v. Umar (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1068) 311 @ 248, Integrated Data Services Ltd v. Adewumi (2013) LPELR — 21032 13 — 14. Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant and pronto set aside or strike out the entire garnishee proceedings for want of jurisdiction.

In response, counsel for the 1st Respondent while arguing this issue submitted that it is settled law that in a garnishee proceeding where the role being played by the Central Bank of Nigeria is only as a banker to the government agencies cum judgment debtors, the Central Bank of Nigeria can no longer hide under the argument that the consent of the Attorney General of the Federal is required to be granted before the

commencement of the garnishee proceedings. He relied on Central Bank of Nigeria v. Interstella Communications Ltd & Ors. (2017) LPELR- 43940 (SC). That constitutional provisions already impose a duty on all authorities and person to enforce the decisions of the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State and that creates a mandatory duty on the office of the Attorney General of the Federation and the Central Bank of Nigeria to automatically enforce the decisions of this Courts without need for any further consent or permission from them. He contended vociferously that a community reading of Sections 1(1) & (3), 287 and 318 of the Constitution puts it beyond any doubt that offices of both the Attorney General of the Federation and the Central Bank of Nigeria are amongst the authorities and persons referred to by the provisions of the constitution to perform their duties/functions of enforcing the decisions of the Federal High Court of the Federation and State High Court without any other need to seek their permission. He cited: A.G. Oyo State v. NLC Oyo State Chapter & Ors. (2002) LPELR – 7077 (CA) @ Pp. 21 — 22, paragraphs C — B.

That these provisions take away the need for any form of consent or permission of the Attorney General to be sought and obtained before any decision of the aforementioned Court can be enforced. Counsel contended further that the provisions of Section 150(1) of the Constitution makes the Attorney General of the Federation the chief law officer of the Federation, hence all the other law officers inclusive of all the judgment debtors are all his agents. That it is the trite law that he who acts through agent acts himself and that being the case it makes him a party in his matter and thus take away the need to seek his consent before a judgment debt against him can be executed, as that could be an affront to the exalted doctrine of natural justice. He relied on the case ofLeventis Technical Limited v. Petrojessica Enterprises Limited (1999) LPELR- 1781 (SC) @ P. 14, paras. A-B. Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favor of the 1st Respondent and dismiss the appeal.

At this point, let me clearly state that garnishee proceeding is that which intends to achieve the result of enforcing judgment of the trial Court by paying the judgment debt ordered

by the trial Court to the judgment creditor. The law which is the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, had laid out the mode of enforcing the judgment of the trial Court, the mode of enforcement through garnishee proceeding appears to be more effective and potent for monetary judgment debts. In the case of CBN V. Interstella Communications Ltd & Ors (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294, 350, Ogunyibi, JSC, explained the role of a garnishee proceedings as follows:
The role of Garnishee in any Garnishee proceeding is delimited. As rightly argued by the counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents, it is not envisaged that after a judgment creditor has gone through the rigors to establish his right through the legal system, that the garnishee, who is asked to surrender the judgment debtor’s money in its possession should engage the judgment creditor in another bout of legal battle. See Order Vlll Part II of the Judgments (Enforcement) Rules. Basically, the restrictive role and legal duty of a garnishee in the judgment enforcement proceeding is to conscientiously and truthfully appear before the Court in order to disclose the Judgment Debtor’s state of account in its

custody. It is no wonder therefore that the lower Court while quoting the Court of Appeal case of Oceanic Bank Plc v. Oladepo & ANOR (2012) LPELR – 19670 held the view that it is not the business of a Garnishee to undertake to play the role of an advocate for a judgment debtor by trying to shield and protect the money of the judgment debtor… By the rule of jurisprudence, no justice will be done to a garnishee, neither will it be denied any legal right when made to give up the judgment debtor’s money in its custody. It is also inequitable for a garnishee to continue to latch on to the money that does not belong to it when the judgment debtor has conceded the judgment.
In the instant case, it is not on record that the judgment creditor or judgment debtor are fighting the judgment debt on appeal. Where the judgment debtor does not fight the judgment on appeal, the garnishee whose role is only to keep the money of the appellant cannot raise issues in the enforcement to challenge the enforcement procedure adopted by the judgment creditor. In that circumstance it is not the business of the garnishee to plead that the trial Court has no jurisdiction

because the fiat of the Attorney General was not obtained before the enforcement of the judgment given against a judgment debtor. The position of the law is as rendered by the Supreme Court in Gwede v. Delta State House of Assembly & Anor., (2019) LPELR – 47441 (SC). The dictum of Okoro, JSC is as follows:-
“A few words on garnishee proceedings. A garnishee proceeding is usually commenced by an ex-parte application made to the Court having jurisdiction to hear the matter by the judgment creditor and the orders of the Court usually come in two steps. The first is a garnishee order NISI. Simply, NISI is a Norman – French word which means “unless”. It is therefore an order made, at that stage that the sum covered by the application be paid in to Court or to the judgment creditor within a stated time unless there is sufficient reason given by the party on whom the order is directed why the ordered should be made. Such reasons could be that he does not hold any money belonging to the judgment debtor or that such money belonging to the judgment debtor in his possession is a subject of litigation or has been assigned to a third party or any other legal and

reasonable excuse. If no sufficient reason is given, the garnishee order is then made absolute and that ends the matter in that the party against whom the order absolute is made liable to pay the amount specified in the order to the judgment creditor. The Court then becomes functus officio as far as that matter is concerned in that the judge who decided the matter is precluded from again considering the matter even if new evidence or argument are presented to him. See Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Boney Marcus Industries Ltd & Ors. (2005) 13 NWLR (PT. 943) 654, Choice Investments Ltd v. Jeromnimon (Midland Bank Ltd. Garnishee) (1981) 1 All ER 225 at 328, Guarantee Trust Bank Plc v. Innoson Nig. (2017) LPELR – 42368 (SC).”
The appellant in this appeal has no justifiable reason to contest the order of the lower Court. This appeal has again shown the modern trend of a garnishee joining the contest of the substantive litigants to fight a proxy war for the judgment debtor. This is no longer to be encouraged or tolerated in a garnishee proceeding.

From the foregoing consideration therefore, this Court has not found any reason to void the order

absolute as raised by the lower Court. This appeal therefore lacks merit. The appeal is hereby dismissed. Parties are to bear their respective costs.

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in advance the judgment just delivered by learned brother STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, JCA and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived.
I also dismiss the appeal and abide by the other orders made in the lead judgment.

ELFRIEDA OLUWAYEMISI WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A.: I agree.

Appearances:

Babajide Babatunde, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Eko Ejembi Eko, Esq., with him E.A. Simon Esq. – for 1st Respondent. For Respondent(s)