BOLANTA & ANOR v. TOSIN NOVEL FIRMS LTD (2020)

BOLANTA & ANOR v. TOSIN NOVEL FIRMS LTD

(2020)LCN/14884(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ILORIN JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, December 04, 2020

CA/IL/56/2019

RATIO

COMPANY LAW: PROPER CLAIMANT IN RESPECT OF A WRONG TO A COMPANY

It is trite that proper claimant in respect of a wrong to a company is the company and not the members.
Thus, subject to certain exceptions, the proper claimant in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company or an association of persons is the company or the association of persons itself and not the shareholders or members of the association. See Onuekwusi vs Reg. Trustee of the Christ Methodist Zion Church (2011) 6 NWLR Pt. 1243 P. 361-362 @ 34.” PER SHATA BDLIYA, J.C.A.
LAND LAW: DUTY OF A CLAIMANT IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE TO LAND

The law is trite, in an action for declaration of title to a parcel of land, a claimant must, by credible evidence prove or establish the identity of the land such that no one can be in doubt ascertaining same. The foregoing preposition of the principles of law had been the decision of the Courts in a litany of decided cases such as F.B.N. Plc vs Okelewu (2013) 13 NWLR Pt. 1372 425 @ 458, wherein the Court held that:
“In an action for declaration of title to land, it is a fundamental principles of law that the first foremost duty of the claimant is to establish the identity, size, location and boundaries of the land with such reasonable degree of accuracy and certainty that the identity will no longer be in doubt.”
In Okeke vs Nnolim (2015) 5 NWLR Pt. 1453 P.444 @ 464, the Court enunciated that:

“In a claim for declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to a statutory certificate of occupancy to land in dispute, the onus lies with the claimant to prove by credible evidence the area of land to which his claim relates, the boundaries thereof, the exact location and size of the land in dispute. The land must be described such that the Court will be certain a surveyor will have no problem as to the identity of the land.”
Belgore J.S.C (as he then was) in the case of Auta vs Ibe (2003) All FWLR Pt.173 P.87 @…, when dealing with the requirement of proving the identity of parcel of land in dispute, espoused thus:
“In a case for declaration of any right or title over land, that land must be describe with certainty so that the parties are ad idem as to its identity. This is because a party will not be found to litigate on unidentifiable object. A survey plan or clear map of the area of land in dispute is identified, or land features-streams, rivers, hill, historical monuments, trees and other permanent or semi-permanent objects are clearly pleaded…. It is a cardinal principle in land disputes to clearly indicate the land even if by boundary neighbours whose evidence can clearly show the land in a visit to locus in quo….”
In the case of Nwokidu vs Okanu (2010) 3 NWLR Pt. 1181 P.362, Adekeye, J.S.C summarized the principles of law on identity of land in dispute at pages 391 to 392 in these words:
“Where a plaintiff claims declaration and injunction, the area of land in dispute must be properly identified in view of the order of injunction which cannot be granted in respect of an undefined area. Therefore, a plaintiff who claims a declaration of title must prove clearly the area of land to which his claim relates and the boundaries thereof. The land must be described with certainty so as to entitle him to an order of injunction. It is a basic step in a claim for declaration. If he failed to prove boundaries of the land he asserts to be in dispute or did not satisfactorily describe the dimension and locality or the description contradicts the plan, the proper order to make is one of dismissal. A relief of declaration of title being discretionary cannot be granted by any Court when the identity of land is not clearly and unambiguously established.”
Of recent, in the case of Alhaji Sule Sawaba vs Mr. S.O Gaadi (2016) All FWLR Pt. 823 P.1864 @ 1888, this Court had this to say:
“This duty to establish the identity of the land in dispute with certainty is referred to as the foremost and fundamental duty of a person claiming an interest in land because where a claimant fails to plead and establish the precise area of the land to which his claim relates, whatever evidence whether oral or documentary, he produces at the trial and however cogent and credible the evidence might appear, it cannot, in law, ground a claim of an interest in land in his favor.” PER SHATA BDLIYA, J.C.A.

DAMAGES: GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN AWARDING DAMAGES

What are the guiding principles of law that are to be applied in awarding damages? In UBA Plc vs Ogundokun (2009) 6 NWLR Pt. 1138 P.450 @ 489 general damages has been defined to be:
“General damages are damages which the law implies or presumes to have accrued from the wrong complained of or as the immediate, direct and proximate result of or the necessary result of the wrong complained of. It is awarded by the Court where it cannot point at any measure to assess the loss caused by the wrong complained of except the opinion and judgment of a reasonable man. See Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Akinfosile (1969) NWLR 217; Beecham Group Ltd. v. Essdee Food Products (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 11) 112; A. G. Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotels Ltd. (No. 2) (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 121) 255; Consolidated Breweries Plc. V. Aisowieren (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 736) 424.”

General damages flows generally from the defendant’s wrongful act or omission hence they are implied by law and need not to be specifically pleaded and strictly proved by evidence. See also Hanseatic Int. Ltd. v. Usang (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt. 784) P. 784. It is important to take note that a Court in awarding damages should scrutinized a claim of general damages where a claim for special damages is also claimed and awarded in order to avoid double compensation. If the plaintiff recovers fully under special damages, the claim of general damages should be awarded with caution to avoid double compensation. See UBA PLC. v. Ogundokun supra P. 491. In awarding general damages, the trial Court has discretion when assessing the quantum. The circumstances and the evidence adduced before the Court must be related to the desirability to award general damages, especially the quantum of the damages to be awarded. See Okoko v. Dakolo (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1040) 401 @ 434. PER SHATA BDLIYA, J.C.A.
APPEAL: ATTITUDE OF THE APPELLATE COURT TO INTERFERING WITH THE AWARD AND ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL DAMAGES

An Appellate Court is not to interfere or disturb the awarding and assessment of general damages unless there is the need to do so under certain circumstances to be proved by the party complaining on whether the assessment was wrongly done or unjustifiable in law. In Ahmed v. CBN (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) P. 524 @ 541, the Supreme Court Per Adekeye, J.S.C. enunciated that:
“Award of damages is an exercise of discretion by the trial Court. An appellate Court will not interfere with an award of damages by a trial Court unless it is made under certain peculiar circumstances which include:
(1) Where the exercise of discretion by the trial Court is perverse.
(2) Where the Court acted under wrong principles of law, or
(3) Where the Court acted in disregard of applicable principles; or
(4) Where the Court acted in misapprehension of facts; or
(5) Where the Court took into consideration irrelevant matters and disregarded relevant matters whilst considering its award or
(6) Where injustice will result if the appellate Court does not act; or
(7) Where the amount awarded is ridiculously low or ridiculously high that it must have been an erroneous estimate of the damages.”
See Zik’s Press Ltd. V. Ikoku (1951) 13 WACA pg. 407; Bola v. Bankole (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 27) P. 141; Elf (Nig.) Ltd. V. Sillo (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 350) P. 258.”

A Georgewell, J.C.A when considering the award of general damages by a trial Court and when and why an appellant can review same postulated as following in the case of Inspector General of Police & 2 Ors vs Peter O. Ikpila (2016) 9 NWLR Pt.1517 P.236 @ 297, thus:
“I am aware and have indeed averted my mind to all the principles of law governing the award of damages or compensation and the permissible grounds for intervention by an appellate Court to either increase or reduce award made by a trial Court, the most basic of which principles is that an appellate Court will interfere and upset damages awarded by a trial Court where it is shown that the amount awarded is manifestly too high or too low or that the trial Court has acted on wrong principles of law. This is so because it must always be borne in mind, particularly by trail Courts, as it is very important, that assessment and measure of damages or compensation is not a gold mine for the successful litigant but meant truly and justifiably to reasonably compensate the victim for the wrong committed against him. See the locus classicus of Flint v. Lovell (1935) 1 KB 354 at P. 360 per Greer, LJ. See also African Newspaper Ltd. v. Ciroma (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt.423) 156; Hassan v. Tade (2011) 19 WRN 130.
Again, in First Inland Bank vs Craft 2000 Ltd (2013) All FWLR Pt. 660 P.1416 @ 1429, this Court held that:
“The award of general damages is a matter for the trial Court and an appeal Court will not interfere with such an award except in circumstances well recognized by law, among which are where the trial judge has acted under a mistake of law or has acted in disregard of principal, and injustice will result if the appeal Court does not interfere. In the instant case, the award of N 25,000,000.00 (Twenty-five Million Naira) as general and exemplary damages for breach of contract by the lower Court was an error of law and in disregard of principle laid down for the award of damages and liable to be set aside. See also Odugwu vs AGF (1996) All NLR 480; Allied Bank of (Nig) Ltd vs Akubueze (1997) 6 SCNJ 16.”
In the case of Ahmed vs CBN (2013) 2 NWLR Pt. 1339, supra at page 541, Adekeye J.S.C enumerated the circumstance in which an appellate Court can interfere and review the award of damages by a trial Court, one of such is that “When the quantum awarded is ridiculously low or ridiculously high that it must have been an erroneous estimate of the damages.” PER SHATA BDLIYA, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Ahmad Olarewaju Belgore Justice of the Court of Appeal

Uchechukwu Onyemenam Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ibrahim Shata Bdliya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. ADISA BOLANTA 2. SHEIKH SHARAF S.A. AJARA APPELANT(S)

And

TOSIN NOVEL FIRMS LTD RESPONDENT(S)

IBRAHIM SHATA BDLIYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Respondent (who was the claimant) in suit No: Kws/170/2016 at the High Court of Justice, Ilorin, Kwara State (the lower Court) is a limited liability Company. The 2nd respondent/cross-appellant (who was the 2nd defendant) before the lower Court is the head of the Ajara Family of Afon, in Asa Local Government Area of Kwara State. The 1st appellant was the 1st defendant before the lower Court. The Ajara Family of AFON owned vast area of land in Asa Local Government Area. The respondent claimed to have purchased a large portion of the land in dispute from the said Ajara Family of Afon and claimed to have taken possession of same, after necessary requirements were completed by the parties. The 1st appellant also claimed to have purchased portion of the disputed land from the Ajara Family of Afon, in Asa Local Government Area of Kwara State.

In the year 2006, the respondent noticed that someone had entered into the portion of the land he purchased from the Ajara Family. It was discovered that the 1st appellant was the person who entered the land claiming that he

purchased it from the owners of the land. The respondent, then instituted an action against the appellants (defendants) in the lower Court. Pleadings were filed and exchanged between the parties. At the trial, both parties called witnesses who testified in support of their respective claims, and documents were admitted in furtherance of proving title holder of the disputed parcel of land. After the adoption of written addresses, the learned judge of the lower Court, in a judgment delivered on the 25th of February, 2019, entered judgment in favour of the respondent. Aggrieved by the decision of the lower Court, the appellants filed Notice of Appeal on the 13th of March, 2019 to this Court, challenging the decision of the lower Court on four (4) grounds of appeal, which was amended and deemed filed on the 8th of July, 2020.

The four (4) grounds of appeal are hereunder reproduced:
“GROUND ONE
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that the respondent has sufficiently established the identity of its land as being the same as that of the 1st appellant to entitle it to the reliefs sought in the statement of claim.

PARTICULARS OF ERROR
i. The learned trial Judge has earlier in this case pronounced that the 1st appellant’s land in Ekunkun is distinct from the respondent’s land in Gbedugbedu.
ii. The trial Court based its decision on identity of the land in dispute on the following contradictory documents.
(a) Exhibit 1 which puts the dimension of the land in dispute at 250 hectares.
(b) Exhibit 3 which puts the dimension of the land in dispute at 255.772 hectares.
(c) Exhibit 6 which was tendered by the counsel to the 1st appellant through PW1 to prove that the document was forged, and which the 2nd appellant (as DW2) testified not to have been executed by him.
(d) Exhibit 4 which puts the dimension of the respondent’s land at 250 hectares.
(e) Exhibit 4 is an agreement dated 15th December, 1978 which was purportedly executed by Alhaji Alabi Labaika in his capacity as the Head and accredited representative of Ajara family.
(f) Alhaji Alabi Labaika became the Magaji (Head) of the Ajara family in 1985 and died in 1998.
(g) Mallam Ishaq Ajara was the Head of Ajara family in 1978.
(h) The foregoing errors have occasioned

miscarriage of justice.
GROUND TWO
The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that there was outright sale of land between the 2nd appellant’s family and the respondent in 1992.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(i) The payment made by the respondent to the 2nd appellant in 1992 constituted a deposit.
(ii) There is no sale of land on credit under the native law and custom.
iii. The purported 1978 agreement was not interpreted to the representatives of the 2nd appellant’s family who were illiterates.
iv. The purported agreement evidencing the 1992 sale of land (Exhibit 6) was forged.
GROUND THREE
The learned trial Judge misdirected himself when he held that the appellants (as defendants) are liable to the respondent in trespass.
PARTICULARS OF MISDIRECTION
(i) The respondent failed to establish the identity of her land.
(ii) Action in trespass lies only when possessory or ownership right exists.
(iii) The respondent failed to prove its ownership and possessory rights over the land in dispute.
(iv) The findings of the Court have occasioned miscarriage of justice.
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GROUND FOUR
The decision of the trial Court is against the weight of evidence.”

In the event of allowing the appeal, the appellants sought the following reliefs:
“An order setting aside the entire judgment of the trial Court and substituting same with a declaration of title to the disputed land in favour of the 1st appellant.”

The appellants’ amended brief of argument was filed on the 8th of July, 2020. On pages 3 – 4 paragraphs 2.01, four issues for determination in the appeal were distilled out of the grounds of appeal, which are as follows:
(i) Whether the Respondent’s case was competent in the face of non-authorization of Elder J.S. Esan who claimed to have instituted the action as an agent and representative of the Claimant at the trial Court (Distilled from Ground One of the Notice of Appeal).
(ii) Whether the trial Court was not in error when it held that the respondent has sufficiently established the identity of its land as being the same as that of the 1st appellant herein. (Distilled from Ground Two of the Notice of Appeal).
(iii) Whether the learned trial judge was not in error when he held

that there was an outright sale of land between the 2nd appellant’s family and the respondent in 1992. (Distilled from Ground Three of the Notice of Appeal).
(iv) Whether the learned trial Court was not in error when he awarded damages for the Respondent against the appellants herein. (Distilled from Ground Four of the Notice of Appeal).”

Amended brief of the respondent was filed on the 10th day of July, 2020, wherein on page 2 thereof, the four (4) issues for determination contained in the appellants’ amended brief of argument were adopted accordingly. A reply brief on points of law was filed by the appellants on the 21st of July, 2020. In considering the Issues for determination formulated in the briefs of argument of the parties, an appellate Court can either adopt or reframe or even formulate new issues, in the determination of the appeal. This is the law as enunciated in the case of FRN v. Obegolu (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1010) P. 188 @ 225 wherein it was held that, after examining the Issues for determination in the appeal, it is the duty of the appellate Court to either adopt those in the briefs of argument or formulate new ones

which it believes would determine the real complaints or grievances of the appellant. See also Aduku v. Adejoh (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 346) P. 582 and Ikegwuoha v. Ohawuchi (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 435) P. 146.

For precision, clarity and comprehensibility, the issues for determination distilled out of the grounds of appeal, are hereunder compressed into three (3) to be resolved in the determination of the appeal. They are as follow:
(i) Whether suit No: Kws/170/2016 was commenced by Elder J.S Eson on the authority of the respondent (then the claimant), if so, is it competent in law, for the lower Court to adjudicate upon? (Ground 1)
(ii) Whether the learned judge of the lower Court was right when he held that the respondent adduced credible evidence establishing the identity of the land in dispute as same with the parcel of land the 1st appellant is claiming title No. ? (Ground 2)
(iii) Whether the learned judge of the lower Court was right when he held that there was valid sale of the disputed parcel of land by the 2nd appellant to the respondent in 1992? (Ground 3)

ISSUE ONE (1)
On this issue, Salman Abdulfatai Esq., of learned counsel

who settled the appellants’ brief of argument, did submit that, P.WI, in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of the statement on Oath, which he adopted before giving oral evidence before the lower Court, stated that he had the authority of the respondent, and indeed been involved in all the stages of the negotiation in the transaction culminating to the sale of the land in dispute to the respondent. Learned counsel further pointed out that the witness admitted instituting suit No: Kws/170/2016, on behalf of the respondent under cross-examination during the proceedings of the lower Court as recorded on pages 375 to 376 of the printed record of appeal.

Submitting further, learned counsel contended that before a person could legally commence any suit before a Court of law on behalf of a corporate body or entity such a person must have been authorised to do so by the Board of Directors of such legal entity as provided in Sections 63 and 65 of the Companies and Allied Matter Act, 2004. The principles of law enunciated by this Court in the case of S.O & S.S Ltd vs Adun (2016) All FWLR Pt. 860 P.1102 P.1118 @ 1119 has been cited and relied on to buttress the

submissions supra. In view of the foregoing principles of Law, learned counsel did content that, the suit No. Kws/170/2016 before the lower Court, and this appeal emanating therefrom, are both incompetent.

It is learned counsel’s further contention that, since suit No.Kws/170/2016 was instituted without the prior consent or authority of the respondent, the lower Court had no jurisdiction in adjudicating upon same in view of the position of the law as espoused in the cases of Madukolu vs Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR P. 58 and Utih vs Onoyivwe (1991) LPELR-3436 (SC). Learned counsel further submitted that Pw1 had no locus standi in the dispute before the lower Court, therefore, what he did in commencing suit No: Kws/170/2016, cannot be legal in law as propounded in the case of Basinco Motors Ltd vs Woermann Line & Anor (2009) 5-6 SC Pt 2 P. 123 @ 144. Concluding, learned counsel did urge that issue 1 be resolved in favour of the appellants.

Toyin Oladipo Esq., of learned counsel for the respondent, referred to the originating processes of suit No: Kws/170/2016, which are located on pages 26-29 and 30-37 of the record of appeal and he did submit

that the witnesses Pw1, did not participate in the institution of the said suit No: Kws/170/2016 before the lower Court. That the proceedings of the lower Court as recorded in the aforesaid documents contained no information that Pw1 instituted or commenced the said suit on behalf of the respondent. It is learned counsel contention that the provisions of Sections 63, 65 and 66 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, do not support the submissions of learned counsel to the appellant on who is responsible to commence any law suit on behalf of a legal entity such as the respondent. On the issue of lack of locus standi to commence the said suit, learned counsel did submit that since suit No: Kws/170/2016, was instituted by the respondent through his counsel, the issue of lack of locus standi, to commence same cannot arise. Learned counsel referred to the decision of the lower Court on pages 409 to 410 of the printed record of appeal, and submitted that what the learned judge of the lower Court decided is the correct position of the law, and did urge this Court to uphold same. This Court has been urged to resolve issue 1 against the appellant accordingly.

The starting point is the question, who instituted or commenced suit No: Kws/170/2016, before the lower Court. The writ of summons by which suit No: Kws/170/2016, was commenced before the lower Court can be located on pages 27-29 of the printed record of appeal. The writ of summons was taken out by learned counsel to the respondent, Toyin Oladipo Esq. He signed the writ of summons on page 28 of the record of appeal, and on page 29 of same, it has been clearly stated that he did so as counsel to the respondent. Order 2 Rules 1, 2, 3 to 11 of the Kwara State High Court Rules 2005, provides for the manner and form a writ of summons should be taken out in commencing a suit before the High Court of Justice, in Kwara State.
I have read and examined the provisions of Sections 63, 65 and 66 of the Companies and Allied Matter Act, and I have not found anything useful therein on the commencement of legal action in a Court of law by a litigant. There is nothing on record of the lower Court to show or establish that suit No: Kws/170/2016, was commenced by Elder J.S Esan as contended by learned counsel to the appellants. I am in full agreement with the submission of the

learned counsel to the respondent that Pw1 Elder J.S Esan, only represented the respondent in Court as a representative, not the person who commenced the suit No: Kws/170/2016. Mere representation of a party to a suit or action before a Court cannot mean instituting such suit before the Court of law. Having reviewed the proceedings of the lower Court in suit No: Kws/170/2016, the writ of summons, the statement of claim and the arguments canvassed by learned counsel in the briefs of argument before this Court; learned judge of the lower Court was right when he held on page 410 of the printed record of appeal as follows:
“On the whole, he urged me to refuse the objection and dismiss same. I have carefully reflected on the submissions of the respective counsel for and against this preliminary objection. I have also carefully examined the Exhibits referred to.
Without wasting time, I agree entirely with Mr. Toyin Oladipo with regard to the competence of the claimant which is a company in instituting the suit.
It is trite that proper claimant in respect of a wrong to a company is the company and not the members.
Thus, subject to

certain exceptions, the proper claimant in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company or an association of persons is the company or the association of persons itself and not the shareholders or members of the association. See Onuekwusi vs Reg. Trustee of the Christ Methodist Zion Church (2011) 6 NWLR Pt. 1243 P. 361-362 @ 34.”
I am in total agreement with the learned judge of the lower Court. I therefore hold that the suit No: Kws/170/2016 was not commenced by Pw1, Elder J.S Esan as erroneously canvassed by learned counsel to the appellants. The said suit was commenced by the respondent represented by his counsel, Toyin Oladipo Esq., a qualified legal practitioner, who in law can validly and legally take out a writ of summons and sign same as counsel to the respondent. Consequently, I resolve issue 1 against the appellants. The lower Court was right in adjudicating upon the said suit No: Kws/170/2016 for it had the jurisdiction in doing so.

ISSUE TWO (2)
Whether the learned judge of the lower Court was right when he held that the respondent adduced credible evidence establishing the identity of the land he claim to

have purchased from the 2nd appellant? On this issue Salman Abdulfatai Esq., of learned counsel, did submit that in a claim for declaration of title to land, a claimant must adduce credible evidence establishing the identity of the land in dispute. The principles of law espoused in the case of Uchendu vs Ogboni (1999) 4 SCNJ P.64 @ 87 was cited and relied on to buttress the submissions supra. As to what is meant by identity of land, learned counsel submitted that it implies a clear description of particulars or features. It is further submitted that the respondent failed to adduce evidence on the identity of the land he claimed title thereto, notwithstanding, the 2 survey plans admitted in evidence as exhibits. On the need to prove the identity of a parcel of land, where title thereto, has be sought, learned counsel cited and relied on the decisions of the Court in the cases of Sawaba vs Gaadi (2016) All FWLR Pt.823 P.1864 @ 1880 and Babatola vs Aladejana (2001) All FWLR Pt. 61 P.1670 @ 1680, wherein it was held that a parcel of land, where title to same is in contention, its identity must be established by a Survey Plan or by evidence, which

relied on a surveyor can produce its plan with certainty and accuracy without any difficulty. In conclusion, learned counsel submitted that the respondent’s evidence on the identity of the land to which he claimed title thereto, is unreliable and urged this Court not to rely on same.

Toyin Oladipo Esq., of learned counsel to the respondent referred to the averments contained in paragraphs 15-17, 21, 32-35 and 39 of the statement of claim and contended that by the statement on Oath of Pw1 on pages 375-378, 373-374 located on pages 394 -395 of the record of appeal, the identity of the parcel of land to which the respondent claimed title to it, has been established. Learned counsel went further to outline 14 established points out of the pleaded facts and the statement on Oath in prove thereof, and submitted that the foregoing reinforced the identification of the dispute parcel of land.

As to the differences in the name of the disputed land, whether it is “Ekunkunn or Gbedugbedu” learned counsel did submit it is of no consequence since the parties knew the land in dispute as espoused in the cases of Edjekpo vs Osia (2007) All FWLR

Pt.361 P.1617 and Akiti vs Oyekunle (2015) All FWLR Pt.776 P.570 @ 586. Furthermore, learned counsel submitted, Pw2, a surveyor prepared a site plan of the disputed land, which is Exhibit ‘8’ before the lower Court, and that since no other site plan was tendered, learned counsel submit, the lower Court was right in relying on same in its holding that the respondent adduced credible evidence in identifying the parcel of land it claimed title thereto. Concluding, this Court has been urged to resolve issue 2 against the appellants.

The appellants’ contention is that the learned judge of the lower Court was not right when he arrived at the decision that the respondent adduced credible and cogent evidence establishing the identity of the parcel of land in dispute. The law is trite, in an action for declaration of title to a parcel of land, a claimant must, by credible evidence prove or establish the identity of the land such that no one can be in doubt ascertaining same. The foregoing preposition of the principles of law had been the decision of the Courts in a litany of decided cases such as F.B.N. Plc vs Okelewu (2013) 13 NWLR Pt. 1372

425 @ 458, wherein the Court held that:
“In an action for declaration of title to land, it is a fundamental principles of law that the first foremost duty of the claimant is to establish the identity, size, location and boundaries of the land with such reasonable degree of accuracy and certainty that the identity will no longer be in doubt.”
In Okeke vs Nnolim (2015) 5 NWLR Pt. 1453 P.444 @ 464, the Court enunciated that:

must be describe with certainty so that the parties are ad idem as to its identity. This is because a party will not be found to litigate on unidentifiable object. A survey plan or clear map of the area of land in dispute is identified, or land features-streams, rivers, hill, historical monuments, trees and other permanent or semi-permanent objects are clearly pleaded…. It is a cardinal principle in land disputes to clearly indicate the land even if by boundary neighbours whose evidence can clearly show the land in a visit to locus in quo….”
In the case of Nwokidu vs Okanu (2010) 3 NWLR Pt. 1181 P.362, Adekeye, J.S.C summarized the principles of law on identity of land in dispute at pages 391 to 392 in these words:
“Where a plaintiff claims declaration and injunction, the area of land in dispute must be properly identified in view of the order of injunction which cannot be granted in respect of an undefined area. Therefore, a plaintiff who claims a declaration of title must prove clearly the area of land to which his claim relates and the boundaries thereof. The land must be described with certainty so as to entitle him to

an order of injunction. It is a basic step in a claim for declaration. If he failed to prove boundaries of the land he asserts to be in dispute or did not satisfactorily describe the dimension and locality or the description contradicts the plan, the proper order to make is one of dismissal. A relief of declaration of title being discretionary cannot be granted by any Court when the identity of land is not clearly and unambiguously established.”
Of recent, in the case of Alhaji Sule Sawaba vs Mr. S.O Gaadi (2016) All FWLR Pt. 823 P.1864 @ 1888, this Court had this to say:
“This duty to establish the identity of the land in dispute with certainty is referred to as the foremost and fundamental duty of a person claiming an interest in land because where a claimant fails to plead and establish the precise area of the land to which his claim relates, whatever evidence whether oral or documentary, he produces at the trial and however cogent and credible the evidence might appear, it cannot, in law, ground a claim of an interest in land in his favor.”

In the determination of whether the respondent who was the claimant at the lower

Court adduced credible and cogent evidence establishing the identity of the parcel of land he claimed to have purchased or acquired from the family of the 2nd respondent or not, it is necessary, at this juncture, to refer to the pleadings and the evidence adduced through them. Paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 21, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 39 of the Amended Statement of Claim, which can be located on pages 251 to 260 of the printed record of appeal are germane. The evidence of Pw1 Elder J.S Esan and that of Pw2 Yomi Babadoye, which are located on pages 374 to 378, and that of Pw5 on pages 304 to 395 respectively, already established identity of the land in dispute.

The appellants relied heavily on Exhibit Dw1, tendered and admitted in evidence through the 1st appellant. It is the contention of the appellant that, if Exhibit 8 and Exhibit Dw1 are compared, it would clearly be seen that the parcel of land to which the respondent claimed to have purchased from the 2nd appellant, is same with that to which the 1st appellant claimed to have purchased from the same 2nd appellant. To ascertain whether the parcel of land in Exhibit 8 and Exhibit Dw1 are same and one, a resort to

the Statement on Oath of the 1st appellant, which can be found on page 171, especially paragraphs 10 and 11 thereof, is apt. In the aforesaid paragraphs, the 1st appellant deposed to these facts in his Statement on Oath, which was adopted at the hearing when testifying at the lower Court. Paragraphs 10 and 11 are as follows:
“(10) That I know as a fact that I hired a heavy duty machine to bulldoze a portion of the land sold to me by the 2nd defendant’s family.
(11) That I know as a fact that the driver of the heavy duty machine reported to me that while he and his staff were bulldozing the land they were challenged by one Elder Esan to stop work claiming that the land belongs to a company whose name is Tosin Novel Firms Nigeria Limited.”

From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties, that is the 1st appellant, and the respondent both knew the land they were disputing its ownership or title thereto. The fact that different names were given to the parcel of land in dispute by the parties “GBEDUGBEDU OR EKUNKUN” is of no legal significance in the determination of who between the respondent and the 1st appellant has

proved a better title to the said land. The conflict in the name(s) of the disputed land can easily be solved bearing in mind the principles of law espoused the case of Akiti vs Oyekunle (2015) All FWLR Pt. 776 P.570 @ 586, wherein, this Court propounded that:
“It is apparent that in the instant case, that the land in dispute is known to all the parties even though it is being called by different names or described differently. The law is settled that where the identity of the land in dispute is known to the parties, the fact that different names are given to the land or area where the land is located is called by separate names, is not fatal to the case of the party claiming interest in such land. In EDJEKPO v. OSIA (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 361) 1617, (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1037) 635 at 671 – 672 Paras H – B, the Supreme Court, per ONNOGHEN JSC held:
“…it is not strange, in fact it is a common feature in a claim for title to land that parties to the dispute call the land in dispute by different names, and will always identify different landmarks as constituting the boundary features of the land. The Courts have always seen

through the contrivances and determine the real issue in controversy between the parties, which is; who is the actual party entitled to be declared the owner.”
In the instance case and from the finding of the trial Court, the claimant produced both a survey plan and a composite plan identifying the area of the land in dispute and it is trite law that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the findings of facts by a trial judge unless same is shown to be perverse.”
Furthermore, in paragraphs 10 to 12 of his Statement of Oath, the 1st appellant deposed to these facts as located on pages 171 of the record of appeal, as follows:
“10. That I know as a fact that I hired a heavy duty machine to bulldozer a portion of the land sold to me by the 2nd defendant’s family.
11. That I know as a fact that the driver of the heavy duty machine reported to me that while he and his staff were bulldozing the land they were challenged by one Elder J.A. Esan to stop work claiming that the land belongs to a company whose name is Tosin Novel Firms Nig. Ltd.
12. That I know as a fact that

the land that was bulldozed belongs to me and not to Tosin Novel Firms Nig. Ltd or any one whatsoever.”
By the foregoing depositions of the 1st appellant, it is not in doubt that he knew the land in dispute was sold to the respondent and also to him. This parcel of land in dispute was well-known to the respondent and the 1st appellant. I am in full agreement with the learned judge of the lower Court when he held as recorded on pages 420 – 421 of the printed record of appeal thus:
“I seem to agree with the submission of Toyin Oladipo Esq., that the claimant and defendants are talking about the same piece of land and it does not matter whatsoever name anybody decides to give to or call the land in the event of dispute.
I also share his view that there is no paragraph in the 2nd defendant’s statements on oath where the location of Gbedugbedu land is given as distinct from the land that the defendants now call or refer to as Ekunkun land.
For clarity, paragraph 33 of the 2nd defendant’s statement on oath states as follows:
33. That my Family’s representatives resident in Afon (the situs of the

land in question) knows the length and breath of Ajara Family land located at Ajara Family land. Gbedugbedu Area Afon Asa LGA of Kwara State.
It is important to note that while the claimant called the surveyor who survey his land to testify and tendered a survey plan showing the extent and location of its own land at Gbedugbedu Area, the 1st defendant neither called his own surveyor nor tender a survey plan.
More importantly, in paragraph 3 of his written Statement on Oath No. 2 which he adopted, Pw.2 who drew the survey plan marked as Exhibit 8 stated categorically that it is the same land at Gbedugbedu Area Afon that the defendants now refer to as Ekunkun land.
Like I said earlier the defendant did not call any surveyor or even give evidence of the exact location of the land called Ekunkun; it is therefore my view that Gbedugbedu and Ekunkun land is one and the same and the claimant and defendants are talking about the same piece of land.
I hold therefore that the claimant has sufficiently established the identity of the land in dispute as being the same as that of the 1st defendant.”

Consequently, issue 2 is hereby resolved against the appellant, but in favour of the respondent.

ISSUE THREE (3)
Whether the learned judge of the lower Court was right when he held that there was an outright sale of the disputed parcel of land between the 2nd appellant’s family and the respondent? Learned counsel to the appellants’ Salman Abdulfatai Esq., made elaborate and extensive submissions citing a litany of authorities in support thereof, that the evidence adduced by the respondent particularly Exhibits 1 and 4, have not proved that there was outright sale of the disputed parcel of land by the 2nd appellant to the respondent. It is learned counsel’s further contention that for any transaction under Yoruba Customary law to be complete and valid, there must be payment of purchase price, the purchaser put into possession and witnesses to such transaction. The principle of law espoused in the cases of Odusoga vs Ricketts (1997) 7 NWLR Pt. 511 P. 1 and Ogundalu vs Macjob (2015) 3-4 SC Pt. 2 P.1 @ 22-28 were cited and relied on to buttress the submissions supra.

On the payment of the purchase price, learned counsel did submit that same must be paid in full for there to

be valid sale of land as required under customary law. Referring to the evidence adduced before the lower Court, learned counsel pointed out that the respondent did not fully pay the purchase price when he purchased the land in 1992, therefore, there cannot be valid transfer of title in the disputed land to the respondent, even if he had taken possession of the land. In view of the foregoing, learned counsel contended that there was no valid sale of the land in dispute between the 2nd appellant and the respondent. This Court has been urged to resolve issue 3 in favour of the appellants.

For the respondent, Toyin Oladipo Esq., of learned counsel, referred to Exhibit 1 and submitted that the Sum of N50,000.00 and N80,000.00 were paid to the Afon family of Ajara through Alhaji Alabi Labaika, in respect of purchase of the parcel of land in Afon. That there is nothing in Exhibit 1 to show that the transaction was conditional. It is learned counsel’s contention that the contents of Exhibit 4 clearly shows that the transaction between the 2nd appellant and the respondent was unconditional. Submitting further, learned counsel pointed out that Exhibits 4,

5 and 6 are documents relevant to the transaction between the respondent and the 2nd appellant in respect of the land in dispute. That being documents, no oral evidence can be used to vary or alter their contents as provided under Section 128 of the Evidence Act. This Court has been urged to resolve issue 3 against the appellants and to hold that the transaction between the respondent and the 2nd appellant was unconditional, valid and binding on the parties.

In determining whether the transaction for the sale of the parcel of land between the 2nd appellant and the respondent was unconditional or not, the following documents are to be examined. The documents are Exhibits 1, 3, 4 and 6. The agreement made or entered into between the Ajara family of Afon and the respondent which is annexed to Exhibit 4 is thus:
“NOW THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSES AS FOLLOWS:
In pursuance of this Agreement and in consideration of the purchase price of One Hundred and Thirty Thousand Naira (N130,000.00) paid by the purchaser to the vendor (the receipt whereof the vendors hereby acknowledge) the vendors as the customary owners acting for and on behalf of the entire

Ajara family in their respective capacity as the Heads and Principal members of the said family hereby sells and transfers to the purchaser absolutely and unencumbered ALL THAT piece or parcel of land lying, situate and being at Gbedugbedu Area, Afon in Asa Local Government Area, Kwara State of Nigeria (the said land being more particularly described, demarcated and delineated in the site plan attached hereto).”
The concluding part of the Exhibit reads, thus:
“The vendors having finally divested themselves of any right customary or otherwise which they previously exercised over the land hereby vest the same in the purchaser and her assigns absolutely and unencumbered.”

Based on the content of the agreement annexed to Exhibit 4, reproduced supra, it cannot be disputed that the transaction between the Ajara Family and the respondent is unconditional transfer of title or interest of the said land to the respondent. There is no other agreement or any type of other transaction that was entered into for the sale of same land to another person which was Exhibit 4. The 2nd appellant’s family confirmed that the sale of the

disputed land to the respondent was unconditional. The relevant part of the Exhibit 4 are thus:
“….The VENDORS as BENEFICIAL OWNERS hereby support fully and stand by their earlier conveyance, and transfer TO THE PURCHASER OF ALL THAT PARCEL OF LAND situate, lying and being at Afon in Asa LGA measuring 255.772 hectares and which said parcel of land with all its dimensions is more particularly described, on the attached survey plan and in the schedule hereto appearing.”

In view of the foregoing, I am in full agreement with the learned judge of the lower Court, when he found and held in his judgment delivered on the 25th day of February 2019, which can be located on pages 426 to 427 of the printed record of appeal, thus:
“I hold therefore like I have held before that the contract for the purchase of the land at Gbedugbedu was concluded as far back as 1992 and re-validated in 2006 on the payment of a further sum of N500,000.00 as the agreed price.
In consequence, I hold that the sale of Ajara family land of Afon in Asa Local Government Area of Kwara State in 1992 and 2006 to the claimant was never a conditional sale

rather, it was an outright disposition of their Legal interest. I also hold that there is no outstanding money to be paid by the claimant to the Defendants.”

I resolve issue 3 against the appellants. Having resolved the 3 issues against the appellants, the appeal fails, same is dismissed accordingly. The judgment of the lower Court delivered on the 25th of February, 2019, in suit No: Kws/170/2016, is hereby affirmed. The respondent is entitled to costs. I hereby asses the sum of N 100,000.00 as cost awarded to the respondent.

THE CROSS-APPEAL
The Notice of the cross-appeal was filed on the 22nd day of October, 2020, with a lone ground of appeal, thus:
GROUND ONE: ERROR IN LAW
The lower Court erred in law by awarding a meager N250,000.00 as general damages against the Cross Respondents after making a finding of trespass against them.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(1) The claim of the claimant (now Cross Appellant) was for N50 Million damages for trespass.
(2) The total land area of the land is 255.772 Hectares while the Area trespassed upon is 56.172 Hectares.
(3) The Cross Respondents unlawfully went into Cross

Appellant’s land which it had paid for on two occasions.
(4) Cross Respondents took a bull dozer into the land and demolished and destroyed Gmelina trees and Survey beacons planted on the land to mark Cross Appellant’s boundary as far back as 1990s.
(5) The 2nd Cross Respondent broke many covenants which his family made in Exhibits 4 and 6 to give quiet possession to the Cross Appellant.
(6) The Cross Respondents trespassed into the Cross Appellant’s land willfully and recklessly.
(7) The 1st Cross Respondent has been using the land to farm and make profit while the Cross Appellant has been deprived of his land for farming.
(8) The award of N250,000.00 by the lower Court is abysmally low based on the circumstances.
(9) The Cross Appellant is entitled not only to aggravated but exemplary and punitive damages.

The cross-appellant prayed the Court for the following reliefs:
RELIEFS SOUGHT FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL
(a) To allow the appeal.
(b) To enhance the award made by the trial Court.
(c) To grant the N50 Million damages claimed.

The cross-appellant’s brief of argument was filed on the 10th of July, 2020, with a lone issue for determination in the cross-appeal, on page 2 of the Amended Respondent Cross-Appellant’s brief of argument. The lone issue for determination is thus:
Whether the sum of N250,000.00 awarded by the trial Court is not ridiculously or inordinately low?

Toyin Oladipo Esq., of learned counsel, referred to the findings and decision of the lower Court, which can be located on page 414 of the printed record of appeal, which is to the effect that the cross-appellant planted gmchina trees on the land which was destroyed by the 1st cross-respondent and submitted, that the award of the sum of N250,000.00 only as damages is too low, especially in view of the evidence of Pw1 Elder J.S Esan who testified that the cross-appellant was earning large sums of money from selling of the Gmalina trees, some of which were destroyed by the 1st appellant. Learned counsel did contend that the award of damages is at the discretion of the Court, but that such discretion must be exercised judicially and judiciously. The principles of law propounded in the case of Garba vs Kur

(2003) All FWLR Pt. 148 P.1277 @ 1291, was cited and relied on to buttress the submissions supra. Submitting further, learned counsel contended that the size of the land which was encroached or trespassed into by the 1st cross-respondent was not taken into consideration when assessing the quantum of damages awarded by the lower Court. That if, the lower Court had given due consideration to the foregoing, the quantum of damages would have been more and urged this Court to review same and award appropriately, the damages to which the cross-appellant is entitled to. In conclusion, learned counsel submitted on page 2 of the brief of argument that:
(i) “The trial Court did not consider relevant factors or materials in awarding damages of N250,000.00.
(ii) The lower Court awarded a most ridiculous amount as damages in the circumstance of the case.”

The Court has been urged to resolve the sole issue for determination in favour of the cross-appellant and to review the quantum of damages awarded by the lower Court accordingly.

Salman Abdulfatai Esq., of learned counsel who settled the cross-respondents’ brief of argument did

submit that for damages to be payable the claimant must adduce evidence to warrant the Court to award same to the claimant. It is learned counsel’s contention that the respondent did not prove that he suffered the injuries due to the conduct of the cross-respondents, therefore, the learned judge of the lower Court was right when he awarded the sum of N250,000.00 general damages to it.

On the award of general damages, it is learned counsel’s submission that, a Court of law has discretion but such discretion is to be exercised objectively and also reasonability. That, where the Court failed to be guided by the principles of law or without considering the reasonableness of the award, an appellate Court, on appeal, can review such award in accordance with the principles of law espoused in First Inland Bank vs Craft 2000 Ltd (2013) All FWLR Pt. 660 P.1416 @ 1429. Learned counsel did urge that the award of damages to the cross-appellant should not be reviewed, for the reasons adumbrated supra.

On page 428 of the printed record of appeal, the learned judge of the lower Court, in arriving at the decision to award damages in favour of the

cross-appellant, against the cross-respondents for trespass to the land in dispute in the judgment delivered on the 25th of February, 2019, held as follows:
The law is settled that once a party is shown to be the owner of a piece of land, he is in exclusive possession or has a right to such possession and anyone on the land without his permission is trespasser ab initio.
See: ONAGORUWA VS. AKINREMI (2001) 13 NWLR (PT. 729) 38 x 59.
I have resolved in issue 2 above that the claimant has made an outright purchase of the disputed land, having paid the agreed price, it follows therefore that the defendants who are on the land without the express permission or consent of the claimant are trespassers.

In concluding the judgment on page 429 of the printed record of appeal, the learned judge of lower Court went on to espoused thus:
“On the whole, having regard to the evidence adduced and the exhibits tendered in this case, I hold that there is merit in the claimant’s case. The claimant has proved its case as required by law.
I hold therefore that there is merit in the claimant’s case and I hereby enter judgment in its favour.

I award general damages of N250,000.00 against the defendants.”

Was the learned judge of the lower Court justified in awarding only the sum of N250,000.00 as general damages in favour of the cross-appellant against the cross- respondents. What is general damages? When can same be awarded by a Court of law? What are the guiding principles of law that are to be applied in awarding damages? In UBA Plc vs Ogundokun (2009) 6 NWLR Pt. 1138 P.450 @ 489 general damages has been defined to be:
“General damages are damages which the law implies or presumes to have accrued from the wrong complained of or as the immediate, direct and proximate result of or the necessary result of the wrong complained of. It is awarded by the Court where it cannot point at any measure to assess the loss caused by the wrong complained of except the opinion and judgment of a reasonable man. See Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Akinfosile (1969) NWLR 217; Beecham Group Ltd. v. Essdee Food Products (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 11) 112; A. G. Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotels Ltd. (No. 2) (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 121) 255; Consolidated Breweries Plc. V. Aisowieren (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 736) 424.”

General damages flows generally from the defendant’s wrongful act or omission hence they are implied by law and need not to be specifically pleaded and strictly proved by evidence. See also Hanseatic Int. Ltd. v. Usang (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt. 784) P. 784. It is important to take note that a Court in awarding damages should scrutinized a claim of general damages where a claim for special damages is also claimed and awarded in order to avoid double compensation. If the plaintiff recovers fully under special damages, the claim of general damages should be awarded with caution to avoid double compensation. See UBA PLC. v. Ogundokun supra P. 491. In awarding general damages, the trial Court has discretion when assessing the quantum. The circumstances and the evidence adduced before the Court must be related to the desirability to award general damages, especially the quantum of the damages to be awarded. See Okoko v. Dakolo (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1040) 401 @ 434.
An Appellate Court is not to interfere or disturb the awarding and assessment of general damages unless there is the need to do so under certain circumstances to be proved by

the party complaining on whether the assessment was wrongly done or unjustifiable in law. In Ahmed v. CBN (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) P. 524 @ 541, the Supreme Court Per Adekeye, J.S.C. enunciated that:
“Award of damages is an exercise of discretion by the trial Court. An appellate Court will not interfere with an award of damages by a trial Court unless it is made under certain peculiar circumstances which include:
(1) Where the exercise of discretion by the trial Court is perverse.
(2) Where the Court acted under wrong principles of law, or
(3) Where the Court acted in disregard of applicable principles; or
(4) Where the Court acted in misapprehension of facts; or
(5) Where the Court took into consideration irrelevant matters and disregarded relevant matters whilst considering its award or
(6) Where injustice will result if the appellate Court does not act; or
(7) Where the amount awarded is ridiculously low or ridiculously high that it must have been an erroneous estimate of the damages.”
See Zik’s Press Ltd. V. Ikoku (1951) 13 WACA pg. 407; Bola v. Bankole (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 27) P. 141; Elf (Nig.) Ltd. V. Sillo (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 350) P. 258.”

A Georgewell, J.C.A when considering the award of general damages by a trial Court and when and why an appellant can review same postulated as following in the case of Inspector General of Police & 2 Ors vs Peter O. Ikpila (2016) 9 NWLR Pt.1517 P.236 @ 297, thus:
“I am aware and have indeed averted my mind to all the principles of law governing the award of damages or compensation and the permissible grounds for intervention by an appellate Court to either increase or reduce award made by a trial Court, the most basic of which principles is that an appellate Court will interfere and upset damages awarded by a trial Court where it is shown that the amount awarded is manifestly too high or too low or that the trial Court has acted on wrong principles of law. This is so because it must always be borne in mind, particularly by trail Courts, as it is very important, that assessment and measure of damages or compensation is not a gold mine for the successful litigant but meant truly and justifiably to reasonably compensate the victim for the wrong committed against him. See the locus classicus of

Flint v. Lovell (1935) 1 KB 354 at P. 360 per Greer, LJ. See also African Newspaper Ltd. v. Ciroma (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt.423) 156; Hassan v. Tade (2011) 19 WRN 130.
Again, in First Inland Bank vs Craft 2000 Ltd (2013) All FWLR Pt. 660 P.1416 @ 1429, this Court held that:
“The award of general damages is a matter for the trial Court and an appeal Court will not interfere with such an award except in circumstances well recognized by law, among which are where the trial judge has acted under a mistake of law or has acted in disregard of principal, and injustice will result if the appeal Court does not interfere. In the instant case, the award of N 25,000,000.00 (Twenty-five Million Naira) as general and exemplary damages for breach of contract by the lower Court was an error of law and in disregard of principle laid down for the award of damages and liable to be set aside. See also Odugwu vs AGF (1996) All NLR 480; Allied Bank of (Nig) Ltd vs Akubueze (1997) 6 SCNJ 16.”
In the case of Ahmed vs CBN (2013) 2 NWLR Pt. 1339, supra at page 541, Adekeye J.S.C enumerated the circumstance in which an appellate Court can interfere and review the

award of damages by a trial Court, one of such is that “When the quantum awarded is ridiculously low or ridiculously high that it must have been an erroneous estimate of the damages.” In the case before the lower Court, now on appeal before this Court, the learned judge of the lower Court in estimating the quantum of the damages he awarded to the respondent, did not consider the size of the land trespassed upon by the 1st appellant; the gmalina tree destroyed and their economic value to the cross-appellant. If the learned judge of the lower Court had taken into consideration the damages done to the parcel of land in dispute together with the destruction of the economic gmalina trees, he would not have awarded the sum of N250,000.00 only as general damages to the cross-respondent. This is the type of under estimation of damages that trial Courts usually award to successful litigation for no justifiable reason. In the end result, I resolve the lone issue for determination in the cross-appeal in favour of the cross-appellant. I do hereby allow the cross-appeal. The award of the sum of N250,000.00 as general damages in favour of the cross-appellant is

hereby set aside. In its place, I award the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Naira (N500,000.00) only as general damages to the cross-appellant against the cross-respondents jointly. I make no order as to costs.

AHMAD OLAREWAJU BELGORE, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother IBRAHIM SHATA BDLIYA.

Having resolved all the three issues against the Appellant, I agree that the appeal is unmeritorious and it is liable to be dismissed.

I dismissed the appeal and affirm the decision of the lower Court. I also allow the cross-appeal and abide by the consequential Order contained in the lead judgment.

UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.: I agree.

Appearances:

S U jabata Esq., with him A.O Mahmood and M.I Olohungbebe For Appellant(s)

Toyin Oladipo, Esq. For Respondent(s)