ANIFOWOSE MUYIDEEN v. THE STATE (2019)

ANIFOWOSE MUYIDEEN v. THE STATE

(2019)LCN/13289(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 17th day of May, 2019

CA/IB/504C/2017

JUSTICES

HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ABUBAKAR MAHMUD TALBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

FOLASADE AYODEJI OJO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ANIFOWOSE MUYIDEEN Appellant(s)

AND

THE STATE Respondent(s)

RATIO

THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY

The actus reus or the fact of conspiracy is the mere agreement between the conspirators to do the unlawful thing or the lawful thing by unlawful means. Accordingly, in a charge of conspiracy, it is necessary that the prosecution establish the element of agreement to do something which is unlawful or to do something which is lawful but done by unlawful means. It is however not every agreement between two or more persons that will constitute a crime. Thus, to constitute a crime, there must be some evidence indicative of the commission of the crime for which the conspiracy is intended to achieve. In other words, the evidence adduced by the prosecution must point to a Criminal intent or design. See Ushie v. State (2018) 11 NWLR (pt.1629) 139,Ugboji v. State (2018) 10 NWLR (pt.1627) 346; Akogwu v. State (2018) 3 NWLR (pt.1605) 137 and Erim v. State (1994) 5 NWLR (pt.346) 522. PER TSAMMANI, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT DRAWS INFERENCE FROM THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL TO ADDUCE THE OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY

It is not in doubt that the offence of conspiracy is often hatched in secrecy. In other words, in most cases, there will be no direct evidence of the agreement. That being so, the Courts often resort to drawing inferences from the evidence adduced at the trial. Accordingly, the Court may draw such inference from the acts or manner the accused person or persons conducted themselves towards actualizing the common purpose for which the conspiracy was hatched. Thus, the acts done by each of the conspirators towards achieving or in furtherance of the agreement is always helpful in reaching a conclusion as to whether or not the conspiracy is founded. See Olakunle v. State (2018) 6 NWLR (pt.1614) 91; Onyenye v. the State (2012) 15 NWLR (pt.1324) 586; Peter v. State (2018) 13 NWLR (pt.1635) 1 and Ikemson v. State (1989) 3 NWLR (pt.110) 455. In the case of Oladejo v. State (2018) 11 NWLR (pt.1630) 238 at 247 paragraphs A ? B, Galinje, JSC said:
The gist of the offence of conspiracy is the meeting of the minds of the conspirators?.. It is therefore difficult to prove the offence of conspiracy by direct evidence. Conspiracy is a matter of inference from the criminal act of the parties concerned which act is done in pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose. It is therefore the duty of the Court in every case of criminal conspiracy to ascertain as best as it could the evidence of the complicity of any of those charge with the offence?. PER TSAMMANI, J.C.A.

HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the Ogun State High Court of Justice, delivered by O. O. Majekodunmi; J in Suit No: AB/35C/2014 on the 14th day of August, 2017.

By an Amended Charge dated and filed on the 5th day of May, 2017, the Appellant and one other were arraigned, tried and convicted on a two counts charge which reads as follows:
COUNT 1:
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A FELONY contrary to and punishable under Section 516 of the Criminal Code Laws of Ogun State of Nigeria, 2006.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
ANIFOWOSE MUYIDEEN (M) and KEHINDE OLUGBEMI (M) sometimes in the month of March, 2013 at Ogun State High Court, Isabo, Abeokuta in Abeokuta Judicial Division conspired to commit a felony, to wit: official corruption.
COUNT II:
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
OFFICIAL CORRUPTION contrary to and punishable under Section 98(1) of the Criminal Code, Laws of Ogun State of Nigeria, 2006.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
ANIFOWOSE MUYIDEEN (M) and KEHINDE OLUGBEMI (M) sometimes in the month of March, 2013, at Ogun State High

Court, Isabo, Abeokuta in the Abeokuta Judicial Division being under the employment of the Ogun State Judiciary as Bailiffs collected the sum of N1,900,000.00 (One Million, Nine Hundred Thousand Naira Only) from Eze Emeka without authorization and thereby committed a felony to wit: official corruption.

It would be seen that the Appellant was the 1st accused person in the Amended Charge. The prosecution?s case against the Appellant and the co-accused is that they were mandated by the Deputy-Sheriff of the Ogun State High Court of Justice, sometimes in March, 2013 to conduct an auction sale of certain items, to wit: a generating set and a Turbo DAF Truck. That the Appellant and the co-accused received from one Eze Emeka the sum of One Million, Nine Hundred Thousand Naira (N1,900,000.00) only as the purchase price of the Turbo DAF Truck without due authorization. That by so doing, they committed a felony, to wit: official corruption which is an offence punishable under Section 98(1) of the Criminal Code Law of Ogun State, 2006.

?In prove of their case, the prosecution called five (5) witnesses who testified as PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5; and

tendered exhibits which were marked as Exhibits ?A? ? ?P?. The Appellant testified as the DW1 and called his wife who testified as DW2. At the close of evidence, counsel filed and exchanged Written Addresses, and in a considered judgment delivered on the 14/8/2017, the Appellant and the co-accused were convicted on both counts. The Appellant being aggrieved by that decision has filed this appeal.

The Notice of Appeal is that dated the 23/10/17 and filed on the 25/10/17. See pages 162 ? 168 of the record of appeal. It consists of four (4) grounds of appeal. In compliance with the Rules of this Court, the parties filed and exchanged Briefs of Arguments. The Appellant?s Brief of Arguments was dated the 18/1/2018 and filed on the 22/1/18 but deemed filed on the 28/11/18. Two issues were distilled therein for determination as follows:
(i) Whether from the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, a case of conspiracy and official corruption has been proved beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant.
[Grounds 1, 2 and 3].
?(ii) Whether the trial Court did not misdirected (sic) itself when

it disbelieved the evidence of DW1 and DW2 thereby releasing the sum of N150,000.00 to the complainant.
[Ground 4].

The Respondent?s Brief of Arguments was dated and filed on the 01/2/2019 but deemed on 27/3/19. Only one issue was distilled therein as follows:
1. Whether from the entirety of the Exhibits and evidence available on the Record, the conviction of the Appellant for the offences of conspiracy to commit official corruption as well as official corruption is justified in the circumstances of this case.

Upon being served the Respondent?s Brief of Arguments, the Appellant filed an Appellant?s Reply Brief. It was dated and filed on the 22/3/19 but deemed filed on the 27/3/19.

I have reflected on the issues formulated by both parties. After, considering the facts of the case and the issues appealed against, I am of the view that the following issues will adequately determine the appeal:
(a) Whether, upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court below was right when it convicted the Appellant on the charge of official corruption?.
?(b) Whether the charge of

conspiracy to commit a felony, to wit: official corruption was proved beyond reasonable doubt?.
(c) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in ordering that the sum of N150,000.00 be released to the complainant, considering the facts before the Court?.

Now, on issue one (1), learned counsel for the Appellant argued that by virtue of Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the case of Chukwuma v. FRN (2011) 5 S.C.N.J. 40 at 55, the prosecution had the onus of proving the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. That, it presupposes that all the ingredients of the offence charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. That, in criminal cases, both the actus reus and mens rea must be found to co-exist. The case of Ononuju v. State (2014) 8 NWLR (pt.1409) 345 at 394 paragraphs G was therefore cited in support.

On the conviction for official corruption, learned counsel contended that the essential ingredients encapsulated in Section 98(1) of the Criminal Code, Law of Ogun State (supra), are as follows:
(i) that the accused person is employed in the public service;
(ii) that the accused person has been charged with a

duty aside the administration of justice; and
(iii) that the accused person corruptly asked, received or obtained, or agreed or attempted to receive or obtain any benefit for himself or any other person on account of discharging his official duties.

?Learned Counsel for the Appellant conceded that the first ingredient of the offence has been proved. That in prove of the 2nd and 3rd ingredients, the prosecution tendered Exhibits ?A?, ?B?, ?E1?, ?E2?, ?F1? ? ?F3?, ?G1? ? ?G3?, ?H?, ?J? and ?K?. That an examination of those exhibits and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, would show that the third ingredient was not proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution; and that, in fact, several doubts had been created in the prosecution?s case. That from the testimony of the PW1 (who is the victim of the alleged crime) there is no evidence that the Appellant corruptly demanded or received any benefit from the transaction in the discharge of his official duties. It was then argued that, PW1

stated categorically that it was the 2nd accused person who told him (Appellant) the price of the truck and the amount to be paid for the truck and the purported commission. That PW1 maintained under cross-examination that it was the 2nd accused person that asked him to pay to the Appellant.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant also submitted that the Appellant never demanded for or relieved any sum of money as proceeds of corruption. That all he did was to comply with the directive of his superior by receiving the money and that obedience to official instruction given in the usual course of the official duty cannot amount to intent to commit corruption. The case of AGIP v. AGIP (2010) 1 SCNJ 1 at 49 was then cited to submit that the decision of the trial Court did not flow from the evidence before the Court, especially when Exhibits ?A? and ?B? which were neither made nor addressed to the Appellant have no bearing on the involvement of the Appellant in the crime perpetrated. That though PW2 testified that the Appellant and the co-accused person did not deny collecting the money from PW1, the evidence before the Court does not in any

way state that the money was demanded for or received by the Appellant as proceed of corruption. Furthermore, that the money received was refunded to the PW1 by the Appellant; and therefore cannot be accused of benefiting from the transaction.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant went on to submit that, Exhibits ?E1? and ?F1? which are statements made to the police by one Idowu Anuoluwapo, who was initially charged along with the Appellant, has no evidential value as the said Anuoluwapo did not testify at the trial and so was never cross-examined. That Exhibits ?E2? and ?F2? which are extra-judicial statements of the Appellant were firm denial of participation of the Appellant in the transaction leading to his trial and conviction. That the only role the Appellant played was to receive the money in obedience to the instruction of this superior (the co-accused). It was then argued that, in the circumstances, the Court must be wary of believing the extra-judicial statement of the co-accused (Exhibit ?F3?), who has his own interest to serve. The case of Ononuju v. State (supra) at 387 paragraphs F

? G was cited in support and to submit that the trial Court did not warn itself before acting on the statement of the co-accused to convict.

It was further submitted by learned counsel for the Appellant that, the testimony of PW3 tend to support or aid the case of the Appellant. Referring to some aspects of the testimony of PW3, learned counsel contended that, the Appellant was not the official in charge of the auction but same was supervised by the PW3 that fixed the price for the truck and passed the information to the co-accused. It was then submitted that, the Appellant was only caught in the web of the transaction because he obeyed the instruction of his superior officer (2nd accused) by collecting the money from PW1 but had no intention to perpetrate a crime. It was therefore submitted that the charge of the Appellant with the 2nd accused person on official corruption has not been proved against the Appellant and his conviction thereon should not be allowed to stand.

Mr. Bamidele A. Adebayo; Esq (Administrator General and Public Trustee) of the Ogun State Ministry of Justice first of all cited the case of Jua v. The State (2010) 2 SCM 68

at 70 to submit that, in a criminal trial, the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. That, for the prosecution to succeed in a charge of official corruption, they must lead evidence to prove the following facts:
1. that the accused person is or was at the time of the crime a public servant;
2. that the accused person was charged with the performance of any duty by virtue of his employment; and
3. that the accused person corruptly asked, received, or obtained; or agreed or attempted to receive or obtain any property or benefit of any kind.

?It was then contended, in agreement with the Appellant, that the fact that the Appellant was a Bailiff in the service of Ogun State Judiciary at the time the crime was alleged to have been committed is not in dispute. That the Appellant as a Bailiff had a specific job description was also not in dispute. That the evidence on record disclose that the Appellant and the co-accused person as Bailiffs were in charge of an auction sale. That the PW1 bidded for the truck listed on the auction notice and same was sold to him at the total sum of One Million, Nine Hundred

Thousand Naira (N1,900,000.00) only which he paid; and the money was received by the Appellant on the instruction of the co-accused person. That when the truck was not delivered to him on the date specified, he approached the Appellant?s co-accused and demanded a refund of his money since the transaction had proved abortive.
?
Learned Counsel for the Respondent went on to submit that, the Appellant and the co-accused person were aware that the truck was not available at the time of the auction but went ahead to collect or receive the sum of N1.9M for the truck. That the action of the Appellant was therefore in breach of Auction Notice (Exhibit ?C?) as there was no public bidding for the truck, payment was made before the sale and the purchaser was not given possession of the truck immediately upon payment. It was then contended that all those facts lead to no other conclusion than that, the Appellant acted in a corrupt manner. Furthermore, that the Appellant admitted under cross-examination that he collected the money from PW1 under the instruction of the co-accused. That, though the Appellant issued the PW1 a hand written acknowledgement

that he received the money, it took much later before the money was refunded after several demands.

It was further argued by learned counsel for the Respondent that, the Appellant had admitted vide Exhibits ?E2? and ?F2? that he collected the money and was in his possession as he had kept same in the bank but did not refund the money to PW1 until after a month. Furthermore, that the Appellant did not acknowledge receipt of the money by issuing an official receipt nor did he inform his superiors that such large such belonging to the Ogun State Judiciary was in his possession. The cases of Akpa v. State (2008) 8 S.C.M. 68; Adeleke v. The State (2013) 12 S.C.M. 1 at 13; Nwachukwu v. State (2007) 12 S.C.M. (pt.2) 447 at 455 and Oseni v. State (2012) 4 S.C.M. 150 at 150 were cited in support; and to also submit that, the extra-judicial statements of the Appellant (Exhibits ?E2? and ?F2?) were confessional of the crime charged and the trial Court could rely on it to convict. Learned Counsel for the Respondent then cited the case of Ismail v. State (2011) 10 S.C.M. 35 at 39 to submit that, the confessional

statements of the Appellant having been corroborated by the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses, the trial Court could safely convict on it. That, there are no contradictions and/or discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as to affect the probative value of such evidence. The cases of Michael Ebeinwe v. The State (2011) 3 S.C.M. 46 at 47; Ndukwe v. The State (2009) 2 S.C.M. 147 at 150; Musa v. The State (2013) 3 S.C.M. 79 at 93 and Attah v. State (2010) 5 S.C.M. 57 at 60 were cited in support.

On the contention of the Appellant that the Statements Anuoluwapo, tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibits ?E1? and ?F1?, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that, the prosecution was not under any obligation to call any particular witness, or the number of witnesses to call. The case of Afolalu v. State (2010) 11 S.C.M. 1 at 7 was then cited to submit that, all that is required of the prosecution is to call material witnesses to prove its case. We were accordingly urged to hold that, the Appellant committed the crime charged and to affirm the decision of the trial Court which convicted him; and to

dismiss the Appeal.

In reply on points of law, learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that, the authorities cited and arguments canvassed thereon by the Respondent are misconceived and misplaced. That in law, it is not enough to prove that there was the commission of a crime but the prosecution have a duty to go further to link the accused person with the commission of the offence. That in the instant case, the prosecution failed through the evidence of their witnesses to prove the charge of official corruption beyond reasonable doubt. He insisted that the only act of the Appellant was to collect the sum of N1.9 million as directed by DW3 (2nd accused person); and that he released the money back to the PW1 as soon as it was demanded. That, contrary to the arguments of the Respondent that the Appellant had the intention to receive by corrupt means while collecting the money from PW1, the Appellant was not in charge of the auction, and so was not involved in the negotiation for the sale of the truck or attempted recovery of the truck.
?
Learned Counsel for the Appellant therefore contended that, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses did not

prove the Appellant?s intent to receive money in a corrupt manner. That circumstantial evidence cannot therefore stand in view of the uncontroverted evidence of the Appellant before the trial Count. Furthermore, that a juxtaposition of the evidence of PW1 to PW5 with that of the Appellant and DW2 has created a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court. It was then submitted that, PW1 and PW2 gave a very good story as to the transaction between PW1 and the Appellant?s co-accused (2nd accused) but that the linking of the Appellant with the commission of the crime of official corruption is based on mere suspicion aimed at nailing the Appellant to the commission of the crime by all means.

Now, Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) has created the presumption of innocence in favour of every person charged with the commission of a criminal offence. By the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed, where the prosecution alleges that a person has committed a particular offence, a burden is cast on the prosecution to adduce credible evidence to prove the guilt of the person charged. That

burden can only be discharged where the evidence adduced by the prosecution has credibly established every essential ingredient of the offence charged. Thus, where the evidence led is incapable of establishing any one of the ingredients of the offence charged, the prosecution would be said to have failed to rebut the presumption of innocence the Constitution has created in favour of the accused person. See Rasaki v. State (2011) 16 NWLR (pt.1273) 251; Abdullahi v. State (2008) 17 NWLR (pt.1115) 203; Chidozie v. C.O.P. (2018) LPELR ? 43602 (SC) and Kamila v. State (2018) LPELR ? 43603 (SC). Thus, in Osuagwu v. State (2016) LPELR ? 40836 (SC), Nweze, JSC said:
?In order, therefore to secure the conviction of an accused person for the offence of armed robbery, the prosecution must satisfy the requirements of these ingredients beyond reasonable doubt. Where this is not done, the case must fail. Put differently, it is the prosecution?s proof of these ingredients beyond reasonable doubt that would warrant a guilty verdict from the court of trial?
In that case, the accused need not say anything in his defence

because, there is no duty on him to prove his innocence. It is only where the evidence adduced by the prosecution has established a prima case against him, that the accused would be required to explain why he cannot be convicted on such evidence. Other than that, there is no duty or burden on the accused to proof his innocence. That is what our accusatorial system of administration of justice requires. See Stephen v. State (2009) 4 FWLR (pt.492) 8153; Igabele v. State (2006) 6 NWLR (pt.975) 100 and Musa v. State (2014) LPELR ? 24026 (CA). In Okoh v. State (2014) 8 NWLR (pt.1410) 502, Okoro, JSC said:
?The law is well settled that it is not the duty of an accused person to prove his innocence as a matter of law, as there is always a presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person.?
The law is that, the prosecution will discharge the burden cast on them beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt only means that the Court should not allow fanciful possibilities to becloud its sense of justice. This is so because, Judges like other human beings are subject to the vagaries of life and therefore in determining events

that affect their actions, fears and doubts are in most times entertained. Thus, Judges trained in the law and saddled with the duty of determining the consequences of the actions of others that affect the society generally, most often entertain some skepticism that require them to apply caution before arriving at any decision. This is more so in criminal cases where the lives and liberties of persons are in issue. In arriving at their decisions therefore, especially in criminal cases, Judges do not allow every trifling possibility to dissuade them in arriving at the decision to convict or not to convict. Thus, where the evidence against the accused person so strong as to leave only a remote or trifling possibility in his favour which can be waived away with the sentence, ?of course it is possible, but not in the least probable?; then the case against him has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. See Abbah v. FRN (2017) LPELR ? 43373 (CA); Chukwunyere v. State (2017) LPELR ? 43725 (SC); Olaiya v. State (2017) LPELR ? 43714 (SC); Ahmed v. State (2001) 18 NWLR (pt.746) 622 and Ofordike v. State (2019) LPELR ? 46411 (SC). Thus in

the case of Ahmed v. State (supra) Iguh, JSC in his dissenting judgment stated that:
?In this regard the point ought to be made that although the burden of proof on the prosecution in criminal cases is to establish its case beyond ?reasonable doubt?, it must be recognised, all the same, that not all doubts are reasonable and ?reasonable doubt? necessarily excludes unreasonable or speculative doubt or a doubt that is not borne out by the particular circumstances of a given case? It is equally now firmly established that proof beyond reasonable doubt means no more than what it says, and needs not attain the degree of absolute certainty although it must attain a high degree of probability. That is what proof beyond reasonable doubt is all about in our criminal jurisprudence.?
?
In this case, the Appellant and one other person who was the 2nd accused, were charged with the offence of official corruption which is an offence contrary to Section 98 (1) of the Criminal Code Law in vol.2 of the Laws of Ogun State, 2006. It provides as follows:
?98. Any person who –
(1) Being employed in the public

service, and being charged with the performance of any duty by virtue of such employment, not being a duty touching the administration of justice, corruptly asks, receives, or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain, any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person on account of anything already done or omitted to be done, or to be afterwards done or omitted to be done, by him in the discharge of the duties of his office; or
(2) , is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for seven years.?
In the instant case, the Appellant is said to have corruptly asked and received the sum of One Million, Nine Hundred Thousand Naira Only (N1,900,000.00) only from Eze Emeka without authorization. Thus, within the con ofSection 98 (1) of the Criminal Code Law of Ogun State (supra) cited above, and the charge against the Appellant, it is my view that, the essential ingredients to be proved in order to secure the conviction of the Appellant under

the charge are:
(a) That the Appellant was employed in the public service;
(b) That he was charged with the performance of a duty by virtue of such employment (the duty to be performed should not touch on the administration of justice);
(c) That he corruptly asked and received property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person;
(d) That he received the property or benefit on account of anything already done or omitted to be done, or afterwards done or omitted to be done by him in the discharge of the duties of his office.
?Now, there is no dispute on the fact that the first and second ingredients of the offence have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence on record establishes beyond contention that the Appellant was employed as a Bailiff in the Ogun State Judiciary. In the course of his employment as such Bailiff he was engaged to participate in auction of certain goods, one of which was a Truck; sometimes in the month of March 2013. These facts are supported by Section 1 of the Criminal Code Law (supra) which defines a ?person employed in the public service? to include:

“any person employed to execute any process of a Court including a native tribunal;?
The Appellant as a Bailiff of the High Court of Justice of Ogun State, was charged with the duty of auctioning the properties which had been attached in execution of the judgment of the Court. The Appellant admitted that much when he stated in his testimony before the trial Court that, he was a staff of Ogun State Judiciary. He then stated that:
?Sometimes in March, 2013 (as at then I was assistant to the 2nd accused at work); the 2nd accused told me there were 2 items to be auctioned, i.e. a caterpillar generator and a Truck vehicle. We sold the big generator to Chief Duro Aikulola at N4M. The truck was sold to Mr. Emeka Eze at N1.9M.?
?
The learned trial Judge was therefore right when he found and held as follows:
?As regards the first ingredient of the offence, I am certain that it is not a matter of contention that both accused persons were in public service as at March, 2013 when the offence was allegedly committed. This is abundantly evident from the testimonies of all the witnesses for the prosecution and for the defence. I find the

first ingredients of the offence to be established beyond reasonable doubt.?

The learned trial Judge also rightly found and held upon evaluation of the testimonies of PW3, DW1 (Appellant) and DW3, as follows:
I find therefore that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the two accused persons were charged with the performance of a duty by virtue of their employment, specifically, the auction of the said 2 items.?

On the 3rd and 4th ingredients, which the learned trial Judge condensed as one issue, the learned trial Judge rightly found at page 157 lines 7 ? 8 of the record of appeal as follows:
, I would rather say that the issue to be determined here is whether the accused persons were authorized to collect money before auction.?

The learned trial Judge then considered the steps to be followed or the Terms of the Public Auction Notice in Exhibit ?C?, to hold that:
In this instance, regarding the auction of the truck; terms 2, 3 and 5 were clearly flouted in that there was no public bidding for the truck, payment was not made after

sale but before sale and the so called purchaser (PW1) was not given possession of the truck immediately after payment of purchase price. It is evidently clear that the sum of N1.9m collected from PW1 on 22/03/13 was inappropriately collected. The question now is whether both the accused persons are culpable.?
?
The findings of the trial Court in my view, cannot be faulted. Clearly, the Truck subject of the dispute leading to the criminal charge, was to be sold by public auction, and the terms of the auction were vividly spelt out in Exhibit ?C?. However, the evidence on record discloses that the Truck was not ?sold? by public auction as required by Exhibit ?C?. The PW3 testified to the effect that, the auction of the truck was to be conducted publicly in the High Court premises but that at the time the auction was advertised, the Truck was not in the High Court premises but in a place called Ibafo. It is therefore obvious to me, from the narrative given by the Pw1 which was neither controverted nor contradicted by the Appellant, that the ?Sale? of the truck was conducted by ?private treaty?

contrary to the requirements of Exhibit ?C?. This is what the Pw1 said at page 72 line 13 ? 73 line 13 of the record of appeal:
On getting to the High Court, he called me on phone and told me he met with the Court bailiffs and that they told him they had a truck for auction. I told him I wanted to see the bailiffs personally so I came down to their office at the premises of High Court, Abeokuta. There, I met the 2 accused persons and both of them were referring to Anuoluwapo Idowu as lawyer. The 2nd accused told me that the truck was for sale in the sum of N1.4M (One Million, Four Hundred Thousand Naira) and that they would collect commission of N500,000 (five hundred thousand naira) to total N1.9M (One million, nine hundred thousand naira). They took me to the area where some trucks were parked in the Court premises and the 1st accused told me that the one I was negotiating was neater than the parked ones. They said the truck was not available on the premises of the High Court. They also told me that they needed the money in cash. Myself and Anuoluwapo Idowu hurriedly went to the bank to withdraw the N1.9M from my account

and brought same to the bailiffs? office at the Court. The 2nd accused asked the 1st accused to collect the money from us and he did. The 1st accused also gave me a Written document acknowledging the payment of the N1.9M. The 2 accused persons then told me to come back for the truck. After coming several times and they kept asking me to come back again. I then wrote them a letter of demand for the return of the sum of N1.9M.”

As stated earlier in the course of this judgment, this testimony of the PW1 was never controverted nor contradicted in anyway. Rather, the testimonies of the defence, Appellant inclusive as DW1, tended to corroborate the testimony of PW1. Indeed the Appellant did not say that there was a public auction nor did he say that the Truck was available in the High Court premises for the inspection of would be buyers. The transaction took place late on a Friday and the money collected that day and time. The big question to be asked is; why did the Appellant and the co-accused insist in collecting the money on that day and time? After all, the property to be auctioned was not in the Court premises. Worse still, the money was

not paid into government coffers and an official receipt issued. The Appellant kept the money in his custody for about a period of three weeks without refunding same to the PW1 even when he knew that the Truck was no longer available for immediate collection by the PW1. That was despite several written and oral demands on the Appellant to refund the money. The money was only refunded after Exhibit ?O? dated 16/4/2013 had been written to the Chief Bailiff by Counsel on behalf of the PW1. It is apparent therefore, that the sum of N1.9M was corruptly received by the Appellant and without authority to do so. I therefore hold that the learned trial Judge was right when he found and held at page 157 line 28 ? 158 line 21 of the Record of Appeal as follows:
?The 1st accused person admitted that he was the one that collected the said sum of money from the PW1 and when asked under Cross-Examination why he collected the cash when the transaction had not been finalized, he admitted it was not right for him to do so. He however told the Court in his evidence ?in-chief as DW1 and under Cross-Examination that the 2nd accused instructed him

to collect the cash and to write a hand written receipt. The evidence of both PW1 and DW1 is that it was DW1 that collected the cash and issued handwritten receipt signed by him. PW1 and DW1 also told the Court that in spite of the non-delivery of the truck to PW1, the money was not refunded to him by DW1 until much later in the month of April, 2013?.
Exhibit ?O? shows that as at 16/04/2013, PW1 was yet to take possession of the truck or recover the amount he paid to DW1. DW1 also told the Court that it was with a lot of efforts from the C.R. and the 2nd accused that the truck was retrieved after 3 weeks and was brought to the High Court premises. All this while, the sum of N1.9m was yet in possession of the 1st accused. In his statement to the police (Exhibit ?E2?), the 1st accused stated that he initially kept the money in the office till the following Monday but he later kept it in the bank. Eventually, after the intervention of the A.C.R. and after almost a month after he collected the money, the 1st accused refunded the sum of N1.9m to PW1.
It is noteworthy that the 1st accused did not give an official receipt to

PW1, did not make an official complaint of the situation to any of his bosses, did not handover the money to his superior, the 2nd accused, did not endeavor to lodge the money into the judiciary account and did not refund same to PW1 until after Exhibit ?O? was Written and the A.C.R. ordered him to immediately refund the money. Whose interest was he fostering by collecting the said sum upfront, that is, before the item of sale became available and by holding onto same for that long period of time? It is certainly not the interest of PW1 and not that of the establishment.?

The above findings and conclusions of the learned trial Judge have said it all. It is therefore my view that the prosecution had proved the charge of official corruption against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this issue is resolved against the Appellant.

On the charge of conspiracy, learned counsel for the Appellant referred to the Black?s Law Dictionary (8th Ed) at p.933 and the case of Yakubu v. State (2014) 8 NWLR (pt. 1408) 111 at 123 to contend that in a charge of conspiracy, the prosecution have to prove the following facts

beyond reasonable doubt:
(a) An agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done same illegal act or some act which is not illegal by illegal means;
(b) Where the agreement is other than an agreement to commit an offence, that some act besides the agreement was done by one or more of the parties in furtherance of the agreement.
(c) That each of the accused persons individually participated in the conspiracy.

That based on the above stated law, the major ingredient of the offence of conspiracy is the agreement to commit an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. That, intention is a key factor in determining conspiracy, as such, a person who has no intention to commit and offence together with others, in terms of either planning or perpetrating the crime, cannot be said to have conspired to commit such an offence.

?In that respect, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that, Exhibits ?A? and ?B? have nothing to do with an agreement to commit a felony as they were neither jointly made by nor in respect of the Appellant and the co-accused. Furthermore, that Exhibits

?E2? and ?F2? being the extra-judicial statements of the Appellant are devoid of the ingredients of conspiracy to commit a felony. That they are in fact, total denial of participation by the Appellant in the negotiation for the price of the truck and the recovery of the truck; and that the only act of the Appellant was to obey the official instruction of his superior officer. Furthermore, that though Exhibit ?F3?, the extra-judicial statement of the co-accused (2nd accused) contains some incriminating evidence, it does not contain any iota of evidence of conspiracy. In other words that, the Appellant was not carried along in all the pre-auction meetings between the PW3 and the 2nd accused person.
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Learned Counsel for the Appellant went on to submit that, the prosecution failed to establish what action or conduct of the Appellant that furthered the non-existing agreement. That the evidence adduced only disclosed how the Appellant obeyed the instruction of his superior officer despite the risk of having to keep the money over the weekend in the best interest of both the PW1 and his employer (the judiciary). It was then

submitted that the evidence led by the prosecution is either fraught with lies and deceit or at best based on mere suspicion and speculation. That the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and the exhibits tendered make it clear that the Appellant did not agree with the 2nd accused person (co-accused) to commit any felony. We were accordingly urged to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant, and to acquit him of the charge of conspiracy.

In response, learned counsel for the Respondent also referred to the definition of conspiracy in the Black?s Law Dictionary (7th Ed); and the Cases of Nwosu v. State (2004) 15 NWLR (pt. 897) and Bello v. The State (2010) 12 S.C.M. (pt.2) 28 at 34. It was then submitted that, the offence of conspiracy is complete once a concluded agreement exists between two or more persons that share a common criminal purpose; and that it does not matter that the conspirators have never met. That, the common intention of the conspirators can be inferred from the evidence led before the Court. It was then submitted that in the instant case, the Confessional Statement of the Appellant show that the Appellant had a consensus with

the co-accused person. That the statements of the Appellant also disclosed the role played by him in the crime. The cases of Ajuluchukwu v. The State (2014) 10 S.C.M. 43 at 56 and Ogbu & Anor v. The State (supra) at 174 were then cited to urge us to hold that the statements of the Appellant did not satisfy the burden placed on the prosecution to proof the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

Learned Counsel for the Respondent then submitted that, in his Confessional Statements (Exhibits ?E2? and ?F2?), the Appellant specifically stated that he collected the sum of money upon the instruction of the co-accused (2nd accused) person. That there was therefore a meeting of the minds amongst the Appellant and his accomplices and thus this Court can infer conspiracy from their acts. The case of Osetola & 1 Anor v. The State (2012) 12 SCM (pt.2) 347 was cited in support. The case of Salawu v. The State (2011) 10 S.C.M. 76 was then cited to urge us to hold that the trial Court was right in holding that the prosecution proved the charge of conspiracy against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
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In reply, learned counsel for the

Appellant contended that there is no prove of any common intention to commit a crime in this case. That, from the evidence on record, the Appellant was not in any agreement with the 2nd accused person to commit official corruption. That the Appellant was not involved in the negotiation with PW1 nor was he involved in fixing the purchase price and the commission to be paid. That, the fact that the Appellant and the 2nd accused person shared an office is no evidence of such conspiracy. Furthermore, that the mere collection of the money in obedience to official instruction cannot lead to an inference of corruption. We were accordingly urged to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.
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The offence of conspiracy for which the Appellant was charged is created by Section 516 of the Criminal Code Law of Ogun State (supra) which stipulates as follows:
?516. Any person who conspires with another to commit any felony, or to do any act in any part of the world which if done in Nigeria would be a felony, and which is an offence under the laws in force in the place where it is purposed to be done, is guilty of a felony, and is liable, if no other

punishment is provided, to imprisonment for seven years, or, if the greatest punishment to which a person convicted of the felony in question is liable is less than imprisonment for seven years, then such lesser punishment.?
It would be seen that the Criminal Code Law of Ogun State (supra) does not define what conspiracy is. In that respect, I shall resort to judicial authorities on the issue. The Courts, particularly the Supreme Court has defined conspiracy to mean an agreement between two or more persons to carry out an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means. The actus reus or the fact of conspiracy is the mere agreement between the conspirators to do the unlawful thing or the lawful thing by unlawful means. Accordingly, in a charge of conspiracy, it is necessary that the prosecution establish the element of agreement to do something which is unlawful or to do something which is lawful but done by unlawful means. It is however not every agreement between two or more persons that will constitute a crime. Thus, to constitute a crime, there must be some evidence indicative of the commission of the crime for which the conspiracy is intended to

achieve. In other words, the evidence adduced by the prosecution must point to a Criminal intent or design. See Ushie v. State (2018) 11 NWLR (pt.1629) 139,Ugboji v. State (2018) 10 NWLR (pt.1627) 346; Akogwu v. State (2018) 3 NWLR (pt.1605) 137 and Erim v. State (1994) 5 NWLR (pt.346) 522.

(2018) 11 NWLR (pt.1630) 238 at 247 paragraphs A ? B, Galinje, JSC said:
The gist of the offence of conspiracy is the meeting of the minds of the conspirators?.. It is therefore difficult to prove the offence of conspiracy by direct evidence. Conspiracy is a matter of inference from the criminal act of the parties concerned which act is done in pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose. It is therefore the duty of the Court in every case of criminal conspiracy to ascertain as best as it could the evidence of the complicity of any of those charge with the offence?.?

The resolution and conclusion of the learned trial Judge on the charge of conspiracy is as stated at page 161 lines 1 ? 5 of the record of appeal is as follows:
From the evidence of Pw1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 as well as Exhibits ?D1?, ?D2?, ?E1?, ?E2?, ?F1 ? F3?, ?O? & ?J?, it can be deduced that there was a meeting of the minds of the accused persons to commit official corruption and I therefore find that they conspired with each

other to commit the crime. I hold the accused person guilty as charged in respect of the 2 Counts of the information.?

Indeed, the evidence on record disclose that the Appellant and his co-accused were Bailiffs of the Ogun State High Court. The evidence also discloses that both of them occupied and shared the same office with the Appellant deputizing for the co-accused. Furthermore, both of them were charged with the duty of auctioning the truck. The PW1 was emphatic in his testimony in Court that the Appellant and the co-accused person were directly involved in the conduct of the auction sale. Specifically, the PW1 stated in his testimony at pages 72 ? 73 of the record of appeal as follows:
On getting to the Court, he called me on phone and told me he met with the Court bailiffs and that they told him they had a truck for auction. I told him I wanted to see the bailiffs personally so I came down to their office at the premises of High Court, Abeokuta. There, I met the 2nd accused person and both of them were referring to Anuoluwapo Idowu as lawyer. The 2nd accused told me that the truck was for sale in the sum of N1.9m

(One million, Nine Hundred Thousand naira) and that they would collect commission of N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) to total N1.9m (One million, Nine Hundred Thousand Naira). They took me to the area where some truck were parked in the Court premises and the 1st accused told me that the one I was negotiating was neater than the parked ones. They said the truck was not available on the premises of the High Court. They also told me that they needed the money in cash. Myself and Anuoluwapo Idowu hurriedly went to the bank to withdraw the N1.9m from my account and brought same to the bailiffs? office at the Court. The 2nd accused asked the 1st accused to collect the money from us and he did. The 1st accused also gave me a written document acknowledging the payment of the N1.9m. The 2nd accused persons then told me to come back for the truck.”
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It is obvious from the narration of the sequence of events as given by the PW1, the Appellant and the co-accused were acting in concert. This testimony of the PW1 was in no way contradicted nor controverted in cross-examination, or the testimony of the defence. There was no iota of contradiction in the

testimony of the PW1. Indeed, all the Appellant did was to try to extricate himself from his criminal conducts on the ground that he was only obeying the instructions of a superior officer. There is no doubt, from the evidence on record that, the fact of conspiracy to commit official corruption had been established. The learned trial Judge was therefore right in convicting the Appellant on the charge of conspiracy to commit a felony; to wit: official corruption.

The last issue is; ?whether the trial Court did not misdirect itself when it disbelieved the evidence of DW1` and DW2 thereby releasing the sum of N150,000.00 to the complainant?. Here, it is the contention of the Appellant that the trial Court misdirected itself in its finding on the evidence placed before it as regards the sum of N250,000.00 (Exhibit ?H?). The said sum of N250,000.00 is said to be refunds made by the Appellant and one Anuoluwapo. Out of the sum of N250,000.00, the Appellant is said to have paid N150,000.00. It was thus contended that, the PW1 admitted under cross-examination that the total sum of N1.9m collected by the Appellant from him (PW1) was

refunded. That this was done before the matter was reported to the police. Furthermore, that the PW1 was not present when the sum of N250,000.00 was collected by the police and so could not know the purpose for which the money was paid. That the PW2 admitted under cross-examination that the Appellant was only granted bail after the sum of N150,000.00 had been collected from his wife (DW2). Learned Counsel then submitted that the circumstances reveal that the sum of N150,000.00 was collected from the Appellant as gratification and condition for his release on bail, and therefore the PW1 should be made to refund it to the Appellant.
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Learned Counsel for the Appellant went on to submit that the Appellant was charged for receiving the sum of N1.9M from the PW1 and no more. That the said sum of N1.9M had by the evidence adduced at the trial been refunded to the PW1 by the Appellant. That it is therefore unbelievable to hold, as done by the trial Court, that the sum of N150,000.00 paid by the Appellant?s wife was a refund. That, the claim that the said money was meant for a refund is a blatant lie orchestrated to further incriminate the Appellant. We were

thus urged to hold that the decision of the Court below on the sum of N150,000.00 is perverse as same is not supported by the evidence on record; and to direct that the sum of N150,000.00 collected from the Appellant?s family be refunded to him forthwith.

There was no response by the Respondent on this issue. It should be noted that this issue takes root from the findings and conclusion of the learned trial Judge at page 161 lines 6 ? 19 of the record of appeal. Therein, the learned trial Judge had held as follows:
?Before I end this judgment, I will like to add that the totality of the evidence of PW1 before this Court has not been contradicted in any manner. On the contrary, as I have stated above, his evidence has been substantiated by several other pieces of evidence. PW1 also gave evidence that at the SCID, Anuoluwapo and the 2nd accused person were asked to write statements and that they also refunded the sum of N250,000. He state that the money was paid to the police and was released to him. PW2 testified in the same vein when he told the Court that part of the money collected from PW1 was paid by Anuoluwapo who paid N100,000

and the 1st accused who paid N250,000, totaling N250,000 recovered from them and that same was entered as an exhibit in their office. The said sum is Exhibit ?H? herein. I have no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW1 and PW2. I do not believe the evidence of DW1 and DW2 that the money was paid to secure his release on bail. I am therefore of the firm view that PW1 is entitled to Exhibit ?H? which I had earlier ordered the Chief Registrar of this Court to keep in a bank account.?

I am of the firm view that the above findings and conclusion of the learned trial Judge is based on a misconception of the facts and circumstances of this case. It should be remembered that the Appellant and his co-accused were charged, tried and convicted for receiving the sum of One Million, Nine Hundred Thousand Naira (N1,900,000.00) only and no other sum. The overwhelming evidence admitted at the trial disclose beyond any contention that the said sum of N1.9M was refunded to and received by PW1. Indeed, the PW1 said so when he testified at page 73 lines 22 ? 25 of the record of appeal as follows:
? I thereafter

wrote the letter of demand. Later, Anuoluwapo called me on phone and told me that he met with 2 accused persons and that they asked that I should come and collect the N1.9M in the Court. On getting to their office, they gave me the money (N1.9M), I counted it and it was complete. I left.?

With the above admission of the PW1, no issue should arise as regards the refund of the said sum. The learned trial Judge therefore misdirected himself when he concluded that the sum of N150,000.00 collected by the police from the Appellant is part payment for the money collected by the Appellant from the PW1.

It should be noted that there was indeed another complaint by the PW1 against one Anuoluwapo Idowu who had initially been charged on the same charge sheet with the Appellant, for falsely obtaining from the PW1, the sum of N1,180,000.00. That was contained in Count 1 of the Information dated the 12/8/2014. The Appellant was never charged together with the said Anuoluwapo for falsely obtaining the said sum of N1,180,000.00 from the PW1. However, in the course of the trial, the said Anuoluwapo Idowu jumped bail and was never apprehended, as a result of

which the charge was amended by dropping counts 1 and 2 on the charge sheet. Consequently, the issue of N1,180,000.00 was no longer an issue at the trial of the Appellant and his co-accused. Accordingly, any evidence adduced on that point was irrelevant to the charge of corruptly receiving the charge of (N1.9M) for which the Appellant was convicted.

It therefore follows that, the learned trial Judge erred when he held that the sum of N150,000.00 collected by the police from the wife of the Appellant was part payment for the money collected by the Appellant from the PW1. The whole sum of money collected by the Appellant from the PW1 and been wholly and completely refunded by the Appellant. There was therefore nothing else which the Appellant could be asked to refund the PW1. It is therefore my view that, the sum of N150,000.00 was collected from the wife of the Appellant (DW2) for a purpose other than refund of the money collected by the Appellant from the PW1. Accordingly, the order (directive) of the Court below, that the money (N150,000.00) paid by the Appellant?s wife be paid to the PW1, was perverse. It is accordingly set aside.
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On the whole, it

would be seen that, save for the second issue formulated by the Appellant, this appeal lacks merit. In other words, the appeal has succeeded in part but with the resolution of issues 1 and 2 formulated by me against the Appellant the appeal cannot be allowed. It is hereby dismissed. Consequently, I hereby hold that the judgment of the Ogun State High Court holden at Abeokuta on the 14th day of August, 2017, convicting the Appellant for conspiracy to commit a felony and for official corruption is hereby affirmed. I however order that the sum of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N150,000.00) collected by the police (Exhibit ?H?) from the wife of the Appellant be refunded to the Appellant.

ABUBAKAR MAHMUD TALBA, J.C.A.: I have had a preview of the Judgment just delivered by my learned brother Haruna Simon Tsammani JCA. I agree with his reasoning and conclusions, especially in respect of the fact that from the evidence of Pw1 at pages 72 – 73 of the record of appeal, it is without any doubt that the Appellant and the co- accused were acting in concert. The learned trial Judge was right in convicting the Appellant on

the charge of conspiracy to commit a felony to wit official corruption.

I also agree with the conclusion of my learned brother that except for the second issue formulated by the Appellant this appeal lacks merit. The appeal has succeeded in part but with the resolution of issues 1 and 2 against the Appellant, the appeal cannot be allowed and it is hereby dismissed.
I abide by the consequential orders in the lead Judgment.

FOLASADE AYODEJI OJO, J.C.A.: I have before now gone through the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Haruna Simon Tsammani JCA. I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein.

The Appellant was convicted for the offences of conspiracy to commit official corruption and official corruption. It was argued on behalf of the Appellant that he only acted on the instruction of his superior who was the 2nd Accused person at the trial before the lower Court.
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As stated by his Lordship in the lead judgment the offence of conspiracy is usually hatched in secrecy which makes it almost impossible to proffer direct evidence to prove same. Proof of the offence of

conspiracy is more often than not premised on circumstantial evidence. In other words, the essential ingredient of the offence of conspiracy which is an agreement to do a lawful or unlawful act through illegal means is a matter of fact which is inferred from the actions or conduct of the Accused person or his conspirators. see GBADAMOSI VS. STATE (2019) 4 NWLR (PT. 1661) 29 AT 55, PARAS C- D; OFORDIKE VS STATE (2019) 5 NWLR (PT. 1666) 395 AT 414 PARAS B – C.
In AKINLOLU VS STATE (2019) 5 NWLR (PT. 1665) 343 AT 391 – 392 PARAS D – A, the Supreme Court per Augie JSC held as follows:
“In other words, the bedrock of the offence is the agreement to do something unlawful, which means there can be no conspiracy unless at least two persons conspire – see IKEMSON VS. THE STATE 1989 3 NWLR (pt. 110) 455 SC- PATRICK NJOVENS VS. THE STATE (1973) NNLR 76; ERIM VS. STATE (1994) 5 NWLR (PT. 346) 522.
What’s more, the best evidence of conspiracy is usually obtained from one of the conspirators or from inferences –
see ABACHA VS. THE STATE (2002) 11 NWLR (PT. 779) 437 (SC) and NJOVENS VS. THE STATE (supra) wherein this

Court per Coker JSC amplified thereon as follows:
“The overt act or omission, which evidences conspiracy, is the actus reus and the actus reus of each and every conspirator must be referable and very often is the only proof of the criminal agreement called conspiracy. It is not necessary to prove that the conspirators like those who murdered Julius Caesar, were seen together coming out of the same place at the same time and indeed conspirators need not know each other …. They need not all have started the conspiracy at the same time for a conspiracy started by some person may be joined at a later stage or later stages by others. The gist of the offence of conspiracy is the meeting of the mind of the conspirators. This is hardly capable of direct proof, for the offence of conspiracy is complete by the agreement to do the act or make the omission complained about. Hence, conspiracy is a matter of inference from certain criminal acts of the parties concerned done in furtherance of an apparent criminal purpose is common between them and in proof of conspiracy, the acts or omission of any of the conspirators in furtherance of the common design may be and

very often are given in evidence against any other or others of the conspirators. It is therefore, the duty of the Court in every case of conspiracy to ascertain as best as it could, the evidence of the complicity of any of those charged with that offence.”

From the evaluation of the evidence given by the trial judge at pages 158 – 160 of the record, it can be deduced that the Appellant conspired with the 2nd accused person to commit the offence of official conspiracy. The sum of N1.9 Million being the agreed sum for the auctioned truck was handed over to the Appellant who kept it on the instruction of the 2nd Accused. At the time of collecting the money, the Appellant and the 2nd accused person were both aware that the vehicle was not in the Court premises. They issued a handwritten receipt to P.W.1 instead of the official receipt. The money was not paid to government coffers at the earliest opportunity.

I find no reason to disturb the findings of the learned trial judge that the Appellant and the 2nd accused person conspired to commit the offence of official corruption.
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For the foregoing and the fuller reasons given by my learned

brother in the lead judgment, I also see no merit in this appeal and I agree it should be dismissed. I agree with the consequential orders of his Lordship on the sum of N150,000 paid by the Appellant’s wife to P.W.1. This appeal is hereby dismissed by me.

Appearances:

Akin Akintoye II, Esq with him, Femi Olorunfemi, Esq.For Appellant(s)

B. A. Adebayo, Esq. (Admin. General & Public Trustee, Ogun State)For Respondent(s)

Appearances

Akin Akintoye II, Esq with him, Femi Olorunfemi, Esq.For Appellant

AND

B. A. Adebayo, Esq. (Admin. General & Public Trustee, Ogun State)For Respondent