ANGULU v. KELEDI & ORS (2021)

ANGULU v. KELEDI & ORS

(2021)LCN/15164(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(MAKURDI JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Tuesday, May 11, 2021

CA/MK/112/16

Before Our Lordships:

Ignatius Igwe Agube Justice of the Court of Appeal

Cordelia Ifeoma Jombo-Ofo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Yargata Byenchit Nimpar Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

BULUS TANKO ANGULU APPELANT(S)

And

1. DANJUMA KELEDI 2. AUDU JIRGI 3. DANJUMA MANYA (Suing For Themselves And On Behalf Of Family Members Of Ganowa) RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WAYS OF ESTABLISHING PROOF OF OWNERSHIP TO LAND

It is trite law that a claim for declaration of title to land as is being sought in the instant case by both parties, places the burden of proof thereon on both sides. This is to say that none of the parties will succeed consequent upon the weakness of the adverse party. Rather, each party will gain or lose depending on the strength or otherwise of his case. In order to achieve the goal, the parties must satisfy any one or all of the following ways:
a. By traditional evidence;
b. By production of title documents duly authenticated;
c. Acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time and positive enough to warrant an inference that the person is the true owner of the land;
d. By acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land; and
e. By proof of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of the land in addition can be the owner of the land in dispute. See the case of Idundun vs. Okumagba (1976) 9-10 SC., 227. PER JOMBO-OFO, J.C.A.

THE ESSENCE OF A VISIT TO THE LOCUS IN QUO

A visit to the locus in quo is to lend support to the oral and documentary evidence led in the Court room. It is not the purpose of such visit to give more weight to the detriment of the oral evidence which prove some hard facts which the observation at the locus in quo cannot supply.
See further Igwe vs. Kalu (2002) 26 WRN, Page 58 at 64-65, ratio 5. PER JOMBO-OFO, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY RELIEFS ARE GRANTED AS A MATTER OF COURSE

The general position of the law is that declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course and on a platter of gold. They are only granted where credible evidence has been led by the Plaintiff or person seeking the declaratory relief. It is also the practice of Court that a declaratory relief will be granted where the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief in the fullest meaning of the word. It is the law that Plaintiff or Counter-Claimant must plead and prove his claim for a declaratory relief without relying on the weakness of the case of the Defendant although where the weakness of the Defendant’s case supports the Plaintiffs case; he can rely on such evidence to strengthen his case. A declaratory relief is not granted even on admission by the Defendant. See Anyanru vs. Mandilas Ltd. (2007) 4 SCNJ 288 and Akinboni & Ors. vs. Akintope & Ors. (2016) LPELR-40184 (CA) pages 25-26 per Abiriyi, J.C.A.; Chukwumah vs. S.P.D.C. Nig. Ltd. (1993) LPELR-864 (SC) pages 64-65; Matanmi & Ors. vs. Dada & Anor. (2013) LPELR-19929 (SC) per Fabiyi, J.S.C. See also Hajiya Lami Misa vs. Bashiru Ahmad (2018) LPELR-44247 (CA) per Abiriyi, J.C.A. page 22, paras. A-E. The Supreme Court held in the case of Nelson Nwosu Onwugbufor & Ors. vs. Herbert Okoye & Ors. (1996) LPELR-2716 (SC) per Iguh, J.S.C. at page 36 paras. A-E thus:
“It cannot be over-emphasized and it seems to me elementary that a Plaintiff in a declaration of title action who bases his claim on customary title must give satisfactory evidence of how he derived the particular title pleaded and claimed. The burden which is on a Plaintiff in such an action is to lead clear evidence that is sufficiently cogent and credible in proof of the particular root of title relied on. Indeed, delivering the judgment of this Court in the Osafile’s case (supra) Uwais, J.S.C. (as he then was) aptly observed as follows: “The difficulty which the Plaintiffs ran into, as pointed out by the Court of Appeal, is that they omitted in their pleadings to aver fully the facts about their root of title. In the absence of such averment, they did not and indeed could not have validly adduced evidence to establish their root of title.” Accordingly, a Plaintiff in a declaration of title action who bases his claim on a particular root of title must sufficiently plead and establish how he derived the specific title claimed.” PER AGUBE, J.C.A.

CORDELIA IFEOMA JOMBO-OFO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal emanated from the judgment of the High Court of Justice of Nasarawa State, holden at New Karu (hereinafter to be referred to as trial/lower Court) in suit No. NSD/MG/162/2010, presided over by Hon. Justice Rose G. Soji, J., and delivered 21st March, 2016.

At the lower Court, the plaintiffs (herein the respondents) having sought for and obtained the leave of the Court to sue on a representative capacity vide Motion Ex-parte filed 28th October, 2010 subsequently and by a writ of summons issued 1st November, 2010, sought the following reliefs against the defendant (herein the appellant):
31. WHEREOF the Plaintiffs claims against the defendant are as follows:
a. A declaration that the plaintiffs are the rightful owner of the land adjoining Auta Gurugu through which a footpath leads to “Tumuna” Auta Gurugu’s source of drinking water, having inherited the said land from Ganowa, their great grandfather, the rightful owner of that land, from whom the plaintiffs derived their title.
b. A declaration that the Defendant’s claim in respect of the said

land is baseless and illegal.
c. A declaration that besides the portion of the entire land which the plaintiffs’ great grandfather loaned to the Defendant’s father, the entry of the defendant into other portions of the land is wrongful, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever and however.
d. A declaration that the defendant having breached the terms of the grant of a portion of the disputed land to him is liable to forfeiting same.
e. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant either by himself or through his privies, agents, successors-in-title or anyone claiming through them from trespassing or committing any further acts of trespass on the said land.
f. An order of this Hon. Court setting aside any sale, granted or disposal of any portions of the said land by the Defendant as same is illegal and unlawful, same having been done without the plaintiff’s knowledge nor consent.
g. Ten Million Naira (10,000,000) (sic) as general damages against the defendant in favour of the plaintiff for trespass on the land. (See particularly pages 12 – 13 of the record of appeal).

Upon receipt of the originating processes, the defendant on 11th March, 2011, filed his statement of defence and counter claimed as follows against the plaintiffs:
63. WHEREOF the Defendant seek (sic) the following reliefs against the Plaintiffs jointly and severally: A declaration that the Defendant is the owner of the land lying, being and situate at AutaGurugu in Kodope District, Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State.
i. A declaration that the Plaintiffs are trespassers.
ii. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Plaintiffs either by themselves, privies, assigns, agents or servants from further entry into, selling, disposing of or otherwise doing anything with the land in dispute or any portion thereof.
iii. An order setting aside any purported sell, (sic) grant or any transaction done by any of the Plaintiffs on any portion of the disputed land.
iv. The sum of N2,000,000.00 only as general damages for trespass. (See page 45 of the record of appeal).

The Plaintiffs with the leave of the lower Court filed a Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence on 1st February, 2012. (See page 117 of the record of

appeal).

With the pleadings filed and exchanged, hearing commenced with the plaintiffs calling four witnesses i.e. PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4 respectively, while the defendants also called four witnesses i. e. DW1, DW2, DW3 and DW4 respectively. Exhibits were tendered and admitted in evidence. At the prompting of the defence, the trial Court was moved to the locus in quo after which the parties were ordered to file and exchange their final written addresses.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs/respondents’ case in a nutshell, is that they are the customary owners of the disputed land situate at AutaGurgu village of Karu Local Government Council of Nasarawa State within the jurisdiction of this Court. They came to own the land by reason of being the descendants of one Ganowa (of blessed memory), who migrated from Zaria now in Kaduna State more than a century ago and deforested the disputed land in its virgin state with no let or hindrance from anybody. Ganowa after successfully deforesting the land settled thereon and cultivated food crops such as yam, cassava, rice, maize, guinea corn etc. Ganowa later gave birth to Jeji, Kalede, Dogara

and Ada (of blessed memory), who also cultivated the disputed land along with their father Ganowa. The plaintiffs being the children of Jeji, Kalede, Dogara and Ada respectively inherited and cultivated the land on the death of their said fathers.

The defendant/appellant on his part claimed ownership of the disputed land, denying that Ganowa ever settled or farmed on the disputed land at all. Defendant/appellant said he inherited the disputed land from his father late Angulu Janyimugye who died in the year 1987 and that he farmed on the land unchallenged. That the said land forms part of a larger portion of land that was granted to his late father as an outright gift by the duo of Adda Uke and Jezhi Uke (two brothers) long ago without any preconditions.

In his considered judgment delivered 21st March, 2016, the learned trial Judge dismissed the defendant’s counter claim, while granting all the reliefs, save for relief (d) as sought by the plaintiffs. (See pages 333 – 356 of the record of appeal).

Piqued by the judgment, the defendant as appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on 5th April, 2016. Upon receipt of the record of appeal, the

appellant sought and obtained the leave of Court consequent upon which the Notice of Appeal was amended hence the Further Amended Notice of Appeal dated 28th May, 2019 and filed 31st May, 2019. The record of appeal was compiled and transmitted to this Court on 28th June, 2016.

In line with the rules and practice of this Court, the respective parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument. The appellant’s amended brief of argument dated 28th May, 2019 and filed 31st May, 2019 was settled by Umar Modibbo, Esq., while the appellant’s reply brief dated and filed 12th February, 2021 was settled by B. B. Sani, Esq. On the other part the defendants/respondents’ brief dated 3rd October, 2019 and filed 4th October, 2019 was settled by Mustapha Abubakar, Esq.

Arising from the four grounds of the Further Amended Notice of Appeal, the appellant crafted the following 3 (three) issues for determination:
1. Whether the trial Judge was right to have relied on the evidence of PW2 and PW4 which is contradictory to the evidence of PW1 and PW3 to arrive at a conclusion that the Defendant/Appellant is a customary tenant of the

Plaintiffs/Respondents. (Distilled from ground (sic) 1 and 2 of the amended notice of appeal).
2. Whether failure by the learned trial Judge to properly evaluate the proceeding of locus in quo has not occasion (sic) miscarriage of justice on the side of the Defendant/Appellant. (Distilled from ground 3 of the amended notice of appeal).
3. Whether the trial Judge was right when she arrived at a conclusion that the evidence of traditional history given by the DW2 is inadmissible in law. (Distilled from ground 4 of the amended notice of appeal).

On the part of the plaintiff/respondent, they distilled the following 2 (two) major issues for determination:
1. Was the judgment of the trial Court proper when it states thus:
i. The respondents have established their ownership over the farmland while the appellant failed to prove his counter-claim and same is hereby dismissed;
ii. The traditional evidence given by DW2 is inadmissible being hearsay. (Grounds 1, 2 and 4).
iii. The appellant is a customary tenant of the respondents over the farmland; and
2. Whether failure of the trial Court to properly evaluate the proceedings

of locus in quo had occasioned any miscarriage of justice on the part of the appellant. (Ground 3).

I deem it pertinent to observe outright that I find the entire issue 1 (one) as framed above by the plaintiffs/respondents a bit odd and ambiguous. In the first instance, save for sub-issue (ii), the likes of sub-issues (i) and (iii) seem not to be tied to any of the grounds of the Further Amended Notice of Appeal. Sub-issues (i) and (iii) are at large, thus leaving the Court to speculate as to which of the grounds of appeal they stem from. Additionally, in couching issue 1 (one), the respondent merely stated the finding of facts of the learned trial Judge without giving a fore view of the error of fact and/or law that he is attacking. It is an elementary rudiment of appeals that issues meant for determination therein, must arise or flow from the ratio decidendi of the judgment. There is nothing to indicate the ratio decidendi from which each of those findings of fact of the learned trial Court, flowed from. Again, the place of clarity and lucidity in briefs of argument in Court can never be clouded or taken for granted in the legal adversarial

system. Counsel should learn to write for others to read and comprehend. Save for issue 2 (two) which I find more straight forward and devoid of ambiguity and also which is in tandem with the defendant/appellant’s own issue 2 (two), I shall discountenance the entire issue 1 (one), while issue 2 (two) is adopted for determination.
The issues for determination are therefore as set out above by the defendant/appellant.

ISSUE 1 (ONE)
Whether the trial Judge was right to have relied on the evidence of PW2 and PW4 which is contradictory to the evidence of PW1 and PW3 to arrive at a conclusion that the Defendant/Appellant is a customary tenant of the Plaintiffs/Respondents.
The appellant submits that the plaintiffs/respondents claim and evidence are founded on allegation of customary tenancy wherein they seek that the defendant/appellant is their customary tenant; and that this shows that the defendant/appellant is in active possession of the disputed land. Appellant contended that he, the appellant is thus presumed to be the owner of the land in dispute until the contrary is proved to rebut the presumption; and that the only way to rebut

the presumption is by strict proof of the alleged customary tenancy.

Referring to page 11, paragraph 20 of the record of appeal, the appellant canvassed that in a bid to prove the alleged customary tenancy, the respondents stated that the condition given to the defendant/appellant is that he should pay customary tribute of farm produce such as maize, yams, rice etc. Appellant submitted that the evidence of the alleged customary tenancy by the plaintiffs/respondents is marred with material contradictions on whether the defendant/appellant pays tribute to justify him being a customary tenant of the plaintiffs/respondents.

Appellant further submitted that the learned trial Judge conceded to the fact that PW1 and PW3 have not adduced concrete evidence that the defendant and his parents were farming the land in dispute and paying tribute. See page 347, paragraph 4 of the record of appeal and the cases of Adediji vs. Kolade (2012) 44 WRN, pg.22 at 36, ratio 9; Babatunde vs. Akinbade (2006) 6 NWLR Pt. 97, pg. 44 at 60, paras. C-E., and Gbadamosi vs. Ajibode (2012) 5 WRN, pg. 144 at 149, ratio 3.

Appellant submits that the evidence of PW1 and PW3 under

cross examination contradicts the evidence of PW2 and PW4 on payment of customary tribute by the defendant/appellant. See Agwu Johnson Amefule & Anor v Nmecha & Ors (2013) LPELR-20632(CA), ratio 6; and Ofu Osadim vs. Chief E. E. Taiwo (2009) LPELR-8209(CA), ratio 3. Appellant argued that the contradictions in the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4 strike at the main case of the plaintiffs/respondents which is the fact in issue and therefore very fundamental and material and fatal to the plaintiffs’/respondents’ root of title. Appellant finally on this issue, submitted that the learned trial Judge was in grave error to have held that the defendant/appellant is the customary tenant of the plaintiffs/respondents, despite the material contradiction. He urged that we resolve issue 1 (one) in his favour and against the respondent.

The plaintiffs/respondents on the converse referred to the touted claim by the defendant/appellant that there was contradiction in the evidence of the plaintiffs’ witnesses regarding the payment or non-payment of tribute by the defendant, as immaterial. Respondents submitted that payment of customary tributes is not a

condition precedent to the creation of a customary tenancy. See Bassey vs. Bassey (2009) 12 WLR 617, ratio 8 as it relates to the issue of payment or non-payment of tributes by customary tenant.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 1 (ONE)
It is trite law that a claim for declaration of title to land as is being sought in the instant case by both parties, places the burden of proof thereon on both sides. This is to say that none of the parties will succeed consequent upon the weakness of the adverse party. Rather, each party will gain or lose depending on the strength or otherwise of his case. In order to achieve the goal, the parties must satisfy any one or all of the following ways:
a. By traditional evidence;
b. By production of title documents duly authenticated;
c. Acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time and positive enough to warrant an inference that the person is the true owner of the land;
d. By acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land; and
e. By proof of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of the land in addition can be the owner of the land in

dispute. See the case of Idundun vs. Okumagba (1976) 9-10 SC., 227.

As I briefly stated above, the case of the respondents which case is based on traditional history is that the disputed land as a virgin forest was deforested by their forbear, one Ganowa over a century ago. He exercised act of possession by farming the land. Ganowa begat children namely Jezhi, Jegri, Kalede, Dogara and Ada (of blessed memory) who joined their father in farming on the land. The plaintiffs/respondents who in turn are the off spring of the aforenamed children of Ganowa, inherited and continued cultivating the land after the death of their said fathers. However, in Ganowa’s lifetime he gave a portion of the land to one Dikko who is also late. Dikko is the grand-father of the defendant/appellant. The gift was on condition that he would only farm on it and pay tributes to the donor. Upon the demise of Dikko, his son Angulu also late and father of the defendant took over the land and continued farming on the portion on loan to Dikko. The defendant took over when his father Angulu passed on and was paying the usual tributes of maize, yam, rice etc. to the 1st

plaintiff/respondent being at the time, the oldest living member of the Ganowa descent.

The defendant however denied that the disputed land was on loan to Dikko, who is the defendant’s uncle as opposed to being his grandfather.

Though the appellant denied being a customary tenant of the respondents, yet he seems to claim on the other breath that by virtue of his being a customary tenant of the respondents, that this makes him to be in actual possession of the disputed land. The appellant is in actual possession no doubt, but that does not terminate the constructive possessory right of the respondents that put him on the portion in dispute. Payment of tribute is not the bedrock or sine qua non of customary tenancy. More importantly, customary tenancy cannot extinguish the constructive possessory right of the donor.

From the statement of claim and evidence adduced before the Court, it is ascertainable that the plaintiffs’/respondents’ witnesses were able to establish the fact that the respondents’ claim of ownership over the disputed land is grounded and the said act of ownership is further strengthened by the

respondents’ ownership of the adjacent land which they sold to the Living Faith Church and the Ahmaddiya School respectively. See Tanko vs. Echendu (2011) 12 WRN 7, wherein the apex Court found and held as follows:
…The act of letting out portions of land to the farmers or tenants is evidence of possession of the land and that singular act cannot derogate from the title of the land…

The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondents’ attempt to prove that the defendant is their customary tenant on the disputed land on condition of payment of tributes to them as their landlords, was flawed with material contradictions. Appellant referred to the following excerpts as instances of the contradictions – at page 303 of the record of appeal where the PW1 testified inter alia as follows under cross examination:
…It is over 30 years now that the defendant has been on the land. I don’t know if the defendant also farms part of the land.

Also, at page 304 still under cross examination, the PW1 testified further thus:
The defendant is not paying any tribute on the land

he lives on as far as I know. I don’t know if he paid it to my parents.

The PW2 on his part and still on the issue of payment or no payment of tribute on the land by the appellant testified thus:
…The defendant after the demise of his father, did not bring tribute. I know the father of the defendant. I know that the defendant’s father used to farm the land in dispute and brings tribute to my parents.

At page 312 of the record of appeal, the PW3 also under cross examination, testified that:
… The defendant and his father has (sic) been giving tributes to our parents.

Finally, the PW4 on his side and while being cross examined stated as follows as contained at page 314 of the record of appeal:
…it is true the defendant is farming on the land in dispute. I don’t know how long he has been farming on the disputed land.
The defendant and his parents have been giving tribute to us on the land in dispute after farming. He gave the tribute to us last when this matter was filed in Court (i.e defendant) the defendant brings the tribute to me in Uke. (Underlining for emphasis).

Aside from the PW1 who said that he would not know whether the defendant and his father were paying tribute or not, all the rest of PW2, PW3 and PW4 stated clearly that the defendant and his parents were bringing tributes to them thereby justifying the customary tenancy pact between the respondents and the defendant. That the PW1 said that as far as he knows the defendant was not paying tributes, is not immutable and does not mean conclusively that he was not supposed to pay tributes to the respondents at all. It could be interpreted and I so hold, that the defendant was in breach of the condition to pay tributes from the produce of his farming. Failure of the PW1 to be direct in his evidence over payment or non-payment of tribute to my mind, is a minor discrepancy which is allowable considering human frailty. Moreover, payment of tribute as I stated earlier is not the bedrock or condition precedent to the creation of customary tenancy. It is usually culled into customary tenancy as a matter of choice. Payment of tribute or otherwise is not such a factor that can make or mar a customary tenancy. In Bassey vs. Bassey (2009) 12 WLR 617, ratio 8, it was held by this

Court that:
Payment of tribute is a recognized condition of customary tenancy but it is not always so and for all times. This is because there are situations where tribute is not paid to the overlord and yet customary tenancy exists. This is because payment of tribute could be overlooked by the landlord as a result of kindness and charity. There are also instances where the landlord asks the tenant to stop payment of tribute because of very long association and good behaviour of the tenant.

It is obvious from the foregoing that contradiction in evidence, concerning payment of customary tributes by a tenant to his customary landlord, will not defeat the existence of the customary tenancy. Furthermore, a minor contradiction of the nature that has occurred in the evidence of the PW1 is not fatal to the case of the respondents. In the case of Owie vs. Ighiwi (2005) WLR Pt. 917, pg. 184 at 193, the Supreme Court, per Niki Tobi, J.S.C., (of blessed memory), has it that:
There could be little differences when witnesses give evidence on the same subject matter. This is because human beings, not machines do not act with the characteristic automatic of

machines. If witnesses give evidence on the same subject matter or events to exact minute details, trial Court should seriously suspect such evidence because of a possibility of tutoring or rehearsal developed into a recitation before the date of giving evidence.
Thus, where there are immaterial differences in evidence of witnesses here and there, that itself shows their truthful testimonies.

That the defendant/appellant has been on the disputed land for over 30 years does not absolve him from being a customary tenant of the plaintiffs/respondents. Much as the defendant/appellant claimed the land to be a subject of gift by Adda Uke and Jezhi Uke, I think that that was more or less a sweeping statement without any backing whatsoever. Appellant did not produce any witness of the gifting. My conclusion is that there was no outright gift of the land in dispute to the appellant, rather he was let into the land as a customary tenant of the respondents.

Touching on the question whether the trial Judge was right to have relied on the evidence of PW2 and PW4 which is contradictory to the evidence of PW1 and PW3, I would say that from the materials

before the Court, there seems not to be such material contradiction in the evidence as to cause the learned trial Judge not to place reliance on it. Payment or non payment as the case may be of tributes to the respondents, is not in the circumstances of this case, a material fact as to blur the underlining customary tenancy arrangement between the appellant’s forbears and those of the respondents. The learned trial Judge was therefore right to arrive at a conclusion that the defendant/appellant is a customary tenant of the plaintiffs/respondents. I settle issue 1 (one) in favour of the respondents and against the appellant.

ISSUE 2 (TWO)
Whether failure by the learned trial Judge to properly evaluate the proceeding of locus in quo has not occasion (sic) miscarriage of justice on the side of the Defendant/Appellant.
Referring to the judgment of the lower Court as contained at pages 327 – 328 of the record of appeal, the appellant contended that the learned trial Judge failed to evaluate the proceedings of the visit to the locus in quo before arriving at his conclusion and this occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice on the side of

the said appellant. Appellant contended that the learned trial Judge did not making findings as regards the fact that the defendant/appellant has lived on the land for more than 30 years. He canvassed that it is not for the trial Court to pick and choose the evidence to be assessed. He submitted that the trial Court observed at the locus in quo that there are many houses on the land in dispute and by the evidence of the appellant, all the people who built on the land got it from him. That the trial Court failed to make a finding on this fact thereby causing a miscarriage of justice to the appellant. Appellant submitted that the issue that called for determination at the lower Court would only be resolved if all the pieces of evidence adduced by the parties including what transpired at the locus in quo would be dispassionately evaluated and findings made therein. He urged that we resolve issue 2 (two) in his favour and against the respondents.

The respondents on the contrary submitted that the learned trial Court evaluated the proceedings at the locus in quo. See pages 340-341 of the record of appeal. They relied on the authority of

Abdullahi Nuhu Wazi vs. Attahiru Dalhatu Bafarawa (2004) 16 NWLR Pt. 998, pg. (?) at ratio 7-21, to add that assuming the trial Judge failed to evaluate or did not properly evaluate the proceedings at the locus in quo, that it is not fatal to the appellant’s case. The respondents further contended that at the locus, no testimonies were taken other than statements confirming evidence in the open Court. See Isamade vs. Okei (1998) 2 NWLR Pt. 536, pg. 455 at 459, where the Supreme Court held that “every decision of the Court must be based on the evidence”. That the appellant did not show how the decision of the trial Court would have been in his favour had the trial Court properly evaluated the statements at the locus in quo.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 2 (TWO)
The learned trial Court and the parties and their respective counsel were on the disputed land. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, the essence of visit to locus in quo was for the trial Court to have a first-hand information regarding the position of the respective parties. The trial Judge will thus not only avail himself of mere belief but of what he sees there.

See Umar v. Bayero University (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 86) at 93; Kenon v. Tekam (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 121) 366 at 373. The visit to the locus in quo and observation made thereat are material and ought to be evaluated and findings made thereon. Belief obviously is strengthened by seeing.

Concerning the visit to the locus in quo in the instant case, the learned trial Judge had this to say:
At locus- in-quo, the plaintiffs showed the land in dispute as described in Court with Living Faith Church and Amadiyya as boundary. This Court observed that the land in dispute is a village and has many developments on it. The plaintiffs showed the Court the land starting from old Keffi – Abuja road bounded by Living Faith Church, Ahmadiyya School, Tumudna stream and back to old Abuja – Keffi road. The area from evidence is called AutaGurgu as well as Tumudna. The defendant agreed that the land shown by the plaintiffs is the land in dispute. The plaintiffs also showed bounding adjacent land bounding the disputed land down side by the east as their land also.
The 2nd plaintiff showed an old house and claim (sic) it belong to their father Kuyawi but was given to Musa

Gambo – chief of AutaGurgu though the defendant disputed this fact.
The defendant at the locus in quo claimed this was the land the area Court gave him.
The plaintiffs in answer to question put to him by the defence counsel told the Court that the village is called Tumudna. Both the plaintiffs and defendant claim ownership of trees on the land. The DW1 and 3 showed the Court their houses on the disputed land. After the visit parties were given the opportunity to file their final written addresses of which… (See pages 340 – 341 of the record of appeal).

Given the circumstances of this case, it could be inferred that the visit to the locus in quo was to enable the trial Court see the physical features as testified by the witnesses in Court and to clear ambiguities in the testimony of the witnesses, if any. In line with this is the case of Ocheni Atomeyi vs. Idakwo Achimogu (1980) NWLR, page 90, ratio 1, where the Supreme Court held thus:
A visit to the locus in quo is to lend support to the oral and documentary evidence led in the Court room. It is not the purpose of such visit to give more weight to the

detriment of the oral evidence which prove some hard facts which the observation at the locus in quo cannot supply.
See further Igwe vs. Kalu (2002) 26 WRN, Page 58 at 64-65, ratio 5. It was obvious from the observation of the learned trial Court at the locus in quo, that the parties were of one mind as regards the identity of the land in dispute. Much as I agree with the submission of counsel for the appellant that the trial Court was satisfied about the existence of the land, the features thereon and the boundary neighbours, I do not however, agree with him that it was the Court’s conclusive observation and findings thereat, that it was the defendant/appellant who gave land to all the people found there to build on. Statements made by the respective parties at the locus did not seem to be on oath or by way of formal taking of evidence. It was rather a casual forum devoid of Court room trappings, for the parties to show features such as boundaries and landmarks and at the same time afford the trial Court the opportunity to clear and clarify doubts arising from the parties’ evidence in Court. That the learned lower Court failed to make explicit

finding of facts thereon, is of no import on the justice of the case.

Therefore, the claim by the defendant/appellant that it occasioned miscarriage of justice on his case is unfounded, more so as he failed to point out how and whence the miscarriage of justice occurred. Courts act on sworn evidence of witnesses as opposed to unsworn loose statements which lack evidential and probative value. In the case of Nkebisi vs. State (2010) 5 NWLR Pt. 1188, pg. 471 at 478 or (2012) 7 Q.R.R. pg.535, ratio 22, the apex Court held as follows:
An appellant who relies on improper evaluation of evidence to set aside a judgment has the onus to identify or specify the evidence improperly evaluated or not evaluated and to show convincingly that if the error complained of had been corrected, the conclusion reached would have been different and in favour of the party complaining of wrong evaluation.

Indeed, and as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, the appellant failed to show how the decision of the trial Court would have been in his favour had the trial Court “properly” evaluated the statements, though devoid of oath,

and made at the locus in quo. It is my humble view that the question suggestive of the fact that the learned trial Judge failed to properly evaluate the proceeding at the locus in quo, does not arise after all in the circumstances of this case. This is because the learned trial Judge based his decision on the cogent and admissible evidence led before the Court by the respective parties. Issue 2 (two) is in this light resolved in favour of the respondents and against the appellant.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 3 (THREE)
Whether the trial Judge was right when she arrived at a conclusion that the evidence of traditional history given by the DW2 is inadmissible in law.
The learned counsel for the appellant submitted herein that the learned trial Judge was wrong to have held that the evidence of DW2 was hearsay and therefore inadmissible. He further submitted that it is not the duty of a trial Judge to attack the personality of a witness when the issue of qualification of the said witness is not put in issue before the Court. He contended that there is nowhere throughout the record where it is stated that DW2 said it was his father who told him the

history of the land. See Adebiyi vs. Umar (2012) 24 WRN, pg. 85 at 92; and Audu vs. INEC (No. 2) (2010) 13 NWLR Pt. 1212, pg. 465.

It goes without equivocation that the Court has no business going outside the issues set before it for determination and then importing extraneous issues or making case for the parties, different from the one they themselves laid before the Court. Both Courts and parties are bound by the pleadings and the evidence led by the parties in proof or substantiation of the facts averred in their respective pleadings. See Abubakar vs. Yar’Adua (2009) All FWLR Pt. 457, pg. 1 at 33, where the Supreme Court, per Niki Tobi, J.S.C., held as follows:
A Court of law can only pronounce judgment in the light of evidence presented and proved before it. A Court of law cannot go outside the evidence presented and proved before it by embarking on a voyage of discovery in search of other evidence in favour of the parties. Courts of law do not give their judgment according to public opinion or to reflect public opinion, unless such opinion represents or presents the state of the law. This is because the Judge’s Chenille is the law

and the law only. Public opinion is in most instances, built on sentiments and emotions…

The DW2 had stated in his sworn deposition that the subject matter of this suit is a parcel of land situate at Tumudna otherwise known as AutaGurgu. That he knows as a fact that the defendant/appellant inherited the land from his father (Angulu Janyimugye). That the land was granted to defendant’s late father as an outright gift by the duo of Adda Uke and Jezhi Uke who were brothers and joint owners of the said land. That upon the said gift, the defendant’s late father built, settled and farmed on the said land with his relations until his demise. That during the lifetime of the defendant’s father, he farmed on the said land by cultivating crops such as guinea corn, yam, maize, beans, cassava etc. unhindered by anyone. After the demise of his father, the defendant inherited the land and continued to farm on it till date. See paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the DW2’s deposition contained at pages 65 – 66 of the record of appeal).

The DW2 under cross examination also testified inter alia:

I know the history of the land in dispute. The defendant is my father. It is true that my father inherited the land in issue from my grandfather (his father)… My great grandfather is not the 1st person to clear the land in issue. I still stand by my paragraphs (sic) 9 of my witness deposition on oath…
I know Mallam Ishaku Jehzi Koya, Danladi Maitoro Koya, Mallam Tanko Jehzi Koya and Mallam Bako Maitoro Koya.
It is true that these people mention (sic) above were the people who gave my father the land in issue as an outright gift. (See page 319 of the record of appeal).

Premised on the foregoing evidence of the DW2, the learned trial Judge found as follows:
It is my view from the evidence of this witness, that though he stated that he knows the history of the land, he does not qualify as a competent witness on the history of the disputed land as he did not testify from his personal knowledge but what his father told him. I cannot attach any weight to his evidence as it is inadmissible more so that he is an interested party whose evidence I have to treat with caution. I find his evidence amounts to hearsay evidence which is not

allowed in law. (See page 350 of the record of appeal).

From the foregoing testimony of the DW2, I must confess that I am at pains seeing where he testified to the fact that his father that is the defendant/appellant relayed to him the history of the land in dispute. On the contrary, the DW2 simply stated that he knows the history of the land in dispute without disclosing how he came by the knowledge, whether through his said father (the defendant) or any other source. Though the DW2 stated that the land was an outright gift from the duos of Adda Uke and Jezhi Uke to his grandfather, yet in another breath he said it was Mallam Ishaku Jehzi Koya, Danladi Maitoro Koya, Mallam Tanko Jehzi Koya and Mallam Bako Maitoro Koya who gave the land as outright gift to his grandfather. Be that as it may, I beg to pare away from the finding of the learned trial Judge to the effect that the DW2 did not testify from his personal knowledge of the disputed land, but by hearsay evidence of his father. The finding is unsupportable by the evidence led before the Court. It is trite that traditional history of land starts from the deforestation or original founding of same,

which is usually relayed from generation to generation by word of mouth, ostensibly, bringing it under hearsay evidence. On the contrary, traditional history of devolution of land, though it borders on hearsay, is an exception to the rule of hearsay hence it is admissible in evidence. Even if the history of the disputed land was relayed to the DW2 by his father, that would not make his evidence in that regard a hearsay evidence. The learned trial Judge was clearly in error when she arrived at the conclusion that the traditional history given by the DW2 is inadmissible in law for being a hearsay evidence. It is in the light of this that I shall resolve issue 3 (three) and it is so resolved in favour of the appellant and against the respondents.

Issues 1 (one) and 2 (two) at the end of the day are resolved in favour of the respondents and against the appellant, while issue 3 (three) is in favour of the appellant and against the respondents. The summation is that the appeal has succeeded in part.
Parties are to bear their respective costs incurred in the appeal.
Appeal succeeds in part.

IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.: I have the privilege of

reading in advance the draft copy of the lead judgment prepared by my noble brother, Hon. Justice C. Ifeoma Jombo-Ofo, J.C.A. I agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached in the lead judgment that the Appeal is partly meritorious and hereby succeeds in part.

Both the Plaintiff (now Respondent) and Defendants (now Appellant) sought declaratory reliefs, injunction order and general damages against each other in the Statement of Claim and Counter- Claim respectively for a piece of land situate at Auta Gurugu (Tumuna) in Kodope District of Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State in the Lower Court.

Defendant although where the weakness of the Defendant’s case supports the Plaintiffs case; he can rely on such evidence to strengthen his case. A declaratory relief is not granted even on admission by the Defendant. See Anyanru vs. Mandilas Ltd. (2007) 4 SCNJ 288 and Akinboni & Ors. vs. Akintope & Ors. (2016) LPELR-40184 (CA) pages 25-26 per Abiriyi, J.C.A.; Chukwumah vs. S.P.D.C. Nig. Ltd. (1993) LPELR-864 (SC) pages 64-65; Matanmi & Ors. vs. Dada & Anor. (2013) LPELR-19929 (SC) per Fabiyi, J.S.C. See also Hajiya Lami Misa vs. Bashiru Ahmad (2018) LPELR-44247 (CA) per Abiriyi, J.C.A. page 22, paras. A-E.

The Supreme Court held in the case of Nelson Nwosu Onwugbufor & Ors. vs. Herbert Okoye & Ors. (1996) LPELR-2716 (SC) per Iguh, J.S.C. at page 36 paras. A-E thus:
“It cannot be over-emphasized and it seems to me elementary that a Plaintiff in a declaration of title action who bases his claim on customary title must give satisfactory evidence of how he derived the particular title pleaded and claimed. The burden which is on a Plaintiff in such an action is to lead clear evidence that is sufficiently cogent and credible in proof

of the particular root of title relied on. Indeed, delivering the judgment of this Court in the Osafile’s case (supra) Uwais, J.S.C. (as he then was) aptly observed as follows: “The difficulty which the Plaintiffs ran into, as pointed out by the Court of Appeal, is that they omitted in their pleadings to aver fully the facts about their root of title. In the absence of such averment, they did not and indeed could not have validly adduced evidence to establish their root of title.” Accordingly, a Plaintiff in a declaration of title action who bases his claim on a particular root of title must sufficiently plead and establish how he derived the specific title claimed.”

The Claimant/Defendant(s) also has the burden/onus of proof for a declaration of title to the same piece of land as enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Osuade Adeyinka Akinbade & Anor. vs. Ayoade Babatunde & Ors. (2017) LPELR-43463 (SC) per Muhammad, J.S.C. at page 22, paras. B-D thus:
“Lastly, the principle must not be forgotten too that a Counter-Claim is a cross-action and where the Plaintiff fails in proving his claim, the Defendant on proving his

Counter-claim, may succeed. Whether in respect of the Claim or the Counter-claim, therefore, the Plaintiff or the Defendant as the case may be, must discharge the burden of establishing his entitlement to the reliefs he claims. See Alhaji Goni Kyari vs. Alhaji Chiroma Alkali & Ors (2001) LPELR-1728 (SC) and Udeze vs. Chidebe (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 141.”
It is also a trite position of law that as enunciated in the above authorities of the Apex Court, where a Defendant counter-claims for a declaration of title to the same land as in the instant case, he has the same onus of proof as the Plaintiff in the main case. This is because a Counter-Claim is for all intent and purposes an independent action. See Oroja & Ors. vs. Adeniyi & Ors. (2017) LPELR-41985 (SC) at 11-13 paras. E-B; Nwaenang vs. Ndarake & Ors. (2013) LPELR-20720 (CA) at 41-44 paras. A-D. See also Charles Isienyi vs. Okereke Chukwu (2019) LPELR-48187 (CA) per Bolaji-Yusuf, J.C.A. at pages 13-14, paras. F-A.

It was the contention of the learned Counsel to the Appellant that the Plaintiffs/Respondents founded their claims on allegation of Customary Tenancy that the

Defendant (now Appellant) was their Customary Tenant. The phrase “Customary Tenant” had been defined by the Apex Court in Garuba Abioye & Ors. vs. Sa’adu Yakubu & Ors. (1991) LPELR-43 (SC) per Obaseki, J.S.C. at page 97, paras. D-G; as follows:
“A Customary Tenant is a Tenant from year to year liable under Customary Law to pay rents or tribute to the landlord for the use of the land and barred from alienating the land or disputing the title of the landlord without consent. He cannot be in possession if his landlord is out of possession as the possession he enjoys is that given by the landlord. The landlord is the holder under the Land Use Act and the tenant does not come within the definition of holder. Where there is a holder, the tenant although an occupier, is not entitled to a Customary Right of Occupancy.”

It is the position of the law in Nigeria that a Customary Tenant is in exclusive possession of his holding, subject to the incidents of his tenure.
A Customary right under Customary Tenancies includes the right to exclusive possession of the land. The law is settled that once land is granted to a Tenant in accordance with

Native law and Custom, whatever the consideration, full right of possession are conveyed to the grantee. See Attaboh Idih vs. Dr. Aliyu Ocheja Obaje & Anor. (2010) LPELR- 3816 (CA) per Galinje, J.C.A. (as he then was) at pages 12-13, paras. D-F; Akinkuowo vs. Fajimoju (1965) NMLR 349; Emegwara vs. Nwaimo (1953) 14 WACA 947; Isiba vs. Hanson (1968) NMLR 76; Kiegbuyi vs. Odunjo (1926) 7 NLR 51; Tong vs. Kalil (1955) 14 WACA 331; Etim vs. Eke (1941) 10 NLR 43 at 50 and Edheremu Ugbodume & Ors. vs. Rev. Moses Abiegbe & Ors. (1991) LPELR-3316 (SC). Accordingly, I also agree with my noble brother that the learned Trial Judge was right at his conclusion that the Defendant (now Appellant) was a Customary Tenant of the Plaintiffs (now Respondents). In consequence, Issue Number 1 (One) is resolved in favour of the Respondents against the Appellant.

On another score, the learned Counsel to the Appellant posed the question as to whether the failure of the learned Trial Judge to evaluate the proceedings of the visit to the locus in quo before arriving at his conclusion can cause a grave miscarriage of justice on the side of the Appellant. It is pertinent to

note that the purpose of a visit to locus in quo is to eliminate contradictions and uncertainties as regards the physical conditions of the land in dispute, it is not meant to afford a party an opportunity to make a different case from the one he led evidence in support of his claim. See Madam Modupe Ore Anike Dosunmu vs. Olori Bolanle Odesanya & Anor. (2013) LPELR-22755 (CA) per Oseji, J.C.A. (as he then was) at pages 23-25, paras. E-B and Odiche vs. Chibogwu (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 354) 78.

For now, it suffices to state that there are authorities galore by the Supreme Court and this Court on the consequence of the improper evaluation of evidence adduced by the parties and their respective Witnesses by the learned Trial Judge. Indeed, this Court in the case of Mr. Zang & Anor vs. Emmanuel Ituma & Ors. (2014) LPELR-23521 (CA) per Garba, J.C.A. at page 32, paras. A-C held thus: “It must be noted that it is not sufficient for learned Counsel to merely make an allegation of an error of law, which the evaluation of evidence by a Trial Court is, without a clear demonstration of the error in the evaluation of evidence. To support an alleged improper

evaluation, the evidence adduced before the Trial Court and its evaluation must be set out to enable this Court to clearly see how the evaluation was carried out by that Court.” In the light of the foregoing, Issue 2 (Two) is also resolved in favour of the Respondents against the Appellant.

The learned Counsel to the Appellant’s contention on Issue 3 (Three) is that the learned Trial Judge was wrong to have held that the evidence (traditional evidence) of DW2 was hearsay and therefore inadmissible in evidence. DW2’s evidence on Oath is that the subject-matter of the suit is a parcel of land inherited from his father. That the land was granted to the Defendant/Appellant’s father as an outright gift by Adda Uke and Jezhi Uke who were joint owners of the said parcel of land situate at Tumudan (Auta Gurugu).

Accordingly, to prove an outright grant of land that is neither for living on nor for cultivation, it is trite position of Law in Nigeria that an outright grant of land to live on is not uncommon; an outright grant of land for cultivation is unusual but not unheard of; but an outright grant of land which is not required either for living on

or for cultivation is so exceptional that it could only be proved by the clearest possible evidence and should never be presumed. See Kalu Obasi & Ors. vs. Chief Okereke Oti & Anor (1966) LPELR-25380 (SC) per Onyeama, J.S.C. at page 7, paras. C-E, (1966) 1 All NLR p. 279 and Giwa & Anor vs. Akinlabi & Ors (2012) LPELR-20426 (CA) per Ikyegh, J.C.A. at pages 44 – 45, paras. E-B.

It is pertinent to note that hearsay evidence is secondary evidence of an oral statement best described as second-hand evidence. What a witness says he heard from another person is unreliable for many reasons. However, where the statement is relevant for some purpose other than the truth of their contents, it is not a hearsay statement, and it is admissible in evidence. See Ojo vs. Gharoro (2006) LPELR-2383 (SC) per Niki-Tobi, J.S.C. at pages 16—17, paras. C-D andHussaini Sama’ila vs. The State (2021) LPELR-53084 (SC) per Augie, J.S.C. at pages 17-20, paras. B-A.

Sections 37-39 of the Evidence Act, 2011 define what constitutes hearsay and the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule as follows:

“37. Hearsay means a statement-
(a) oral or written made otherwise than by a witness in a proceeding; or
(b) contained or recorded in a book, document or any record whatever, proof of which is not admissible under any provision of this Act, which is tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated in it.
38. Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as provided in this part or by or under any other provision of this or any other Act.
39. Statements, whether written or oral of facts in issue or relevant facts made by a person-
(a) who is dead;
(b) who cannot be found;
(c) who has become incapable of giving evidence; or
(d) whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are admissible under Sections 40 to 50.”
Sections 66 and 70 of the Evidence Act, 2011 however provide as follows: –
“66. When the title to or interest in family or communal land is in issue, oral evidence of family or communal tradition concerning such title or interest is admissible.
70. In deciding questions of Customary Law and Custom, the opinions of

Traditional Rulers, Chiefs or other persons having special knowledge of the Customary Law and Custom and any book or manuscript recognized as legal authority by people indigenous to the locality in which such Law or Custom applies are admissible.”

Customary law and customs are matters of evidence to be decided by facts presented before the Court unless they are of such notoriety that judicial notice would be taken of then without evidence required in proof. See Mr. Michael Oyediran Ajibi vs. Joseph Olaewe & Anor. (2002) LPELR-5890 (CA) per Adekeye, J.C.A. at page 19, paras. B-C, (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt.822) page 237; Usiobaifo & Anor. vs. Usiobaifo & Anor. (2005) LPELR-3428 (SC) per Niki-Tobi, J.S.C. at pages 20-21, paras. F- A and Tuoyo & Ors. vs. Agba & Ors. (2014) LPELR-24533 (CA) per Saulawa, J.C.A. at page 47, paras. A-C.

What then is Traditional History or Traditional Evidence? It is trite position of law that traditional evidence is evidence as to rights alleged to have existed beyond the time of living memory proved by members of the community or village who claim the land as theirs or who defend a claim to such land.

It is a bit of ancient history. It is hearsay evidence, however, it had been elevated to the status of admissible evidence by the statutory provision of Sections 66 and 70 of the Evidence Act, 2011. See Ikenye Dike & Ors. vs. Obi Nzeka II & Ors. (1986) LPELR-945 (SC) per Oputa, J.S.C. at pages 23-24, paras. D-A, (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.34) p. 144 and Mazang vs. Mashinkpen & Anor. (2018) LPELR-46144 (CA) per Omoleye, J.C.A. at pages 31-32, paras. B-F.

Consequently, the learned Trial Judge was wrong to have arrived at the conclusion that the traditional history/evidence given by the DW2 was inadmissible in law as being hearsay evidence. Therefore, it is my considered view, the evidence of DW2 falls within the exceptions of hearsay evidence which is admissible in evidence. Accordingly, Issue 3 (Three) is resolved in favour of the Appellant.
On the whole, I adopt the entire decision of my learned brother in also holding that the Appeal is partly meritorious and hereby succeeds.

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A: I was afforded the privilege of reading in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, C. IFEOMA JOMBO-OFO, J.C.A. and

I agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at in the leading judgment.

It is settled law that there are five ways of proving title to land and parties are expected to plead and prove just one or more of the methods to succeed:
i. Traditional evidence.
ii. Production of title documents duly authenticated.
iii. Acts of selling, easing, renting out all or any part of the land or farming on it, or on a portion of it.
iv. Act of long possession and enjoyment of the land.
v. Proof of possession connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of such connected or adjacent land would, in addition, be the owner of the land in dispute.
See the cases of AJIBOYE V. ISHOLA (2006) 5 SCNJ (PT. 20) 655; IDUNDUN V. OKUMAGBA (2002) 20 WRN 127; ALADE V. AWO (1975) 4 S.C. 215; NWOKOROBIA V. NWOGU (2009) 50 WRN 1; ODUTOLA V. SANYA (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 400) 780.

It is trite that that a Claimant for declaration of title must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defence, see the case of YAKUBU V. JAUROYEL & ORS (2014) LPELR-22732(SC) wherein per KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C held thus:

“The law is settled that in an action for declaration of title, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness (if any) of the defence, except where the defence supports the plaintiffs case. See: Onwugbufor V. Okoye (1996) 1 NWLR (424) 252; Shittu v. Fashawe (2005) 14 NWLR (946) 671: Eze v. Atasie (2000) 9 WRN 73 at 88; Adesanya V. Aderonmu (2000) 13 WRN 104 at 115 lines 10 – 35. The standard of proof is on a preponderance of evidence.”

From the facts and evidence adduced at the trial Court, the Respondents were able to establish sufficiently the claim of ownership over the disputed land through traditional evidence which was also established that the Defendant’s father was paying tributes of maize, yam, rice etc. to the Respondents and the acts of ownership which was further strengthened by the Respondent witnesses and the ownership of the adjacent land which they sold to the Living Faith Church and the Ahmaddiya School respectively. On this issue, the trial Court was right to hold that the Appellant is a Customary tenant of the Respondents.

It is in the light of above that I adopt the judgment as mine

and abide by the orders made therein.

Appearances:

M. Zubairu, Esq. with him, M. I. Ariffi, Esq. For Appellant(s)

I. Ibrahim, Esq. with the brief of Mustapha Abubakar, Esq. For Respondent(s)