AMAC v. THE OCCUPIER (2022)

AMAC v. THE OCCUPIER (GW163902)

(2022)LCN/16201(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Tuesday, January 11, 2022

CA/A/272/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein Justice of the Court of Appeal

Olabode Abimbola Adegbehingbe Justice of the Court of Appeal

Muslim Sule Hassan Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

ABUJA MUNICIPAL AREA COUNCIL APPELANT(S)

And

THE OCCUPIER (GW163902) RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION CAN BE RAISED AT ANY TIME OF THE COURT PROCEEDINGS

It needs to be mentioned that the issue of the juristic personality of the respondent was not made a matter of contention before the lower Court. The law is settled that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even at the Supreme Court, for the first time. Once a party challenges jurisdiction, the law is that it does not have to relate to any ground of appeal. See Emerald Energy Resources Ltd. v. Signet Advisors Ltd. [2021] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1779) 579 at 617; INEC, Anambra State & Anor. v. Ifeanyichukwu Okonkwo [2008] LPELR-4315(CA); and, Agwu & Ors. v. Julius Berger Nig. Plc. [2019] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1682) 165. The appellant is permitted by law to raise the question, as it has done, for the first time, on appeal.

There is no controversy about the rule that a Court has and can only exercise jurisdiction when:
(a) is properly constituted as regards number and qualification of members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and
(b) the subject-matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
(c) the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962) 2 SCNLR 341. PER ADEGBEHINGBE, J.C.A.

THE FUNDAMENTAIL PRINCIPLE OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is the life blood of any adjudication without which no proceeding, however brilliantly conducted by the Court or Tribunal, can be valid. It is, really, a threshold matter or sometimes referred to as a periphery matter to be dealt with once raised or challenged in any proceeding, Without jurisdiction, the whole trial or proceeding of the Court is a nullity, however well conducted. That is why jurisdiction is very vital and fundamental to the administration of justice, in any judicial system.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE CAPACITY OF A PARTY TO SUE AND BE SUED
As a general principle, only natural persons, that is, human beings and juristic or artificial persons such as body corporate are competent to sue or be sued. Consequently, where either of the parties is not a legal person, the action is liable to be struck out, as being incompetent. SeeShitta v. Ligali [1941] 16 NLR 23 and Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd. v. General Manager Ollivant Ltd. and Anor. [1961) 1 All NLR 116. PER ADEGBEHINGBE, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE INFRINGEMENT OF NATURAL JUSTICE AGAINST A PARTY

Natural justice demands that a party be heard before the case against him is determined. Once there is an infringement of the principle of natural justice against him, then the trial is not fair. The principle of fair hearing is not a mere adjudication but a doctrine that enjoins that once a party entitled to be heard before deciding a matter is denied opportunity of being heard, the order or decision given thereon will be vacated or set aside, this is because the issue of fair hearing is constitutional and fundamental. See Olufeagba v. Abdulraheem & Ors. [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 384 and Ararume v. Ubah [2021] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1779) 511 at 539, per Oseji, J. S. C. Denial of fair hearing, in circumstances of this appeal, is confirmation, without more, that miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the inexplicable abstinence of the lower Court from considering the counter-affidavit and the written address filed by the appellant, in opposition to the application before it, despite the fact that the appellant was absent at the hearing of the application. The lower Court’s ruling is not good enough, in the circumstances, to be retained as pure exercise of judicial authority and has to be weeded out, for the sanctity of the process of adjudication to be sustained. PER ADEGBEHINGBE, J.C.A.

OLABODE ABIMBOLA ADEGBEHINGBE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The respondent, named The Occupier (GW 163902), filed an Originating Motion before the lower Court on 18/10/2018, where it/she/he prayed the Court for the following orders:
“1) A Declaration that having regards to the pendency of an appeal filed at the Court of Appeal by the 1st Respondent against the decision of this Honourable Court delivered on the April 12th, 2018 in suit NO. FCT/HC/CV/2625/16 between Planned Shelter Limited Vs. Abuja Municipal Area Council & 5 Others it is unlawful and improper for them to ignore the said judgment, the subject matter of appeal also filed by them and proceed to carry out the very activity which this Honourable Court, by virtue of the said decision has prohibited.
2) A Declaration the Suit/case No: AMAC/1053/2018 pending before the 2nd Respondent is contemptuous abuse of process, the effect of which is that the proceedings is a nullity and as such the Court below lacks jurisdiction.
3) An Order of Certiorari removing to this Court for prohibiting the 2nd Respondent from further hearing in the case forthwith.
4) Any other Order as this Court may make in the circumstance.”

Christabel Ayuk Esq., a legal practitioner, deposed to the affidavit in support of the application, wherein she stated, thus:
“1. That I am a Legal Practitioner in the Law Firm of Ikechukwu Uzuegbu & Co., Solicitors to the Plaintiff/Respondent thus conversant with the facts I depose herein.
2. That I have the consent and the authority of the Plaintiff/Respondent and my employers to depose to this affidavit.
3. That the facts as stated in this affidavit are facts within my personal knowledge except where otherwise stated.
4. That I know as a fact that the High Court of Justice sitting at Apo Abuja gave a judgment stopping the 1st Respondent from further collection of Tenement Rate until the appropriate laws are made to that effect. A copy Certified True Copy of the judgment is hereby attached and marked Exhibit “A”.
5. That the 1st Respondent immediately appealed that judgment at the Court of Appeal and the matter is still at the Court of Appeal and yet to be decided.
6. That instead of 1st Respondent to wait for determination of its appeal by the Court of Appeal continues the same act of which the High Court declared null and void.
7. That the Applicant was dragged by the 1st Respondent to the 2nd Respondent Court for not paying the bill which a competent Court of Jurisdiction has declared null and void, a judgment that is still pending at the Court of Appeal. A copy of the Summons from the 2nd Respondent’s Court is hereby attached and marked Exhibit “B”.
8. That I know that it is a contemptuous act to disobey a subsisting judgment.
9. That the matter brought by the 1st Respondent to the 2nd Defendant Court is an abuse of Court process hence this application.”
(Note – Exhibit B is not attached to the affidavit and is not in the record of appeal)

The appellant, who was the 1st respondent before the lower Court, filed a notice of preliminary objection, on 14/01/2019, in which it complained that the lower Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the application before it, on the ground that the respondent in this appeal (as applicant before the lower Court) did not give the appellant, herein, mandatory pre-action notice, before filing the suit. A written address was filed along with the notice of preliminary objection, which was signed by Omakoj Friday Abu, Esq.

The appellant also filed a counter-affidavit, deposed to by Hannah Hamo, a Clerk in the Law Firm of the appellant’s counsel. The deponent testified, in the counter-affidavit, dated 14/01/2019, as follows:
“3. That I was informed by Michael Inyang, an in-house counsel in the tenement rate office of the 1st respondent on the 7th day of January, 2019 in our office at Suite 03, Nusaiba Towers, along Ahmadu Bello Way Abuja at about 3:10 pm while discussing this matter and I verily believe him of the following facts:
(i) That he has read the verifying affidavit of Christabel Ayuk, Esq in support of the Originating Motion dated 17th October, 2018 and most of the paragraphs thereof are not true.
(ii) That paragraphs 1-3 of the affidavit are facts within the personal knowledge of the deponent and the 1st respondent cannot confirm them.
(iii) That paragraphs 4 & 5 of the affidavit are true but that after the judgment of Honorable Justice V. B Ashi of the High Court of the FCT was delivered on the 12th day of April, 2018, another Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, High Court No. 11 presided over by His Lordship M. A. Nasir delivered another judgment on the same subject matter touching on the same issue on the 22nd May, 2018 in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/603/2017 Between Ibrahim Kabir Masan vs. The Chairman AMAC & 3 Others and held that the 1st respondent herein, AMAC has the powers to access, demand and collect tenement rate in the FCT as all necessary laws for such assessment, demand and collection are already in place in deference to the Court of Appeal Decision given earlier in 2014 in the case of AFDIN VENTURES & 2 ORS. VS. THE CHAIRMAN, ABUJA MNICIPAL AREA COUNCIL. Now shown to me are copies of Justice M. A. Nasir’s judgment dated 22nd May, 2018 and Court of Appeal’s (Abuja Division) judgment dated 12th May, 2014 annexed hereto and marked Exhibits “A” & “B” respectively.
(iv) Further to paragraph 3(iii), that though the parties in the 3 cases mentioned in paragraph 3(iii) (i.e. Planned shelter Ltd vs. AMAC & 5 Ors., decided by Justice V. B. Ashi, Ibrahim Kabir Masari vs. The Chairman AMAC & 3 Ors, decided by the Court of Appeal) are different, the main issue is the same i.e. whether there is in place necessary legal framework to enable AMAC or any other Area Council in the FCT assess, demand and collect tenement rate.
(v) That contrary to paragraph 6, the 1st respondent is, indeed waiting for the outcome of the appeal it filed against the judgment of Justice V. B. Ashi in Planned Shelter Ltd vs. AMAC & 5 Ors. The 1st respondent is not only waiting but taking all necessary steps to ensure that the appeal is heard expeditiously but being a revenue matter some of the matters instituted at the Magistrates Courts earlier are still pending but no one has taken any step to enforce payment of tenement rate against the applicant herein or any other person.
(vi) That paragraphs 7, 8 & 9 are denied and the 1st respondent states that the action of the applicant herein is premature as no steps have been taken to enforce anything against him. Besides, and in particular response to paragraph 8 of the verifying affidavit, there is also a subsisting judgment of the Court of Appeal (Abuja Division) which was earlier in time and which held that there is a legal framework in place to properly enable the 1st respondent (AMAC) to collect tenement rate. In addition, there is a later judgment of the same FCT high Court aligning with the Court of Appeal Decision and which permits AMAC to go ahead to collect tenement rate.
(vii) That the applicant herein has not placed any material before the Court to show that any demand was made on him/it and that the matter before the 2nd respondent (magistrate) is for the purpose of taking any steps in disobedience of the judgment of His Lordship, Justice V. B. Ashi delivered on 12th April, 2018.
(viii) That no pre-action Notice was ever served on the respondent by the applicant before this action was filed in Court.
(ix) That this suit is brought malafide in order to thwart government business and due judicial process.”

The appellant filed a written address, along with the counter-affidavit, which was signed by Omakoji Friday Abu Esq.

At page 116 of the record of appeal is a letter, dated 11/01/2019, addressed to the Chief Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja requesting that suit no. FCT/HC/CV/3065/2018 be re- assigned to another Judge of that Court, apart from Justice V. B. Ashi.

At page 121 of the record of appeal, the respondent’s counsel (Amaka Eke Esq.) argued the respondent’s motion before the Court, in the absence of the appellant and his counsel, after the lower Court refused to adjourn the suit. The lower Court, immediately, proceeded to record its ruling on the motion, on the same date. This appeal is against that decision of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, in suit no. FCT/HC/CV/3063/2018, dated 28/10/2019, signed by justice valentine B. Ashi.

On 07/02/2019, the appellant filed a notice of appeal. With leave of Court, the appellant filed an amended notice of appeal, on 11/12/2019, bearing seven grounds of appeal.

As required by the Rules of this Court, in the appellant’s amended brief of argument, filed on 11/12/2019, settled by Wole Agunbiade Esq. (SAN), three issues were set for the determination of this appeal. These are:
a. Whether the lower Court rightly exercised Jurisdiction to entertain the action of the 1st Respondent (the Applicant at the lower Court), when the identity and juristic personality of the 1st Respondent were not established, (Grounds 2 and 4).
b. Whether the Appellant’s right to fair hearing was violated by the failure of the lower Court to consider the counter-affidavit and written address of the Appellant before arriving at its decision in the action (Ground 5).
c. Whether, in the entire circumstances of this case, the lower Court was right in quashing the proceedings in SUIT NO. AMAC/1053/2018, pending before the 2nd Respondent, and making orders relating to other proceedings, pending or yet-to-be filed, before other Magistrate Courts or Magistrates in respect of the non-payment of tenement rate. (Grounds 6 and 7).

In the respondent’s brief of argument filed on 25/09/2020, settled by I. E. Uzuegbu Esq., the sole issue found for determination of the appeal is said to be:
Whether the appellant was right to have continued the very activity which the trial Court by virtue of the judgment it delivered on 28/01/2020 had prohibited even when the same appellant has gone on appeal to challenge the said judgment.

It is clear that the issue formulated by the respondent is not derived from or related to any of the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant. In view of the fact that the respondent did not file a cross-appeal or any respondent’s notice, it is my view that the respondent is not permitted to do what was done. The issue submitted by the respondent is without any root and it is hereby struck out. The appeal will be determined on the issues submitted by the appellant.

APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT OF THE APPEAL
With respect to the first issue, appellant’s counsel pointed out that the identity of the respondent, before the lower Court, was not ascertained or disclosed. The juristic personality of the respondent was also not proved. He relied on the decisions in Persons, Name Unknown v. Sahris Int’l Ltd. (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1689) 203 at 230; Madukolu & Ors. v Nkemdilim (1962) NSCC 374 at 379; The Registered Trustees, Pentecostal Assemblies of the World Inc. v. The Registered Trustees of the African Apostolic Christ Church [2002] 15 NWLR (Pt. 790) 424 at 449; and Oloba v. Akereja [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 508 at 520 to make the point that with the name of the respondent before the lower Court, it is certainly not a juristic person, which fact deprived the lower Court of jurisdiction to entertain the action.

On the second issue, learned counsel submitted that failure of the lower Court to consider the counter-affidavit and written address filed by the appellant to oppose the Originating Motion amounted to denial of the appellant’s right to fair hearing, which occasioned miscarriage of justice. He explained that the lower Court, curiously, confined itself to the notice of preliminary objection filed by the appellant in its ruling or decision. It was submitted that the counter-affidavit before the lower Court constituted evidence before that Court, which the lower Court had a duty to consider. Reliance was placed on the case of Gever & Ors. v. China [1993] 9 NWLR (Pt. 315) 97 at 106 per Kastina-Alu, JCA. (as he then was); Mbang v. Janet & Ors. [2014] LPELR-22656(CA); Ashiru v. Ayoade [2006] 6 NWLR (Pt. 976) 405 at 430; Obodo v. Olomu [1987] 2 NSCC 824 at 820-829; Ihom & Ors. v. Gaji [1997] 6 NWLR (Pt. 509) 526 at 531; United Spinners Nigeria Limited v. Chartered Bank Limited [2001] 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 195 at 216, to make the point that the failure of the lower Court to consider the counter-affidavit and the written address has the effect of rendering proceedings before the lower Court invalid. The case of Isyaku & Ors. v. Master & Ors. [2003] 5 NWLR (Pt. 814) 443 at 468-469 was cited.

With respect to the third issue, learned counsel argued that a Court is an impartial arbiter and does not award to a party what is not claimed, by that party. He submitted that the decision of a Court must be confined to the issues raised by the parties and it is improper for a Court to make a case for the parties. He relied on the cases ofUniversity of Jos v. Ikegwuoha [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478 at 497-498; Oyediran v. Amoo & Ors. [1970] LPELR-2867(SC); NALSA & Team Associates v. NNPC (1991) LPELR-1935(SC); Odunze & Ors. v. Nwosu & Ors. [2007) LPELR- 2252(SC). The Court was advised that the respondent did not pray for the order quashing proceedings before the lower Court, which that Court granted. He described the third prayer before the lower Court as vague and imprecise, which does not make it a relief. He cited the cases of Attorney-General of Lagos State v. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors. [2003] 12 NWLR (Pt. 833) 1 at 251, Olatunji v. Owena Bank of Nigeria Plc & Anor. [2002] 15 NWLR (Pt. 790) 272 at 286; and, Ozueh & Ors. v. Ezeweputa & Ors. [2005] 4 NWLR (Pt. 915) 221 at 241.

Learned counsel insisted that there was no prayer brought before the lower Court regarding prohibition of the Magistrate Court from hearing cases or quashing proceedings, as the lower Court eventually ordered in its ruling. He cited the case of Adefulu & Ors. v. Okulaja & Ors. (1996) LPELR-24853 (SC). He complained that the proceedings of the 2nd respondent, as well as other proceedings relating to non-payment of tenement rates were not produced or placed before the lower Court. He is of the view that the lower Court was wrong to have made those orders. He placed reliance on the case of Onyekwuluje & Anor. v. Benue State Government & Ors. [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 614 at 640. Learned counsel complained that the orders made would affect persons who were not before the lower Court, including Area Councils who were not parties to the action before the Court, which the law does not allow or permit. He cited the case of Kokoro-Owo & Ors. v. Lagos State Government & Ors. [2001] LPELR-1699 (SC). He took specific umbrage to fact that orders made concern “future proceedings” and “future claims”, and submitted that the lower Court ought to have confined itself to the circumstances of the action of the respondent. He relied on the case of Nnoruga & Ors. v Eniowo & Ors. [2015] LPELR- 24273(CA).
He urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the lower Court.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Respondent’s counsel submitted that orders made by a Court have to be obeyed, with the aid of the cases of Kehinde Anumege v. Mr. Gideon Anumege [2014] LPELR-23996(CA); Labour Party v. INEC [2009) LPELR-1732(SC); and, Nigerian Army v. Mowarin [1992] 4 NWLR (Pt. 235) 345.

Learned counsel pointed out that the appellant does not dispute the fact that there is a judgment prohibiting it from an act and that appealed against the order. Learned counsel, further, stated that the appellant admitted that it dragged the respondent to Court for the same act, in respect of which there is a judgment against it, which confirms respondent’s juristic personality, which appellant should not deny.

Learned counsel submitted that it amounts to contempt of Court for an appellant to refuse, neglect, ignore or fail to comply with a judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction and to, still, approach that same Court, subsequently, with an application or even an objection, while in disobedience of the earlier order. Such a party, by law, is not entitled to be heard. He submitted that all Courts have the power and duty to ensure that their orders are duly complied with, or obeyed, by all, to whom the said orders are directed, otherwise, the Courts may turn to empty barrels. He explained that the lower Court merely applied the law, in a bid, to ensure that the appellant obeyed/complied with its valid and subsisting order.
He urged the Court to uphold the ruling of the lower Court and to dismiss the appeal.

Appellant’s reply brief of argument was filed on 01/03/2021, settled by Wole S. Agunbiade Esq. (SAN). Learned counsel recalled that:
a. The amended brief of argument was filed on 11/12/2019, but deemed properly filed on 28/01/2020.
b. The ruling of the lower Court was delivered on 28/01/2019 and not 28/01/2020, as erroneously stated on page 1 of the respondent’s brief.
c. Appellant filed its notice of appeal on 07/02/2019 and not 13/03/2019 as wrongly stated in the respondent’s brief of argument.

He complained, as already dealt with, above, that the issue raised by the respondent does not arise from the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant. The argument of the respondent, in the view of learned counsel, does not answer the argument canvassed by the appellant. He submitted that the respondent’s brief of argument is deemed to be defective, for non-compliance with Order 19 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016. He relied on the case ofOjabo v. Inland Bank Nigeria Plc [1998] 11 NWLR (Pt. 574) 433 at 438, by which he urged the Court to strike out the lone issue (which has already been done in this judgment) and to also strike out respondent’s brief of argument. With the aid of the case of Okongwu v. NNPC [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 115) 296 at 309, he submitted that the respondent has conceded the arguments of the appellant.

RESOLUTION
This appeal was argued on 07/12/2021. Wole S. Agunbiade Esq. (SAN) appeared for the appellant. Agunbiade Esq. (SAN), on the occasion, to withdraw the appeal against the person, originally listed as, the 2nd respondent (Magistrate Mariam Bukola Said). The Court, consequently, struck out the name of the 2nd respondent.

Learned counsel adopted appellant’s brief of argument, filed on 11/12/2019, deemed properly filed and served on 20/01/2021 as argument of the appeal. He also adopted appellant’s reply brief, filed on 26/02/2021, deemed on 02/12/2021 as properly filed and served, as further argument of the appeal.

The 1st respondent was represented by I. E. Uzuegbu Esq. Learned counsel adopted the 1st respondent’s brief of argument filed on 25/09/2020, and deemed properly filed and served on 02/12/2021.

DETERMINING THE FIRST ISSUE
Whether the lower Court rightly exercised jurisdiction to entertain the action of the 1st Respondent (the Applicant at the lower Court), when the identity and juristic personality of the 1st Respondent were not established. (Grounds 2 and 4).
It needs to be mentioned that the issue of the juristic personality of the respondent was not made a matter of contention before the lower Court. The law is settled that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even at the Supreme Court, for the first time. Once a party challenges jurisdiction, the law is that it does not have to relate to any ground of appeal. See Emerald Energy Resources Ltd. v. Signet Advisors Ltd. [2021] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1779) 579 at 617; INEC, Anambra State & Anor. v. Ifeanyichukwu Okonkwo [2008] LPELR-4315(CA); and, Agwu & Ors. v. Julius Berger Nig. Plc. [2019] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1682) 165. The appellant is permitted by law to raise the question, as it has done, for the first time, on appeal.

There is no controversy about the rule that a Court has and can only exercise jurisdiction when:
(a) is properly constituted as regards number and qualification of members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and
(b) the subject-matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
(c) the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.
See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962) 2 SCNLR 341.

Jurisdiction is the life blood of any adjudication without which no proceeding, however brilliantly conducted by the Court or Tribunal, can be valid. It is, really, a threshold matter or sometimes referred to as a periphery matter to be dealt with once raised or challenged in any proceeding, Without jurisdiction, the whole trial or proceeding of the Court is a nullity, however well conducted. That is why jurisdiction is very vital and fundamental to the administration of justice, in any judicial system.

It is also settled law that the jurisdiction of the Court is determined by the claimant’s claim as disclosed in the writ of summons and/or endorsed in the statement of claim. See Tukur v. Govt of Gongola State (No. 2) (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517.

Where one or both parties before the Court are not juristic persons in the eyes of the law, what the Court can do is to strike out the name of the party. See C.C.B. (Nig.) Ltd v. Rose (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) 37 at 44. The simple reason is that the trial Court will not have jurisdiction over any party, without legal personality, before it. It is only legal persons who can sue and be sued in a Court of law. SeeBank of Baroda v. Iyalabani [1998] 2 NWLR (Pt. 539) 600 at 613 and Carlen v. Unijos [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt. 323) 631.

It is unmissable that the respondent, who was the applicant in the lower Court, was described as “THE OCCUPIER (GW163902)” in the Originating Motion, by which proceedings before the lower Court was commenced. The respondent did not make any attempt to alter the description given and that situation persists in this appeal. It is worthy of note that the respondent did not describe itself/himself/herself as an “unknown person” or “unknown occupier”. There has been no suggestion that the number or serial number included in the description of the respondent represents anything, like a prison inmate’s serial identification number or a police recruit’s identification number, which may aid the recognition of the respondent. In the affidavit deposed to in the lower Court, which, incidentally, has a legal practitioner as its deponent, there was no attempt to reveal the identity of the person or entity or being described as “the occupier”, who gave instructions to the deponent or counsel who have “valiantly” represented the undisclosed party, both in the lower Court and in this Court, and got the lower Court to give judgment to such an unknown party. There is no provision in the Rules or practice of the lower Court permitting a masquerade or “masquerader” to participate in our litigation process.

It is very clear, in this appeal, that the respondent, who brought the application before the lower Court is not a person or known person in the eyes of the law. The respondent, deliberately, obscured its/his/her identity in the proceedings, with the unfortunate connivance of his counsel and the deponent to the affidavit in support of the Originating Motion, for reasons which remain inexplicable. It is doubtful if the respondent actually exists, as a matter of fact. The Originating Motion filed, in commencement of the proceedings before the lower Court, did not confer jurisdiction on the lower Court, as proper parties were not before that Court. That fact is very glaring and it strikes one, strongly, that the respondent’s counsel knew that fact, as fact, as, when expected to explain or reveal the juristic personality of his client in this appeal, all the respondent’s counsel could say, in argument of this appeal, on the issue of juristic personality, is thus:
“We humbly and most respectfully submit that the argument of the Appellant before this Honourable Court is that the 1st Respondent is a non-juristic person. The question that arises from this contention of the Appellant is that if it were aware that the 1st Respondent was a non-juristic person, why did it drag the Respondent to the 2nd Respondent’s Court for it to be committed to prison? The Appellant cannot be seen to approbate and reprobate at the same time.”

For specificity and affirmation, it was the respondent who filed the Originating Motion, which commenced the suit before the lower Court. For an action to be properly constituted so as to vest jurisdiction in the Court to adjudicate on it, there must be a competent claimant/applicant and a competent defendant/respondent. As a general principle, only natural persons, that is, human beings and juristic or artificial persons such as body corporate are competent to sue or be sued. Consequently, where either of the parties is not a legal person, the action is liable to be struck out, as being incompetent. SeeShitta v. Ligali [1941] 16 NLR 23 and Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd. v. General Manager Ollivant Ltd. and Anor. [1961) 1 All NLR 116.
It is the holding of this Court that the appellant made a valid complaint in the first issue, to the effect that the respondent is not a juristic personality and thus, could not have had a legal standing before the lower Court, as to ignite that Court’s adjudicatory powers. In the circumstance, it is my view, that the Originating Motion filed by the respondent, an unknown entity in law, is unworthy of judicial time and resources expended on its determination. The lower Court should have struck out the Originating Motion. Having failed to strike out the Originating Motion, therefore, upon the valid complaint of the appellant in this appeal, it is an imperative duty on this Court to strike out the respondent’s action before the lower Court. That order will be made in this judgment. The first issue is resolved in favour of the appellant.

DETERMINING THE SECOND ISSUE
Whether the Appellant’s right to fair hearing was violated by the failure of the lower Court to consider the counter-affidavit and written address of the Appellant before arriving at its decision in the action (Ground 5).
An examination of the ruling of the lower Court, against which this appeal was brought, will confirm that the lower Court did not mention or refer to or give consideration to either the counter-affidavit of the appellant or the written address filed by the appellant, both, in opposition to the Originating Motion.

With regard to the counter-affidavit, since it constituted the basis of the argument in the written address, it is my view that the process retains its identity as evidence before the lower Court, which should have been given due attention and consideration, on the trip to conclusive and fair adjudication.

The case of Gever & Ors. v. China [1993] 9 NWLR (Pt. 315) 97 at 106 per Kastina-Alu, JCA, (as he then was), cited and relied upon by appellant’s counsel, did not decide the point made by appellant’s counsel, with due respect. While the holding of this Court, cited in the headnote of the Law Reports appears to have stated the principle cited by the appellant’s counsel, there is nowhere such a statement was made by the Court in the body of the judgment. However, see the case of Mbang v. Janet & Ors. [2014] LPELR- 22656(CA), which is apposite.

With regard to the written address, filed in argument of opposition to the application and in aid of the counter-affidavit, Order 33 Rules 1 and 4 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2018, to which neither the lower Court nor the parties referred (but which continuously winks at all of us) provides thus:
“1. This Order shall apply to all applications and final addresses.
…
4. … Where a party is absent, he shall be deemed to have adopted his written address.”
Though the appellant and its counsel were neither represented in Court nor represented by learned counsel at the time the respondent’s application was argued by the respondent’s counsel, since those processes were before the Court, it was the unwavering duty of the lower Court to give consideration to the processes, in its ruling.
Natural justice demands that a party be heard before the case against him is determined. Once there is an infringement of the principle of natural justice against him, then the trial is not fair. The principle of fair hearing is not a mere adjudication but a doctrine that enjoins that once a party entitled to be heard before deciding a matter is denied opportunity of being heard, the order or decision given thereon will be vacated or set aside, this is because the issue of fair hearing is constitutional and fundamental. See Olufeagba v. Abdulraheem & Ors. [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 384 and Ararume v. Ubah [2021] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1779) 511 at 539, per Oseji, J. S. C. Denial of fair hearing, in circumstances of this appeal, is confirmation, without more, that miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the inexplicable abstinence of the lower Court from considering the counter-affidavit and the written address filed by the appellant, in opposition to the application before it, despite the fact that the appellant was absent at the hearing of the application. The lower Court’s ruling is not good enough, in the circumstances, to be retained as pure exercise of judicial authority and has to be weeded out, for the sanctity of the process of adjudication to be sustained.
The fact that the lower Court was aware of the pendency of the two processes is signposted by the fact that the lower Court commented on their existence and pendency before it. The lower Court also recalled and commented, in decision, on the notice of preliminary objection filed by the appellant, on the same date, with the counter-affidavit and written address. On 28/01/2019, the lower Court stated (at pages 119-120) of the record of appeal), as follows:
“Court:- 1st respondent filed a notice of preliminary objection coupled with a notice of conditional appearance.
Court:- From the process filed before me, the respondents have been duly served with the order ex parte issued by this Court on the 31st day of October, 2018 whereby leave was granted to the applicant hereof to bring the substantive motion for an order of certiorari and prohibition. Only the 1st defendant, which in any case, is the necessary party to this proceeding entered a conditional appearance and filed two other processes, namely, a counter-affidavit to the motion, praying for certiorari as well as a notice of preliminary objection. In the first place, I am strongly of the view that the filing of a memorandum of appearance to an action for judicial review is absurd and unnecessary. …
By and large, i find no merit in the preliminary objection as such I believe that it is unprofitable to adjourn this proceeding for the hearing of the objection I will proceed at once to hear the substantive motion.”
For inexplicable reasons, the lower Court did not give consideration to the counter-affidavit and the written address, filed by the appellant which made its decision impure, having been contaminated by denial of fair hearing to the appellant, in avoidable, but unpardonable circumstances.
The appellant has succeeded in showing that the ruling of the lower Court was written and delivered upon denial of fair hearing. The ruling will have to be set aside. The second issue is resolved in favour of the appellant.

DETERMINING THE THIRD ISSUE
Whether, in the entire circumstances of this case, the lower Court was right in quashing the proceedings in SUIT NO. AMAC/1053/2018, pending before the 2nd Respondent, and making orders relating to other proceedings, pending or yet-to-be filed, before other Magistrate Courts or Magistrates in respect of the non-payment of tenement rate. (Grounds 6 and 7).
It is settled that a Court must not grant a prayer not contained in a motion paper, as the Court and parties are bound by the terms of prayers contained in a motion paper. See Agip (Nig.) Ltd. v. Agip Petroli International [2010] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1187) 424, 427; Okoya v. Santilli [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 131) 172; and Zaboley International Ltd. v. Omogbehin [2005] 17 NWLR (Pt. 953) 200 at 218.

It is also settled that Courts are not expected to make orders at large and without specific restrictions to that pleaded before them. It is not the duty of the Court to go on voyage of discovery. Thus, prayers placed before the Court need to be specific, decisive, precise and to the point in such a way that there can be no question as to what is asked for. SeeOzueh v. Ezeweputa [2005] 4 NWLR (Pt. 915) 221 at 241.

It bears repetition to recall that the prayers laid before the lower Court, are as follows:
1) A Declaration that having regards to the pendency of an appeal filed at the Court of Appeal by the 1st Respondent against the decision of this Honourable Court delivered on April 12th, 2018 in suit NO. FCT/HC/CV/2625/16 between Planned Shelter Limited Vs. Abuja Municipal Area Council & 5 Others, it is unlawful and improper for them to ignore the said judgment, the subject matter of appeal also filed by them and proceed to carry out the very activity which this Honourable Court, by virtue of the said decision has prohibited.
2) A Declaration the Suit/case No: AMAC/1053/2018 pending before the 2nd Respondent contemptuous abuse of process, the effect of which is that the proceedings is a nullity and as such the Court below lacks jurisdiction.
3) An Order of Certiorari removing to this Court for prohibiting the 2nd Respondent from further hearing in the case forthwith.
4) Any other Order as this Court may make in the circumstance.”

The orders made by the lower Court went thus:
“The Chairman of AMAC being the Chief Executive Officer of the 1st defendant is hereby ordered to file an affidavit to show cause why he should not be committed to prison until he purges himself of contempt in choosing to ignore the judgment of this Court against the AMAC & Ors., delivered on the 12th of April, 2018 as well as ignoring an appeal filed by the 1st defendant (AMAC) to the Court of Appeal. Besides the affidavit of cause, the Chairman of the 1st respondent hereof shall physically attend Court on the next adjourned date.

Meanwhile, proceedings in suit NO. AMAC/1053/2018 and an other proceedings relating to the non-payment to tenement rate, now pending or to be filed in any magistrate Court within jurisdiction are hereby quashed and the 2nd respondent, as well as all other Magistrates within jurisdiction, are hereby prohibited from further hearing of any case relating to the non-payment of tenement rate unless and until the Court of Appeal sets aside the judgment of this Court delivered on the 12th of April, 2018.”

A first glance or multiple, comparative, glances at both the prayers and the orders made by the lower Court will confirm the complaint of the appellant, that the lower Court did not allow itself to be guided by the prayers before it. Rather, it set up orders, which are, painfully, divorced from what the Court was requested, by the respondent, the owner of the case, to give judgment in respect of. That was a complete abdication of judicial duty and an unacceptable creation of another suit, out of the suit before the lower Court. The law does not permit Courts to follow a course different from those presented by parties, who own the cause, before the Court. Where a Court embarks upon such a course, not led by parties’ prayers, the Court’s judgment becomes its own judgment, not owned by the parties. As the Court is not a litigant, it is not permitted to create or own its prayers and enter judgment in respect thereof, without clear legal authority. In the circumstance of this case, there was no portion of the ruling of the lower Court where it stated positively or negatively, its view of the real prayers before it, in terms of success or failure. This Court, as an appellate Court, cannot sustain or retain the efficacy or confirm the validity of the ruling or decision of the lower Court, which was wrongly given. What was quashed was not available for quashing before the lower Court and the exercise of disciplinary powers should not be conducted at large.
The third issue is resolved in favour of the appellant.

CONCLUSION
It should be noted that it is not every slip or error that is found in a judgment that will attract success to such an appeal. It is only when such slip or error is substantial, in that, it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice that the appellate Court will interfere and the appeal allowed. See Ipinlaye II v. Olukotun (1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 453) 148 at 174 and Oladele v. Aromolaran II [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 453) 180. The appellant has shown, and I agree, that it suffered gross miscarriage of justice by the decision of the lower Court.

I find that there is merit in the appeal brought by the appellant, which merits the orders sought.
Thus, in line with the prayers of the appellant, the appeal succeeds and the following orders are, consequently, made:
a. The ruling of the lower Court dated 28/10/2019 is hereby set aside, along with all orders made therein.
b. The Originating Motion filed by the respondent, dated 17th October, 2018, filed at the lower Court on the same date, is hereby struck out for being incompetent.

MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Olabode Abimbola Adegbehingbe, JCA.

On the threshold issue of jurisdiction, it is perhaps important to note that the respondent was the plaintiff in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/3063/2018, which was commenced by way of an originating motion on notice. It is apparent on the record of proceedings that the question of the juristic or legal personality of the respondent was not made as an issue before the trial Court. However, since jurisdiction is the life wire in the adjudication process, it can be raised at any stage of proceedings, and even for the first time on appeal. See Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 SCNLR 296; African Newspapers Nigeria Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 6) 137 and Mrs. Esther I. Adesigbin & Ors. v. Military Governor of Lagos State & Anor. (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1574) 442.
The question of jurisdiction can even be raised for the first time on appeal without leave of Court. See Isaac Gaji v. Emmanuel Paye (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 823) 583 and University of Ilorin v. Rasheedat Adesina (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1414) 159.

In this case, it is the legal personality of the respondent that is in issue and has been challenged. And the law is that where the juristic personality of a party is challenged, by an opponent, the party whose legal personality is challenged has the burden to establish his or its legal or juristic capacity. See Multichoice Nigeria Limited v. Musical Copyright Society Nigeria Ltd/Gte. (2020) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1742) 415.

The respondent, in this case, has woefully failed to establish its legal personality. Having failed to prove that it is a persona ficta, that is a juristic person, the 1st respondent could not institute the action in the trial Court against the appellant or at all. A non-juristic person cannot commence or institute any action in a Court of law. Thus, in the case of Multichoice Nigeria Ltd/Gte (supra) at 516, this Court, per Ogbuinya, JCA; held that:
“… a juristic person is an entity armed with the capacity to ventilate his/its complaints in judicio. Generally, it is only natural persons, id est, human beings, and juristic or artificial persons such as body corporate/corporation, an artificial being which is invisible, intangible and exist only in the contemplation of the law, that are imbued with the capacity to sue and be sued in law Court. The jural units, which the law has cloaked with the garment of legal personality, are: human beings, incorporated companies, corporate sole with perpetual succession, trade unions, partnerships and friendly societies. No action can be commenced by or against nay party except a natural person(s) save such a party has been accorded by a statute, expressly or impliedly, or by common, either a legal personality under the name by which it sues or is sued or right to sue or be sued by that name”.
Since the respondent has failed to show that it has legal personality to sue the appellant, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the respondent’s purported suit.

It is for the above reasons, and the more articulate and elaborate reasons given in the leading judgment, that I also allow the appeal and strike the respondent’s suit.

MUSLIM SULE HASSAN, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft, the leading judgment, the reasoning and conclusions therein just delivered by my learned brother OLABODE A. ADEGBEHINGBE, JCA and I agree with him.

My lords permit me to add some few words on issue two, the right to fair hearing, the learned trial Judge glossing over the pending motion without considering same was in breach of the right to fair hearing of the Appellant, the law is settled that the Court must hear pending applications even if the judgment has already been prepared and ready for delivery. See the case of IBATOR V. BARAKURO (2007) 9 NWLR (PT 1040) 475 at 502 paragraphs G-A.
The law is trite that where there is a breach of fair hearing, the hearing or proceedings will be set aside. The Apex Court in the case of OYEYEMI V. COMMISSIONER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, KWARA STATE & ORS (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.226) Page 651 at 678 paragraphs C-F per Nnaerneka-Agu JSC (as he then was) held “‘This principle, which obliges us to hear a man before his right or interest can be taken away in any judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings or even in purely administrative proceedings in which the right of the person is to be taken away or his interest interfered with, has been reiterated in numerous cases. See e.g. Copper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, 14 C.B.N.S. 180 at 194; also Broadbent v. Rotherharn Corporation (1917) 2 Ch.31.
Indeed God heard Adam before he found him guilty and sentenced him. This principle, often expressed by the Latin Maxim: audi alteram partem (hear the other side) is applicable in all cases in which a decision is to be taken in any matter involving a person’s interest in a property, right or personal liberty, it has been applied in numerous Nigeria cases, and even includes all those cases which for want of appropriate explanation are explained away by the well-known judicial acronym ex dibito justitia. See for these Deduwa & Ors v. Okorodudu & Ors (1976) 10 SC 329 at 347, Adigun & Ors v. Attorney-General of Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.53) 678 and so many other cases.”
The effect of breach of the rule of audi alteram partem or of fair hearing is to render the hearing liable to be set aside or declared invalid by the Court. The Court will look at the situation as if such a hearing never in fact took place. The issues in litigation will be set back to the situation before the decision was taken. See OYEYEMI V. COMMISSIONER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, KWARA STATE & ORS (Supra) at page 685 paragraphs A-B.

In the light of the above and for the detailed reasons given in the lead judgment, I too allow the appeal and I hereby join my learned brother in the leading judgment to allow the appeal and set aside the ruling of the lower Court made on 28th October 2019.