ALI v. STATE (2020)

ALI v. STATE

(2020) LCN/4942(SC)

In The Supreme Court

On Friday, December 18, 2020

SC.879/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Olukayode Ariwoola Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Kudirat Motonmori Olatokunbo Kekere-Ekun Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

John Inyang Okoro Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Ejembi Eko Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

MOHAMMED ALI APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

INGREDIENTS TO PROVE THE OFFENCE OF RAPE

Generally, in a charge of rape or unlawful carnal knowledge of a female without her consent, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the following.
(a) That the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix.
(b) That the act of sexual intercourse was done without her consent or that the consent was obtained by fraud, force, threat, intimidation, deceit or impersonation.
(c) That the prosecutrix was not the wife of the accused.
(d) That the accused had the mens rea, the intention to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix without her consent or that the accused acted recklessly not caring whether the prosecutrix consented or not.
(e) That there was penetration.
See Oludotun Ogunbayo Vs. The State (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt.1035) 157; (2007) 5 SCM 154; Upahar Vs. The State (2003) NWLR (Pt.816) 290; State Vs. Ojo (1980) 2 NWLR 391; (1980) 2 NCR 391; Okeyamor Vs. The State (2005) 1 NCC 499; Iko Vs. The State (2005) 1 NCC 499; Ndewenu Posu & Anor Vs. The State (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt.1234) 393 at 416-417. PER ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.

THE MOST ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENCE OF RAPE

WHETHER OR MEDICAL REPORT CAN BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS

Generally, by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, a medical report may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of proving the nature of any injuries received by such a person. On the admission of such report, same shall be read over to the accused and he shall be asked whether he disagrees with any statement therein and any such disagreement shall be recorded by the Court. If by reasons of any such disagreement or otherwise it appears desirable for the ends of justice that such medical report officer or registered medical practitioner shall attend and give evidence in person, the Court shall summon such medical officer or registered medical practitioner to appear as a witness. See Section 249 (a)-(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In other words, in practice and procedure, a medical report need not be tendered by the medical officer or practitioner who prepared or made same. See Mohammed Sarki Fulani M. Vs. The State (2018) LPELR – 45195 (SC). PER ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.

OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Jos division, delivered on 17/07/2018 – Coram:- Uchechukwu Onyemenam; Habeeb Adewale O. Abiru; Elfrieda O. Williams-Dawodu, JJCA which upheld the judgment of the High Court of Gombe State delivered by the Hon. Justice J. A. Awak, in charge No. GM/26C/2013 on the 30th day of June, 2015.

The appellant had been arraigned before the trial Court by a charge dated 18th November, 2013 for the offence of rape, contrary to Section 282 of the Penal Code and punishable under Section 283 of the same Code.

The appellant was alleged to have, on or about the 12th of March, 2012 at Jauro Abare Quarters of Gombe State, had unlawful carnal knowledge of one Hadiza Shuaibu who was five (5) years old at the time of the commission of the alleged offence. The Charge reads:-
“That you Mohammed Ali of Jauro Abare quarters on or about 12th March, 2012 at Jauro Abare quarters of Gombe State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court did an unlawful act, to wit: having unlawful carnal knowledge of one Hadiza Shuaibu – 5 years old and thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 282 of the Penal Code and punishable under Section 283 of the Penal Code.”

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and the matter proceeded to trial. The Prosecution called six witnesses and tendered three documents that were admitted and marked – Exhibits A, B and C respectively. The appellant in his defence testified and called two other witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial, counsel filed and adopted their respective written addresses.

In its reserved judgment, the trial Court found the appellant guilty as charged. He was convicted and sentenced to ten (10) years imprisonment without an option of fine.

Appellant was aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court, hence he appealed to the Court below. In its reserved judgment delivered on 17th July, 2018, the Court below found as follows:
“All in all, this Court finds that the appellant has not given it any tangible or cogent reason to tamper with the evaluation of evidence carried out by the lower Court. This Court finds no merit in the appeal and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the High Court of Gombe State delivered by Honourable Justice J. A. Awak in charge No. GM/26C/2013 on the 30th of June, 2015 is affirmed along with the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant therein.”

Further aggrieved by the judgment of the Court below led the appellant to appeal to this apex Court with his Notice of Appeal filed on 15th August, 2018 which was amended to five grounds of appeal. Upon settlement of the records of appeal, parties filed and duly exchanged briefs of argument. The appeal was later heard on 8th day of October, 2020.

In the appellant’s brief of argument settled by Josiah Daniel-Ebune Esq., the learned counsel distilled the following three issues for the determination of the appeal:
1. Whether the judgment of the trial Court is unconstitutional and therefore a nullity (Ground 4 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether the Court of Appeal approached the resolution of the appellant’s appeal against the judgment of the trial Court, fairly and dispassionately and thereby did not prejudge the issues. (Ground 1 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).
3. Was the Court of Appeal right in affirming the decision of the trial Court on the Potency of Exhibit C, and the evidence of PW3 and 4 as corroborating the evidence of the Prosecution having regard to all the facts and circumstances of this case? (Grounds 2, 3 and 5 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).

In the respondent’s brief of argument settled by Zainab Abdulkadir El-Rasheed Esq., filed on 7/2/2019, learned counsel also formulated three issues for determination as follows:-
1. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the judgment of the trial Court on Exhibit C (Ground 2).
2. Whether the decision of the lower Court in affirming the judgment of the trial Court has occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the appellant (Grounds 1, 3 and 5).
3. Whether the judgment of the trial Court violates constitutional provisions and therefore makes it invalid. (Ground 4).

However, reading through the Amended Notice of Appeal of five grounds, I am convinced that the following are the two issues that arise for the determination of the appeal:
1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in upholding the judgment of the trial Court that the prosecution proved the charge of rape against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. (Grounds 2, 3 and 5 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether the Court of Appeal was not wrong in affirming the judgment of the trial Court which was prima facie null and void, not having been signed by the trial Judge who delivered the said judgment. (Grounds 1 and 4 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).

In arguing Issue 1, learned appellant’s counsel referred to the testimony of the victim of the alleged rape – Hadiza Shuaibu at 8 years old and contended that she gave an unsworn evidence before the Court and that the prosecution relied on the statement and the content of Exhibit C – the Medical report and Exhibits A and B, which though not confessional in nature but were said to be consistent with the evidence of the victim that she did not give her consent to the assault on her.
Learned counsel further referred to the trial Court’s evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution when it came to the conclusion that it proved the case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant, emphasizing the potency of the exhibit unsworn evidence of the prosecution, being credible, independent and in line with Section 209(3) of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel however contended that in all its findings, the trial Court did not decide how Exhibit C connected the appellant with the offence. He referred to the findings of the Court below on pages 7 and 8 of the judgment on pages 159-160 of the record. He contended that the type of corroboration required under Section 282 (1) of the Penal Code is not ordinary corroboration but such corroboration to clearly implicate the accused. He relied on Igbine Vs. State (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt.519) 101 at 108.

Learned counsel referred to the Statements of both parents of the victim – PW3 and PW4, and their respective oral evidence in Court. He contended that there were inconsistencies in the oral testimonies of PW1 – PW4 and their respective previous statements on record. He submitted that where a witness has made a previous statement which is inconsistent with his oral testimony, the previous statement, whether sworn or unsworn, does not constitute evidence upon which the Court can act. He submitted that it was unsafe to have convicted the appellant on the evidence of those witnesses.

He contended that there were inconsistencies in the prosecution’s evidence, such as to cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of the appellant, and should have been given the benefit of the doubt. He relied on Nwabueze Vs. The State (1988) 2 NSCC 389, Onubogu & Anor Vs. The State (1974) 1 All NLR 5 at 17.

Learned counsel contended that there was nothing to show that the PW1 and PW2 properly investigated the case. He contended further that the evidence of both PW3 and PW4 are hearsay and inadmissible. He referred to the evidence of the Prosecutrix herself at pages 65-66 of the Record. He also referred to Exhibit C – the Medical report, said to have been prepared by a Youth Corper on National Service. He contended that being a Corp member, he could not have acquired the requisite experience to give an opinion on sensitive issue of this nature. He submitted that Exhibit C is not independent to corroborate the testimony of PW5 as it did not link the appellant with the charge. He contended that the said medical report was not served on the appellant at least ten (10) clear days before it was tendered and admitted in evidence. He relied on Section 57 of the Evidence Act.

He submitted that Exhibit C was therefore wrongly admitted in evidence in the proceedings before the trial Court. Learned counsel contended that the essence of medical report in a case of rape is to establish injury or some scientific proof of penetration. He contended further that Exhibit C speaks for itself and it is apparent from the contents that it did not provide the requirement of the law to establish rape and that the appellant is connected to it.

Learned counsel contended that for another evidence to corroborate the other, such other must not be a repetition of the evidence to be corroborated, otherwise there will be no need for the original evidence. He relied on Okabichi Vs. The State (1975) NSCC 124 at 130.

On the proof required of rape allegation, he relied on Francis Okpanefe Vs. The State (1969) 1 All NLR 420. On the law on the critical point of strictly linking appellant with penetration and specifically with the victim, he relied on Jegede Vs. The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 733) 264 at 274-275.

Learned counsel submitted that from the statement of the appellant admitted in evidence and his oral testimony at page 82 of the record, corroborated by Exhibit C itself and pages 8 and 20 of the record, he contended that the maker of Exhibit C only examined the prosecutrix. He contended further that the two Courts below ought to have known that the appellant denied the contents of Exhibit C hence the Prosecutrix ought to have called the maker of Exhibit C to enable the appellant exercise his right to cross examine the Doctor. He submitted that the failure to call the maker of Exhibit C and the fact that there was no other independent credible evidence of penetration implicating the appellant has occasioned actual miscarriage of justice which rendered both conviction and sentence of the appellant unsustainable. He urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the appellant.

On this issue 1, the respondent’s counsel referred to the testimony of PW5 – the prosecutrix on page 65 of the record and how same was corroborated by Exhibit C. Learned counsel referred to the findings of the trial Court on page 101 of the record and contended that the unsworn testimony of the prosecutrix was corroborated by Exhibit C. He relied on Oguno Vs. The State (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt.1376) 1 at 30. He referred to the evidence adduced by the prosecution and contended that the said evidence was neither challenged, discredited nor controverted by the defence during the trial. He submitted that where a party fails to cross examine a witness on a point, he is bound by that point. He relied on Okosi Vs. The State (1989) 1 CLRN 39.

Learned counsel urged the Court to hold that the Court below was right in affirming the judgment of the trial Court that the prosecution proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He urged the Court to resolve the issue against the appellant but in favour of the respondent.

As earlier stated, the appellant was charged with the offence of rape of a five (5) year old girl. He was tried, found guilty and convicted as charged. He was later sentenced to a term of imprisonment. His appeal to the Court below was found lacking in merit and was accordingly dismissed, leading to this appeal.

What then is the offence of rape? It is the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl without her consent, or with her consent, if the consent is obtained by force or by means of threats or intimidation of any kind or by fear of harm or by means of false and fraudulent representation as to the nature of the act, or in the case of a married woman by personating her husband. See Sunday Jegede Vs. The State (2001) LPELR -1603 (SC) (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 733) 264 at 275; (2001) 10 SCM 49; Edet Okon Iko Vs. The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt.732) 221.
At common law, an offence of rape is the unlawful sexual intercourse committed by a man with a woman not his wife through force and against her will. Generally, the common law crime of rape required at least a slight penetration of the penis into the vagina. See Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition page 1374; Habibu Musa Vs. The State (2013) LPELR – 19932 (SC) (2013).
In Nigeria, in particular, under the Penal Code Act, a person is said to commit rape who has sexual intercourse with a woman in any of the following circumstances –
(a) Against her will;
(b) Without her consent;
(c) With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her in fear of death or of hurt;
(d) With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believe that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married;
(e) With or without her consent when she is under fourteen years of age or of unsound mind.
See; Section 282 (1) of the Penal Code Act.
Unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age of consent, regardless of whether it is against that person’s will is known as statutory rape.

There is no doubt and it is not in dispute that as at the time of the alleged rape, the victim in this case was only five (5) years old, and by every standard – a child, who certainly cannot give consent to sexual intercourse. She however testified in Court at the age of eight (8) years. Yet under fourteen (14) years of age hence was said to have given evidence without being on oath. In other words, she was unsworn.

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial, the Court found that the prosecutrix who testified that when she was sent on an errand by her mother – PW4 to the shop of the appellant to buy beans, the appellant removed something from his waist under his trouser and inserted the thing in her vagina. She was said to have stayed too long to return to the house, but when she returned, she came with neither the money (twenty Naira) she had gone with nor the beans she was to buy. She was given yet another money – now fifty naira to go to the same shop for the beans but she went out and refused to go – crying. The trial Court further found that what the appellant was said to have inserted into the prosecutrix vagina was painful.

The testimony of her mother – PW4 was said to have confirmed the unsworn testimony of the prosecutrix.

Exhibit C is the medical report of one Dr. Akanbi who examined the prosecutrix upon presentation after the alleged sexual assault.

On record at page 100, the trial Court found, inter alia, as follows:
“the testimony of PW5 Khadija Shaibu to the effect that when sent on errand by her mother to the shop of the accused person to buy beans, the accused person put something into her private part. This witness though young in age gave an intelligent evidence and knew the consequence of telling the truth and lies before the Court, that what the accused person put into her private part is attached to his body, at the lower part of his body.”

The learned trial judge on page 101 of the record came to the conclusion that the unsworn testimony of the victim was corroborated by the medical report of the examination carried out by Dr. Akanbi confirming that the appellant had raped the prosecutrix.

Ordinarily, the most important and essential ingredient of the offence of rape is penetration and the Court will deem that sexual intercourse has taken place upon proof of penetration of the penis into the vagina. Therefore, any slightest penetration of the male organ – the penis, will be sufficient to constitute the act of sexual intercourse. In other words, emission or the rupture of the hymen is unnecessary to establish the offence of rape. See Ndewenu Posu & Anor Vs. The State (Supra).
However, penetration required by law in an offence of rape is the entry of the penis or some other part of the body or a foreign object into the vagina or other body orifice. This is the typical meaning today in statutes defining sexual offences. See Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, page 1248.

In Exhibit C which was the medical report of the Medical Doctor who examined the prosecutrix at the Gombe Specialist Hospital, the doctor reported, inter alia, as follows:
“Patient claims the man (Appellant) took off her pant and skirt and inserted something into her private part.
She was said to have cried both on micturition and defecation at home and assailant was arrested the same night and placed on Police custody.
On examination, there was no sign of beating or physical abuse. The main finding was in the examination of genitals with mild oedema of the labia minora and torn hymen at 9 O’clock position.
There was also some whitish vaginal discharge at the vagina orifice.
…………………………………..
An assessment of sexual assault was made. She was discharged home.” (Brackets supplied)

It is note worthy that the learned appellant counsel had attacked the medical report – Exhibit C on the ground that it was not tendered by the maker to be available for cross examination by the appellant. This is unfortunate and there is a misconception by the counsel. It depends on the purpose for which the said medical report was being tendered.
Generally, by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, a medical report may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of proving the nature of any injuries received by such a person. On the admission of such report, same shall be read over to the accused and he shall be asked whether he disagrees with any statement therein and any such disagreement shall be recorded by the Court. If by reasons of any such disagreement or otherwise it appears desirable for the ends of justice that such medical report officer or registered medical practitioner shall attend and give evidence in person, the Court shall summon such medical officer or registered medical practitioner to appear as a witness. See Section 249 (a)-(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In other words, in practice and procedure, a medical report need not be tendered by the medical officer or practitioner who prepared or made same. See Mohammed Sarki Fulani M. Vs. The State (2018) LPELR – 45195 (SC).
There is nothing on record to show that the learned counsel prayed the Court to summon the Medical Officer who examined the prosecutrix and prepared the report admitted as Exhibit C for the purpose of being cross examined. The medical report was therefore properly admitted in evidence by the trial Court. It was relevant and admissible in the circumstance. The trial Court was right to have relied on same on the findings therein on the alleged sexual assault on the prosecutrix – PW5. The medical report indeed materially corroborated the unsworn testimony of PW5 who was the victim to the effect that she was sexually assaulted.

Still on the record of appeal, there is nothing to show that the appellant denied being with the prosecutrix on the day in question where her mother (PW4) had sent her on errand to buy beans.

Even though the prosecutrix who testified as PW5 was barely eight (8) years old when she testified before the trial Court, her testimony was properly countenanced when taken together with the testimonies of her parents – PW3 and PW4 and Exhibit C. The provisions of Section 209 (1) and (3) of the Evidence Act was not breached in any form.

On the attack by the learned counsel to the appellant on the testimony of PW4 – the mother of the Prosecutrix, the Court below had found as follows:
“The evidence led by the fourth prosecution witness that she sent the victim to the shop of the accused defendant to buy beans and that the victim stayed for a long time and came back without the money or the beans and that when she sent the victim to go back to buy the beans, the victim refused to go and was crying, are statements that the witness perceived herself and is not hearsay evidence. The statement of the witness of what the victim told her as the reason for her not wanting to go back to the shop of the accused defendant cannot also be termed as hearsay evidence because the victim who told her, testified as a witness and her evidence confirmed the statement of the fourth prosecution witness. The evidence of the fourth prosecution witness corroborated the evidence of the victim in material particulars and the lower Court was correct to have treated it as such.”

I cannot agree more with the Court below, that the testimony of the PW4 corroborated the unsworn testimony of the prosecutrix and the trial Court was correct in treating it as such.

From the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution before the trial Court, the Court was correct in coming to the conclusion that the prosecution proved the charge of rape against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The Court below was therefore right to have affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the trial Court. Accordingly, this issue is resolved against the appellant.

The second issue for determination as it arose from the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant is whether the Court below was not wrong in affirming the judgment of the trial Court which was, prima facie null and void, not having been signed by the trial judge who delivered the said judgment.

As earlier noted in this judgment, the learned appellant’s counsel had contended that although the judgment of the trial Court was dated 30/6/15, it was neither sealed, initialed nor signed by the learned trial Judge in the open Court at the time of the delivery of the judgment in the open Court. It was therefore not constitutionally authenticated. Learned counsel submitted that the said judgment violated the provisions of Section 294 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code touching date, signature and seal, hence it is invalid and should be so declared.

In response, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the judgment of the trial Court satisfied all the requirements of the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code. He submitted that it is the primary duty of the appellant to compile and transmit the record of proceedings of the trial Court to the appellate Court through the appeal registry of the trial Court. Learned counsel contended that it is not in dispute that record of proceedings of the trial Court transmitted to the Court below by the appellant is a typed record of the proceedings of the trial Court which is secondary evidence in nature. He contended further that the only way the appellant could have been able to justifiably raise an issue of violation of the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code was if the handwritten judgment of the Judge is placed before the Court and shown to be unsigned and not sealed as required by law.

There is no doubt, that every Court established under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all parties to the cause on matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the delivery thereof.

See Section 294 (1) of the Constitution. And by Section 269 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code – every judgment shall, inter alia, be dated and signed or sealed by the Court in open Court at the time of pronouncing it.
On the record, the judgment of the trial Court being attacked now is on pages 86-105 of the record. On page 86, being the first page of the judgment, it is indicated that the judgment was delivered on 30th day of June, 2015. This is conceded by the appellant. It is also indicated that it is the judgment of Honourable Justice J. A. Awak in Suit No. GM/26c/13. On the last page of the judgment on page 105 of the record of appeal, it is indicated that the document is a Certified True Copy, duly certified by one Hannatu Alawuta – Principal Registrar (Appeals) of the High Court of Gombe State. It is indicated at the conclusion of the said judgment that the Judge signed and dated the judgment.
Ordinarily, any document not signed does not have any efficacy in law. Indeed, such a document is worthless and a worthless document cannot be efficacious. See Omega Bank Nigeria Plc Vs. O.B.C Ltd (2005) 2 SCM 119; (2005) LPELR – 2636 (SC); (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt.928) 547. In this matter, the appellant’s counsel contended that “no one knows when the word ‘SGD’ typed on the space provided for signature on the word ‘JUDGE’ which is neither the initials nor the names of the trial Judge not indicated thereunder”. Learned counsel submitted that merely typing the word ‘SGD’ on the Judgment of the trial Court is not indication that the trial Judge who delivered it, signed or initialed the said Judgment. I must state clearly before proceeding further that the argument of the learned appellant’s counsel on this point, is to say the least, spurious, vexatious and embarrassing. As I stated earlier, the judgment of the trial Judge produced on pages 86-105 of the record of appeal is a Certified True copy of the original Judgment which was delivered on the 30/6/2015. In law, to certify a document is to authenticate or verify it in writing. In other words, with the stamp, signature, name and official status of the person who certified the judgment, the law presumes that the document represents exactly what is on the original. That is to say that on the original of the judgment, there is the name and signature of the Judge who wrote and delivered the said judgment. However, if the appellant was indeed serious with his contention that the judgment of the trial Court was not signed by the Judge and not sealed, what he ought to have done was to produce the original judgment as an Exhibit. See Saidu H Ahmed & Ors Vs. CBN (2013) 12 SCM (Pt.2) 115; (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt.1365) 352.
I am therefore of the firm view that the judgment of the trial Court in this case said to have been delivered on 30/6/2015 was duly authenticated, signed and properly dated in compliance with the requirement of the Constitution and the law. The appellant therefore failed totally to prove otherwise. In the circumstance, this issue is resolved against the appellant.

In the final analysis, this appeal is found to be unmeritorious and deserves to be dismissed. It is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court below delivered on 17th of July, 2018 which affirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant by the trial Court is affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.: I agree with the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Olukayode Ariwoola, JSC and to underscore the support, I have in the reasonings from which the decision emanated, I shall make some comments.

This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Jos Division or Court below or lower Court delivered on the 17/7/2018 Coram: Abiru, Onyemenam and Williams-Dawodu JJCA, upholding the decision of the High Court of Gombe State per J.A. Awak delivered on the 30th June, 2015.

The background facts leading to this appeal are well captured in the lead judgment and so I shall not repeat them unless I have to make a reference to any part of those facts. On the 8th October, 2020 date of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant, Josiah Daniel-Ebune Esq adopted the brief of argument filed on 17/10/2018 and a reply brief filed on 14/2/2019. He distilled three issues for the determination of the appeal which are thus:-
1. Whether the judgment of the trial Court is unconstitutional and therefore a nullity (Ground 4 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether the Court of Appeal approached the resolution of the Appellant’s appeal against the judgment of the trial Court, fairly and dispassionately and thereby did not prejudge the issues? (Ground 1 of the Amended Notice of Appeal).
3. Was the Court of Appeal right in affirming the decision of the trial Court on the potency of Exhibit C, and the evidence of PWS 3 and 4 as corroborating the evidence of the prosecutrix having regard to all the facts and circumstances of this case? (Grounds 2, 3, and 5 of the Amended notice of Appeal).

The learned Solicitor-General of the Gombe State Ministry of Justice, Zainab Abdulkadir El-Rasheed adopted the brief of the respondent filed on 7/2/2019 and formulated three issues for determination, viz:-
a. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the findings of the trial Court on Exhibit C? Relates to grounds 2.
b. Whether the decision of the lower Court in affirming the judgment of the trial Court has occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant relates to grounds 1, 3 and 5.
c. Whether the judgment of the Court violates constitutional provisions and therefore makes it valid. Relate to grounds 4.

I shall utilise the issues as crafted by the respondent for ease of reference and convenience.

ISSUE ONE AND APPELLANT’S ISSUE 3
Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the findings of the trial Court on Exhibit C.

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in all the findings, the learned trial judge did not decide, how Exhibit C the medical report connected the appellant with the offence charged and did not provide the expected corroboration. He cited Igbine v State (1997) 9 NWLR (pt.519) 101 at 108; Okabichi v The State NSCC 124 at 130 etc.

That there were inconsistencies between the oral evidence of PW1-PW4 and their previous statements on record which discrepancies are fatal to the prosecutions case.

That in admitting Exhibit C, the appellant was denied cross-examining the maker and so his right to fair hearing was breached. That it is not enough that the maker was a youth corps doctor who was not available to testify.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the testimony of the prosecutrix and the content of Exhibit C shows that Exhibit C corroborated the testimony of PW5. He cited Posu & Anor v The State (2012) Vol.10 LFCNCC 60 at 67.

That the appellant is only now raising the issue of inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses though he left that undone at the cross-examination stage thus of no moment now. He relied on Afolabi v The State (2012) Vol. 10 LRCNCC 30 at 40.

It was contended for the respondent that it is not mandatory that the maker of a medical report such as Exhibit C testimony before such a report can be used by the Court.

The summary above shows the stand of the appellant and that of the respondent respectively. The appellant had posited that the evidence of the prosecutrix, PW5 was not damaging to the defence and did not corroborate the medical report, Exhibit C. I shall recast excerpts of the testimony of PW5 thus:-
“My mother sends me to Mohammed shop to buy beans in his shop and when I got there he told me that beans have finished and he inserted something into my private part. When I went I did not enter the shop when he said the beans are finished. The accused inserted something into my private part outside the shop. I did not know where he removed the thing he put into my private part. I cannot remember the thing he inserted into my private part looks like what the accused person put into my private part is attached to his body, the thing he inserted into my private part is at his lower body. What the accused person inserted into my private part is painful…”

The content of Exhibit C revealed that on examination, there was no sign of beating or physical abuse. The main findings were in the examination of genitals with mild oedema of the labia minora and torn hymen at 9 O’clock position. There was also some whitish vaginal discharge at the vaginal orifice. The above quoted part of the testimonies of the prosecutrix and the content of Exhibit C show that Exhibit C corroborated the testimony of PW5. The learned trial Court judge held at page 101 of the record of the appeal thus:
…I also agree with the contention of the prosecution that the content of Exhibit C, the medical report did corroborated the evidence of the victim. That she was raped by the accused person, I do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel to the accused person, that the medical report did not support the case of the prosecution, the main findings were in the examination of the genitals with mild oedema of the labia minora and torn hymen at 9O’clock position. This finding on the medical report is consistent with rape as complained by the prosecution.”

Indeed the portion of the trial Court’s judgment showed quite clearly that Exhibit C, the medical report corroborated the evidence of the victim who is a minor in implicating the appellant to the offence of rape. This situation produced the need to enter into the meaning of corroboration which is, evidence that confirms the evidence of a complainant and in this case, the prosecutrix. See Posu & Anor v The State (2012) Vol. 10 LRCNCC 60 at 67.

The Court below was on firm ground in its judgment anchored by Abiru JCA who stated thus:
“…Counsel to the Appellant clearly did not avert his mind to the fact that corroborative evidence does not need to be direct evidence that the accused person committed the offence and that it is sufficient even if is only circumstantially connecting or tending to connect him with its commission. The contents of the medical report and the circumstances leading to the examination of the victim, as led in the unchallenged evidence of the third prosecution witness, in very material particulars and where taken along with the evidence of the victim, linked the appellant to the commission of the crime. The reliance placed by the lower Court on the medical report as corroborating evidence cannot be faulted.”

The situation of the appellant was not assisted by the extra-judicial statements he made, that is, Exhibits A and B, wherein he denied the offence as the evidence deployed by the prosecution was sufficient with the independent material evidence, Exhibit C giving the corroboration. This satisfied the requirements of Section 209 (3) of the Evidence Act 2011 as amended in the light of the fact that prosecutrix was a minor.

The appellant at this stage is raising issues of inconsistencies in the evidence of PW1 to PW4 and their statements to the police which were attached to the application to prefer the charge against the appellant. This stance throws up a position running against the law which is that statements made by the witness to the police during investigation cannot be used as evidence before the Court as the Court only uses the evidence provided by a given witness in the Court. Anyway if there was to be something of a contention in regard to those extra-judicial statements of witnesses, the concern ought to be raised in the course of the trial and not after and worst of all in a counsel’s brief which does not take the place of evidence. In other words, whatever is lost in evidence cannot be restored in a lawyer’s address or brief as it is lost for all time. Therefore the lawyer’s brief is not the place to bring up the credibility or lack of it when it did not come up during cross-examination of the witness or witnesses on the other side.

The assessment of the credibility of a witness is a matter within the province of the trial Court as it is only the Court of trial that has the advantage of seeing, watching and observing the witnesses in the witness box. The Court has the liberty and privilege of believing him and accepting his evidence in preference to the evidence adduced by the defence. See AFOLALU vs. THE STATE (2012) VOL. 10 LRCNCC 30. The learned trial Court at page 100 of the record of appeal held thus:-
“…particularly the testimony of PW5 Khadija Shaibu to the effect that when sent on an errand by her mother to the shop of the accused person to buy beans the accused person put something in her private part. This witness though young in age gave an intelligent evidence and knew the consequence of telling the truth and lies before the Court that what the accused put into her private part is attached to his body and at the lower part of his body. What he put into her private part is painful.”

The appellant herein raises the issue of Exhibit C being wrongly admitted by the learned trial judge, a grouse the appellant glossed over at the Court below. Bringing the matter up herein in the circumstance places, this Court in a difficult position of going into appeal from the trial Court instead of appeal from the Court of Appeal.

However, I shall make a comment on the reason the appellant is crying out at this late hour on the admissibility of Exhibit C as it was not tendered by the maker. This reason is farfetched as it is not backed by law as the admission is covered by Sections 39(b) and 55(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 as amended and Section 249 (1)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Clearly from what was before the trial Court all that ought to be done when the maker was not available was covered when PW6 tendered the document and it was admitted. I shall quote what transpired in the trial Court before the admission of the exhibit thus:-
“…I am in charge of administrative activities. In 2012, I know one medical doctor I.O. Akanbi, he served in our hospital as a corper Doctor, I do not know where he is now. The Doctor completed his NYSC since December 2012 from the time he completed his service, l do not know his whereabouts. When he served in our hospital I was able to see his handwriting and signature…”
The Supreme Court in POSU & ANOR vs. THE STATE (2011) 1SCM 192 held thus:- Courts should presume the genuineness of any signature on a certification in the absence of evidence to the contrary. See also State v Ajie (2000) 11 NWLR (pt.678) 438; Ogun v State (2010) 7 NWLR (pt.124) 314.
Section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code has extended the position of Section 55(1) of the Evidence Act to all written reports by the medical doctors or registered medical practitioner of the examination carried out on a person for the purpose of proving the nature of the injury suffered or received by that person.

Therefore the finding of the Court below was apt and I cannot depart from it.

ISSUE TWO
Whether the decision of the lower Court in affirming the judgment of the trial Court judgment has occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the appellant.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the procedure adopted by the Court below occasioned a miscarriage of justice as it gave the impression that the Court had prejudged the appeal before considering of the material before it and so should be set aside. He cited Agwarangbo v Nakande (2000) 9 NWLR (pt.672) 341 at 363.

Responding, learned counsel for the respondent disagreed with the position espoused by the appellant. That what the appellant’s counsel is contending is against the style of the Court of Appeal justice which had nothing to do with a miscarriage of justice.

That the components of a good judgment were on display and that is all that is required. He cited Ogba v Onwuzo (2005) 14 NWLR (pt.945) 331 at 334 – 335.

He stated that no reasonable doubt has been created in the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and so the concurrent findings of facts of the two Courts below should be upheld.

I shall quote a portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeal which appellant had a grouse with, contending it occasioned a miscarriage of justice as the fair hearing right of the appellant had been compromised. It is thus:-
“…Now it is trite law that an appeal against the judgment of the trial Court in a criminal matter will be dismissed once the judgment answers the following questions positively: (i) did the prosecution prove the essential elements of the offence, (ii) was the case proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii) was the evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and defence witnesses properly done. See Osuagwu vs State (2013) 5 NWLR (pt.1347) 360. In this wise, it is the view of this Court that there is only one issue for determination in this appeal and this is:- Whether the lower Court was correct when it found that the Respondent led credible and cogent evidence to prove the elements of the offence of rape against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt?”

Indeed what I see is the style of the jurist at the Court of Appeal which is in order and had nothing jeopardizing the interest of justice. It was the learned justice’s way to state the facts in context and his assessment of what they amounted to. The judgment is a good one, sound and within the laws before the judge and all the known elements in such judgment are at play. The learned counsel for the appellant was unfair in this allegation. See Ogba v Onwuzo (2005) 14 NWLR (pt.945) 331 at 334 – 335; Mogaji v Odofin (1978) 4 SC 9; Ojogbue v Nnubia (1972) 1 All NLR (pt.2) 226; Olomosola v Oloriawo (2002) 2 NWLR (pt.750) 113 at 125.

There is nothing in this issue except for counsel for appellant clutching at straws. The issue is resolved against the appellant.

ISSUE THREE
Whether the judgment of the trial Court violates constitutional provisions and therefore makes it invalid.

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the judgment of the trial Court was not authenticated and so contrary to Section 294(1) of the Constitution as it was not signed at the time of delivery hence a nullity. He cited Ajari v The State (1978) 1 LRN 260 at 262 – 263; Lawal v NEPA (1976) 3 SC 109 at 127 etc.

That the appellate Court ought not to have acknowledged the void judgment.

He relied on Kpema v State (1986) 1 NWLR (pt.17) 396.

Learned counsel for the respondent stated that the judgment of the trial Court complied with the provisions of Section 294 (1) of the Constitution and Section 269(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. He cited Akoma & Anor v Osenwokwu & Ors (2014) LPELR – 22885(SC); Owoyemi v Adekoya (2003)18 NWLR (pt.857) 307 etc.

It is not in doubt that Section 294 (1) of the Constitution and Section 262 and 269(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code which require that for a judgment to be valid, it must be dated, signed and sealed by the judge in an open Court at the time of pronouncement of the judgment. The materials available to the Court right now have not shown anything to the contrary nor has the appellant displayed the Constitutional breach on the face of the judgment. Therefore the assertion by the appellant goes to no issue. See Akoma & Anor v Osenwokwu & Ors (2014) LPELR – 22885 (SC}; Owoyemi v Adekoya (2003) 18 NWLR (pt.857) 307.
This issue also is found against the appellant.
In conclusion, this appeal lacks merit and I dismiss.
I abide the consequential orders made.

KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, JSC just delivered. The reasoning and conclusion reflect my views in this appeal.

It is pertinent to note that this appeal is against concurrent findings of fact by the two lower Courts. In order to persuade this Court to interfere, the appellant must demonstrate convincingly that the findings are perverse. He must satisfy the Court that the two lower Courts made some fundamental errors that have occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The simple facts of the case, are that on the fateful day, the prosecutrix (PW5), who was 5 years old at the time of the commission of the offence, was sent by her mother, PW4 with N20 to buy beans from the appellant’s shop. It took some time before she returned with neither the beans nor the money she was given. PW4 testified that she gave the prosecutrix N50 and asked her to go back and buy the beans, at which point she started crying and said she would not go back to the appellant’s shop because, whenever she went to his shop, he would remove something that is attached to the lower part of his body and insert it into her vagina and that it was painful.

PW4 narrated what her daughter told her to PW3 (her husband) who also questioned the prosecutrix and she told him the same story. A report was made to the Police and the appellant was arrested. PW6 tendered the medical report issued by one Dr. L.O. Akanbi, who was a member of the Youth Service Corps serving in Gombe State at the material time. The report was admitted in evidence as Exhibit C. The report states inter alia:
“On examination, there was no sign of beating or physical abuse. The main finding was in the examination of the genitals with mild oedema of the labia menorah and torn hymen at 9 O’clock position.
There was also some whitish vaginal discharge at the vagina orifice.…
An assessment of sexual assault was made.”

The Appellant’s extra judicial statements were admitted in evidence as Exhibits A and B.

It has been held by this Court severally that there is no legal requirement for corroboration in rape cases. However, the Courts have adopted the prudent practice of seeking corroborative evidence in such cases: See Posu Vs The State (2011) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1234) 393;

Okoyomon Vs The State (1973) NSCC 1; Sambo Vs The State (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 300) 399. Corroboration in a rape case is evidence which tends to show that the story of the prosecutrix (the victim) is true and that it was the accused person who committed the offence. It is also settled law that the corroborative evidence need not be direct, bearing mind, the near impossibility of eye witness evidence. It has been held that it is enough if it corroborates the prosecutrix’s evidence in some material particular. See: Inspector Dantalle Mohammed Vs Kano State (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1635) 85; Ogunbayo Vs The State (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1035) 157; Musa Vs The State (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 214.
At the time she testified, the prosecutrix was 8 years old. By Section 209 (3) of the Evidence Act, 2011, being a child under the age of 14, her evidence requires corroboration. Her testimony was unsworn, although the Court was satisfied that she understood the duty of telling the truth.
Generally, corroborative evidence of rape must confirm the following:
(1) That sexual intercourse has taken place;
(2) That it took place without the consent of the victim; and<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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(3) That the accused was the person who committed the offence.
See: Musa Vs The State (supra). In the instant case, being a child under 14 years of age, by Section 282 (1) (e) of the Penal Code, the offence of rape is committed where sexual intercourse occurs with or without her consent.

I am in agreement with the Court below that Exhibit C corroborates her testimony.

As for the testimonies of the appellant and his witnesses, the lower Court affirmed the rejection of their evidence by the trial Court in the following terms:
“The Lower Court rejected the case presented by the three defence witnesses on the grounds (i) that the Appellant in his extra judicial statement to the Police, tendered as Exhibit B, denied that the victim came to his shop on the day of the incident and asserted that he did not see the victim at all on that day, while in his oral evidence before the Court he admitted that the victim came to his shop on the day to buy beans and he told her that beans had finished; (ii) that the Appellant claimed in his oral evidence that the prosecution witnesses told lies against him but did not specify the exact untruths in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses; (iii) that in his extra judicial statement to the Police, Exhibit B, the Appellant stated the names of the persons who were his witnesses as Mai lam Samaila and Malam Usman, and not Abdullahi Yakubu and Salisu Ali who testified as the first and second prosecution witnesses.
The Appellant did not appeal against the rejection of his case by the Lower Court and his Counsel did not canvass arguments in this appeal challenging the findings of the lower Court thereon or the grounds of the lower Court in rejecting the evidence. It is settled law that where there is no appeal against any specific finding of fact made by the trial Court, the finding remains unassailable and it is binding on and conclusive between the parties. It cannot be re-examined by this Court.”

The above findings cannot be faulted.

I agree entirely with my learned brother, OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, JSC that there is no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court which affirmed the appellant’s conviction and sentence by the trial Court is affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.

JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.: My learned brother, Olukayode Ariwoola, JSC obliged me with a draft of the leading judgment he has just delivered and I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion contained therein.

The Appellant was arraigned before the High Court of Gombe State for the offence of rape contrary to the provision of Section 282 of the Penal Code and punishable under Section 283 of the same law. Upon conclusion of trial, the Appellant was convicted and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment without an option of fine. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed hence his further appeal to this Court.

Even though I have no hesitation in also dismissing this appeal, I wish to make a few comments in support of the judgment and for purposes of emphasis. The facts of the case leading to this appeal has been comprehensively reproduced in the lead judgment and I shall not repeat the exercise save as may be necessary to refer to any portion of those facts for purposes of dealing with any point in this appeal.

The position of the law as variously upheld by this Court is settled that the important and essential ingredient of the offence of rape is penetration. See Posu v. State (2011) 2 NWLR (pt. 1234) 393; Musa v. State (2013) 9 NWLR (1359) 214; Ogunbayo v. State (2007) 8 NWLR (pt. 1035) 157; Iko v. State (2001) 14 NWLR (732) 221.
It is also settled that where corroboration is required as in the instant case such piece of evidence offered as corroboration must tend to confirm, support and strengthen other evidences sought to be corroborated. See Sambo v. State (1993) 6 NWLR (pt. 300) 399.
The PW5 was five years old at the time of the incident and eight year old at the time she testified in Court. She was able to give uncontroverted account of how the Appellant raped her.
Both the evidences of PW4, her mother, and Exhibit c which is the medical report conjunctively corroborate the testimony of PW5. The medical report tendered reads in part as follows:
“on examination, there was no sign of beating or physical abuse. The main finding was in the examination of genitals with mild oedema of the labia minora and thorn hymen at 9 O’clock position. There is also some whitish vaginal discharge at the vaginal orifice…”
The above report is sufficient evidence that the prosecutrix, at five years had a thorn hymen and the evidence of PW4 connects the dots very clearly. Corroboration must be an independent testimony, direct or circumstantial, which confirms in some material particular, not only that an offence has been committed, but that the accused person has committed it.
See Ogunbayo v. State (supra) per Ogbuagu, JSC at page 178.

The Appellant had unlawful carnal knowledge of the prosecutrix at the time she was only five years old. He committed an abomination to say the least and deserves the sentence handed out to him by the trial Court below. I have found no reason to interfere with concurrent findings of the two lower Courts.

For the above reasons and further ones more comprehensively adumbrated in the lead judgment, I too find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed by me. I abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
Appeal Dismissed

EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.: The Appellant was charged, tried and convicted of raping the PW.5, a child of 5 years (at the time of the offence). The PW.5 testified, unsworn, at the age of 8 years. She exhibited commendable high level of intelligence.

On 12 March, 2012 the PW.5 reported to her mother (PW.4.) what the Appellant did to her. This aspect of the PW.5’s report to the PW.4 was corroborated by the PW.4 and the PW.3 (PW.5’s father).

Between the PW.5 and the Appellant (the DW.3), no doubt whatsoever exists that both of them at the material time were at the locus criminis. Both agreed on this notwithstanding the Appellant/DW.3’s ambivalence. In Exhibit B, which rendered his testimony unreliable, the DW.3/Appellant denied ever seeing the PW.5 at his shop on the material day. However, in the oral testimony, the DW.3, like DW.1 and DW.2, seemed to admit the contrary. By this admission both the PW.5 and the Appellant (DW.3) were seemingly ad idem. This evidence of opportunity against the Appellant remains unshaken.

The vexed issue in the appeal is whether in the alleged rape, there was any penetration into the PW.5’s vagina by the Appellant’s male genitalia (penis)? The PW.5’s evidence that the Appellant brought something out of his lower body (which was attached thereto) and inserted it into her sexual organ was not at all challenged by cross-examination. Thus, facts not challenged or disputed are taken as established and therefore need no further proof. Exhibit C, the medical report, corroborated the PW.5 that there was penetration into her sexual organ.

The trial Court satisfied that the (statutory) rape of the minor was established, had no hesitation convicting the Appellant of the alleged rape. That was a finding of fact. The lower Court, on the Appellant’s appeal against conviction, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial Court’s finding of fact.
In this further appeal, it behoved the Appellant to show what good grounds exist for this Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact: KODILINYE v. ANATOGU (1955) 1 W.L.R 231. Of course, the law is now trite and fossilised that the apex Court will not, in the absence of special circumstances, interfere with concurrent findings of fact. See DAWODU v. DANMOLE (1962) 1 ALL NLR 702. The appellant, seeking the apex Court to interfere with concurrent findings of fact, must establish that there has been a miscarriage of justice negativing judicial procedure; failing which the respondent is, on concurrent findings of fact of Courts below, prima facie entitled to a judgment dismissing the appeal. The Privy Council in ADANSI v. THE STOOL OF BRENASE (1956) 1 W.A.L.R (Ghana); P. C No. 23 of 1956 minced no words in so re-stating the law on this. It had earlier, in line with this stance, posited that it will decline to review the evidence for the third time unless there are some special circumstances which would justify a departure from this practice. See NANKA-BRUCE v. GBEKE P.C No. 56 of 1948 (Ghana). Section 168 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, providing that when any judicial act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that formal requisites for its validity were complied with, appears to statutorily endorse this practice.
My Lords, we have not been shown any special circumstances to warrant our interference with the concurrent findings of fact against the Appellant. It is therefore safe and in the interest of justice to better leave those findings of fact alone.

Let me also add that at page 103 of the Record, the trial Court found that the testimonies of the DW.1 and DW.2 did not help the Appellant in any way nor did they exonerate him. They both testified that the PW.5 came to the Appellant’s shop. The totality of Exhibit B (the statement made on 13th March, 2012 wherein the Appellant denied ever seeing the PW.5 in his shop on the fateful day) and the evidence of DW.1 and DW.2, when read against the evidence of the PW.5 (under cross-examination at page 66), reinforce the finding of the trial Court that the testimonies of the DW.1 and DW.2 were not useful to the defence of the Appellant. Exhibit B was rendered useless to the defence by the Appellant’s subsequent admission that the PW.5 was at the scene of crime at the material time.

The Appellant, not challenging the Record duly certified for this appeal by the appropriate Registrar or officer of the Court in his official capacity, cannot be heard to say that the trial Judge did not sign the judgment as Section 294 (1) of the Constitution and Section 269(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code require him to do. The presumption of regularity under Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act (supra) adversely works against this argument which, in my firm view, is mere appeal to arcane technicality.

Finding nothing to warrant my disturbing the decision of the lower Court, I hereby agree with my learned brother, OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, JSC that the appeal be and is hereby dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.

Appearances:

JOSIAH DANIEL-EBUNE, ESQ. For Appellant(s)

ZAINAB ABDULKADIR EL-RASHEED, ESQ. (SG), with him, NAPE H. LAIMA, ESQ. (CSC), ABDULKADIR UMAR, ESQ. (SSC) For Respondent(s)