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FORCADOS OVO OBODO v. STAFFORD OLOMU & ANOR.(1987)

FORCADOS OVO OBODO v. STAFFORD OLOMU & ANOR.

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 5th day of June, 1987

SC.204/1985

 

JUSTICES

ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AUGUSTINE NNAMANI    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

SALIHU MODIBBO ALFA BELGORE    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

FORCADOS OVO OBODO  Appellant(s)

AND

  1. STAFFORD OLOMU
    2. RORERT OBOLOJE Respondent(s)

RATIO

THE IMPORTANCE OF A WRITTEN ADDRESS

The hearing of a case, under our system, is that every party must not only be heard but also must be afforded the opportunity of being heard. Without the opportunity of one side being heard, there can be no facts for the court to fully assess as in Mogaji v. Odofin, (1978) 4 S.C. 91. Addresses form part of the case and failure to hear the address of one party, however overwhelming the evidence seems to be on one side, vitiates the trial; because in many cases, it is after the addresses that one finds the law on the issues fought not in favour of the evidence adduced. PER BELGORE, J.S.C.

THE IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT THAT PARTIES EXCHANGE WRITTEN ADDRESSES

The most important requirement is that the other party must know what the address is all about. In a written address, the Court must make sure that the parties exchanged addresses. It is by making clear order as to the time of filing, service on the other side and so forth, that the Court would be certain that both parties would have opportunity of addressing. Perhaps it is better to adhere to tried and tested practice of oral addresses. PER BELGORE, J.S.C.

THE  EFFECT OF A WRITTEN ADDDRESS IN ARRIVING AT A JUST DECISION OF THE COURT

The hearing of addresses by every Court established by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is recognised by the Constitution. It is to be given before judgment is delivered. See Section 258(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. Its beneficial effect and impact on the mind of the Judge is enormous but unquantifiable. The value is immense and its assistance to the Judge in arriving at a just and proper decision, though dependent on the quality of address, cannot be denied. The absence of an address can tilt the balance of the learned Judge’s judgment just as much as the delivery of an address after conclusion of evidence can. PER OBASEKI, J.S.C.

THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PARTY WHO BEGINS TO LEAD EVIDENCE IN A CIVIL PROCEEDINGS SHOULD ADDRESS THE COURT LAST

It is well settled that in civil proceedings in our trial Courts the party which begins to lead evidence normally addresses last, that is after the defendant would have addressed. Although a party is not obliged to address the court, the right to address is nevertheless there. In the normal course of things, the proceedings cannot be said to be complete until both parties have addressed the court.
So it is that Order 26 Rules 17and 18 of the High Court of Bendel State (Civil Procedure) Rules Cap. 65 Laws of Bendel State, 1976 provide as follows:-
“17. If the party opposed to the party beginning calls or leads evidence, the party beginning shall be at liberty to reply generally on the whole case or he may, by leave of court, call fresh evidence in reply to the evidence given on the other side on points material to the determination of the issues, or any of them, but not on collateral matters.
18. Where evidence in reply is tendered and allowed to be given, the party against whom the same had been adduced shall be at liberty to address the Court and the party beginning shall be entitled to the general reply.” PER NNAMANI, J.S.C.

THE PRIMARY AIM OF THE COURTS

I think Pepple JCA expressed it correctly when in his dissenting Judgment he stated as follows-
“The primary aim of the court is to do justice, and this aim cannot be achieved by denying a party his due as penalty for his counsel’s failure to comply with a directive which in fact violates the Rules of Court.” PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.

BELGORE, J.S.C.: (Delivering the Leading Judgment): After hearing all the evidence by the parties in the trial Court of Warri in the High court of Bendel State, Eluaka, J., without being addressed by the counsel to the parties, wrote as follows:-
“Court:    Parties will send their address (sic) to me in writing;
Order:     Adjourned 2nd August 1983 for judgment.
(Sgd.) M. C. Eluaka
Judge
1/7/83”
The judgment was delivered on 14th September,1983 within three months of the conclusion of evidence at the trial. Learned counsel for the defendants, the respondents before Court of Appeal and also before this Court, filed in the trial Court on an unknown date what is headed a “WRITTEN ADDRESS SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ CASE.” This document was not served on the Plaintiff/Appellant or on his counsel. As it is undated one would only know that it was filed before judgment was written as learned trial Judge seemed to rely heavily on it. The appellant filed no address in Court. The Trial Judge reviewed the evidence before him and then got to his findings on the evidence by saying:
“When the case was concluded, parties were asked to send their written address to me; only counsel for the defendant sent a written address. The counsel referred to the claim. He referred to the witnesses called for the plaintiff and remarked that Mr. M.N. Chukwurah was the same surveyor who surveyed the land for the 1st Defendant and also for the Plaintiff’s piece of land. This was admitted as Exhibit B … etc.”
Learned trial Judge dwelt at great length on the written address by the defendants and in the absence of a written address by the Plaintiff he relied heavily on what the defendants’ written address had submitted on the facts and law governing the case. Six pages of the judgment reviewed the evidence, four pages dealt with findings based on the address submitted to Court by the defendants’ counsel. He finally held as follows:
“I think I have carefully considered the evidence led in this case and I have also gone through the submissions by counsel for the defendants. The facts of the case have (sic) been well summarized by him and I am in agreement with points of law raised therein. It is unfortunate that the Plaintiff have (sic) not shown evidence that he was in possession of this area in dispute except attempted possession which was immediately disturbed which gave rise to this action. It is trite law that in an action for trespass, the plaintiff must show that he is in possession and his possession was disturbed. If he is not in possession no action in trespass will lie. Also there has not been evidence of ownership of the land because according to plaintiff when he made an agreement for a sale of land this agreement could not be registered because by then the Land Use Decree has set in so the persons who gave the land to him cannot be said to own the land in view of Section I of Land Use Act. It will not be possible for the plaintiff and the people who gave the land to him to now assume ownership of the land in dispute.”
The plaintiff appealed to Court of Appeal and among the many grounds of appeal was ground 4 which reads as follows:-
“The Learned Trial Judge erred in law when he proceeded to give judgment solely on the written address sent to him by the Defence Counsel praying the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs Claim without giving the Appellant or his Counsel opportunity of a reply.
PARTICULARS OF ERRORS
(a) The learned Trial Judge having failed to give the Plaintiff Counsel’s opportunity of a reply to the written address of the Counsel for the Defendants, the trial ceased to be fair within the provisions of S.33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979..
(b) The Defendants having given evidence and called witnesses have the prior right to address the court and the Plaintiff is entitled to reply to the Defendants’ address, but the Learned Trial Judge acted on the written address of the Defendants which address was not served on the Plaintiff or
his Counsel.
(c) The Learned trial Judge having held inter alia as follows:”
The fact of the case have been well summarised by him (meaning the Defendant’s Counsel) and I must say I
am in agreement with the points of law raised therein” ought in the interest of Justice to have ordered that the written address of Defence be served on the Plaintiff or his Counsel to afford Him the opportunity of a reply.”
The Court of Appeal (Ete, J .C.A. and Babalakin, J .C.A; with Pepple, J.C.A. dissenting), dismissed the appeal on all grounds, holding that the trial Court considered the credibility of all witnesses who testified before it and came to the conclusion reached in the case; and as for Ground 4 the Court was of the view that since the appellant and his counsel were present when the trial Court ordered “written address” to be submitted and he submitted none, he was bound by the address of the respondents. For, according to the Court of Appeal, the plaintiff by neglecting to send written address to the Court “deprived himself of the opportunity of seeing his address. He is the person at fault.” The Court held the lapse in not having the address of the plaintiff before the Court as mere procedural irregularity and not substantial enough to disturb the decision of the trial Court and relied on Alhaji Ahmadu v. Alhaji Salawu, (1974) 11 S.C. 43, 49. It further held that even “without the address by both parties the decision arrived at by the learned trial Judge would not have been different”
In the appeal before this Court, there are three Grounds, two of which are based mainly on error in law concerning the failure to consider the absence of an address by the plaintiff at the conclusion of the case in Trial Court and the attitude of the Court of Appeal to that failure. For clarity I reproduce hereunder Grounds 1 and 2:
“GROUNDS OF APPEAL:
1. The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves in law when they upheld the procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge whereby the said learned trial Judge based his judgment solely on the written address sent to him by Defendants/Respondents Counsel, without given the Plaintiff/Appellant or his Counsel opportunity to be heard in reply.
Particulars of Error or Misdirection:
(a) The learned trial Judge’s directive to Counsel to send written address to him is a violation of Order 26 Rule 17 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap. 65, Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976.
(b) The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves in law, when they upheld the decision of the trial Judge which violated the provisions of Order 26 Rule 17 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1976, Cap 65, Laws of Bendel State and thereby failed to hold that the trial ceased to be fair within Section 33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979.
(c) The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves on the evidence, when they came to the conclusion that Plaintiff/Appellants’ Counsel disobeyed the order of the learned trial Judge when he failed to send a written address to Court, when there was no address for him to reply to in accordance with Order 26 Rule 17 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976.
2. The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves in law when they held “without the address by both parties the decision arrived at by the learned trial Judge would not have been different”
(a) The Learned Trial Judge did not make findings of facts of his own apart from facts summarised in the address of the defence counsel.
(b) He did not decide which of the two contesting parties and their landlords have a better right to possession that is to a statutory customary right of occupancy to the land in dispute.”
High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap. 65 Laws of Bendel State 1976 Order 26 Part III lays down the procedure to be followed at the hearing of a case. For example, the party upon whom the burden of proof lies shall produce his evidence – Order 26 Rule 12; when the party beginning has concluded his evidence and the other party is not calling evidence he shall sum up the evidence already given; Order 26 Rule 13. When the party beginning has concluded his case, the other party shall be at liberty to state his case and to call evidence, and to sum up and comment thereon – Order 26 Rule 15. If no evidence is called by the other party the party beginning shall have no right of reply and the case for both parties shall then be considered as closed Order 26 Rules 15and 16. But Order 26 Rule 17 relevant to the parties in this case reads as follows:
“17. If the party opposed to the party beginning calls or leads evidence, the party beginning shall be at liberty to reply severally on the whole case, or he may, by leave of the Court, call fresh evidence in reply to the evidence given on the other side, on points material to the determination of the issues, or any of them, but not on collateral matters.”
The trial Judge asked each party to produce written address at the close of evidence of the defendants. In usual practice such address is done orally before the Court. The terms used in the Rules of Court are “sum up”, “reply” but in practice these are called “address”. The procedure whereby the parties to a case at the conclusion of evidence are to address the Court on the evidence before the Court, enumerating the issues canvassed and adverting to the law governing the issues has taken such a root in our superior Courts that denial of it cannot be regarded as mere procedural irregularity. Just as a party is not compellable to give evidence to prove his case so is a party not compellable to address the Court where he has the right so to do. But when the right exists, a party must not be denied that right and denial of the right may render the proceeding a nullity if miscarriage of justice is occasioned. Perhaps, for the convenience of the Court, such addresses may be in writing as the rules of Court are not clear about this, but it must be in accordance with rules whereby a party is not denied by implication of the right to address. The addresses, I hold, are not directed at the Court alone. The purport of the address by a party is to let the Court and his adversary know what his summing up is on the facts and the law as revealed by the evidence before the Court. Therefore it is a wrong supposition for a trial Court to believe that an address at the close of a party’s case is meant for it alone; the other side, throughout the trial of a case must not be blinded from what his adversary relies upon. In this case, the defendants, who were to start addressing the Court, filed an address. The address is undated and not served on the other side i.e. the plaintiff. This is unjust. The plaintiff was being blinded against the address of the defendants. The Court of Appeal adverted only to failure of plaintiff to submit a written address and held that the plaintiff was to blame for this failure. Had the Court adverted to the principle that the address was not meant for the Court alone but also for the other side, it would have discovered fundamental error in the trial Judge’s approach. No date was given for the addresses to be submitted, no order was made for service of Defendants’ address on the plaintiff and when the plaintiff was to file his reply address. The importance of addresses is shown by S.258(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979:
“258(1) Every Court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than 3 months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses… The trial Judge was in error in the manner he ordered for the written addresses. He was wrong in deciding the case virtually on the written address of the defendants’ counsel which was not served on the plaintiff or his counsel to afford him the opportunity of writing his own address. Is it not after final addresses on the evidence that time starts to run to deliver judgment The Court of Appeal fell into the same pitfall and erred further by speculating in holding that
“without the addresses by both parties the decision arrived at by the learned trial Judge would not have been different.”
The hearing of a case, under our system, is that every party must not only be heard but also must be afforded the opportunity of being heard. Without the opportunity of one side being heard, there can be no facts for the court to fully assess as in Mogaji v. Odofin, (1978) 4 S.C. 91. Addresses form part of the case and failure to hear the address of one party, however overwhelming the evidence seems to be on one side, vitiates the trial; because in many cases, it is after the addresses that one finds the law on the issues fought not in favour of the evidence adduced. Order 26 Rule 17 is mandatory and as the appellant was not aware of what was contained in the defendants’ address and the judgment of the trial Court was based almost solely on that address, there is a miscarriage of justice which was not mitigated by the approach of Court of Appeal to the issue.
By holding that the decision could not have been different if all addresses were before the Trial Court, the Court of Appeal was attempting to read the mind of the trial Judge. He heard the evidence and saw the witnesses, the addresses might have thrown a new light on his view on the evidence. For the totality of a case heard entails not only the evidence but also the addresses. A party entitled to address the Court may waive that right but it must be shown that he has so waived his right. Time would have been saved if the conventional practice was adhered to whereby oral addresses are made. The most important requirement is that the other party must know what the address is all about. In a written address, the Court must make sure that the parties exchanged addresses. It is by making clear order as to the time of filing, service on the other side and so forth, that the Court would be certain that both parties would have opportunity of addressing. Perhaps it is better to adhere to tried and tested practice of oral addresses.
It is for the reasons given above that I allowed the appeal on 10th day of March 1987 and set aside the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal, upholding trial Court’s judgment and upheld the minority judgment of Court of Appeal by Pepple, J.C.A., dated 7th March, 1985 and that the case be remitted to the High Court of Bendel State, Warri Judicial Division for retrial with N300.00 costs to the respondents.

OBASEKI, J.S.C.: On the 10th day of March, 1987, after reading the record of proceedings and judgment of the court below, the briefs of argument of the parties filed by counsel in the appeal and hearing the submissions of counsel in oral argument, I allowed the appeal, set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court and remitted the case to the High Court of Bendel State holden at Warri for hearing de novo. I then reserved my reasons for the judgment till today. I now proceed to give them.
However, I had the advantage of reading in advance the draft of the Reasons for Judgment delivered a while ago by my learned brother, Belgore, J.S.C. I agree with them and I adopt them as my own.
The main question for determination is whether the failure of the High Court Judge to invite counsel to address the Court orally and hear the addresses of counsel after the conclusion of the evidence is not such an irregularity in procedure sufficient to occasion a miscarriage of justice and vitiate the proceedings and judgment of the High Court.
The subsidiary issue is whether the failure of the counsel to the respondent to serve a copy of the written address sent to the learned trial Judge on him to enable him submit a written address in reply to the learned trial Judge and serve a copy on him does not vitiate the proceedings and judgment
These questions were raised in the Court of Appeal in Ground 3 which reads:
“The learned trial Judge erred in law when he proceeded to give judgment solely on the written address sent to him by the defence counsel praying the court to dismiss plaintiff’s claim without giving the appellant or his counsel opportunity for a reply.”
Particulars of Error
(a) The learned Trial Judge having failed to give the Plaintiffs Counsel the opportunity of a reply to the written address of the Counsel for the Defendants, the trial ceased to be fair within the provisions of 5.33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
(b) The Defendants having given evidence and called witnesses have the prior right to address the court and the Plaintiff is entitled to reply to the Defendants’ address, but the Learned Trial Judge acted on the written address of the Defendants which address was not served on the Plaintiff or his Counsel;
(c) The Learned Trial judge having held inter alia as follows;”
The fact of the case have been well summarised by him (meaning the defendant’s Counsel) and I must say I am in agreement with the points of law raised therein” ought in the interest of Justice to have ordered that the written address of Defence be served on the Plaintiff or his Counsel to afford Him the opportunity of a reply.”
Before this Court, the issue was raised again in grounds 1 and 2 of the grounds of appeal. They read as follows:
1. The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves in law when they upheld the procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge whereby the said learned trial Judge based his judgment solely on the written address sent to him by Defendants/Respondents Counsel, without giving the Plaintiff/Appellant or his Counsel opportunity to be heard in reply.
Particulars of Error or Misdirection:
(a) The learned trial Judge’s directive to Counsel to send written address to him is a violation of Order 26 Rule 17 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap. 65, Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976.
(b) The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves in law, when they upheld the decision of the trial Judge which violated the provisions of Order 26 Rule 17 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1976, and thereby failed to hold that the trial ceased to be fair within Section 33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979.
(c) The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves on the evidence, when they came to the conclusion that Plaintiff/Appellants’ Counsel disobeyed the order of the learned trial Judge when he failed to send a written address to Court, when there was no address for him to reply to in accordance with Order 26 Rule 17of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976.
2. The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves in law when they held “without the address by both parties the decision arrived at by the learned trial Judge would not have been different”
(a) The Learned Trial Judge did not make findings of facts of his own apart from facts summarised in the address of the defence counsel.
(b) He did not decide which of the two contesting parties and their landlords have a better right to possession that is to a statutory customary right of occupancy to the land in dispute.”
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s arguments on the ground that the result would have been the same if the appellant had submitted a written address in reply to the respondents’ written address.
This appeal is unique in that the complaint is not of failure to hear evidence from the plaintiff or from the defendant and their witnesses but of failure to provide an opportunity for the delivery of and the consideration of the address of the plaintiffs counsel in reply before judgment. The Rules of the High Court of Bendel State, i.e. the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules make provision for the hearing of address of parties or their counsel. See Order 16 Rules 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules.
The hearing of addresses by every Court established by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is recognised by the Constitution. It is to be given before judgment is delivered. See Section 258(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. Its beneficial effect and impact on the mind of the Judge is enormous but unquantifiable. The value is immense and its assistance to the Judge in arriving at a just and proper decision, though dependent on the quality of address, cannot be denied. The absence of an address can tilt the balance of the learned Judge’s judgment just as much as the delivery of an address after conclusion of evidence can.
It is not for this Court to speculate on what the effect of plaintiffs counsel’s address would have been on the learned trial Judge’s judgment as the Court of Appeal has done. Until the learned trial Judge’s mind is exposed to an address, no one can say what effect it will have on his mind.
The fact of denial of opportunity to deliver the address has robbed the learned trial Judge the benefit the address would have had on his mind in arriving at a just decision. The necessity for address is emphasised by Rules 14, 17 and 18 of Order 26 of the High Court Rules. These Rules read:
“14. when the party beginning has concluded his case, the other party shall be at liberty to state his case and to call evidence and to sum up and comment thereon;
“17. If the party opposed to the party beginning calls or leads evidence, the party beginning shall be at liberty to reply severally on, the whole case, or he may, by leave of the Court, call fresh evidence in reply to the evidence given on the other side, on points material to the determination of the issues, or any of them, but not on collateral matters.”
18. Where evidence in reply is tendered and allowed to be given, the party against whom the same has been adduced shall be at liberty to address the court and the party beginning shall be entitled to the general reply.”
It cannot be said, in the light of the above,that  the failure to hear the address of counsel for the plaintiff has not occasioned a miscarriage of justice. It certainly has not served the interest of justice. Miscarriage of justice vitiates a judgment and renders it a nullity.
It was for the above reasons and the Reasons for Judgment delivered by my learned brother, Belgore, J.S.C. that I allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the two courts below and remitted the case to the High Court for hearing de novo.

NNAMANI, J.S.C.: This appeal came before this Court on 10th March, 1987. After reading the record of proceedings, and hearing learned counsel for both parties, I was satisfied that the appeal had merit. I therefore allowed it, set aside the judgment of the High Court and the Court of Appeal and remitted the case for re-trial in the High Court of Bendel State, Warri Judicial Division. I then indicated that I would give my reasons for this judgment today. I now give my reasons. I have before now had a preview of the reasons for judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Belgore, J.S.C. and I entirely agree with them. As they are the same reasons for my own judgment, I adopt them.
It is well settled that in civil proceedings in our trial Courts the party which begins to lead evidence normally addresses last, that is after the defendant would have addressed. Although a party is not obliged to address the court, the right to address is nevertheless there. In the normal course of things, the proceedings cannot be said to be complete until both parties have addressed the court.
So it is that Order 26 Rules 17and 18 of the High Court of Bendel State (Civil Procedure) Rules Cap. 65 Laws of Bendel State, 1976 provide as follows:-
“17. If the party opposed to the party beginning calls or leads evidence, the party beginning shall be at liberty to reply generally on the whole case or he may, by leave of court, call fresh evidence in reply to the evidence given on the other side on points material to the determination of the issues, or any of them, but not on collateral matters.
18. Where evidence in reply is tendered and allowed to be given, the party against whom the same had been adduced shall be at liberty to address the Court and the party beginning shall be entitled to the general reply.”
In the High Court, and at the conclusion of evidence, Eluaka, J. made the following order:
“Court. Parties will send their addresses to me in writing”
Ominously, no dateline was set for the submission of these addresses. Contrary to usual practice, no order was made obliging the defendant’s Solicitor to serve his address on the plaintiffs Solicitor. The defendant/respondents’ Solicitor duly filed his written address without serving a copy on the plaintiff/appellant’s Solicitor. From the records, the learned trial Judge did not himself on receipt of this address order that it be served on the plaintiffs Solicitor. Instead on pages 77-78 of the record, he made extensive use of the address.
In the grounds of appeal, as well as in his brief of argument, learned counsel to the appellant, J.O.E. Igbinoba, complained of these serious aberrations. The rules of Court do not provide for written addresses, he contended. It was his submission too that the proceedings could not have been fair as he was not allowed to conclude the case of the appellant. These complaints seemed to me of substance. They are certainly beyond mere irregularities as the Court of Appeal held. They struck at fairness, and in many ways is a denial of hearing to the appellant. It cannot be argued that there may be materials in the address which could sway the case one way or the other. To receive and use such material as the learned trial Judge did, without giving appellant’s Solicitor opportunity to see and reply to it, was certainly less than justice. A retrial was therefore inevitable.
It was for these reasons, and the more detailed reasons given by my learned brother, that I allowed the appeal.

UWAIS, J.S.C.: I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the reasons for judgment read by my learned brother Belgore, J.S.C. It was for the same reasons that I agreed on 10th March, 1987 that this appeal should be allowed with N300.00 costs to the respondent; and also that the case should be remitted to the High Court of Bendel State sitting at Warri for it to be heard de novo. I do not wish to add anything.

KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: On the 10th March, 1987, I allowed the appeal by the Appellant against the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal, Benin City, (Babalakin, Ete, JJCA, Pepple JCA dissenting) dismissing his appeal against the judgment of Eluaka J of the Warri High Court. I also made an order that the case be remitted to the Warri High Court to be heard de novo. I indicated that my reasons for allowing the appeal will be given today. Herein below are the reasons.
I have read the judgment in this appeal of my learned brother Belgore J.S.C. I agree with his reasoning and conclusions which essentially coincide with my views. I shall however in this short judgment deal only with the two grounds of appeal, (namely grounds 1 & 2 which complained against the judgment of the Court of Appeal
(a) that the learned trial judge gave judgment to the Defendant on the written address of their Counsel without the address of the Plaintiffs; and,
(b) that the Court of Appeal was wrong in holding that the trial Judge would have come to the same decision without relying on the written address of Counsel for the Defendant/Respondents.
I think it is relevant to what will be stated hereafter to set out the salient facts relating to the grounds of appeal considered in this appeal.
Plaintiff on the 20th February, 1981 issued a writ of summons claiming from the defendants/respondents the sum of N1,500 being damages for trespass in respect of the piece of land in dispute; and perpetual injunction against the servants/or agents, or of all persons claiming through them; from interfering with the rights and interests of Plaintiffs in the said piece of land. The Defendants denied and disputed the claims. Pleadings were filed, served and exchanged. Issues were joined. Evidence was led on both sides in support of their contentions. After the close of the case of the parties on the 1st July, 1983, the learned trial Judge, made an order that parties counsel send their addresses to him and adjourned to 2nd August, 1983 for judgment. Only Counsel to the Defendants complied with this Order. It is not certain this written address was sent to the learned Judge before the 2nd August, 1983. Judgment was not delivered on 2nd August, 1983, but on the 14th September, 1983. The learned trial Judge with only the written address of the Defendants considered and dismissed the claim of the Plaintiffs in its entirety.
In his judgment the learned Judge reiterated the evidence led before him and after referring to the submissions and the cases cited in the written submission of Counsel to the Defendants, stated as follows:-
“I think I have carefully considered the evidence led in this case and I have also gone through the submissions by Counsel for the defendant. The facts of the case have been well summarised by him and I must say that I am in agreement with the points of law raised therein”
It seems to me unarguable that the learned Judge did not receive and did not consider submissions made by Counsel to the Plaintiffs. Accordingly in considering the case before him had before him only the summary of the case and submissions on points of law made by Counsel to the Defendants. Plaintiff appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the 4th ground of appeal which is here relevant complained as follows:
“4. The Learned Trial Judge erred in law when he proceeded to give judgment solely on the written address sent to him by the Defence Counsel praying the court to dismiss the Plaintiffs Claim without giving the Appellant or his Counsel opportunity of a reply.
PARTICULARS OF ERRORS
(a) The Learned Trial Judge having failed to give the Plaintiffs Counsel opportunity of a reply to the written address of the Counsel for the Defendants, the trial ceased to be fair within the provisions of S.33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
(b) The Defendants having given evidence and called witnesses have the prior right to address court and the Plaintiff is entitled to reply to the Defendants’ address, but the Learned Trial Judge acted on the written address of the Defendants which address was not served on the Plaintiff or his Counsel.
(c) The Learned Trial Judge having held inter alia as follows:) “The fact of the case has been well summarised by him (meaning the Defendant’s Counsel) and I must say I am in agreement with the points of law raised therein” ought in the interest of Justice to have ordered that the written address of Defence Counsel be served on the Plaintiff or his Counsel to afford him the opportunity of a reply.”
In the judgment of the Court, Babalakin JCA, with whom Ete JCA agreed, Pepple JCA, dissenting, considering this ground of appeal stated as follows; at p.107.
“In the first place, the learned trial Judge did not give judgment solely on the written address of Defence Counsel. He based his judgment on the evidence before him. See page 77 lines 13-14 where the Judge so state(d). It is also not true that the Judge did not give the Plaintiff’s Counsel time to address the Court. He ordered both parties to send written address(es) to him. Page 63 lines 28-29. At the time this Order was made Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendants were present in Court-See page 63 of the printed record of proceedings. The Appellants’ Counsel raised no objection to this order and therefore he consented to the order, but he neglected and/or refused to obey the order. Having consented to the order he was duty bound to obey it, but he neglected to do so. It was therefore he who deprived himself of the opportunity to address and he also deprived the learned trial Judge the opportunity of seeing his address. He is the person at fault.”
The view of the Court of Appeal was that the order for written address made by the trial Judge was with the consent of the Counsel for the Plaintiff who was not in a position thereafter to complain. Since there was default on the part of Counsel in submitting to the trial Judge his written submission, it was Plaintiff who was at fault in not affording the trial Judge the opportunity of seeing his written address. Accordingly the trial Judge was perfectly right in the procedure adopted in relying only on the written address of the Counsel for the Defendants. The Court of Appeal regarding the issue as one of irregularity proceeded in the judgment to state as follows-
“The Supreme Court has in fact decided in the case of Alhaji Ahmadu v. Alhaji Salawu (1974) 11S.c. 43 at page 49 that where the subject matter of the action is substantial enough to dispose (SIC) the court not to allow mere procedural irregularities to preclude an opportunity to scrutinise the case and determine it on merits, the Court should so determine the case on its merits.”
The Court of Appeal then concluded as follows –
“I have carefully read the printed record of the proceedings without the address by both parties the decision arrived at by the Learned Trial Judge would not have been different. The practice of disobeying court order by one of parties to a case and such disobedience to be later made a ground of appeal should be discouraged.”
It is interesting to observe that the Court of Appeal admitted that Counsel to the Plaintiff did not submit his written address. Obviously the disobedience by counsel cannot supply the missing written address essential for the completion of the Plaintiffs case.
The dissenting judgment of Pepple JCA, after stating the general practice and procedure in the Courts pointed out that the order of the trial Judge did not conform with the rules of Civil Procedure which makes it mandatory that a party must be made to know what case his opponent was bringing against him and be given an opportunity to answer it. He referred to Order 26 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules and pointed out that the order of the trial Judge should have included that the written addresses be served on counsel to enable replies to be made on points raised therein. Pepple JCA observed that procedure adopted was that the learned trial Judge after setting out the evidence given by both parties and their witnesses, went on to put down in summary form the written submissions of counsel to the defendants, and said. at p. 113.
“Thus the learned Judge copied down the submission of defendants’ Counsel, said he agreed with it and made it his judgment. He did not consider the case put forward by Plaintiffs and weigh it against that of the defendants, before coming to a decision. The judgment was based mainly on the judge’s acceptance of the submission of defendants’ Counsel, that plaintiff was not in possession because he had done nothing on the land since he bought it, whereas the defendant had successfully chased his contractor away from the land and had built a house on part of it. With due respect to the learned Judge, I must say that was a wrong approach …
The grounds of Appeal to this Court are precisely the same as was argued in the Court of Appeal. Grounds I and 2 which we are here concerned with are as follows:
“1. The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves in law when they upheld the procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge whereby the said learned trial Judge based his judgment solely on the written address sent to him by Defendants/Respondents Counsel, without giving the Plaintiff/ Appellant or his Counsel opportunity to be heard in reply.
Particulars of Error or Misdirection:
(a) The Learned trial Judge’s directive to Counsel to send written address to him is a violation of order 26 rule 17 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap. 65, Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976.
(b) The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves in law, when they upheld the decision of the trial Judge which violated the provisions of order 26 rule 17of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1976, and thereby failed to hold that the trial ceased to be fair within Section 33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979.
(c) The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves on the evidence, when they came to the conclusion that Plaintiff/Appellants’ Counsel disobeyed the order of the learned trial judge when he failed to send a written address to Court, when there was no address for him to reply to in accordance with order 26 rule 17 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976.
2. The Learned Justices of the Court of appeal erred in law or misdirected themselves in law when they held “without the address by both parties the decision arrived at by the learned trail judge would not have been different.”
Whereas:
(a) The Learned Trial Judge did not make findings of facts of his own apart from facts summarised in the address of the defence counsel.
(b) He did not decide which of the two contesting parties and their landlords have a better right to possession, that is to say, which of them has better right to a statutory customary right of occupancy to the land in dispute.
Only the following issues fall for determination in this appeal. These are
(1) Whether the Court of Appeal was right in affirming the Judgment of the learned trial Judge of the High Court, when it accepted and adopted the procedure followed by the said learned trial Judge in coming to their decision
(2) Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held inter alia as follows:) “without the address by both parties, the decision arrived at by the learned trial Judge would not have been different”
There is no doubt that the determination of these questions turn entirely on the proper construction of Order 26, rr. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Bendel State, Cap. 65 Laws of Bendel State and the proper application of these Rules in the administration of justice. Order 26 regulates proceedings at the trial after issues had been joined on the pleadings. I reproduce the rules which are self explanatory and require no annotations.
“13 When the party beginning has concluded his evidence, he shall ask the other party if he intends to call evidence (in which term is included evidence taken by affidavit or deposition, or under commission, and documentary evidence not already read or taken as read); and if answered in the negative he shall be entitled to sum up the evidence already given, and comment thereon; but if answered in the affirmative he shall wait for his general reply.
“14. When the party beginning has concluded his case, the other party shall be at liberty to state his case and to call evidence, and to sum up and comment thereon.
“15. If no evidence is called or read by the latter party, the party beginning shall have no right to reply, unless he has been prevented from summing up his case by the statement of the other party of his intention to call evidence.
16. The case of both sides shall then be considered closed.
17. If the party opposed to the party beginning calls or reads evidence, the party beginning shall be at liberty to reply generally on the whole case, or he may, by leave of the court, call fresh evidence in reply to the evidence given on the other side. on points material to the determination of the issues, or any of them, but not on collateral matters.
These rules explain the procedure at the trials and regulate the order of addresses at the conclusion of evidence. It is important to observe that the provision of Order 26 r. 10 uses the expression “shall” which wherever applicable is mandatory. It is as follows
The order of proceeding at the hearing of a cause, in cases in which statements of claim and of defence have been filed, shall be as provided in the following rules.”
The normal and general practice which is not mandatory, but a right is for counsel to make oral addresses at the conclusion of evidence of the parties. This is more consistent with the rules which enabled a party. a general or specific reply, with respect to points raised in the address of the opposing party. It seems to me that written addresses were not contemplated by the rules of court, as this may not take care of objections in reply to collateral matters which are not permitted in reply to addresses. A reply presupposes knowledge of the address of the other party. Counsel have in this appeal filed briefs of argument which they relied upon before us. Mr. Igbinoba of Counsel to the Appellant argued grounds 1 and 2 of the grounds of appeal, and relied on Order 26 r. 17, High Court Rules of Bendel State; Sections 33 and 258(1) of the Constitution 1979 to contend that the Court of appeal was wrong in upholding the judgment of the trial Judge. After referring to the facts of the case, counsel submitted that counsel to the appellant had no opportunity of either hearing or reading the address of the other party. He submitted that the majority of the Court of Appeal was wrong to hold that counsel consented and was therefore under a duty to obey, and his failure to submit written address was a disobedience of the order of Court. Counsel submitted that since there was no requirement in the Order that the written address be served on him, the Court of appeal ought to have held that there was no fair trial within section 33(1) of the Constitution 1979 in the High Court.
In his reply, Mr. Esombi for the Respondents supported the majority judgment and submitted that counsel for both parties having consented to the procedure adopted, that is, to submit written addresses, neither ought now to complain against the procedure. He cited and relied on Akhiwu v. Principal Lotteries Officer (1972) 1 ALL NLR, 229. It is important to observe here that the address of counsel at the conclusion of evidence is an important, even if dispensable part of the proceedings and the right if exercised an integral part of the hearing of a lis. It is for the proper administration of justice that the order of address is regulated to enable the party on who the burden to establish his claim lies to address last unless where the other party called no evidence, the party beginning will be entitled to reply to the address of counsel to such party. In the appeal before us, the order of the trial Judge ignored the observance of all these rules and merely gave an order for written addresses to be sent to him. Obviously the Plaintiff who is entitled to know the submission of the Defendants, and to give a suitable reply where necessary could not in this circumstances, do so even if he had complied with the order of the Court. In the circumstances I am persuaded by the submission of Mr. Igbinoba, of Counsel to the appellants that the violation of the rules of Court in this case is not merely a procedural error, but went to the substance of the case and denied the Plaintiff the right to present his case fully before the trial Judge. I think Pepple JCA expressed it correctly when in his dissenting Judgment he stated as follows-
“The primary aim of the court is to do justice, and this aim cannot be achieved by denying a party his due as penalty for his counsel’s failure to comply with a directive which in fact violates the Rules of Court.”
The order in this case requiring counsel to submit written addresses to the learned Judge was made in violation of the rules of Court, and the compliance with which was bound to result in the court not having the full benefit of consideration by the parties of their case. The trial Judge was oblivious of the fact that the counsel was entitled to the address of the other opponent.
Mr. Esombi appears to have misunderstood the ratio decidendi of Akhiwu v. Principal Lotteries Officer, Mid) Western State & anor (1972) 1 All NLR.229 which he relied upon. What was there decided was that when a party had consented to the procedure adopted at the trial in the High Court and suffered no injustice thereby, it was too late to complain on appeal that the wrong procedure was followed. In Akhiwu’s case, the Supreme Court agreed that the procedure consented to by the parties did not result in injustice to either of the parties, and that it was too late for the party who had lost in the action to complain. In the instant case the complaint is not merely because appellant had lost in the action but that he was not only prevented but had also been precluded from presenting all his case before the learned Judge in accordance with the rules of procedure.) See Alhaji Ahamadu v Alhaji Salawu  (1974) 11 SC. 43 at p.49. I agree with Mr. Igbinoba that the violation of the rules of the procedure also infringed the provisions of section 33(1) of the Constitution 1979wherein the observance of the rules of natural justice of fair hearing has been entrenched. In this case the contravention of the rules of procedure even if it was conceded, agreed by consent, resulted in the non-observance of the rules of natural justice which cannot be waived. In the evaluation of the case Plaintiff had not concluded his case, whereas the Defendant did. All the case of the Plaintiff/Appellant was not before the learned Judge. The learned trial Judge delivered his judgment in this case after acknowledging the fact that Plaintiff had not concluded his case when he said, at p.77.
“I have carefully considered the evidence led in this case and I have also gone through the submissions of counsel for the defendants …. ”
The Court of Appeal also accepted this finding when the majority referring to the order to submit written addresses said at p.107
“It was therefore he who deprived himself of the opportunity to address and he also deprived the learned trial Judge the opportunity of seeing his address. He is the person at fault.”
In my opinion with these admissions the proceedings between the parties cannot reasonably be described as fair. Consequently it is a nullity.) See Mohammed v. Kano NA (1965) 1 All NLR. 424 Bronik Motors Ltd. & anor v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 6 SC. 658.
This leads me to the consideration of the second ground of appeal and the determination of the second issue in this appeal. The majority of the Court of Appeal was of the view that the absence of the address in the case I would have made no difference to the decision of the learned trial Judge. This is pure speculation without any basis as the learned trial Judge had stated clearly that he had considered in his judgment the written submission of counsel for the Defendants. It is therefore preposterous to speculate otherwise. However absent the written submission, the Court of Appeal would have been left with the unevaluated evidence of the parties without findings of a fact by the trial Judge. It is difficult to draw conclusions in such a situation.
In considering how the learned Judge came to his decision, it will easily be seen that he considered the evidence of both sides in the case, and the submissions of Counsel to the Defendants alone, without considering the submissions of Counsel to the Plaintiff. Thus if the learned trial Judge were to put the case of both parties on an imaginary scale, there is no doubt the Defendants already by virtue of the submissions of counsel which he relied upon, will have an advantage and the absence of such submissions by Plaintiff’s Counsel will weigh less since there was unequal advantage and consequently no true balance on the probabilities between them. The learned trial Judge adopted the wrong approach, and the Court of Appeal erroneously endorsed it.- See Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 S.C. 91.
Finally, the learned trial Judge having violated the rule of natural justice in his application of Order 26, was in no position to consider the merits of the case as was being suggested by the majority decision of the Court of Appeal) See Ukpe Ibodo & Ors. v. Enarofia & ors. (1980) 5-7. S.C. 42, 52.
The proceedings were therefore a nullity.
The dissenting judgment of Pepple J .C.A. correctly observed when he stated, at p. 113.
“Thus the learned Judge copied down the submission of the defendants’ Counsel, said he agreed with it and made it his judgment. He did not consider the case put forward by Plaintiffs and weigh it against that of the defendants before coming to a decision.”
The majority judgment of the Court of Appeal appears to have adopted the same approach to the judgment of the learned trial Judge when Babalakin J.C.A. said at p.108,
“I have carefully read the printed record of proceedings without the address by both parties the decision arrived at by the learned trial Judge would not have been different”
As I have already pointed out in this judgment there is no basis for such a pronouncement. Grounds 1 & 2 of the grounds of appeal therefore are allowed.
These are my reasons for allowing the appeal of the appellants and making an order that the case be tried de novo at the Warri High Court.
Appeal Allowed.

 

Appearances

J.O.E. Igbinoba Esq For Appellant

 

AND

O. Esombi. Esq For Respondent