TRANS BRIDGE COMPANY LIMITED V. SURVEY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(1986) LCN/2265(SC)
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 11th day of July, 1986
SC.17/1985
JUSTICES
KAYODE ESO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
DAHUNSI OLUGBEMI COKER Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
SAIDU KAWU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
TRANS BRIDGE COMPANY LIMITED Appellant(s)
AND
SURVEY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER A COMPANY CAN RATIFY OR ENFORCE A CONTRACT ENTERED BY ITS PROMOTERS BEFORE IT IS INCORPORATED OR IT COMES INTO EXISTENCE BY REGISTRATION UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 1968
The law on the point is settled. It is that the company is not bound by a pre-incorporation contract and it cannot ratify such contract without the consent of the other party (i.e not the promoters of the company) see Kilner v. Baxter, (1866) L.R. 2 CP 174; Caligara v. Giovanni Sertori & Co. Ltd. (1961) 1 ALL NLR 534, and NIPC Ltd. v. Bank of West Africa Ltd. (1962) 1 ALL NLR 556. PER UWAIS, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT EQUITY BY VIRTUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL AND JUSTICE WILL INTERVENE WHERE IT WOULD BE UNCONSCIONABLE FOR A PARTY TO A PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT TO REPUDIATE IT AFTER INCORPORATION
It was submitted on the authorities that where it would be unconscionable for a party to a pre-incorporation contract to repudiate it after incorporation, equity by virtue of the doctrine of estoppel and justice and fair-play will intervene to prevent that party from repudiating. The cases of
1. Spillers v. Paris Skating Rink Co. (1877-78) 7 Ch.D.368;
2. Touche v. Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Co. (1877) LR. 6 Ch. App. 671
3. Hereford & Southwales Waggon Engineering Co. (1875-76) 2 Ch. D.621;
4. Crabb v. Arum D. C. (1976) 1 Ch. 621;
5. Amalgamated Investment & Property Company Ltd. vs. Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. (1981) 3 All ER.577;
6. Taylor Fashions v. Liverpool Victoria Trustees Company (1981) 1 All ER.897 were all cited and relied upon. PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.
A PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT IS MADE BY PROMOTERS OF THE COMPANY
A pre-incorporation contract is generally made by the promoters of the company with the intention that such contracts would be ratified or adopted, or otherwise taken over on incorporation. In such a situation a valid contract can be made with the promoter of such company – see Stephen v. Buildco (Nig.) Ltd. (1968) (2) A.L.R. Comm. 242 Kelner v. Baxter (1886) L.R. 2 CP.174. 11 is not a contract made with the company which is in law non-existent – see Stephen v. Buildco (Nig.) Ltd. (1968) 2 A.L.R. Comm.242. Shonibare v. Mansour (1963) LL.R.I; NIPC Ltd. v. Bank of West Africa Ltd. (1962) 1 All NLR.556 Caligara v. Giovanni Sartori & Co. Ltd. (1961) 1 All NLR.534 following Kelner v. Baxter (supra). The result is the same where the promoter or anyone entering into the contract for and on behalf of the unincorporated company purports to do so as if the contract was by the company itself. See Newborne v. Sensolid (Great Britain) Ltd. (1954) 1.Q.B.45. PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPANY WILL BE LIABLE FOR PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS MADE BY IT OR ON ITS BEHALF
As a company is not liable for pre-incorporation contracts made by it or on its behalf – see Stephen v. Buildco (Nigeria) Ltd. (supra), even where it has derived benefit – see Re English and Colonial Produce Co. Ltd. (1906) 2 Ch. 435, so also can it not enforce a contract made in its name before its incorporation – see Natal Land and Colonisation Co. Ltd. v. Pauline Colliery Syndicate Ltd. (1904) AC. 120 at p.126. PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.
ESO, J.S.C. (Presiding and Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal touches on an important aspect of Company Law and though it is not new, the issues involved seldom arise in our courts. The issues are in regard to enforceability vel non of pre-incorporation contracts and circumstances that could amount to what the Appellant chose to refer to as “equitable estoppel” and which the Respondents term “promisory estoppel” and “estoppel by conduct.”
Let me, however give the background to the case. The evidence is mostly documentary. Ibrahim Maina Damcida, a Company Director, and who later became the Chairman of Trans Bridge Company Ltd, the Appellants, entered into an arrangement with Survey International Ltd. (the Respondents in this case) for the sale of a landed property situate at 222/231 Apapa by the Respondents to the Appellants. But it is not as simple as all that, as the documents would show presently. The Appellant Company was incorporated on 17th September 1976 but meanwhile the transaction in question had taken place before the incorporation.On 29th May 1976 Ibrahim Maina Damcida, hereinafter referred to simply as Damcida, had written a letter to the respondents, conveying to them the terms of the oral agreement they had had about the sale of the property. The letter of 29th May was not in evidence, but by 31st May, the Respondents replied, in a letter to Damcida, but addressed as the “Chairman” of Trans Bridge Co. Ltd., which was still unincorporated (Ex.P1) as follows –
“We are in receipt of your letter of the 29th May, 1976 on the above subject to confirm our acceptance to sell the property at the terms agreed between ourselves during the various meetings held some time ago.
We do agree to grant you the time required in order to allow you to finalise with your financiers all the transactions.
After the expiration of this time, stated by you as the first week in July, we will consider ourselves free to negotiate the sale with any other parties which might be interested in this property.
With best regards.
Yours faithfully,
SURVEY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(Sgd) ”
It is evident from EX.P1 that Damcida gave the end of the first week in July as the time limit within which to complete the terms of the agreement, as contained in Ex. P4 as follows –
“The Director,
Alhaji Ibrahim M. Damcida,
34, Oyekan Road,
Apapa.
Dear Sir,
RE: PROPERTY – 222/231, APAPA ROAD
We are in receipt of your letter of 26th May, 1976 and we would confirm to you that in principle we are prepared to sell said property at the following conditions:
(a) The area presently occupied by Motor Parts Industry is to be excluded from the deal as we want to retain ownership of the same. This portion of land is “L” shaped North-east oriented as per enclosed drawing with the following measurements 550.3′ x 515.7′ x 126.9′ approximately, covering therefore an area of 2.73 acres out of 6.23 acres approximately which is the entire area of said property. The area which actually would be left for your use is therefore 3.50 acres approximately as per drawings.
(b) The remaining area of the property actually partly covered by the Workshop and Offices of Structural Steel Works will have to be at our use for eight/nine months in order to allow Structural Steel Works to complete the erection of their new Workshop at Agege and to shift Machinery and Stock of raw materials in their new premises.
Kindly keep us informed of your’s and your partner’s decision on this issue.
Yours faithfully,
SURVEY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED”
Meanwhile, by 30th June 1976, a week before the expiration of the time limit, a third party – The Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry, hereinafter referred to simply as the Bank, entered into the transaction. In a letter (Ex.12) to the Respondent, the Managing Director of the Bank said-
“We are informed by Trans Bridge Company Limited which company has lodged an application with us for financial assistance towards the implementation of an investment proposal, that it is under considerable pressure from you to exercise its action to acquire your property situated along Apapa Road, Lagos, which forms a part of the underlying assets of the proposal with us, on or before 7th July, 1976.
The business proposal received from the company involving inter alia, our participation in the Share Capital and the provision of a substantial Term Loan towards the implementation of the investment proposal is actively undergoing our appraisal exercise prior to the presentation to our Board of Directors for consideration and approval. It is, however, unlikely that that appraisal exercises will be completed before the expiration of the correct deadline, 7th July, 1976, agreed between you and Trans Bridge Company Limited.
Considering that our appraisal of the company’s regulations reached advanced stages it will be appreciated if you will exercise reasonable patience over the disposal to any other party of the above-mentioned property which we consider vital to the viability of the project until the conclusion of our current exercises. We assure you that necessary steps are being taken to expedite the completion of the appraisal exercise.
Yours faithfully,
C.E. OKOBI,
Managing Director
By July 6, a day before the expiration of the time limit, the Managing Director of the Appellant (be it noted it is still unincorporated), wrote to the Respondents (Ex. P3) as follows-
“TRANS BRIDGE COMPANY LIMITED
Tel. No. 45824 Office
Telegrams: 34, Oyekan Road,
Apapa,
LAGOS, NIGERIA
Your Ref: …….
Our Ref:……..
The Chairman,
Messrs, Survey International Ltd.,
222/231 Apapa Road,
Lagos.
Dear Sir,
The letter addressed to you by the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry on the 30th June 1976, was a clear confirmation of the Bank’s commitment to finance the project as well as participate in it as a Shareholder. At the meeting held in your office on Saturday 3rd July, 1976, however, you left us with the impression that despite the Bank’s letter you would still wish us to confirm our commitment to buying your property along Apapa Road, Lagos, which forms an integral part of the project in question.
By this letter we wish to confirm that we still firmly stand by our commitment to buy that property on the terms already agreed upon by our two parties, As you were informed last week, it is more than likely that in a few week’s time the Board of Directors of the Bank will meet and formally approve the partnership arrangement and the financing scheme for the project. Needless to repeat, we are confident that the outcome will be favourable.
Many thanks for the understanding.
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd.)
MOHAMAMMED SAID FAWAZ”
As I earlier said, the Appellant/Company was incorporated on 17th September 1976. The arrangement was however not completed before the incorporation. Nor, was it at an end, for on the 3rd October, 1977, the respondents wrote to the Bank to the effect that the Board of Directors of the Bank were not in position to finalise the agreement in principle on May 1976. The letter reads –
“Dear Sirs,
Re: Property 223, Apapa Road, Lagos
As already explained to Alhaji Damcida in the meeting of 25th September, 1977 we would inform you that our Board of Directors is not in the position to finalize what they agreed in principle on May, 1976 but to the following reasons:-
(i) It was our intention to sell a portion of the above mentioned land in order to finance with the proceed of the sale the new establishment in Agege.
(ii) Our negotiations could not be finalised in time and in December last year we had to face financial hardship in order to keep our Agege project within completion scheduled time and we were therefore compelled to obtain fresh finance from our bankers against the mortgage of above property.
(iii) As at now, due to the rampant cost of the building we have also extended our borrowings to the extent of 3.5 million.
(iv) You would also appreciate that we might have sold the property subject to re-negotiation of selling price in order to enable us to repay back our bankers.
(v) Also we would point out that the current value of said property is far above the original amount offered by Messrs Transbridge.
We regret we are not in the position to satisfy your requirements and we remain.
Yours faithfully,
SURVEYS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(Sig.)”
It is obvious that the Respondents were no longer willing to sell the property on the terms formerly agreed. A letter dated 11th October, 1977 from the Appellant is illuminating, and though rather long, would be best reproduced herein to appreciate the whole factual relationship between the parties before applying the principle of law to the situation.
“Dear Sir,
Sale of Property Covered By Title No. 10855
You will recall the series of meetings we held with you and your officials in the course of which we discussed and agreed on the sale to Messrs TRANS-BRIDGE COMPANY LTD. of the above property located at No. 222/231 Apapa Road, Lagos. The area covered by your title was put at 6.230 acres, which title was registered in the Lagos Land Registry as Title No. MO.10855 on Lagos Sheet 542/896/14 and 342/896/10, Plan 23580 Parcel No. 19.
2. Following that agreement we addressed a letter dated 29th May, 1976, to you confirming our acceptance of your offer to sell the said property to us on the terms agreed by both sides at the discussions. To refresh your memory, the terms so agreed were as follows-
(i) sale of the entire 6.230 acres of land including all the structures thereon;
(ii) the total price for the property as described in (i) above was N1.5 million;
(iii) the sale was to be subject to Messrs TRANS BRIDGE COMPANY LIMITED inheriting the lease already executed between you and your subsidiary company (Messrs. MOTOR PARTS INDUSTRIES LIMITED) covering an area 1.5 acres. The said lease was for a period of 25 years at an annual rent of N8,000.00 (subsequently, at a meeting held at No.2 Probyn Road, Ikoyi, it was agreed between our two companies that the said rent of N8,000.00 be raised to N10,000.00 and
(iv) that since your company’s new premises or workshop at Agege would not be ready immediately, Messrs. TRANS BRIDGE COMPANY LIMITED would permit your company to remain in occupation of No. 222/231 Apapa Road, until February, 1977. It was indicated in that letter that our acceptance of your offer was to be subject to the concurrence of our remaining partners and financiers, Messrs Nigeria Bank for Commerce and Industries; and that barring unforseen circumstances, we should be able to complete the negotiations with the said partners (the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries) to enable us pay to you, in local Currency, the full value ofthe property by the first week of July, 1976.
3. In your reply to the letter (your reference No. is L/668/TV of 31st May, 1976) you confirmed your offer on the terms set out in paragraph 2 above and, in addition, agreed to grant us the required time to enable us finalise with our financiers “all the transactions”. You however, indicated that after the expiration of the time required by us, i.e. first week of July 1976, you would consider yourselves free to negotiate the sale with other parties which might be interested in the said property.
4. When it became clear that, in view of the protracted nature of the negotiations between us and the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries, we would not be able to meet the deadline date i.e. first week of July, 1976, the Bank addressed a letter to you dated 30th June, 1976, confirming that we had approached them for part-financing of the purchase of the said Property as part of our investment proposal. They further confirmed their interest in the proposal and informed you that, in the light of their mode of operation, they would be unlikely to complete action on our proposal to enable us meet the deadline of July 1976 agreed between us. They, therefore, urged you, specifically, to exercise reasonable patience over the disposal of the land to any other party since they (the Bank) were not only interested as Shareholders in our company but also considered the purchase of the said Property vital to the viability of the entire project under consideration by them.
5. On Saturday, 3rd July, 1976, we held a meeting with you at which we discussed the letter addressed to you by the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries dated 30th June, 1976. You did not then raise any objection to the Bank’s request to you for further extensions of time to enable us conclude the negotiations with them. On the contrary, you indicated that you would be prepared to await the outcome of the negotiation provided we would confirm our commitment to buy the said property on the terms already agreed. In the circumstances we provided you with the required confirmation in our letter dated 6th July, 1976. We went further; we joined the Bank in asking you for the extension of time to enable us complete the purchase of the said land.
6. Soon after our negotiations with the Bank were completed in May, 1977, we sought and had a meeting with you at which we informed you of our readiness to conclude the purchase of the land on the agreed terms. At that meeting, you confirmed that you were still prepared to sell the said piece of land to us subject to the following additional conditions:-
(a) a new lease arrangement must be made to enable your Company utilize another 1.5 acres of the remaining open space; and
(b) the remainder, including the workshop, must be left for you to use for another eight months, i.e. until February 1978.
Our reply to you then was that we would communicate those additional terms to the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries. We subsequently addressed a letter to you dated 26th May, 1977, recalling the meeting with you the previous week and requesting you to confirm that our record of the meeting was correct. On 17th June, 1977, in your letter No. S11/108/IF/AG of 17th June, 1977, you confirmed that you were still prepared to sell the said property on the basis of the previous terms of sale and the two additional ones put forward by you at our meeting referred to above.
7. It is significant that whilst throughout this period you have continually assured us, orally and in writing, of your determination to sell to us the said property on the agreed terms, culminating with your letter No. SIL/108/IF/AG dated 17th June, 1977, unknown to us, you had addressed a letter to the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries (No. SIL/064/7 dated 8th July, 1976) emphasising that although you considered 7th July, 1976 as the deadline for conclusion of the sale, you were prepared to extend the period only to 15th August, 1976, after which you would consider yourself free to sell to other interested parties. Yet as late as 12th September, 1977, in a reaction to a letter addressed to you by the Bank for Commerce and Industries (the original of which you claimed not to have received) expressing their concern at the additional terms of sale of the said property and requesting for your comments, you reaffirmed your preparedness to sell the entire 6.230 acres of land to us at the “original” terms stated in your letter of June 17th, 1977.
8. Given this background, therefore, you must appreciate why we reacted with indignation and utter disbelieve to your new proposal to sell the property to us on completely new terms when these were spelt out by you at a meeting held in your office at 6.00 p.m. on Sunday, 25th September, 1977. For instance, for the first time ever, you had sought to introduce inflation in Nigeria and its effects on the cost of your new Agege Workshop as one reason why you decided that we must negotiate a new price for the property. Another reason you put forward was your “excessive” indebtedness to your bankers for which you had pledged the property. It was made clear to you at the meeting that your new proposal, including the reasons adduced by you as necessitating the change in your position, were unacceptable to us. It was pointed out to you that at no time during the negotiations covering the entire period (May 1976- September 1977) was any of those points made a condition of the sale or an aspect which could influence the price of the property. All along you had led us (the Bank and ourselves) by your words and deeds to believe that you still stood by the terms of your offer to sell us this property. It is this belief that has led both the Bank and ourselves to continue with the negotiations for finance to enable us pay you the originally agreed price of N1.5 million. It is this belief that has led both the bank and us to maintain the close contact we have maintained throughout the period. Considering the time and efforts the Bank and we have expended on this project, we are firmly of the opinion that there can be no justification for you to change your position at this late hour.
9. In the circumstance we now write to confirm to you our total rejection of your new terms. We also hereby confirm to you our continued acceptance of the original terms of your offer as set out in paragraph 2 above.
10. In the alternative, and considering the friendly relation that exists between us, we will be prepared to consider the modifications to those terms referred by you in your letter to the Bank dated 12th September, 1977 (the modifications were spelt out in ” your letter to us dated 17th June, 1977). In this regard, naturally, we will insist that the original price of N1.5 million be renegotiated to take account of the reduced size of the land, etc.
11. Please be informed that should you fail to inform us of your acceptance of either of the two alternative proposals in paragraphs 9 and 10 above, on or before 20th October, 1977, we will be left with no alternative other than to take steps and protect our legal rights under the contract.
12. We regret the length of this letter. But as you will doubtless understand this has been necessitated by our desire to record every development in its proper and correct historical sequence.
We look forward to hearing from you very soon.
Yours faithfully,
IBRAHIM M. DAMCIDA
(CHAIRMAN)”
The Appellant rejected the new terms (again it should be emphasized that by this time the Appellant/Company had been incorporated).
There was no reaction from the Respondents until the Appellants instructed their Solicitors who wrote the Respondents. The reaction of the Respondents to this letter, from the Appellants’ Solicitors, is contained in Ex. P8 directed to the Solicitors to the Appellants. It reads –
“Re: Sale of Premises at 223 Apapa Road, Lagos i.e. Title No. 10855 Re: Trans Bridge Company Limited
Your letter dated the 22nd day of October, 1977 in respect of the above subject matter has been referred to us with specific instructions. We would only at this juncture refer you to the last paragraph of our clients’ letter referred to in your above mentioned letter and to state that due to your clients’ inability to carry out their obligations under the said agreement for sale after the first week in July, 1976, the offer for sale thereon became lapsed.
If your clients told you the true position of the facts relating to the negotiation and if you went through the correspondence particularly your clients’ letter dated the 29th May, 1976 and our clients’ reply dated the 31st May, 1976 you would, without doubt, conclude that our clients had done what is lawfully within their power to do in the Circumstances.
May we go further to inform you that our clients are in no way liable to any specific performance or to pay the said substantial damages for breach of the said agreement as contained in paragraph 3 of our letter.
We do hope that you would advise your clients that they have no claim whatsoever with our clients because our clients had done what they were legally expected to do.
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd.)
for A. Ola Yesufu & Co.”
The Respondents’ position is clear from EX.8. They claim that the arrangement between them and Damcida lapsed and so there was no contractual relationship between the two. The question of a breach of contract by the Respondents or liability to the Appellants after their incorporation would therefore not arise.
Appellants sued and claimed (as amended)
“4. Under and by virtue of series of negotiations through correspondence and meetings held between the plaintiff and the Defendant and in which the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry was actively involved the Defendant agreed to sell the aforesaid premises to the plaintiff for mutually agreed terms at the purchaser price of N1.5 million and accepted by the plaintiff.
5. The Defendant was aware of the magnitude of motor transport industry which the plaintiff had arranged to establish on the said premises involving over N5,000,000.00 and that the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry was to participate through substantial investment of N2,500,000.00. This letter of participation by the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry dated 4th May, 1977 will be founded upon.
6. The said series of correspondence exchanged between parties concerned are dates 31st May, 1976, 30th June, 1976, 6th July, 1976, 8th July, 1976, 23rd July 1977, 12th September 1977, 3rd October 1977, 11th October 1977, letter dated 17th June, 1977, letter 12th and 19th October, 1977 and these letters will be founded upon.
7. Subsequent to the conclusion of the agreement to sell the said premises to the plaintiff, the Defendant made inconclusive attempt to re-open the terms of the concluded agreement as evidenced by their letter dated 3rd October, 1977 which new terms were rejected by the plaintiff.
8. As per Mr. Giusepee Cava’s letter dated 2nd October, 1977, the Defendant purported to cancel the concluded original agreement of May, 1976.
9. On the face of the concluded original agreement for the sale of the said premises the plaintiff has entered into substantial financial and contractual obligations.
10. The Plaintiff on the basis of the concluded agreement for the sale of the said premises by the Defendant abandoned all other avenues and since the purported unilateral retraction by the Defendant the plaintiff in spite of intensive efforts has not succeeded in obtaining any other suitable alternative sites for their industry.
11. The plaintiff has been reliably informed that the Defendant is negotiating to dispose of the said premises or part thereof to some other companies e.g. Union Trading Company.
12. By reason of the refusal of the Defendant to agree to assign the said premises in furtherance of the concluded agreement the plaintiff has suffered considerable loss both financially and in the business reputation.”
While the Respondents’ defence was one of reliance on the various documents, which I have already set out in this judgment, the learned trial Judge, Omololu-Thomas J. (as he then was) found for the Appellant. He made some fundamental pronouncements which I must refer to in this judgment for the purpose of bringing to light my own conception of the law.
Omololu-Thomas J. held that from the correspondence, the Respondents were aware, or must have been aware, that the Appellants were in the process of formation, and the Respondents treated the Appellants as a duly incorporated company. The learned trial Judge relied on (among others) on Ex. P5, Ex.P14, EX.P15. I have already reproduced on Ex.5. EX.P14 is as follows-
“Sale of Property Covered By Title No. 10855
I am authorised by my co-promoters of the above-named transport company in formation to refer to the series of meetings held between your goodself and us to discuss the sale to us of your above described property located along Apapa Road, Lagos.
I am to confirm to you, once more, our interest in purchasing the said property on the terms discussed and agreed by the two sides, subject only to the concurrence of our remaining partners and financiers, Messrs. Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries.
Our negotiations with that Bank have gone very far without a hitch. Indeed, we are confident that before the end of June these negotiations will be finalised to enable the new venture to commence operation by end of August.
Thus, barring unforeseen circumstances, we should be in a position to finalise this transaction with you including payment to you in local currency of the full value of the property – by the first week in July.
Needless to repeat, my partners and I are anxious to purchase this property. We hope, therefore, that you will as promised, bear with us for the next four weeks while we and the Bank finalise our
Negotiations With warmest regards.”
It was written before the incorporation of the company and it promised finalisation before 7th July. The Respondents said in Ex. P15
“Dear Sir,
We thank you for your letter of 30th June in which you confirm the interest of your bank to participate in the share capital of Trans Bridge Company Limited.
We however assure you that we will not consider the 7th of July as the deadline for the conclusion of the transactions with the above company but on the other end, we hope that you will exercise pressure in order to reach the conclusion not later than the 15th of August 1976.
Assuring you of best co-operation, we remain,
Yours faithfully
(Sgd.)
SURVEYS INTERNATIONAL LTD.
The deadline for the completion of the contract has now been shifted from July 7 to August 15, still, before the formation of the contract. The Appellants’ counsel never disputed the rigour of the law, in the courts, which would not bind companies with pre-incorporation contracts after incorporation, nor, could the company, after incorporation, ratify the contract, he sought sanctuary in equity. He said, after referring to so many authorities in support of the proposition that a company cannot by adoption or ratification obtain the benefit of a contract purporting to have been made on its behalf before the company came into existence –
“I do not think that the facts of these cases have been any real relevance to this case, and even if they do, will the cases be decided in the same way in equity if there are circumstances or facts that warrant the application of equitable principles'”
Omololu- Thomas J. further held that taking the correspondence as a whole though payment or finalisation of the contract was fixed for August 15, time was no longer of essence after Agust 15. He relied upon Exhibit P5 and P7 for the proposition. I have already reproduced EX.P5 herein. Ex.P7 states –
“Alhaji Ibrahim Damcida,
c/o Nigerian Bank for Commerce & Industry,
P. O. Box 4424,
Lagos.
Through Mr. OKOBI
Dear Alhaji Damcida,
Please be informed that on Friday 30th September 1977 at 9.00 a.m. myself, Mr. Vegezzi and Mr. Guzzetti have reported for the meeting at the Headquarters of the Nigerian Bank for Commerce & Industry as agreed and I waited till twenty to ten hoping to see you and bank representative. It is unfortunate that I have to leave the country and lost the opportunity to meet you again and confirm you I regret not to be in the position to finalize what agreed in principle on May, 1976.
I hope that our mutual esteem will last and our friendship strengthens to do business together at an early convenience.
I take this opportunity to remind you my invitation to spend some days with me in Italy and awaiting to hear from you soon.
I remain.
Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) G. CAVA”
The writer of Ex.P7 (supra) Cava, was the Chairman of the Respondent Company. He also held that the Respondents waived the completion time and opted to vary the time of the contract. And so, he said –
“I …. hold, from the various affirmations, by reference to the original contract after the time limit, that the defendant has elected to waive the completion time and opted to vary the time of the contract …. substituting a new contract without first determining or repudiating the original contract. He cannot now …. be heard to say that time was of essence of the contract. … ”
As I said earlier, he found for the Appellants and he granted them the reliefs sought.
The Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal. In that Court, Ademola J.C.A., reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal, with which Kazeem and Uthman Mohammed JJ.C.A. concurred, after stating the law affecting the position of a company in regard to pre-incorporation contract, and tracing the ameliorating effect of Equity, and having stated that the law in this country is in pari materia with the law in England, refused to apply the authorities on equitable estoppel to the facts of this appeal, for the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal held that equity is inapplicable to this case. He found, and this he did after a thorough consideration of the facts and the law-
“(1) That no new contract has been arrived at between the parties after the incorporation of the respondent company in September, 1976.
(2) That the exhibits, the letters exchanged between the parties, cannot be regarded as representation to the respondent (that is the Appellant herein) by the appellant (the Respondent herein) that the agreement of May 1976 reached with the promoter of respondent company should bind it.
(3) That the respondent (the Appellant herein) cannot take it upon itself to be bound by any agreement reached in May 1976 as this would amount to ratification or adoption of any act of the promoters which it could not have authorised in any event.”
He allowed the appeal filed by the present Respondents, and set aside the order for specific performance made by Omololu-Thomas J. (as he then was) and also the award of damages made by the trial Judge in the alternative.
And so, the Appellants, who were dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal, have appealed to this Court, basing their complaint against the judgment on the ground of appeal that –
“(1) The Court of Appeal misdirected itself in law and on the facts in holding that the subsequent protracted series of conduct of the Defendant/Appellant both before and after incorporation of the Plaintiff through series of correspondence and meetings making specific reference to the Agreement of May, 1976 with the Plaintiff/Respondent and the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry do not raise an equitable estoppel to render it unconscionable on the part of the Defendant/Appellant to repudiate the contract of sale of the disputed landed property on the ground that the alleged contract of May, 1976 was a pre-incorporation contract.
There were seven particulars of error attached to that ground of appeal, apart from the appeal on the general ground, of the judgment being against the weight of evidence.
Chief Sobo Sowemimo, S.A.N. learned counsel for the Appellant filed a most comprehensive brief, wherein he accepted the general theme that pre-incorporation contracts are unenforceable in law, but went on to propound the theory of law that gives special circumstances, “Equity” will interpose to render such a pre-incorporation contract enforceable through mitigation of strict legal rules. He called this equitable estoppel.
Learned Senior Advocate said that it was admitted by both parties that an agreement to purchase the Respondents’ property at 233 Apapa Road was concluded in May 1976, when the Appellant Company was in the process of incorporation. But was it so admitted I think one must pause here, a bit to investigate the facts. I have already set out the correspondence between the parties, and it is clear to me that EX.P11 made the sale conditional upon the completion of the contract by 7th July 1976. There is also no such admission in the pleadings. However, according to the brief filed by Chief Sowemimo, the earlier question for the determination of this Court is whether by virtue of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, in the circumstances of this case, and having regard to the evidence “a pre-incorporation contract made in May, 1976, between the [parties] prior to the incorporation could be enforceable at the instance of the unincorporated Appellant Company.” Chief Sowemimo then submitted that although the proposition that-
(1) A company does not exist in the eyes of the law until it has been duly registered and invested with a certificate of such registration (Kilner v. Baxter (1866) L.R. 2 CP 124 d p.183);
(2) A company, to be bound by an agreement entered into on its behalf before incorporation, must enter into a new contract in terms of the previous one Kilner v. Baxter (supra) pp.185-186 Omnis retihabitio retrotratium, et mandato prior aequiparatur;
(3) A subsequent ratification could only be with the assent of the plaintiff, and then it would be a new contract; is correct in law, it is untenable in equity. He submitted that it would be unconscionable for a party to do so for equity, by the doctrine of estoppel and justice and fair play, will intervene.
Then Chief Sowemimo stated that it was only in the past thirty years that, what he termed the aggressive and stimulating evolution of the rules of equity especially the doctrine of estoppel, came in. He referred the Court to attempts by Lord Denning in such cases as Liverpool C.C. v. Irwin (1976) Q.B. 311 at 332, where the Master of the Rolls said that it was for Judges to develop the law, case by case, as they have done in the past; Re Vanderwell Trusts (No.2) 1974 Ch.269 332, and the law Lords “Family Story” where he exhorted Judges to assume, as their proper role, to do justice before them. He finally referred to the recent decision of the High Court and the Court of Appeal in England in the case of Amalgamated Investment v. Texas Commerce (1981) 1 All E.R. 923 as per Goff J. in the High Court, and Lord Denning’s judgment in the same case in the Court of Appeal (1981), 3 All E.R. 577.
This case had nothing to do with pre-incorporation contracts, but it is illuminating on the subject of estoppel by conduct or representation. A property company in England arranged with an English Merchant Bank for a loan of $3m, on the security of properties in England owned by that Company, and $3.25m to its Bahamian subsidiary on the English Company’s security guarantee and the security of an office building in Nassau. The building was owned by the subsidiary. The English Company’s guarantee was to the effect that, in consideration of the Merchant Bank making loans or advances or giving credit from time to time to the subsidiary, the English Company covenanted to pay the Bank on demand all money owing to the Bank by the subsidiary. There was an arrangement made to circumvent Bahamian restrictions on foreign Banks trading in the Bahamas, and the Bank purchased “off the shelf” Bahamian subsidiary which subsidiary, known as the Bahamian Bank, made the loan to the English Company’s subsidiary after the Bahamian Bank had got a loan from its principal, the English Bank. The mortgage of the Nassau building was executed by the Bahamian Bank and the English subsidiary but the original guarantee by the English Company to the English Bank was never amended, and thus it remained a guarantee by the English Company in respect of money owing to the English Bank, rather than to the Bahamian Bank.
Now, and this is important in the case, in the course of dealings between the parties, both the English Bank and the English Company were under a mistaken belief that the guarantee was binding and effective and to cover the liability of the English Company in respect of the Nassau loan. The mistake originated in the Bank but the English Company by its course of conduct, represented to the Bank and encouraged it to believe that the guarantee was binding and effective and that it covered the Nassau loan. This reinforced and confirmed the English Bank’s mistaken belief.
Robert Goff J. made certain pronouncements, in an action for the winding up of the English Company, where both the English Bank and the Bahamian Bank exercised their respective powers as mortgagees and sold the English properties owned by the English Company and the Nassau building. He held that –
(1) both the officers of the Bank directly concerned believed that the English Company guarantee was binding and effective and covered the liability of its subsidiary in respect of the Nassau loan. (2) The officers of the English Company also believed that the guarantee was likewise binding
(3) The English Company by their whole course of conduct represented to the English Bank and encouraged the English Bank to believe that this guarantee was binding and covered the Nassau loan And so he said –
“Of all doctrines, equitable estoppel is surely one of the most flexible. True from time to time distinguished judges have enunciated statements of principle concerning aspects of the doctrine, as, for example, the statements of Lord Cranworth LC in Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) LR 1HL 129 at 140-141, of Thesiger U in De Bussche v. Alte (1878) 8 Ch D 286 at 314, [1874-80] All ER Rep 1247 at 1253and of Fry J in Willmott v. Barber (1880) 15 Ch. D. 96at 105 – 106, concerning what is usually called the doctrine of acquiescence; the statement of Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v. Dyson LR 1 HL 129 at 170-171, on what may be called the doctrine of encouragement; and the statements of Lord Cairns LC in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (1887) 2 App Cas 439 at 448, (1874-80 All ER Rep 187 at 191 and of Denning J in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1956] 1 All ER 256 at 258, [1947] K.B. 130 at 134, on promissory estoppel. But all these have been statements of aspects of a wider doctrine; none has sought to be exclusive. It is no doubt helpful to establish, in broad terms, the criteria which, is certain must be fulfilled before an equitable estoppel can be established; but it cannot be right to restrict equitable estoppel to certain defined categories, and indeed some of the categories proposed are not easy to defend. Thus, in Snell on Equity (27th Edn, 1973, Ch 7), the learned editors isolate two categories of equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel. It may be possible nowadays to identify the former with some degree of precision; but the latter is much more difficult to accept as a separate category. The cases concerned appear to derive from two distinct principles the principle stated by Lord Cranworth LC in Ramsden v. Dyson, and the principle stated by Lord Kingsdown in the same case, the former being concerned with an estoppel precluding a person, who stands by and allows another to incur expenditure or otherwise act on the basis of a mistaken belief as to his rights, from thereafter asserting rights inconsistent with that mistaken belief (commonly called the doctrine of acquiescence) and the other being concerned with an estoppel precluding a person, who has encouraged another to improve his, the encourager’s, property in the expectation that he will receive an interest in it, from denying that the first of these principles appears to be directed towards preventing a persons from fraudulently taking advantage of another’s error, whereas the latter appears to derive rather from encouragement or representation. ”
On appeal, Lord Denning MR, reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal, gave a resume of the doctrine of estoppel. He said-
“The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with cases. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments; proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence and promissory estoppel. At the same time it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims; estoppel is only a rule of evidence; estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action; estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption (either of fact or of law, and whether due to misrepresentation of mistake, makes no difference), on which they have conducted the dealings between them, neither of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. If one of them does seek to go back on it, the courts will give the other such remedy as the equity of the case demands.” (The italics are mine)
Chief Sowemimo has made much of the pronouncements of these learned Judges of England, and submitted that in this case, equity should soften the rigour of the law in regard to hard line taken over the years by the Courts in dealing with pre-incorporation contracts.
Chief F.R.A. Williams S.A.N. learned Senior Advocate for the Respondent, in a very concise brief, submitted that the “equitable estoppel” is not an accurate expression. He preferred “promissory estoppel” and “estoppel by conduct”. In Birmingham & District Land Co. v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. (1888) 40 CH 268 Bowen LJ had interpreted the principle of promissory estoppel as follows –
“If persons who have contractual rights against others induce by their conduct those against whom they have such rights to believe that the rights will either not be enforced or will be kept in suspense or abeyance for some particular time, those persons will not be allowed by a Court of Equity to enforce the rights until such time has elapsed, without at all events placing the parties in the same position as they were before.”
See also Lord Cairns L.C. in Hughes v. Metropolitan Ry Co. (1877) 2 A.C 439. In this country, in Ajayi v. R.T. Briscoe Ltd (Nig) Ltd. (1964) 3 ALL ER. 556, the Privy Council as per Lord Hodson, held the principle to be quasi -estoppel, or promissory estoppel and said –
“when one party to a contract in the absence of fresh consideration, agrees not to enforce his rights, an equity will be raised in favour of the other party.
But then, the board qualified this proposition –
“This equity is, however subject to the qualifications-
(a) that the other party has altered his position;
(b) that the promisor can resile from his promise on giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position;
(c) the promise only becomes final and irrevocable if the promise cannot resume his position.”
In the submission of Chief Williams , he said that for a promissory estoppel to apply there must be a legal relationship subsisting between the parties. Learned counsel also submitted that if that Appellant knew the true state of the facts, he cannot be heard to say that he was induced to act to his prejudice in reliance on the representation of the respondent.
As regards estoppel by conduct, learned counsel referred this Court to section 150 of the Evidence Act which provides –
“150 Where one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative in interest shall be allowed, in any proceedings between himself and such persons representative in interest, to deny the truth of that thing.”
The issue of estoppel by conduct has not arisen in this case, learned counsel concluded. The courts will not be too hasty to infer a contract and will not do so merely because one or both parties wrongly thought that the company is bound by the alleged contract, counsel concluded. And so, Chief Williams summarised what he termed cases in which a company has been held bound by a pre-incorporation contract as follows –
(a) Where the court, on the particular facts presented, is prepared to grant relief by way of restitution to promoters who before the incorporation of the company have performed services which have enhanced the value of the company’s assets. Such promoters can either enforce an equitable claim against those assets for the value of the services, or sue the company for a quantum meruit. See Re Hereford and South Wales Waggon & Engineering Co. (1876) 2 Ch.D. 621; Re Empress Engineering Co. (1880) 16 Ch.D.125.
(b) Where grounds exist for holding that the company is estopped from asserting that it had entered into a fresh contract on the terms of a pre-incorporation contract. In this class of cases however it is not, strictly speaking, the pre-incorporation contract that is being enforced. The pre-incorporation contract only serves as evidence of the terms of a post-incorporation contract, the existence of which, the company is estopped from denying. Moreover the contract sued for must be clearly pleaded. It is also clear that in this class of case it is the other party and not the company sought to be bound that can so plead. See cases cited in Part 4 of this brief.
(c) Probably (though there are conflicting judicial decisions on the point) a person who before incorporation contracts with the promoters of the company may enforce his claim against the company by being subrogated to the promoters’ rights to an indemnity out of the company’s assets for the expense of carrying out the contract. It must however be established that the company contracts to indemnify the promoters after incorporation. See Touche v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (1971) 6 Ch. App. 671; Melhade v. Porro Alegre Railway Co. (1874) LR OCP 503; Hagot Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Clipper Pheumatic Tyre Co. (1902) 1 Ch. 146. But see also Re National Motor Mail Coach Co. (1908) 2 Ch. 515.”
I am of the view, with great respect, that much as interesting as the exposition made by learned Senior Advocate for the Appellant has been, much theory has been generated into this appeal, without relevance to the very facts of the case. I have no difficulty in agreeing with Lord Denning in Liverpool C.C. v. Irvine (1976) Q.B. 311. It would be tragic to reduce Judges to a sterile role and make an automaton of them. I believe, it is the function of Judges to keep the law alive, in motion, and to make it progressive for the purpose of arriving at the end of justice, without being inhibited by technicalities, to find every conceivable, but acceptable way of avoiding narrowness that would spell injustice. Short of a Judge being a legislator, a Judge, to my mind, must possess an aggressive stance in interpreting the law.
Notwithstanding all these, law should only be applied to facts of a case. It is not for a Court to manufacture facts or work from law backwards to facts on the pre of justice. That could amount to judicial anarchy. It is the establishment of facts that comes first, and later the application thereto of the principles of law. Indeed, I consider this as the only legal process by which justice could be arrived at.
Be that as it may, the facts of this case having regard to the correspondence which I have already set out in this judgment show already that-
(1) the Appellants had till 7th July to finalise all the transactions of the sale of the property (Ex. P1).
(2) That the letter Ex. P2 asking for extension of time within which the Appellant should perfect the arrangement between the Appellant and the Respondent was written not by the Appellant but by a third party. That was on 30th June 1976 a week before the deadline.
(3) That EX.P3 written by the Appellants on the eve of the deadline was asking for extension to time . …,
(4) That there was no such extension granted by the Respondents up till the time the Appellant Company was incorporated in September 1976 and therefore by the time of that incorporation, there was nothing legal between the parties.
(5) That EX.P5 is a new negotiation between the Appellant and the Respondent and the respondents have put up new terms in that exhibit.
(6) That these new terms were totally rejected by the appellants in Ex. P6. When therefore, the Appellants said, in paragraph 9 of that Exhibit –
“9. in the circumstances we now write to confirm to you our total rejection of your new terms. We also hereby confirm to you our continued acceptance of the original terms of your offer as set out in paragraph 2 above.”
Where, the said paragraph 2, refers to the offer of 29th May 1976 which had lapsed by 7th July, 1976, there was no legal agreement between the two – see Odufunade v. Josiah Folorunso Ososami (1972) U.I.L.R. 101 Chief Samson Obaseki v. African Continental Bank Ltd. and Anor. 1966 NMLR. 35.
Upon what facts then will equity be invoked in this case Surely, equity should not be treated as a tyrannous phenomenon threatening the law. It does not exist in vaccuo or supposedly to roam about pouring water on the fire of the law. Equity is not a warlord, determined to do battle with the law. It is part of a legal system which has been mixed with the law and the admixture is for the purpose of achieving justice.
Since the Judicature Acts, 1873 and 1875, and the fusion of law and equity, there had been an amalgam of the superior courts, in England, into one Supreme Court of Judicature. The Courts of Queens Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas, and the Court of Chancery, together with the Court of Exchequer Chamber, and the Court of Appeal in Chancery, were all replaced by the Supreme Court. These replacements were the Courts of Appeal and the High Court with five, but later, three Divisions. The Supreme Court – that is, these Courts (Court of Appeal and the High Court) was directed to administer both law and equity. Pollock put the admixture into a ditty –
“The Courts that were manifold dwindle.
To diverse Divisions of one”
See Pollock: Leading Cases Done into English 1892 p. 57. And though it has always been a “catechism” that where law and equity conflict, equity prevails, there have always been Limits to this rule. The Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875 and later 1925, never abolished the distinction between legal and equitable rights – see Gentle v. Faulkman 1900 2 Q.B. 267, at 274 – 275. The Acts never abolished the distinction between legal and equitable remedies either, see Joseph v. Lyons (1884) 15 Q.B.D. 280, where Cotton L.J. said –
“I think that the clause enacting that the rules of equity shall prevail (Judicature act, 1873) shows that it was not intended to sweep away altogether the principles of the common law – see p. 286. see also Manchester Brewery Co. v. Combs (1901) 2 Ch. 608 at 617. And so the legal right in a contractual obligation exists and is certainly not abolished by equity. In so far as Equitable Estoppel is concerned, it is usually in two forms – “promissory estoppel” which I believe is the one the Appellant could claim to rely upon in this appeal- see Ajayi v. R. T. Briscoe (Nig.) Ltd. (1964) 1 W.L.R. 1326 at 1330; Dean v. Bruce (1952) 1 K.B. 11 at p.14 or “proprietary estoppel” in E.R. Ives Investments Ltd. v. High (1967) 2 Q.B. 379 at 399. There is also estoppel by representation see S.150 of the Evidence Act. As I have said, the legal right and the legal remedy of the parties have not been submerged by equity, all that could be claimed in this case, is that, as a result of the agreement between the parties, which made one party to perform certain acts, that party should not be made to suffer by the other party resiling on the agreement. And so the question must remain, was there an agreement between the parties Was there one before incorporation. Was there one after incorporation
I am very much inclined to the submission of Chief Williams that this case does not come within the scope of cases where the existence of a fresh contract could be inferred. The old contract died before incorporation. The new contract was never agreed upon after incorporation. It was still born. And so, where will equity lie
Ademola, J.C.A. is perfectly right, and I adopt his reasoning when he concluded that nothing in this case turned to warrant an embarkation on an exercise of applying the authorities on equitable estoppel.
As this is the only issue in this appeal the appeal must be and it is hereby dismissed with N300.00 costs to Respondents.
UWAIS, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment read by my learned brother Eso, J.S.C. and I agree that the Appeal should be dismissed. Both learned counsel for the appellant, Chief Sowemimo, and learned counsel for the respondent, Chief Williams, are at one on the question whether a company can ratify or enforce a contract entered by its promoters before it is incorporated or it comes into existence by registration under the Companies Act, 1968. The law on the point is settled. It is that the company is not bound by a pre-incorporation contract and it cannot ratify such contract without the consent of the other party (i.e not the promoters of the company) see Kilner v. Baxter, (1866) L.R. 2 CP 174; Caligara v. Giovanni Sertori & Co. Ltd. (1961) 1 ALL NLR 534, and NIPC Ltd. v. Bank of West Africa Ltd. (1962) 1 ALL NLR 556.
In the present case two contracts were actually contemplated by the parties although none came to fruition. There was one negotiation, for the sale of land, in respect of the contracts, which lasted throughout the period material to the dispute between the parties. The first contract was to be executed by 7th July, 1976 but later the time was extended to 15th August, 1976. The contract fell through when the appellants were unable to raise loan from their Bankers – Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries – by the stipulated dates. The appellant became incorporated on 17th September, 1976. On 25th November, 1976 its Bankers made finance available to it for the completion of the contract which had become ineffective on 16th August, 1976.
The negotiation for the sale of the land to the Appellant by the respondent was kept alive despite the inability of the Appellant to complete the first contract which became frustrated by 16th August, 1976. The Chairman of the Appellant wrote a letter (exhibit p.12) on 26th May, 1977 to the Chairman of the respondent from which it transpired that the respondent was imposing new conditions to those earlier agreed upon in the frustrated contract. These new conditions were specifically mentioned by the chairman of the Respondent in his reply, which is exhibit P4, dated 17th June, 1977. The new conditions were rejected by the appellant in a letter (exhibit P6) which its Chairman wrote to the Chairman of the respondent on 11th October, 1977 in the following words-
“9. In the circumstance we now write to confirm to you our total rejection of the new terms. We also hereby confirm to you our continued acceptance of the original terms of your offer as set out in paragraph 2 above.”
Exhibit P6 continues as follows in paragraph 11 thereof –
“Please be informed that should you fail to inform us of your acceptance of either of the two alternatives proposals in paragraphs 9 and 10 above, on or before 20th October, 1977 we will be left with no alternative other than to take steps and protect our legal rights under the contract.”
Thus the ground had been prepared for the institution of this case. It is significant to note that the chairman of the appellant – Alhaji Ibrahim Mina Damcida – was one of the promoters of the appellant, who had been involved in the negotiation with the respondent from the very beginning of the transaction.
Now it is obvious that the second contract contemplated by the respondent on their new conditions was never completed because the appellant’s Chairman rejected the proposal. There is therefore no contract whatsoever which the appellant could have ratified after its incorporation. The action in this appeal was not brought by any of the promoters of the appellant who negotiated with the respondent. Although Alhaji Ibrahim Mina Damcida is the Chairman of the appellant, his status as a promoter of the company is different from that as the Chairman of the Company. And the fact that the case was instituted by the appellant does not make him a party to the case even as Chairman.
From the foregoing it is clear that the appellant per se has no legal right to enforce against the respondent. The novel question for determination in this appeal is: whether a company is entitled in equity to enforce, after its incorporation, an agreement made on its behalf by its promoters Chief Sowemimo has conceded that at common law, the appellant cannot claim legal right from the negotiation that took place between its promoters and the respondent. He however argued that the appellant can enforce the contract between the promoters and the respondent by calling to aid the doctrine of “equitable estoppel”. Learned Senior Advocate relied in the main on the decisions of the English High Court and the Court of Appeal in Amalgamated Investment Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. (1981) 1 ALL ER. 923 and (1981) 3 ALL ER 577 respectively.
Chief Williams, learned Senior Advocate replied that the term “equitable estoppel” is an inaccurate expression and instead it should be either “promissory estoppel” or “estoppel by conduct”. Counsel argued that for a promissory estoppel to apply in a case, there must be a legal relationship between the parties thereof. He submitted that estoppel by conduct is defined under Section 150 of the Evidence Act. It is his contention that both promissory estoppel and estoppel by conduct do not apply in the present case.
Since the appellant was not party to the negotiation entered between its promoters and the respondent and moreover, there is no contract whatsoever as earlier found, between the promoters and the respondent, there is, in my opinion, no legal right which the appellant can enforce, because the appellant has not suffered any disadvantage or loss. Suppose there was even a contract between the promoters and the respondent (which I hold there was not) the contract had not been ratified by the appellant and therefore, the appellant could not claim any right under it.
For these and the reasons contained in the lead judgment read by my learned brother Eso, J.S.C. I too will dismiss the appeal and it is hereby dismissed with N300.00 costs to the respondent.
COKER, J.S.C.: I agree with the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother Eso, J.S.C. the draft of which I have had the privilege of reading. I adopt his reasons as mine and have nothing to add. I agree with the order for costs of N300.00 to the Respondent.
KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: I have read the judgment of my learned brother Kayode Eso, J.S.C. in this appeal. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed. The facts of this case which are not in dispute, have been exhaustively stated in the judgment of my learned brother Kayode Eso, J.S.C. I need only reiterate such aspects as are essential to my consideration of the issues raised by counsel for the Appellants.
The only issue raised in this appeal, is whether a company is entitled in equity to enforce after incorporation an agreement made on its behalf by other persons before its incorporation. It is admitted on all sides that it cannot in law do so. Counsel for the Appellants alone has contended that such contract ought to be enforceable in equity.
It is helpful for a clear understanding of the issue canvassed in this appeal to restate the salient facts relied upon by both sides in this appeal. The facts are that after a series of meetings held between the respondent company and the promoters of the Appellant company, the co-promoters of the Appellant company authorised Mohammed Said Fawaz, to confirm the interest of the Appellant in the purchase of 222/231 Apapa Road, on the terms discussed, subject only to the concurrence of the remaining partners and financiers of the Appellant company, Messrs Nigeria Bank for Commerce and Industries. Mohammed Said Fawaz, in his letter of acceptance dated 29/5/76 “Exhibit P14” to the Respondents conveying this agreement stated inter alia as follows:-
“Our negotiations with that Bank have gone very far without hitch. Indeed we are confident that before the end of June, these negotiations will be finalised to enable the new venture to commence operation by the end of August.
Thus barring unforseen circumstances, we should be in a position to finalise this transaction with you including payment to you in local currency of the full value of the property – by the first week in July. Needless to repeat, my partners and I are anxious to purchase this property. We hope, therefore, that you will as promised, bear with us for the next four weeks while we and the Bank finalise our negotiations.”
This letter did not state who are the co-promoters of the Appellant company. It however named Messrs. Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries as its Partner and Financier. In the ordinary definition of the term promoter, the Bank undoubtedly qualifies. The reply of the Defendants to the offer of Appellants Exh. P14, to buy the property is important and states clearly the premium it placed on the date for the finalisation of the agreement. Exhibit P1 states:-
EXHIBIT “PI” SUIT NO. LD/1137/77
TRANS BRIDGE CO. LTD. V SURVEY INTERNATIONAL LTD.
(Intld) 15/1/81
Survey International Limited
Engineering Consultants
APAPA: 31st May, 1976.
SIL/062/VV.
The Chairman,
Trans Bridge Co. Limited,
34, Oyekan Road,
Apapa.
Dear Sir,
Re: Sale of Property Title no. 10855
“We are in receipt of your letter of the 29th May, 1976 on the above subject to confirm our acceptance to sale the property at the terms agreed between ourselves during the various meetings held some time ago.
We do agree to grant you the time required in order to allow you to finalise with your financiers all the transactions.
After the expiration of this time, stated by you as the first week in July, we will consider ourselves free to negotiate the sale with any other parties which might be interested in this property.
With best regards. ”
Yours faithfully,
SURVEYS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(Sgd.)
Office in Africa Office in Europe:
229/231 Apapa Road, Viale Aventino n.89 C
P.O. Box 2742, Lagos (Nigeria) Rome (Italy)
Tel: 53105. Tel.: 576022 – 573984.
Cable Address: MELCHIMPRESS
On the 30th June 1976, Messrs. Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries wrote “Exhibit P2”, stating that the date of 7th July agreed to between the promoters of the Appellant company and Respondents was not practicable and requested as follows:-
Exhibit “P2 Suit No. LD/1137/77
TRANS BRIDGE CO. LTD. VS. SURVEY INTERN LTD.
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries
Address: 3 Prisons Street, Lagos
P. O. Box 4424
Your Ref:..
Our Ref: Tel. 53917
Cables/Telegrams
NIBACIND LAGOS.
30th June, 1976.
The Chairman,
Messrs. Surveys International Ltd.,
222/231, Apapa Road,
Lagos.
Dear Sir,
We are informed by Trans Bridge Company Limited, which company has lodged an application with us for financial assistance towards the implementation of an investment proposal, that it is under considerable pressure from you to exercise its action to acquire your property situated along Apapa Road, Lagos, which forms a part of the underlying assets of the proposal with us, on or before 7th July, 1976.
The business proposal received from the Company involving inter alia, our participation in the Share Capital and the provision of a substantial Term Loan towards the implementation of the investment proposal is actively undergoing our appraisal exercises prior to the presentation to our Board of Directors for consideration and approval. It is, however, unlikely that the appraisal exercises will be completed before the expiration of the correct deadline, 7th July, 1978, agreed between you and Trans Bridge Company Limited.
Considering that our appraisal of the company’s regulations reached advanced stages it will be appreciated if you will exercise reasonable patience over the disposal to any other party of the above-mentioned property which we consider vital to the viability of the project until the conclusion of our correct exercises. We assure you that necessary steps are being taken to expedite the completion of the appraisal exercises.
Yours faithfully,
C.E. OKOBI
Managing Director
cc: Messrs. Trans Bridge Co. Ltd.,
34, Oyekan Road,
Apapa.
A copy of this letter was sent to the Appellant. This is Exhibit “P2A”. The reaction of Appellants to “Exhibit 2A” was their letter to Respondent Exhibit 3 dated 6th July, 1976 confirming their continued interest in the purchase of the property under discussion on the terms already agreed upon. It was obvious at this stage that Appellants could not meet the completion date of 7th July 1976 and were pleading for more time. This is clear from “Exh. P3” . .,
EXHIBIT “P3” SUIT NO. LD/1137/77
TRANS BRIDGE COMPANY Vs. SURVEY INTERNATIONAL
Trans Bridge Company Limited
Telephone: 45824 Office
Telegrams: 34 Oyekan Road,
Apapa.
Your Ref:…. Lagos, Nigeria.
Our Ref:….. Date: July 5, 1976.
The Chairman,
Messrs. Survey International Ltd.,
222/231 Apapa Road,
Lagos.
Dear Sir,
“The letter addressed to you by the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry on the 30th June 1976, was a clear confirmation of the Bank’s commitment to finance the project as well as participate in it as a Shareholder. At the meeting held in your office on Saturday 3rd July, 1976, however, you left us with the impression that despite the Bank’s letter you would still wish us to confirm our commitment to buying your property along Apapa Road, Lagos, which forms an integral part of the project in question.
By this letter we wish to confirm that we still firmly stand by our commitment to buy that property on the terms already agreed upon by our two parties. As you were informed last week, it is more than likely that in a few weeks’ time the Board of Directors of the Bank will meet and formally approve the partnership arrangement and the financing scheme for the project. Needless to repeat, we are confident that the outcome will be favourable. Please bear with us a little longer.
Many thanks for the understanding.”
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd.) MOHAMMED SAID FAWAZ
The Respondents in their letter dated 8th July, 1976, “Exh. P15”, on receipt of “Exh. 2”, extended the date of completion of the sale to the 15th August, 1976. “Exhibit P15” which was sent only to Messrs. Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries, was not copied to Appellants.
Exhibit “P15” Suit No. LD/1137/77
Trans Bridge Co. Ltd. Vs. Survey Inter. Co.
(Intld) Ola. 8/5/81.
SIL/C54/VV. Apapa: 8th July, 1976
The Managing Director,
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry,
3, Prisons Street,
Lagos.
Dear Sir,
“We thank you for your letter of 30th June in which you confirm the interest of your bank to participate in the share capital of Trans Bridge Company Limited.
We however assure you that we will not consider the 7th of July as the deadline for the conclusion of the transactions with the above company but on the other end, we hope that you will exercise pressure in order to reach the conclusion not later than the 15th of August, 1976.
Assuring you our best co-operation, we remain,
Yours faithfully,
(Sigd.)
SURVEY INTERNATIONAL LTD.”
Stricto sensu, Appellants were only aware of the completion date of 7th July 1976. Appellant was still not incorporated during all these transactions. Letters were written to and by the Appellant company in the name in which it later became incorporated on the 17th September 1976 in “Exhibit P16”.
Exhibit Pl6 Suit No. LD/1137/77
Trans Bridge Co. Ltd. Vs. Survey Inter. Ltd.
(Intld.) Ola. 8/5/81.
DUPLICATE FOR THE FILE No. PC.I9090.
“Federal Republic of Nigeria
Certificate of Incorporation
I HEREBY CERTIFY that TRANS-BRIDGE COMPANY LIMITED is this day incorporated under the Companies Decree 1968 and that the Company is limited.
Given under my hand at Lagos this 17th day of September One thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Six.
Fees and Deed Stamps N100.00
Stamp Duty on Capital N3,000.00
(Sgd.) A. A. OLADAPO
Registrar of Companies. ”
Certificate received by Joseph Izumma Obi, Plot 776A Biadun Street, South West, Ikoyi, Lagos.
Date: 17th September, 1976.”
Thus, as at the 17th September 1976, the agreement to buy the property being negotiated was not in accordance with its terms, completed. – See Killner v. France (1946) K.B.83. Furthermore the Appellant company was not a legal entity having not been registered as required under the Companies Act 1968. Even if Appellants were a person in law, in accordance with the terms of the negotiations, the Respondents stated clearly that they were prepared to extend the period for the conclusion of sale only to 15th August, 1976, after which date they considered themselves free to sell to other interested persons.
The negotiations for the sale of the land in question was not concluded on the 15th August, 1976. On the 25th November, 1976 Messrs. Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries provided the financial assistance required for the execution of the agreement and now approved the revised scheme for financial assistance to Appellants. By 4th May, 1977 the Appellants had not indicated to Messrs. Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries, their acceptance of the offer – see “Exhibit P10”, dated 4th May, 1977.
The earliest transaction which Appellant company after incorporation had in respect of this property was that evidenced in “Exhibit P12”, a letter from its Chairman to Respondents dated 26th May, 1977 which recorded the results of a meeting between the parties. It was obvious that the Respondents were now asking for additional conditions – “Exhibit P12” stated as follows:-
Exhibit “P12” Suit No. LD/1137/77
Trans Bridge Co. Ltd. Vs. Survey Inter. Ltd.
(Intld.) ala. 1611/81
No. 34, Oyekan Road,
Apapa, Lagos.
26th May, 1977.
“The Chairman,
Messrs Survey International Ltd.,
222/231 Apapa Road,
Lagos.
Dear Sir,
During a meeting in your office last week between your goodself and representatives of this company, you were able to confirm that despite the delay in finalizing the purchase arrangements for your property located at No. 222/231 Apapa Road, you were still prepared to sell it to us. The sale now is to be subject to the following additional conditions:-
(a) A new lease arrangement must be made for you to allow you the use of another 1.5 acres of the remaining open space;
(b) The workshop must be left for you to use for another eight months, i.e. until next February.
The above conditions were to be in addition to the lease of 25 years which you had earlier concluded in favour of one of your companies and which also covered an open space of 1.5 acres. In effect, therefore, what will be left for our use will be an area of approximately 2.25 acres cross-crossed by NEPA’s high tension wires. Such a piece of land, as you well know, cannot be used for building purposes.
Despite the fears expressed by our side at that meeting, however, it was nevertheless agreed that we should refer the matter to our partners, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries. We have asked for a meeting with the Bank sometimes next week, at which this matter would be discussed. At that meeting we feel certain that the Bank, as it has always done will demand a written confirmation of your new conditions from you. Thus, by this letter I wish to ask you to please be kind enough to confirm those conditions in writing.
A copy of this letter is being addressed to the Bank for their information.
Kind regards and all the best to you.”
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd.) IBRAHIM M DAMCIDA
DIRECfOR
Respondents replied to “Exhibit PI2” in “Exhibit P4” dated 17th June, 1977, specifying the conditions under which they were prepared to sell the property. Exhibit P4, states as follows-
EXHIBIT P4 SUIT NO. LD/1137/77
(Intld.) 15/1/81.
Survey International Limited
Engineering Consultants
“Highways
Roads
Buildings, BY HAND
Airports bridges etc.
Our Ref: SII/108/IF/AG 17th June, 1977
“Confidential”
The Director,
Alhaji Ibrahim M. Damcida,
34, Oyekan Road,
Apapa.
Dear Sir,
“Re: Property – 222/231, Apapa Road
We are in receipt of your letter of 26th May, 1977 and we would confirm to you that in principle we are prepared to sell the said property at the following conditions:
(a) The area presently occupied by Motor Parts Industry is to be excluded from the deal as we want to retain ownership of the same. This portion of land is “L” shaped North-East oriented as per enclosed drawing with the following measurements 550.3′ x 515.7′ x 126.9′ x 126.9′ approximately, covering therefore an area of 2.73 acres out of 6.23 acres approximately which is the entire area of said property. The area which actually would be left for your use is therefore 3.50 acres approximately as per drawings.
(b) The remaining area of the property actually partly covered by the Workshop and Offices of Structural Steel Works will have to be at our use for eight/nine months in order to allow Structural Steel Works to complete the erection of their new Workshop at Agege and to shift machinery and stock of raw materials into their new premises.
Kindly keep us informed of your and your partner’s decisions on this issue.
Yours faithfully,
SURVEYS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED.”
Ends: 1 drawing.
Offices in Africa:
229/231 Apapa Road, Offices in Europe
P. O. Box 2742, Viale Aventino n.89
Lagos – Nigeria. ROME (Italy)
Telephones: 53101-53105 Telephones: 576022-573984.
Cable Address: MELCHIMPRESS.”
Thus, although the negotiations commenced by the promoters had not been concluded till after incorporation of the Appellants when Respondents introduced new conditions, the attitude of the chairman of the company to this development and the attitude of the Legal Advisers of the company, and Appellants’ counsel in court, was that the negotiations which were commenced by the Promoters before incorporation of the Appellant company continued after the incorporation of the company. This is clear from the analysis of the disagreement between the parties in the letter to the respondents by the chairman of the Appellant company dated 11th October, 1977, “Exhibit P6″. His evidence in court followed the same pattern. On the 22nd October 1977, the solicitors to the Appellant wrote to the Respondents asking respondents to finalise the concluded agreement of May, 1976 within 7 days from the date of the letter, in default of which an action for specific performance of the said concluded agreement and for substantial damages for breach of the said agreement will be brought in the High Court – see” Exhibit P9″. In “Exhibit P8, the solicitors for the Respondents in their letter dated 15th November, 1977, replied denying liability. Respondents letter reproduced hereunder is unequivocal on the issue.
“Exhibit “P8″ Suit No. LD/1137/77
Trans Bridge Co. Ltd. Vs. Survey Inter.
(Intld.) Ola. 15/1/81
A.O. YESUFU & CO. CHAMBERS
SOLICITORS & ADVOCATES 236, Murtala Mohammed Way
Yaba, Lagos.
Our Ref:.. 15th November, 1977.
Your Ref:..
Telephone: 48316.
Messrs. Fani-Kayode & Sowemimo,
26, Abibu-Oki Street,
(1st Floor),
P. O. Box 5163,
Lagos, Nigeria.
Dear Sirs,
Re: Sale of Premises at 223 Apapa Road Lagos i.e. Title No. 10855
Re: Trans Bridge Company Limited
Your letter dated the 22nd day of October, 1977 in respect of the above subject matter has been referred to us with specific instructions.
We would only at this juncture refer you to the last paragraph of our clients’ letter referred to in your above-mentioned letter and to state that due to your clients’ inability to carry out their obligations under the said agreements for sale after the first week in July 1976, the offer for sale thereon became lapsed.
If your clients told you the true position of the facts relating to the negotiation and if you went through the correspondence particularly your clients’ letter dated the 29th May, 1976 and our clients’ reply dated the 31st May, 1976 you would, without doubt, conclude that our clients had done what is lawfully within their power to do in the circumstances. May we go further to inform you that our clients are in no way liable to any specific performance or to pay the said substantial damages for breach of the said agreement as contained in paragraph 3 of our letter.
We do hope that you would advise your clients that they have no claim whatsoever with our clients because our clients had done what they are legally expected to do.
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd.)
for A. Ola. Yesufu & Co.”
This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal which reversed the judgment of the High Court that the transactions between Appellants and Respondent resulted in an enforceable agreement. In his judgment the learned judge held that the facts disclosed in the various correspondence between the parties and the oral testimony of the chairman of Appellant company, that the agreement between the promoters of the Appellant company dated 29th May, 1976 before its incorporation was adopted or ratified by the company after incorporation. The learned Judge went further to hold that even assuming that no such adoption or ratification arose in law, that by the defendant/company constant reference to the agreement in correspondence and assurances at meetings as to the existence of the contract (which they later wanted to be varied by incorporation of the terms referred to as “conditions”) led the plaintiff after incorporation to believe in the continued existence of the contract, and to act upon it, the defendant knowing or reasonably knowing that it will be acted upon They were in fact acted upon and I am so satisfied. The principle applies to this case and the defendant will in my humble opinion, be estopped from relying on the non-incorporation of the plaintiff/company in May 1976 as a bar to enforce the contract.
The learned Judge rejected the contention that there was no privity of contract between the Appellant company and the Respondents in respect of the purported agreement of May 1976.
The learned Judge conceded that though originally time was of the essence of the contract, the subsequent conduct of the Respondents after the 15th August 1976 made time no longer of the essence. His reasons were that-
” …. there was no repudiation of the contract of May 1976. On the contrary, meetings were being held on “additional conditions” , and correspondence were being exchanged in which references were made to the contract of May, 1976″.
Relying on Charles Rickads Ltd. v. Oppenhein (1950) 1 KB.616 and other cases such as Strickney v. Keeble (1951) AC.366, Panchaud Freres S.A. v. Establishments General Grain Co. (1970) 1 Lloyd. Rep.53, the learned Judge said that respondents elected to waive the completion time and opted to vary the time of the contract, or to substitute a new contract without first determining or repudiating the original contract. He concluded-
” …. He cannot now in my humble opinion be heard to say that time was of the essence of the contract or that the contract of May 1976 was determined on 15th August 1976 when the contract ought to have been completed by payment of the purchase price.”
The learned Judge had no doubt that there was in May 1976 an enforceable agreement for sale of the premises subject to the payment of the purchase price. He then went on to hold …
“The principle as established is that when once there is shown that there exists a complete contract, even though contained in letters, and it appears that the letters of offer and acceptance contain all the terms agreed upon between the parties at the date of acceptance further negotiations between the parties cannot without the consent of both parties get rid of the contract already arrived at.” (See Perry v. Suffields Ltd. (1916) 2 Ch.187).
The contention by the Respondents that the offer of the 26th May 1976 lapsed due to the non-completion by the Appellants was rejected. In his view, an offer which has been accepted can never lapse.
The Court of Appeal pointed out correctly what was the central issue in the appeal before it, that is, whether a pre-incorporation contract between the promoters of the Respondent company and the Appellant company had been adopted or ratified by the Appellant company from the various correspondence and testimony of the Respondents’ chairman given in this case. In this court the question will be the same if in place of Respondent, it reads Appellant and vice versa.
The Court of Appeal after setting out the principles of law governing pre-incorporation contracts and that such contracts were incapable of confirmation or adoption either by resolution of the company on incorporation or the company having taken any benefit from such contracts, examined the cases relied upon by the Respondent that the contention that the rule was different in equity and rejected the contention by the Respondent that in equity the rule is the converse. After reviewing the contentions of counsel, the Court of Appeal stated-
“The estoppel relied upon by the learned Judge is rather in the nature of a promissory estoppel. In my view and on the authorities, learned Counsel for the respondent brought before the Court, there can be no doubt in my mind that the respondent is relying on estoppel by representation contained in the exhibits mentioned hereinbefore and what was said at the meeting between the parties. This is a new specie of equitable estoppel which would give effect to transactions which otherwise will be void but for reliance which one of the parties to the transaction has placed upon such assurances as given by the other side that things are what both of them think they were; though it may turn out that they are not. This new specie of estoppel reached its high water-mark in the case of Amalgamated Investment Company Ltd. v. Texas Commerce International Bank Limited (1981) 1 All ER.923”
After an analysis of the evidence of the chairman of the Respondent (now Appellant’s) company and the series of correspondence between the parties. The Court of Appeal arrived at the following conclusions –
(1) The parties did not enter any new contract after the incorporation of the Respondent company in September, 1976.
(2) The letters exchanged between the parties after the incorporation of Respondents in September 1976 cannot be a representation by the Appellants of their intention to be bound.
(3) The Respondent cannot take it upon itself to be bound by the agreement reached in May 1976 as this will amount to a ratification or adoption of such an agreement entered into by the Promoters.
Following these conclusions the Court declined to apply the cases relied upon by the Respondents in support of the contention on equitable estoppel to the facts of this case. All the grounds of appeal, were allowed. The judgment of the trial court was set aside.
Only two grounds of appeal were filed in this Court. The second ground is the general ground which complains of the weight of evidence. The first ground of appeal omitting the particulars which is the real challenge to the judgment states as follows-
“(1) The Court of Appeal misdirected itself in law and on the facts in holding that the subsequent protracted series of conduct of the Defendant/Appellant both before and after incorporation of the Plaintiff through series of correspondence and meetings making specific references to the Agreement of May 1976, with the Plaintiff/Respondent and the Nigeria Bank for Commerce and Industry do not raise an equitable estoppel to render it unconscionable on the part of the Defendant/Appellant to repudiate the contract of sale of the disputed landed property on the ground that the alleged contract of May 1976 was a pre-incorporation contract”
In his brief of argument at p.7, counsel for the Appellant has formulated the question for decision in this appeal, as
” …. whether by virtue of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, in the circumstances of this case, and having regard to the entirety of the evidence adduced before the trial court, a pre-incorporation contract made in May, 1976 between the Defendant/Respondent and the Plaintiff/Appellant prior to the incorporation of the latter could be legally binding between the parties so as to be enforceable at the instance of the now incorporated Plaintiff/Appellant company.”
Chief Sowemimo S.A.N. for the Appellant accepted the propositions of law that a pre-incorporation contract can neither be ratified nor adopted in law on the incorporation of the company on behalf of which the contract was made. A new contract after incorporation on the same terms as the previous one is essential. It was submitted on the authorities that where it would be unconscionable for a party to a pre-incorporation contract to repudiate it after incorporation, equity by virtue of the doctrine of estoppel and justice and fair-play will intervene to prevent that party from repudiating. The cases of
1. Spillers v. Paris Skating Rink Co. (1877-78) 7 Ch.D.368;
2. Touche v. Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Co. (1877) LR. 6 Ch. App. 671
3. Hereford & Southwales Waggon Engineering Co. (1875-76) 2 Ch. D.621;
4. Crabb v. Arum D. C. (1976) 1 Ch. 621;
5. Amalgamated Investment & Property Company Ltd. vs. Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. (1981) 3 All ER.577;
6. Taylor Fashions v. Liverpool Victoria Trustees Company (1981) 1 All ER.897 were all cited and relied upon.
Counsel submitted that the cases of English & Colonial Produce Company Ltd. (1906) 2 Ch.435 at p.442 and Newborne vs. Sensolid (G.B.) Limited (1954) 1 Q. BD. 45 at p.51 relied upon by the Court of Appeal do not support the proposition of law enunciated by the Court. It was submitted that in the English & Colonial Produce Company Ltd. (supra), the issue of ratification or estoppel in relation to a pre-incorporation contract did not arise and that the case cannot be authority for the proposition that in law and in equity pre-incorporation contract did not arise and that the case cannot be authority for the proposition that in law and in equity pre-incorporation contracts are incapable of confirmation or adoption. Counsel distinguished Newborne v. Sensolid (G. B.) Ltd. (supra), from the instant case on the facts because in Newborne’s case, it was only after the action had been instituted that the Plaintiff and their solicitors discovered that the company had not been incorporated at the time of making the contract. The instant case is different in that both parties knew all the time that the company was not yet incorporated at the time of making the contract. He also pointed out that the position in equity of the binding effect, if any, of pre-incorporation contracts was never even canvassed or considered at all.
Counsel referred to Caligara v. Sartori & anor (1961) 1 All NLR Pt.3, 534 and Firgos (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Zelters (Nigeria) Pools Ltd. (1965) where the Court relied on the case of Kelner v. Baxter and submitted that in these cases where the English cases were followed, the courts were not called upon to, and did not consider the position in equity in relation to the enforcement of pre-incorporation contracts.
Counsel for the Appellants relying on the authority of Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Company (1876-77) 2 AC.489; Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. submitted that the sources of the principle contended are in these cases,. The principle is that-
“where both parties knew that at the time of the contract that the company was in process of formation and by their mutual relations and conduct an underlying assumption was established that there was after incorporation, a binding contract between the company and the vendor and the company did rely and act upon that assumption, the court will by the operation of estoppel, prevent the vendor from now coming behind that underlying assumption to deny it, where it would be unconscionable for him to do so.”
Counsel submitted that the principle has been extended from promises to conduct – in Nehanel Freies S.A. v. Et General Grain Company (1970) 1 Lloyds Rep.53. It was also contended that even where the underlying transactions was devoid of legal effect as in the instant case, the doctrine of estoppel can assist a party to succeed on a cause of action on which he would otherwise have failed. Amalgamated Investment v. Texas Commerce (1981) 1 All ER.923, Taylor Fashions v. Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. (1981) 1 All E.R. 897 were cited as supporting that proposition.
Counsel for the Appellant also criticised the findings of fact of the court below and submitted that the findings that there was no agreement between the parties could not be justified on the facts. It was submitted that the Court of Appeal did not have regard to the fact that respondents were at all times namely by May 1976 aware that Appellants were an unincorporated body and dealt with it in that capacity. There was also evidence that the transaction was carried on by them after the incorporation of the Appellant in September, 1976. Counsel referred to the several letters exchanged between the parties and to the evidence of the chairman of the Appellant company. It was urged on us to apply the equitable principle of estoppel against the respondents and to hold “that the protracted series of the conduct of the latter (respondents) before and after incorporation, through the exchanged correspondence raised an estoppel to make it unconscionable for the Defendant/ Respondent to subsequently repudiate the agreement on the ground of non-incorporation of the Plaintiff/Appellant in May 1976.”
In his reply, Chief Rotimi Williams, S.A.N. for the Respondents agreed with the formulation of the issues for determination of counsel for the Appellants, but rejects the proposition that the doctrine of “equitable estoppel” is capable of making the pre-incorporation contract binding and enforceable at the instance of the company after incorporation. In his submission, Chief Williams says that the term “promissory estoppel” is more consistent with Appellant formulation of the proposition, and cites the case of Ajayi v. R. T. Briscoe (1961) 1 W.L.R.J364. It was submitted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel requires for its application the existence of the following preconditions – First, there must exist a legal relationship between the parties. Secondly, the person invoking the doctrine must have acted to his prejudice in reliance on the representation. It was submitted that in this case, the Appellant knew all the facts and cannot be heard to say that he was induced to act to his prejudice. Indeed on the facts no representation was made to the Appellants. The cases of Ogilvie v. West Australian Mortgage & Agency Corporation (1896) AC.587, 592; Tyne Mutual Steamship Insurance Association v. Brown (1916) 85 L.J.K.B. 1408 were cited in support. Chief Williams submitted that Appellants having not pleaded facts capable of supporting a plea of promissory estoppel, it was not a plea available to them. It was further submitted that facts supporting estoppel by conduct were not pleaded by the appellant. Moreover even if it were pleaded and available it cannot be employed to establish appellants case as is being sought to do here. It can only assist Appellant to resist a claim against him.
Chief Williams submitted finally that the cases of Howard v. Patent Ivory Manufacturing Co. (1888) 38 Ch.D.156, Bago Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Clipper Pneumatic Tyre Co. (1901) 1 AC.196; In re Empress Engineering Co. (1880) 1 Ch. D. 125, relied upon by Appellant are all cases where, on the facts, the court was prepared to infer the existence of a fresh contract. They are distinguishable from the instant case where there are no averments in the pleadings from which a fresh contract could on the terms of the one made in May 1976 be inferred.
The above summary of the principal submissions of counsel represent the contentions of counsel in this appeal. It is immediately obvious that Appellants are not in their ingenious but sterile submissions directly challenging the well settled propositions of law that a company cannot before its incorporation enter into any contracts by itself. Also contracts made on its behalf before its incorporation can neither be ratified nor adopted by it after its incorporation. These principles are based on the fundamental principle that only persons, natural or artificial, are capable of entering into legal relations. It follows accordingly that a contract made by, for and or on behalf of a company before its incorporation is a nullity. Counsel for the Appellant accepts these propositions of law as well settled. He however contends that notwithstanding this situation equity will come to the aid of the company to enable it enforce a contract entered into by it or on its behalf, if after its incorporation it will be inequitable to allow the other contracting party resile from the transaction.
A pre-incorporation contract is generally made by the promoters of the company with the intention that such contracts would be ratified or adopted, or otherwise taken over on incorporation. In such a situation a valid contract can be made with the promoter of such company – see Stephen v. Buildco (Nig.) Ltd. (1968) (2) A.L.R. Comm. 242 Kelner v. Baxter (1886) L.R. 2 CP.174. 11 is not a contract made with the company which is in law non-existent – see Stephen v. Buildco (Nig.) Ltd. (1968) 2 A.L.R. Comm.242. Shonibare v. Mansour (1963) LL.R.I; NIPC Ltd. v. Bank of West Africa Ltd. (1962) 1 All NLR.556 Caligara v. Giovanni Sartori & Co. Ltd. (1961) 1 All NLR.534 following Kelner v. Baxter (supra). The result is the same where the promoter or anyone entering into the contract for and on behalf of the unincorporated company purports to do so as if the contract was by the company itself. See Newborne v. Sensolid (Great Britain) Ltd. (1954) 1.Q.B.45. As a company is not liable for pre-incorporation contracts made by it or on its behalf – see Stephen v. Buildco (Nigeria) Ltd. (supra), even where it has derived benefit – see Re English and Colonial Produce Co. Ltd. (1906) 2 Ch. 435, so also can it not enforce a contract made in its name before its incorporation – see Natal Land and Colonisation Co. Ltd. v. Pauline Colliery Syndicate Ltd. (1904) AC. 120 at p.126.
The above principles are applicable to transactions for and on behalf of a company before its incorporation. It is necessary to examine the facts of the case before us to consider whether any of these principles apply. Counsel has conceded that at common law the transaction relied upon does not give rise to any legal right. He however relies on equitable estoppel “to interpose to render such a pre-incorporation contract enforceable through mitigation of strict legal rules”.
What are the facts upon which Appellant relies for this remedy It is admitted that the Appellant company was registered as a company on the 17th September, 1976. – see “Exh. P16”. The negotiation to purchase the Respondents’ property at 222/231 Apapa Road, Lagos was in May 1976, when known to both parties Appellant was in the process of incorporation. It is clear from “Exhibit P1” already reproduced that the completion of the sale was indicated as the first week in July after which time the Respondents considered themselves free to deal with any other interested buyer. Appellants did not comply with this date. Respondents did not enforce the stipulation. It is pertinent to observe that “Exh.P1” was addressed to the Chairman of the Appellant company, which did not at the time exist. Although “Exh.P14”, which prompted the acceptance in “Exh. P1” was signed by M. Fawaz who described himself and signed as Managing Director of the Appellant company, and was addressed to the Chairman of Defendant/Respondent company. The first sentence of the letters reads-
“I am authorised by my co-promoters of the above-named transport company-in-formation to refer to the series of meetings held between your goodself and us to discuss the sale to us of your above described property located along Apapa Road, Lagos.”Thus Mohammed Said Fawaz, Managing Director of Appellant company yet to be incorporated was negotiating with the Respondents company and subject only to the concurrence of Messrs Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries who were the remaining partner and financiers of the proposed Appellant company. This letter “Exh.P14” did not create any legal relationship since the company was non-existent and signed by M. Fawaz purported to have acted as its Managing Director – see Newborne v. Sensolid (G.B.) Ltd. (1954) 1 Q.B. 45. An offer or its acceptance cannot be made to a non-existing person. It is not sufficient to concede that the Respondent company treated Appellant company as a legal entity. Stricto sensu, the transaction culminating in “Exhibits P1 and P14” did not result in a contract; it is a nullity. The Court of Appeal rightly so regarded it. Even if it is conceded as the Appellant contends that the transaction did not end in “Exhibits P1 and P14”, which expressed the transaction before Appellant company was incorporated, and that after the incorporation of the Appellant company on the 17th September, 1976 negotiations continued as before incorporation until Respondent introduced additional conditions in “Exh. P4″ which resulted in its rejection by the chairman of the Appellant Company in Exh. P6”. It is this rejection of “Exh. P4” that has resulted in the present litigation. There is no doubt that the Appellant company after incorporation did not enter into any fresh contract with the respondent company. Both parties would appear to have assumed that the pre-incorporation negotiations or agreement, continued after incorporation. In my view since the pre-incorporation transactions are a nullity, they did not survive after the incorporation. Consequently Appellant company can only rely on such agreements reached in respect of the purchase of the property subject matter of this action after the incorporation of Appellant company on the 17th September, 1976. The erroneous opinion by Appellants that a contract made before the company was incorporated was binding on the company and acting on the erroneous supposition does not render the contract, which is a nullity, binding – see In re Northumberland Avenue Hotel Co. (1886) 32 CBD. 16. There is no evidence before the court to show that after incorporation appellant company intended to enter into a new contract on the same terms and to the same effect as the old one, or that even an entirely new contract which would have been binding was made. – See In re Empress Engineering Co. (1880) 16 Ch.D.125 at p.128. A company after incorporation is an entirely new creature. All the evidence and the pleadings of the Appellants in this case are directed towards establishing that Appellants relied on the validity of the contract in “Exhibits P1 and P14”, because they believed in it, and never intended after the incorporation of Appellant company to enter into another contract whether on the same or different terms. It is in such circumstance impossible to infer the existence of a contract not contemplated by or compatible with the conduct of the parties – see In re Northumberland Avenue Hotel Company (1886) 32 Ch. D. at p.21. See Edokpolo’s Co. Ltd. v. Sem. EdoWire Industries Ltd. (1984) 7 Sc. 119 at p.89.
The Respondents were therefore perfectly right to have denied in their pleadings the existence of any contract between Appellants and themselves, and that at the time of the alleged contract in May 1976, Appellants were not in existence.
Counsel for the Appellants faced with the authority of these well settled principles in support of the position taken by the Respondents has resorted to equity for assistance. In the view of Counsel for Appellants’ it will be unconscionable for Respondents after treating Appellants as a person and entering into contract with them, to contend that because the contract was entered before Appellant was incorporated, no contract existed.
It is vital to appreciate that in other to call in aid the application of the principles of equity; the person invoking the equity must be a party to the transaction. There must be in existence a contract or such like relationship – see Canadian Pacific Railway Co.- v. The King (1931) AC. 409 Lala BeniRam v. Kundun Hall L.R. 26 A.A. 58. This is because equity does not come to the aid of a volunteer. The question now is whether in the circumstances of this case equity will come to the aid of the company after incorporation to enable it enforce a contract made before its incorporation. Chief Sowemimo, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants relying on these cases which suggest that a person should be entitled to payment for work done for and on behalf of an unincorporated company, if after incorporation the company takes the benefit of such work, has contended that the expanding rule of equitable estoppel is sufficient to provide a remedy. It is again pertinent to point out that Appellant relies on “Exh. P14” for the estoppel to support the claim. This is a letter written by Respondents to a non-existent person. Who is now relying on the equity It seems clearly the incorporated company, for a transaction when it was not in existence. All the authorities and common sense are against it.
I agree with the submission of Chief Williams for the respondents that the term equitable estoppel employed by counsel for the Appellant is inaccurate and inappropriate to describe the circumstances relied upon by Appellants in this case. The term equitable estoppel is now used to refer inclusively to both proprietary estoppel and promissory estoppel – see Megarry J., in Re Vandervell’s Trusts, White v. Vandervell Trustees, Ltd. (1974) Ch. 269 at pp.300-310. There is now high judicial authority and substantial judicial support for describing the doctrine whatever its content as one of “promissory estoppel” – see Ajayi v. R. T. Briscoe (Nig) Ltd. (1964) 3 ALL ER. 556 Woodhouse A.C. Israel Cocoa, Ltd. S.A. v. Nigerian Produce Marketing Co. Ltd. (1972) 2 ALL ER. 271 at p. 282. Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd. (in Liquidation) v. Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. (1981) 3 ALL ER 577,584 W.J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nosr Export and Import Co. (1972) 2 ALL ER. 127.
The promissory estoppel popularised by Denning J. in the Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. (1947) K.B. 130 and adapted from the dictum of Lord Cairns in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railways Co. (1977) 2 App. Cas. at p. 448 would appear to be an extension of the principle in Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 H.L. Cos. 185 (though not cited or referred to by the Court) where it was held that estoppel could operate only on a misrepresentation of an existing fact. In stating the principles which is the origin of promissory estoppel, Lord Cairns said that-
“it could not be argued, that there was any right of a Court of Equity, or any practice of a Court of Equity to give relief in cases of this kind, by way of mercy, or by way merely of saving property from forfeiture ….. ” and proceeded to state the principles as follows –
” ….. but it is the first principle upon which all Courts of Equity proceed, that if parties who have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal results – certain penalties or legal forfeiture – afterwards by their own act or with their own consent enter upon a course of negotiation which has the effect of leading one of the parties to suppose that the strict rights arising under the contract will not be enforced, or will be kept in suspense, or held in abeyance, the person who otherwise would have enforced these rights will not be allowed to enforce them where it would be inequitable having regard to the dealings which have thus taken place between the parties”.
These principles follow from the facts of the case where there existed between the parties the legal relationship of landlord and tenant. the obligation to repair resulting in forfeiture on failure to do so arose after the six months notice was given. During the pendency of the notice, the parties commenced negotiation to purchase the property subject matter of the tenancy. This continued for some months. The repairs were suspended during the negotiations. Meanwhile the notice to repair was running. The negotiations to purchase broke down, and appellant then resumed its obligation to repair. Respondent on the expiration of the notice proceeded to apply for forfeiture, which was granted. Appellant applied for a stay of execution and was refused. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal which reversed the decision and stayed the execution. The tenant then appealed to the House of Lords where Cairns laid down the principles quoted above. It is these principles that were extended by Denning J., as he then was in the Central London Properties Ltd. v. High Trees House (1947) K.B. 130. Denning J. in the process of formulating the principles recognised that there have been earlier cases described as cases of estoppel which really are not such cases. He referred to Fenner v. Blake (1900) 1 Q.B. 406 In re Wickham (1917) 34 T.L.R 158; Re William Porter & Co. Ltd. (1937) 2 ALL ER. 361 and Buttery v. Pickard (1946) WN. 25. He said, at p.134.
“They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted upon by the person to whom it was made, and which was in fact so acted on.”
He concluded,
“As I have said, they are not cases of estoppel in the strict sense. They are really promises – promises intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and in fact acted on. ”
It is from these statements that the principles arose that where a person makes to another a clear and unambiguous representation of fact intending that it should be acted on, and is relied upon by that other person the person making the representation is estopped from denying the truth of the representation. Denning L.J. restated the principles clearly and explained it further in Combe v. Combe (1951) 2 K.B. 215 at p. 220. The principle has been extended from actual promise or assurance in High Trees to cases of conduct in Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenhaim (1950) 1 K.B. 616; Axioni v. Davidsons (Manchester) Ltd. (1952) 1 Llyods Rep. 527. In Combe v. Combe (supra) Denning L.J. further explained the principle thus, at p. 220
“The principle, as I understand it, is that, where one party has by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations even though it is not supported in point of law by any consideration but only by his word.”
Although too widely stated, there has been support of the essential elements in subsequent cases. The courts have been urged to proceed with caution particularly in commercial transactions and to avoid creating rights through mere acts of indulgence – see Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Tungsten Electric Co. Ltd. (1955) 1 WLR. 761 at p. 764 per Lord Scarman. The following essential requirements would seem to me required for the application of the doctrine. Firstly, there must be in existence, two contracting parties, who are contractually bound or who but for the representation could have been contractually bound. – see Evenden v. Guildford Football Club (1975) 1 Q.B. 917. Secondly there must be a representation, relied upon resulting in something different from what was agreed between the parties – see Ajayi v. R. T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd. (supra); W.J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co. (1972) 2 ALL ER. 127. It is not necessary that there should be detriment in the sense of loss or damage. Thirdly, the representation is not necessarily supported by valuable consideration. It is sufficient merely if it is a promise which has been relied upon. If these conditions are present the doctrine of promissory estoppel operates. But in Ajayi v. R. T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd. (supra) Lord Hodson had stated the following qualifications, namely,
“(a) that the other party has altered his position;
(b) that the promissor can resile from his promise on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promise a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position; the promise only becomes final and irrevocable if the promise cannot resume his position.” It is clear from the principles stated above, that the effect of the operation of the equity where applicable is to prevent the promissor from insisting on his strict legal rights because it will be inequitable for him to do so. And as has been pointed out in the High Trees case and subsequent cases, the principle never stands alone as giving a cause of action in itself. In Combe v. Combe, (supra) Denning L.J. expressed it unequivocally when he said-
“The principle stated in the High Trees case … does not create new cause of action where none existed before. It only prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal rights, when it would be unjust to allow them to enforce them, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties … ”
How then does the Appellant fare in the application of these principles Appellant is not a party to the transactions relied upon for the application of the doctrine not being a person at the time. He is therefore not a contracting party or a person in a similar situation who can be contractually bound, to who any representation has been made. Furthermore there was no evidence that any representation has been made. Furthermore, there was no evidence that any representation was made to appellant who in reliance altered his position. This is because the contract in issue related to the pre-incorporation period. I therefore agree with the submissions of Chief Williams learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent that the Court of Appeal was right to hold that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable to the facts of this case.
It was submitted by counsel for the Appellants that the Court of Appeal was wrong in finding that the exhibits and letters exchanged between the parties did not constitute a representation to the Plaintiff/Appellant by the defendant/Respondent. The cases of Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129 and Crabb v. Arun D. C. (1976) 1 Ch. 179 were cited for the proposition that all that is required “is an expectation, created or encouraged”.
As I have consistently pointed out, in this judgment, Plaintiff/Appellant was not in existence in May 1976 when “Exhibits P1” and “P14” relied upon as the contract were admittedly purportedly concluded. Again this so-called contract for the purchase of 222/231 Apapa Road, was never the subject matter of a fresh agreement between Plaintiff/Appellant and Defendant/Respondent after incorporation of the former on the 17th September, 1976. It therefore follows that there was no contract in respect of which any representation could be made as between the parties. Equity cannot therefore be invoked where there is a legal right the reliance upon which is not unconscionable.
Counsel for the Appellant relied on the authority of those cases where the courts have decided to grant the claims of promoters of companies, made before incorporation, on the ground that after incorporation the Companies derived benefits from the services of such persons. Re Hereford and South-wales Waggon & Engineering Co. (1876) 2 Ch. D. 621 relied upon was explained in In re English & Colonial Produce Company Ltd. (1906) 2 Ch. 435 where Romer L.J., pointed out that there is no such equity. After stating that where a claim cannot be made on legal grounds either by the claimant or someone else who stands in his shoes, a claim on what are called equitable grounds cannot be established. He went on to say, at p. 442-
“The idea that a company merely because it has obtained the advantage of the solicitor’s work done before the formation of the company is liable in equity for the costs of that work appears to me to be wholly untenable. In my opinion, there is no such equity, and any claim based upon it ought to fail.”
Fletcher Moulton L .J. also agreed with this proposition. In re Rotherham Alum and Chemical Company (1883) 5 Ch.D. at pp. 108, 111, Cotton, Lindley, Fry L .J denied the existence of such equity. It is clear however then in those cases where payments have been made for work done as in In re English & Colonial Produce Co. Ltd. (1906) 2 Ch. 435, the company was under a statutory liability after incorporation to pay for the registration fees, consequently it was held applicant was entitled to recover. Spiller v. Paris C Skating Rink Co. (1877-78) 7 Ch.D. 368 and Touche v. Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Company (1871) 6 L.R. Ch. App. 671, which are cases on the adoption or ratification of pre-incorporation contracts have since been disapproved in subsequent cases.
I do not think that in this case, counsel is seriously contending that Appellant is entitled to the claim for specific performance or damages on the grounds that Appellant has performed any services in respect of which it will be inequitable to deny him remuneration by the Respondents’ strict reliance on his legal rights. On examination of the facts of the cases relied upon, the claim has always been brought against a company after incorporation in respect of services rendered before incorporation. There has been no cases of a company claiming to enforce a pre-incorporation contract made on its behalf. The equity relied upon by the Appellant is one available for the protection of the company. It is described as a shield, and not a sword. As was pointed out by Denning L.J. in Combe v. Combe, (supra)
“The principle stated in the High Trees case …. does not create new causes of action where none existed before. It only prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal rights, when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce either having regard to the dealings which have taken place between them … ”
He went on to say:
“It may be a part of a cause of action, not a cause of action itself.” Counsel for the appellant nevertheless relies on the pronouncement in Crabb v. Arun D.C. (1976) 1 Ch. 179, that “The new rights, and interests, so created by estoppel in or over land, will be protected by the courts and in this way give rise to a cause of action … ” to submit that Appellant has a cause of action. Denning M.R. was here speaking of what he called proprietary estoppel which in his opinion does give rise in appropriate cases to a cause of action – see also Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings (1975) 3 ALL ER. 311. This is quite different from the instant case where Appellant has failed to establish the existence of any equity, and moreso as he failed to show that he was at the time in question a person capable of creating rights and/or duties. It would in my opinion if allowed be an extraordinary extension of the principles of equity to hold that acts which are nullities in law are capable of creating equitable claims in favour of the offending party. The facts of this case do not in any sense fit into the preconditions for the exercise of the court’s equity jurisdiction. The circumstances of this case are entirely negative – see Plimmer v. Mayor & Wellington (1884) 9 App Cas. 699 at p. 713.
For the reasons I have given in this judgment, both grounds of appeal fail and are dismissed.
Appellants will pay costs assessed at N300 to the Respondents.
KAWU, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother, Eso, J.S.C., which has just been delivered. I entirely agree with his reasons and conclusions therein, and for the reasons expressed in the said judgment, I too would dismiss the appeal.
The Appellant Company could not have legally entered into an agreement with the Respondents in May, 1976 as it was not yet a legal entity at that time. There is also no evidence that after its incorporation on the 17th September, 1977, it entered into any fresh contract with the Respondents.
The appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed with N300.00 costs to the Respondents.
Appeal Dismissed.
Appearances
Chief S. A. Sowemimo (SAN) with him Mr. Femi Lijadu and Mr. Segun Akin-Olugbade For Appellant
AND
Chief F.R.A. Williams (S.A.N.) with him O. A. Fani-KayodeJnr. For Respondent



