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OBI IZEDIUNO EZEWANI V. OBI NKADI ONWORDI & ORS.(1986)

OBI IZEDIUNO EZEWANI V. OBI NKADI ONWORDI & ORS.

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 27th day of June, 1986

SC.32/1985

 

JUSTICES

ANDREW OTUTU OBASEKI    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

ANTHONY NNAEMEZIE ANIAGOLU    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AUGUSTINE NNAMANI    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

BOONYAMIN OLADIRAN KAZEEM    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

CHUKWUDIFU AKUNNE OPUTA    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

 

OBI IZEDIUNO EZEWANI,
THE OBI OF OGWASHI-UKWU
(For Himself and on Behalf of the People of OGWASHI-UKWU)  Appellant(s)

AND

  1. OBI NKADI ONWORDI
    2. OBI KEONWEA NZEKEA
    3. OBI ODOGWU NWANDUBE
    4. MR. OKONUE OBANYE
    (For Themselves and on Behalf
    of OGBE-OWELE and Three Other
    Quarters of IBUSA) Respondent(s)

RATIO

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES OF “CAUSE OF ACTION ESTOPPEL” AND “ISSUE ESTOPPEL”

The issue had already been decided in the 1962 cases; and it had become an issue estoppel as pointed out by Idigbe, J.S.C. in Samuel Fadiora & Anor. v. Festus Gbadebo & Anor. (1978) 3 S.C. 219. In that case the learned Justice of the Supreme Court while discussing the differences between the principles of “cause of action estoppel” and “issue estoppel” as estoppel by record inter partes, had these to say at pages 228 to 229:-
“Now, there are two kinds of estoppel by record inter partes or per rem judicatam, as it is generally known. The first is usually referred to as “cause of action estoppel’ and it occurs where the cause of action is merged in the judgment, that is, Transit in rem judicatam (See King v. Hoare (1844) 13 M & W495 at 504). Therefore, on this principle of law (or rule of evidence) once it appears that the same cause of action was held to lie (or not to lie) in a final judgment between the same parties, or their privies, who are litigating in the same capacity (and on the same subject matter), there is an end of the matter. They are precluded from relitigating the same cause of action. There is, however, a second kind of estoppel inter partes and this usually occurs where an issue has earlier on been adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction and the same issue comes incidentally in question in any subsequent proceedings between the same parties (or their privies); in these circumstances, “issue estoppel” arises. This is based on the principle of law that a party is not allowed to (i.e. he is precluded from) contending the contrary or opposite of any specific point which having been once distinctly put in issue, has with certainty and solemnity been determined against him. (See Outram v. Morewood (1803) 3 East 346). Issue estoppel applies whether the point involved in the earlier decision is one of fact or law or one of mixed fact and law. However, for the principle to apply, in any given proceedings, all the pre-conditions to a valid plea of estoppel inter partes or per rem judicatam must apply, that, (1) the same question must be for decision in both proceedings (which means, that the question for decision in the current suit must have been decided in the earlier proceeding), (2) the decision relied upon to support the plea of issue estoppel must be final (3) the parties must be the same (which means that parties involved in both proceedings must be the same) (per se or by their privies).” PER KAZEEM, J.S.C.

WHETHER OR NOT IT IS SUFFICIENT FOR THE PLEADER TO STATE THE MATERIAL FACTS.

It is sufficient for the pleader to state the material facts. He need not state and is riot bound to state the legal result. If his bubbling mind leads him to do so he is not bound or limited to what he has stated. Any legal consequence of which the facts admit can be presented in the argument. See Re Vandervell’s Trusts (1974) 3 WLR. 256, per lord Denning, MR. at p.264. PER OBASEKI, J.S.C.

THE ISSUE OF BOUNDARY AND TRADITIONAL HISTORY

The issue of boundary and the issue of traditional history of the founding of the settlement having been previously determined in the suits pleaded the plea of issue estoppel become available.
See:
Yaw Duedu v. Evi Yiboe (1961) 1 WLR. 1040
Amos Ogbesusi Aro v. Salami Fabolude (1983) 2 Sc. 75 at 76-78, 95, 98-99.
Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v. VIO Exportchled (1966) 1 Q.B. 630 at
640 per Lord Denning, MR. and at 642 per Diplock, L.J.
Y. A. Lawai v. Chief Yakubu Dawodu and Another (1972) 1 All NLR (Part 2) 270 at 282.;
Cole v. Sanyaolu (1976) 9-10 Sc. 203 at 217-218. PER OBASEKI, J.S.C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE APEAL COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT

In deciding this appeal it is well worth remembering that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal have found, on the issues of fact in the case placed before them, against the people of Ogwashi-Ukwu (the appellants) and in favour of the people of Ibusa (the respondents), and consistent with the practice of this Court, as decided in several authorities over the years, such concurrent findings are usually not disturbed by this Court except there be weighty reason for so doing (see the recent cases of LAMAI v. CHIEF ORBIH (1980) 5-7 S.C. 28; MOGO CHlNWENDU v. MBAMALI (1980) D 3-4 S.C. 31).
This well known practice is now embodied in the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1985, in ORDER 2 RULE 33 thereof which provides that:
“Where, in an appeal to the Court from the Court below, the Court below has affirmed the findings of fact of the Court of first instance, any application to the Court in pursuance of its jurisdiction under 213(3) of the Constitution for leave to appeal shall be granted only in exceptional circumstances.” PER ANIAGOLU, J.S.C.

WHETHER OR NOT TRADITIONAL HISTORY IS TO BE SPECIFICALLY PLEADED

Generally speaking, all relevant facts are to be pleaded and if the traditional history of a party to an action is a relevant fact, then that history ought to be specifically pleaded. Failure to so plead will render any evidence of such facts not pleaded inadmissible. The trial Judge is bound to expunge such evidence from the record when considering his judgment. See George & Ors. v. Dominion Flour Mills Ltd. (1963) 1 All N.L.R. 71 at p.77: See also Aniemeka Emegokwue v. James Okadigbo (1973) 4 S.C. 113 at p.117. PER OPUTA, J.S.C.

KAZEEM, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The land dispute between the people of Ibusa and the people of Ogwashi-Ukwu both of Bendel State, which gave rise to this appeal, apparently began in 1962. It is therefore important as background to this appeal, to take a look at what happened at that time. In that year, both parties sued themselves over the same land; and those Suits – Nos B/44/62, B/46/62 and B/47/62 – (hereinafter called the “1962 case”), were subsequently consolidated for trial. In two of those Suits, the Ogwashi- Ukwu people as plaintiffs claimed declaration of title, damages for trespass and perpetual injunction over the same farmland which they called Odonkwo land. But at that time, the Ibusa people as defendants did not counter-claim for any declaration of title to the land in dispute. In both their pleadings and the evidence adduced at the trial of the 1962 cases, both parties, relied heavily on their traditional histories. The trial Judge therefore at the conclusion of the trial disbelieved the traditional history of the Ogwashi-Ukwu people and said inter-alia that he was inclined to lean to the view that the grains-of truth in the traditional history (of the Ogwashi-Ukwu people) appeared to have lost their lustre with the passage of time. (See page 118 lines 21-24 of Exh. F.). On the other hand, he believed the evidence led on the traditional history of the Ibusa people and said: “I must say that I am impressed by the Traditional history (of the Ibusa people) which rings true”. (See page 121 lines 4-7 of Exh. F.).
In the result, the Ogwashi-Ukwu people lost their case both at the High Court; and on appeal to the Supreme Court. However, since the Ibusa people did not counter-claim for a declaration of title to the land in dispute, none was declared in their favour. Consequently in 1966, the Ibusa people as plaintiffs took out a fresh action against the Ogwashi- Ukwu people as defendants on the same land in these terms:-
“(a) A declaration that the boundary between the plaintiffs of Ibusa and the defendant of Ogwashi-Uku is at Ubu Stream and in accordance with the boundary as represented on Plan NWC/102/70 by life trees on the North-West of the land in dispute and verged GREEN on the said plan.
(b) A declaration of title to the piece and parcel of land known as Ani Umuezemesa and comprising other smaller portions of land as shown in the plaintiffs’ plan and verged GREEN on the said plan.
(c) 300 for trespass to the plaintiffs land known as “Ani Ezemesa” of smaller parcels known and called Ibulu-Ibu, Adagba, Oloki, Etekuehe, Alagbo Elue and Akwu Ukwa.
(d) Injunction to restrain the defendant, his servants and/or agents from further acts of trespass or interference with the plaintiffs’ possession, ownership, use and enjoyment of the said land.”
In their Amended Statement of Claim the plaintiffs pleaded the boundaries of their land and the acts of ownership exercised thereon in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 thereof; but they did not specifically plead their traditional history therein. Rather, they pleaded the facts and findings of the proceedings and judgment of the 1962 Cases in paragraphs 7 and 10 thereof.
It is significant that in their own Amended Statement of Defence the defendants pleaded in paragraphs 16 – 23 thereof another traditional history different from the one relied upon in the 1962 cases. Moreover, they denied that they were parties to those cases.
Finally, they also joined issues with the plaintiffs on the ownership of the land in dispute in paragraph 12 of their Amended Statement of Defence.
At the trial, the plaintiffs on the one hand testified substantially in support of the averments in their Amended Statement of Claim and tendered the proceedings and judgment in the 1962 Cases as Exh. F. Even though they did not specifically plead afresh their traditional history, the 1st Plaintiff – Obi Nkadi Onwardi – in answer to questions under cross-examination confirmed that he was a party to the 1962 Cases, and also gave their own traditional history. He said:-
“I was a party in Suits Nos. 8/44/62; 8/46/62 and 8/47/62. I was the plaintiff in those cases. I know that towns like Asaba, Ibusa and Ogwashi-Uku were founded by one person at a time. Ogwashi-Uku was founded by a man called Odaigbo. I knew how he came to Ogwashi-Uku.
Ezemese kept Ogwashi-Uku people where they now live. We were first people to settle in that area and Ezemese gave Ogwashi people the land they now occupy. He showed them the boundary. Ogwashi came from Nshi and Ezemese came from Isu, in Anambra State.
They were neighbours in their places of origin.
Umejei founded Ibusa; he was a prince of Isu who came to Ibusa to settle. It was Umejei who came before Odaigbo; and Umejei’s children had in fact established the quarters at Ibusa before Odaigbo and Edini came at the same time. The spiritual head of Ibusa is the Senior Diokpa although there are ten Diokpas at Ibusa Ogboli was never called Ogboli-Ogwashi; the people in that quarter at Ibusa are known as Ogboli-Nshi. Ogboli came from Nshi which was the home place of Odaigbo. They came to meet the descendants of Umejei on the land.”
The defendants on the other hand, also testified in support of the averments in their Amended Statement of Defence. Of significant importance was the evidence of D.W.6 – Justus Dikede Mordi, the Ihaza (Chief) of Ogwashi-Ukwu – who was the defendants’ star witness. He not only testified about the defendant’s new traditional history; but he also gave evidence in support of their claim. But under cross-examination, he made the following admissions:-
“I remember that in 1962 Ogwashi-Uku people sued Ibusa and the latter counterclaimed against Ogwashi- Uku people and three cases, Suits Nos. B/44/62, B/46/62 and B/47/62 were consolidated. Our plans in those cases were prepared by late Mr. George Obianwu – a Licensed Surveyor. That plan is Exhibit ‘J’ in this case. In the consolidated cases the Obi of Ogwashi-Uku gave evidence. The Obi would only know some Ogwashi-Uku Traditional history. OgwashiUku people lost those cases. We appealed to the Supreme Court and lost. When late Mr. George Obianwu was preparing our plan, we showed him everything he should put on the plan.”
Furthermore the Defendant – Obi Izediuno Ezewani I, the Obi of Ogwashi-Uku-also testified in support of the defendants’ claims and made admissions as follows:-
“I know Chief J.D. Mordi (6th D.W.); he is one of my Chiefs. He is in charge of Odonkwu land; he is also in charge of Ogbakwu quarter. He supervises the tenants in Odonkwu area; he is the Ihaza of Ogwashi-Uku. Odonkwu land is in the bush in Ogbankwu area.
I have been on the throne since 1934. I was born on 12th November 1906. Today is my Birthday.
I know the plaintiffs; they are from Ibusa. The people of Ibusa used to bring yams to me through D.W. 6 when they farmed on my land; they also brought Palm-wine, fish and Kola-nuts. They stopped bringing tributes to me in 1946.
XXD BY BALONWU: In 1962 I sued the people of Ibusa over this land in Suit No.B/44/62 and B/46/62. They also sued me in Suit No., B/46/62. I gave evidence in those cases which were consolidated. I gave evidence on the traditional history of our people. It is the Ihaza who tells me everything about the land.”
It is thus clear from the evidence adduced at the trial that the defendants were aware of the traditional history relied upon in support of the plaintiffs’ claims (which was the same one used in the 1962 Cases); and inspite of their denial, it became crystal clear that they were parties to the 1962 Cases which were in respect of disputes on ownership to the same land, between the same parties.
The learned trial Judge after considering the evidence adduced by both parties and the addresses of learned counsel came to the following conclusions;-
(a) On the question of proof of boundaries, the learned trial Judge having reviewed and considered the evidence adduced by both parties, believed those of the plaintiffs while he disbelieved the testimonies of the defendants. Particularly, he contradictions between the evidence of D.W.1- Udeh Iwenofu- and D.W. 6 – Justus Mordi – on that issue, and concluded thus:
“I have set out fully the evidence of these two defence witnesses in order to expose the contradictions in their evidence with regard to the boundary features on their land, bearing in mind the nature of the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs in this action. It was difficult to know the land which Chief Mordi was describing, and in any case it could not be the land claimed by the plaintiffs. I can also not see how the land in the imagination of Udeh Iwenofu (D.W.1) agreed with that of the Ihaza of Ogwashi-Uku, who I am told was the Chief in-charge of Odonkwu land. It is sufficient to conclude this portion of the judgment by finding and holding that I do not believe the evidence of these two witnesses with regard to their boundary evidence. Even their tenant, Jeremiah Okeke (D.W.5) righteously confessed ignorance of the boundaries of Odonkwo land. I am fortified in the view I have taken of the falsity of their evidence as it had no tangible bearing on the plans produced by them either in this or other cases against Ibusa people. I am far more convinced by the direct evidence of boundary given by the plaintiffs and which was borne out of their witnesses with regard to the entire area of Ani-Umuezemesa land of Ibusa than the unestablished area claimed by the defendant.”
(b) On the issue of traditional history, the learned trial Judge also after considering the evidence of traditional history led by both parties at both the 1962 Cases and in this case came to the following conclusions:-
“Again, Iam far more impressed with the traditional evidence of Ibusa people than that of the defendant, and at no time could Umejei and his wife be slaves of anybody, needless to say of Adaigbo who owned no slaves. Although traditional evidence is of oral nature, there is no fundamental basis or available material for the view held by Ogwashi-Uku people about their closest neighbours, the Ibusa Community. What strikes me as rather strange is that although the people of Ogboli Quarter are their blood relations nobody from that quarter came to Court to testify for the defendant. That in my opinion, could not be said to be favourable to Ogwashi-Uku people.
Further, I am not convinced at all that there was any time the plaintiffs as a people, took tributes to the Obi of Ogwashi-Uku for farming on the lalter’s land. It could be possible that a few Ibusa men who went beyond the boundary line did so, but that could not be held that the plaintiffs had thereby become tenants of the defendant’s community. That evidence was invented but it was always rejected in all the cases between the two Communities. This shows that the defendant’s Community desperately invented materials to support a non-existent claim to Ibusa land. ”
(c) The learned trial Judge also considered the effect of the judgment in the 1962 Cases in which the defendants lost to the plaintiffs up to the Supreme Court; (See Exh. F) and he observed that the judgment estopped the defendants from relitigating the issues of traditional history as well as ownership of the same land in dispute between the same parties. Then he said:-
“Independent of my own findings in this case, and having regard to the fact that Odugba or Odonkwo land formed part of the areas of land in dispute in this case, I cannot see how it is possible to set aside those findings in Exh. ‘F’ which were fully supported by evidence and which evidence was similarly canvassed and accepted by me in the instant case”
And finally he dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for trespass, but gave judgment for them for the declarations sought as well as for an injunction.
I have gone to this length in setting down the issues decided by the learned trial Judge in order to show that he did not decide the case between the parties on the issue of traditional history alone; but he also considered the preponderance of evidence led by the parties for the proofs of boundaries and act of possession and ownership.
The defendants thereafter appealed against that decision to the Court of Appeal in Benin City; but the appeal was equally dismissed. The judgment of the trial court was therefore affirmed.
Against that judgment, the defendants (hereinafter referred to as the Appellants) have appealed to this court on the following grounds:-
“1. The learned Judges misdirected in law themselves in holding that the plaintiff/Respondents pleaded traditional history by mere reference in their statement of claim to the judgment and record of proceedings in an earlier case.
Particulars:
The doctrine of incorporation by reference is alien to pleadings in that it defeats the main purpose of pleadings – namely to set before the court and the parties, on the face of the pleadings, grounds and facts upon which the claim or defence is based.
Misdirected (sic) in Law:
The Court of Appeal misdirected itself in law holding that the complaints of the Appellants against the judgment of the learned trial Judge on the issue of traditional evidence was irrelevant and that the traditional evidence was properly raised by the pleadings of the Respondents when:-
(i) the plaintiff/Respondents had in fact led oral evidence on their traditional evidence without having pleaded the same;
(ii) the learned trial Judge had in fact made findings of fact on the traditional evidence independently of the judgments as pleaded as res judicata:
(iii) plea in respect of traditional evidence not placed on Record in the present suit cannot be deemed to have been incorporated by reference to the consolidated suits merely because traditional evidence was given by both parties in those consolidated suits.
3. The learned Judges of the Court of Appeal misdirected themselves in holding that “the judgment of the learned trial Judge has not been faulted” whereas:-
(1) the learned trial Judge merely based his judgment on evidence in earlier decisions on the issue of traditional history but failed to consider the lack of evidence by the plaintiff/Respondents to establish their continued ownership of the land in dispute. as if evidence of traditional history alone was sufficient to discharge the burden on the plaintiff/Respondents,
(2) the learned trial Judge failed to consider the judgment of the Warri High Court in Suit No. AW/6/1935 between the plaintiff/Respondents and the Defendant/Appellant, which was confirmed by the West African Court of Appeal on the 13th day of January, 1937 wherein the plaintiff/Respondents failed to maintain an action against the Defendant/Appellant for declaration of title to the same piece of land “Odonkwo”,
The plaintiffs will also hereinafter be referred to as the Respondents.
Emanating from ground 1 (the only one argued), the following issues are relevant for determination in this appeal namely:
(i) Did the respondents plead their traditional history in this action
(ii) If the traditional history was not pleaded, was the trial court entitled to consider it and give judgment on the basis of the evidence led on traditional history by the respondents merely because it had been considered in a previous Suit between the parties
(iii) Was the action decided by the trial court on other grounds apart from proof of traditional evidence
Mr. G. O. K. Ajayi S.A.N, learned counsel for the appellants said that the respondents failed to plead their traditional history in this case; but they merely averred in paragraph 10 of their Amended Statement of Claim that they would rely on the findings of fact on the traditional history pleaded in the 1962 cases, mentioned in paragraph 7 thereof. He then submitted that because of that, any evidence led and based on that traditional history, including those given by the 1st respondent under cross-examination, went to no issue. Consequently, he argued that the learned trial Judge was in error to have considered the traditional history of the respondents, and to have made findings upon them to the detriment of the appellants. Furthermore, Mr. Ajayi contended that, if the respondents were raising the issue of traditional history in the 1962 Cases as “issue estoppel” which could have estopped the appellant from raising it anew in this case, they should have specifically pleaded it as such. He further submitted that since they failed to plead specifically the facts upon which that issue estoppel could be raised, the learned trial Judge should not on any account, have held that the issues of traditional history between the parties have been settled in the 1962 cases. Finally, Mr. Ajayi submitted that since the learned trial Judge made copious findings on the traditional history given in the 1962 Cases which were adverse to the appellants; and those findings were confirmed by the Court of Appeal, there had been grave misdirection on the facts by those two Courts. He therefore urged this Court to allow the appeal. In reply, Chief F.R.A. Williams (S.A.N.), learned Counsel for the respondents, first observed that the appeal before this court is one against the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Hence, this Court should primarily be concerned with the judgment of that Court. He then drew attention to the basis of the decision of that Court at page 152 lines 10 to 33 of the Record which concentrated on “issue estoppel” on the question of traditional history pleaded and decided in the 1962 cases. Chief Williams therefore submitted that the effect of that finding of the Court of Appeal was that both parties were wrong in giving evidence again on traditional history; and in trying to relitigate the issue which had already been decided. He pointed out that the respondents had pleaded in paragraphs 7 and 10 of their Amended Statement of Claim the facts and findings on the question of traditional history as decided in the 1962 Cases; and that they were relying on those facts and findings. After citing the decision of this Court in Mogo Chinwendu v. Nwanegbo Mbamali and Another (1980) 3-4 S.C. 31, Chief Williams finally submitted that once it was pleaded in this case that there were judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court on the issue of traditional history which was a matter of facts and not evidence, the appellants were estopped from relitigating the question in this case. He then urged the court to dismiss the appeal.
In summarising the submissions of learned counsel for both parties, it seems to me that the gravamen of Mr. Ajayi’s complaint is that the respondents did not plead their traditional history in this case; nor did they even plead it specifically as an “issue estoppel; and that since they failed to do so, the learned trial Judge and indeed the Court of Appeal erred to have considered it, let alone to have made findings of facts on it adverse to the appellants.
However, Chief Williams’ contention was that the respondents need only plead facts and not evidence; and that since they had pleaded the facts and findings of the judgments of the 1962 Cases, which had decided the issue of traditional history against the appellants, they (the appellants) were estopped from relitigating that issue in this case. What then is the position of the matter
Even though the appellants denied being a party to the 1962 cases, their witnesses – D.W. 6 and the Defendant admitted that they were; and that the decision in the cases went against the appellants. It was also not in dispute that in the 1962 cases, both parties contested the issue of ownership of the land in dispute; and relied heavily on their traditional histories to prove it. All those facts were pleaded by the respondent in paragraphs 7 and 10 of their Amended Statement of Claim as follows:-
“7. Sometime in 1962 the defendant claimed portions of the land in dispute and brought action in Suits B/44/62 and B/47/62. The plaintiffs sued the defendant in B/46/62 for some portions of the land in dispute. The three suits were consolidated and tried in the High Court at Asaba. The defendant lost and appealed to the Supreme Court and his appeal was dismissed, the plaintiffs will rely on the judgment and the record of proceedings of the above suits and the F.S.C. Judgment SC.272/1966.”
10. In the consolidated suits both the plaintiffs and the defendant gave and relied on their traditional history. The learned trial Judge found as a fact that Ubu stream is the natural boundary between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The plaintiffs will rely on these findings of facts.”
And as I have said elsewhere in this judgment the appellants admitted the facts of those judgments which decided the issue of traditional evidence against them. Indeed the learned trial Judge in the 1962 cases, said:
“I find it extremely difficult to reconcile the plaintiffs’ (that is, the Ogwashi-Uku people’s) traditional history with the truth and I disbelieve it.” (see page 110 lines 27-28 of Exh. F).
Having regard to those circumstances it was therefore unnecessary to plead afresh the traditional history of the respondents. The issue had already been decided in the 1962 cases; and it had become an issue estoppel as pointed out by Idigbe, J.S.C. in Samuel Fadiora & Anor. v. Festus Gbadebo & Anor. (1978) 3 S.C. 219. In that case the learned Justice of the Supreme Court while discussing the differences between the principles of “cause of action estoppel” and “issue estoppel” as estoppel by record inter partes, had these to say at pages 228 to 229:-
“Now, there are two kinds of estoppel by record inter partes or per rem judicatam, as it is generally known. The first is usually referred to as “cause of action estoppel’ and it occurs where the cause of action is merged in the judgment, that is, Transit in rem judicatam (See King v. Hoare (1844) 13 M & W495 at 504). Therefore, on this principle of law (or rule of evidence) once it appears that the same cause of action was held to lie (or not to lie) in a final judgment between the same parties, or their privies, who are litigating in the same capacity (and on the same subject matter), there is an end of the matter. They are precluded from relitigating the same cause of action. There is, however, a second kind of estoppel inter partes and this usually occurs where an issue has earlier on been adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction and the same issue comes incidentally in question in any subsequent proceedings between the same parties (or their privies); in these circumstances, “issue estoppel” arises. This is based on the principle of law that a party is not allowed to (i.e. he is precluded from) contending the contrary or opposite of any specific point which having been once distinctly put in issue, has with certainty and solemnity been determined against him. (See Outram v. Morewood (1803) 3 East 346). Issue estoppel applies whether the point involved in the earlier decision is one of fact or law or one of mixed fact and law. However, for the principle to apply, in any given proceedings, all the pre-conditions to a valid plea of estoppel inter partes or per rem judicatam must apply, that, (1) the same question must be for decision in both proceedings (which means, that the question for decision in the current suit must have been decided in the earlier proceeding), (2) the decision relied upon to support the plea of issue estoppel must be final (3) the parties must be the same (which means that parties involved in both proceedings must be the same) (per se or by their privies).”
For the above reasons, I entirely agree with both the learned trial Judge and the Court of Appeal that the issue of traditional history having been previously decided in the 1962 cases between both parties in this appeal, and on the same land in dispute, against the appellants, it has become an “issue estoppel”. Hence the appellants were estopped from relitigating the issue in this case.
But being an issue estoppel, must it be specifically pleaded as estoppel before it could be raised Was it not sufficient to plead the facts and findings in the judgment of the court on which the issue could be founded
While I will answer the first question in the negative, I will however answer the second in the affirmative. This point came for consideration in a decision of this court in Mogo Chinwendu v. Nwanegbo Mbamali and Another (supra) where again Idigbe, J.S.C. observed as follows:-
“This appeal turns, in the main, upon the true and real effect of estoppel per rem judicata, and on the effect of the failure of the party who seeks to rely on the plea to make a specific plea of the same in his pleadings although he pleaded enough facts on which the plea can be founded. One of the principal contentions of the appellants in the Court of Appeal and in this court is that the respondents having failed to plead specifically estoppel by record (i.e. in this case, that the appellants are estopped from claiming, as owners, the land in dispute by virtue of Exhibit 3) the learned trial Judge erred in law in giving effect to Exhibit 3 in the face of abundant evidence on both sides relating to the claim, proceedings and judgment in Exhibit 3. It is my view that the Court of Appeal was right in rejecting this contention of the appellants. Undoubtedly the old rule was that estoppel by record and deed must be pleaded where, as here, there was opportunity to do so; under the modern practice it is not, however, necessary to plead estoppel in any particular form so long as the matters constituting the estoppel are stated in such a manner (as has been done in the pleadings of the respondents in these proceedings) to show that the party pleading relies upon it as a defence or an answer. “(The italics are mine)
As I save said earlier on, the respondents need not plead the issue of  traditional history specifically as an “issue estoppel”. They have already pleaded in paragraphs 7 and 10 of the Amended Statement of Claim sufficient facts on which the issue can be founded; and that was enough in my view.
However, the learned trial Judge did not find the claims of the respondents proved on the evidence of their traditional history alone; but he also considered the evidence adduced on the question of boundaries and acts of possession and ownership exercised by them. And in conclusion, he said:”
As said earlier in this judgment I accept and believe the evidence of 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs and that of their witnesses with regard to their traditional history, and the description of their boundary with the defendant. I also believe their evidence that they actually carried out various acts of ownership and possession with regard to the various portions of the land comprised in what they described as ANI UMUEZEMESA land, Ibusa.”
With that conclusion, it is therefore not surprising that the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decisions of the High Court dated 22nd February, 1980. Accordingly, I will also dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal dated 10th July, 1984 with N300.00 costs to the respondents.

OBASEKI, J.S.C. (Presiding): I have had the privilege and advantage of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Kazeem, J.S.C. I agree with all the opinions expressed on the issues raised in this appeal. My comments therefore will be for purposes of emphasis.
The two issues raised by the appellants in the appeal were as stated by the appellants. They are:
1. Whether the plaintiffs/respondents pleaded their traditional history in the action; and
2. Whether, if the traditional history was not pleaded, the High Court was entitled to consider it and give judgment on the basis of the evidence of traditional history offered by the plaintiffs/respondents merely because it had been considered in a previous suit between the parties.
The claims instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants were for:
(i) A declaration that the boundary between the plaintiffs of Ibusa and the defendants of Ogwashi- Uku is at Ubu stream and in accordance with the boundary as represented on plan MWC/102/70 by life trees on the north-west of the land in dispute and verged Green on the said plan;
(ii) A declaration of title to the piece and parcel of land known as Ani Umuezemese and comprising other small portions of land shown in the plaintiffs’ plan and verged Green on the said plan;
(iii) 300.00 for trespass to the plaintiffs’ land known as “Ani Ezemes” of smaller parcels known and called Ibulu-Ibu, Adagba, Oloko, Elekuehe, Alagbo Elue and Akwu-Ukwa;
(iv) injunction to restrain the defendant, his servants and/or agents from further acts of trespass or interference with the plaintiffs’ possession, ownership, use and enjoyment of the said land. Pleadings were ordered, filed and delivered before trial. The appellant lost in the High Court and his appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful. Eight witnesses including the appellant testified for the defence. Before then, the 1st plaintiff/respondent and 9 witnesses testified in support of plaintiffs’ case.
Ogbobine, J. in the concluding paragraph of his well considered judgment said:
“As said earlier in this judgment, I accept and believe the evidence of the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs and that of their witnesses with regard to their traditional history, and the description of their boundary with the defendant. I also believe their evidence that they actually carried out various acts of ownership and possession with regard to the various portions of the land comprised in what they described as Ani Umuezemese land Ibusa. While I am of the firm view that the plaintiffs have proved their title to the land in dispute, I am not too sure whether they led concrete evidence on the relief for trespass claimed by them”
He proceeded to grant the declarations and injunction but refused the claim for trespass.
The issues as formulated are in their most simplistic terms having regard to the facts pleaded in paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of the amended statement of claim and paragraphs 10, 11 and 13 of the amended statement of defence. These paragraphs highlighted the contention of the parties. Taking the amended statement of claim first, the paragraphs read:
“7. Sometime in 1962, the defendant claimed portions of the land in dispute and brought action in suits B/44/62 and B/47/62. The plaintiffs sued the defendant in B/46/62 for some portions of the land in dispute. The three suits were consolidated and tried in the High Court at Asaba. The defendant lost and appealed to the Supreme Court and his appeal was dismissed. The plaintiffs will rely on the judgment and the record of proceedings of the above suits and the Federal Supreme Court judgment in SC.272/1966;
8. In the consolidated suits, the plaintiffs used plan MWC/81/62. In the present suit the plaintiffs will file with the amended statement of claim plan No. MWC/102/70 which plan is merely a detailed plan of plan MWC/81/62. The plaintiffs will rely on these two plans.
10. In the consolidated suits both the plaintiffs and the defendants relied on their traditional history. The learned trial judge found as a fact that Ubu stream is the natural boundary between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The plaintiffs will rely on these finding.”
Turning to the amended statement of defence, the relevant paragraphs read:
“10. In answer to paragraph 7 of the statement of claim, the defendant avers that except for some persons of Ogbe Owele the plaintiffs herein were not parties to suits Nos. B/44/62, B/46/62 and B/47/62 and SC.272/66 and were not represented.
11. The defendant denies that the plaintiffs herein were parties to the consolidated suits referred to in paragraph 8 of the statement of claim and will put the plaintiffs to the strictest proof thereof. In further answer to paragraph 8 of the statement of claim, the defendant is not in a position to admit or deny that plan No. MWC/102/70 is merely a detailed plan of plan MWC/81/62 and will put the plaintiffs to the very strict proof thereof. The defendant will object in limine to the plan filed and served with the statement of claim.
13. The defendant denies that the plaintiffs herein were parties to the suits referred to in paragraph 10 of the statement of claim or that they were represented in the said suits. The defendant herein categorically denies that the defendants in those suits specifically pleaded any traditional history. In further answer to paragraph 10 of the statement of claim the defendants shall contend that the findings of fact mentioned therein do not constitute estoppel per rem judicata and cannot be relied upori in this suit.”
The two issues raised and adumbrated by the appellant can conveniently be merged into and considered under one issue which is whether the respondents failed to plead enough facts about their traditional history to enable them contend that the appellants were estopped from contending that they pleaded their traditional history and relied on it in the previous suit. I think and I am of the settled opinion that an affirmative answer can flow from a consideration of paragraph 10 of the amended statement of claim. The denial that the respondent specifically pleaded any traditional history in the previous proceedings threw open the issue whether the respondent pleaded their traditional history in the previous suit, what the traditional history was, and whether, the court that heard the previous suit relied on the traditional history in its judgment. Thus, having pleaded the proceedings and judgment, the need to plead the issue determined does not arise. From the state of the pleadings, however, the respondents cannot be regarded as claiming the advantage of estoppel per rem judicata. Rather, their weapon lies in the plea of issue estoppel. I think at this juncture, it is necessary to ask the question: Was the issue of the correct traditional history of ownership of the land in dispute raised in the previous suits This question arises from the strict denial by the appellant that the defendants in the cases pleaded, pleaded any traditional history. If the traditional history proved the basis for the decision in the previous suits, the traditional history pleaded and accepted by the court in the said previous suits has, in my view, become incorporated by reference without the need to plead them in detail in the respondents’ amended statement of claim. The incorporation is first by the averment that both the plaintiffs, and the defendants in the previous consolidated suits relied on their traditional history and that the plaintiffs will rely on the findings made by the Court. Secondly, by the categorical denial of the defendant/appellant that the defendants in those suits now plaintiffs/respondents in this suit, specifically pleaded any traditional history.
Issue Estoppel:
The manner and form of pleading issue estoppel came before this court for consideration in the case of Mogo Chinwendu v. Nwanegbo Mbamali and Another (1980) 3-4 S.C. 31. This Court gave serious consideration to the changes that have taken place in the manner of pleadings particularly from the strict, rigid, archaic forms to the simple forms shorn of all the ancient legal terminology but intelligible enough to bring to the mind of the court the case being presented to the court. True enough, this is less colourful but it serves the purpose of the modern society and helps to highlight the changes from the old to the new. It is sufficient for the pleader to state the material facts. He need not state and is riot bound to state the legal result. If his bubbling mind leads him to do so he is not bound or limited to what he has stated. Any legal consequence of which the facts admit can be presented in argument. See Re Vandervell’s Trusts (1974) 3 WLR. 256, per lord Denning, MR. at p.264.
Ogbobine, J. in his judgment in this matter at the High Court, Asaba, adverted his mind to the issue of traditional history. He was quite conscious of the fact that the traditional history of ownership pleaded and testified to by the appellant was rejected and that that pleaded and testified to by the respondents was accepted. This is vividly reflected in his said: judgment when he said:
“In suit No. B/47/62, the claim of the present defendant against the entire people of Ibusa for Odugba land which they said formed part of Odonkwu land was dismissed, so too were the claims for trespass and injunction. In dismissing that claim, Exhibit ‘F’ the trial judge did not accept their evidence of traditional history nor did he find any material on which to hold that Ogwashi- Uku people had possession of the land. In suit No. B/46/62, the plaintiffs were from Ibusa and the action which affected Odugba land was against the present defendants. The court, Izuora, J. found for the plaintiffs in every conceivable aspect of the case both as to traditional history which he said favoured the plaintiffs and also with regard to acts of ownership which included maintaining tenants and farmers on the land. The court entered judgment for a declaration of title to Odugba land in favour of the plaintiffs and also awarded damages against Ogwashi-Uku people for their acts of trespass. The judgment in B/46/62 and B/47/62 (consolidated) was affirmed by the Supreme court in Exhibit ‘F1’.
Independent of my own findings in this case, and having regard to the fact that Odugba or Odonkwu land formed part of the areas of land in this case, I cannot see how it is possible to set aside those findings in Exhibit ‘F’ which were fully supported by evidence and which evidence was similarly canvassed and accepted by me in the instant case'” (Italics mine)
The issue of what the boundary between Ogwashi-Uku and Ibusa people is and the traditional history of the two communities of the settlement in their respective land or parcels of land have therefore been settled in the previous suit. The respondents have in their pleadings made it abundantly clear that the area of or extent of the land claimed in this suit far exceeded the area claimed in the previous action. Hence, they did not raise the plea of estoppel per rem judicata which would have required them to establish that the subject matter and the claims were identical in addition to the identity of the parties being the same. The issue of boundary and the issue of traditional history of the founding of the settlement having been previously determined in the suits pleaded the plea of issue estoppel become available.
See:
Yaw Duedu v. Evi Yiboe (1961) 1 WLR. 1040
Amos Ogbesusi Aro v. Salami Fabolude (1983) 2 Sc. 75 at 76-78, 95, 98-99.
Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v. VIO Exportchled (1966) 1 Q.B. 630 at
640 per Lord Denning, MR. and at 642 per Diplock, L.J.
Y. A. Lawai v. Chief Yakubu Dawodu and Another (1972) 1 All NLR (Part 2) 270 at 282.;
Cole v. Sanyaolu (1976) 9-10 Sc. 203 at 217-218
If as contended by the respondents; the issue of the correct traditional history in support of the claim of ownership of the land in the area was contested by the parties in the previous consolidated suits and decided by the High Court which decision was affirmed by this Court, the decision on the point constitutes an issue estoppel and the appellants are estopped from raising the issue and setting up a different traditional history in subsequent proceedings.
In Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v. VIO Exportchled (1966) 1 Q.B. 630 at 640, Lord Denning, MR., while applying the principle to arbitration, explained it thus:
“That issue having been decided by the court can it be re-opened before the Umpire I think not. It is a case of “issue estoppel” as distinct from “cause of action estoppel” or “fact estoppel,” a distinction which was well explained by Diplock, L.J. in Thoday v. Thoday. The law as I understand it is this: if one party brings an action against another for a particular cause and judgment is given upon it, there is a strict rule that he cannot bring another action against the same party for the same cause. Transit in rem judicatam: see King v. Hoare. But within one cause of action, there may be several issues raised which are necessary for the determination of the whole case. The rule then is that once an issue has been raised and distinctly determined between the parties, then as a general rule, neither party can be allowed to fight that issue all over again. The same issue cannot be raised by either of them again in the same or subsequent proceedings except in special circumstances. See Badar Bee v. Habib Merican Noordin, per Lord Macnaghten. And within one issue, there may be several points available which go to aid one party or the other in his effort to secure a determination of the issue in his favour. The rule is that each party must use reasonable diligence to bring forward every point which he thinks would help him. If he omits to raise any particular point from negligence, inadvenence or even accident (which would or might have decided in his favour) he may find himself shut out from raising the point again, at any rate, in any case where the self same issue arises in the same or subsequent proceedings. But this again is not an inflexible rule. It can be departed from in special circumstances.”
This Court cited with approval the Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. case in the case of Amos Ogbesusi Aro v. Salami Fabolude (supra) and applied the principle to bar one Aratun from claiming that he was the son of Aro Orija (deceased) whose estate had been the subject of litigation in the Owo Grade B Customary Court wherein it was established that he died without issue. The same principle was stated by Lord Romer in the case of New Brunswick Railway Co. v. British and French Trust Corporation Ltd. (1939) A.C. 1 a Privy Council decision when he said at p. 43:
“It is no doubt true to say that whenever a question has in substance been decided, or has in substance formed the ratio of or been fundamental to the decision in an earlier action between the same parties, each party is estopped from litigating the question thereafter.”
In the case of Samuel Fadina & Anor. v. Festus Gbadebo & Anor. (1978) 3 S.C. 219, my learned brother, now late, Idigbe, JSC, at pages 228- 229 after dealing with the distinction between estoppel per rem judicata or cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel expressly pointed out and I agree with him, that issue estoppel applies whether the point involved in the earlier decision is one of fact or law or one of mixed law and fact, but that for the principle to apply in any given proceedings, all the preconditions to a valid plea of estoppel inter partes or per rem judicata must apply.
For the above reasons and the reasons so ably set out in the judgment of my learned brother, Kazeem, JSC., I would and hereby dismiss the appeal with costs to the respondents fixed at N300.00.

ANIAGOLU, J.S.C.: The judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Kazeem, J.S.C., was made available to me in draft and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion. The said judgment has set out in comprehensive details the contentions of the parties in this appeal and no useful purpose will be served in repeating them here.
In deciding this appeal it is well worth remembering that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal have found, on the issues of fact in the case placed before them, against the people of Ogwashi-Ukwu (the appellants) and in favour of the people of Ibusa (the respondents), and consistent with the practice of this Court, as decided in several authorities over the years, such concurrent findings are usually not disturbed by this Court except there be weighty reason for so doing (see the recent cases of LAMAI v. CHIEF ORBIH (1980) 5-7 S.C. 28; MOGO CHlNWENDU v. MBAMALI (1980) D 3-4 S.C. 31).
This well known practice is now embodied in the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1985, in ORDER 2 RULE 33 thereof which provides that:
“Where, in an appeal to the Court from the Court below, the Court below has affirmed the findings of fact of the Court of first instance, any application to the Court in pursuance of its jurisdiction under 213(3) of the Constitution for leave to appeal shall be granted only in exceptional circumstances.”
The two Courts below rejected the story of the traditional history told by the people of Ogwashi-Ukwu and accepted that of the people of Ibusa. Following the said practice of this Court the said findings of fact will not be inquired into by this Court, and if inquired into, will not be disturbed, there being nothing shown by the appellants to fault those findings of fact.
Apart from the practice of this Court hereinbefore stated, there is the question of issue estoppel arising from the determination of the 1962 case between the same parties. An issue once finally settled, will not be permitted to be raised again in a fresh suit between the same parties or their privies (see Aro v. Fabolude (1983) 2 S.C. 75 at p. 95). The principle behind this rule lies in the desire of the law to see finality to civil actions (interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium). The issue of the traditional history – that is, which of the traditional histories put forward by the Ibusas and the Ogwashis represented the truth – was fought right up to this Court (Exhibit F) and was resolved finally in favour of the Ibusas. The Ogwashis are precluded from contending that the traditional history put forward by the Ibusas is not the accurate one.
All the conditions for applying the principle of issue estoppel barring the Ogwashis from so contending are present, namely,
(1) the same question was decided in the 1962 case as well as in this case;
(2) the decisions were final judicial decisions by Courts of competent jurisdiction; and
(3) the parties are the same – namely – the Ibusas and the Ogwashi-Ukwus.
But then, Mr. Ajayi, S.A.N., while appreciating the point on issue estoppel and the principles for the applicability of the principle, has contended that the Ibusas had not pleaded specifically, in the present case, the traditional history they have relied on. They had merely pleaded the proceedings in the 1962 case without specifically pleading, in the present case, the facts of the traditional history upon which they have relied. It was not enough, he contended, merely to refer to the 1962 proceedings (which he called the doctrine of incorporation by reference) in which was contained the traditional history. The facts of that traditional history must, he argued, be repleaded in the present suit and the rules of pleadings cannot be satisfied by the Ibusas merely alluding to the 1962 case and stating that they would rely on the traditional history therein pleaded.
This brings me to the object, and the true meaning, of pleadings. They are designed to give the opponent notice of the case the pleader is bringing forward in order that the opponent may not be taken unawares and in order also that he may come forward with answers to the points raised in the said pleadings. (ABIMBOLA GEORGE and ORS. V. DOMINION FLOUR MILLS LTD. (1963) 1 ALL N.L.R. 71). Where a party has pleaded a previous case contested between him and his opponent and called the attention of that opponent to the traditional history which that party pleaded in that previous case and has given notice to the opponent that he will rely on that same traditional history, I cannot see that the opponent can, in all fairness, say that he has not been informed of the traditional history the pleader is going to rely on, or in those circumstances, that he has been taken by surprise.
By specifically pleading a specific in an earlier proceeding between the same parties, that specific must be held and deemed to have been properly identified in the said pleadings.
Paragraphs 7 and 10 of the amended statement of claim of the Ibus read:
“7. Sometime in 1962 the defendant claimed portions of the land in dispute and brought action in Suits B/44/62 and B/47/62. The plaintiffs sued the defendant in B/46/62 for some portions of the land in dispute. The three suits were consolidated and tried in the High Court at Asaba. The defendant lost and appealed to the Supreme Court and his appeal was dismissed. The plaintiffs will rely on the judgment and the record of proceedings of the above suits and the F.S.C. Judgment SC.272/1966.”
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
10. In the consolidated suits both the plaintiffs and the defendant gave and relied on their traditional history. The learned trial Judge found as a fact that Ubu stream is the natural boundary between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The plaintiffs will rely on these findings of facts.”
Order 13 Rules 5 and6 of the Bendel State High Court specify how facts are to be pleaded for the purpose of clarity as follows:
“5. Every pleading shall contain a statement of all the material facts on which the party pleading relies, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved, such statement being divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively and each paragraph containing as nearly as may be a separate allegation.”
“6. The facts shall be alleged positively, precisely and distinctly, and as briefly as is consistent with a clear statement.”
The positive, precise and distinct statements of facts are to be alleged as briefly as is consistent with. a clear statement. There can hardly be clearer statement than that a pleader informs his opponent that the facts of the same traditional history which he put forward to the court in that earlier case (named) which he fought against that opponent, will be the very same traditional history which he is going to put forward again in the new case. I think that Mr. Ajayi’s contention on this issue is not well founded and must be, and is hereby, rejected.
Appellant’s complaint that the learned trial Judge based his judgment merely on traditional history has been adequately dealt with in the lead judgment and shown therein, by reference to the acts of ownership pleaded and proved, that the contention is incorrect. I agree that the complaint on that score cannot stand.
This appeal, in my view, is without merit. I must, and hereby, dismiss it with N300.00 costs to the Respondents.

NNAMANI, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother KAZEEM, J.S. C. and I entirely agree with his reasoning and conclusions. It seems to me too, that the traditional history put up by the respondents in the 1962 cases and which was then accepted by the learned trial judge was properly used by the trial judge in this case. I think it was sufficient that the respondents relied on Exhibit F, the record of proceedings in those cases. I do not myself see the need for them to lead evidence to prove the traditional history again. In any case, it is to be appreciated that the learned trial judge decided the case not only on traditional history but also on act of ownership and possession as well as proof of boundaries. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal. I abide by all the orders made by my learned brother, KAZEEM, J.S.C.

OPUTA, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother Kazeem, J.S.C. I am in complete agreement with him that the appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed.
The only point I want to emphasise is the legal effect of failure to specifically plead an estoppel.
The facts are by no means complicated. The issues arising from the pleadings when properly considered lie within a very narrow compass. In 1962, the parties to the present dispute sued one another in Suits B/44/62, B/46/62 and B/47/62. These three suits were later consolidated for hearing. In these suits, the parties relied very heavily on their traditional histories. The trial court after a very careful review of the evidence led on both sides disbelieved the traditional evidence of the people of Ogwashi-Uku, believed the traditional evidence of the people of Ibusa and accordingly entered judgment for the people of Ibusa. The people of Ogwashi-Uku appealed to the Supreme Court and lost. In the 1962 Suits, the people of Ogwashi-Uku sued as Plaintiffs. The fact that they lost in both courts did not automatically mean that the Defendants – the people of Ibusa – were the owners of the land in dispute in the 1962 cases. No. They did not counter-claim and so no declaration could have been made or was in fact made in their favour:- see J.M. Kodilinye v. Mbanefo Odu (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 336 at p.338. All that the 1962 cases decided was that having regard to the traditional histories of the parties and other evidence such as acts of possession etc. the land in dispute did not belong to the people of Ogwashi-Uku. It is important to emphasise this point quite early in this judgment because all I want to point out is the impact and extent of the law as it relates to Issue Estoppel. Although the 1962 cases did not resolve the issue of title in favour of Ibusa people (since they claimed no title) yet it resolved that issue against Ogwashi- Uku in any future dispute inter partes about the same piece or area of land.
May be it was to correct this imbalance that the people of Ibusa as Plaintiffs sued in Suit A/28/66. Ogbobine, J. on 22/2/80 in a well-considered judgment found for the Plaintiffs of Ibusa granting the two declarations they sought and an order for Perpetual Injunction. The Plaintiffs’ claim for Trespass was refused “for insufficient evidence”.
Apparently aggrieved by the above judgment, the people of Ogwashi-Uku appealed to the Court of Appeal Benin Division. On the 10th July 1984, the Court of Appeal, Benin Division, coram Omoigberai Ebo, Okagbue and Abai Ikqechegh, JJ.C.A. , dismissed the appeal of Ogwashi-Uku people and upheld the judgment of the learned trial Judge, Ogbobine, J. declaring that title of the land in dispute vested in the people of Ibusa. In his lead judgment, Okagbue, J.C.A. dealt at pages 152 to 153 with the 1962 cases namely, B/44/62, B/46/62 and B/47/62 and held:-
“I am of the opinion that as between the parties that issue (the traditional histories of the parties settled in these cases) cannot be allowed to be re-litigated”.
On the issue of how to plead an estoppel, the learned justice of the Court of Appeal remarked at p.153 of the record:-
“The point about the plaintiffs’ not pleading traditional history is a red herring. In paragraph 10 of their Statement of Claim the Plaintiffs said they would rely on the judgment and record of proceedings of the consolidated suits.”
The result is that Ogwashi-Uku people lost in the trial Court and also lost in the Court of Appeal. It is the policy of this Court not to interfere with concurrent findings of two courts below unless there was such an error of law or in procedure that amounted to a miscarriage of justice. This in effect means that an appellant asking this Court to reverse the concurrent findings of two courts below has a difficult and uphill task before him.
The stage is now set to examine the grounds of the Appellants’ attack on the concurrent judgments of the Asaba High Court and the Benin Court of Appeal in this case. In his Brief of argument, learned counsel for the Appellants, G. O. K. Ajayi ,S.A.N. formulated two issues as “Issues Raised In This Appeal”.
Issue No.1.  “Did the Plaintiffs in this action plead their traditional history”
Issue No.2: “If the traditional history was not pleaded, was the High Court entitled to consider it and give judgment on the basis of the evidence of traditional history offered by the Plaintiffs/Respondents merely because it had been considered in a previous suit between the parties” (the Italics are mine as the phrase italicized holds the key to the answer of the two questions raised above).
Generally speaking, all relevant facts are to be pleaded and if the traditional history of a party to an action is a relevant fact, then that history ought to be specifically pleaded. Failure to so plead will render any evidence of such facts not pleaded inadmissible. The trial Judge is bound to expunge such evidence from the record when considering his judgment. See George & Ors. v. Dominion Flour Mills Ltd. (1963) 1 All N.L.R. 71 at p.77: See also Aniemeka Emegokwue v. James Okadigbo (1973) 4 S.C. 113 at p.117. Also on the Appellants’ credit side is the rule that a party entitled to rely on an estoppel is not bound to rely on such estoppel. He may from motives of delicacy or generosity decline to avail himself of the weapon which the law places in his hands. In that event the courts will have no further say in the matter than it has in cases where a man of high honour disdains to plead privilege to an action for defamation. There is still a third point in Mr. Ajayi’s favour. A finding of fact in one case should not normally be exported from that case and then as it were transplanted into another case to supplement any deficiency in the second case. Judges are not bound to travel beyond the facts pleaded in the case before them. The facts of the case are therefore very important because without known facts it will be impossible to know the law on those facts. The use of cases is to establish principles. I may at this stage repeat the warning of Brett, F.J. in Odunsi v. Boulos (1959) 4 F.S.C. 234 at p.237:-
“Such decisions (decisions in previous cases) are to be used with great caution. As findings of fact they are irrelevant and the decisions on questions of law which they contain are only helpful to the extent that they are based on facts indistinguishable in their legal consequences from those in the present case”.
I have above stated the credit side of the submissions of learned counsel for the Appellants.
But there is a debit side to the account. When a previous case was between the same parties, as the present case before this Court, different considerations are bound to arise. In the old case of R . v. Duchess of Kingston 20 St. Tr. 355: (1776) 1 East, P.c. 468: (1775-1802) All E.L.R. Res. 623: the principle was firmly established that judgments upon the same matter and between the same parties were, as a plea, a bar and as evidence conclusive. It is admitted on both sides and there is no controversy at all that the 1962 cases and the present case now on appeal to this court were between the same parties – namely the people of Ogwashi-Uku and the people of Ibusa. It is conceded and there is no doubt at all, that the plaintiffs now Respondents pleaded the 1962 cases in paragraphs 7 and 10 of their Statement of Claim at p.12 of the record. These cases were also tendered in evidence. Following the fact that the 1962 proceedings and judgments were pleaded and tendered in evidence then on the legal principle established in the Duchess of Kingston’s case above those 1962 cases constituted a bar to any further relitigation of the issues therein decided. Two of those issues were:-
i. That the traditional history given by Ogwashi-Uku people was discredited and disbelieved.
ii That the Ogwashi-Uku people were declared not to be the owners of the land (then in dispute), and part of the land now in dispute between the same parties.
I do not think it is now open to argument that the 1962 cases created between the parties an estoppel per rem judicata as regards the area litigated upon in 1962 and an Issue Estoppel with regard to the Issue of the Traditional histories of the parties. This means that those judgments bind not only the parties but also the Courts unless under any existing law the courts are given the power to review them. It is here relevant to note that the 1962 cases went up to the Supreme Court. They could not then and cannot now go further than that. It then follows that the 1962 cases were not only pro obligatione habetur but also pro veritate. There was therefore no need for the tedious luxury of receiving any evidence of the traditional histories of either Ogwashi-Uku or Ibusa. That had been concluded by the 1962cases and which are still pro veritate. In this respect not only the judgments in the 1962 cases but also the reasons for those judgments have binding force as they are obligatory parts of the said judgments. In New Brunswick Rail Co. v. British French Trust Corporation (1939) A.C. 1 at p.43 Romer, L.J. held that:
“It is no doubt true to say that whenever a question has in substance been decided or has in substance formed the ratio of, or been fundamental to the decision in an earlier action between the same parties, each party is estopped from litigating the same question thereafter.”
Now I think it is common ground that the. 1962 judgments constituted and still constitute partly an estoppel per rem Judicata and fully Issue Estoppel if so pleaded.
The appeal now turns on the question – what happens if those judgments, although pleaded, the Plaintiffs failed to add that the judgments constituted an estoppel In other words is there any magic in the word “estoppel” so that failure to use it will deprive the judgments pleaded of their effect or will prevent the court from giving such effect to those judgments What then is an Estoppel and what is its value Estoppel is part of the law of evidence. It is no other than a bar to testimony. Its sole function or office is either to place an obstacle in the way of a case which might otherwise succeed or to remove an impediment out of the way of a case which might otherwise fail. I agree partially with Chief Williams’ submission that strictly speaking “estoppel deals with evidence while pleadings deal with facts. What is to be pleaded are facts. Estoppel comes with evidence and evidence need not be pleaded”.But although estoppel is part of the law of evidence yet, unlike other evidence, an estoppel must be pleaded, for it may also be waived. In Evans v. Bartlam (1837) 2 All E.R. 646 at p.653, Lord Wright stated:-
“Estoppel is a rule of evidence that prevents the party estopped from denying the existence of a fact”.
In the case now on appeal before this Court, the Ogwashi-Uku people cannot deny the existence and effect of the 1962 cases which were clearly pleaded.
Also in London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan (1918) A.C. 777 Viscount Haldane at p.818 observed:-
“Estoppel is hardly a rule of what is called substantive law in the sense of declaring an immediate right or claim. It is rather a rule of evidence, capable nonetheless on that account of affecting gravely substantive rights”.
Strictly speaking therefore the concept and value of an estoppel is to bar a person from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of that which has, in the contemplation of law, been established as the truth either by the acts of judicial or legislative officers or by his own deed or representation, express or implied. Will an estoppel not have the same concept and function unless the act or judgment constituting an estoppel is described in the pleadings as estoppel I do not think that this is the present position. Before the Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875 any party who is desirous of setting up an estoppel per rem judicatam or Issue Estoppel must do so by pleading that. Modem practice has been to relax the rigidity and strictness of the rules requiring such pleading as essential, and the modern tendency has been to inquire simply whether justice requires the disallowance of the estoppel by reason of failure to plead it: – see Winnan v. Winnan (1949) Probate 174 C.A. There the estoppel was given effect to although not pleaded. The case of Winnan was however dismissed on other grounds. I am of the view that the justice of the case on appeal requires that the 1962 judgments pleaded be given effect to although they were not specifically pleaded as estoppel. In Kwasi Agyako v. Nazir Zok & Ors. (1941) 10 W.A.C.A 277, the West African Court of Appeal held that “an estoppel should be pleaded, but if obvious should succeed although not pleaded” .
The problem or difficulty presented by and in this case on appeal, is that by and large an estoppel has always been viewed as a defensive weapon and not as an offensive weapon or a weapon for attack. In the normal kind of cases, it is usually the defendant who is on the defensive, defending the claim of the plaintiff. From sheer force of habit counsel for the defence always sets up an estoppel to bar the plaintiff’s way to success. But there is nothing preventing a plaintiff pleading an estoppel. Aniagolu, J .S.C. in Mogo Chin- F wendu v. Nwanegho Mbamali & Anor. (1980) 3/4 S.C. 31 at pA8 made and emphasised this same point. In Chinwendu v. Mbamali supra this Court considered in very great details the failure of the Plaintiffs to-specifically plead existing judgments inter partes as constituting an estoppel. There was a general consensus that it is not necessary to plead estoppel in any particular form so long as the matters constituting the estoppel are stated in such a manner to show that the party pleading relies upon them as a defence or an answer. Obaseki, J.S.C. in his own concurring judgment in Mbamali’s case at p.72 of the Report made it clear that “the fact that the plea of Estoppel was not specifically made in the plaintiffs’ pleadings ….. that failure did not deprive the Plaintiffs now Respondents of the effective use of the estoppel created by the Supreme Court judgment – the facts of which were pleaded and admitted”. Kayode Eso, J.S.C. in his own concurring judgment in Chinwendu Mbamali held that “there is nothing sacrosanct in the word estoppel”. If there has been any lingering doubt about the effect of failure to plead specifically that certain judgments are being relied upon as Estoppel per Rem Judicata or as Issue Estoppel that doubt should be and had been completely cleared and dispelled by the judgment of this Court in Chinwendu v. Mbamali’s case above.
In conclusion, it is my humble view that in the quest for justice, the Court should not be inhibited by unnecessary technicalities but should rather consider and deal with legal results of pleaded facts. The 1962 cases were pleaded. It was the duty of the court of first instance to give effect to these judgments. If the trial court erred at all, it erred on the side of caution. It was not necessary after pleading the 1962 cases to go all over again receiving evidence on matters and issues (like the traditional histories of the parties) which had been finally decided inter partes. The Court of Appeal Benin Division was right in its mild censure of the trial court in receiving or rather allowing the parties to repeat the evidence of the traditional history decided inter partes in the 1962 cases. The Asaba High Court and the Court of Appeal Benin Division were both right in treating the 1962 cases as entirely and effectively estopping the people of Ogwashi-Uku claiming the land, then in dispute, and a greater part of which is in dispute as theirs. The two courts below were right in awarding the declaration sought by the people of Ibusa and in ordering the Injunction sought by them. The concurrent findings of these two courts below have not been faulted by any argument presented and urged before this Court in this appeal. Those findings remain intact and impregnable. This being the case, this appeal fails. For all the reasons given above and for the fuller reasons in the lead judgment of my learned brother Kazeem, J.S.C., I, too, will dismiss this appeal. I abide by all the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
Appeal Dismissed

 

Appearances

Mr. G.O.K. Ajayi S.A.N., (with him G.N. Uwechie and A Adara (Miss) For Appellant

 

AND

Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.A.N., (with him Mr. P.O. Balonwu, S.A.N., Chuka Agbu and F.R.A. Williams (Jnr.) For Respondent