LawCare Nigeria

Nigeria Legal Information & Law Reports

AFOLABI COKER V MARIAMO OGUNTOLA & ORS(1985)

AFOLABI COKER V MARIAMO OGUNTOLA & ORS

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 28th day of June, 1985

SC.108/1984

 

JUSTICES

MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

MOHAMMED BELLO    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AUGUSTINE NNAMANI    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

SAIDU KAWU    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

AFOLABI COKER  Appellant(s)

AND

MARIAMO OGUNTOLA & ORS  Respondent(s)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

The above findings of facts which, in my view, were amply supported by the evidence before the trial court, were confirmed by the Court of Appeal. Thus we have two concurrent findings of fact on the issue of the ownership of the land in dispute at the time it was purportedly sold to the appellant’s father. Now the general rule is that where there are two concurrent findings of fact, such findings will not be disturbed by this Court unless there is a substantial error apparent on the record of proceedings. See Mogo Chinwendu v. Nwanegbo Mbamali and Anor. (1980) 3-4 S.C. 31 at page 75; Kofi v. Kofi 1, W.A.C.A. 284 at page 285; Ganiyu Kale v. Madam Coker (1982) 12 S.C. 252 at page 271. The Court will interfere only where not to do so will occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice. PER KAWU, J.S.C.

WHETHER OR NOT A FAMILY MEMBER CAN SELL FAMILY LAND AS HIS PRIVATE PERSONAL PROPERTY UDNER THE YORUBA CUSTOMARY LAW

It is a well settled Yoruba customary law that a member of a family and even the head of the family cannot sell family landed property as his own private personal property. Such a sale is totally null and void. PER OBASEKI, J.S.C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT CAN BEAR REPETITION

The attitude of this Court on that has been stated in so many authorities that it cannot bear repetition (see Etowa Enang and Ors. v. Adu (1981) 11 & 12 S. C. 25 at 39. PER NNAMANI, J.S.C.

KAWU, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The respondents herein were the plaintiffs in suit No. AB/33/73 instituted against the appellant and one Raimi Beji in the Ogun State High Court, Abeokuta Judicial Division, Abeokuta, on 30th March, 1973. In the suit the respondents claimed as follows:
“(a) Declaration of title to all that piece of land shown on the plan attached to conveyance made between Sinatu Efuyola, Raimi Beji and Esther Oyindaola and Solomon Oyeneye Coker dated 31st day of January, 1945 and registered at No. 80 at page 80 in volume 505 of the land registry, Ibadan.
(b) An order setting aside the conveyance made between Sinatu Efuyola, Raimi Beji and Esther Oyindaola and Solomon Oyeneye Coker dated 31st day of January, 1945 and registered as No. 80 at page 80 in volume 505 of the land registry, Ibadan. The annual rental value of the land is N20.”
Pleadings were ordered, filed and exchanged, but before hearing commenced, 2nd defendant, Raimi Beji was reported dead and the respondents withdrew their action against him.
The respondents case was that their ancestor Odutolu was the first person to settle on the land in dispute some time in 1830; that he later brought his brother, Sofoluwe to live with him on the land and that both of them cultivated and used the land jointly; that Sofoluwe died first, and after the death of Odutolu, the children of both Odutolu and Sofoluwe inherited the land under native law and custom, and continued to use it without partition; that some time in 1972, the respondents saw a building on the land, and upon inquiry, found that it was being erected by the appellant who when challenged, claimed that the land had been sold to his father in 1942 by one Idowu Beji, a member of the respondents family. It was the respondents case that as the land in dispute was not the personal property of Idowu Beji, he could not have validly sold it to the appellant’s father.
The appellant’s case was that the land in dispute was the personal property of Idowu Beji, who had inherited the same from his mother Mosuago, the only issue of Odutolu; that his father Chief Solomon Coker bought the land from Idowu Beji in 1942 and thereafter continued to exercise numerous acts of ownership on the land without disturbance; that in 1945 a formal Deed of Conveyance (Exhibit C) in respect of the land was executed by the children and sister of Idowu Beji in favour of his father.
Before hearing commenced, counsel were invited to settle issues to be determined by the Court and both counsel agreed that the issues for determination were:
“(i) Whether the land was the personal property of Idowu Beji at the time he purportedly sold it to 1st defendant’s father, or
(ii) Whether, at that time the land was Odutolu family land of which Idowu was a branch,
(iii) If the land were family land, whether the plaintiffs have been guilty of laches and acquiescence. ”
After hearing the parties and their witnesses, the learned trial Chief Judge came to the conclusion that the respondents had established their claim. He consequently granted them declaration of title to the land in dispute but refused to set aside the Deed of Conveyance.
Being dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal (Ogunkeye, Akanbi and Omo, J.C.A.) on a number of grounds, and in the judgment delivered by Omo, J.J.C.A., and concurred in by Ogunkeye and Akanbi, J.J.C.A. that court dismissed his appeal and upheld the decision of the High Court.
Still not satisfied, the appellant has further appealed to the Supreme Court on the three grounds of appeal, complaining as follows:
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
“1. The Federal Court of Appeal misdirected itself in law when it held as follows:
“There is no doubt that Exhibits D to F are exfacie (sic) personal and not representative actions…….If this process of inheritance was not established by the respondent, then it becomes very clear that he was dealing with family property as his personal property unchallenged. Furthermore, Exhibit C has been shown by the trial Judge to be defective, passing no interest whatsoever to any purchaser and inadmissible in evidence.”
PARTICULARS
(i) There was no evidence to support the conclusion of the Court of first instance as confirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal that Idowu Beji appeared to the outside world as the sole owner of the land in dispute.
(ii) The court actions taken by Idowu Beji (Exhibits D, E, F) speak for themselves and show the capacity in which Idowu Beji sued. It was improper to substitute the opinion of witness for the records of court.
(iii) The respondents knew of the court actions when the actions were in progress and if they claimed as co-owners with Idowu Beji, they are estopped from subsequently setting up claims contrary to the tenor of the actions fought by Idowu Beji.
(iv) Exhibit C, a registered instrument which was tendered by Consent of the parties constitutes notice to respondents and was never declared to be inadmissible evidence by the Court of first instance.
2. The submission made to cover Ground 2(d) to (g) is that the learned trial Judge erred in coming to the conclusion by flying against clear evidence before him, that the respondents were not guilty of laches and acquiescence…….Nor is it applicable to the facts of this case so as to justify the conclusion that the respondents stood by whilst their ‘brother’ Idowu Beji claimed the land as his own……”.
PARTICULARS
(i) The facts found approved (sic) by the appellants, that is to say that acts of Chief Coker, his widow and his children, and the occupation of the land in dispute by persons claiming through the appellant constituted acquiescence. In limiting the acts to the acts of Idowu Beji alone the Court of Appeal failed to direct itself on the quantum of the acts which constituted acquiescence in the case.
(ii) Even if the consideration were limited to the acts of Idowu Beji, such acts (Exhibits D, E, F) were sufficient to conclude the issue against the respondents.
3. The Federal Court of Appeal misdirected itself in law in holding as follows:
“In the light of the issues framed the pith of the traditional evidence is whether or not Mosugo was the only child of Odutolu. The fact that the seven children of Odutolu set out in the pleading were later said to belong to his brother Sofolu and himself is in the con of this case immaterial….”
PARTICULARS
(i) The family tree of the parties being material to determine the issues settled, any departure from the genealogy pleaded which purported to be answers to the issues is fatal to the case of the respondents on whom rests the onus of showing (sic).
(ii) Since (sic) the customary law a person’s real estate is inherited by his children to the exclusion of other blood relations, the Federal Court of Appeal did fail to direct itself on the need to establish the family tree pleaded with particularity; moreso “when Sofoluwe who was alleged to be Odutolu’s brother did not feature in the family tree’.”
At page 2 of this brief, learned counsel to the appellant formulated the issues for determination in this appeal as follows
“(1) Whether it is open to a court in the trial of an issue on the basis of previous judgments which are tendered by consent, to go behind the judgments and not to confine itself to the substance of the decision contained in the judgments.
(2) Whether the judgments (Exhibits D, E and F) and memoranda attached to the conveyance, (Exhibit C) and the acts testified to and as found by the trial court do not sustain the defences of laches and acquiescence.
(3)(a) Whether in a case where the plaintiffs rely on their genealogy to found their case the Court was not obliged to make specific findings in very clear terms on the genealogy pleaded and that proved if what was pleaded differs from what was testified to.
(b) Is failure to make such clear findings not fatal to a decision on the issue”
Now it is obvious that issue No. (1) Above arises from the first ground of appeal. One of the complaints in this ground of appeal is that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal failed to give effect to the judgments in Exhibit D, E and F. In my view, all the arguments canvassed in the appellant’s brief in support of this ground of appeal, and the oral submissions made in amplification of these arguments were to the effect that, if the courts below had confined themselves to the substance of the decisions in Exhibits D, E and F and had properly evaluated all the evidence adduced, they (the Courts) would have come to the conclusion that the land in dispute was the personal property of Idowu Beji. But this was precisely one of the important issues that both parties agreed should be resolved by the trial Court and in respect of which that Court found as follows:
“I am satisfied from the evidence before me that the land in dispute is family land, that it has been used in turn by elders of the family and has not at any time been partitioned…………

I was not told that Idowu was the Head of the Odutolu family. I got the impression that he just managed the property on behalf of the family. If he were the Head of the Family, I would have to consider whether the sale to Chief Coker was void or voidable. But there is no need to embark upon such consideration because the Defendant’s case was that the land belonged to Idowu personally, he having inherited it from his mother. I do not believe that. I find as a fact that the land was family property, and that Idowu had no right to sell the land to Chief Coker without the consent of members of this family.”
The above findings of facts which, in my view, were amply supported by the evidence before the trial court, were confirmed by the Court of Appeal. Thus we have two concurrent findings of fact on the issue of the ownership of the land in dispute at the time it was purportedly sold to the appellant’s father. Now the general rule is that where there are two concurrent findings of fact, such findings will not be disturbed by this Court unless there is a substantial error apparent on the record of proceedings. See Mogo Chinwendu v. Nwanegbo Mbamali and Anor. (1980) 3-4 S.C. 31 at page 75; Kofi v. Kofi 1, W.A.C.A. 284 at page 285; Ganiyu Kale v. Madam Coker (1982) 12 S.C. 252 at page 271. The Court will interfere only where not to do so will occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice.
The appellant in this appeal has failed to persuade me that the concurrent findings of fact by the two lower courts were not justified. This ground of appeal therefore, fails.
The second ground of appeal raises the issue of the plea of laches and acquiescence, and the substance of the complaint here is that the Court of Appeal was wrong to have upheld the finding of the trial court that the appellant’s defence of laches and acquiescence was not established. In this connection, Chief Olisa Chukura, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant, made the following submissions.
(1) That the acts found proved by the appellant’s witnesses were sufficient to sustain the plea of laches and acquiescence.
(2) That to the knowledge of the respondents, the appellant’s father planted some oranges and bananas on the land, and that he was never challenged because the respondents knew that he had bought the land.
(3) That the courts below should have held that the averments in the pleadings in respect of the erection of some advertisement boards on the land were proved.
(4) That in dealing with the plea of laches and acquiescence the Court of Appeal confined itself to the acts of Idowu Beji alone and “failed to direct itself on the quantum of the acts which constituted acquiescence in the case”.
With regard to the various acts found proved by the appellant’s witnesses the finding of the trial court, which was based on the evidence before it, was that the acts proved were temporary in nature and not permanent in character as to lead one to the conclusion that they were acts in proof of exclusive ownership of land.
With regard to the appellant’s plantation, the evidence accepted by the learned Chief Judge was that Idowu Beji gave part of the land in dispute to the appellant’s father to establish a piggery and plant only cash crops, and that when the appellant’s father started planting oranges and bananas on the land, Idowu Beji had them cut down. It was also established that the appellant’s father had removed his piggery from the respondent’s land before he died.
With regard to the question of the erection of advertisement boards on the land, in paragraph 29 of his Statement of Defence the appellant pleaded as follows:
“From 1964 to 1968 the defendant collected rent from the West African Publicity Limited which later became Afromedia (Nigeria) Limited which (sic) for advertisement boarding Nos. At (sic) 125 and 105 on the land in dispute. These advertisement Hoardings (sic) were in very conspicuous places on the “land in dispute and were visible to everybody who knew the land in dispute.”
In order to prove the above averments, the appellant gave evidence and tendered Exhibit “G” the contents of which are as follows:
“RECEIVED FROM WEST AFRICA PUBLICITY LIMITED, LAGOS
The sum of two Pounds nil Shillings nil Pence (2 pounds) for advertisement Hoarding No. 105 on my property at Aro from 1958 to 1959.
(Sgd.)
Witness to Signature………. O.K. COKER

This receipt also signifies my agreement to the renewal of the rights granted to West Africa Publicity Limited, for the erection of the advertisement boarding No. 105 size 19 x 88 on my above described Property and a continuance of these rights for a further period of one year with the option of a fresh renewal after this period at the same rental of 2 per annum, it being further agreed that one month’s notice in writing be given by either party should the removal of the hoarding be desirable, in which case rent will be returned to West Africa Publicity Limited, on any hoarding be removed, as from the date of removal until the end of the year on the 31st August, 1959.
(Sgd.)
Witness……………..    O.K. COKER

Now, bearing in mind the contents of Exhibit G, could it be seriously contended that that document conclusively proves or is capable of proving that portion of  paragraph 29 of the appellant’s statement of defence set out above My answer is in the negative. In the first place there is hardly any nexus between Exhibit “G” and the land in dispute. Secondly, while the averments in the pleadings speak of the appellant collecting rents “from 1964 to 1968”, Exhibit “G” would appear to cover period 1st September, 1958 to 31st August, 1959. No attempt was made to explain the apparent discrepancy between the averments in the pleadings and the evidence adduced to prove them. Thirdly, assuming Exhibit “G” is the actual receipt issued for the payment of rents made by the publicity company to the appellant, in my view, its mere production cannot be proof of the fact that the advertisement boards were actually erected “in very conspicuous places on the land in dispute and were visible to everybody who knew the land in dispute”, as pleaded by the appellant.
For the above reasons, I am in agreement with the lower courts that the semi-permanent act pleaded in paragraph 29 of the appellant’s statement of defence was not proved.
Lastly on this ground, the complaint that the Court of Appeal, when considering the appellant’s plea of laches and acquiescence, confined itself to the acts of Idowu Beji alone, is not borne out by the record as the relevant portion of that court’s judgment states as follows
“The submission made to cover Ground 2(d) to (g) is that the learned trial judge erred in coming to the conclusion, by flying against clear evidence before him, that the respondents were not guilty of laches and acquiescence. The facts as found by the court below are that the acts of ownership proved were not of such permanent character as to lead it to the conclusion that they were acts in proof of exclusive ownership of the land and against the interest of the other members of Odutolu family. No evidence was adduced to challenge the temporary nature of acts. Some semi-permanent acts averred were not proved. Even the piggery once established thereon by appellants predecessors were removed by him. The only attempt at a permanent user, the construction of a house thereon, was immediately challenged.”
On the totality of the evidence adduced, therefore, I am of the firm view that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal were right in their decision that the appellant’s plea of laches and acquiescence was not established. Accordingly, the second ground of appeal also fails.
The substance of the complaint in the third ground of appeal was that the respondents failed to adduce evidence to prove the averments in paragraph 13 of the Amended Statement of Claim. It was said that while the respondents averred in their pleadings that Odutolu had seven children, the evidence adduced at the trial showed that he, in fact, had only three children, and that the remaining four children named in the pleadings, were the children of his brother, Sofoluwe. I do not see any substance in this complaint. The main issue in controversy between the parties was whether the land in dispute was Odutolu family land at the time it was purportedly sold to the appellant’s father (as the respondents alleged) or whether it was the personal property of Idowu Beji (as the appellant claimed). This was the issue which the trial Court resolved in favour of the respondents. In my view, as the number of Odutolu’s children was not a material issue before the trial Court, failure on the part of the respondents to substantiate their averments on the point was not fatal to their case.
In the final result therefore, all the grounds urged before us having failed, the appellant’s appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed with N300.00 costs awarded to the respondents.

M. BELLO, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment delivered by my learned brother, Kawu, J.S.C. The main issue was whether the land in dispute was family land as the plaintiffs/respondents alleged or was personal property of Beji as the defendant/appellant alleged. From the evidence before him the trial judge found for the plaintiffs and the Court of Appeal confirmed. For the reasons stated by Kawu, J.S.C., I have not been convinced that this is a proper case to interfere with concurrent findings of fact. The appeal is dismissed with N300 costs to the Respondents.

M. L. UWAIS, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment read by my learned brother, Kawu, J.S.C. I agree with the reasons and conclusion therein, I too will dismiss the appeal with N300.00 costs to the respondents.

A. O. OBASEKI, J.S.C.: Three issues were formulated as questions for determination in this appeal. They are:
“(1) Whether it is open to a court in the trial of an issue on the basis of previous judgments which are tendered by consent, to go behind the judgments and not confine itself to the substance of the decision contained in the judgments.
(2) Whether the judgments (Exhibits D, E and F) and memoranda attached to the conveyance Exhibit C) and the acts testified to and as found by the trial court do not sustain the defences of laches and acquiescence.
(3) (a) Whether in a case where the plaintiffs rely on their genealogy to found their case, the court was not obliged to make specific findings in very clear terms on the genealogy pleaded and that proved if what was pleaded differs from what was testified to;
(b) Is failure to make such clear findings not fatal to a decision on the issue”
These issues have been examined in detail by my learned brother, Kawu, J .S.C. and I find his opinions on them in concurrence with mine and I adopt them as mine and I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. However, by way of emphasis, I add the following comments.
The land the subject matter of the action was found by the trial High Court, Craig, C.J. to be family property but dealt with by Idowu Beji, a member of the family as his own private personal land. In his own words, the learned Chief Judge said:
“But there is no need to embark upon such a consideration because the defendants case was that the land belonged to Idowu personally, he having inherited it from his mother. I do not believe that. I find as a fact that the land was family property and that Idowu had no right to sell the land to Chief Coker without the consent of members of this family.”
The Court of Appeal affirmed this finding and thus there are two concurrent findings on the same issue.
Nothing said in this appeal has persuaded me to the view that there is error in the findings. Concurrent findings cannot be set aside except for obvious errors. See Lokoyi v. Olojo (1983) 8 S.C. 61 (1983) 2 S.C.N.R. 127, Ganiyu Kale v. Madam Coker (1982) 12 S.C. 252 at 271. It is a well settled Yoruba customary law that a member of a family and even the head of the family cannot sell family landed property as his own private personal property. Such a sale is totally null and void.
On laches and acquiescence, the evidence does not establish any spectacular permanent structure which should have attracted the attention of the family to an invasion of their proprietory rights. More so when there is evidence of Idowu Beji’s active protection of the family property. The erection of advertisement signboards for four years and the planting of cash crops were too temporary activities to warrant any adverse inference about the intention of the appellant particularly when he was on the land with Idowu Beji’s permission.
For the reasons stated above and in the judgment of my learned brother, Kawu, J.S.C., I agree that there is no merit in this appeal and I hereby dismiss it and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal with costs to the respondents fixed at N300.00.

A. NNAMANI, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Kawu, J.S.C. and I agree with his reasoning and conclusions.
The three issues which the parties accepted at the trial court appear to me the main issues on which this appeal must turn. These were:
(i) Whether the land (i.e. land in dispute) was the personal property of Idowu at the time that he purportedly sold it to the 1st defendant’s father, or
(ii) Whether at the time the land was the Odutolu family land, of which Idowu was a branch
(iii) If the land was family property whether the plaintiffs have been guilty of laches and acquiescence.
The findings of fact which the learned trial Chief Judge made in respect of these issues, and which the Court of Appeal upheld, put the outcome of this appeal beyond question.
As summarised in the respondent’s brief they were as follows:
(a) That the land in dispute is family land belonging originally to Odutolu
(b) That Odutolu had more than one child
(c) That Idowu the Ibeji of Kemta belonged to Mosuago branch of the family
(d) That the land in dispute was being used in turn by elders of the family
(e) That the land in dispute had not at any time been partitioned
(f) That Idowu Ibeji who appeared to the outside world as the sole owner was in actual fact a co-owner that held an undivided share in the family property.
Both learned Senior Advocates, Chief Olisa Chukurah and Kehinde Sofola who appeared for the appellant very ably showed some discrepancies and inconsistencies in the evidence of the plaintiffs/respondents contending that the learned trial Chief Judge ought not to have made some of his findings of fact. Admittedly following their submissions one can see some discrepancies and contradictions but I am not so sure that these are so material as to have defeated the respondent’s case. They complained of the use which both the learned trial Chief Judge and the Court of Appeal made of Exhibits D, E and F contending that rather than look at the substance of those cases the learned trial Chief Judge went behind them and took what material fitted in with the conclusions he arrived at. The Court of Appeal on its own part saw those actions as ex-facie personal actions by Idowu Ibeji but did not draw the conclusions there from that the learned Senior Advocates for the appellant would have wished to see. The problem with Exhibit D, E and F is of course that they were not accompanied by the proceedings in the Customary Court which would have made it easier to know the substance of the decision. See Gabriel Madukolu and Ors. v. Johnson Nkemdilim [1962] 1 All N.L.R. 587 and 593. Exhibit D was infact not a judgment but a record of the terms of settlement. These cases were no doubt relied on by the appellant to show the claim of Idowu Beji on which the appellants anchored his title. That the respondents were fully aware of these cases and of the fact that they concerned the land in dispute is very obvious, but if as has been found by the two Courts below, the land is family land the respondents could not be concerned since they would assume that Idowu Beji was only defending family property. There was evidence which the two Courts accepted that the land went from one elder to the other and accordingly came into care of Idowu Beji. Idowu Beji’s son Raufu, in evidence said:
“Those who have used the land after Odutolu and Sofoluwe were Oguntola, then Mosuogo, then Idowu (after Mosuogo’s death) and on Idowu’s death Moriamo Oguntola 1st plaintiff. The land has never been partitioned.”
This is not a case in my view in which the principle of law in Wytoberly v. Andrews (1871) L.R. 2 P&M 328 applies. That principle would apply if the case had been obvious that Idowu was treating the land in dispute as his personal land and they stood by while he prosecuted the actions. Here although he was not the Head of the family, there was evidence that he was the elder for that time looking after the family land. It is settled law and this has to be remembered that a member of the family can sue to protect family property.
The learned Senior Advocates complained that the evidence on geneology which the learned trial Chief Judge accepted was different from the pleadings of the plaintiffs. They cited Okagbue v. Romaine (1982) 5 S.C. 133, 152. It is settled that if evidence is given in respect of any matter not in the pleadings it goes to no issue. But this, with respect, is not a case of departure from pleadings but a question of fall in the standard of proof. The respondents pleaded that they were 7 branches of the Odutolu family but established only 3 children in evidence. I do not consider this a material departure for the effect of the evidence which the learned trial Chief Judge accepted is that Odutolu did not have one child, Mosuago, Idowu’s mother, as appellant contended.
The appellant was clearly battling against heavy odds for the findings he was attacking were the concurrent findings of the High Court and Court of Appeal. The attitude of this Court on that has been stated in so many authorities that it cannot bear repetition (see Etowa Enang and Ors. v. Adu (1981) 11 & 12 S. C. 25 at 39. The case of the appellant was virtually demolished by the findings of fact to which I had made reference.
As to laches and acquiescence, both the learned trial Chief Judge and the Court of Appeal found against the Appellant. This Court dealt with these concepts lately in O. Solomon & Ors. v. A. R. Mogaji & Ors. (1982) 11 S.C. 1 at 25-32. Being equitable defences in essence they merely state that if a land owner stood by while a stranger developed his land in good faith, such owner would be stopped from reaping the benefit of such development and a court of equity would not assist him in enforcing his rights. But this was clearly not an appropriate case in which to hold laches and acquiescence against respondents. The acts of the persons put on the land by Idowu Beji, appellant’s father and mother and appellant himself were of a temporary nature-food sellers, mechanic workshops, etc. The permanent things like the Publicity Company with Bill boards or the petrol stations were not proved. The Piggery on the land had as it were been stopped even before Coker died. Once a permanent structure was being erected in 1972, the Odutolu family rose up in arms. The only matter here that merited serious consideration was the oranges and bananas planted by the appellant’s father. These being economic trees are clearly in a different category. Unfortunately evidence on this was inconclusive. While Exhibit D showed that it was appellant’s father who planted them, it seemed they were planted even before the land was sold to him. Besides, there was evidence of cutting down these oranges and bananas given by 2nd plaintiff and Raufu Beji. It is not clear in the evidence of proceedings in Exh. D, E, F whether Idowu Beji cut them down because Coker went beyond the right of usage allowed him or whether they were cut down in the process of ldowu’s claim for recovery of possession. See Exh. D. The other allegedly permanent structures were mud houses.
Although there was no evidence that Idowu was Head of the family it is necessary nevertheless to state that even if he was (in the face of finding that the land in dispute was family land) and he was treating it as his personal land and sold it as such, such a sale would be void. See Mogaji’s case (supra).
For these reasons and for the more detailed reasons ably set down by my learned brother, Kawu, J.S.C. I would also dismiss the appeal. I abide by all the orders in the said lead judgment.

Appeal Dismissed.

 

Appearances

Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. ( with him, Chief Olisa Chukwuma, SAN.,C. J. Chukwura and Miss. A. A. Adeniyi) For Appellant

 

AND

Chief O. O. Ogunyemi ( with him, G. A. Aremu) For Respondent