T. A. YONWUREN V. MODERN SIGNS (NIG.) LTD.
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 15th day of February, 1985
SC.55/1983 (CONSOLIDATED)
JUSTICES
GEORGE SODEINDE SOWEMIMO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AYO GABRIEL IRIKEFE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
MOHAMMED BELLO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ANTHONY NNAEMEZIE ANIAGOLU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
BOONYAMIN OLADIRAN KAZEEM Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
DAHUNSI OLUGBEMI COKER Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
- A. YONWUREN – SC.55/1983(1) UDEALO NWAORA
(2) CHRISTIAN ONWUKA (DEAD) – SC.130/1983
(For themselves and on behalf of the
members of Umugulu/Umudue Iweanya Family(1) DANIEL ONOKPITE
(2) CHIEF OKORO ONOKPITE – SC.104/1983
(For themselves and on behalf of Ediemudeke descendants)
(CONSOLIDATED) Appellant(s)
AND
MODERN SIGNS (NIG.) LTD. – SC.55/1983
(1) NWANNOLI NWAKONOBI
(2) NWANKWO NNADIMMA
(3) NNAEGBO ONWUEGBUNA
(4) UZOEGBUNA IGWEZE
(5) MICHAEL NNOLI
(6) CHIKEZIE NWAORA
(7) UDENZE NWAORA
(For themselves and on behalf of Umuonuora family, Achalla)
– SC.130/1983
(1) JOHN EMEMOH
(2) ERHINOJARE UKONUKO UKUTAYE – SC.104/1983
(For themselves and on behalf of Usifo Abaka and Aluawa
descendants of Usifo village in Okpe Clan)
(CONSOLIDATED) Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT CAN DEPART FROM ITS PREVIOUS DECISION
Recently, it was decided by this Court with a full panel that although this court has jurisdiction to depart from and overrule its previous decision whether by a full court or not, it will do so rather sparingly; and only when new facts have emerged to show that the previous decision was wrongly decided, or that it was decided per incuriam, or that it was decided, without jurisdiction: See S.C. 144/83 – Paul Odi & Anor. v. Gbaniyi Osafile judgment delivered on 11th January, 1985. PER KAZEEM, J.S.C.
CONSEQUENCES OF WHEN AN APPEAL IS STRUCK OUT BY THE COURT
When an appeal is struck out the position is as it would have been if no appeal had been brought that is to say, the effective judgment is that appealed against, not a judgment of the appeal court and there seems to be nothing contrary to general principle in holding that it is still possible to appeal against the effective judgment, if a proper procedure is followed and if the limits of time for taking any particular step arc not exceeded. Either an application to relist or a fresh notice of appeal, with an enlargement of time if necessary, would be a form of procedure known to the law, and we do not attach as much importance as Betuel J., did to the absence of express statutory provision for the relisting of an appeal that has been struck out. PER KAZEEM, J.S.C.
THE APPLICABLE RULES THAT EMPOWERS THE COURT TO RELIST FOR HEARING AN APPEAL DISMISSED FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
But in our own Rule, there is specific provision for relisting such appeals for hearing even though they might have been dismissed and not struck out for non appearance of the appellants. This is provided for in Order 7 rule 23 thus:
“23(1) Subject to the provisions of Order 9 Rule 6(6) of these Rules, if the appellant fails to appear when his appeal is called on for hearing and has not taken action-under Rule 22 of this Order, the appeal may be dismissed with or without costs.
(2) When an appeal has been dismissed owing to the nonappearance of the appellant the Court may, if it thinks fit, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may deem just, direct the appeal to be re-entered for hearing.” Another rule similar to this which empowers the court to relist an appeal dismissed for non-compliance with conditions of appeal is Order 7 rule 19 which provides thus:
“19(1)11 the appellant has complied with none of the requirements of Rules 9 and 10 of this Order the Registrar of the court below shall certify such fact to the Court, which shall thereupon order that the appeal be dismissed either with or without costs, and shall cause the appellant and the respondent to be notified of the terms on its order.
(2) Where an appeal has been dismissed under paragraph (1) of this Rule, a respondent who has given notice under Rule 13 of this Order may give notice of appeal and the provisions of Rule 18 of this Order shall apply as if the appeal were brought under that Rule. PER KAZEEM, J.S.C.
THE INHERENT JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
On the issue of the exercise of inherent jurisdiction on which learned counsel heavily relied, I think it is pertinent to refer to the important points made by Mr. Jacob in his article on the matter. Inter alia, he said:
(a) “The inherent jurisdiction of the court is a concept which must be distinguished from the exercise of judicial discretion.
(b) It may be exercised in any given case, notwithstanding that there are Rules of Court governing the circumstances of such case. The powers conferred by Rules of Court are, generally speaking, additional to, and not in substitution of, powers arising out of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
The terms “inherent jurisdiction of the Court” is not used in contradistinction to the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by statute.
The Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction even in respect of matters which are regulated by statute or by rule of court, so long as it can do so without contravening any statutory provision.
The Superior Courts of criminal law have exercised inherent jurisdiction from the earliest times to punish for contempt of court committed in the face or presence of the court and of its process, and by way of regulating the practice of court and preventing the abuse of its process by staying an action shown to be vexatious and frivolous. Hence, the main methods by which the inherent jurisdiction of the court may be exercised are by coercion and the regulation of its process.
(e) Under its inherent jurisdiction the court has power to control and regulate its process and proceedings, and it exercises this power in a great variety of circumstances and by different methods ……. The exercise of this power has been pervasive throughout the whole legal machinery and has been extended to all stages of proceedings, pre-trial, trial and post-trial. Indeed, it is difficult to set the limits upon the power of the court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to control and regulate its process, for these limits are coincident with the needs of the Court to fulfil its judicial functions in the administration of justice.
(f) Under its inherent jurisdiction, the court may dismiss an action for want of prosecution; not only by analogy with the limitation of statutes, where the action has been allowed to be dormant for a period exceeding the relevant limitation period: (See KraKaner v. Kartz (1954) 1 W.L.R. 278 or (1954) 1 All E.R. 244; but also where it is satisfied that by reason of prolonged or inordinate delay which is inexcusable, the defendant has suffered or is likely to suffer prejudice or that it is no longer possible to have a fair trial between the parties – See Allen v. Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd. (1968) 2 QB 229 (1) and Supreme Court Practice 1970 Para. 25/1/3A et. seq. PER KAZEEM, J.S.C.
KAZEEM, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): In these three applications, the applicants in the main, sought orders directing that the appeals which had previously been dismissed for want of prosecution be re-entered on the cause list for hearing on such terms as the court might consider just in the circumstances.
The second application also sought an order for enlarging the time within which the appellant might file his written brief as required by rules of court; and the third also sought an order of three days’ extension of time in order to regularise the brief already filed by the appellants/applicants three days out of time and for such further order or orders as the court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.
In each case, the appeal had been dismissed by the court by virtue of Order 9 Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’) for failure to file the briefs within the time provided for under rule 3 of the said Order or within the time extended by the Court. The first appeal was dismissed on Monday the 12th March, 1984, the second on 4th June, 1984 and the third on 21st May, 1984.
The said Order 9 rule 7 provides as follows:
“7. If an appellant fails to file his brief within the time provided for in rule 3 above, or within the time as extended by the Court, the respondent may apply to the Court for the appeal to be dismissed for want of prosecution. If the respondent fails to file his brief, he will not be heard in oral argument except by leave of the Court.”
Various reasons for the failure to file the briefs were given in the affidavit in support of each application. However, since the applications were similar, and were seeking the same order a full court decided to consolidate the three applications for hearing.
Prior to the hearing of those applications, this court (but not by a full panel) had an occasion to consider a similar application in the case of Chief Iro Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum and Anor. (1984) 4 S.C. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the “Iro Ogbu’s case) in which it decided that once an appeal had been dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 rule 7 of the Rules, it has no statutory or inherent jurisdiction to grant an application to restore it to the list for hearing. As this decision is very important for the determination of these applications, it is necessary to summarise here the findings in that matter.
In Iro Ogbu’s case, this court held the following views that:-
(i) Neither Order 7 rule 23(2), nor Order 7 Rules 19(1) or 19(4) or Order 10 of the Rules confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to relist for hearing any appeal dismissed by the court for want of prosecution for failure to file Briefs within the time stipulated by Order 9 rule 3 and dismissed under Order 9 rule 7 because:-
(a) the applicants’ appeal was not dismissed for non-appearance of appellant to enable the applicant call for the exercise of the power under Order 7 rule 23(2),
(b) the applicants’ appeal was not dismissed for failure to comply with the conditions of appeal to enable the appellant call in aid the exercise of the power under Order 7 rule 19(4); and
(c) the lis is not extant to enable the Court exercise the power under Order 10.
(ii) The procedural jurisdiction of the Court is statutory in the main and in the absence of any provision in the Rules, the Court will be unable to entertain and grant the application.
(iii) The failure by an appellant to file a brief has a far reaching effect and there being a subsisting judgment against the appellant, the dismissal for want of prosecution in such a case under the present Rules in force amounts to an affirmation of the judgment of the court below in respect of which the appeal was brought.
(iv) Any Order of dismissal under Order 9 Rule 7 of the Rules amounts to a final judgment the finality of which is emphasised by Order 7 rule 30 which prevents the Court from reviewing “any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention.”
(v) Even if the judgment were not drawn up, signed and sealed, the provisions of Order 7 rule 30 deprives this Court of any jurisdiction to review the judgment of dismissal for want of prosecution.
(vi) The inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic, 1979 cannot be invoked to save the situation because there is no lis extant before the court upon which the inherent jurisdiction can operate.
(vii) Sympathy cannot override the clear provision of the Rules and it would be in the interest of all if parties and their counsel endeavour to keep to the time set out in the Rules for the doing of any act or taking of any step.
(viii) In Ratnam v. Cumarasamy (1964) 3 All E.R. 933 at p. 935, Lord Guest observed:
“It must be emphasised and realised that the rules of Court must.
prima facie, be obeyed and, in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step or procedure required to be taken, there must be some material on which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach would have unqualified right to an extension of time that would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to provide a time table for the conduct of litigation.”
(ix) The failure to file briefs by the appellants within the extended time can be likened to an abandonment of their appeal particularly when such failure is coupled with non-appearance in court without excuse at the time of hearing. See the observation of Lawson J. at p. 545 of R. v. Medway (1976) 2 W.L.R. 528.
Carama Lord Widgery C.J., Stephenson L.J. O’Conner, Lawson and Jupp J.J. Also see English Court of Appeal Rules 1968 Rule 10 sub-rule 4.
I shall deal further with certain aspects of the decision in Iro Ogbu’s case later on in this appeal.
Also in Sodeinde Brothers (Nig.) Ltd. v. African Continental Bank Ltd. (1982) 6 SC. 137, the decision in Iro Ogbu’s case was approved and followed by this Court.
It is therefore to be noted that the main purpose of the applications for consideration here was to urge this Court to depart from and overrule the decision in Iro Ogbu’s case. As a matter of fact. learned counsel for the applicants said so specifically in their submissions before this Court. Chief F. R.A. Williams, S.A.N., learned counsel for the applicant in the first application said that the question for consideration was whether the court has jurisdiction to restore to the list an appeal which has been dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 rule 7 of the Rules; and that if the decision of this Court in Osita Ikeakwu & 21 ors. v. Chinwuba Nwamkpa (1967) NMLR. 224 at p. 227 was cited to the Court in Iro Ogbu’s case, it would have decided differently. However, Mr. Anyamene, S.A.N., learned counsel for the applicants in the second application said in paragraphs 7 and 8 of his brief thus:
“7. This application for re-entering the appeal is made with full knowledge of the decision of this Court in Chief Iro Ogbu v. Chief Ogburu Urum (1981) 4 SC. 1.
8. The applicants will invite the court to depart from its decision in Chief Ogbu v. Chief Urum cited above and this is the primary reason for making this application, the secondary reason being the hardship which the rigid application of Order 9 Rule 7 has worked on the applicants.”
And Dr. Mowoe learned counsel for the applicant in the third application referred to the posture already taken by this court in the decision of Iro Ogbu’s case and that of Sodeinde Brothers v. African Continental Bank, and then submitted that it was time for the Court to abandon that posture.
Recently, it was decided by this Court with a full panel that although this court has jurisdiction to depart from and overrule its previous decision whether by a full court or not, it will do so rather sparingly; and only when new facts have emerged to show that the previous decision was wrongly decided, or that it was decided per incuriam, or that it was decided, without jurisdiction: See S.C. 144/83 – Paul Odi & Anor. v. Gbaniyi Osafile judgment delivered on 11th January, 1985. It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether learned counsel in these applications have drawn the attention of this court to such new facts that will necessitate a departure from or the overruling of the decision in Iro Ogbu’s case.
Chief Williams, S.A.N. learned counsel for the applicant in the first application made a number of both written and oral submissions before this court. He submitted that there is a fundamental difference between an appeal that was dismissed and the one that was struck out; that an appeal may be dismissed after it has been heard on the merit, and the court is of the view that the appellant is not entitled to the relief sought; that on the other hand, an appeal may be dismissed under the inherent jurisdiction of the court to prevent an abuse of the process of the court because the court exists for settling genuine disputes, and not to allow an appeal to hang over the head of an opponent. He submitted further that where the court uses its disciplinary power apart from its adjudicative power, the court is entitled to revoke or recall its Order made in exercise of its disciplinary power. He therefore concluded that this court has a discretionary power to recall or set aside an order made in exercise of its disciplinary power if the circumstances of the case so deserve. He conceded that the court has Rules of Court which repeat and codify its disciplinary powers; but he maintained that this court had held before rightly that the existence of Rules does not take away, the exercise of its discretionary powers. He referred to the decision of this court in Osita Ikeakwu & Ors. v. Chinwuba Nwamkpa (1967) NMLR. 224 at p. 227 which deals with the relisting of an appeal that had been struck out; and he said that if that decision had been cited to the court in Iro Ogbu’s case, that case would have been decided differently.
Learned counsel then referred to an Artcile entitled “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” written by Mr. I.H. Jacob, Senior Master of the Supreme Court in England; and published in Vol. 23 of the Current Legal Problems 1970 – a journal of the Faculty of Laws of the University College London. He cited copiously from it particularly from page 32 on “Control over Process”, pages 40-44 dealing with” Abuse of Process”, and pages 50 – 51 relating to “Relations between Inherent Jurisdiction and Rules of Court; and he then made the following submissions:
that once the Court is satisfied that it has inherent powers, those of them put in the Rules should not inhibit the court from exercising those not put in the Rules; that inherent jurisdiction is not a fanciful notion to which a party can resort when he cannot find any other authority to support his case; that it is the very essence that goes to the root of any jurisdiction; that both the Federal Supreme Court and the Privy Council had always made orders in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court; see Palmer v. Beresford Stooke 14 WACA 333 at 335 and Forfie v. Seifah (1958) A.C. 59 at p. 67; that the Rule of Court is ancillary to inherent jurisdiction and it cannot be used to curtail or inhibit inherent jurisdiction of the court; that even if there is no Order 9 rule 7 it is within the inherent jurisdiction of the court to refuse to allow an appeal to be argued without filing a brief, and even to dismiss the appeal; that inherent jurisdiction is an adjunct to the statutory jurisdiction of the court, and that it is in essence a jurisdiction which is necessary to enable the court to exercise its statutory jurisdiction; and finally that this court is created by the Constitution of Nigeria and given its jurisdiction by that Constitution and that as far as Nigeria is concerned, no Rule of Court can diminish the express or inherent jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution.
On Order 7 rule 30 of the Rules, Chief Williams submitted that it must not be construed in such a way as to curtail or diminish the powers of the court in hearing appeal on its merit; and that Rules of Court which deal with procedure must not be used to override the jurisdiction of the court because both operate in different compartments. Learned counsel then submitted that the two terms “dismissal” and “struck out” are interchangeable where the former is used as “dismissal otherwise than on the merit”, but dismissal on the merit is completely different and can amount to res judicata. To buttress his contention, Chief Williams cited the decision in Onalaja v. Oshinubi 12 WACA. 503 and referred to the Oxford English Dictionary meaning of “Dismiss” and “Strike out” at page 470. Meaning No. 10 and page 1135 Meaning No. 83 respectively; and he finally submitted that whether one strikes out or dismisses a case not on the merits the meaning is the same.
In his own submissions, Mr. Anyamene, S.A.N. learned counsel for the applicants in the second application mainly gave reasons why he was urging this Court to depart from Iro’s Ogbu’s case as follows:-
(i) that filing of briefs is only a matter of procedure, failure of which is not fatal to the case;
(ii) that Order 9 rule 7 of the Rules does not envisage the consequences that a failure to file brief will shut out an appellant from having his appeal heard because the court has the power to waive the requirement of filing a brief which it did in the two election cases of Egemasi v. Agim Duru (1983) 9 Sc. 7-21 and Emeka Ojukwu v. Dr. Edwin Onwudiwe (1983) 11 SC. 198
(iii) that the court can re-enter the appeal under its inherent jurisdiction.
The decisions in NEM General Insurance Co. v. Uchay (1973) 1 N.M.L.R. 170; Olu of Warri v. Esse (1958) 3 FSC. 94 at p. 97 and Osita Ikeakwu v. Chinwuba Nwamkpa (1967) NMLR. 224 at p. 227 were cited in support;
(iv) that on the issue of jurisdiction, a dismissal of an appeal for failure to file a brief is not a final judgment.
Dr. Mowoe for the applicant in the third application associated himself with the submissions of Chief Williams and then reiterated the reasons why the Court should overrule the decision in Iro Ogbu’s case as follows:
(i) Justice, fairplay and/or equity demand that the doors to the highest temple of justice in Nigeria, should not be shut against proper and deserving appellants.
(ii) Appeals in the highest/last court in Nigeria should be won or lost on merit not by default.
(iii) This Honourable Court, which is the LAST hope of an appellant should feel perfectly free to do what justice, equity and good conscience call for and should not be hampered by rules of court or lack of rules of court.
(iv) Rules of Court or absence of rules of courts should not pose any impediment to this Honourable Court’s dispensation of justice without fear or favour, ill will or affection.”
In reply, learned counsel for the respondents in the three applications (Messrs. T.A. Molajo and G.N.A. Okafor and Chief Ororho respectively) made various submissions supporting the decision in Iro Ogbu’s case and Sadeinde Bros. v. A.C.B; and they emphasized the points decided in those cases. They therefore submitted that in so far as the appeal in each case was dismissed for want of prosecution by virtue- of Order 9 rule 7 of the Rules, this Court has no statutory or inherent jurisdiction to relist the appeal for hearing; and the court was urged to dismiss the applications.
Let me examine the points made by learned counsel in their submissions to see whether or not they have succeeded in convincing the court that the Iro Ogbu’s case was wrongly decided. Chief Williams had given the impression in his submissions that the Iro Ogbu’s Case was decided per incuriam in that it did not take cognizance of the decision in Ikeakwu’s Case (supra) which was not cited before it in that matter; and Mr. Anyamene said that the Ikeakwu’s case is an authority for the proposition that this court has an inherent jurisdiction to entertain an appeal whether or not the lis is extant. But because of the importance that learned counsel had attached to the decision of this Court in Osita Ikeakwu & Ors. v. Chinwuba Nwamkpa (1967) NMLR. 224 at p. 227, I have decided to set out the facts as well as the decision in the matter in full as follows:-
“In that appeal the appellants were defendants in the High Court. There, the respondents obtained judgment against them for damages for trespass on certain fishponds and an injunction to restrain further fishing there without respondent’s consent.
The appellants had pleaded that the title to the fish ponds had been awarded them by the judgment of the Resident, Onitsha Province, given on appeal in Native Court Suit 83/1945. The High Court, presided over by Betuel J. held that the Resident’s judgment was given without jurisdiction because the Resident had earlier struck out the appeal, and that the appeal had therefore come to an end since there was no specific provision in the Native Courts Ordinance or Regulations made thereunder for relisting an appeal that had been struck out. It was submitted for the respondents and accepted by the Lower Court that the order of the Resident striking out the appeal therefore had the effect of an order dismissing the appeal. For the appellants, it was submitted that since the Resident only struck out the appeal he had not determined it on the merits and that it was open to the appellants to start again before the Resident by applying for leave to appeal out of time as they did, or to apply by correct procedure for it to be relisted.
The respondents relied on judgments given in their favour in other suits which were instituted later than No. 83/1945, but the Resident’s judgment in No. 83/1945 was the latest in time, and the appellant relied on it as res judicata. The issue was whether that judgment was a nullity.”
Brett, J.S.C. while delivering the judgment of the court observed:
“All appellate jurisdiction is statutory and the power to adjudicate on an appeal, by allowing or dismissing it, includes the power to decline to adjudicate on the merits where an appeal is not properly before the Court. This Court frequently exercises such a power. In such a case the usual course is to strike out the appeal, and although an order striking out an appeal has for some purposes much the same effect as an order dismissing it, it does not thereby become a decision on the merits and docs not necessarily preclude a subsequent decision on the merits if the matter can he re-opened by an appropriate procedure. When an appeal is struck out the position is as it would have been if no appeal had been brought that is to say, the effective judgment is that appealed against, not a judgment of the appeal court and there seems to be nothing contrary to general principle in holding that it is still possible to appeal against the effective judgment, if a proper procedure is followed and if the limits of time for taking any particular step arc not exceeded. Either an application to relist or a fresh notice of appeal, with an enlargement of time if necessary, would be a form of procedure known to the law, and we do not attach as much importance as Betuel J., did to the absence of express statutory provision for the relisting of an appeal that has been struck out. Section 37 of the Native Courts Ordinance empowered an appeal tribunal to grant an extension of time for bringing an appeal, and if Mr. Beaumont had jurisdiction to entertain the matter at all he had jurisdiction to grant an extension of time. Provided nothing is done which is contrary either to any express requirement of the law or to the principles of natural justice, we do not consider that the Courts should treat decisions given under the Native Courts Ordinance as invalid merely because of any informalities of procedure, and in our view Mr. Beaumont had jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal on the merits. If it is once accepted that he acted within his jurisdiction, his decision must be treated as binding.”
In the above case it is to be noted in the first place, that an appeal was first struck out by the Resident’s Court for non appearance of the appellant; and there was no specific provision in the Native Court Ordinance or the Regulations made thereunder for such appeals to be relisted for hearing.
But in our own Rule, there is specific provision for relisting such appeals for hearing even though they might have been dismissed and not struck out for non appearance of the appellants. This is provided for in Order 7 rule 23 thus:
“23(1) Subject to the provisions of Order 9 Rule 6(6) of these Rules, if the appellant fails to appear when his appeal is called on for hearing and has not taken action-under Rule 22 of this Order, the appeal may be dismissed with or without costs.
(2) When an appeal has been dismissed owing to the nonappearance of the appellant the Court may, if it thinks fit, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may deem just, direct the appeal to be re-entered for hearing.”
Another rule similar to this which empowers the court to relist an appeal dismissed for non-compliance with conditions of appeal is Order 7 rule 19 which provides thus:
“19(1)11 the appellant has complied with none of the requirements of Rules 9 and 10 of this Order the Registrar of the court below shall certify such fact to the Court, which shall thereupon order that the appeal be dismissed either with or without costs, and shall cause the appellant and the respondent to be notified of the terms on its order.
(2) Where an appeal has been dismissed under paragraph (1) of this Rule, a respondent who has given notice under Rule 13 of this Order may give notice of appeal and the provisions of Rule 18 of this Order shall apply as if the appeal were brought under that Rule.
If the respondent alleges that the appellant has failed to comply with a part of the requirements of Rules 2, 9 or 10 of this Order, the Court, if satisfied that the appellant has so failed, may dismiss the appeal for want of due prosecution or make such other order as the justice of the case may require.
(4) An appellant whose appeal has been dismissed under this rule may apply by notice of motion that his appeal be restored. Any such application may be made to the Court and the Court may in
its discretion for good and sufficient cause order that such appeal be restored upon such terms as it may think fit.”
Secondly, this court took the view in Ikeakwu’s case that there was provision in Section 37 of the Native Courts Ordinance which empowered an appeal tribunal to grant an extension of time for bringing an appeal; and that the Resident (Mr. Beaumont) who later allowed the appeal must have exercised that power. Hence Betuel J. was held to be wrong in saying that the Resident acted without jurisdiction in allowing the appeal. Under our Rules Order 1 rule 5 gives the court such power of enlargement of time thus:
“5. The Court may enlarge the time provided by these Rules for the doing of anything to which these Rules apply, or may direct a departure from these Rules; any other way when this is required in the interest of justice.”
However, the appeals dismissed in this case were not dismissed because the court failed to exercise its power to enlarge the time within which the appeals could be brought.
Thirdly the reason for giving the decision in Ikeakwu’s Case is contained in these observations of Brett, J.S.C. that:
“When an appeal is struck out the position is as it would have been if no appeal had been brought, that is to say, the effective judgment is that appealed against, not a judgment of the appeal court. and there seems to be nothing contrary to general principle in holding that it is still possible to appeal against the effective judgment, if a proper procedure is followed and if the limits of time for taking any particular step are not exceeded. Either an application to relist or a fresh notice of appeal, with an enlargement of time if necessary, would be a form of procedure known to the law”
But that was not the situation when the appeals that gave rise to these applications were dismissed. The dismissal of those appeals for want of prosecution brought finality to the proceedings and the effective judgments were the judgments of the Court of Appeal which were appealed against.
Moreover once the appeals were dismissed. and the orders have been drawn up, signed and sealed, the court became functus officio and those judgments could not be reviewed again. That is the essence of Order 7 rules 29 and 30 of the Rules which provides as follows:
“29(1)Every judgment of the Court shall be embodied in an order.
(2) A sealed or certified copy of the order shall be sent by the Registrar to the court below.
(3) Interlocutory orders shall be prepared in like manner.
30. The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the Court decided nor shall the operative and substantive part of it be varied and a different form substituted.
Fourthly, the elections cases of Egemansi and Ojukwu mentioned by Mr. Anyamene cannot in my view be regarded as an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to hear the appeals in those cases without the filing of briefs. Rather, because of the special nature of the case which required accelerated hearing, the court exercised its power to waive compliance with Order 9 rule 7 in accordance with the provisions of Order 9 rule 8 which says:
8. The Court may, where it considers the circumstances of an appeal to be exceptional, or that the hearing of an appeal must be accelerated in the interest of justice, waive compliance with the provisions of Order 9, in so far as they relate to the preparation and filing of Briefs of Argument, either wholly or in part, or reduce the time limits specified in the Order, to such extent as the Court may deem reasonable in the circumstances of the case.”
On the issue of the exercise of inherent jurisdiction on which learned counsel heavily relied, I think it is pertinent to refer to the important points made by Mr. Jacob in his article on the matter. Inter alia, he said:
(a) “The inherent jurisdiction of the court is a concept which must be distinguished from the exercise of judicial discretion.
(b) It may be exercised in any given case, notwithstanding that there are Rules of Court governing the circumstances of such case. The powers conferred by Rules of Court are, generally speaking, additional to, and not in substitution of, powers arising out of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
The terms “inherent jurisdiction of the Court” is not used in contradistinction to the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by statute.
The Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction even in respect of matters which are regulated by statute or by rule of court, so long as it can do so without contravening any statutory provision.
The Superior Courts of criminal law have exercised inherent jurisdiction from the earliest times to punish for contempt of court committed in the face or presence of the court and of its process, and by way of regulating the practice of court and preventing the abuse of its process by staying an action shown to be vexatious and frivolous. Hence, the main methods by which the inherent jurisdiction of the court may be exercised are by coercion and the regulation of its process.
(e) Under its inherent jurisdiction the court has power to control and regulate its process and proceedings, and it exercises this power in a great variety of circumstances and by different methods ……. The exercise of this power has been pervasive throughout the whole legal machinery and has been extended to all stages of proceedings, pre-trial, trial and post-trial. Indeed, it is difficult to set the limits upon the power of the court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to control and regulate its process, for these limits are coincident with the needs of the Court to fulfil its judicial functions in the administration of justice.
(f) Under its inherent jurisdiction, the court may dismiss an action for want of prosecution; not only by analogy with the limitation of statutes, where the action has been allowed to be dormant for a period exceeding the relevant limitation period: (See KraKaner v. Kartz (1954) 1 W.L.R. 278 or (1954) 1 All E.R. 244; but also where it is satisfied that by reason of prolonged or inordinate delay which is inexcusable, the defendant has suffered or is likely to suffer prejudice or that it is no longer possible to have a fair trial between the parties – See Allen v. Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd. (1968) 2 QB 229 (1) and Supreme Court Practice 1970 Para. 25/1/3A et. seq.
(g) The court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction by summary process, even where there are Rules of Court under which it can exercise an equally effective jurisdiction. It may be useful at this stage therefore to define more precisely the relation, as well as the difference, between the inherent jurisdiction and the Rules of Court.
The powers of the court under its inherent jurisdiction are complementary to its powers under Rules of Court; one set of powers supplements and reinforces the others. The inherent jurisdiction of the court is a most valuable adjunct to the powers conferred on the court by the Rules. The usefulness of the Rules of Court is that they regulate with some precision the circumstances in which the court can apply coercive measures for disobedience of or non-compliance with the requirements of the rules or orders of the court. These measures are simply convenient and effective to uphold the authority of the court in cases in which there are no aggravating circumstances accompanying such disobedience or non-compliance.
On the other hand, where the usefulness of the powers under the Rules ends, the usefulness of the powers under inherent jurisdiction begins. This is shown in three important respects in which the powers arising out of the inherent jurisdiction differ from those conferred by Rules of Court. First, perhaps by their very nature, they are wider and more extensive powers, permeating all proceedings at all stages and filling any gaps left by the Rules and they can be exercised on a wider basis, for example, by enabling the court to admit evidence by affidavit or otherwise in order to examine all the circumstances appertaining to the merits of the case. Secondly, they can be invoked in respect of persons who are not themselves actual litigants in pending proceedings.
Thirdly, they can be used to punish the offender by fine or imprisonment.”
It is to be noted that the writer has made some points in the Article which are relevant for our consideration in this matter namely:
(i) that the court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction even in respect of matters which are regulated by statutes or by rules of courts so long as it can do so without contravening any statutory provision;
(ii) that the main methods by which the inherent jurisdiction of the court may be exercised are by coercion and the regulation of its process.
It seems clear that we are not concerned here with the exercise of the coercive powers of the Court to punish for contempt; nor are we considering matters relating to control of the court’s process which are considered to be vexatious and are tantamount to an abuse of the process of the court. But we are dealing with matters relating to the proceedings of the court which are already regulated by Rules of Court. The Chief Justice of Nigeria had made those rules in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 216 of the Constitution 1979 read along with section 274 thereof relating to existing laws. There is nothing in those rules which authorizes the relisting of or hearing of an appeal, which has been dismissed for want of prosecution by virtue of Order 9 rule 7 of the Rules. But the rules provide that by a dismissal in such a case, the appeal had been brought to finality and the judgment could no longer be reviewed save in certain cases which are not applicable here.
See Order 7 rule 30 of the Rules. These are the provisions which Mr. Jacob in his Article said must not be contravened by the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
I am therefore of the opinion that no inherent jurisdiction can be exercised to revive the appeals that were dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It should be remembered that all those issues were canvassed before this Court in Iro Ogbu’s Case and they were thoroughly considered therein. No new facts have therefore emerged, in my view, from the submissions of learned counsel for the applicants in the three applications to show that the decision in fro Ogbu’s Case was either wrongly decided; or that it was rendered per incuriam. In the circumstances, I find no merit in the three applications which are hereby dismissed with costs assessed at N25.00 in favour of the respondents in each application.
SOWEMIMO, C.J.N. (Presiding): The arguments, addressed to the Court in three applications by the appellants/applicants and respondents, were on the basis that the ruling in Suit No. SC.18/80, Chief Iro Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum & Anor was wrongly decided. I refer to the relevant portions of the judgments of my learned brothers, Bello and Uwais, JJ.SC.:-
“Justice Bello, J.S.C.
I agree that there are no provisions in the Supreme Court Act 1960 and in the Supreme Court Rules 1977 permitting this Court to set aside its judgment and to re-enter for hearing an appeal that has been dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 rule 7 of the said Rules. I consider it pertinent to point out that when an appeal has been dismissed owing to the failure of the appellant to perfect the conditions of appeal or owing to the non appearance of the appellant or respondent, the Court is empowered in proper cases to set aside its judgment and to order the appeal to be restored and re-entered for hearing: Order 7 rule 19(4); Order 7 rule 23(2) and Order 7 rule 25(3) of the said Rules.
No such provisions were made for an appeal that has been dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 rule 7.
I have also considered whether the Court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside its judgment of dismissal of an appeal founded under the provisions of Order 9 rule 7. It seems to me that on the authority of Obimonure v. Erinosho (1966) 1 All N.L.R. 250, the inherent jurisdiction of a Court to set aside its judgment or order is limited to judgments or orders which are nullities. The issue of nullity does not arise in the case in hand.”
“Justice Uwais, J.S.C.
Be that as it may, Mr. Ofodile indicated at first that he brought his application under Order 7 rule 23(2) and Order 9 rule 3(1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977. However, on realising that Order 7 rule 23(2) is unapplicable, he sought to invoke Order 7 rule 19 and Order 10 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977.
Chief Kehinde, on the other hand, opposed the application and submitted that there is no provision in the Supreme Court Rules, 1977 which allows for the re-instatement of appeal once it
is dismissed for want of prosecution.
The instances which this Court can in its discretion restore appeals which had been dismissed are specifically provided under the Supreme Court Rules 1977. Such instances include the non-compliance with conditions of appeal (Order 7 rule 19(4), the non-appearance of an appellant at the hearing of the appeal (Order 7 rule 23(1)) and the non-appearance of a respondent at the hearing of the appeal (Order 7 rule 25(1) Although Order 9 rule 7 provides for the dismissal of appeal on the failure of appellant to file brief timeously, the Rules remain silent on whether such dismissal could specifically be set-aside. There is, however, the rubric ‘Miscellaneous’ under Order 10 of the Rules which states:
‘Non-compliance on the part of the appellant or respondent with these Rules or with any Rule of practice for the time being in force shall not prevent the further prosecution of the appeal if the Court considers that such non-compliance was not wilful, and that it is in the interests of justice that such non-compliance be waived. The Court may in such manner as they think right, direct that the appellant or the respondent as the case may be to remedy such non-compliance, and thereupon the appeal shall proceed……’
I agree that the provisions of Order 10 are wide enough to embrace the circumstances of Order 9 rule 7. However, the provisions will only come into play when they are raised at the opportune moment. In this case at the time when application to dismiss the appeal was made by the respondents on 24th November,1980. Once the appeal is dismissed it seems to me that this Court becomes functus officio and has no power under Order 10 to re-list the appeal.”
May I refer, in this respect, to the provisions of Order 9 rules 7 and 8.
May I also refer to a portion of an article written by I.H. Jacob, on behalf of the Faculty of Laws, University College, London , Volume 23, and titled “Current Legal Problems 1970”, which reads:-
“In many spheres of the administration of justice, the High Court of Justice in England exercises a jurisdiction which has the distinctive description of being called ‘inherent’. The inherent jurisdiction of the court may be invoked in an apparently inexhaustible variety of circumstances and may be exercised in different ways. This peculiar concept is indeed so amorphous and ubiquitous and so pervasive in its operation that it seems to defy the challenge to determine its quality and to establish its limits. Yet there are insistent questions about inherent jurisdiction which demand and deserve an answer, such as, what is its nature, its juridical basis, its limits, its capacity to diversify, and its claim to viability. An attempt to provide some answers may help to throw a little light upon an important, though perhaps somewhat uncharted, area of English procedural law.
Nature of Inherent Jurisdiction
To understand the nature of the inherent jurisdiction of the court, it is necessary to distinguish it first from the general jurisdiction of the court, and next from its statutory jurisdiction.
The term ‘inherent jurisdiction of the court’ does not mean the same thing as ‘the jurisdiction of the court’ used without qualification or description: the two terms are not interchangeable, for the ‘inherent’ jurisdiction of the court is only a part or an aspect of its general jurisdiction. The general jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court of records is, broadly speaking unrestricted and unlimited in all matters of substantive law, both civil and criminal, except in so far as that has been taken away in unequivocal terms by statutory enactment. The High Court is not subject to supervisory control by any other court except by due process of appeal, and it exercises the full plenitude of judicial power in all matters concerning the general administration of justice within its area. Its general jurisdiction thus includes the exercise of an inherent jurisdiction.
Moreover, the term ‘inherent jurisdiction of the court’ is not used in contradistinction to the jurisdiction conferred on the court by statute. The contrast is not between the common law jurisdiction of the court on the one hand and its statutory jurisdiction on the other, for the court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction even in respect of matters which are regulated by statute or by rule of court, so long as it can do so without contravening any statutory provision. There is, nevertheless, an important difference between the nature of the inherent jurisdiction of the court and its statutory jurisdiction. The source of the statutory jurisdiction of the court is of course the statute itself, which will define the limits within which such jurisdiction is to be exercised, whereas the source of the inherent jurisdiction of the court is derived from its nature as a court of law, so that the limits of such jurisdiction are not easy to define, and indeed appear to elude definition.”
The above observation made by Jacob is interesting and useful.
“Dismissal” is an English word and the meaning attached to it in England has been set out in Jowitts Dictionary of English Law 1959. The publishers of the book refer to its object: “has been to produce a really comprehensive lexicon covering English Law from the earliest times to the present day, giving a definition and an explanation of every legal time, old and new.” In commonwealth jurisdiction like Nigeria, the word “Dismissal” retains its meaning with an invigoration and insaturated avarice for technicality.
It may bear an extreme meaning in Nigeria parlance, when its meaning to failure to take “due prosecution” attaches to failure or lateness in filing brief. Allowance must, however, be made to dexterity. While it is to be discouraged, the observance of a rule of court in its breadth may be, in a proper and genuine case, the courts in Nigeria will not beat back an attempt at reoriginating a lost cause.
The peculiar circumstances in this appeal, Suit No. SC.55/83, T.A. Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (Nig.) Ltd., are that the appellant collected the record of proceedings, delivered it to the chambers of his legal practitioner, and it was mis-placed. When the appeal came on the list for disposal, for the purpose of dismissing it for want of due prosecution, the legal practitioner representing the appellant appeared. On the other hand, the respondent also appeared. It comes for a decision whether the situation, as disclosed, creates a situation of want of due prosecution, because briefs were not filed or of non-appearance of an appellant.
The Court decided to dismiss the appeal, for want of due prosecution.
The present application for re-listing, in exercise of inherent jurisdiction, is hereby dismissed, on the genuine merit, with N25.00 costs to the respondent.
In Suit no. SC.104/83, John Ememoh & Anor. v. Chief Daniel O. Onok-pile & Ors. which was argued along with this as a separate motion, the appellant/applicant appeared in Court after filing his brief out of time, and the respondent filed his brief of reply within the prescribed time. The appellant/applicant asked for:
(1) re-listing/re-placing on the cause list, his appeal which was dismissed for want of due prosecution under Order 9 rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977;
(2) three days’ extension for filing his brief, which though had been filed out of time, to bring his appeal within the prescribed time.
In an affidavit evidence, especially paragraph 9, the appellant/applicant swore –
“9. That on 21/5/84 when this appeal came up for hearing before this Honourable Court, the Court raised the point that the brief filed in support of our appeal was filed on Monday, 21st November, 1983 and that the last day for filing same was Wednesday, 16th November, 1983. That meant that our brief was filed nearly three (3) days out of time because documents due for filing on Saturday, 19th November, 1983 could properly be filed on Monday, 21st November, 1983 since this Honourable Court’s Registry did not open on Saturday, 19th November, 1983 and Sunday, 20th November, 1983.
The Court did not allow the appellant/applicant’s legal practitioner to argue the appeal, because of the breach of Order 9 rule 7, nor did it grant him extension of time.
Surely, learned counsel for the appellant/applicant ought to realise that this Court is governed by Rules of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, 1977. He cannot be let-in to argue an appeal which was not properly before the Court.
The judgment dismissing the appeal stands, and the application in this case is hereby dismissed, with N25.00 costs to the respondent.
In Suit No. SC.130/83, Udealo Nwaora v. Nwannoli Nwakonobi & Ors., Mr. A.N. Anyamene, S.A.N., as counsel for appellant/applicant, asked that the appeal be re-entered for re-hearing, and an order enlarging the prescribed time for filing of brief be extended. There is nothing stated on the heading of the motion that the application is being made under any Order of Court. On the face of the motion itself, it would appear that the application for extension of time was to enable the counsel for appellant/applicant to file his brief out of prescribed time, or as extended. Paragraph 12 of the affidavit evidence in support reads –
“12. The financial circumstances of myself and members of my community were so bad. We were unable to raise any money immediately.
Whilst one may express sympathy for the appellant/applicant, the point has to be resolved according to Rules of Court. No brief has been filed in this appeal within the prescribed time, no extension has been asked for or granted, under Order 9 rule 7. The appeal stands dismissed, for want of due prosecution.
In Suit No. Sc. 104/83, John Ememoh & Anor. v. Chief Daniel O. Onokpite & Ors., Mr. T.A. Molajo, counsel for the respondent, in opposition to the application, referred to Order 7 rule 30, which provides as follows:-
“30. The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention.
judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the Court decided nor shall the operative and substantive part of it be varied and a different form substituted.”
He submitted that any departure from that rule does not give any jurisdiction to the Court. Exceptions, he submitted, should not be allowed to take over the Rules of this Court. He referred to the exceptions in the Rule quoted above. It is his submission, that in the absence of any expressed provisions outside those provided for in Order 7 Rule 19(4), the Court has no jurisdiction to review its judgment. The Court has the jurisdiction to raise non-compliance with its Rules; it has no power to set aside its judgment (Order 9 rule 7) unless the judgment is a nullity.
In conclusion, learned counsel stated that no appeal can be restored after it has been dismissed on the merit, for breach or non-compliance with relevant Rules of Supreme Court, 1977.
In Suit No. SC.130/83 between Udealo Nwaora v. Nwannoli Nwakonobi & Ors. Mr. G.N.A. Okafor, learned counsel for the respondents, in opposition to Mr. Anyamene, S.A.N., submitted that since the applicants have concluded that the previous case was rightly decided, there was no need, therefore, for this Court to set aside the decision. In reference to inherent jurisdiction, it is his submission that it does not arise for application in this appeal.
May I draw attention to the views expressed by my learned brother, late Idigbe, J.S.C., in suit No. SC. 57/80 – Bashir Alade Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission:-
“……………………………………
From the above judgment, the appellant appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal (hereinafter referred to simply as ‘the Court of Appeal’); and their Lordships in that Court (Coker, Wali and Uthman Muhammed, JJ .C.A.) on the 12th day of June, 1980 dismissed the appeal for almost exactly the same reasons which formed the basis of the order of dismissal, of the application, by the Court of first instance. Again, I think it is desirable to refer to certain passage in the lead judgment of Uthman Muhammed, J.CA. in the Court of Appeal with whom Wali, J.CA. found himself ‘in complete agreement’ and Coker, J.CA. ‘reluctantly in agreement’, After stating, in his judgment, that ‘the issue of the applicant’s status as a public officer if distinguished from those situations of ordinary master and servant relationship raised varied opinions, ‘His Lordship, Uthman Muhammed, J.C.A. referred to a passage in the opinion of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin (1963) 2 All E.R. at 66, and continued and adopted it:-
(a) ‘….when one refers to this classification it would appear that the appellant would fall in the second category, that is, those holding office at pleasure. But here in Nigeria the Public Service Commission (i.e. the respondent) promulgated a procedure which would guide it in performance of its statutory duty. It would seem that the regulations, not being statutory provisions, (sic) is not a public right….The Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria has not specified (i.e. imposed) these limitations….I agree with the learned Chief Judge that you cannot impose on a master the servant he does not want….in my view, submitted that the appellant has no legal right to be appointed a Civil Servant……….Certainly this is the gist of the whole application. Needless to ask whether the applicant has a legal right to be reinstated or employed as a legal adviser in the Federal Ministry of Justice….”
This appeal was dismissed, for want of due prosecution because no brief of appellant was filed.
Suit No. SC 104/83, John Ememoh & Anor. and Chief Daniel O. Onokpite & Ors. – Chief Ororho, in his submission in opposing Dr. Mowoe, said that he filed his reply brief in time and that he took preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal, because the appellant’s brief in the case was not filed within the prescribed period, and this amounts to non-compliance with Order 9 rule 7.
Inherent jurisdiction of the Court should not be used so as to defeat the expressed Rules and Practice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, 1977.
The appeal was dismissed on the 21st day of May, 1984, for want of due prosecution under Order 9 rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977, because the appellant failed to file his brief of argument within eight weeks as required by Order 9 Rule 3(1). There is no power in this Court to set aside the order of the dismissal properly made by this Court when it came before it for hearing.
I have had the privilege of reading, in draft, the judgment of my learned brother, Oladiran Kazeem, J .S.C. and I agree entirely with his reasonings as set out succinctly and meticulously. To set it clearly, the three motions are hereby dismissed with costs.
IRIKEFE, J.S.C.: The three applications listed above were consolidated since each application raises an issue identical with that raised in the others.
The request is for the restoration to the list of this court of an appeal dismissed for failure to file a brief pursuant to Order 9 Rule 7 of the Rules of this court.
I had seen in advance the lead ruling just read by my learned brother KAZEEM, J.S.C. The said ruling focused attention on several provisions of our rules of court, where, after dismissal, an appeal may be restored to the list. The rule with which this appeal is concerned does not so provide. I agree entirely with the views so clearly and ably set out in the ruling of KAZEEM, J.S.C. The submissions vigorously urged upon us by learned counsel in the three applications have not in any way put at risk the decision of this court in Chief Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Urum & Ors. (1984) 4 SC. page 1. While it could be seen that Order 7 deals with the formative stage of the exercise of a party’s constitutional right to commence an appeal and comply with the procedures laid down for prosecuting same, Order 9 deals with that stage when all these procedures would have been concretised; in short as at this stage, the appellant would have overtly evinced a desire to go through with the appeal. Put differently, he would also by not filing a brief, shown unequivocally, that he is no longer desirous of going through with the appeal. An order of dismissal at this stage was intended by the rules of this Court applicable to the instant proceedings, to be one on merit, to lay the ghost of the case, as it were, once and for all. Surely, since there is a presumption that the judgment of the Court of Appeal is right until set aside, there is a heavy burden on an appellant to show great vigilance by taking all such steps as are necessary to render an appeal ripe for hearing. Under Order 9 Rule 6(5) an appellant who has filed no brief may yet be heard orally with the leave of this court. Such a situation did not arise in any of the cases now being considered.
While I would readily agree that the court’s inherent jurisdiction is a necessary adjunct to the rules of court for the purpose of a speedy and effective dispensation of justice, the former cannot be a total substitute for the latter, as it is to the latter, that one would have to look for the actual conduct of the case.
I, like KAZEEM, J.S.C. would draw support from Lord Guest when, in Ratnam v. Cumarasmy & Anor. (1964) 3All E.R. 933 at 935 – the learned law Lord stated as follows:-
“The rules of court must, prima facie, be obeyed, and, in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken, there must be some material on which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified right to an extension of time which would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to provide a time table for the conduct of litigation.”
(Italics mine)
This mischief to which the relevant rule is directed is the bringing to an end of litigation in the interest of the party who won in the Court of Appeal.
Finally I agree that once an appeal is dismissed under the rule, there is no longer a “lis pendens” in respect of which a restoring order may be made.
I also find no merit in these three applications and hereby dismiss them with N25.00 costs in respect of each in favour of the respondents to each application.
BELLO, J.S.C.: The main question for determination in these three applications is whether the decision of this Court in Ogbu & Ors. v. Urum & Anor. (1981) 4 SC. I was per incuriam. We decided in that case that this Court has neither statutory nor inherent jurisdiction to restore for hearing an appeal which had been dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules 1977. We have been urged to depart from and overrule that decision and to hold that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to restore such an appeal. The decision of this Court in Ikeakwu & Ors. v. Nwamkpa (1967) 1 NMLR. 224 is the main spear for the attack on Ogbu’s case. It has been vigorously contended that Ikeakwu & Ors. v. Nwamkpa (supra) had not been brought to the attention of the Court and had the Court considered it, the Court would have decided Ogbu’s case differently.
In his lead judgment my learned brother. Kazeem, J.S.C., has fully considered the facts, the circumstances and the ratio decidendi of the case of Ikeakwu & Ors. v. Nwamkpa (supra). I agree with his conclusion that the facts and the circumstances of that case were entirely different from the facts and the circumstances of the three applications under consideration. That case dealt with the power of an appeal court to strike out an appeal and thereafter in the exercise of its statutory power to remedy the situation by granting an extension of time to appeal. I am satisfied there is no conflict whatever in the two decisions.
In the recent case of Paul Odi & Anor. v. Osafile SC.144/1983 delivered on 11th January, 1985, unreported yet, we had occasion to review the cases wherein grounds had existed which had warranted the Court to depart from its previous decisions and we reinterated the principles which may justify a departure from precedent. With those principles in mind, I have not been convinced to change my view, which I stated in Ogbu’s case, that this Court has no jurisdiction – statutory or inherent – to restore for hearing an appeal which has been dismissed under Order 9 rule 7. A judgment of dismissal under Order 9 rule 7 is final and conclusive. It makes no difference and it does not matter whether a formal order has been drawn up or not. But the fact that formal orders relating to the judgments in these applications have been drawn up reinforces the finality of the said judgments: Bockelmann v. Nwaehi (1965) 1 All N. L. R. 112 and Asiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All N. L. R. 82.
For these reasons and for the reasons fully stated in the judgment of my learned brother, Kazeem J.S.C., the applications should be dismissed with N25.00 costs to each set of respondents.
OBASEKI, J.S.C.: These three applications each of which seeks the order of this Court to re-enter the appeal dismissed for want of prosecution were for the purpose of hearing consolidated. Since the applications raise the same issue which is whether this court has inherent jurisdiction to entertain such applications and make the orders prayed for, it was decided to hear all the counsel for the applicants first and thereafter all the counsel for the respondents.
The applicant in SC.55/1983 was the appellant in Appeal No. SC.55/1983 and the respondent was the respondent in the said appeal from the Court of Appeal to this Court. The appellant fulfilled the conditions of appeal imposed by the Deputy Chief Registrar of the Court of Appeal.
Thereafter, the record of proceedings and judgments in the High Court and the Court of Appeal usually termed the record of appeal was compiled and the appellant was duly notified that a copy of the record of appeal was available for his collection upon payment of N317.72 the total of the balance of preparation of the copies for his use and that of the Justices of the Supreme Court. The appellant is a legal practitioner in Nigeria and on receipt of the notification from the Senior Registrar, Court of Appeal, Lagos he went to the Deputy Chief Registrar’s office, paid outstanding balance and collected the record of appeal.
This was on the 8th day of July, 1983. He had before then given instructions to Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.A.N. to act for him in the appeal. On receipt of the record of proceedings, he took it to the Chambers of Chief F.R.A. Williams and gave it to one of the clerks in the Chambers with a letter attached to the front page of the record for delivery to Chief F.R.A. Williams who was absent from Chambers at that time. Chief F.R.A. Williams, was not handed either the letter or the record of proceedings. He was also not contacted by the appellant to ascertain whether he received the record of appeal and the action he was taking on it.
Subsequently, the court’s copies of the record of appeal for the use of the Justices of the Supreme Court were received and after the time for the filing of briefs of arguments by the parties had expired, the appeal was set down for hearing on the 12th day of March, 1984. On that day, Chief F.R.A.
Williams, S.A.N. appeared as counsel for the appellant and Mr. T.A. Molajo, appeared as counsel for the respondent. The appellant had under the Rules of the Supreme Court 1977 Order 9 Rule 3(1) 8 weeks or 56 days from the 8th day of July, 1983in which to file and serve his brief of argument.
On a motion by Mr. E.A. Molajo, S.A.N. counsel for the respondent for an order dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution under Order 9 Rule 7, Rules of the Supreme Court, Chief F.R.A. Williams replied that he had neither seen the appellant nor the record of appeal since the appellant collected the record of appeal. That if the appellant had delivered the record of appeal to him, he would have prepared and filed the brief of arguments on behalf of the appellant. Thereafter, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under Order 9 Rule 7, Supreme Court Rules, 1977. Nine days later, the applicant filed this application seeking from this Court “an order directing that the appeal be re-entered for hearing on such terms as the court may consider just …..”
The motion was filed under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Order 7 Rule 23(2) and Order 10 of the Supreme Court Rules 1977.
Briefs of arguments were filed on the orders of this Court in this application.
This court had in a considered Ruling in the case of Chief Iro Ogbu and Others v. Chief Ogburu Urum and Anor. (1981) 4 Sc. 1 held that the court had no jurisdiction either under the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules 1977 or under its inherent powers to re-enter an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 Rule 7 of the Supreme Court 1977 for hearing.
The principal question was therefore correctly stated by counsel for the applicant in his brief as
“whether this Court has jurisdiction to restore to the list an appeal which has been dismissed for want of prosecution under
Order 9 Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules 1977”
Counsel rightly commented on this question that “if the answer is in the affirmative, it means that the application can be moved and determined on the merits. But if the answer is in the negative, it means that the application must be struck out for want of jurisdiction.
Learned counsel’s main approach was through an attempt to establish that there is no difference in effect on the decision appealed from between an order of dismissal of an appeal for want of prosecution and an order striking the appeal from the cause list. He contended that a dismissal for want of prosecution is not a ‘dismissal’ on the merit. He submitted that a civil or criminal proceeding may be dismissed either on the merits or for non-compliance with the rules of practice and procedure. In other words, a civil or criminal proceeding may be dismissed because, after hearing all parties to the proceedings on the merit of the matter or matters in controversy between
them, the court comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff or the prosecutor (as the case may be) is not entitled to the judgment or verdict he is asking for. It may also be dismissed without hearing all parties particularly where there is a failure on the part of the appellant to prosecute the appeal. Learned counsel emphasised that where there is jurisdiction to re-open or reconsider a judgment or order it should more readily be exercised where there has been a “dismissal” not on the merits.
Order 7 Rule 30 of the Supreme Court Rules forbids any review of any judgment of this Court except to correct slips and typographical errors.
Drawn up orders can only be corrected for slips and typographical errors and to truly convey the meaning of the orders of the Court. See Asiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All N.L.R. p. 82. Counsel conceded that jurisdiction to reopen or reconsider a judgment or order in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary should be exercised with the greatest caution.
Counsel then submitted that the jurisdiction to correct an error of fact or law on which the court’s judgment or order is obviously based is inherent in every court of justice and cited in support the case of Staniar v. Evans 34 Ch. D 470 the Headnote of which reads:
“where a wrong order has-been made by reason of misrepresentation or mistake of fact the error may be corrected by a new order made notwithstanding the former order ..
Learned counsel submitted that this rule of practice was followed in Asiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All N.L.R. p.82. Counsel invited this Court to overrule the decision in that case for the reasons that:
(1) the decision was based on the then Order 7 Rule 29 which no longer applies;
(2) in any event the decision did not correctly represent the practice in England;
(3) having regard to the active participation of lawyers for the parties in drawing up an order or judgment, it is perfectly logical that English Courts should decline to alter or set aside an order after it had been drawn up;
(4) there is no requirement under the present Rules of the Supreme Court to draw up an order or judgment and the present practice of doing so is no more than a ‘hangover’ from the Supreme Court Rules 1961 (now repealed) in the process the drawing up of an order in Nigeria can be of no legal consequence.
When learned counsel’s attention was drawn to the relevant Rules in the 1977 Supreme Court Rules, particularly Order 7 Rules 29 and 30, he with drew the 1st and 4th reasons relying only on grounds 2 and 3. Counsel contended that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review, reconsider or set aside a judgment or order given by it (though to be exercised with the greatest caution) is not limited to orders which have not been drawn up at the time of the application.
I cannot find sufficient reasons for the application to overrule the decision in Asiyanbi v. Adeniji. I agree with learned counsel that the general policy of the courts is to lean over backwards to see that cases are decided on their merits rather than on technicalities. It is not just mere technicality to dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution. Since the law has given the appellant a right of appeal, the law has imposed a corresponding duty on the appellant to prosecute his appeal diligently in accordance with the rules. See sections 213(2), 213(3); 214, section 216 and Order 9 Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules. Learned counsel commended the dictum of Lord Atkin in Evans v. Bartlam (1937) AC 473, 480, which reads:
“The principle obviously is that unless and until the court has pronounced a judgment upon the merits by consent, it is to have power to revoke the expression of its coercive power where that has only been obtained by a failure or any of the rules of procedure.”
It is however to be observed that there is no provision in the English Rules similar in terms to the provisions of Order 9 Rule 7. Even in the Judicial Committee Rules 1957, Rule 37 makes provision for an appellant whose appeal has been dismissed for non-prosecution to present a petition to Her Majesty in Council praying that his appeal be restored. We have no such provision in our rules because of the fact that an appeal can be decided on the briefs filed without an oral hearing.
Learned counsel submitted that the test to ascertain the true import of the term or word “dismissed” is whether there has been an adjudication. On reflecting deeply and further, learned counsel qualified his submission with the words:
“I do not wish to suggest for one minute that the exercise of disciplinary powers of the court cannot in a proper case put an end finally to the procedings concerned. All that I am saying is that
the court has the discretionary power to recall or set aside a dismissal on disciplinary exercise if the interest of justice so requires”
Counsel contended that the inherent powers of the court are more extensive than the rules of court. He observed that the rules of court repealed and codified some of the disciplinary or inherent powers (which are power necessary for the court to operate as a court). This fact of the promulgation of the rules of court resulting in the codification of some of the inherent powers should not inhibit the court from exercising its inherent powers, learned counsel urged. Learned counsel then quoted copiously from an article by I.H. Jacobs on Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court published in Vol. 23 of the 1970 Publication of Current Legal Problems. He emphasised that the powers exercisable under the Inherent Jurisdiction of the court and the Rules of court are complimentary and cited the case of Osita Ikeakwu & 20 Ors. v. Chinwuba Nwamkpa (1967) NMLR. 224 at 227 which dealt with relisting an appeal that has been struck out.
Learned counsel then submitted that the terms “dismissed” and “struck out” are interchangeable in the con of a decision otherwise than on the merit.
With the greatest respect to the learned Senior Advocate, the two terms may be used interchangeably in con but their meanings in con may differ very widely. When used in Rules of Court. their meanings in con must depend largely on the intention of the legislature as expressed and conveyed by the particular rule. I am unable to find any support for applicants’ contention in the authority he has cited. It dealt exclusively with the effect of striking out, and stressed that all appellate jurisdiction are statutory.
Learned counsel conceded that if there is no authority for re-entering the appeal under the Supreme Court Rules unless the Court holds it has inherent jurisdiction to entertain the application, the application must fail.
He then touched on the effect of drawn up orders of dismissal on subsequent application. He cited in support Bockblemann v. Nwachi (1965) NLR. 112.
The Headnote of this case reads:
“If the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing and his appeal is dismissed under sub-rule (1) of rule 21 in order VII of Supreme Court Rules 1961 ( in judgment), an application to have the appeal re-entered cannot be entertained after the order of dismissal has been drawn up. In re Samuel (1945) Ch 364; (1945) 2 All E.R. 316; James Lamoni & Co. Ltd. v. Hyland Ltd. (1950) 1 KB. 585; (1950) 1 All E.R. 341 followed Application refused.”
Counsel then submitted that once the order is drawn up that is the end of the matter. The facts of the above authority shows clearly that the court does not act on sentiment and sympathy has no place where on the facts the law is against the applicant. The short facts of the case are as follows:
There the applicants’ representative was caught in a traffic jam and the resulting over-heating of his car engine delayed him to such an extent that instead of arriving at the Supreme Court on or before 9, he arrived at 10.15 a.m. by which time his case had been called and dismissed for non-appearance of the appellant under Order 7 Rule 21(1). The order of dismissal was subsequently drawn up and sealed. Thereafter, his application to have his appeal re-entered was refused on the ground that the order of dismissal had been drawn up despite the provision of Order 7 Rule 21(2) that the court may, if it thinks fit, and on terms etc. direct the appeal struck out owing to the non-appearance of the appellant to be re-entered; refused the application.
The court said:
We are sorry that we cannot help the appellant and must refuse the motion to relist.”
The order of dismissal of the appeal sought to be re-entered has been drawn up and sealed and on the above authority, this application must fail. Learned counsel then dealt with the case of Iro Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum & Anor. (1981) 4 SC. 1. He conceded that the actual decision in that case is not open to objection. He observed that the applicant in that case did not invoke the inherent powers of the court and that the observations on the inherent powers were made obiter by Obaseki, J.S.C. He contended that if the case of Osita Ikeakwu & 21 Ors. v. Chinwuba Nwamkpa (supra) had been drawn to the notice, the ruling might have been otherwise. He then referred to the case of Hasham v. Zanab (1958) 1 W.L.R. 1214 where the Privy Council after the initial refusal to relist the appeal in exercise of its powers under its rules exercised its inherent jurisdiction to relist the case for hearing when it discovered a fundamental error.
He conceded that the case is not on all fours with the instant application.
The facts and the ruling of the Privy Council in the case of Hasham v. Zanab (1958) 1 W.L.R. 1214 are interesting and instructive. The Headnote reads in full
“Petition:
On December 7, 1957, the Court of Appeal of East Africa granted to the present petitioner leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council from a judgment of that court which had affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court of Kenya ordering that a contract whereby the petitioner had agreed to sell certain land at NAIROBI should be specifically performed.
On December 19, 1957, the petitioner, by the solicitors then acting for her, duly entered an appearance in the appeal pursuant to rule 21 of the Judicial Committee Rules, 1925. After correspondence between the solicitors and the petitioner the former on March 14, 1958 purported to withdraw the appearance. On March 18, 1958 the petitioner instructed new solicitors to proceed with the appeal. The petition stated that the new solicitors in fact took no further step in the appeal, and in particular did not take any of the steps prescribed in rule 86, namely, to give notice in writing of the change of agents to the Registrar and to the outgoing agents and to amend the appearance accordingly. By letter of April 16, 1958, the registrar purported to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution under rule 34. Thereafter, the petitioner applied by petition for leave to restore her appeal; that-petition was dismissed by the Judicial Committee on July 16, 1958. By the present petition, the petitioner sought an order that her appeal was still pending.”
Lord Tucker (delivering the Ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council) said that they would humbly advise
“Her Majesty that the petition be allowed and that an order be made as prayed in the petition declaring that
“Notwithstanding the order made as aforesaid on July 16, 1958 dismissing your petitioner’s application for leave to restore, and notwithstanding all or any other matters or steps that may have occurred or been taken, the appearance entered by (the original solicitors) on December 19, 1957 still stands as effective appearance and that the appeal is still pending.”
If an appeal is pending or properly pending before the Supreme Court if there exists an order of dismissal which is a nullity erroneously made by the Supreme Court, it is my opinion that the Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to declare that the appeal is still pending when a proper application is made before it.
If should be emphasised that the case of Chief Iro Ogbu & Anor. v. Chief Ogburu Urum& Anor. did not decide that the Supreme Court has no or cannot exercise inherent jurisdiction over matters and appeals properly before it. It only decided that it has no inherent or statutory jurisdiction to entertain the particular application.
Anyamene, S.A.N. learned counsel for the applicant in SC. 130/1983 in amplification of the brief filed by him associated himself with the submissions of Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.A.N. He also invited this Court to depart from the decision in Ira Ogbu & Anor. v. Ogburu Urum & Anor. (supra) that the court’s jurisdiction can only be invoked where there is a lis pendens or lis extant. He submitted that the exercise of the inherent powers of the court does not depend on the pendency of a lis and that the inherent jurisdiction can be invoked where there is no lis pendens. Learned counsel proceeded to cite in support the following authorities:
National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd. v. J. O. Uchey (1973) 1 NMLR. 170 Olu of Warri v. Esi & Anor. (1958) 3 FSC. 94 at 97.
It is my view that neither of the above two authorities supports the applicants’ contention. In National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd. v. J.O. Uchey (supra) hereinafter referred to as Uchey’s case, the Supreme Court did not invoke its inherent jurisdiction to grant the leave to appeal prayed for. The Supreme Court had constitutional powers under section 117(4)(c) and section 117(5) of the Constitution of the Federation 1963.
No. 20 Section 117(4) reads:
Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section an appeal shall lie from decisions of the High Court of a territory to the Supreme Court with the leave of the High Court or the Supreme Court in the following cases.
(a) ………………………..
(b) ………………………..
(c) decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings in which an appeal has been brought to the High Court from some other courts.
(d) …………………………….
In Uchey’s case, (1973) 1 NMLR. 170 at 175, Elias, C.J.N. said
” …………….Because of the special circumstances of the case we granted Mr. Anyamene’s oral application for leave to appeal out of time, which application he made to us as soon as we gave our ruling that leave is necessary in this case. We however ordered that the appeal must be brought within three months.”
I cannot see how it could be properly and rightly contended that the Supreme Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction in granting leave when it has jurisdiction expressly conferred by the Constitution.
Learned counsel quite rightly submitted that the Supreme Court has in many cases particularly in all the 1983 election cases dispensed with the filing of briefs. This is in exercise of the powers of the court under Order 1 Rule 5 and Order 9 Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules 1977 and not in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The provisions of these rules read:
Order 1 Rule 5
“The Court may enlarge the time provided by these Rules for the doing of anything to which these Rules apply, or may direct a departure from these Rules in any other way when this is required in the interest of justice.”
Order 9 Rule 8:
“The Court may, where it considers the circumstances of an appeal to be exceptional, or that the hearing of an appeal must be accelerated in the interest of justice, waive compliance with the provisions of Order 9, in so far as they relate to the preparation and filing of Briefs of Argument, either wholly or in part, or reduce the time limits specified in the Order, to such extent as the Court may deem reasonable in the circumstances of the case.”
Mr. Mowoe, learned counsel for the applicant in SC.104/1983 John Ememoh & Anor. v. Chief Daniel O. Onokpite & Anor. adopted the submissions of Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.A.N. and Mr. A.N. Anyamene, S.A.N.
He submitted that his case was unique in that the respondent at the hearing of the appeal did not apply to have the appeal dismissed for want of prosecution for failure to file his brief within the time prescribed by the Rule.
Learned counsel is in error in this regard as the records reflect the contrary.
Even the brief filed by the respondent drew the courts attention to the failure to file the appellant’s brief within the time prescribed.
Mr. T.A. Molajo, relied on the brief filed on behalf of the respondent in SC.55/1983 T.A. Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (Nigeria) Ltd. i.e. this application.
He submitted that a dismissal by the Supreme Court of an appeal on the merits is not distinguishable in effect or result from a dismissal for want of prosecution under Order 9 Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules 1977 because in both cases the judgment of the court below appealed against in both cases remains affirmed.
He contended that where an appeal is dismissed under Order 9 Rule 7 Supreme Court Rules 1977 that is the final end of the appeal and it does not matter whether the order has been drawn up or not. He observed that the Supreme Court has not been given jurisdiction to restore such an appeal
after an order of dismissal. Learned counsel adopted the reasoning in Chief Iro Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum & Anor. (1981) 4 SC. 1 at pp. 13 and 18.
The failure to grant powers by the rules to the Court to exercise a discretion to make an order to restore such an appeal, in the light of the promulgation of provisions for relisting appeals dismissed for failure to appear, Order 7 Rule 23(2), or dismissed for failure to fulfil conditions, Order7 Rule 19(4), is intentional.
He submitted that Order 7 Rule 29 Supreme Court Rules 1977 provides for the drawing up and sealing of orders of the Supreme Court. He further submitted that the drawing up of orders has very great significance and referred to the decisions of this court in
Bocklemann v. Thompson Nwaehi (1965) 1 All N.L.R. 122 Asiyanbi v. Adeniji (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 82 Macarthy v. Agard (1933) 2 KB. 417. Umunna & Ors. v. Okwuraiwe & Ors. (1978) on SC. 1 at pages 9-11.
Counsel further submitted that once an appeal has been dismissed there is nothing upon which the court can waive non-compliance. He further submitted that there is no mistake alleged or shown to have occurred and that there was no mistake of fact. Learned counsel observed that a brief of arguments was not filed for over 6 months before the appeal was listed for hearing and on dismissal on respondent’s motion.
Learned counsel then referred the court to Order 7 Rule 30 Supreme Court Rules 1977 which prohibits review of judgments except in a few cases to correct slips and convey the intention. Learned counsel submitted that under Order 9 Rule 7 Supreme Court Rules 1977 the court can act suo motu or on the application of the respondent. He submitted that there is no power to re-enter under the Rules or under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
He analysed the decision in Iro Ogbu v. Ogburu Urum’s case to show its content.
Finally, he submitted that there is no basis for departing and that there are no grounds for departing from the decision in Iro Ogbu v. Ogburu Urum.
Similarly, there are no compelling reasons adduced for overruling Asiyanbi v. Adeniji (supra).
Mr. G.N.A. Okafor for the respondent in the 2nd application SC. 130/1983 observed that the applicant’s counsel have all conceded that Iro Ogbu v. Ogburu Urum’s case was rightly decided and therefore submitted that there are no grounds for departing from the decision. On inherent jurisdiction, learned counsel observed that all the Justices of the Supreme Court in Iro Ogbu v. Ogburu Urum made reference to it and held that there was no inherent jurisdiction in the court under which the application to re-enter the appeal dismissed for want of prosecution could be granted.
He also cited the case of Sodeinde Bros. Ltd. v. A. C. B. Ltd. (1982) 6 SC. 137 in support. Learned counsel then referred to the case of Ikeakwu v. Nwamkpa and commented that it dealt with an appeal that has been struck out not an appeal that has been dismissed. He then submitted that even if that case had been cited to the Court it would not have altered the opinions of the learned Justices of the Supreme Court.
Chief Orhoro, counsel for the respondent in SC.I04/1983 – Chief D. O. Onokpite & Anor. v. John Ememoh & Anor. corrected the impression created by Dr. Mowoe’s statement that he did not apply to have the appeal dismissed. He submitted that the court has no inherent jurisdiction under the Constitution, the law and the Rules to entertain the application. He referred to Alhaji Raimi Edun & Ors. v. Odan Community (1980) 8/11 SC. 103.
Replying to respondent’s counsel submissions, Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.A.N. further developed his point that there exists in this court inherent jurisdiction to entertain the applicant’s application. He submitted that inherent jurisdiction is not a fanciful motion to which counsel resorts when he cannot find any authority on which to rely. He submitted that the court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside judgments given and orders made in cases heard and determined without jurisdiction. I agree. This is because in law the matters are still pending in Court. He emphasised that the Rules of Court cannot take away, curtail or abridge the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Learned counsel then referred to section 6(6)(a) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which provides “that the judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions (i.e. section 6(1) and (2)) of this section shall extend notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law.”
He then conceded that even if the provisions of Order 9 Rule 7 had been absent from the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court could decline to hear an appeal where the appellant had failed to file his brief as required by Order 9 Rule 6(1) and proceed to dismiss the appeal.
Learned counsel emphasised that inherent jurisdiction is an adjunct to the statutory jurisdiction of the court and necessary to enable the court to exercise its statutory jurisdiction. Learned counsel then referred to pages 24,25 and 28 of Master Jacob’s article on the Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court. Learned counsel then submitted that since the Supreme Court is a creature of the 1979 Constitution, the Rules of Court cannot curtail its jurisdiction.
He then referred to page 32 of the article by Master Jacob on Inherent Jurisdiction. He finally submitted that the Rules of Court cannot conflict with inherent jurisdiction.
Turning to the provisions of Order 7 Rule 30, Supreme Court Rules 1977 which provides that:
“The court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it save to correct any clerical mistake or some error arising from any accidental slip or omission or to) vary the judgment order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention. A judgment or order shall not be varied when it correctly represents what the Court decided nor shall the operative or substantive part of it be varied and a different form substituted.”
Learned counsel submitted that it must not be construed in such way as to curtail or diminish the jurisdiction or powers of the Court to entertain and consider an appeal on its merits from the court below. He then referred to Thyne v. Thyne (1955) Probate 272.
No authority was cited to show that ‘striking out’ of a case and ‘dismissal’ of a case otherwise than on the merit are interchangeable and means the same thing. However counsel cited Onalaja v. Osinubi 12 WACA. 503. The Headnote of this case is interesting and instructive. It reads:
“Dismissal of an action for want of jurisdiction is no bar to a plaintiff suing again in any court which has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, but where an action is dismissed (or as in this case struck out) for want of jurisdiction and the same plaintiff institutes a fresh and identical action against the same defendant, the inherent jurisdiction is rightly exercised by striking out the second action”
The inherent jurisdiction of the Court was rightly invoked to prevent an abuse of its processes. Dr. Mowoe referred to English Rules, Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 Order 19 Rule 1 and concluded that it is similar to our Order 9 Rule 7 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1977 stressing that want of prosecution is a serious matter.
That concludes the submissions of counsel. The main issue or question for determination before the Court is whether sufficient reasons or compelling reasons have been advanced before this Court to warrant a departure from the decision in Iro Ogbu v. Ogburu Urum (1981) 4 SC. 1 In that case,
at page 8 of the report, I Obaseki, I.S.C. said:
“Where-briefs have been filed, the absence of the parties or their counsel does not attract any sanction of the court and the appeal will be treated as having been duly argued and will be considered as such for purposes of the judgment. See Order 9 Rule 6(6).
The failure by the appellants to file a brief therefore had far reaching effect and there being a subsisting judgment against the appellant, the dismissal for want of prosecution in such a case under the present Rules in force amounts to an affirmation of the judgment of the court below in respect of which the appeal was brought…………………………………….
It appears from a consideration of the Rules that any order of dismissal under Order 9 Rule 7 Supreme Court Rules 1977 amounts to a final judgment the finality of which is emphasised by Order 7 Rule 30 ………………………………..I am aware that since the order of dismissal was delivered by the court, the judgment has been drawn up, signed and sealed.
Even if it were not drawn up, signed and sealed, the provision of Order 7 Rule 30 deprives this Court of any jurisdiction to review the judgment of dismissal for want of prosecution.”
and at page 12 of the Report, I said:
“As the jurisdiction of this Court is based upon statute (the 1979 Constitution, the Supreme Court Act 1960 and the Supreme Court Rules 1977), the inherent jurisdiction to regulate proceedings before this court arises only where there is alis extant before this Court upon which the inherent jurisdiction can operate. Resort cannot therefore in this application, be made to section 6(6)(a) of the Constitution which provides that
“The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section
(a) shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law”
as authority for the exercise of jurisdiction to set aside an order of dismissal of an appeal for want of prosecution (failure to file brief of arguments)
This Court, in my view, has no inherent jurisdiction to grant the application.”
Learned counsel for the applicants conceded that there is no jurisdiction under the Rules of Court to entertain an application for re-entering an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 Rule 7 and I agree with them. To that extent, counsel conceded that Iro Ogbu v. Ogburu Urum was correctly decided. They contended however, that the decision that there was no inherent jurisdiction to grant the application was obiter because the inherent jurisdiction of the court was not invoked by the applicant. The question was raised by the court suo motu and pronounced upon. I think it right and proper that where the jurisdiction of the court is invoked in any application, the court ought to consider both its statutory and inherent jurisdiction to ascertain whether it can entertain the matter. This court would have failed in its duty if it had not done so.
However, learned counsel for the applicants have argued strenuously that this court has inherent jurisdiction to re-enter an appeal dismissed under Order 9 Rule 7 for want of prosecution.
As sections 213(1), 213(6) and 216 of the 1979 Constitution have considerable bearing on this question. J set them out hereunder for easy reference:
Section 213(1) reads:
“The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court to hear and determine appeals from the Court of Appeal.”
Section 213(6) reads:
“Any right of appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions of the Court of Appeal conferred by this section shall, subject to section 216 of his Constitution be exercised in accordance with any Act of the National Assembly and the rules of court for the time being in force regulating the powers, practice and procedure of the Supreme Court.”
Section 216 reads:
“Subject to the provisions of any Act of the National Assembly, the Chief Justice of Nigeria may make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court.”
The question that naturally arises from a consideration of the instant application is “whether having regard to the provision of sections 213(1), 213(2) and 213(3) which conferred right of appeal and section 213(6) set out above, the applicants are entitled to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to make these applications to re-enter an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 Rule 7 Supreme Court Rules, 1977.
There is a further question of whether in view of the provisions of the above sections of the 1979 Constitution, the Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to entertain the application. Having regard to the fact that subsection 6 of section 213 of the Constitution enjoins the person intending to exercise the right of appeal to do so in accordance with the provisions of the Supreme Court Act, 1960 which is regarded as an Act of the National Assembly and the Supreme Court Rules 1977 which are the rules in force regulating the powers, practice and procedure of the Supreme Court for the time being, can the applicant purport to exercise the right to have his appeal re-entered for prosecution under the inherent jurisdiction of the court
The predicament in which the applicants have found themselves is further confounded by the fact that the orders of dismissal of their appeals for want of prosecution have all been drawn up.
Of course, Chief Williams, S.A.N. has strenuously argued that since counsel for the parties play no part in the drawing up of the order, this court should not follow English authorities on the inviolability or finality of drawn up orders on the issue of re-entering an appeal dismissed or struck out. This point was also made by counsel in 1967 in the case of Asiyanbi v. Adeniji (supra) but was dismissed by this Court, (Supreme Court).
With great respect to the learned Senior Advocate, I am unable to see how the non-participation of counsel in the drawing up of the order can detract from the weight and effect or full authority of the order. There can only be argument about this if the order does not bear the signature of the Chief Justice of Nigeria or Justice presiding and the seal of the Court. The important thing in my view, is for the order drawn up to reflect the decision of the Court. While a case could be made for the participation of counsel if need-be in drawing up the order for the approval and eventual signature of the Chief Justice of Nigeria or Justice presiding, I do not see why a drawn up order of the Court in Nigeria should not be accorded the same weight of authority as a drawn up order of the Court of England.
Turning to the Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, it is necessary to consider the meaning, scope and operation of inherent jurisdiction in order to determine whether the instant applications can be granted under the inherent jurisdiction of the court.
Learned counsel for the applicants commended to the court the Article on the subject of inherent Jurisdiction by Master Jacobs and Chief William, kindly made available to the Court Photostat copies of the article. I have gone through it carefully and will praise the courage of Chief F.R.A. Williams and Mr. A.N. Anyamene, S.A.N. in commending it to the Court. It contains very useful material. The learned author was of the view that:
“the term “inherent jurisdiction of the Court” is not used in contradistinction to the jurisdiction conferred by statute. The contrast is not between the common law jurisdiction of the court on the one hand and its statutory jurisdiction on the other, for the court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction in respect of matters which are regulated by statute or by rule of court, so long as it can do so without contravening any statutory provisions.”
Summarising some of the features, he said:
“(1) The inherent jurisdiction is exercisable as part of the process of the administration of justice. It is part of the procedural law, both civil and criminal, and not of substantive law; it is invoked in relation to the process’ of litigation.
(2) The distinctive basic feature of the inherent jurisdiction of the court is that it is exercisable by summary process, i.e. without a plenary trial conducted in the normal way or ordinary way, and generally without waiting for the trial or for the outcome of any pending or other proceeding.
(3) Because it is part of the machinery of justice, the inherent jurisdiction of a court may be invoked not only in relation to the litigant parties inpending proceedings, but in relation also to anyone, whether a party or not, and in respect of matters which are not raised as issues in the litigation between the parties.
(4) The inherent jurisdiction of the court is a concept which must be distinguished from the exercise of judicial discretion………………………… There is nevertheless a vital juridical distinction between jurisdiction and discretion, which must always be observed.
(5) The inherent jurisdiction of the court may be exercised in any given case, notwithstanding that there are Rules of court governing the circumstances of such case. The powers conferred by Rules of court are generally speaking, additional to and not in substitution of, powers arising out of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The two heads of powers are generally commutative, and not mutually exclusive, so that in any given case, the court is able to proceed under either or both heads of jurisdiction.”
Turning to the juridical basis of inherent jurisdiction, the learned author said:
“On what basis did the superior Court exercise their powers to punish for contempt and to prevent abuse of process by summary proceedings instead of by ordinary course of trial and verdict
The answer is, that the jurisdiction to exercise these powers derived, not from any statute or rule of law, but from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law and for this reason, such jurisdiction is called inherent. Such a power is intrinsic in a superior court, it is its life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such a power, the court would have form but would lack substance. The jurisdiction which is inherent in a superior court of law is that which enables it to fulfil it self as a court of law.”
Lord Morris in Connelly v. D.P.P (1964) A.C. at p.130l dealing with inherent powers, said:
“There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. I would regard them as powers which is inherent in its jurisdiction. A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process.”
The learned author, Master Jacobs, then classified cases in which inherent jurisdiction may be exercised into 3 broad groups:
A. Control over process
B. Control over persons
C. Control over powers of inferior court and tribunals Under “Control of process” inherent jurisdiction is exercised to
(1) Regulate process and proceedings
(2) terminate proceedings which were frivolous or vexatious or which were an abuse of process and
(3) to compel observance of its process and obedience of and compliance with its orders.
The powers are inherent in the sense that they are necessary attributes to render the judicial function effective in the administration of justice.
The learned author observed that “the court has no power, even under its inherent jurisdiction to prevent a person from commencing proceedings which may turn out to be vexatious. Under its inherent jurisdiction, the court may dismiss an action for want of prosecution not only by analogy with the limitation of statutes where the action has been allowed to lie dormant for a period exceeding the relevant limitation period; Krakauer v. Katz (1954) 1 WLR 278, (1954) 1 All ER. 244; but also where it is satisfied that by reason of prolonged or inordinate delay, which is also inexcusable, the defendant has suffered or is likely to suffer prejudice or that it is no longer possible to have a fair trial between the parties. Allen v. Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd. (1968) 2 QB 229 CA.”
The article, useful as it is, has not advanced the cause of the applicants in these application. The article has not shown the decision in Iro Ogbu v. Ogburu Urum (supra) to be erroneous. On the contrary, it has emphasized the procedural nature of inherent jurisdiction and in view of the provisions of section 213(6) of the 1979 Constitution, an appellant can only exercise his right of appeal in accordance with the Supreme Court Act 1960 or the Supreme Court Rules 1977. Since it has not been shown that the order of dismissal for want of prosecution was made without jurisdiction or that it was a nullity, the applicants cannot invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the ocurt as the court has no inherent jurisdiction to set aside an order of dismissal it has properly made in exercise of its powers and jurisdiction and re-enter the appeal.
It is settled law that this Court has jurisdiction to depart from its previous decisions. It has been restated in Paul Odi & Another v. Gbeniyi Osafile & Ana/her SC.144/1983 delivered on 11th January, 1985. Therein Obaseki, JSC. said at page 19:
“Turning to the first question, there is unanimity and I hold very strong views on it that the Supreme Court, as a Court at the apex of the judicial hierarchy in this country, has the jurisdiction and power, sitting as a full court of seven justices, to depart from and overrule previous erroneous decisions on points of law given by a full court on constitutional questions or otherwise.”
Chief Iro Ogbu v. Chief Ogburu Urum (supra) was a decision given by a regular court of five justices of the Supreme Court and if the decision had been shown to be erroneous on points of law or given per incuriam or a vehicle of injustice, a full court of 7 Justices would have every reason to depart from it and overrule it.
The failure to bring to the notice of the court, the case of Osita Ikeakwu v. Chinwuba Nwamkpa (1967) NMLR 224 at 227 would have been of importance to the applicants if the authority would have influenced the court to the opposite view. The obiter dictum of Brett, JSC. referred to dealt with or was concerned with an order “striking out an appeal not properly before the Native Court” That is a totally different situation from an order of dismissal for failure to file brief of arguments of the appeal or want of prosecution under Order 9 Rule 7 Supreme Court Rules, 1977. This Rule was never part of the 1961 Supreme Court Rules. It also has no equivalent in the privy Council rules 1957. The obiter dictum of Brett, JSC. is self explanatory. It reads in part:
“In the course of his judgment, Betual, J. said-
‘There appears to be no specific provision in the Native Courts Ordinance or the Regulations made there-under for relisting an appeal that has been struck out. It would not seem that there is any inherent power to do so in any statutory court of appeal, such as the resident’s.’
All appellate jurisdiction is statutory and the power to adjudicate on an appeal, by allowing or dismissing it, includes the power to decline to adjudicate on the merits when an appeal is not properly before the court. This court frequently exercises such a power. In such a case, the usual course is to strike out the appeal, and although an order striking out an appeal has for some purposes, much the same effect as an order dismissing it, it does not thereby become a decision on the merits and does not necessarily preclude” a subsequent decision ‘On the merits if the matter can be reopened by an appropriate procedure. When an appeal is struck out the position is as it would have been if no appeal has been brought that is to say, the effective judgment is that appealed against, not a judgment of the appeal court, and there seems to be nothing contrary to general principle in holding that it is still possible to appeal against the effective judgment, if a proper procedure is followed and if the limits of time for taking any particular step are not exceeded ” (Italics mine)
This authority does not constitute any reason or compelling reason to overrule Chief Iro Ogbu & Anor. v. Chief Ogburu Urum & Anor. (supra). It emphasises the point that all appellate jurisdictions are statutory.
This Court has of recent struck out numerous appeals found not to be properly before the Court and appellants have succeeded in bringing back the matters on to the list by following the proper procedure mainly by obtaining extension of time and filing fresh notices and grounds of appeal and filing their briefs within time. The case of Chief Frank Ebba v. Chief Warri Ogodo (1984) 4 SC. 84 is a case in point. The cases were not dismissed for want of prosecution. It should be observed that the rule of Court, Order 9 Rule 3(1) requires the appellants to reduce his arguments in the appeal into writing, called his brief of arguments, serve a copy on the respondent and file it for the use of the Court. A period of 8 weeks is given to him to do this. His failure to do this prima facie amounts to an abandonment of his appeal and on a motion for dismissal of the appeal by the respondent, he is entitled to have the appeal dismissed and the dismissal has not the effect of merely striking out the appeal but of affirming the decision of the lower court. The dismissal order is a final judgment of this Court which this Court has no jurisdiction to review except on the grounds stated in Order 7 Rule 30 of the Supreme Court Rules 1977.
For the above reasons and the reasons set out in the judgment of my learned brother, Kazeem, JSC., the draft of which I had the advantage of reading, each of these applications fails and is hereby struck out with N25.00 costs to the respondents.
ANIAGOLU, JSC.: I have had a preview, before now, of the ruling just delivered by my learned brother Kazeem, J.S.C. in the above appeals consolidated for the purpose of this Ruling, and I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusion.
Applications were made for re-entering the appeals on the Cause List of hearing.
In SC.55/1983 the motion was
“for an order directing that the above appeal be re-entered for hearing on such terms as the court may consider just”
while in Sc.n0/1983 the motion was
“for an order that the above appeal be re-entered for hearing and on such a re-entering for a further order enlarging the time within which the appellant may file his written brief as required by Rules of Court.”
In SC.140/1983 the application was for
“re-listing/re-placing on the Cause List to enable it to be heard on its .merits this appeal which was dismissed by the Honourable Court on 21st May, 1984 for want of diligent prosecution pursuant to Order 9 Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977.”
In each case the appeal was dismissed upon failure of the appellants to file their written briefs under Order 9 Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977 and, therefore, for want of prosecution. The brief in SC.104/1983 was out of time for about five days. SC.55/1983 was dismissed on 12th May 1984; Sc.130/1983, on 4th June, 1984, while SC.104/1983 was dismissed as hereinbefore stated, on 24th May, 1984.
Each applicant, as aforestated, is asking this Court to re-enter his appeal for hearing, the dismissal not-withstanding. The questions are
(a) has the court jurisdiction to re-enter the appeal;
(b) if the court has jurisdiction, should the court exercise its discretion in favour of the applicants and re-enter the appeals
The line of argument of the applicants was on the footing that the decision of this Court in Chief Iro Ogbu and ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum and Anor. (1981) 4 SC. p.1, decided on 3rd April, 1981, should not be followed.
The unanimous judgment of this Court in that appeal was that, where an appeal has been dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 9 Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977, this Court has no jurisdiction, inherent or otherwise, to re-enter the appeal for hearing.
CHIEF WILLIAMS (SC.55/1983) had argued that this Court has discretionary power to re-enter such an appeal dismissed, or to set aside the dismissal, if the interest of justice so requires. He argued that under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, the court had control over process; and abuse of process; and that this Court, as a court of last resort, should lean over backwards to do justice by restoring the appeal on the list. He cited the decided, cases and legal authorities detailed in the lead Ruling of my learned brother, Kazeem, J.S.C., and stated that although the decision in CHIEF IRO OGBU V. CHIEF OGBURU URUM AND ANOR, was not open to objection, yet, he contended, this Court had inherent jurisdiction.
MR. ANYAMENE (SC.130/1983), on the other hand, contended that this Court recognised in the decision in CHIEF IRO OGBU V. URUM that the Court had inherent jurisdiction which could only be exercised when there is a list pending. He relied for support on the decisions in National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association v. I. O. Uchey (1973) 1 N.M.L.R. 170; Olu of Warri v. Chief Sam Warri Esi and Anor. (1958) 3 F.S.C. 94 at 97and Gaius Egemasi and Anor. V. Agim Duru Onyekwere and Anor. (1983) 9 S. C. 7. He further submitted that a decision of this Court dismissing an appeal for failure to file brief, cannot really be regarded as a final judgment. Once a decision has not been arrived at on the merit, he submitted, the court can re-enter the appeal for a determination on the merits.
DR. MOWOE (SC.104/1983), on his own part, argued that:
(i) under Order 1 Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977, the Court has power to enlarge the time provided by the rules for the doing of anything to which the rules apply and may direct a departure from the rules in any other way when this is required in the interest of justice;
(ii) the dismissal of his case was contrary to the intent of Order 9 Rule 7 because his clients were only 5 days out of time. There was, he said, no want of prosecution in his own case;
(iii) as a court of last resort, this court must act to restore his own appeal. The Court must in proper circumstances be a master of the situation;
(iv) the authorities relied on in the decision of Chief Iro Ogbu v. Chief Ogburu Urum (Supra), showed that once an order had been drawn up, the court is functus officio and that then it became a matter of estoppel by conduct because parties take part in drawing up the order;
(v) Order 9 Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1977 requires a respondent to apply to court far an appeal to be dismissed for want of prosecution, and that unless the respondent applies, this Court cannot raise it. Respondents Counsel not only did not raise it, but also, said he was not raising it and was not opposed to his application for re-entering the appeal for hearing.
This was however denied by Chief Ororho who vigorously contended that he did not acquiesce to Dr. Mowoe’s application and that in fact he raised the issue of non-filing of brief by Dr. Mowoe in his own brief and complied with Order 7 Rule 14 giving sufficient notice of his preliminary objection.
FOR THE RESPONDENTS:
Mr. MOLAJO (Jnr.) (SC.55/1983) referred to Order 7 Rule 30 on the issue of jurisdiction saying that the rule contained the general rule. Any departure from the general rule was an exception and argued that exceptions could not be allowed to be co-extensive with the rule. The First Exception, he contended, was contained in Order 7 Rule 30 itself, where the rule contained the provision for correcting a clerical mistake or some error arising from accidental slip or omission or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect to its meaning or intention; the Second he said, was Order 7 Rule 19(4) where the appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with the conditions of appeal, in which case an application for re-listing can be made; while the Third Exception, he argued, came under Order 7 Rule 23 for non-appearance of the appellant.
Barring these exceptions, he argued, the general rule prevails, namely, that this court has no power to review its judgment as decided in Chief Iro Ogbu v. Chief Ogburu Urum (Supra).
There are different species of non-prosecution, he submitted. Whereas the other species of non-prosecution could be remedied by a re-listing of the appeal by court, the special species of non-prosecution contained in Order 9 Rule 7 does not permit of are-opening.
He finally submitted that this Court has jurisdiction or power to ensure compliance with the rules. CHIEF IRO OGBU v. CHIEF OGBURU URUM rightly decided, he said,
(a) that there is no power in this Court under the Rules to re-list a dismissed appeal under Order 9 Rule 7, and
(b) that there is no inherent jurisdiction in this Court to do so.
The important point, he contended, was not whether there was a lis pendens or extant. For this proposition he cited DANIEL ASIYANBI AND ORS. V. EMMANUEL AWE ADENIJI (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 82.
Mr. Molajo (Jnr.) finally submitted that there was no basis for overruling either the ADENIJI case or the Iro Ogbu case (omni supra).
MR. AMANKE OKAFOR (SC. 130/1983) was of the view that argument on these appeals was made easier by the fact that all Counsel for the applicants considered Chief Iro Ogbu v. Ogburu Urum as not wrongly decided, saying that there was therefore no cause for this court to say that it was wrongly decided. Indeed, he said, Iro Ogbu v. Urum was applied and approved by this Court in Sodeinde Brothers (Nig) Ltd. v. African Continental Bank Ltd. (1982)6 S.C. 137and he specifically referred to page 140 where ESO, J.S.C., stated:
“There is no statutory or inherent jurisdiction in this court to grant the application seeking that the appeal which has been dismissed by this court to be restored: See Chief Iro Ogbu & Ors. v. Chief Ogburu Urum & Anr. (1981) 4 S.C., p.4 particularly as per Obaseki, J.S.C. on pp. 3-15. This case has been dismissed for want of prosecution and I agree it stands dismissed.”
He finally submitted that OSIFA IKEAGWU AND 21 ORS. v. CHINWUBA NWANKPA (1967) N.M.L.R. 224 (IKEAGWU wrongly written in the report as “IKEAKWU” and NWANKPA as “NWAMKPA”) dealt with an appeal struck out and not with an appeal dismissed.
In determining these applications it is significant to note that where in the Supreme Court Rules 1977the court is given the power to re-enter a dismissed appeal, it is specifically spelt out in the particular rule. Hence Order 7 Rule 19(4) gives power to court to re-enter an appeal dismissed under Rule 19 for non-compliance with the conditions of appeal; Order 7 Rule 23 gives power to court to re-enter an appeal dismissed for non-appearance of the appellant. Again; under Order 7 Rule 17 a withdrawal of an appeal is a bar to further proceedings and under Order 7 Rule 17(5) an appeal which has been withdrawn shall be deemed to have been dismissed.
I see nothing in the argument put forward to justify a departure from the decision in Chief Iro Ogu v. Ogburu Urum, which clearly I consider was
rightly decided. OSITA IKEAGWU AND ORS. V. CHINWUBA NWANKPA (Supra) referred to by Chief Williams and which he said was not referred to this Court in argument in Chief Iro Ogbu v. Ogburu Urum, on the basis of which he considered that the case was decided per incuriam, was a case dealing with the power of court to restore an appeal which was struck out under the provisions of the Native Courts Ordinance and the Regulations made thereunder. I am very much familiar with the facts and circumstances of that case because I appeared, as Counsel before the High Court (Betuel, J.), for Chinwuba Nwankpa. Brett, J.S.C., delivering the judgment of this court on the case, brought out the kernel of the issue involved in that case, when be said, at p.227:
“When an appeal is struck out the position is as it would have been if no appeal had been brought, that is to say, the effective judgment is that appealed against, not a judgment of the appeal court, and there seems to be nothing contrary to general principle in holding that it is still possible to appeal against the effective judgment if a proper procedure is followed and if the limits of time for taking any particular step are not exceeded. Either an application to relist or a fresh notice of appeal, with an enlargement of time if necessary, would, be a form of procedure known to the law and we do not attach as much importance as Betuel J., did to the absence of express statutory provision for the relisting of an appeal that has been struck out.”
Again 1see nothing in the rules to justify the approach of the applicants in their arguments that where an appeal has been dismissed for failure to file brief it cannot be a dismissal on the merit. The filing of brief is a step to be taken in the prosecution of one’s appeal and if a party failed to take the step he ought to take in the prosecution of his appeal, it would follow that, at the end of the day, he would not have successfully challenged the judgment appealed against. Since there is a presumption in the rightness of the judgment of the court below, it would follow, in those circumstances, that the challenge by the appellant would have been without merit since he had not
even scaled the first hurdle, of the many steps to be taken, for setting aside the judgment appealed against, in which case, the judgment would remain good.
I hold that for the above reasons, and for the wider reasons set out by my learned brother, Kazeem, J.S.C., in his Ruling just delivered, this Court has no jurisdiction, inherent, or pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 1977, to re-enter an appeal dismissed under Order 9 Rule 7 of those Rules. Accordingly, I agree that there is no merit in the three applications and would also dismiss and hereby dismiss, each application with costs to each of the Respondents assessed at N25.00.
COKER, J.S.C.: 1 have had the privilege of reading in draft the leading judgment of Kazeem, J.S.C., and 1agree with his reasoning and conclusion that this Court has no power to set aside its judgment in each of the consolidated appeals. The dismissal of the appeals finally brought them to an end.
In the absence of any statutory power to do so, they cannot be resuscitated.
They are dead and have been finally laid to rest. I agree with the orders for costs as stated in the said judgment of Kazeem, J.S.C.
Applications Dismissed.
Appearances
Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.A.N. with F.R.A. Williams, (Jnr.)-for applicant in the 1st Application
Mr. A. Anyamene, S.A.N. with R. Igweonwu – for Applicant in the 2nd application For Appellant
AND
Mr. T.A. Molajo – for Respondents in the 1st Application
Mr. G.N.A. Okafor – for Respondents in the 2nd Application
Chief J. A. Ororho – for Respondents in the 3rd Application
Dr. D. D. Mowoe – for Applicant in the 3rd application. For Respondent



