M.A. SANUSI V THE STATE
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 19th day of October, 1984
SC.49/1983
JUSTICES
ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ANTHONY NNAEMEZIE ANIAGOLU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AUGUSTINE NNAMANI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CHUKWUDIFU AKUNNE OPUTA Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
M.A. SANUSI Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
RATIO
THE DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION AND SELF-DEFENSE
Provocation does not excuse murder, it merely has the effect of reducing it to a lesser offence of manslaughter. Self defence on the other hand is a complete answer to the charge of murder. But these defences cannot be set up in vacuo. That will be a futile, academic exercise. For any of these defences to avail the appellant in this case, there ought to be enough credible evidence on which to found each of these defences. PER OPUTA, J.S.C.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN RESPECT OF THE DEFENCE OF INSANITY
But before considering what evidence there is in this case indicating that the appellant was insane, certain radical and fundamental points regarding the defence of insanity will have to be borne in mind and kept in view:-
1. The law presumes every person, including any person accused of crime, sane until the contrary is proved ….. (S.27 of the Criminal Code).
2. The prosecution does not set out to prove what the law presumes in its favour.
3. An accused person who raises insanity as his defence has the onus of proving such insanity cast on him. The standard of such proof is not as high as that cast on the prosecution. It is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but it is proof of reasonable probability, proof sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of a fair minded jury as to the sanity of the accused.
4. Insanity is a blanket term embracing a considerable variety of mental abnormalities, mental infirmities, neurosis and psychosis.
5. To constitute a defence the mental condition relied on should be such that could and did deprive the accused of capacity:
1. To understand what he was doing; or,
2. To control his action; or,
3. To know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission complained of as constituting the actus reus of the offence charged.
The important thing is this lack of capacity. At the root of the defence of insanity is the fact that by reason of his mental condition the act of the accused cannot really be held to be the product of the free exercise of his will and he is therefore deemed incapable of forming the requisite intent. Learned counsel for accused persons setting up insanity as a defence will appreciate that they have to work very hard and place before the court credible evidence tending to establish this incapacity. PER OPUTA, J.S.C.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DEFENCE OF INSANITY AND DELUSIONS
It is to underline that distinction that our late highly esteemed learned brother, Idigbe J.S.C., said in Ngene Arum v The State (1979) 11 S.C.91 at 105:
“The first limb of section 28 deals with the defence of insanity; and the second limb clearly relates to delusions (sometimes loosely – though not necessarily the same – referred to as ‘insane delusions’); insanity is not a sine qua non to the experience of a delusion or hallucination. It is, indeed, not easy to distinguish between delusion and insanity when these terms are used in their ordinary meaning; but as far as section 28 of the Criminal Code is concerned, there is a clear distinction for the purposes of establishing a defence under either limb of the section…”
Secondly from a long line of authorities relating to insanity (See Rex v Omoni 12 WA CA 511 at 513) it has been established that for the accused to succeed on a defence of insanity he must establish that he was, at the relevant time, suffering either from mental disease or from “natural mental infirmity” and that that mental disease or natural mental infirmity was such that at the relevant time he was deprived of capacity:
(a) to understand what he was doing or
(b) to control his actions or
(c) to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.
The onus of proof is on the balance of probabilities. PER OBASEKI, J.S.C.
OPUTA, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal was heard on the 27/8/84. Learned counsel for the appellant, Fola Akinrinsola Esquire relied on his brief which was seemingly erudite and unnecessarily copious. He then made a few observations in elaboration of the paints canvassed in his brief. Learned counsel for the respondent R. A. Bello Esquire (P.S.C. Ogun State) also relied on his brief. After reading their briefs and listening to learned counsel on both sides, the court decided that the appeal should be dismissed. We then dismissed the appeal and agreed to give reasons for the dismissal on the 19th October 1984. Hereunder are my reasons.
The material facts of this sad case are simple, straightforward and in the main not disputed. It is common ground that the appellant on 10th April 1978 inflicted very serious and mortal matchet cut wounds on his own mother, who later died of those wounds on the 19th April 1978. The trial court – the Abeokuta High Court -believed the prosecution witnesses and found as a fact that the appellant killed the deceased. The actus reus of the offence of murder was thus established. In the Court of Appeal there was no quarrel about this aspect of the case. The quarrel was whether or not the requisite mens rea was established and more particularly whether on the totality of the evidence led, the defence of insanity was not available to the appellant. It was also argued that from the appellant’s statement to the police during their investigation into the murder, the appellant was entitled to the further defences of provocation and self defence.
The Court of Appeal in a well reasoned judgment considered the defences of insanity, provocation and self-defence and came to the conclusion that on the evidence before the trial court none of these defences availed the appellant. That court accordingly dismissed the appellant’s appeal and affirmed and confirmed the judgment and sentence of the trial court.
The present appeal is against this judgment of the Court of Appeal. As in the Court of Appeal, the main arguments in this Court centred around the defences of insanity, provocation and self-defence. I will deal firstly with provocation and self defence. Provocation does not excuse murder, it merely has the effect of reducing it to a lesser offence of manslaughter. Self defence on the other hand is a complete answer to the charge of murder. But these defences cannot be set up in vacuo. That will be a futile, academic exercise. For any of these defences to avail the appellant in this case, there ought to be enough credible evidence on which to found each of these defences. From the proceedings in this case, it is clear that the appellant did not give evidence during his trial. He could not therefore, have raised the issues of either provocation or self defence. The prosecution called seven (7) witnesses and their evidence contained nothing remotely suggesting that the deceased offered the appellant any provocation; or remotely indicating the necessity of the appellant being compelled to defend himself against any attack (provoked or unprovoked) offered against him by the deceased.
There is however the appellant’s alleged statement to the police which was tendered by P.C. No.35269, Oladipo David, called as the 2nd p.w. In that statement appears the following:-
“At about 5 p.m. of Monday 10/4/78, when I wanted to cook, I saw my mother called Safu. She started to abuse me that I am useless and that I am a bastard and a eunuch. Three other women Adijatu, Musili and Atoke joined my mother to abuse me. Adijatu was talking when my mother gripped my hand and bit my right hand thumb. The hand pained me, and when she did not leave off the thumb I used the knife I was holding… to cut my said mother out (at) the mouth… It was when I used the knife which the police took from me to cut my mother’s mouth that she left my hand…”
Several questions arise out of the above statement, exhibit B viz:-
1. Is exhibit B evidence in this case If yes, evidence of what
2. How did the trial court deal with exhibit B
3. Did the appellant at the trial accept exhibit B as his statement to the police
4. In view of the answers to questions (1), (2), and (3) above can the appellant now rely on exhibit B to found and sustain his defence of provocation and self defence.
I shall now attempt to answer the four questions posed above. Firstly – Is exhibit B evidence in this case and if so evidence of what The police during their investigation into any criminal offence usually obtains statements from accused persons. These statements are usually also tendered by the investigating police officer who recorded the statement as part of the prosecution’s case. The question now is – At that stage what is the statement being tendered as Does the statement at that stage constitute proof and if yes, proof of what A review of the authorities will confirm that at best the prosecution will tender the statement of an accused person as a Res – as something the investigating police officer obtained during his investigation. It is then open to the trial court to consider that statement (along with other available evidence) accepting or rejecting it before coming to a decision. In Subramanian v Public Prosecutor (1956) 1 W.L.R. 965 at p.970 the necessary distinction was drawn between tendering an accused person’s statement as proof of the fact that it was made and tendering same as proof of the truth of its contents. It is my humble view that when the prosecution tenders the statement of an accused person they tender same only as proof that a statement was made, and not as proof of the truth of its contents. And that is why it is open to the accused to deny or confirm and affirm the said statement or else to admit the making of it but attack it on grounds of it not being voluntarily made.
Now how did the trial court treat exhibit B The learned trial Judge ab abundantia cautela considered the contents of exhibit B and exhibit B1 (the Yoruba statement & its English translation) and arrived at the following conclusions:-
“I find not proven evidence to the effect that deceased abused or called accused a bastard or labelled him a eunuch.”
The Judge in rejecting exhibits B & B1 said emphatically:
“I totally reject accused substitution of his declared intention as stated by the 6th prosecution witness to the disguised one in exhibits B and B1 that his mother abused him, cursed him …. or gripped and bit his hand or thumb…”
Now the two defences of provocation and self-defence must be based on existing proved and accepted facts. There is a distinction to be drawn between submissions that can be made before a court of trial and before an appellate court. A submission to an appellate court has to rest on a firm foundation of proved and accepted facts. If a particular story is disbelieved by the trial court and that disbelief is not perverse – in the sense that it was not a proper exercise of the trial court’s judicial discretion to believe or disbelieve – then that story cannot form the basis of any serious and meaningful submission to an appellate court. The only course then open to an appellant is to attack the finding of the lower court rather than arguing as though no findings were made or that the finding was in appellant’s favour.
Now how did the appellant himself at the trial treat exhibit B and exhibit B1 When exhibit B was sought to be tendered the trial court made the following record:-
“Court Note: Accused denies his alleged statement made to P.W.2”
Now how possibly can the present appellant base his defence of provocation and self defence on a statement which he categorically denied making. How can he deny exhibit B in one breath and in another breath use it If exhibit B is discounted, as it rightly ought to be (since it was neither affirmed by the maker nor accepted by the court) then there is absolutely nothing on which to base the defences of provocation and self defence. All the grounds of appeal urging these defences and the submissions thereto appertaining lack foundation, merit and substance. These grounds therefore fail.
I shall now consider the arguments regarding the defence of insanity. The appellant did not testify during his trial and he denied his statement to the police. He did not therefore raise himself the issue of insanity. But the court is bound to consider any defence, which on the totality of the evidence led, is available to the appellant.
But before considering what evidence there is in this case indicating that the appellant was insane, certain radical and fundamental points regarding the defence of insanity will have to be borne in mind and kept in view:-
1. The law presumes every person, including any person accused of crime, sane until the contrary is proved ….. (S.27 of the Criminal Code).
2. The prosecution does not set out to prove what the law presumes in its favour.
3. An accused person who raises insanity as his defence has the onus of proving such insanity cast on him. The standard of such proof is not as high as that cast on the prosecution. It is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but it is proof of reasonable probability, proof sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of a fair minded jury as to the sanity of the accused.
4. Insanity is a blanket term embracing a considerable variety of mental abnormalities, mental infirmities, neurosis and psychosis.
5. To constitute a defence the mental condition relied on should be such that could and did deprive the accused of capacity:
1. To understand what he was doing; or,
2. To control his action; or,
3. To know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission complained of as constituting the actus reus of the offence charged.
The important thing is this lack of capacity. At the root of the defence of insanity is the fact that by reason of his mental condition the act of the accused cannot really be held to be the product of the free exercise of his will and he is therefore deemed incapable of forming the requisite intent. Learned counsel for accused persons setting up insanity as a defence will appreciate that they have to work very hard and place before the court credible evidence tending to establish this incapacity.
With the above as preamble let me now consider what evidence there is in this case tending to establish the defence of insanity.
1. The 5th p.w. Isiaka Ajani Safidipe a full brother of the appellant testified for the prosecution and under cross examination stated:-
(a) I have taken the accused to the Aro Psychiatric Hospital for treatment on more than three occasions since 1970.
(b) To my knowledge there was no quarrel between the accused and my deceased mother.
(c) Sometimes in October 1970 accused attempted to stab me with a knife.
(d) About a year after (that is after 1970) accused was again being treated at Aro Psychiatric Hospital. He again developed a new attack of his mental illness.
(e) Again in 1974 accused on many occasions turned on his customers… and chased them off for no just cause.
2. The other witness who gave some evidence concerning the appellant’s mental history was Adijatu Sanusi wife of the 5th p.w. Isiaka. She was called as 6th p.w. She testified under cross examination:-
(i) I observed that accused had some mental illness some twelve years ago.
(ii) There was no quarrel between the accused and my deceased mother-in-law.
The available evidence of the appellant’s mental condition covered the period 1970 to 1974. There was no evidence at all of his mental condition “at the time of doing the act” that is 10th April 1978. The defence of insanity will, in accordance with the provisions of section 28 of the Criminal Code, only avail the appellant if at the time of doing the act, that is 10th April 1978, his mental condition deprived him of “capacity to know what he was doing, or to control his actions or to know that he ought not to do the act” – that is kill his mother. Mere vague suggestions of abnormal behaviour four years before the date of the offence charged are simply not enough to satisfy the requirement of section 28 of the Criminal Code even on the balance of probability.
The trial court considered at some length the defence of insanity and found it not established since there was evidence which that court believed that appellant knew what he was doing and knew that what he did was wrong. The defence of insanity as such was not canvassed and vigorously agitated in the Court of Appeal. What was argued and disposed of was whether or not the provisions of sections 223 and 224 of the Criminal Procedure Act were infringed by the trial court.
Before this Court the brief filed by counsel for the appellant dealt at considerable length with the defences of provocation and self-defence. It was a beautiful brief showing considerable hard work and research. But unfortunately those defences (of provocation and self defence) lacked the requisite foundation of proved facts. Those defences had no leg on which to stand. They could not therefore stand. They fell.
In the brief the defence of insanity was put forward as an “Alternative Argument”. In this Court it was feebly argued without enthusiasm or zest. What was however apparent during the argument was that learned counsel for the appellant found it difficult to keep the issue of insanity different and distinct from the issue of insane delusion. The law treated them differently. Proof of insanity provides a complete answer to the charge as the accused will not be “criminally responsible for the act”. That is one reason why our former verdict of “Guilty but Insane” sounds ridiculous and inappropriate. It is contradictory. How can an accused person who is by law deemed not to be “criminally responsible for the act” be at the same time criminally guilty of committing the offence of which that same act forms an essential ingredient After the attack on Queen Victoria in 1883 the British Parliament passed the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883 and section 2 (1) of that Act provided for the special verdict of Guilty but Insane. Our law did not provide for any such special verdict. Under our own law the proper verdict should be:- “Not guilty on the ground of insanity.” Reed, J. made this point in Reg v Yayiye of Kadikadi (1957) N.R.N.L.R. 207. Also in Rex v Ashigifuwo (1948) 12 WACA 389 at p.391 the correct order was substituted by the West African Court of Appeal. There the appellant was “acquitted of the offence charged on the ground of unsoundness of mind at the time at which he committed the act”. In Ted Kayode Adams v D.P.P. of the Federation (1966) N.M.L.R. 111 at p.114 this Court held that – the words “A person is not criminally responsible” used in section 28 of the Criminal Code “imports that he is not guilty of the offence charged and must be acquitted”.
Insane delusions stand on an entirely different footing. In the case of delusions the accused “is criminally responsible for the act or omission to the same extent as if the real state of things had been such as he was induced by the delusions to believe to exist.”
In insanity the accused does not know what he is doing etc. In delusions the accused knows what he is doing although he is living in an imaginary world of make believe – not in the real world.
Now coming back to the appeal before the Court, there is nothing on record upon which the defence of insanity or insane delusion can be successfully argued.
The “alternative argument” therefore fails.
It was for all the reasons given above that I dismissed this appeal.
OBASEKI, J.S.C.: At the conclusion of the hearing on the 27th day of August, 1984, I (in concurrence with all my learned brothers), dismissed this appeal and reserved my reasons for the judgment till today. I now proceed to give them. This burden is lightened by the fact that I have had the advantage of reading in draft, the reasons just delivered by my learned brother, Oputa, J.S.C. I agree with them and I adopt them as my reasons for my judgment in this appeal. I will however add the following comments and observations.
It is to be observed that the labours of the learned counsel for the appellant may have attracted richer rewards from the court if his submissions had been grounded on the facts found by the learned trial Judge. Appellate courts hear and deal with complaints against the judgments and decisions of lower courts, be they in exercise of their appellate jurisdiction or original jurisdiction. The basic materials for deliberation or consideration are contained in the findings of fact and law made by the courts below in the light of the evidence and submissions of law made before them.
Trial courts provide the judicial fora where the foundations for the cases of both parties to litigation are laid and their cases first made with available admissible cogent and credible evidence. With such formidable body of evidence on record, establishing a case of murder against the accused and leaving no room for a finding that the defence of insanity or delusion is established, the failure of the defence to call evidence has not helped the appellant in this appeal.
The submissions of counsel in this appeal have focused the attention of the court on the consideration by the courts below of the defences of insanity and delusion and I propose to make these brief comments on them. I have left out the defences of self defence and provocation as they have been adequately dealt with by my learned brother and are not available to the appellant from the evidence on record.
1. Insanity:
The law of the land, i.e. the Nigerian law, places no onus on an accused person to make any statement to the police or to give any evidence in court on his own behalf or in his own defence. [See section 32(2) and section 33(10) of the 1979 Constitution]. But if an accused person decides to contend that he is insane or that he suffers from insane delusions, then he has the duty to rebut the presumption of law which regards all persons sane until the contrary is proved. See section 27 of the Criminal Code, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Cap 42 Vol. 2. This section reads:
“Every person is presumed to be of sound mind and to have been of sound mind at any time which comes in question until the contrary is proved.”
It is this section that directly places on the person who contends that he is insane the onus of establishing that fact – the state of insanity. If he succeeds, he will under section 28 of the Criminal Code be relieved of criminal responsibility. To succeed, he must establish, by a preponderance of evidence necessary to discharge the civil onus of proof, that he is in such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity as to deprive him
(1) of capacity to understand what he was doing, or
(2) of capacity to control his actions, or
(3) of capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.
The evidence that the appellant was treated at Aro Mental Hospital in the years 1970 and 1974 is, in my view, insufficient to establish the state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity required by section 28 of the Criminal Code. The defence suffers also from the fact that there is a total absence of evidence to establish or prove the very important fact that the appellant was deprived.
(1) of capacity to understand what he was doing, or
(2) of capacity to control his actions, or
(3) of capacity to know that what he was doing was wrong.
Contrary to the contention of counsel, the evidence on record showed that at the particular time, the appellant had capacity to know what he was doing and that he had capacity to control his actions. He did not run amok. He went straight for his mother and no one else, dealt with her violently as he desired and escaped. The evidence also showed that he knew that what he was doing was wrong. His escape from arrest is a direct reaction to this awareness.
The concept of criminal liability which requires the act to go with the mind will not be satisfied if either the mind or the act is absent. If a man is in such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity as to lose such capacities as are described above, his mind will certainly not go with his actions.
There was an oblique reference to the appellant being affected by delusions. Here again, a mind that is affected by delusion cannot be regarded as a sound mind and the onus that the appellant’s mind was so affected was not discharged as is required by law. The recitation of events which never occurred in his statement to the police does not, in my view, establish or prove a mind affected by delusion.
The specific matter on which his mind was deluded was that the deceased was discussing him with p.w. 6. The part of section 28 of the Criminal Code Cap 42, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria which deals with delusion reads:
“… A person whose mind at the time of doing or omitting to do an act, is affected by delusions on some specific matter or matters, but who is not otherwise entitled to the benefit of the foregoing provisions of the provisions of this section, is criminally responsible for the act or omission to the same extent as if the real state of things had been such as he was induced by the delusions to believe to exist.”,
The 6th p.w., in her testimony about the event said:
“As the deceased was talking to me, accused suddenly emerged from within the inside of our house to the frontage outside where I was talking with my mother-in-law. Accused was holding a knife. Accused pounced on the deceased and held on to her with his right hand while a knife was in his left hand. Accused then shouted on the deceased to lie down as he was also going to kill her on that day which also would be her last day on earth. Deceased replied that she was not talking of him and that she (deceased) had come to discuss Morili’s matrimonial problems with 5th p.w. Accused insisted that his mother (deceased) was discussing him and held her throat while the deceased denied vehemently that she was discussing him.” (Italics mine).
2. Delusion:
It appears that the appellant erroneously believed that the deceased was discussing his problems in unpleasant terms with p.w. 6. the question may be asked whether the law allows someone to take the life of another for engaging in unfavourable discussion of the other. The running down of a person by the use of such descriptive words as a eunuch and a good for nothing man or an economic failure, etc. does not under our law excuse the offence of murder or warrant the taking of the life of the deceased. A man may be eccentric or capricious or prone to flights of violent temper, yet, he may be perfectly sane and normal.
The mere eccentricity is not enough to constitute mental unsoundness, nor great caprice nor violence of temper but that there must be an aberration of reason. See Dew v. Clark (1836) 3 Addams 97. See Words & Phrases Legally Defined Vol. 2 p. 40 1969 Edition.
Delusion is properly defined as “the belief of things as realities which exist only in the imagination of the patient.” The frame or state of mind which indicates his incapacity to struggle against such an erroneous belief constitutes an unsound frame of mind. See Warring v. Warring (1848) 6 Moo PCC 341 per cur at pp. 353, 354. As this defence and that of insanity keep on rearing their heads in criminal matters prosecuted before the lower courts, this Court has recently examined the defences, nature and the extent of insanity and insane delusion which will relieve an accused person of criminal responsibility in the following three cases:
(1) Ngene Arum v. The State (1979)11 S.C. 91 at 94
(2) Egbe Nkanu v. The State (1980) 3-4 S.C. 1 at 11- 12; and
(3) Udofia v. The State (1981) 11-12 S.C. 49.
In Ngene Arum v. The State (supra), Fatai- Williams, C.J.N. at page 94 said:
“But if his delusion was that the man had inflicted a serious injury to his character or his fortune, and he then kills him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment for murder.”
In the same report at page 123, I said:
“In the final analysis, the finding of fact arrived at by the learned trial Judge that the appellant did not suffer from any disease of the mind or natural mental infirmity was fatal to the defence under section 28 of the Criminal Code and to the conjecture or suggestion of D.w. 2 in his testimony that the delusion under which the appellant was labouring (which did not respond to treatment) suggested an underlying mental illness.”
It was for the above reasons and those set out in the reasons for judgment by my learned brother, Oputa, J.S.C. that I dismissed the appeal.
ANIAGOLU, J.S.C.: On 27th August 1984, this Court dismissed, this appeal in which the appellant, Musulumi Alao Sanusi, appealed against the judgment of the Court of Appeal which dismissed his appeal to that court against his conviction and sentence for murder, by the High Court of the Abeokuta Judicial Division (O. O. Somolu, J.), and set down today for giving the reasons for the dismissal. I now give my reasons for my dismissal of the appeal.
I have been privileged to read in draft the reasons for judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Oputa, J.S.C.
The account given by the eye witness to the incident, one Adijatu Sanusi – an account which was accepted, and rightly so in my view, by the trial Judge – was that she (Adijatu), was sitting with the deceased on a cement pavement in front of their house and the deceased, who was the mother of the appellant, was narrating to her the dispute between one Morili, the deceased’s daughter, and her husband, when the appellant, like a bolt from the blue, emerged from behind the house, dagger in his hand, attacked the deceased with the dagger claiming that she was discussing him, and inflicted mortal injuries on her from which she later died.
These injuries were described by the doctor (p.w.4) Dr. Akinwunmi Majekodunmi
(i) laceration on the face which went across the nose;
(ii) a deep laceration at the left angle of the teeth;
(iii) a deep laceration across the neck;
(iv) lacerations across both arms and left wrist;
(v) laceration and haematoma at the left frontal region –
who gave them as the cause of the death of the deceased. That it was the act of the appellant which caused the death of the deceased was, therefore, clearly not in doubt.
The appellant chose not to give evidence, as he was perfectly legally entitled to. A police witness, one Oladipo David, swore that the appellant made a statement to him in Yoruba language after being cautioned and that exhibit B was the statement, which was translated in English in exhibit B 1. When the said exhibit B was tendered in evidence by the witness, the trial Judge recorded as follows:
“Court Note: Accused denies his alleged statement made to 2nd p.w., but his counsel Mr. Jacobs says he has no objection to the statement with its English translation being admitted.
Accused’s statement is hereby admitted into evidence and is hereby marked exhibit B. The English translation is also admitted in evidence and marked as exhibit B1.”
The “Court Note” by the trial Judge did not clearly portray what the appellant’s contention was as to the statement. What did the sentence that “Accused denies his alleged statement” connote
(i) Was it that he denied he made a statement – any statement – to the police, at all or
(ii) Was it that he made a statement but the contents of exhibit B were not what he told the police or
(iii) That some of the contents of exhibit B were what he told the police and some were not
One thing, however, is clear, namely, that a confession by an accused person is relevant and admissible, in a trial of the accused person, unless it appears to the trial court that it was not voluntarily made, having regard to the provisions of section 28 of the Evidence Act.
Counsel for the appellant, having stated that he had no objection to the statement being admitted in evidence, must be understood to be saying that if the statement was found by the court to have been made by the appellant, he was not raising any objection that it was not voluntarily made, for, it is only where objection is raised that a statement is not voluntarily made that a trial of the issue – in a voir dire proceeding – will arise. Counsel having raised no objection to its admissibility, and the statement having been admitted in evidence, it was for the trial Judge to determine, at the end of hearing, whether the contents of the statement were true, as part of his determination of the truth or otherwise of the whole case presented by the prosecution.
As it turned out, the trial Judge determined that the story told by the eye witness was true and rejected the account narrated in exhibit B. In effect, what the trial Judge was saying was that:
‘on the assumption that the appellant stated what was in exhibit B, that story told in exhibit B was untrue’.
I am in agreement with my learned brother, Oputa, J.S.C., that the appellant having denied he made the statement exhibit B and having failed to give evidence, sworn or unsworn, in court, there was no way in which he could properly rely on the contents of exhibit B to support a plea of provocation or self- defence, the prosecution eye witness having given an account of the incident in complete contradiction to the contents of exhibit B. On the facts of this case, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal were clearly right in holding that no defence of provocation or self-defence could possibly arise.
But the defence of insanity, although not raised by the appellant before the trial Judge, deserved to be considered, as indeed it was considered by both courts below, and rejected, by reason of all the facts as disclosed in evidence. Insanity is a plea to be raised by the defence. The onus is on the defence to discharge the burden of proof of insanity. The facts and special circumstances appertaining to the appellant’s case have been amply dealt with by my brother, Oputa, J.S.C., and no useful purpose will be served in recapitulating them here.
This Court recently, in Ngene Arum v. The State (1979) 11 S.C. 91, elaborately considered the defence of insanity and insane delusions as contained in section 28 of the Criminal Code Law of Eastern Nigeria, 1963 and subsequently, the defence of insanity as a result of intoxication under section 29 of the same Code, in Egbe Nkanu v. The State (1980) 3-4 S.C.1.
There is a tendency for some counsel to be casual in presenting their case of insanity on behalf of accused persons. Some tend to treat the matter as if all that was required to establish the defence of insanity was to allude to insanity as the accused’s defence and proceed to show how unreasonable and motiveless the action of the accused had been, leaving it for the court to infer that anyone guilty of such behaviour as the one committed by the accused could not but be insane. Such an approach to the defence of insanity is wrong. Defence counsel must always work hard to present before the court proof which could include, among others, positive acts of the accused, before and after, the deed complained of; evidence of a doctor who examined and watched the accused over a period of time as to his mental state; evidence of relations who know the accused person intimately relating to his behaviour and the change which had come upon him; the medical history of the family which could indicate hereditary mental affliction or abnormality, and such other facts and circumstances which will help the trial Judge come to the conclusion that the burden of proof of insanity, placed by the Criminal Code on the defence, has been amply discharged. There is no presumption that an accused person is insane or that whoever has committed the sort of act with which he is charged, must be insane; rather the presumption is the other way round – that the accused is sane and had always been sane, at all times material to the incident being investigated.
It was for the foregoing reasons that I dismissed this appeal on 27th August 1984 as hereinbefore stated.
NNAMANI, J.S.C.: On the 27th August, 1984 I dismissed the appeal of the appellant to this Court. I then indicated that I would give my reasons for that judgment on 19th October, 1984. I now give my reasons.
I had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons for judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Oputa, J.S.C. As I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusions, I have made no more than a concurring comment.
The appellant was convicted of the murder of his mother, Safuratu Sanusi, and sentenced to death. His appeal to the Court of Appeal having been dismissed, he appealed to this Court. The three defences put forward in his admittedly well written brief by learned counsel to the appellant, Fola Akinrinsola, were provocation, self defence and insanity. It is not my intention to deal with these defences in any detail as I think they have been adequately dealt with in my learned brother’s judgment.
It is pertinent for purposes of my comment to look briefly at the evidence before the learned trial Judge to determine whether these defences or indeed any of them was available to the appellant. In that connection, it should be stated straight-away that the appellant did not testify at the trial nor did he call any witnesses in his defence. All that was before the trial court from the appellant’s side was his statement to the police which was tendered in evidence as exhibits B and B1. This statement was the appellant’s first reaction to the charge against him and, as it were, his own account of the incident. It is equally pertinent to add that as the appellant’s statement was being tendered in evidence he denied it although his counsel, Mr. Jacobs, had no objection to its admissibility. In that statement containing the appellant’s account of the incident the crucial portions were as follows:-
“At about 5 p.m. on Monday 10/4/78 when I started to cook, I saw my mother called Safu. She started to abuse me that I am useless and that I am a bastard and a eunuch
…Adijatu was talking when my mother gripped my hand and bit my right hand thumb. The hand pained me and when she did not leave off the thumb, I used the knife I was holding and which I had wanted to use for peeling cocoyam to cut my said mother out (sic) the mouth. I had no intention to kill the woman. My thumb which she bit made me to cut her mouth.
… She bit me at the right hand” (Italics mine).
If this account had been accepted as representing what really transpired there would have been some material on which to consider the defences of provocation and self defence. But the appellant had himself denied the statement containing this account of the incident and offered no further explanation at the trial. More important is the fact that against the background of the testimony of the 6th prosecution witness which he wholly accepted, the learned trial Judge totally rejected the appellant’s version of the events as contained in exhibit B, B1. He concluded
“So also do I find no proven evidence to the effect that deceased abused or called the accused a bastard or labelled him a eunuch.”
In such circumstances I too find no evidence on which the defences of provocation and self defence can be pegged nor do I find anything that can remotely bring the appellant within sections 283, 318 and 287 of the Criminal Code. (See Lee Chun Chuen v The Queen (1962) 3 W.L.R. 1461; R v Duffy (1949) All E.R.932n; 45 R v Afonja (1958) 15W.A.C.A. 26; Chukwu Obajiv The State (1965) N.M.L.R. 417; R v Igiri (1948) 12 W.A.C.A. 377; R v Knock (1877) 14 Cox Crim. Cas.1; R v Onyemaizu (1958) N.R.N.L.R.93.
As for the defence of insanity, there is nothing on the face of exhibit B even if accepted on which it could have arisen. Learned counsel to the appellant appears to have relied for this defence on some portions of the evidence of prosecution witnesses 5 and 6. Prosecution witness 5, a brother of the appellant, under cross-examination agreed that he had on more than 3 occasions in 1970 taken the appellant to the Aro Psychiatric Hospital. He further testified that the appellant tried to stab him in 1970. Between 1971-72 the appellant also abused people for no just cause. He said that in 1974 the appellant, a tailor, turned on his customers who gave clothes to him to sew and chased them away. Significantly though he testified that he did not take the appellant to the hospital again after 1974. The 6th prosecution witness under cross-examination admitted that the appellant had some mental illness some 12 years ago (i.e, from March 1981 when she gave evidence). The statutory’ provisions in relation to sanity and insanity under our law are contained in sections 27 and 28 of the Criminal Code. While section 27 presumes “every person to be of sound mind and to have been of sound mind at any time which comes in question until the contrary is proved”, section 28 in its two parts deals with criminal responsibility for the acts of persons who are in a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity and persons whose minds at the time of doing or omitting to do the acts are affected by delusions. The first observation one ought to make in the light of the submissions of learned counsel to the appellant is that insanity and delusions are certainly distinct under our law and carry separate and distinct legal consequences. The use in his brief by learned counsel to the appellant of such terms as fits, instabilities, delusions, automatism, delusions of insanity does not show that he has fully adverted to this distinction. It is to underline that distinction that our late highly esteemed learned brother, Idigbe J.S.C., said in Ngene Arum v The State (1979) 11 S.C.91 at 105:
“The first limb of section 28 deals with the defence of insanity; and the second limb clearly relates to delusions (sometimes loosely – though not necessarily the same – referred to as ‘insane delusions’); insanity is not a sine qua non to the experience of a delusion or hallucination. It is, indeed, not easy to distinguish between delusion and insanity when these terms are used in their ordinary meaning; but as far as section 28 of the Criminal Code is concerned, there is a clear distinction for the purposes of establishing a defence under either limb of the section…”
Secondly from a long line of authorities relating to insanity (See Rex v Omoni 12 WA CA 511 at 513) it has been established that for the accused to succeed on a defence of insanity he must establish that he was, at the relevant time, suffering either from mental disease or from “natural mental infirmity” and that that mental disease or natural mental infirmity was such that at the relevant time he was deprived of capacity:
(a) to understand what he was doing or
(b) to control his actions or
(c) to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.
The onus of proof is on the balance of probabilities. In relation to the present appeal, the crucial words are at the relevant time. In this case, that is 10th April, 1978. There is no scintilla of evidence that on that date the appellant was suffering from any mental disease or infirmity. All the evidence available was of mental illness up to 1974. Nor is there anything in exhibit B, or any other evidence from which one can discern a delusion to justify consideration of the second part of section 28 of the Criminal Code. The situation would certainly have been different if there was even evidence of mental illness before or after the act (See Rex v Ashigifuwo (1948) 12 WACA 389).
Finally, learned counsel for the appellant complained that once evidence had been given of mental illness, the learned trial Judge ought to have ordered an inquiry to determine whether the appellant was capable of making his defence. He relied on sections 223 and 224 of the Criminal Procedure Act. This was raised as a ground of appeal to the Court of Appeal the contention being that the failure of the learned trial Judge occasioned a miscarriage of justice. That court after due consideration rejected it as per Dosunmu J.CA “The learned trial Judge” he said –
”was not obliged to comply with those sections. There can only be an obligation if he has reason to suspect that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence as stated in section 223 (1). The evidence referred to has no relevance to the capacity of the appellant for making his defence. It relates to a past history which was in no way tied to the condition of the appellant as at the trial.”
I agree with those conclusions although it seems to me that if there had been any evidence of mental illness at the relevant time it would raise the issue of the capacity of the accused to make his defence.
Although it is settled that the question whether an accused is fit to make his defence can arise before plea or even after evidence has been taken (See R v Ogor (1961) 1 All N.L.A. 70), the sections do not appear to me to apply here. There is nothing that could have aroused the suspicion of the learned trial Judge as to the mental state of the appellant. He pleaded to the charge normally; his behaviour during the proceedings was normal; his statement to the police exhibit B was quite coherent. In any case, the only evidence of mental imbalance before the trial court related to events in 1974.
It was for these reasons, and for the more detailed reasons set down in the judgment of Oputa J.S.C. referred to earlier that I dismissed this appeal.
KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: On the 27th August, 1984, I dismissed appellant’s appeal and indicated that I would give my reasons for doing so today. I now give the reasons.
I have had the privilege of reading the draft of the judgment of my learned brother Oputa, J.S.C. I agree that this appeal be dismissed on the grounds very lucidly stated therein. I wish however to make some comments of my own on a point merely adumbrated and not exhaustively dealt with in my learned brother Oputa J.S.C.’s judgment. This is in respect of the 4th ground of appeal which is as follows:-
“4. The learned Court of Appeal erred in law and misdirected itself in concluding that the trial High Court was justified in not invoking sections 222 and 224 of the Criminal Procedure Act to the effect that the trial court ought to have stopped further proceedings and ordered an inquiry after PW/5 had testified that the appellant was insane”.
Particulars
”The failure of the trial court to hold an inquiry at the stage that the PW/5 testified as to the insanity of the appellant, amounts to a miscarriage of justice.”
The provisions of sections 222 and 224 of the Criminal Procedure Act relied upon are as follows – Section 222: For the purposes of this Part, unless the con otherwise requires:-
“asylum” includes a lunatic asylum, a mental or other hospital, a prison and any other suitable place of safe custody for medical observation; “medical officer” means the medical officer attached to any asylum or any medical officer from whom a court requires an opinion.
Section 224:
(1) If such medical officer shall certify that the accused person is of sound mind and capable of making his defence, the court shall, unless satisfied by the defence that the accused person is of unsound mind, proceed with the inquiry or trial, as the case may be.
(2) If such medical officer shall certify that such person is of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence, the judge, jury or magistrate shall, if satisfied of the fact, find accordingly, and thereupon the inquiry or trial, as the case may be, shall be postponed, and the jury, if any, shall be discharged.
If the Judge, jury or magistrate is satisfied that the accused person is of sound mind and capable of making his defence the court shall proceed with the trial or inquiry as the case may be.
(3) The trial of the issue as to whether or not the accused person is of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence shall, if the finding is that he is of sound mind and capable of making his defence, be deemed to be part of his trial before the court.
(4) The certificate of such medical officer shall be receivable as evidence under this section.
(5) If the accused person is certified to be of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence it shall not be necessary for him to be present in court during proceedings under this section.
Section 222 is merely the definition section.
Section 224 depends on S. 223 which is as follows –
Section 223:
(1) When a Judge holding a trial or a magistrate holding a trial or an inquiry has reason to suspect that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence the judge, jury or magistrate, as the case may be, shall in the first instance investigate the fact of such unsoundness of mind.
(2) Such investigation may be held in the absence of the accused person if the court is satisfied that owing to the state of the accused’s mind it would be in the interests of the safety of the accused or of other persons or in the interests of public decency that he should he absent, and the court may receive as evidence a certificate in writing signed by a medical officer to the effect that such accused person is in his opinion of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence or is a proper person to be detained for observation in an asylum, or the court may, if it sees fit, take oral evidence from a medical officer on the state of mind of such accused person.
(3) If the Judge, jury or magistrate, as the case may be, is not satisfied that such person is capable of making his defence, the court shall postpone the trial or inquiry and shall discharge the jury, if any, and shall remand such person for a period not exceeding one month to be detained for observation in an asylum.
(4) The medical officer shall keep such person under observation during the period of his remand and before the expiry of such period shall certify under his hand to the court his opinion as to the state of mind of such person, and if he is unable within the period to form any definite conclusion, shall so certify to the court and shall ask for a further remand. Such further remand may extend to a period of two months.
(5) Any court before which a person suspected to be of unsound mind is accused of any offence may, on the application of a law officer made at any stage of the proceedings prior to the trial, order that such person be sent to an asylum for observation. The medical officer may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, detain any such accused person for such period, not exceeding one month, as may be necessary to enable him to form an opinion as to the state of mind of such person, and shall forward a copy of his opinion, in writing, to the court.
The submission of appellant’s counsel in his brief and in his expatiation of the brief in his argument before us was that once a witness has given evidence that the accused was insane, the trial judge was bound to apply the provisions of s. 223 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Mr. Akinrinsola referred to the evidence of P.W.5 at page 21 of the record of proceedings and submitted that the failure of the trial Judge to hold an inquiry to determine whether appellant was capable of standing trial was a miscarriage of justice. He cited and relied on R v. Ogor (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 70.
The short answer to this argument does not even rest on the answer to the question whether there was a finding of fact by the learned trial Judge on the issue of insanity raised in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses at the court of trial, appellant having not given evidence on his own behalf. It is clear from the judgment of the learned trial judge, the finding after reviewing the evidence, was that there was lack of evidence of insanity and that the defence of insanity was not available to the appellant.
It is pertinent to refer to the evidence of P.w.5 relied upon by Mr. Akinrinsola as sufficient to compel the learned trial Judge to hold investigation as to the unsoundness of mind of the appellant to stand trial. I reproduce the evidence in extenso
Under cross-examination he said,
“I have taken accused to Aro Psychiatrist Hospital for treatment on more than three occasions since 1970. Accused has an hospital card in that hospital. To my knowledge there was no quarrel between accused and my deceased mother or between accused and me. I know that accused loved my deceased mother. Sometime about October 1970, accused attempted to stab me with a knife. There was no (sic) more from me to accused that warranted his wanting to stab me with a knife on that October 1970. About a year after accused was being treated at Aro Psychiatrist Hospital, he again developed a renew(ed) attack of his mental illness. He rebukes people who normally extend greetings to him or at times he empties away his food as if in a kind of protest anger. All these for no just cause at about 1972. Again in 1974 accused on many occasions turned on his customers who gave their clothes to him to sew and chased them off for no just cause. Accused is a tailor by profession. I did not take accused to the hospital again after the 1974 attack. I hold the view that it was accused’s mental illness that could have been responsible for accused to inflict so much or any injuries, at all on the deceased who was his (our) mother.” (See page 21 lines 6-28).
It is relevant to point out that all the evidence of abnormal behaviour by the appellant so carefully recounted by P.w.5, was in respect of the period 1970 – 1974. Nothing was known or indeed said about his behaviour after 1978, and more appropriately at the time of the trial.
There is no doubt that mental fitness is an essential prerequisite to a valid trial. See R. v. Podola (1960) 1 Q.B. 325. Although s. 27 of the Criminal Code presumes every one charged with an offence to be of sound mind at anytime which comes in question until the contrary is proved; the trial Judge who has reason to suspect that the accused standing trial before him is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, shall in the first instance investigate the fact of such unsoundness of mind. – See s. 223 (1) Criminal Procedure Act. (supra). Thus for s. 223 (1) to operate the following circumstances must be present –
(a) The trial Judge must have reason to suspect that the accused is of unsound mind.
(b) That because of the unsoundness of mind accused is incapable of making his defence.
If both circumstances arise the learned trial Judge shall then proceed in his fact finding capacity to investigate the fact of such unsoundness of mind. It is well settled that the plea of the accused person is his answer to the written charge against him. Fitness to stand trial not merely connotes the capacity of the accused to understand the charge against him, it also involves his ability to make a reasonable defence to such charge – See Bakori v. Zaria N.A. (1964) N.A.N.L.A. 25. It is not enough that the accused was able to understand the nature of the charge, he should be capable of following the proceedings intelligently – R v. Inyang (1946) 12 WACA 5. Concisely stated the accused must be capable of defending himself, and instructing counsel, at the time of the plea and during the trial.
In The Queen v. Benson Madugba (1958) 3 F.S.C. 1, where the appellant was convicted on a charge of murder, it was submitted on appeal against conviction that the trial Judge was bound to accept a medical certificate of appellant’s unsoundness of mind. The issue arose from the question of appellant’s unfitness to stand his trial raised at the commencement of the trial. The learned trial Judge held that appellant was capable of pleading and making his defence. The Federal Supreme Court in a judgment read by Nageon de Lestang, F.J. said, at page 2
“It seems to us quite clear from section 224(2) that is in every case for the trial Judge to decide whether the accused person is of sound mind or not and that he is not bound by the certificate of the medical officer to the contrary, although naturally, great store ought to be attached to the medical opinion.”
The Court went further to state as follows –
“It may be that had we been trying this issue we should have been inclined to accept the medical evidence in preference to our own judgment of the condition of the appellant, but we feel unable to say that in all the circumstances of this case the Judge was wrong in his conclusion. He took great pains to ascertain the true condition of the appellant. He questioned him in the presence of the doctor, agreed with the learned judge that his answers were intelligent, and he had the great advantage, which is denied us, of seeing and hearing the appellant. It is obvious that the appellant gave him the impression that he was sane but feigning madness.”
The appeal was dismissed.
The question of an investigation into the mental fitness of an accused arises only if the trial Judge has reason to suspect that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence. These two conditions must co-exist. If the accused is of unsound mind but is capable of making his defence, it would seem that the provision has not been satisfied. It would seem however that where the accused is incapable of making his defence, even when he is of sound mind such as deaf mutes, or difficulty in communication on grounds of language, other considerations not relevant in this case would arise – See s. 220 Criminal Procedure Act; Zaria N.A. v. Bakori (1964) N.A.N.L.A. 25. The issue may arise at the time the plea is taken as in Zaria N.A. v. Bakori (supra) or during the trial. In each case the investigation must be taken up immediately, this prerequisite is accentuated by the use of the expression in the first instance in s. 223(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The Provisions of s. 223 read as a whole contemplate both the circumstances where the question of unfitness to stand trial arises before the plea is taken and during the trial after evidence has begun to be heard – See The Queen v. Ogor (1961) 1 All N.L.R. at p. 73. The words of s. 223(1) requiring “a Judge holding a trial” suggests that the issue of unsoundness of mind was not raised and that the Judge had no reason to suspect at the time plea of the accused was taken. On the other hand s. 223(3) with the expression ”the court shall postpone the trial” suggests unsoundness of mind discovered after the trial has begun and includes a trial which has not started but plea has been taken. In any event, the unsoundness of mind to be investigated is one that affects the trial, either by rendering the accused incapable of making his plea or his defence on the evidence against him at the trial.
Where there is no evidence leading the trial Judge to suspect the accused to be of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his plea or of making his defence, there is no duty on the trial Judge to enter into an investigation into the unsoundness of mind of the accused. In Paul Eledan v. The State (1964) 1 All N.L.R. 146 appellant was charged and convicted for murder. The offence of murder was not denied. The ground of appeal was that appellant was not fit to plead and take his trial and should not have been tried without compliance with the provisions of section 223 of the Criminal Procedure Act. R v. Ogor (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 70 was relied upon. Bairamian J.S.C. who also wrote the judgment of the Court in R v. Ogor (supra) distinguished the two cases. In Eledan v. The State, (1964) 1 All N.L.R. 146,
“Not only is there a presumption of sanity, there was a medical certificate less than a week old before the trial court that the appellant was mentally fit; that court had no reason to suspect that his mind was unsound. On the evidence of the doctor he was fit to stand his trial.”
In R v. Ogor (supra) the Court said,
“We agree with the learned Judge in so far as his aim was to be satisfied that the accused was capable of understanding the proceedings and making his defence; it is the means by which he was satisfied that does not accord with the law: for he was apparently making an inquiry into the accused’s fitness to stand his trial owing to the doubt raised by the medical officer’s certificate, and he resolved that doubt without evidence.”
The distinction lies in the fact that whereas in Ogor’s case the learned Judge had good reason to suspect that the mind of the accused was unsound, in Eleden’s case the learned Judge had no reason to suspect that the mind of the accused was unsound. In Ogor’s case the learned Judge without evidence resolved the doubt from the medical certificate he had on the unsoundness of mind of the accused.
The only evidence in this appeal, relied upon by counsel for the appellant to call in aid the provisions of s. 223(1) is the evidence of P.w.5 which has already been set out above. These were acts committed by the appellant about seven years before his trial. In this case appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, and there were no circumstances such as in R v. Inyang (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. p.5 indicated in the printed record suggestive that appellant was likely to be of unsound mind. Furthermore appellant did not give evidence in his own defence thereby depriving the-learned Judge of the opportunity of assessing his mental condition and whether he was capable of defending himself as was in The State v. Eledan (1964) 10 1 All N.L.A. 146, 150. There was nothing in exhibit B, the statement of the appellant, which was, in any event, denied by appellant to suggest that he was of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence. As I have already said, it is only unsoundness of mind existing at or during the trial, that will render it obligatory on the trial Judge to investigate the soundness of mind of the appellant. The Court of Appeal referring to compliance with s.223 and s. 224 stated the law correctly that –
“The learned trial Judge was not obliged to comply with these sections. There can only be an obligation if he ‘has reason to suspect that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence’ as stated in s.223 (1). The evidence referred to has no relevance to the capacity of the appellant for making his defence. It relates to a past which was in no way tied to the condition of the appellant as at the trial. Those actions do not apply and the learned trial Judge was in order not to have acted under them.”
The learned trial Judge was right in not going into any inquiry as to unsoundness of mind of the appellant. The Court of Appeal correctly held that the learned trial Judge was not obliged to do so, this ground of appeal fails and is dismissed. I am in entire agreement with the reasons given by my brother Oputa, J.S.C. in dismissing the other grounds of appeal and the appeal. The judgments of the trial court convicting the appellant for murder, and sentencing him to death, and of the Court of Appeal, affirming that judgment and dismissing appellant’s appeal are hereby upheld and affirmed. For the above reasons I dismissed the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Appearances
Fola Akinrinsola, Esq. For Appellant
AND
R.A. Bello, Esq. (P.S.C. Ogun State) For Respondent
