KINGSLEY BISONG v. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2019)

KINGSLEY BISONG v. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE

(2019)LCN/12975(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 29th day of March, 2019

CA/L/797CA/2016

RATIO

CRIMINAL LAW: PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

The law has remained very well settled upon an unbroken thread of judicial authorities to the effect that in criminal trials, the accused person is presumed innocent until proven otherwise by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. That is, the prosecution has the bounden duty of proving the complicity of an accused person in any offence alleged against him beyond reasonable doubt. There are three ways by which the prosecution can achieve its goal of gaining a conviction on the charge/charges laid against the accused person. It can be by direct evidence of eye witnesses, or through circumstantial evidence or by the confessional extra-judicial statement of the accused person OR even by a combination of the three aforesaid ways.Adeyemo v. The State (2015) 4 S.C. (pt.ii) 12; Musa v. The State (2017) 5 NWLR (pt.1557) 43; Frank Ohaeri v. The State (2018) LPELR- 43933 (CA). The Supreme Court reiterated the principle in Oyebode A. Atoyebi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2017) LPELR- 43831 (SC) @ pg 12, that:
“From time immemorial, it has been a principle in our Criminal Justice System, that an accused person is always presumed innocent until proved guilty. Any person accused of committing an offence, is presumed to be innocent, unless proved otherwise through credible and reliable evidence, adduced before a Court of law, before which he is arraigned, tried and convicted. In order to obtain conviction, the prosecution must always prove the offence against all accused beyond reasonable doubt (see Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 2011). See also Odu v. State (2001) 10 NWLR Part 722, 688.”PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.

ROBBERY: HOW TO PROVE THE OFFENCE OF ROBBERY

For this purpose, case law evolved a Trinitarian test which is that, the prosecution must prove:
(a) the factual reality of a robbery;
(b) the participation of the accused person in the said robbery operation; and
(c) that, at the material time when the offence was being committed, he was either armed with firearms, or an offensive weapon, or that he was in the company of a person who was so armed.
Bozin v. State (1985) 2 NWLR (pt.8) 465; Okosun v. A. G. Bendel State (1985) 3 NWLR (pt.12) 283; Ikemson v. State (1989) 3 NWLR (pt. 110) 455; Adeosun v. State (2007) 46 WRN 1; FRN v. Usman (2012) 8 NWLR (pt.1301) 141; Bassey v. State (2012) 12 NWLR (pt.1314) 209; Eke v. State (2011) 3 NWLR (pt. 1235) 589; Aruna v. State (1990) 6 NWLR (pt.155) 125; Tanko v. State (2009) 4 NWLR (pt.1131) 430; Alabi v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt.307) 511.”PER TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

KINGSLEY BISONG Appellant(s)

AND

THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE Respondent(s)

TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant along with three other accused persons were arraigned and prosecuted for the offences of Conspiracy to commit Robbery contrary to Section 403(A) of the Criminal Code Law Cap. C17 Vol. 2 Laws of Lagos State, 2003 and also Armed Robbery contrary to Section 402(2) (A) of the Criminal Code Law Cap. C17 Vol. 2 Laws of Lagos State, 2003 at the Lagos State High Court of Justice, holden at Ikeja, Lagos. The four accused persons were convicted for the offence of Conspiracy to commit Robbery and on the second count for a lesser offence of Robbery. They were each sentenced to 21 years imprisonment for both offences and for the said sentences to run concurrently. The appellant’s appeal is against the ruling rendered by the learned trial judge on 27th October, 2015 and the judgment rendered by the same judge on 28th January, 2016. Hence there are two separate notices of appeal in this matter. However, with the leave of this Court, both the interlocutory and the substantive appeals were argued together. This judgment, is with respect to the main appeal vide the Notice of Appeal

filed on 28th January 2016.

The appellant in order to activate the prosecution of the appeal, filed the Appellant’s brief of argument, on 2nd May, 2018. On its part the respondent’s brief of argument which was filed on 30th May, 2018 was deemed filed by this Court on 4th December, 2018. The appellant’s reply brief filed on 7th November, 2018 was also deemed filed on 4th December, 2018.

In the appellant’s brief of argument, prepared by Dr. Olawoyin, SAN., Wole Omisade, Esq., and Mrs. Oluwaseyi Omotaje, two issues were nominated for the resolution of the appeal, to wit:
Considering the facts, evidence and circumstances of this case, whether the learned trial judge was right to have, in the absence of a cogent and credible evidence concluded that the Respondent proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant without calling any credible or vital witness to corroborate PW1’s testimony. Grounds 1 & 2 of the Notice of Appeal.
Whether or not PW1’s testimony on the confession of the Appellant during his interrogation at the Special Anti-Robbery Squad which said confessional statement was never tendered as an exhibit before the

lower Court amounts to Hearsay Evidence. Grounds 3, 4 & 5 of the Notice of Appeal.

On his part, the learned Respondent’s counsel also nominated two issues for the resolution of the appeal, namely:
Whether from the evidence available before the learned trial judge, the Respondent proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and is evidence of PW1, one that requires corroboration? Grounds 1 & 2 of the Notice of Appeal.
Whether PW1’s testimony on the confession of the Appellant during interrogation at Special Anti- Robbery Squad’s office, Ikeja amounts to hearsay evidence when such confessional statement was not tendered as exhibit before the Court.

The two issues nominated by the respondent’s counsel, are in my view, more concise, hence I adopt them in my consideration and determination of this appeal.

Appellant’s Arguments:
Appellant’s learned counsel, contended that the prosecution failed to prove the charges preferred against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required under Section 135 (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. He contended to the effect that the essential ingredients of the offences of Conspiracy and Armed

robbery were not established against the appellant, by the prosecution. This, according to him was because the prosecution did not proffer any piece of evidence against the appellant, at the Court below, to show that the appellant connived, conspired or agreed with any person to rob nor took part in the alleged robbery operation on the PW 1, at NO. 23 Taiwo Street, Iyaiye Ojokoro, Lagos on 27 October, 2009. It was his further contention to the effect that the learned trial judge, ought not to have relied on the uncorroborated evidence of the PW 1, which was used to convict the appellant, for the offences of conspiracy and robbery. Furthermore, the appellant’s learned counsel, contended that the prosecution, failed to call the investigating police officer in the case, the members of the PW 1’s family and the workers in the PW 1’s company who all witnessed the alleged robbery operation on 27 October, 2009 and that the failure to call the vital witnesses above mentioned, damnified the prosecution’s case against the appellant. And at paragraph 4.32 of the appellant’s brief of argument, the learned appellant’s counsel contended to the effect that it was the failure

of the prosecution to prove the offence of armed robbery against the appellant, which prompted the learned trial judge to convict the former, not for the offence of armed robbery, but only for robbery simpliciter.

Arguing the second issue, the appellant’s learned counsel, contended to the effect that the evidence proffered by the PW 1 with respect to the arrest and confessions of the appellant, were inadmissible hearsay evidence. He referred to Sections 37 and 38 of the Evidence Act, 2011. He insisted that in the absence of the Investigating Police Officer, to whom the appellant made the alleged confession, as recounted by the PW1, the latter’s evidence, was inadmissible and that the learned trial judge ought not to have relied on that piece of evidence to convict the appellant.

Respondent’s Arguments:
The learned counsel to the Respondent, with respect to the question, of proving the offence of conspiracy, submitted to the effect that the proof of it is generally, a matter of inference deduced from certain criminal acts of accused persons in the pursuance of a criminal purpose. Therefore, according to him, it is the meeting of the minds of

the conspirators that is crucial and this becomes evident in the actual execution of their common purpose. He insisted that there can hardly be any direct evidence of conspiracy and that with the actual execution of the robbery operation in the instant case by the appellant and the co – convicts, the prosecution’s case of conspiracy, was proved against the appellant, beyond reasonable doubt. He further submitted to the effect that the PW1’s evidence was very clear with respect to the appellant’s role in the robbery operation on the former on 27 October, 2009. He also submitted that the prosecution needed not to have called a host of witnesses in order to prove its case against the appellant and that the cogent and reliable pieces of evidence proffered by the PW 1, which required no corroboration, were enough to ground the conviction of the appellant for the offences of conspiracy and robbery committed on the PW1 by the appellant and the co- convicts.

Arguing issue 2, the Respondent’s learned counsel, submitted to the effect that the PW 1’s evidence touching on what he personally heard the appellant say of his involvement and participation in the robbery

operation of 27 October, 2009 against the PW1 himself could not have amounted to hearsay evidence and so according to him, that piece of evidence was not inadmissible. He relied on Sections 125 and 126 of the Evidence Act and insisted that since it was the PW 1, who heard the words of confession, uttered by the appellant, it cannot be said that what the PW1 heard, in the circumstances, was tantamount to hearsay evidence. Responding to paragraph 4.32 of the appellant’s brief of argument, to the effect that it was because there was no proof of the offence of armed robbery against the appellant that necessitated his conviction for the offence of robbery simpliciter, the Respondent’s learned counsel, referred to page 247 of the record of appeal wherein the learned trial judge formed the opinion that since the weapon that was used in the attack on the PW 1, on the fateful day was not tendered into evidence by the prosecution, he could not make a finding on armed robbery.

Resolution:
The law has remained very well settled upon an unbroken thread of judicial authorities to the effect that in criminal trials, the accused person is presumed innocent until

proven otherwise by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. That is, the prosecution has the bounden duty of proving the complicity of an accused person in any offence alleged against him beyond reasonable doubt. There are three ways by which the prosecution can achieve its goal of gaining a conviction on the charge/charges laid against the accused person. It can be by direct evidence of eye witnesses, or through circumstantial evidence or by the confessional extra-judicial statement of the accused person OR even by a combination of the three aforesaid ways.Adeyemo v. The State (2015) 4 S.C. (pt.ii) 12; Musa v. The State (2017) 5 NWLR (pt.1557) 43; Frank Ohaeri v. The State (2018) LPELR- 43933 (CA). The Supreme Court reiterated the principle in Oyebode A. Atoyebi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2017) LPELR- 43831 (SC) @ pg 12, that:
“From time immemorial, it has been a principle in our Criminal Justice System, that an accused person is always presumed innocent until proved guilty. Any person accused of committing an offence, is presumed to be innocent, unless proved otherwise through credible and reliable evidence, adduced before a Court of law,

before which he is arraigned, tried and convicted. In order to obtain conviction, the prosecution must always prove the offence against all accused beyond reasonable doubt (see Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 2011). See also Odu v. State (2001) 10 NWLR Part 722, 688.”

In the instant case, the charges against the appellant, as contained in an Information dated 26th January, 2011, read as follows :
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE COUNT 1
Conspiracy to commit Armed Robbery contrary to Section 403 A of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C.17, Vol.2, Laws of Lagos State, 2003.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Yinka Adesina (M), Charles Arikpo (M), Kingsley Bisong (M) and Emeka Okafor (M), on or about the 27th of October, 2009 at No. 23, Taiwo Street, Ijaiye Ojokoro, Lagos in the Ikeja Judicial Division conspired to commit Armed Robbery.
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE COUNT 2
Armed Robbery, contrary to Section 402(2) (a) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C.17, Vol.2, Laws of Lagos State, 2003.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Yinka Adesina (M), Charles Arikpo (M), Kingsley Bisong (M) and Emeka Okafor (M), on or about the 27th of October, 2009 at No. 23, Taiwo Street,

Ijaiye Ojokoro, Lagos in the Ikeja Division, while armed with two locally made guns, robbed Chief Andrew Arikhan of his Toyota Camry Salon car with Reg. No. EM. 394 ABJ, cash totaling N1.9 million, Jewelry worth about N700,000 and four GSM handsets.

In order for the prosecution to succeed in proving the offence of conspiracy against an accused person, it is hard and impossible to procure and proffer hard evidence of how the conspiracy was hatched by the conspirators. Therefore, direct evidence of a plot by the conspirators is hardly achievable. The bottom line of the offence of conspiracy, is the meeting of the minds among the conspirators for them to commit a criminal offence and they need not to meet physically and arrange how their criminal mission will be actualized. However, it is from each of the overt actions of the conspirators, in furtherance of their criminal agreement, that the offence of conspiracy is inferred. And most often, it is from the testimonies of some of the accused persons at the trial, of how they each got linked with one another, that the offence of conspiracy becomes apparent. In the instant case, it is clearly evident that it

was the appellant, who set the ball in motion by arranging the planned attack on the PW 1 on 27 October, 2009. He indeed was the hub and central figure in the evil scheme, around whom all the other criminally minded conspirators flocked and since he was at the centre of the circle and had set the ball in motion, the other conspirators needed not to have met and known one another, so long as they each were aware of the existence of an evil mission that must be executed/carried out. Patrick Njovens v. The State (1973) 5 S.C. 17; Oladejo v. The State (1994) 6 NWLR (pt.348) 101; Oduneye v. The State (2001) 2 NWLR (pt. 697) 311; Osuagwu v. The State (2013) 1 SCNJ 33; Sule v. Musa (2018) 13 NWLR (pt.1636) 307 @ 317; Osho v. The State (2018) 13 NWLR (pt. 1637) 474 @ 488; Frank T. Ohaeri v. The State (2018) LPELR – 43933 (CA). I am satisfied and in total agreement with the finding of the learned trial judge in his judgment, to the conclusive effect, at page 247 of the record of appeal, thus:
“The Court finds that the Defendants acted in concert and there was a meeting of minds to commit an unholy cause which can very properly be inferred from the surrounding

circumstances of this case. The operation was a joint operation carried out by all the Defendants, acting in unison to invade the house of PW 1. This is the evidence before me that I believe and this evidence suffices in order for the Court to make a finding of conspiracy as charged.”

Now, with respect to the charge of armed robbery, the prosecution needed to prove three essential ingredients of the offence, namely:
(1) That there was a robbery;
(2) That the robbery was carried out with use of offensive weapon(s); and
3) That the accused persons/defendants participated in the robbery operation.
There are a basketful of the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court in respect of the above mentioned ingredients as being sine qua non in any allegation of armed robbery. For example in a more recent decision of the apex Court in Aliyu Yahaya v. The State (2018) 16 NWLR (pt.1644) 96 @ 115, his Lordship, Nweze, JSC., restated the three ingredients, thus:
“When the penal statutes incorporated the offence of armed robbery as a specie of capital offence in the adversarial criminal justice system, the Courts were confronted with the

task of enunciating specific ingredients which must be proved to warrant a conclusion that the prosecution discharged the burden of proving its commission beyond reasonable doubt. For this purpose, case law evolved a Trinitarian test which is that, the prosecution must prove:
(a) the factual reality of a robbery;
(b) the participation of the accused person in the said robbery operation; and
(c) that, at the material time when the offence was being committed, he was either armed with firearms, or an offensive weapon, or that he was in the company of a person who was so armed.
Bozin v. State (1985) 2 NWLR (pt.8) 465; Okosun v. A. G. Bendel State (1985) 3 NWLR (pt.12) 283; Ikemson v. State (1989) 3 NWLR (pt. 110) 455; Adeosun v. State (2007) 46 WRN 1; FRN v. Usman (2012) 8 NWLR (pt.1301) 141; Bassey v. State (2012) 12 NWLR (pt.1314) 209; Eke v. State (2011) 3 NWLR (pt. 1235) 589; Aruna v. State (1990) 6 NWLR (pt.155) 125; Tanko v. State (2009) 4 NWLR (pt.1131) 430; Alabi v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt.307) 511.”

In the instant case, there is the testimony of the PW 1- the victim of the robbery attack of 27th October, 2009, at his home. He

was emphatic as to the fact that each of the convicts, including the appellant, were the persons who invaded his home and attacked him with a locally made gun and carted away his Toyota Camry Salon car, some amount of money and jewelry. He stated the role played by each convict on the fateful day. He was indeed the star eyewitness of the robbery operation. The learned trial judge, in his judgment, particularly at pages 246 – 247 of the record of appeal had the following to say in respect of the testimony of the PW 1, inter alia:
“PW 1 testified that he was present when all the Defendants were arrested. His testimony is logical and consistent. He testified of what he saw, what he heard, and what he experienced. His testimony was not challenged, discredited, or disparaged under cross-examination. The testimony of the PW 2 was also not challenged, discredited or disparaged under cross-examination.”
The Court finds the testimony of the Prosecution Witnesses to be consistent and reliable.
On the issue of the identification of the Defendants. The first Defendant identified the second Defendant when he was arrested at Excellence Hotel and brought to

Special Anti Robbery Squad. It was when the third Defendant was arrested and brought to Special Anti Robbery Squad that the second Defendant identified him. It was the third Defendant that called the fourth Defendant and set him up for his arrest.
PW 1 testified that he was watching a football match in his living room upstairs when the robbery incident took place. The Defendants i.e the first, second and fourth Defendants were not masked and there was light. Only the second and fourth Defendants went upstairs. The first Defendant was on guard downstairs and later when the fourth Defendant led him downstairs at gun point, the first Defendant drove away the car. PW 1 was expletive in his denial of PW 2 when the Police Officers from Special Anti Robbery Squad arrested PW 2 and told him that they had caught one of the robbers, he said PW 2 was not one of them.
This Court finds that there is continuum in the arrest of the Defendants whose roles were clearly narrated in the testimony of PW1. The testimony of PW 1 is direct eye witness account of the arrest of the Defendants.”

The above far reaching findings by the learned trial judge

were not effectively impugned by the appellant’s counsel. I have myself painstakingly perused the pieces of evidence proffered by the PW1 and PW2. It was their pieces of evidence against those of the appellant and the co-convicts. The learned trial judge who saw and heard each of all the witnesses in the case had the singular advantage of watching their demeanor as they testified before him. He had the prerogative of assessing their credibility and the probative value to assign to each of their testimonies. This Court does not have that advantage. That is why the appellate Court is usually reluctant in interfering with primary finding of facts made by trial Courts, especially as in the instant case, where such findings are clearly borne out of the evidence proffered by the witnesses in the case. This principle of the law was more recently restated by the Supreme Court inIkpa v. State (2017) LPELR- 45290 (SC) @ pp. 63-64, per Augie, JSC., thus:
“It is settled that findings on primary facts are matters within the province of a trial Court. There is a rebuttable presumption that its findings and conclusions on facts are correct, therefore such findings are

accorded due respect in appellate Courts- see Ibhafidon v. Igbinosun (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt.716) 653 SC, wherein this Court, per Karibi-Whyte, JSC, stated as follows – ?It is a well-established principle that an appellate Court will very rarely, if at all, interfere with the findings of facts made by the trial Court. This is because such findings of fact enjoy the privilege of passing through the furnace of acrimonious cross- examination, the tooth comb scrutiny of the observation of the witnesses’ reactions and assessment of the veracity of their testimony. Accordingly, such findings ought to be accorded due respect in appellate Courts, which did not have the advantage of the trial Judge.?
Therefore, it is only where the findings of the trial judge is not borne out by the evidence placed before him or where the trial judge made wrong inferences from the evidence placed before him that the appellate Court will interfere with such findings.
I have myself, perused the pieces of evidence proffered by the witnesses at the Court below vis a vis the findings made by the learned trial judge which ultimately culminated in the conviction of the

appellant. I am satisfied that those findings are clearly borne out of the evidence placed before his Lordship. The findings are, to my mind, unassailable. I have no reason whatsoever to tamper or interfere with them. I affirm them accordingly.

Let me say a word with respect to contention by the learned appellant’s counsel to the effect that there was no corroboration of the PW1’s evidence, which the learned trial judge believed and convicted the appellant. The law has been well settled beyond per adventure that the evidence proffered by a single witness, if it is direct, cogent, credible and believable by the trial Court is strong enough to ground a conviction, especially where there is no statutory provision that such evidence must be corroborated.Babarinde & Ors v. The State (2013) LPELR – 21896 (SC). In the circumstances of the instant case, there is no law which requires that the evidence of the sole eye witness such as the PW 1, must be corroborated before it was believed and acted upon by the learned trial judge.

In the same vein, the prosecution was not obliged to call a host of witnesses in order to prove the charges against the appellant.

There are myriads of authorities on this elementary and settled principle of the law. Just a few will suffice: Anthony Igbo v. The State (1975) 9-11 S.C. 129; Okon Akpan v. The State (1993) 3 NWLR (pt.182) 646 @ 657; The State v. Nnolim (1994) 6 SCNJ 48 @ 59-60.

The remaining aspect in this appeal relates to the question of hearsay evidence. I had earlier in this judgment, reproduced the portion of the findings of the learned trial judge made at page 246 of the record of appeal. The PW 1 had testified to the fact that he heard the appellant when the latter informed the police at the Special Anti Robbery Squad office, of his participation in the robbery operation on 27th October, 2009, on the PW1, in his home. The law is that if that piece of evidence was to state the fact that such a statement was made and heard by the testifier, such as the PW1 herein, it will not be tantamount to hearsay evidence. However, if the PW 1 gave that piece of evidence in order to prove the truth of its having been made by the appellant, it then becomes hearsay and inadmissible in evidence, since the alleged confession was not made directly to the PW 1, but to the

Investigating Police Officer, who did not testify in the case at the trial Court. That is the essence of the provisions of Sections 37 and 38 of the Evidence Act, 2011, which provide, inter alia:
“37. Hearsay means a statement –
(a) oral or written made otherwise than by a witness in a proceeding; or
(b) contained or recorded in a book, or document or any record whatever, proof of which is not admissible under any provision of this Act, which is tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated in it.”
“38. Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as provided in this Part or by or under any other provision of this or any other Act.”
The Supreme Court in Utteh v. The State (1992) 2 NWLR (pt.223) 257; (1992) LPELR – 6239 (SC) @ p.11, paras, C – E, per Kawu, JSC., had this to say on the rule against hearsay evidence, thus:
“In the Subramanian (supra) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council did not say that in cases hearsay evidence is inadmissible. At page 970 of the report, the rule against hearsay is stated as follows: –
“Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who himself is not

called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and it is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of statement but the fact that it was made.”

In the instant case, I fail to see the ingenuity in the contention of the appellant’s learned counsel on this issue. The evidence of the PW1, with respect to the alleged confession by the appellant, was nowhere in the judgment of the learned trial judge, relied upon for the conviction of the appellant. Therefore issue 2 is not available to the appellant.

?I should make a remark in respect to the comment by the learned trial judge to the effect that although, he believed and accepted the PW 1’s evidence of the armed robbery attack on him by the appellant and the co- convicts, since the weapon used by the latter was not tendered into evidence by the prosecution, he could not make a finding of armed robbery. The law is well settled to the effect that the fact that the weapon used in a commission of an offence was not found and tendered

into evidence does not damnify the prosecution’s case and exculpate an accused person of his complicity in the crime committed by him. Yahaya v. State (supra) @ page 116; The People of Lagos State v. Mohammed Umaru (2014) LPELR -22466 (SC); (2014) 7 NWLR (pt.1407) 584. In any event, since the respondent did not complain about the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the lesser offence of Robbery instead of Armed Robbery, let the sleeping dogs lie, as the appellant is fortunate for the respondent’s benevolence. I am satisfied and in agreement with the learned trial judge that the prosecution’s case against the appellant, was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In sum, having resolved the two issues in the appeal against the appellant, the appeal deserves a dismissal. The judgment, rendered by S. S. Ogunsanya, J., in re – Charge NO: ID/61C/2011 at the Ikeja Division of the Lagos State High Court, on 28 January, 2016, is hereby affirmed. Consequently, the conviction of the appellant and the sentence imposed on him are both affirmed.

ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read the draft of the

judgment delivered by my learned brother, TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, JCA in this appeal, he has covered the field.

Therefore I agree that the appeal lacks merit; it is hereby dismissed. The judgment rendered by the trial Court is hereby affirmed.

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: My learned brother TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU JCA. afforded me the opportunity of reading before today a draft copy of the lead judgment just delivered.
I adopt the judgment as mine with nothing further to add.

Appearances:

J. A. Omisade, Esq.For Appellant(s)

For Respondent(s)

Appearances

J. A. Omisade, Esq.For Appellant

AND

For Respondent