BABATUNDE HABEEB v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
(2019)LCN/12958(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 29th day of March, 2019
CA/L/890c/2018
JUSTICES
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
BABATUNDE HABEEB Appellant(s)
AND
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA Respondent(s)
RATIO
THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF OBTAINING BY FALSE PRETENCE
Section 1 of the Fraud Act provides that:-
?1. Obtaining property by false pretence, etc.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment or law, any person who by any false pretence, and with intent to defraud ?
(a) obtains, from any other person, Nigeria or in any other country, for himself or any other persons: or
(b) induces any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country, to deliver to any person, any property, whether or not the property is obtained or its delivery is induced through the medium of a contract induced by the false pretence, commits an offence under this Act.
(2) A person who by the false pretence, and with the intent to defraud, induces any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country, to confer a benefit on him or on any other person by doing or permitting a thing to be done on the understanding that the benefit has been or will be paid for commits an offence under this Act.
(3) A person who commits an offence under Subsection (1) or (2) of this section is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not more than twenty years and not less than seven years without the option of a fine.?
As can be seen, these provisions provide for and punish the offence of obtaining by false pretence by a person and with intent to defraud, any property from any other person in Nigeria or any other country for himself or any other person.
Section 20 of the Fraud Act defines ?false pretence? as follows:-
?False pretence means a representation, whether deliberate or reckless, made by word, in writing or by conduct, of a matter of fact or law, either past or present, which representation is false in fact or law, and which the person making it knows to be false or does not believe to be true.?
In Uzoka v. FRN (2010) 2 NWLR (1177) 118, this Court referred to the definition of ?false pretence? in 7th Edition of Black?s Law Dictionary, at page? as follows:-
?The crime of knowingly obtaining title to another?s personal property by misrepresenting a fact with intent to defraud.?See also Onwudiwe v. FRN (2006) ALLFWLR (319) 774. PER GARBA, J.C.A.
INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENCE OF OBTAINING BY FALSE PRETENCE
In the case of Alake v. State (supra), the Court per Tobi, JCA, set out the essential elements or ingredients which constitute the offence of obtaining by false pretences under the provisions of the Criminal Code, as follows-
?1. That there was a pretense;
2. That the pretence emanated from the accused person;
3. That it was false;
4. That the accused person knew of its falsity.
5. That there was an intention to defraud;
6. That the thing is capable of being stolen;
7. That the acused person induced the owner to transfer his whole interest in the property PER GARBA, J.C.A.
THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY
On its part, Section 8(a) of the Fraud Act, provides that:- A person who
(a) conspires with, aids, abets, or counsels any other person to commit an offence; or
(b) attempts to commit or is an accessory to an act or offence; or
(c) incites, procures or induces any other person by any means whatsoever to commit an offence under this Act, commits the offence and is liable on conviction to the same punishment as is prescribed for that offence under this Act.?
Neither the section nor the Act defines what ?conspiracy? is for the purpose of the offence under the Section or the Act. However, the Supreme Court, in the case of ACN v. INEC (2003) 13 NWLR (1370) 161 @ 185 defined conspiracy as follows:-Conspiracy is an agreement by two or more persons to do or cause to be done, an illegal act or a legal act, by illegal means.?
See also Ikemson v. State (1989) 3 NWLR (110) 455; Osondu v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (682) 483; Aje v. State (2006) 8 NWLR (982) 345; Shurumo v. State (2010) 19 NWLR (1226) 73; Abondejo v. FRN(2013) 7 NWLR (1353) 285; Ogogovie v. State (2016) 12 NWLR (1527) 468. In the case of Ikemson v. State(1989) (Supra) Karibi-Whyte, JSC, said that: –
?An offence of conspiracy can be committed where persons have acted either by agreement or in concert, bare agreement to commit an offence is sufficient. The actual commission of the offence is not necessary.?
The ingredients of the offence of conspiracy were set out in the case of Akinkunmi v State (1987) 7 NWLR (52) 606 as follows:-
(1) there must be two (2) or more persons;
(2) they must form a common intention;
(3) the common intention must be toward prosecuting an unlawful purpose,
(4) an offence must be committed in the process; and
(5) the offence must be of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence.
See also Sodiya v. State (2009) LPELR-4430 (CA); Aituma v. State (2006) 10 NWLR (989) 452. PER GARBA, J.C.A.
THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES
The law in Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 places the burden of proof of the offences with which the Appellant was charged before the Lower Court, beyond reasonable doubt, on the Respondent throughout the trial on the basis of the Constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed in his favour. See Onye Chimba v. State (1998) 8 NWLR (563) 587; Igbi v. State (2000) 3 NWLR (648) 169; Ani v. State (2003) 11 NWLR (830) 142; Igabele v. State (2006) 6 NWLR (975) 100.
The law is also settled that the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt placed on the Respondent does not mean proof beyond any or every shadow of doubt, but that all the essential ingredients or elements which constitute offences with which he was charged must be established or proved by sufficient and credible evidence which is so cogent and strong against the Appellant such that there would not be even the remotest probable doubt that he in fact committed the offences he was charged with. In the case of Dibie v. State (2007) 3 SC (Pt. 1) 176 (2007) 9 NWLR (1038) 30, Tobi JSC, stated the law that:- ?Proof beyond doubt does not mean proof beyond an shadow of doubt. Once the proof drowns the presumption of innocence of the accuse person, the Court is entitled to convict him. The moment the proof by the prosecution renders the presumption of innocence on the part of the accused useless and pins him down as the owner of the mens rea and actus reus or both, the prosecution has discharged the burden of placed on it. See also Yongo v. COP (1992) 4 SCNJ, 113; Akalezi v. State (1993) 2 SCNJ, 19, (1993) 2 NWLR (273) 1; Abadom v State (1997) 1 NWLR (479) 1; Akinyemi v. State (1999) 6 NWLR (607) 463; Uwagboe v. State (2007) 6 NWLR (1031) 606; Uluebeka v. State (2011) 4 NWLR (1237) 358; Nwaturuocha v. State (2011) LPELR-8119(SC); Abo v. State (2011) LPELR-4799(CA). PER GARBA, J.C.A.
ESTABLISHING PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Proof beyond reasonable can be achieved and the guilt of an accused person proved in any one or more of the following ways –
(a) by confession freely and voluntarily made by the accused person which meets the requirement of the law;
(b) by cogent, credible and compelling evidence of eye witnesses to the commission of the offence; or
(c) by circumstantial evidence which satisfies, the requirements of the law and irresistibly points and fixes the accused, and no other as the person who committed the offence.
See Igabele v. State (supra); Nwaeze v. State (1996) 2 NWLR (428) 1; Akinmoju v. State (2000) 4 SC (Pt. 1) 64; Durwode v. State (2000) 12 SC (Pt. 1) 1; Ubani v. State (2003) 18 NWLR (851) 22; Emeka v. State (2001) 6 SCNJ, 259; Joshua v. State (2010) 1 WRN, 41. PER GARBA, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION CAN BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE IN THE PROCEEDINGS
Although the issue of the jurisdiction of a Court to adjudicate over a case is one at large that can be raised at any and all stages of judicial proceedings of a case, anyhow and by any of the parties or the Court suo motu, see NDIC v. CBN (2002) 7 NWLR (766) 272 @ 292; Nuhu v. Ogele (2003) 12 SC (Pt.1) 32, (2003) 18 NWLR (852) 251; Mil. Gov., Ondo State v. Kolawole (2008) 5 SCNJ, 37, except as may be provided by a statute, see Jov. v. Dom (1999) 9 NWLR (620) 538; Adejobi v. State (2011) 6 MJSC (Pt. 1) 101 @ 119; Oko v. State (2017) 17 NWLR (1593) 24 @ 47-8, the challenge is one that should be directed at the competence of the Court to adjudicate over the case on any of the judicially established and recognized grounds which would deprive the particular Court of the requisite jurisdiction in the case. Courts of law being creatures of the Constitutions or/and Statutes, are vested or conferred with the necessary powers and authority in form of jurisdiction to adjudicate over causes or matters brought before them. Braithwaite v. G. D. M. (1998) 7 NWLR (557) 307; Ifeajuna v. Ifeajuna (2000) 19 NWLR (671) 107; APC Ltd. v. NDIC (NUB Ltd) (2006) 15 NWLR (2000) 404; Agbiti v. Nigerian Navy (2011) 4 NWLR (1236) 175. PER GARBA, J.C.A.
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant was convicted and sentenced for the offences of conspiracy and obtaining money by false pretence in charge No. ID/565C/2014, by the Lagos State High Court (High Court) in a judgement delivered on the 15th March, 2018. Dissatisfied, he brought this appeal by the Notice of Appeal dated and filed on the 24th April, 2018 and from the four (4) grounds contained thereon, three (3) issues are formulated in the Appellant?s brief filed on the 11th September, 2018, for decision by the Court as follows:-
?i. Whether the learned trial judge of the Court below correctly interpreted, construed, applied and properly evaluated the oral and documentary evidence placed before the Court before coming to the conclusion that the appellant is guilty and liable for the criminal conduct and liability of his master (Alhaji Ishola Salawudeen in using No. 59, Oriola Street Alapere Ketu in obtaining money from tenants via Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10.
OR IN PUT IN ANOTHER WAY
Whether from the oral and documentary evidence placed before the Court the Respondent
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proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant is liable and guilty of the criminal conduct committed by his master (Alhaji Ishola Salawudeen) who is now at large and who used No. 59, Oriola Street Alapere Ketu in obtaining money from tenants via Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 to obtain money by false pretences from PW1-PW5 and others. (This issue No. 1 covers grounds one and three of the Notice of appeal).
ii). Whether the learned trial judge of the Court below has the jurisdiction to make an order of forfeiture and sale of the lease property situate at and known as 59, Oriola Street, Alapere, Ketu, Lagos when empirical evidence show that that the legal proprietary interest does not belong to either the appellant or his master (Alhaji Ishola Salawudeen). (This covers ground four of the Notice of appeal).
iii). Whether where issues I and II are answered in the negative, the judgement of the Court below as delivered by Honourable Justice Atinuke Ipaye is perverse and entered per incuriam. (This covers grounds two of the Notice of Appeal.?
Two (2) issues are submitted for determination by the Court in the Respondent?s brief filed
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on the 8th November, 2018 in the following terms: –
?1. Whether the learned trial judge correctly interpreted, construed, applied and properly evaluated the oral and documentary evidence place before the Court before rendering her judgment.
2. Whether the learned trial judge has the jurisdiction to make an order of forfeiture and sale of the property situate at 59, Oriola Street, Ketu, Lagos State which was used to defraud innocent citizens.?
From the substance of the grounds contained on the Notice of Appeal, the issues which call for decision by the Court in the appeal are, precisely and concisely, thus: –
(1) whether the Respondent proved the offences the Appellant was charged with, as required by law, and
(2) whether the High Court was right to make the consequential order for forfeiture in the case.
On the judicial authorities which includeChabasaya v. Anwasi (2010) 10 NWLR (1201) 163 @ 181; Agbareh v. Mimra (2008) 2 NWLR (1071) 378; Emeka v. State (2014) 13 NWLR (1425) 614 @ 627 and Gov., Ekiti State (2017) 3 NWLR (1551) 1 @ 23, I intend to determine the appeal on these issues, taking into consideration, the
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relevant arguments of learned Counsel for the parties.
Before then, the facts on which the charge against the Appellant was predicated are briefly that he and one Alhaji Ishola Salawudeen, said to be his brother, conspired and by false pretence that they had shops and residential apartments for rent at No. 59, Oriola Street, Alapere-Ketu, Lagos, collected various sums of money from several people as rents and failed to provide the shops/apartments or refund the money collected.
I now return to the issues for determination.
APPELLANT?S SUBMISSIONS:
After setting out the provisions of Sections 1 (1), (2), (3) and 8 of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act, 2006 (Fraud Act hereafter) and the elements to be established for the offence of obtaining by false pretences as set out in FRN v. Amah (2016) ALL FWLR (818) 889 @ 893 and Alake v. The State (1991) 7 NWLR (205) 591, learned Counsel for the Appellant said that the evidence adduced by the Respondent shows that that Appellant was an employee of Alhaji Salawudeen who was the developer of the property in question by the virtue of an agreement with the owner; one Mrs.
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Clara Kehinde Adeniyi, as the lessor. The evidence of PW2 and the Appellant was referred to and it is argued that it was not in dispute that the Appellant issued receipts to the people who paid money on Salawudeen?s instruction and which bear his name and that the Appellant is not the owner of the property, but only a servant or employee of Salawudeen. Also, that only two (2) payments were made into the account of the Appellant opened for him without his consent and so the only offence which can be imputed or inferred on the Appellant is that of impersonation using the name of Habeeb Ayinde Salawudeen to run his bank account, for which he was not charged. Relying on Section 66 (2) and (3) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, (CAMA), Mr. V. I. Nwana; learned Counsel for the Appellant says the acts of Alhaji Salawudeen, as Managing Director and alter ego of Sholex Construction Nigeria Ltd, were acts of the company and that the Appellant did not act on his own to possess the mens rea and actus reus which have to be proved for the offence he was charged with. The cases of Harb (sic) v. FRN (2008) FWLR (340) 705; Nwosu v. Bd. of Customs (1988) 5 NWLR (93)
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225 and Oladepo v. State (1999) 6 NWLR (348) 101 were cited and it is submitted that the Respondent failed to establish the charge against the Appellant since there was no evidence that he told the PW1-5 that he was the landlord of the property in question which made them to part with their money.
It is also the case of the Appellant that the confessional statement by Alhaji Salawudeen on the property and the receipts issued for the rents show that the Appellant only acted as a servant or agent and so the Respondent has failed to show or prove any fraudulent intent or inducement on the part of the Appellant in order to prove the offences he was charged with. FRN v. Usman (2012) ALLFWLR (632) 1639 and Olanipekun v. State (2012) ALLFWLR (607) 752 were referred to for the submission and the High Court was said to have interpreted Sections 1(3) and 8(a) of the Fraud Act in isolation instead of the Statute as a whole on the authority of INEC v. AC (2009) ALLFWLR (480) 732 and Adeleke v. Oyo State of Assembly (2007) ALLFWLR (345) 211.
Learned Counsel also contends that the High Court, being a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction with the Federal High Court,
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which made an order on the 28th March, 2014 for interim forfeiture of the property in question, lacks the jurisdiction to order the forfeiture of the same property in its judgement, which does not belong to Alhaji Salawudeen or the Appellant. According to Counsel, the order was an abuse of court process as defined in Abiola v. FRN (2015) ALLFWLR (773) 1930 and he urges the Court to set aside the order.
In the alternative, it is argued that since the beneficial owner and the land developer were not parties to the amended charge before the High Court, the order of forfeiture and sale was made without jurisdiction.
It is the further contention of the Counsel for the Appellant that since the evidence before the High Court shows that the property in question did not belong to the Appellant, and Alhaji Salawudeen and that the beneficial owner and the developer were not parties, its order for forfeiture and sale was perverse as enunciated in Emeka v. State (2014) ALLFWLR (751) 1480 and Naude v. Simon (2014) ALLFWLR (753) @ 1892 and 1904.
Arguments were then made from paragraph 6.2 at page 30 to the last paragraph on page 33 of the Appellant?s
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brief on the propriety of the sentence imposed on the Appellant by the High Court. However, none of the four (4) grounds contained on the Notice of Appeal complaints about the sentence passed on the Appellant by the High Court and so the arguments on the sentence have no foundation to be valid and competent for consideration in the appeal. In fact, the arguments were just brought in at large without any relation to any of the issues formulated by Counsel or the grounds of appeal contained on the Notice of Appeal. The law is now elementary in the appellate Courts that all issues and arguments in an appeal which have no relationship with the grounds of the appeal and are not reasonably derivable or even traceable to such grounds, are invalid, incompetent and not worthy of consideration by the appellate Court. See Elakhame v. Osemobor (1991) 6 NWLR (196) 170; Kano . Printers Ltd. v. Gloede & Hoff Nig. Ltd. (2005) 5 SC (Pt. II) 140; Obiekwe v. Obi (2006) ALLFWLR (315) 152; Len v. FRN, Odeh v.FRN (2008) 5 MJSC, 1; Mbang v. State (2012) 6-7 MJC (Pt. IV) 119.
The arguments are liable to be discountenanced in the determination of the appeal.
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In conclusion, the Court is urged to resolve the Appellant?s issues in his favour and allow the appeal, set aside the decision by the High Court and discharge and acquit him.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant has argued on the authority of Sarkin Yaki v. Bagudu (supra) that on the ground of absence of the NBA seal and stamp of the person who signed the Respondent?s brief, it is incompetent. This appeal being against a judgement in a criminal matter, the fact that the Appellant?s counsel has filed a Reply brief in reaction or answer to the Respondent?s brief and he has not in objecting to the Respondent?s brief, indicated any prejudice or disadvantage which in any manner howsoever, affected his ability to write and adequately prepare and answer the issues raised in the said brief, I consider the objection to the brief one in the realm of technicality. Since learned Counsel has not suggested or indicated any doubt that the person who signed the Respondent?s brief is not a legal practitioner as defined under the Legal Practitioner Act, the mere absence of the NBA Seal and Stamp in the circumstances of this appeal of the
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person who settled the Respondent?s brief, cannot ipso fact, be held to render the brief incompetent. In any case, the Appellant is to succeed in the appeal on the viability and sustainability in law of the issues raised and canvassed in the Appellant?s Brief and not on whether or not the Respondent?s brief is competent.
The justice of the case requires that the objection be and is hereby dismissed.
RESPONDENT?S SUBMISSIONS:
It is submitted that the offences of conspiracy and obtaining by false pretence with which the Appellant was charged were proved as required by law. On conspiracy, that the evidence of PW1-PW5 shows that the Appellant and Alhaji Salawudeen conspired to defraud over one hundred (100) persons under false pretence that apartments were available for rent and that payments were made into Appellant?s account and into Alhaji Salawudeen?s account on direction by Appellant who issued receipts. Also, that the Appellant opened and operated the Skye Bank account with a fictitious name, along with Alhaji Salawudeen, with the name of Salaudeen Habeeb Ayinde, using his phone number and passport size
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photograph, which he admitted. Exhibits 11b and 12b were cited in support of the submission and in further argument, Mr. A. B. C. Ozioko, Esq., who settled the Respondent?s brief, said the evidence also shows that there were only thirteen (13) apartments to let out for rent at the property in question, but the Appellant and Alhaji Salawudeen collected money from over a hundred (100) people for them. On the authority of R v. Ligali (1959) 4 FSC, 7 and Shodiya v. State (1992) 3 NWLR (230) 447 @ 457, it is submitted that even if there was no proof on express agreement, it could be implied between the defendants who may be convicted for the offence of conspiracy.
Then, Counsel also set out the provision of Section 1(1) of the Fraud Act and the definition of obtaining money by false pretence stated in Rolls in Reg. v. Aspinall (1) 2 QBD, 48 and argues that the Respondent has proved all the ingredients of the offence as the evidence shows that PW1-PW5 were induced and misled by the Appellant that he was related to Alhaji Salawudeen as borne out by Exhibit 11(a); the statement made by the Appellant and his admission under cross-examination that he did not
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report any of their acts to the security agencies or returned the money to the people who were not allocated the apartments they paid for.
It is the case of the Respondent?s Counsel that the issue of forfeiture of the property in question was not raised before the High Court and the leave of the court was not obtained to be raised at the appeal, as a new or fresh issue. That the issue arose out of a post judgement application which was filed by parties who did not take part in the trial of the Appellant before the High Court and that the Appellant did not show how the property in the lease between one Clara Akiniyi and Wasiu Salawu, is the same as the one in respect of which the forfeiture order was made or that Wasiu Salawu was the same as Alhaji I. Salawudeen.
In the alternative, it is contended that the High Court, under Sections 11(1) of the Fraud Act and 290 (1) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2011 (ACJA) is empowered to make the order for forfeiture and since there is no evidence that the property described as 103, Oriola Street, Ketu is the same as the property ordered to be forfeited, the Appellant cannot be heard to
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rely on documents not in evidence. In addition, it is submitted that the evidence shows that the Appellant personally participated in the offence and was criminally responsible, not as agent or servant of Alhaji Salawudeen.
In the Appellant?s Reply brief, an objection was raised on the competence of the Respondent?s brief on the ground that the Nigerian Bar Association? seal and stamp of the person who signed it was not affixed thereto. The case of Sarkin v. Bagudu (2015) 11 LPELR-1@ 27 and Ado v. State (2017) ALLFWLR (897) 1938 @ 1944-5 were referred to on the objection.
In the alternative, it is argued that the Appellant requires no leave to raise the issue of the jurisdiction of the High Court to order for forfeiture of the property since the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings even at appeal, for the first time on the authority of Maraire v. State (2017) ALLFWLR (881) 1051 @ 1057-8 and Mohammed v. Babalola (2012) ALLFWLR (623) 1894 @ 1398-9.
The cases of Alahassan v. Ishaku (2017) ALLFWLR (866) 209 and Jev. v. Iyortyom (2016) ALLFWLR (837) 760 were cited for the law that parties are bound by the
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Record of Appeal and the order for forfeiture made by the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/281/2014 was referred to on the property it was directed at.
The Court is urged to regard the Appellant?s Issue III and arguments thereon as unchallenged since the Respondent did not proffer arguments on it.
RESOLUTION:
By the Amended charge dated the 30th November, 2015 and filed on the 1st December, 2015, the Appellant was charged with eighty-one (81) Counts of conspiracy to obtain and obtaining money by false pretences contrary to Sections 8(a) and 1(1) and (3) of the Fraud Act, respectively. He pleaded not guilty to all the Counts of the charge.
Section 1 of the Fraud Act provides that:-
?1. Obtaining property by false pretence, etc.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment or law, any person who by any false pretence, and with intent to defraud ?
(a) obtains, from any other person, Nigeria or in any other country, for himself or any other persons: or
(b) induces any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country, to deliver to any person, any property, whether or not the property is
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obtained or its delivery is induced through the medium of a contract induced by the false pretence, commits an offence under this Act.
(2) A person who by the false pretence, and with the intent to defraud, induces any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country, to confer a benefit on him or on any other person by doing or permitting a thing to be done on the understanding that the benefit has been or will be paid for commits an offence under this Act.
(3) A person who commits an offence under Subsection (1) or (2) of this section is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not more than twenty years and not less than seven years without the option of a fine.?
As can be seen, these provisions provide for and punish the offence of obtaining by false pretence by a person and with intent to defraud, any property from any other person in Nigeria or any other country for himself or any other person.
Section 20 of the Fraud Act defines ?false pretence? as follows:-
?False pretence means a representation, whether deliberate or reckless, made by word, in writing or by conduct, of a matter of fact or law,
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either past or present, which representation is false in fact or law, and which the person making it knows to be false or does not believe to be true.?
In Uzoka v. FRN (2010) 2 NWLR (1177) 118, this Court referred to the definition of ?false pretence? in 7th Edition of Black?s Law Dictionary, at page? as follows:-
?The crime of knowingly obtaining title to another?s personal property by misrepresenting a fact with intent to defraud.?
See also Onwudiwe v. FRN (2006) ALLFWLR (319) 774.
In the case of Alake v. State (supra), the Court per Tobi, JCA, set out the essential elements or ingredients which constitute the offence of obtaining by false pretences under the provisions of the Criminal Code, as follows-
?1. That there was a pretense;
2. That the pretence emanated from the accused person;
3. That it was false;
4. That the accused person knew of its falsity.
5. That there was an intention to defraud;
6. That the thing is capable of being stolen;
7. That the acused person induced the owner to transfer his whole interest in the property.?
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On its part, Section 8(a) of the Fraud Act, provides that:-
?A person who ?
(a) conspires with, aids, abets, or counsels any other person to commit an offence; or
(b) attempts to commit or is an accessory to an act or offence; or
(c) incites, procures or induces any other person by any means whatsoever to commit an offence under this Act, commits the offence and is liable on conviction to the same punishment as is prescribed for that offence under this Act.?
Neither the section nor the Act defines what ?conspiracy? is for the purpose of the offence under the Section or the Act. However, the Supreme Court, in the case of ACN v. INEC (2003) 13 NWLR (1370) 161 @ 185 defined conspiracy as follows:-
?Conspiracy is an agreement by two or more persons to do or cause to be done, an illegal act or a legal act, by illegal means.?
See also Ikemson v. State (1989) 3 NWLR (110) 455; Osondu v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (682) 483; Aje v. State (2006) 8 NWLR (982) 345; Shurumo v. State (2010) 19 NWLR (1226) 73; Abondejo v. FRN(2013) 7 NWLR (1353) 285; Ogogovie v. State (2016) 12 NWLR (1527) 468. In the case of
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Ikemson v. State(1989) (Supra) Karibi-Whyte, JSC, said that: –
?An offence of conspiracy can be committed where persons have acted either by agreement or in concert, bare agreement to commit an offence is sufficient. The actual commission of the offence is not necessary.?
The ingredients of the offence of conspiracy were set out in the case of Akinkunmi v State (1987) 7 NWLR (52) 606 as follows:-
(1) there must be two (2) or more persons;
(2) they must form a common intention;
(3) the common intention must be toward prosecuting an unlawful purpose,
(4) an offence must be committed in the process; and
(5) the offence must be of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence.
See also Sodiya v. State (2009) LPELR-4430 (CA); Aituma v. State (2006) 10 NWLR (989) 452.
The law in Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 places the burden of proof of the offences with which the Appellant was charged before the Lower Court, beyond reasonable doubt, on the Respondent throughout the trial on the basis of the Constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed in his favour. See Onye Chimba v. State
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(1998) 8 NWLR (563) 587; Igbi v. State (2000) 3 NWLR (648) 169; Ani v. State (2003) 11 NWLR (830) 142; Igabele v. State (2006) 6 NWLR (975) 100.
The law is also settled that the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt placed on the Respondent does not mean proof beyond any or every shadow of doubt, but that all the essential ingredients or elements which constitute offences with which he was charged must be established or proved by sufficient and credible evidence which is so cogent and strong against the Appellant such that there would not be even the remotest probable doubt that he in fact committed the offences he was charged with. In the case of Dibie v. State (2007) 3 SC (Pt. 1) 176 (2007) 9 NWLR (1038) 30, Tobi JSC, stated the law that:- ?Proof beyond doubt does not mean proof beyond an shadow of doubt. Once the proof drowns the presumption of innocence of the accuse person, the Court is entitled to convict him. The moment the proof by the prosecution renders the presumption of innocence on the part of the accused useless and pins him down as the owner of the mens rea and actus reus or both, the prosecution has discharged the
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burden of placed on it.?
See also Yongo v. COP (1992) 4 SCNJ, 113; Akalezi v. State (1993) 2 SCNJ, 19, (1993) 2 NWLR (273) 1; Abadom v State (1997) 1 NWLR (479) 1; Akinyemi v. State (1999) 6 NWLR (607) 463; Uwagboe v. State (2007) 6 NWLR (1031) 606; Uluebeka v. State (2011) 4 NWLR (1237) 358; Nwaturuocha v. State (2011) LPELR-8119(SC); Abo v. State (2011) LPELR-4799(CA).
Proof beyond reasonable can be achieved and the guilt of an accused person proved in any one or more of the following ways –
(a) by confession freely and voluntarily made by the accused person which meets the requirement of the law;
(b) by cogent, credible and compelling evidence of eye witnesses to the commission of the offence; or
(c) by circumstantial evidence which satisfies, the requirements of the law and irresistibly points and fixes the accused, and no other as the person who committed the offence.
See Igabele v. State (supra); Nwaeze v. State (1996) 2 NWLR (428) 1; Akinmoju v. State (2000) 4 SC (Pt. 1) 64; Durwode v. State (2000) 12 SC (Pt. 1) 1; Ubani v. State (2003) 18 NWLR (851) 22; Emeka v. State (2001) 6 SCNJ, 259; Joshua v. State (2010) 1 WRN, 41.
20
At the trial of the Appellant before the Lower Court, five (5) of the people from whom the Appellant was said to, in concert with Alhaji Salawudueen, have obtained money by false pretences, testified in proof of the offences he was charged with. In brief, their evidence was that they saw a billboard advertising residential apartments for rent with Appellant?s numbers on it, they called him and went to the address where they met the Appellant who took them to inspect the apartments, as the person in charge or caretaker. That Alhaji Salawudeen, the Appellant?s senior brother was the owner of the apartments and that the Appellant gave them Bank Account numbers into which they paid the agreed amounts as rents for their chosen apartments. However, the apartments were not given to them and the Appellant and Alhaji Salawudeen disappeared, switched off their phones and failed to return the money collected or paid for the apartments. That there were over one hundred (100) people who paid money for the apartments to the Appellant and Alhaji Salawudeen and who were neither given the apartments nor their money returned or refunded to them and so
21
they reported the matter to the police and later to the EFCC by PW2. Receipts for the monies paid by the witnesses for the apartments issued by the Appellant for Alhaji Salawudeen, were put in evidence.
The evidence was not discredited under cross examination but rather strengthened by the admission of the Appellant in his statement to the police during the investigation of the matter, which was put in evidence as Exhibit 11(a) (c) and (s) by which he substantially confirmed the evidence. In his evidence before the Lower Court, the Appellant again, substantially confirmed the evidence of PW1-PW5 on the transaction between them but only claimed that he was an employee of Alhaji Salawudeen.
In its judgement, the Lower Court after a restatement of the principle of the law on the essence and proof of the offence of conspiracy, stated that: –
?In the instant case, the clear unequivocal testimony of PW6 the lead investigator, that upon investigation of the petition tendered as Exhibi 1, he discovered the following facts:-
i) The defendant and the Alhaji Ishola Salawudeen (still at large) are brothers.
2) Alhaji Ishola Salawudeen is the
22
landlord and owner of the subject property located at No. 59, Oriola Street Ketu, Alapere, Lagos.
3) A billboard was mounted at the subject property advertising the availability of apartments to the public.
4) That upon inquiries from interested members of the public they were assured that apartments were available in the subject property, which at the material time was still under construction.
5) That the defendant was appointed as a site engineer and agent to deal with the prospective tenant by his older brother Alhaji Ishola Salawudeen.
6) That the defendant herein represented to interested persons that to secure an apartment they only had to pay the rent in advance.
7) That a total of 13 mini flats or apartments were available in the subject property.
8) That the defendant herein collected rents from a total of 101 prospective tenants and issued them with receipts as shown on Exhibit 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11(b).
9) That the defendant in order to facilitate collection of rents from the prospective tenants opened a account on 05/04/13 with Skye Bank Plc as shown on Exhibit 12(b) a lime contemporaneous with construction of
23
the subject property located at No. 59, Oriola Street, Ketu, Alapere, Lagos and advertised to the public.
10) That the defendant also received direct payments into his bank account domiciled with Skye Bank Plc from prospective tenants as shown on Exhibit 12(c).
11) That the defendant collected a sum in excess of N28 Million from the 101 prospective tenants.
12) That the defendant signed tenancy agreement with some of the paid up tenants.
13. That the defendant instructed each of the 101 tenants to come for keys to their apartments on different dated knowing that the available apartments could not go round all the paid up tenants.
A Combination of the above facts clearly suggests that the defendant in concert with his brother Alhaji Ishola Salawudeen (at large) came together to carry out an unlawful enterprise. The role played by each one of them has been described in detail as above. The defendant was the point man in the scam. I am therefore satisfied that the circumstantial evidence before Court show that the defendant and his brother at large acted together in the ground scam. And I am satisfied that the prosecution has proved beyond
24
reasonable doubt Count 1 of the Amended information dated and filed on 01/12/15 to wit: ?conspiracy to obtain money by false pretence.?
This position of the Lower Court is unassailable as the evidence adduced by the Respondent shows beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant who admittedly introduced himself as the brother to Alhaji Salawudeen to the over one hundred (100) prospective tenants, including PW1-PW5, who paid money through and to him, by conduct, acted in concert with Alhaji Salawudeen to misrepresent and deceive them into believing that there were apartments which were available to let out on rents, when in fact they knew that only thirteen (13) of the apartments were to be available. The Appellant acted as the front man who took the several people around the apartments for inspection in the continued deception and in order to induce them to pay their money when and even after he knew that the number of available apartments had already been paid for. The continued receipt of money as rents for apartments which were not available or going to be available by both the Appellant and Alhaji Salawudeen, as admittedly shown by the
25
uncontroverted evidence before the Lower Court, shows the common intention of the two of them to deceive the prospective tenants and induce them to part with their money. Whether or not the Appellant has any blood or employment relationship with Alhaji Salawudeen, was/is not material for the purpose of the offence of conspiracy since the law is that it can be committed even by people who did not know each other before the commission of the offence once their common intention can be ascertained from the fact and circumstances of a case. In the case of Adejobi v State (2011) LPELR-97(SC) it was held per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC that:-
?The offence of conspiracy is complete when two or more persons agree to do an unlawful act by an unlawful means. Concluded agreements can be inferred by what each person does or does not do in furtherance of the offence of conspiracy. It is immaterial that persons had not met each other.?
The apex Court, in Daboh v. State (1977) 5 SC, 122, (1977) ALLNLR, 146 stated the law in the words of Udo Udoma, JSC, that:-
?It is well recognized law that conspiracy may exist between persons who have never seen
26
each other or corresponded with each other: R. v. Parnell 14 Cox 508 at page 515.?
See also Odigiji v. State (1976) 6 SC 152; Njovens v. State (1973) 5 SC, 12; Lawson v. State (1975) 4 SC (Reprint) 84; Okosun v. A. G. Bendel State (1985) 16 NSCC (Pt. II) 1327, (1985) 3 NWLR (12) 283. The evidence of PW 1-PW5 and that of the Appellant amply shows the overt acts of common intention and agreement between the Appellant and Alhaji Salawudeen to misrepresent facts on the apartments advertized to be let out by them, the deception and continuing inducement to the prospective tenants to pay their money for non available apartments. The arguments by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that Appellant was either agent, servant or employee of Alhaji Salawudeen or his company are therefore non-sequitur for the purpose of the offence of conspiracy between the two (2) of them. Reference to the provisions of CAMA is completely irrelevant in this appeal for proof of the offence of conspiracy against the Appellant.
?
The Lower Court was right in its finding that the evidence adduced before it by the Respondent has proved beyond reasonable doubt, all the
27
essential ingredients of the offence of conspiracy, to ground a conviction against the Appellant.
On the offence of obtaining by false pretences, the misrepresentation, continued deception and inducement by the Appellant to the prospective tenants to pay him and Alhaji Salawudeen money for apartments which they knew were not available or not going to be available as misrepresented by them, leaves no reasonable doubt that the money admittedly paid to and collected or received by the Appellant through the account opened by him at Skye Bank with a false name, was obtained by false pretence which he knew was not true, but false. The misrepresentation made by the Appellant to the prospective tenants on the availability of the apartments to all of them, was deliberate; in both words and conduct of showing them around, which was false and he knew to be false or did not believe it to be true, constituted false pretence under Section 20 of the Fraud Act. The Lower Court rightly appraised the facts and correctly evaluated the evidence placed before it on the offence of obtaining by false pretence as follows in its judgement: –
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?I have also listened to the unchallenged fact that each of the prospective tenants came to know about the property from the billboard advertisement in front of the subject property. In addition, that the defendant after his initial contract with the prospective tenants who came to view the subject property and make enquiries, always introduced them to one Alhaji ishola Salawudeen, (still at large) as the landlord and owner of the building. That he the defendant always assured them of the availability of apartments. That the rent and other terms and conditions of the tenancy were always negotiated with the defendant herein. That he also supplied the bank details into which the agreed rent is to be paid. Of significance is the testimony from each of the prospective tenants who came forward namely PW1-PW5, is that the defendant always called to encourage them to pay additional sums as rent in order to further secure their apartment and expedite the ongoing construction. All the above demonstrates very clearly the elaborate scam set up by the defendant lo not only reel in potential victims, but the calculated representations that apartments were available to each of the persons who
29
showed interest was a deliberate ploy to obtain rent from them in addition pressure phone calls were made by the defendant to the prospective tenant to pay more money as rent. Some ended up paying rent for 2, 3, years in advance to the defendant. At the end of the day more than a 100 people were so persuaded by the representation to make payment for rent, in a building with only 13 apartments altogether.?
In both his statement in Exhibits 11(a), (b) and (c) as well as his oral evidence, the Appellant plainly and unequivocally admitted the facts and evidence placed by the Respondent before the Lower Court in respect of the transactions between him and the prospective tenants of the advertized apartments. The law remains that there is no evidence of a fact or set of facts better or stronger than an unequivocal, express and direct admission of the existence of such a fact or set of facts by a person against whom they were asserted. By the provision of Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011, admission in criminal law, of the commission of an alleged crime or offence by an accused person either during or in the course of investigation of the crime or
30
offence or at the trial of the accused person for the said crime or offence before a Court of law, is a confession by the accused person that he in fact committed the offence or crime he was charged or tried for. This in effect, was what the Appellant did in Exhibits 11(a), (b) and (c) as well as his testimony at the trial; to confess to the commission of the offence of obtaining money by false pretence, which is a thing or property capable of being stolen; Adejobi v. State (supra) Olamolu v. State (2013) 2 NWLR (1339) 580, from the prospective tenants, including PW1-PW5, by the false pretence, deceit and inducement that the apartments were available to all of them, which he knew to be false and did not believe to be true. In the case of FRN v. Iweka (2013) 3 NWLR (1341) 285, Tabai, JSC, stated that: –
?A confessional statement made by an accused person, ?. and properly admitted in evidence is, in law, the best pointer to the truth of the role played by such an accused person in the commission of the offence.?
See also Mohamed v. State (2014) 12 NWLR (1421) 387; Nkie v. FRN (2014) 13 NWLR (1424) 305; Alo v. State (2015) 9 NWLR
31
(1464) 238; Afolabi v. State (2018) 11 NWLR (1524) 497.
The evidence adduced by the Respondent undoubtedly, has established all the ingredients of the offence of obtaining money by false pretence against the Appellant, as required by the law; beyond reasonable doubt and the Lower Court was right to have so found in its judgement.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant has also argued that the Lower Court has no jurisdiction to order for the forfeiture of the property in respect of which the Appellant was convicted for the offence of obtaining of money by false pretence.
The 1st ground of the complaint by Counsel is that the property in question does not belong to either the Appellant or Alhaji Salawudeen. The first point to be made is that since the property does not belong to the Appellant who learned Counsel represent in this appeal, it means the Appellant has no ascertainable legal grievance against the order for forfeiture in respect of or against which the learned Counsel can competently complain about in the appeal. In the case of Ogunkunle v. Sacred Order of the C & S (2001) 6 SC, 145, (2001) 12 NWLR (727) 359, it was stated that: -<br< p=””
</br<
32
?The right of appeal conferred by the Constitution is a right against the decision of Court adversely affecting a party. It therefore goes without any argument that for a person to claim any right of appeal as envisaged, that person must show that the decision of the court is against him or against his interest.?
The apex Court in Mobil v Monokpo (2003) 12 SCNJ, 206 @ 223 has held that: –
?A party to proceedings cannot appeal a decision thereat which does not wrongfully deprive him of an entitlement or something which he had a right to demanded. Unless there is a grievance, he cannot appeal against a judgement which has not affected him since the whole exercise may turn out to be academic. Under no circumstances can it be argued that a party to proceedings who has not been affected by a decision may never the less appeal against it merely as a party.?
?In the present appeal, as pointed out above, the case of learned Counsel is that the property ordered to be forfeited by the Lower Court does not belong to the Appellant and he has not claimed any right or interest over it at the trial or in this appeal. It is therefore
33
curious for the learned Counsel to attack a consequential order by the Lower Court which in no way or manner, howsoever, deprived him of any right or interest or affected him, anyhow, to make him legally aggrieved by it as to be entitled to the right of appeal against same. By the showing of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, the property in question allegedly belongs to someone with whom Alhaji Salawudeen had a lease agreement with, both of whom he does not represent in the appeal since they are not parties to the appeal. More importantly, neither of them was tried by the Lower Court for the offences the Appellant was convicted in the judgement wherein the order of forfeiture was made. The ground of the complaint against the order by the learned Counsel is in the circumstances, with respect to him, grossly misconceived.
The other ground of the complaint against the order of forfeiture is that an earlier order was made for the forfeiture of the same property, by the Federal High Court and so the Lower Court lacks the jurisdiction to make the order in its judgement, according to learned Counsel. Although the issue of the jurisdiction of a Court to
34
adjudicate over a case is one at large that can be raised at any and all stages of judicial proceedings of a case, anyhow and by any of the parties or the Court suo motu, see NDIC v. CBN (2002) 7 NWLR (766) 272 @ 292; Nuhu v. Ogele (2003) 12 SC (Pt.1) 32, (2003) 18 NWLR (852) 251; Mil. Gov., Ondo State v. Kolawole (2008) 5 SCNJ, 37, except as may be provided by a statute, see Jov. v. Dom (1999) 9 NWLR (620) 538; Adejobi v. State (2011) 6 MJSC (Pt. 1) 101 @ 119; Oko v. State (2017) 17 NWLR (1593) 24 @ 47-8, the challenge is one that should be directed at the competence of the Court to adjudicate over the case on any of the judicially established and recognized grounds which would deprive the particular Court of the requisite jurisdiction in the case. Courts of law being creatures of the Constitutions or/and Statutes, are vested or conferred with the necessary powers and authority in form of jurisdiction to adjudicate over causes or matters brought before them. Braithwaite v. G. D. M. (1998) 7 NWLR (557) 307; Ifeajuna v. Ifeajuna (2000) 19 NWLR (671) 107; APC Ltd. v. NDIC (NUB Ltd) (2006) 15 NWLR (2000) 404; Agbiti v. Nigerian Navy (2011) 4 NWLR (1236) 175. In
35
that regard, the parties to a case, cannot, by agreement or acquiescence confer a Court the valid requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate over their case and the Court cannot arrogate and vest itself the necessary jurisdiction, where it is not vested by statutes, to adjudicate a matter or case. See Nyame v. FRN (2010) 7 NWLR (1193) 344; Emeje v. Positive (2010) 1 v. (1174) 48; PDP v. Okorocha (2012) 15 NWLR (1323) 205; Zakari v. Nigerian Army (2015) 17 NWLR (1487) 77. However, where as in this appeal, the challenge is not one which goes to the lack of competence or jurisdiction of the High Court to adjudicate over a cause or matter or charge brought before it, but purport to challenge the power of the Court to make a consequential order after reaching and pronouncing a final decision in the case, the challenge is not one that enjoys the privileges? of an objection to the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate over a case.
The ex parte forfeiture order made by the Federal High Court on 28th March, 2014 in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/281/2004 between the FRN v. Ishola Salaudeen, was in the following terms:-
36
?IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS;
That the properties set out in the schedule hereto properties of the person being investigates for offences of conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses, obtaining money by false pretense and money laundering is hereby in the interim forfeited to the Federal Government of Nigeria pending the conclusion of investigation and/or possible prosecution of the suspect for the alleged offences.”
ISSUED AT LAGOS UNDER THE SEAL OF THE COURT AND THE HAND OF THE PRESIDING JUDGE THIS 28TH DAY OF MARCH, 2014.?
Even a passing and discerning glance at the above order would show, readily, that the property in question ?is hereby in the interim forfeited to the Federal Government of Nigeria pending the conclusion of investigation and/or possible prosecution of the suspect for the alleged offences.?
Clearly, the order was made ex parte, during the course of investigation of the offences that the accused person in the charge before that Court or any other competent Court, was alleged to have committed and to await the prosecution of the accused person for the said offences. The order for forfeiture in the case was made ?in the
37
interim? and the word ?interim? is defined in the 8th Edition of the Black?s Law Dictionary, page 832, as follows:-
?Done, made or occurring for an intervening time; temporary or provisional.?
At page 1130 of the Dictionary, ?interim order? is defined as:- ?A temporary Court decree that takes effect until something else occurs.”
From the definitions, it is ?clear as crystal? that the order of forfeiture made ex parte by the Federal High Court in the case presented before it was only temporary and to await the completion of investigation and/or possible prosecution of the accused person for the offences he was alleged to have committed.
The order by the Lower Court in the Appellant?s case was for restitution in the following terms:-
?4. Finally, a FORFEITURE, SALE and RESTITUTION ORDER be and is hereby made to wit: the property lying being and situate at No. 59 Oriola Street, Ketu Alapere, Lagos State is hereby forfeited to the Federal Government. The said property shall be sold forthwith and the proceeds of sale distributed to the 101 tenants who paid
38
money to the defendant, which is receipted.
5. The Commission is at liberty to engage the services of a reputable real estate & property firm to implement the orders in No: 4 above.?
(Underline supplied)
Clearly, the purport and effect of the above order is that the property in question shall be sold for the primary and sole purpose of restoring the prospective tenants from whom the Appellant and Alhaji Salawudeen collected various sums of money as rents on the false pretence, the Appellant was found guilty of in respect of the property, their monies to them. Section 11 of the Fraud Act, vests the Lower Court with the statutory requisite power, authority and jurisdiction to do make the order for restitution to the victims of the offences for which the Appellant was convicted. It provides thus: –
?(1) In addition to any other penalty prescribed under this Act, the High Court shall order a person convicted of an offence under this Act to make restitution to the victim of the false pretence or fraud by directing that person ?
(a) where the property involved is money, to pay to the victim an amount equivalent to the
39
loss sustained by the victim;
(b) in any case ?
(i) to return the property to the victim or to a person designated by him; or
(ii) to pay an amount equal to the value of the property, where the return of the property is impossible or impracticable.
(2) An order of restitution may be enforced by the victim or by the prosecutor on behalf of the victim in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.?
The order was made after conviction and in addition to the term of imprisonment penalty prescribed under the Sections of the Act the Appellant was convicted of the offences he was charged with. The order made by the Federal High Court on the other hand, was pending the completion of investigations and possible prosecution of the accused person therein for the same offences in respect of the same property and so was temporary. It is not and cannot be right in the circumstances, to argue that the Lower Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to make the order of forfeiture for the purpose of the restitution provided for in Section 11 of the Act under which the Appellant was tried.
40
I do not find merit in the argument of Counsel for the Appellant on the issue and it is resolved against the Appellant.
In the final result, the appeal is devoid of merit and bound to fail, for the reasons set out in this judgement.
The appeal is dismissed and in consequence, the judgment by the Lower Court is affirmed in its entirety.
ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, J.C.A.: I have read before now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JCA, and I agree with the judgment.
The appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court is hereby affirmed.
GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE, J.C.A.: My Lord, the Hon. Justice MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JCA has just delivered the leading judgment in this criminal appeal, wherein he dismissed the appeal filed by the Appellant and affirmed the judgment of the lower Court delivered on 15/3/18.
I have had the privilege to read the leading judgment in draft, and I entirely agree with the analysis of the issues raised and their resolution by which he eventually found the appeal unmeritorious.
?I too dismiss the appeal for the reasons which have
41
been elaborately stated in the leading judgment just delivered.
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Appearances:
V. I. P. Nwana
For Appellant(s)
A. M. Ocholi led by A. B. C. OziokoFor Respondent(s)
Appearances
V. I. P. NwanaFor Appellant
AND
A. M. Ocholi led by A. B. C. OziokoFor Respondent
