HELEN YIYE TSADO v. THE REGISTRAR, FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, MINNA & ORS
(2019)LCN/12912(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 26th day of March, 2019
CA/A/496/2017
RATIO
LABOUR LAW: EMPLOYMENT DISMISSAL WITHOUT FAIR HEARING
“This Court in Yemisi v. FIRS (2012) LPELR-7964(CA) emphasised the need to adhere to the procedure established by law for the dismissal of a staff to accord with the principle of fair hearing.” EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ABDU ABOKI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ADAMU JAURO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
HELEN YIYE TSADO Appellant(s)
AND
1. THE REGISTRAR FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, MINNA
2. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR, FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY MINNA
3. FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, MINNA Respondent(s)
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This appeal No. CA/A/496/2017 was commenced on 12-6-2017 when the appellant herein filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria at Abuja delivered on 5-6-2017 in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/115/2016 by R.B. Haastrup J. The notice of appeal contains 4 grounds of appeal.
Both sides filed, exchanged and adopted their respective briefs as follows- appellant?s brief, respondents? brief and appellant?s reply brief.
The respondents in pages 2 to 5 of their brief raised and argued a preliminary objection to the competence of this appeal on the grounds that the appellant did not obtain leave of Court to appeal on grounds 1, 3 and 4 which are grounds of mixed law and facts, that grounds 1 and 2 did not specify the nature of the error alleged therein as either one of law or fact and are therefore vague and that no issue for determination was distilled from ground 4 of this appeal. The appellant argued in reply to this objection in her reply brief.
?I have carefully read and considered the arguments of both sides on this objection.
It is obvious that grounds 1 and 2 of this appeal merely stated that the trial Court erred, without stating if it erred in law or fact. But it is glaring from the complain in each ground and the particulars of each, that the omission to expressly state that the error is one of law or fact did not render the said grounds of appeal vague nor defeat their purpose as grounds of appeal.
They clearly and sufficiently identify the part of the judgment complained against and the nature and subject matter of the complain. The labelling of an error as one of law or fact is not conclusive about the nature of the error alleged in the ground. It is the totality of the ground and the particulars of the error alleged therein that show the nature of the said error. See for example Minister of Petroleum & Mineral Resource & Anor v EXPO -Shipping Line (Nig) Ltd (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt 1208) 261 (SC) and Obatoyinbo & Anor v. Oshatoba & Anor (1996) LPELR-2156. The grounds satisfy the purpose or essence of a ground of appeal as they highlight the error made in particular parts of the judgment of the trial court. SeeNwankwo v. ECDS (2007) 1-2 SC 145, Bhojsons Plc v. Daniel-Kalio (2006) LPELR-777 (SC). As the Supreme Court held in Aderounmu & Anor v. Olowu (2000) LPELR ? 141 (SC). ?The prime purpose of the rules of appellate procedure, both in this Court and in the Court of Appeal, that the appellant shall file a notice of appeal which shall set forth concisely the grounds which he intends to rely upon on the appeal; and that such grounds should not be vague or general in terms and must disclose a reasonable ground of appeal, is to give sufficient notice and information, to the other side, of the precise nature of the complaint of the appellant and, consequently, of the issues that are likely to arise on the appeal. Any ground of appeal that satisfies that purpose should not be struck out, notwithstanding that it did not conform to a particular form. In my opinion, what is important in a ground of appeal, and the test the court should apply, is whether or not the impugned ground shows clearly what is complained of as error in law and what is complained of as misdirection, or, as the case may be, error of fact.
Since grounds 1 and 2 of this appeal satisfy the purpose of a ground of appeal, I hold that they are competent and I refuse to strike them out.
Let me now consider the contention that grounds 1, 3 and 4 being grounds of mixed law and fact, are not competent as no leave was first obtained to appeal on grounds of mixed law and facts. The judgment appealed against in this appeal is a final judgment of the National Industrial Court. S.243(2) and (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (the 1999 Constitution) which create the right of appeal from decisions of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria did not require that the right of appeal on grounds of mixed law and fact would be exercised only with leave of Court. It prescribes the need for such leave of Court only in respect of appeals on grounds not involving questions of fundamental rights contained in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution. S.242 of the 1999 relied on by the respondent for this ground of preliminary is not applicable to the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. It applies only to the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State or the Federal Capital Territory. So the ground of objection that leave of Court not having been obtained to appeal on grounds of mixed law and facts, grounds 1, 3 and 4 are incompetent, is not valid.
It is obvious from the issues raised for determination in the appellant?s brief, that no issue was raised for determination from ground 4 of this appeal. The appellant indicated in her brief that issue No. 1 is derived from ground 1 and that issue No. 2 is derived from grounds 2 and 3. As it is, she abandoned ground 4 of this appeal by raising no issue for determination from it. The said ground 4 heaving been abandoned is hereby struck out.
On the whole the objection succeeds only in respect of the abandonment of ground 4 of this appeal and fails on all other grounds.
I will now proceed to consider the merit of the issues raised for determination in the respective briefs.
The appellant?s brief raised the following issues for determination-
1. Whether the Appellant was afforded fair hearing prior to her summary dismissal by the Respondents. (Ground One).
2. Whether the trial Court made perverse findings and occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant (Grounds Two and Three).
The respondent’s brief adopted the above issues raised for determination in the appellant’s brief.
Let me start with issue No. 1 which asks- Whether the Appellant was afforded fair hearing prior to her summary dismissal by the Respondents.”
The appellant a senior staff of the 3rd respondent was by a letter dated 30-9-2014 (Exhibit CW4) granted approval to proceed on annual leave from 20-9-2014 and return to work on 29-10-2014.
While on annual leave, she travelled to England and accepted the offer of admission granted her by Bedfordshire University by a letter dated 11-6-2014 (Exhibit CW6) to study for MSc in Information Systems and Business Management, enrolled in the University and started the said study in the University. While in Bedfordshire, she filled and sent to the 3rd respondent through her Head of Department of Mathematics and Statistics the application form for Senior Staff Study Fellowship/Study leave Award (exhibit CW7). The form was received by her said Head of Department, but there was no response from the 3rd respondent to her said application. On 29-10-2014, she remained in Bedfordshire and continued her study and did not resume work with the 3rd respondent. By a letter dated 14-11-2014 (Exhibit CW8) issued by the Registrar of the 3rd respondent queried her thusly ?
QUERY
You will recall that you were granted approval for 2013/2014 Annual Leave with effect from 29th October, 2014.
However, as at the date of writing this letter you are yet to resume duty. Your action, according to Section 6(B) of the Conditions of Service of Senior Staff of Federal University of Technology, Minna is a serious misconduct.
In the light of the above, I am directed to request you to explain in writing why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for such act of misconduct.
Your response should reach the Registrar?s Office within Seventy-two (72) hours from the date of this letter.?
By a letter dated 18-11-2014, the appellant replied to the query thusly-
RE: QUERY
I refer to your letter reference PF.2025 dated 14th November 2014 on the subject matter, please.
I was on my annual leave when a rare but tempting opportunity came my way to further my education. This I believe will not only benefit me but also the University and the country.
I have wanted to go on vacation abroad before now and I was denied Visa. However, there was an opportunity for my father and I to travel out of the country in which I rode on his Visa and took part of my vacation as I was once denied an entry Visa.
During my holiday I was able to gain admission to study for an MSc in Information System and Business Management at the University of Bedfordshire, United Kingdom. This opportunity appeared irresistible since my parents may not be readily willing to use their retirement benefits to sponsor me for an overseas Masters and this golden opportunity may be lost.
Furthermore, I was of the opinion that the University Governing Council would have met to ratify the confirmation of my appointment effective June 2014 which would have been before the expiration of my annual leave. Also I was to cut short my annual leave and come to formalize my study fellowship award but was advised that while still on leave I can fill and submit a study fellowship form for processing. This made me to stay back in the UK and I subsequently forwarded my completed fellowship form to my H.O.D. before the expiration of my leave.
PRAYER
From the foregoing explanation it can be deduced that it was not my deliberate intention to be absent from duty after the expiration of my leave. It is also not in my character to disobey the terms of my employment or rules governing the Conditions of Service for Senior Staff of the University.
I sincerely want to appeal that you temper justice with mercy and pardon all the mistakes made innocently and permit me to enjoy the privilege of this golden opportunity of SELF DEVELOPMENT that I strongly believe after completion would add value to our esteemed Institution and our great country Nigeria.
Once again ma, in whatever way my actions may appear, I plead to your highly exalted office and position that in dispensing justice, please do so from your milk of human Kindness.
I sincerely regret all the inconveniences my action might have caused the system.?
There was no response from the 1st to 3rd respondents to her above reply. She completed her study at Bedfordshire University in England, returned home and resumed work on 5-1-2016. She wrote a letter dated 5-1-2016 (Exhibit CW11) thusly-
LETTER OF RESUMPTION
I write to inform you of the completion of my degree of Master of Sciences in Information Systems and Business Management from the University of Bedfordshire, UK and to formally resume back to my duty post.
I also want to express my sincere appreciation to you for your kind understanding for the inconveniences caused while pursuing the programme.
Thank you ma.?
By a letter dated 22-3-2016, (Exhibit CW12) the Registrar responded to her letter of resumption thusly-
RE: LETTER OF RESUMPTION
Please, refer to your letter dated 5th January, 2016 on the above subject matter.
It has been observed with dismay that you deliberately and voluntarily left your duty post to pursue your Master?s programme without official approval, thereby, demonstrating a flagrant disregard of University regulations. This, according to Section 6B(h) is an act of Serious Misconduct which is inimical to the image of the service.
In view of the above, I am directed to inform you that your services are no longer required in the University with immediate effect.
Consequently, be informed that you are expected to handover all University properties in our possession, including Staff Identity Card to your Head of Department before departure.
By a copy of this letter, the Bursar has been requested to delete your name from the payroll.
We wish you good luck in our future endeavours.
Thank you.
Aggrieved by the letter terminating her employment with the 3rd respondent, the appellant filed the suit leading to this appeal claiming for ?
i. A declaration that her disengagement by a letter dated 22nd March, 2016 was in gross violation of her right to fair hearing.
ii. An Order setting aside the disengagement of the Claimant from the services of the 3rd Defendant as unlawful.
iii. An Order compelling the 1st and 2nd Defendants to restore the appointment of the Claimant with the 3rd Defendant forthwith.
iv. An Order for payment of all salaries, allowances and other benefits that would have accrued and due to the Claimant but for the unlawful disengagement until final judgment.
v. Payment of salary arrears between November, 2014 and March, 2016 and thereafter until final judgment.
vi. The cost of this suit.”
After considering the evidence adduced by both sides and their final written addresses, the trial Court rendered its final judgment dismissing the appellant?s claim. The concluding part of the judgment reads thusly- ?It is clear from the foregoing, that the claimant was obviously absent from her duty post and decided to remain overseas after the expiration of her annual leave for her masters? programme, and without any official approval given. The essence of query is to allow the employee the opportunity of knowing or be confronted with the alleged offence committed. It is now for the employer to investigate, which may not necessarily mean having to set up a formal panel or committee to have the claimant in attendance. All these would depend on the nature of offence committed. Some offences may attract suspension, warnings, forfeiture of salaries for some period or even outright dismissal as the case may be. And in the case of serious misconduct, where retaining such an employer as in this case, would be right to dispense with the services of the claimant. I think keeping such a staff as the claimant would not be in the interest of the University, as it would serve as a bad example to other staff. The claimant cannot complain of being denied of fair hearing, having been given the opportunity of defending herself in writing. It is for her employer to investigate and see if her defence is weighty enough to exculpate her from the allegation of serious misconduct levelled against her. By the query and answer to same, the claimant was not denied the opportunity of being heard, and I so hold. The Courts have held that to satisfy the rule of natural justice and fair hearing, a person likely to be directly affected by disciplinary proceedings must be given adequate notice of the allegation against him to enable him make a representation in his own defence. It is thus sufficient if the compliant as formulated conveys to him the nature of the accusation against him. See Power Holding Company of Nigeria vs. Waheed Abiodun Alabi (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1186) 65 @ 79, Paras D-F. Furthermore, by Abubakar Tatari Ali Polytechnic vs. Maina (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 934) Page 487 @ Pg. 516 Paras D-F, fair hearing need not be oral. Written forms are equally good and sufficient hearing. All that is required is for the person directly affected by disciplinary proceedings to write to the party and confront him with the allegation made against him. He need not be allowed to remain around at the deliberation of the Committee/Panel where his fate was determined. The above cases are apt and applicable to the claimant in the instant suit, as I hold that the claimant?s appointment was lawfully terminated, and the defendants are not in breach of claimant?s right to fair hearing.
It is glaring that the defendants have not adduced any documentary evidence before this Court, but even then, the failure of the defendant to adduce any documentary evidence is not automatic judgment for the claimant. The burden still rests squarely on the claimant here to place before the Court cogent and sufficient evidence to sustain her claims. See Gonzee (Nig) Ltd vs. Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 634 @ 650, Para D. The totality of evidence adduced before this Court, is rather in favour of the defendants than the claimant. I have no difficulty in the circumstance to resolve the two issues formulated for determination in favour of the defendants. In effect, the claimant has failed entirely in all her reliefs as contained in Paragraph 21(i) ? (vi) of her statement of facts dated the 4th day of April, 2016, and I do so hold.
In sum, all the reliefs of the claimant are hereby accordingly dismissed, in favour of the defendants. No cost is awarded in this action.
Judgement is entered accordingly.
Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that before disengaging the appellant, the respondents did not comply with the mandatory conditions precedent in Exhibit CW13, that therefore Exhibit CW12 cannot stand, that exhibit CW8 was made by the 1st respondent and not the council of the 3rd respondent, that the appellant?s reply to the 1st respondent?s query (Exhibit 8) was not forwarded to the Governing Council of the 3rd respondent, that the appellant was placed on suspension, that a joint committee of the council and senate of the 3rd respondent was not set up to hear the appellant, that the allegation of serious misconduct made against the appellant was never investigated, that no report of the investigating Committee was made to the council of the 3rd respondent before exhibit CW12 was made, that it was wrong for the trial Court to hold that the appellant was given an opportunity to explain in writing within 72 hours why disciplinary action should not be taken against her for misconduct, when no prima facie case of misconduct had been first made against her, that the respondents acted contrary to S.15 of the Federal Universities of Technology Act in terminating the employment of the Appellant.
Learned Counsel for the respondent argued in reply that an employer, in public or private employment, can summarily dismiss an employee in all cases of gross misconduct, provided the employee is fairly heard, that the appellant was given opportunity to answer to the query and he did by Exhibit CW9, that therefore he was not denied fair hearing, that during trial, the appellant in her pleadings and evidence did not challenge the authority of the 1st respondent to query her and terminate her employment with the 3rd respondent, that the 1st respondent acted under directives, that the query and termination of service should be presumed to have been regularly done, that the 1st respondent is empowered to, on council?s behalf, appoint, query or remove/dismiss the appellant as non academic/administrative staff by virtue of Article 12(1) of the 3rd Schedule and Articles 5(2) and 9 of the First Schedule to the Federal Universities of Technology Act, that the 1st respondent is competent to issue Exhibits CW8 and CW12 and Council has not complained that the 1st respondent usurped its powers, that a joint Committee of the Council and Senate can only be set up to investigate and hear the case involving the appellant upon the request of any 3 members of Council or the staff concerned by virtue of S.14(1) of the Federal Universities of Technology Act and paragraph 7(1) of the 3rd respondent?s Conditions of Service of Senior Staff, that neither the appellant nor any 3 member of Council made such a request, no case of lack of fair hearing was made out by the appellant.
Let me now determine the merits of the above.
The appellant as a senior staff of the 3rd respondent is entitled to a full disciplinary hearing by the Council of the 3rd respondent as prescribed by S.15 of the Federal University of Technology Act thusly- If it appears to the Council that there are reasons for believing that any person employed as a member of the academic, administrative or professional staff of the University, other than the Vice-Chancellor, should be removed from his office or employment on the ground of misconduct or of inability to perform the functions of his office or employment, the Council shall-
(a) Give notice of those reasons to the person in question
(b) Afford him an opportunity of making representations in person on the matter to the Council; and
(c) If he so requests or any three members of the Council so request within the period of one month beginning with the date of the notice, make arrangements-
(i) For a joint committee of the Council and the Senate to investigate the matter and to report on it to the Council; and
(ii) For the person in question to be afforded an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by the investigating committee with respect to the matter, and if the Council, after considering the report of the investigating committee, is satisfied that the person in question should be removed as aforesaid, the Council may so remove him by an instrument in writing signed on the directions of the Council.
S.7(a) of the Conditions of Service of Senior Staff of the 3rd respondent (Exhibit CW13) contains the same provisions as S.15 Federal University of Technology Act.
The truncated disciplinary hearing of the appellant by the 1st respondent constituted by the query issued by the 1st respondent to the appellant (Exhibit CW8), her reply thereto (Exhibit CW9) and the letter from the 1st respondent terminating her employment with the 3rd exhibit (Exhibit CW12) deprived the appellant of the opportunity of a full and a more elaborate disciplinary hearing by he said Council. The truncated disciplinary hearing by only the 1st respondent deprived the appellant of her right to be heard by the council consisting of not less than 20 members as prescribed by S.5 of the Federal Universities of Technology Act. It is not reasonably open to question that a hearing by such a large body of persons would certainly be better than a hearing by one individual person and offers a better guarantee of impartiality and independence in decision making. As the adage of hallowed antiquity states, two or more heads are better than one.
The argument of Learned Counsel for the respondents that the 1st respondent is empowered by Article 12(1) of the 3rd Schedule, Articles 5(2) and 9 of the 1st Schedule to the Federal Universities of Technology Act to carry out a summary or truncated trial of the appellant is not correct. There is nothing in any of the above mention provisions of the schedule to the Federal Universities of Technology Act that empowers the 1st respondent to do what he did.
Article 5 of the 1st Schedule provide thusly-
(1) There shall be for each University, a Registrar, who shall be the chief administrative officer of the University and shall be responsible to the Vice-Chancellor for the day-to-day administrative work of the University except as regards matters for which the Bursar is responsible in accordance with paragraph 6(2) of this Schedule.
(2) The person holding the office of the Registrar shall be virtue of that office be secretary to the Council, the Senate, Congregation and Convocation.
Article 9 of the 3rd Schedule provides that-
(1) When a vacancy occurs in the office of the Director of Works, a selection board shall be constituted by the Council which shall consist of-
a. The Pro-Chancellor
b. The Vice-Chancellor
c. Two members appointed by the Council, not being members of the Senate; and
d. Two members appointed by the Senate
(2) The selection board, after making such inquires as it thinks fit, shall recommend a candidate to the Council for appointment to the vacant office; and after considering the recommendation of the board the Council may make an appointment to that office.?
Article 12 of the 3rd Schedule provides that-
(1) The administrative and professional staff of the University other than principal officers, shall be appointed by the Council or on its behalf by the Vice-Chancellor or the Registrar in accordance with delegation of any powers made by the Council in that behalf.
(2) In the case of administrative or professional staff who have close and important contacts with the academic staff, there shall be Senate participation in the process of selection.?
There is nothing in these provisions that enables the 1st respondent to deprive the appellant her entitlement to be heard by the Council and the full disciplinary hearing by the council prescribed by S.15 of the Federal University of Technology Act.
The truncated disciplinary hearing of the appellant by the 1st respondent which deprived the appellant of the hearing by the Council of the 3rd respondent, also deprived her of the opportunity of a request either by her or any three members of council that she be investigated and heard by a joint committee of the Council and the Senate and the Committee report forwarded to the Council for its consideration.
In the light of the foregoing, I hold that the appellant was deprived her right to a hearing by the Council in the manner prescribed by S.15 of the Federal University of Technology Act and Section 7A of Exhibit 13 (the conditions of service of senior staff of the 3rd respondent) by the truncated or summary trial of her case by the 1st respondent and termination of her employment with the 3rd respondent. This clearly violated her right to fair hearing. Therefore, the termination or disengagement of her services with 3rd respondent by the 1st respondent is hereby declared a nullity.
This Court in Yemisi v. FIRS (2012) LPELR-7964(CA) emphasised the need to adhere to the procedure established by law for the dismissal of a staff to accord with the principle of fair hearing. It stated thusly- the procedure set out in Rule 04306 must be followed. Because of the serious nature of the penalty for the alleged misconduct, the Rules set out detailed procedure that must be followed. If fully accords with the principle of fair hearing.?
It is clear from the arguments of Learned Counsel for the Appellant in the appellant?s brief that the appellant in this appeal is not challenging the authority or power of the 1st respondent to query the appellant and terminate her employment with the 3rd respondent. The appellant has argued that the respondents did not comply with procedures prescribed in S.7A of exhibit 13 and S.15 of the Federal University of Technology Act before terminating the appellant?s employment, that the said non compliance with the said procedures violated her right to fair hearing and that the trial Court was wrong to have upheld as valid the termination of her employment without compliance with the said procedures. So the argument of Learned Counsel for the respondent that the appellant in her pleadings and during trial did not challenge the power and authority of the 1st respondent to query the appellant for gross misconduct and terminate her employment is of no moment. The power and authority of the 1st respondent to terminate the employment of the appellant is not in issue here. What is obviously in issue here is whether the termination of her employment without affording her a hearing by council as prescribed in S.15 of the Federal University of Technology Act and S.7A of Exhibit 13 and in accordance with the procedures prescribed herein did not violate her right to a fair hearing before her employment is terminated. This is the question determined here.
For the above reasons, issue No 1 is resolved in favour of the appellant.
Let me now consider issue No. 2 which asks- ?Whether the trial Court made perverse findings and occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant.?
I have carefully read and considered the arguments of both sides under this issue.
It is not enough for an appellant to argue in an appeal that the trial Court made perverse findings that occasioned a miscarriage of justice without pointing out the findings of the trial Court he considers perverse, demonstrating that they are perverse and showing how it occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
The only finding Learned Counsel for the appellant referred to in the appellant?s brief is the one that reads thusly-
From the evidence adduced before this Court, it is clear that the disengagement of the claimant from services of the defendants was according to the defendants premised on claimant?s absence from her duties without permission, having proceeded on study leave without approval, and equally exceeded the 30 days period approved for her 2013/2014 annual leave.”
After producing this finding Learned Counsel argued that exhibit CW12 show that the disengagement or termination of the appellant?s employment was not made under the directive of the council of the 3rd respondent and that the conclusion reached by the trial Court that there was sufficient evidence of the appellant?s disengagement is perverse. This argument is not correct because, the trial Court did not determine if the council directed the appellant?s disengagement and did not find as a fact that the council authorised it. Secondly, it was not in dispute at the trial that the appellant was absent from work without permission and did proceed on study leave without approval and as a result her employment was terminated. Exhibit CW12 (the letter terminating her employment) is evidence of that termination.
Issue No. 2 as raised and the arguments thereunder is vague, baseless and lacking in substance. It is therefore resolved in favour of the respondent.
On the whole, this appeal succeeds as it has merit. It is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria delivered in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/115/2016 on 5-6-2017 by R.B. Haastrup J., is hereby set aside. Rather it is hereby adjudged that the claimant proved her claim. Therefore the following reliefs are hereby granted-
1. A declaration that her disengagement by a letter dated 22nd March, 2016 was in gross violation of her right to fair hearing.
2. An Order setting aside the disengagement of the Claimant from the services of the 3rd Defendant as unlawful.
3. The defendants are hereby ordered to restore and reinstate the claimant to her employment with the 3rd defendant forthwith.
4. An order that the defendants pay the appellant the salaries, allowances and any benefits that have accrued to her from 5th January, 2016, being the date the appellant resumed duty till her employment with the 3rd defendant lawfully comes to an end.
The respondents shall pay costs of N400,000.00 to the appellant.
ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.: I have read in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, JCA. I agree with the conclusion reached therein that the appeal succeeds as it has merit. I accordingly allowed same and abide by all the consequential orders as contained in the lead judgment.
ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading before now the judgment, just delivered by my learned brother, Emmanuel Akomaye Agim, JCA. I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion to the effect that the appeal is meritorious and ought to be allowed. The respondents have not complied with the procedure laid down in Section 7(a) of the conditions of service for senior staff of the 3rd Respondent (Exhibit CW13) and Section 15 of the Federal University of Technology Act, hence depriving the appellant of her right to fair hearing before terminating her employment.
I adopt the judgment as mine and join my brother in allowing the appeal. I adopt all consequential Orders, including that on costs.
Appearances:
J.G. Taidi, Esq, with him, A.M. Zoaka Esq., O.E. Ayoola, Esq. and U.C. Okani, Esq.For Appellant(s)
Philip A. Olusola, Esq.For Respondent(s)
