NIGERIAN POSTAL SERVICE & ANOR v. EDEKI IGILI & ANOR
(2019)LCN/12605(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 29th day of January, 2019
CA/B/62/2003
RATIO
JURISDICTION: JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT
“In other words, the Federal High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 42(2) of the Constitution to enforce a fundamental right only in relation to those matters in which Section 230(1) and (2) have conferred it with jurisdiction, Per Nnamani in TUKUR V. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) 517 at 556. In the present case, the learned jurist of the lower Court was in order when he assumed jurisdiction to hear the matter before it.” PER PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. NIGERIAN POSTAL SERVICE
2. COMM. OF POLICE, OGUN STATE COMMAND Appellant(s)
AND
1. EDEKI IGILI
2. JOHN ORHE Respondent(s)
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This is an appeal against the Ruling of the Federal High Court delivered on the 13th of January 2000, in the Benin Judicial Division in Edo State.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The claim of the Applicants/Respondents was for the enforcement of the Applicant?s fundamental rights to liberty and freedom of movement. The Applicants have also claimed damages for pains, torture or humiliation.
The facts of this case briefly stated are as follows:
‘The Applicants now Respondents filed an action at the Federal High Court against the Respondents/Appellants for the enforcement of their fundamental rights. The Respondents were at all time material to this case, employees of the Nigerian Postal Service who were entrusted with mail bag and postal matters in the Lagos Post Office to be delivered to the Benin Post Office. The said Respondents were assigned the duties of carrying mail from Benin Post Office to Lagos Post Office and back. The Respondents however failed to deliver the mail bags entrusted to them in the Lagos Post Office to be delivered in Benin City alleging that they were attacked by armed robbers and proceeded to report to police.
The Appellants claim that the Respondents were not arrested by them but rather that they reported or submitted themselves to the Police following the report but were later released on bail to one Rashidi Ayinde Onajobi of the Nigeria Postal Services, Abeokuta.
The Respondents on the other hand claimed that breaches of their fundamental rights occurred in Ibadan, Oyo State and Abeokuta, Ogun State respectively where the Respondents were detained. The action was however filed in the Federal High Court sitting at Benin City in Edo State.
The Appellants on their part, claimed they had reason to believe that the Respondents committed offences under the Telecommunications and Postal Offences Decree No. 21 of 1995 to wit: that the Respondents? failure to deliver the postal matters to Benin Post Office was as a result of their conspiracy with other people to hand over the postal matters to them having divulged the information relating to their movements to commit the act or omission in breach of their duty, and that the Respondents were being detained in exercise of the power conferred on the Appellants by the Decree No. 21 of 1995.
Pursuant to the leave of the Federal High Court, Benin City, given on the 17th day of June 1997, the Appellants, Mr. John Orhe and Mr. Edeki Igili, filed an application in the Federal High Court praying for the following orders:
1. A Declaration that the arrest of the Applicants by the agents of the second Respondents on 19/5/1997 is without reasonable basis and is in contravention of the Applicants? liberty and freedom of movement.
2. A Declaration that the continued detention of the Applicants by the second Respondent is illegal and unconstitutional.
2a. An injunction restraining the Respondents from repeating their illegal actions.
3. An Order releasing the Applicants from Police Custody.
4. An Order staying all actions/matters relating to or connected with the Applicants? detention until the determination of this application.
5. N50,000 general damages to each applicant for the pain, torture and humiliation suffered by the Applicants.
When the matter came up on the 13th of December 1999, the Appellants were absent and unrepresented.
The learned trial Judge adjourned the matter to the 13th of January, 2000 for mention.
On the 13th of January, 2000, counsel to the Respondents moved the trial Court to enter judgment for the Respondents on the basis of the motion dated and filed on 23/12/1999, after which, judgment was entered in favour of the Applicants with costs awarded.
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Appellant hereby instituted this appeal, raising the following issues for determination from their amended notice and grounds of appeal:
ISSUE ONE:
Whether having regard to the affidavit evidence on the printed record and ouster provisions of the Telecommunication and Postal Offences Decree 21 of 1995, the Federal High Court competently exercised jurisdiction over the matter of the Respondent’s action.
ISSUE TWO:
Whether in view of the provisions of Section 42(1) of the 1979 Constitution (as amended), the Federal High Court sitting at Benin City, Edo State, validly exercised jurisdiction over the Respondent?s claim breaches of which occurred in Abeokuta, Ogun State and Ibadan, Oyo State respectively.
ISSUE THREE:
Whether the judgment entered in favour of the Respondents without a consideration of the case presented by the Appellants was not a violation of the Appellants’ right to fair hearing.
ISSUE ONE: Whether having regard to the affidavit evidence on the printed record and ouster provisions of the Telecommunication and Postal Offences Decree 21 of 1995, the Federal High Court competently exercised jurisdiction over the matter of the Respondent’s action.
It is the Appellant’s submission that in a case such as the instant case where a detainee alleges that his arrest and detention are illegal, unconstitutional and without reasonable basis, the burden of proving the legality or constitutionality of his arrest and detention is on the arrestor and that this could only be successfully done by disclosing to the trial Court in the counter-affidavit what the detainee did, the role he played and the extent of his involvement in the crime. See C.O.P. ONDO STATE V. OBOLO (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 120) 130 at 137 paras. H ? A; 139 para. F.
The Appellants argued that in the instant case, the Appellants successfully adduced evidence to establish the grounds for detaining the Respondents by disclosing to the trial Court in their counter-affidavit what the Respondents did, the role they played in relation to mails entrusted to the in Lagos to be delivered to Benin Post Office to justify the detention of the Respondents.
Learned counsel for the Appellants further contended that the Respondents were detained pursuant to the power conferred on them under the Telecommunications and Postal Decree No. 21 of 1995, and that the onus rests on the Respondents now to establish that the Appellants did not have the power to detain them thus infringing on their right to personal liberty and freedom of movement. See the case ofHERNIMAN V. SMITH (1938) AC 305 at 316.
Counsel also pointed out that in the instant case, the Respondents failed to depose to a further affidavit controverting facts deposed to in the Appellants Counter-Affidavit, and that having failed to do so, the facts contained in the Counter-Affidavit are herein established. He cited AJOMALE V. YADUAT (NO. 2) (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 191) 266 at 282-283.
Learned counsel for the Appellants further opined that the Appellants acted within the contemplation of Section 30(2) of the TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POSTAL OFFENCES DECREE NO. 21 of 1995. Consequently, Appellants added that Section 35 of Decree 21 of 1995 operated to exclude the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court over the subject-matter of the Respondents’ action. OKUMAGBA V. EGBE (1985) 1 AII NLR 62.
He again submitted that the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned trial Judge in the face of clear, unambiguous, express prohibitions in Section 35 of Decree 21 of 1995 with due respect, is an exercise in excess of jurisdiction and that the Judgment entered for the Respondents is a nullity.
Appellants stated that the issue of jurisdiction is so fundamental to the hearing of an action that it can be raised at any stage of proceedings even for the first time on appeal, and humbly urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellants.
ISSUE TWO: Whether in view of the provisions of Section 42(1) of the 1979 Constitution (as amended), the Federal High Court sitting at Benin City, Edo State, validly exercised jurisdiction over the Respondent’s claim breaches of which occurred in Abeokuta, Ogun State and Ibadan, Oyo State respectively.
The Appellants in this issue are questioning the validity of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Federal High Court sitting in Benin City, Edo State, over an action for breach of fundamental rights which occurred in Ibadan, Oyo State and Abeokuta, Ogun State respectively.
It is the Appellants’ submission that the Federal High Court sitting in Edo State could not validly exercise jurisdiction over the Respondents’ action for enforcement of their fundamental rights, breaches of which occurred in Abeokuta, Ogun State and Ibadan, Oyo State respectively.
Appellants stated that they had not lost sight of the fact that Section 42(2) of the 1979 Constitution (as amended) read with the definition of ‘High Court’ in Section 277(1) of the same Constitution empowered the Federal High Court to hear and determine issues or matters involving fundamental human rights. However, Appellants stated that the provision of Section 42(1) of the 1979 Constitution (as amended), specifically empowers any persons complaining of contravention of the fundamental rights provisions in relation to him in any State, to apply to a High Court in that State.
Appellants contended that in the instant case, the Respondents complained that their arrest and detention in Abeokuta, Ogun State and Ibadan, Oyo State were in contravention of their liberty and freedom of movement, illegal and unconstitutional. That the Respondents however applied to the Federal High Court sitting in Edo State, which is not a High Court in Oyo State or Ogun State instead of applying to a High Court sitting in both Oyo and Ogun States respectively since that was where the breach or contravention occurred.
Appellant concluded that the Federal High Court sitting in Benin lacked the geographical jurisdiction to hear and determine the Respondents’ action. TUKUR V. GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 at 556 para. F – H; 557 para. A – C, 561 para. D – F ratio 16.
ISSUE THREE: Whether the judgment entered in favour of the Respondents without a consideration of the case presented by the Appellants was not a violation of the Appellants’ right to fair hearing.
Learned Appellant counsel submitted that a Court is bound to and must give full and dispassionate consideration to the case presented to it by parties before it. A refusal to do so on any pre, except on a ground of law will amount to a denial of the right to hear such a party which is a ground fundamental to the administration of justice. He then cited Section 33(1) of the Constitution; OJOGBUE V. NNUBIA (1972) 6 SC 27. That in the instant case, the Respondents claimed that their arrest and detention were illegal, unconstitutional and without reasonable basis.
The Appellants in their counter-affidavit denied that the Respondents were arrested. They further deposed to facts establishing reasonable grounds for detaining the Respondents, and they also deposed to the fact that the Appellants acted in the exercise of powers conferred on them under Decree 21 of 1995.
Appellants stated that the facts in the Appellants? Counter-Affidavit were never controverted since the Respondent failed to file a Further Affidavit to deny any of the facts deposed to in the Counter-Affidavit, and that the uncontroverted facts were deemed to be established. He citedLONG JOHN V. BLAKK (1998) NWLR (Pt. 555) 524 at 547 para. H.
Appellant stated that the failure of the learned trial Judge to address himself to the issue of the reasonableness or otherwise of the Appellants’ grounds of belief when he entered Judgment for the Respondents based on the Respondents’ application filed on the 18th of June, 1997 and Counter-affidavit, left the issue unresolved and had failed to fully discharge his duties of adjudication.
Appellants’ finally submitted that the failure of the learned trial Judge to consider and act on the fact validly presented and duly established, was not only perverse but contrary to law and a misdirection tantamount to an infringement of the Appellants’ right to fair hearing and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice which affected the decision arrived at.
RESOLUTION:
I have taken pains to critically examine all the issues raised from the Appellants grounds of appeal and I find that the said issues are all intertwined and can be fused into a single issue to wit:
Whether the Federal High Court competently exercised jurisdiction over the Fundamental Human Rights matter of the Respondents in the absence of the Appellants.
The history of this case is that on the 13th day of January 2000, learned counsel for the Applicants Mrs. Ayinde Wilson moved the Court to enter judgment in favour of the Applicants/Respondents since Plaintiffs/Applicants had failed to diligently prosecute the matter due to their continuous absence from Court. They referred to paragraphs 8(a) (b) & (c) of their motion paper where reasons had been deduced for granting their application in the absence of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. The then learned trial Judge accordingly entered judgment in favour of the Applicants pursuant to their motion on notice which was dated the 23rd day of December 1999 and moved on 13th day of January 2000. A cost of N1,000 was then awarded in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondent.
On the 6th day of April, 2000, learned counsel for the Plaintiff/Applicant again brought a motion to set aside the Judgment of the 13th day of January 2000.
Both learned counsel applied for an adjournment due to lack of service and agreed for a further date of adjournment being the 17th day of May 2000. On the 17th day of May 2000, S.M. Tenku of counsel who was in Court appealed for a further date of adjournment as learned counsel for the Applicant was absent from Court. The Court then adjourned the matter to the 27th day of June 2000.
On the said adjourned date, learned counsel for the Defendant/Respondent conceded a further adjournment and the matter was further adjourned to the 13th day of September 2000. After a couple of further adjournments, the matter was finally heard on the 3rd day of November, 2000. On that day, learned counsel for the Defendant/Respondent brought a motion to set aside the default judgment of the 13th day of January 2000. Showing in their paragraphs 3 – 8, the reasons for their absence and at paragraphs 11 – 12 further reasons for failure to bring their application within the 6 days period.
Learned counsel then urged the Court to refuse the application and the Court adjourned to 18th day of January 2001 for Ruling on the motion for extension of time to set aside the judgment made on 13th day of January, 2000 and hear the matter on the merits.
In a considered Ruling on the 18th day of January, 2001, the Federal High Court refused the application to set aside the judgment of Justice Aina stating as follows:
‘I believe Justice Aina was right when he entered Judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs, against the defendant. It is a case of the enforcement of fundamental human right, it ought to have been concluded since, and it should take priority over any official engagement that the defendant’s counsel have gone to do in Abuja. I therefore found that this application have no merit. It is accordingly dismissed.’
The Defendants then filed a notice of appeal being dissatisfied with the Ruling of the 18th day of January, 2001 raising the issue of jurisdiction in the main. Learned counsel then urged the Court to hold that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that the effect and claim of jurisdiction makes the proceedings a nullity. That application to stay the execution of the Judgment of the Federal High Court was also roundly refused, hence this appeal.
Like I stated earlier, the grounds of appeal and the issues therefrom all border on the claim that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. To begin with the 1979 Constitution S. 42(1) which learned counsel referred to has been described in the definition at S. 277 as: High Court means Federal High Court of High Court of a State. Order II Rule 9 also refers to all other suits in the division which the defendants resides.
Section 236 of the 1979 Constitution states that Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law, the High Court of a State shall have unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.
Section 231(1) of the same Constitution states that for the purpose of exercising any jurisdiction conferred upon it by this Constitution or as may be conferred by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have all the powers of the High Court of a State.
Subject to the foregoing, the Federal High Court is vested with the same powers as the State High Court.
In other words, the Federal High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 42(2) of the Constitution to enforce a fundamental right only in relation to those matters in which Section 230(1) and (2) have conferred it with jurisdiction, Per Nnamani in TUKUR V. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) 517 at 556. In the present case, the learned jurist of the lower Court was in order when he assumed jurisdiction to hear the matter before it.
From the totality of all of the above, it is my ardent view that this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.
Accordingly, the Ruling of the Federal High Court delivered on the 13th day of January 2000 is affirmed.
Appeal Dismissed.
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.: I have read the judgment just delivered by my learned brother PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE JCA. I am in complete agreement that the narrow issue for determination in this appeal of whether the Federal High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a case involving Nigeria Police Service and the Commissioner of Police, Ogun State Command had been properly answered in the affirmative by the trial Court. The ruling of the Federal High Court delivered on 13th day of January, 2000 is hereby affirmed.
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME, J.C.A.: I agree
Appearances:
S.O. Sangotayo Esq. with him M.A. Abdulraheem Esq. and Nwogu Evarest Esq. For Appellant(s)
Respondent not represented For Respondent(s)
