ENGR. ALFRED ASOWATA v. MR. K.D.E. AIHIE
(2019)LCN/12603(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 29th day of January, 2019
CA/B/53/2009
RATIO
CONTRACT: WHETHER THE COURT CAN INTERFERE IN A CONTRACT
“In general legal parlance, Courts are imbued with the judicial authority and jurisdiction to give life to contractual agreements made between the parties, provided that such contracts are rooted within the law. See ADEDEJI V. OBAJIMI (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1644) 146 @ 148 1.” PER PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.
INTERPRETATION: PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION
“The principle of interpretation is that where a penal statute is capable of two interpretations, the interpretation which is favourabe to the accused is to be preferred and applied; see OLADELE V. STATE (1993) 1 SCNJ 60 @ 70.”PER PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
ENGR. ALFRED ASOWATA Appellant(s)
AND
MR. K.D.E. AIHIE Respondent(s)
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This Appeal emanated from the judgment of the High Court of Edo State sitting in Benin, delivered on 16th October, 2008, wherein the trial Court granted the Respondent?s claim for declaration of title, damages for trespass and an order of perpetual injunction against the Appellant.
The facts of this appeal can be summarized as follows: By a writ of Summons dated 23rd March, 1999 the Plaintiff/Respondent sued the Defendant/Appellant claiming the following reliefs:
a. A declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to the grant of a statutory Right of Occupancy to all that piece/parcel of land measuring approximately 100 feet by 200 feet lying and being at Ward 11K, Isiohor Iyekuselu, Benin City within the Benin Judicial Division which piece or parcel of land will be more delineated in a Survey Plan to be drawn later.
b. N500, 000. 00 damages against the Defendant for his acts of trespass on the said land.
c. Perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant, his servants, agents, and or privies from further acts of trespass to the said land.
The matter was fought on the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim and defendant’s amended statement of defence. The Defendant/Appellant in his amended Statement of Defence included a Counter Claim which is substantially the same as the Claim reproduced above.
In proof of his case, the Plaintiff/Respondent testified for himself and called two other witnesses. The Defendant/Appellant on his part testified for himself and called four other witnesses. The summary of the case of the plaintiff/Appellant is that he purchased the land in dispute from one J.E. Uyigue on 26th day of March, 1975. He was put in possession and enjoyed peaceful possession until sometime in 1994 when the Appellant trespassed into the land. On his part, the Appellant’s case is that he acquired the land from one Mr. A. A. Akpasi, who in turn derived title from Mr. Ohunwu Ovie. The Appellant contended that he exercised acts of possession over the land including fencing it and mounting an iron gate. It was in evidence that J.E. Uyigue actually died on 5th day of November, 1974 and that J.O. Uyigue conducted the transaction with the Respondent in the name of his late father.
Many exhibits were tendered and respective counsel filed final addresses.
In a considered judgment delivered on the 16th day of October, 2008, the learned trial judge found as a fact that the land in dispute as claimed by the parties was the same and that it is part of the Estate of late J.E. Uyigue and that it was of no moment that O.J. Uyigue sold the land as J.E. Uyigue since the Respondent had a better title than the Appellant. On the basis of this finding the trial judge granted the reliefs of the Respondent whilst dismissing the counter claim of the Appellant.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL:
By a Further Amended Notice of Appeal dated 18th day of December, 2017, but filed on 19th day of December, 2017 following the leave granted by this Honourable Court, the Appellant raised the following grounds of Appeal:
Ground One:
The judgment is against the weight of evidence.
Ground Two:
The learned trial judge erred in law in granting Respondent?s claim, which was clearly based on fraud.
Ground Three:
The learned trial judge erred in law when he admitted in evidence as Exhibit D the indenture/receipt dated 26th March 1975, which document was inadmissible in evidence by virtue of the provisions of Section 5 (1) of the Land Instruments Preparation Law, Cap, 80 Laws of the defunct Bendel State of Nigeria applicable to Edo State.
From the grounds of appeal reproduced above, the Appellant in his Further Amended Brief of Argument dated 18th day of December 2017, but filed on 19th day of December 2017, distilled three issues for determination, which he couched thus:
Issue one:
Whether the lower Court was right when it entered judgment for the Respondent whose case was evidently based on fraud/illegality.
Issue two:
Whether the Respondent proved his case at the lower Court on the balance of probabilities.
Issue three:
Whether in the light of the provisions of Section 5(1) of the Land Instruments Preparation Law, Cap. 80, Laws of the defunct Bendel State of Nigeria applicable in Edo State the lower Court did not wrongly admit Exhibit D in evidence. (Ground 3).
In an Amended Respondents Brief of Argument dated and filed on 22/10/2018, the Respondent formulated three issues for the determination of the appeal via:
a. Whether the agreement between the Respondent and O. J. Uyige or J.E. Uyigue (as the case may be) is tainted with fraud/illegality.
b. Whether the Respondent proved his case at the lower Court on the balance of probabilities.
c. Whether Exhibit D is admissible in law.
NOTE: By the order of this Court granted on 4th day of December 2017, the Respondent was substituted for Rev. N.I.I. Aihie, who died in the course of the appeal.
ARGUMENT:
Issue one: Whether the lower Court was right when it entered judgment for the Respondent whose case was evidently based on fraud/illegality.
In arguing this issue, learned counsel for the Appellant cited many authorities including SODIPO V LEMMINKAINEN OY (1986) 1 NWLR (PT. 15)220 @ 232 and FASEL SERVICES LTD V. N.P.A. & ANOR (2003) 8 NWLR (PT. 821) 73 @ 102 to the effect that a contract that is tainted with illegality is unenforceable even where the illegality is not pleaded. Learned counsel referred to paragraph 5(a)-(d) of the Amended Statement of Defence which is contained at Page 44-45 of the records and the evidence of PW2 and submitted that from the state of pleadings and evidence adduced at the trial, it was clearly established that PW2 impersonated his father in conducting the land transaction with the Respondent which resulted in the document which was tendered as Exhibit D.
Arguing further on this issue, learned counsel highlighted some of the points which made it improbable for the Respondent to feign ignorance of the fraud/illegality. Counsel reproduced Section 3 of the Administration of Estates Law, Cap. 2, Laws of defunct Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976 applicable to Edo State and submitted that the trial Court was wrong to have held that the law supported the transaction between the PW2 and the Respondent. Counsel contended that the law was meant to protect the estate of a deceased property owner and not to further the commission of crime.
Learned counsel contended further that the case of UNOKA V. AGILI (2007) 11 NWLR (PT. 1044) 122 @ 141 cited by the Court at page 90 of the Records is distinguishable from the facts of the instant appeal as there is no feature of crime in the case unlike the instant appeal.
Counsel summed up argument on this issue by stating that the fact that the Appellant claimed no share in the estate of late J.E. Uyigue cannot debar him from raising this issue of illegality against the Respondent as the Court cannot close its eyes to the issue once such is disclosed to the Court. The cases of MORIYAMO ADESANYA V. A.O. OTUEWU & ORS. (1993) 1 SCNJ 77 and OKOYA & 2ORS V. SANTILLI & 2 ORS (1993) ALL NLR were called in aid for this contention.
Arguing this issue, counsel for the Respondent noted that it is not in dispute that the land in dispute forms part of a larger piece of land belonging to J.E. Uyigue, and that the PW2 (O.J. Uyigue) is his eldest son. Counsel contended that in the absence of testamentary disposition, the land by virtue of Section 3 of the Administration of Estates Law Cap. 2 Vol. 1 Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria,1976 as applicable to Edo State devolved on PW2 and other children of their late father. Counsel submitted that the action of O.J. Uyigue (PW2) in transferring the land in dispute in the name of his father, J.E. Uyigue is not tainted with fraud, as the PW2 is deemed as the personal representative and therefore heir of late J.E. Uyigue.
Furthermore, counsel referred to page 370 of Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Edition for the definition of the term ‘illegal contract’. Counsel called in aid the cases of AMIZU V. NZERIBE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 118) 755 @ 770 PARAS H-G; AJAYI V. TOTAL (NIG.) PLC (2013) 15 NWLR (PT. 1378) 423 @ 441 and PAN BISBILDER NIG. V. FIRST BANK (2000) 74 LRCN 109 @ 122 PARA F-H to the effect that a contract is illegal where the subject matter of the promise is illegal or where the consideration or any part of it is illegal. On the premise of these authorities, counsel submitted that the object of the transaction between the PW2 and the Respondent was the sale of land which is not illegal and did not contain any promise that is illegal. Counsel added that the said contract of sale of land is not against public policy which is the root of the defence of illegality. In the same vein, counsel referred to Section 4(1) of the Administration of Estates Law, (supra) and contended that the case of UNOKA V. AGILI (Supra) is applicable to this case.
In a further argument, learned counsel cited OVENSERI V. OSAGIEDE (1998) 11 NWLR (PT. 577) 1 and opined that by Bini Native Law and Custom, O.J. Uyigue (PW2) being the eldest surviving son is the only person entitled to hold the property in trust for his late father. Counsel also referred to Section 151 of the Evidence Act, to the effect that having held himself out as J.E. Uyigue, the PW2 (O.J. Uyigue) cannot hold the agreement he entered into with the Respondent as illegal, let alone the Appellant who is a total stranger to the contract. Counsel referred to page 90 of the records particularly lines 22-24, and cited ONWUCHEKWA V. N.D.I.C. (2002) 94 LRCN 232 @ 241 PARA OO to the effect that a stranger to an alleged illegal transaction will not be allowed to raise the defence of illegality founded on a transaction to which he is not a party.
Counsel concluded argument on this issue by citing KANUMBU V. BUNU (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 300) 1709 @ 1733 PARA E to the effect that a person who was not privy to a contract can neither be bound nor be liable under its terms. Counsel contended strongly that the Appellant not being privy to the agreement between the Respondent and PW2, cannot raise illegality as a defence.
Replying to the submissions of counsel on this issue, learned counsel for the Appellant in a Reply Brief dated and filed on 9th day of November 2018, cited CHIEF JOHN EHIMIGBAI OMOKHAFE V. CHIEF JOHN ILAVBAOJE IBOYI ESKHEMO (1993) LPELR 2649 to the effect that a person’s legal personality is extinguished at death. Counsel contended that contrary to the arguments of learned counsel for the Respondent the law does not permit the sale of land in the name of a dead person as the transaction will certainly be against public policy and the Court ought not to give effect to it. Learned counsel stressed that the mere fact that the PW2 is the father’s eldest son does not justify his action of transacting in the name of his father as the PW2 did not assume the legal personality his father lost at death.
On the competence of the Appellant to challenge the legality of Exhibit D, counsel contended that the Appellant is competent in that the said Exhibit is being used to assert title to the land in dispute against the interest of the Appellant.
Opinion:
On this issue, learned counsel for the Appellant has argued extensively that the case of the Respondent is based on fraud/ illegality. This argument to my mind is of no moment. Counsel has harped on the fact that Exhibit D was obtained by fraud and therefore should not be relied on, but the question is, is the Appellant a party to the contract as embodied in Exhibit D? The obvious answer is in the negative. Exhibit D does not confer any rights or impose any obligations on the Appellant, therefore he is not privy to the contract entered into in Exhibit D. The simple implication of this is that there is no privity of contract between either the Appellant and the Respondent, or between PW2 and the Appellant. In general legal parlance, Courts are imbued with the judicial authority and jurisdiction to give life to contractual agreements made between the parties, provided that such contracts are rooted within the law. See ADEDEJI V. OBAJIMI (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1644) 146 @ 148 1.
In the instant case, I throw my weight behind the reasoning of the learned jurist of the lower Court who held as follows:
‘By virtue of S.3 of the Administration of Estates Law Cap 2 Vol. 1 Laws of Bendel State 1976 applicable in Edo State, the real estate to which a deceased person is entitled for an interest not ceasing on his death shall on his death, and notwithstanding any testamentary disposition thereof, devolve on the personal representative of the deceased, and the personal representatives for the time being of the deceased are deemed in law his heirs and assigns within the meaning of all trusts and powers. See Unoka v. Agili (2007) 11 NWLR Part 1044 page 122 at 141.’
The Respondent therefore had the legal right to step into the shoes of his late father, being the oldest surviving son and contract on his behalf as his personal representative. The Appellant cannot therefore enforce the contents of Exhibit D so as to allege fraud/illegality; see: U.B.N. PLC V. SOARES (2012) 11 NLWR 550.
In any case, I do not see any issue of fraud/illegality as regards Exhibit D. The mere fact that the transaction was conducted in the name of J.E. Uyigue who was deceased at the time does not necessarily connote fraud/illegality. The Respondent paid for the land and title was transferred to him without challenge from any member of the family. It does not lie in the mouth of the Appellant, who in fact is not a member of the family to raise the issue. In other words, the case of the Respondent was not based on fraud/illegality and the trial judge was right to have entered judgment for the Respondent. This issue ought to be resolved in favour of the Respondent.
Issue two: Whether the Respondent proved his case at the lower Court on the balance of probabilities.
In arguing this issue, learned counsel for the Appellant regurgitated the arguments he had earlier made as regards issue 1 on the illegality/validity of the transfer made by the PW2 to the Respondent. Counsel contended that until 10th May, 1985 when Exhibit R was made, the PW2 had no authority to transfer family property without the consensus of other family members to the Respondent. Counsel cited the cases of GEGE V. NANDE (2006) 10 NWLR (PT. 988) 256 @ 284-285 PARA E-A and IBRAHIM V. OSUNDE (2009) 6 NWLR (PT. 1137) 382 @ 404 PARAS A-B and submitted that since the property was not vested in the PW2, the Respondent derived nothing from the transaction as one cannot give what one does not have.
Learned counsel referred to Exhibit P at page 66 line 7 of the Records and stated that the Respondent could not have received compensation for his land from the then Bendel State Government and still retain the land.
Counsel referred to Section 133 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the case of IMAM V. SHERIFF (2005) 4 NWLR (PT. 914) 80 @ 186-187 PARAS E-F to the effect that the burden of proof shifts to the person against whom judgment will be given, if the person asserting the fact has adduced evidence. Counsel contended that the Appellant discharged the burden of proof on him when he tendered Exhibit P and the mere bare denial of the Respondent that he did not receive any compensation is not credible evidence. Counsel cited OMOZEGHIAN V. ADJARHO (2006) 4 NWLR (PT. 969) 33 @ 61 PARAS A-B as to what constitutes credible evidence.
Counsel concluded argument on this issue by submitting that the Respondent who claimed declaration of title to land has the duty to establish his title and not to rely on the weakness of the case of the Appellant. Counsel stated that Exhibit D is not just inadmissible but also has no evidential value.
In his reply, learned counsel to the Respondent relying on AJAYI V. TOTAL NIG. PLC (supra) submitted that the foundation of the contract (Exhibit D) between the Respondent and the PW2 is enforceable in law as it is not illegal as contended by the Appellant.
Counsel x-rayed the evidence of DW1, DW2 and DW3 at page 69 lines 3-6; page 70 lines 15-20 and Page 84 of the records and submitted that the Appellant and his witnesses having fixed the land in dispute as that within the registered land of J.E. Uyigue, the Appellant cannot question the action of O.J. Uyigue in relation to the estate by setting up the title of Uhunwu Owie. Counsel contended that contrary to the argument of counsel for the Appellant that the lower Court did not make any pronouncement as regards payment of compensation and Exhibit P, the court actually found that the Respondent?s name is shown against the land in dispute as owner and made reference to page 90 line 25 and page 91 lines 1-3 of the records.
Arguing further on the issue, counsel debunked the submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent to the effect that Exhibit D is inadmissible because it was prepared by a non-legal practitioner. Learned counsel for the Respondent referred to paragraph 10(iv) of the Respondent?s amended statement of claim at lines 24-35 of page 29 of the records, and lines 1-9 of page 56 and opined that Exhibit D was tendered as a receipt of money paid.
Further on this point, counsel stated that nothing in Section 5 of the Lands Instrument Preparation Law, Cap. 80, Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria as applicable to Edo State precludes a non legal practitioner from preparing a receipt for the consideration paid for a land transaction.
Furthermore on this issue, counsel stated that the transaction leading to the preparation of Exhibit D was one under Bini Native and Custom, the provisions of Section 5 (1) of the Lands Instrument Preparation Law, (supra) would not apply. Counsel cited Sections 5 (2), 3 and 4 of the Land Instrument Preparation Law and contended that it is the agreement to pay a fee to a non-legal practitioner for preparation of land documents that the law frowns at and not the document per se. Lastly on this issue, counsel contended that Exhibit S which is later in time is of no moment in the case and the Appellant cannot rely on it. Counsel urged that this issue be resolved in favour of the Respondent.
By way of reply, Counsel to the Appellant submitted that contrary to the contention of the Respondent, the misrepresentation of PW2 in Exhibit D borders on the offence of impersonation which is punishable by law and therefore against public policy. On the contention that the transaction leading up to the preparation of Exhibit D was done under Bini customary Law, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that issuance of receipt is unknown to customary law; the cases of OKOROAFOR & ORS V. UDENSI & ANOR. (2013) LPELR 20649 PAGES 15-16 AND WILLIAMS & ANOR. V. ADEBAYO & ORS. (2012) LPELR 7940 PAGE 33, PARAS B-D were referred to.
Finally on this, counsel submitted that contrary to the contention of the Respondent, any instrument prepared in violation of Section 4 of the Land Instruments Preparation Law is illegal and ineffectual being the product of an illegality and hence cannot form the basis of conferment of rights.
RESOLUTION:
It is however imperative to refer to the principle of law enunciated in OKELOLA V. ADELEKE (2004) ALL FWLR (PT. 224) 1980 @ 1990 PARAS G-H to the effect that “where parties to a land dispute trace their root of title to a common root, it is the party who establishes a better title thereto that is entitled to succeed in a claim for declaration of title.”
In the instant appeal, from the evidence adduced, it is common ground that the land in dispute forms part of the estate of late of J.E. Uyigue. The question then is, who between the two parties has proved a better title? To my mind, this question can be answered by referring to the evidence led at the trial Court. The PW2 (O.J. Uyigue) who is the head of the family of J.E. Uyigue testified that he sold the land in dispute to the Respondent. The document evidencing the sale was also tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibit D. The Appellant on his part traced his title to one Uhunwu Owie. There is no evidence that this said Uhunwu Owie is a member of the family of J.E. Uyigue or that he had a better title than O.J. Uyigue who sold to the Respondent.
In the same vein, Exhibit P which was tendered by the Appellants at the Court below also reinforced the fact that the Respondent is indeed the owner of the land in dispute. Juxtaposing the evidence of the Appellants and that of the Respondents, the scale in my view, will definitely tilt in favour of the Respondents. The Appellant is aware of this fact and that is why he argued vigorously to discredit Exhibit D.
To my mind therefore, the Respondent proved his case at the lower Court on the balance of probabilities and therefore is entitled to judgment. This issue therefore should be resolved against the Appellant.
Issue three: Whether in the light of the provisions of Section 5(1) of the Land Instruments Preparation Law, Cap. 80, Laws of the defunct Bendel State of Nigeria applicable in Edo State the lower Court did not wrongly admit Exhibit D in evidence. (Ground 3).
Learned counsel to the Appellant while arguing this issue reproduced the provisions of Section 5(1) of the Land Instrument Preparation Law and submitted that by this the Court ought to have struck down Exhibit D as being void. Counsel urged the Court to invoke Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004 to interfere with the decision of the trial Court by rejecting Exhibit D on the grounds of its inadmissibility and setting aside the judgment of the trial Court founded on it.
Arguing on this issue, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Land Instrument Preparation Law came into force on the 1st day of January, 1976, whereas Exhibit D was made on 26th March, 1975 before the commencement of the said law. Counsel reiterated his earlier argument that Exhibit D was not tendered as an instrument of title but as a receipt in proof of the transaction between the parties, and nothing in the law precluded a non legal practitioner from drawing up a receipt of payment to evidence a transaction.
Learned counsel argued further that Exhibit D was prepared under Benin Native Law and Custom hence admissible and not subject to registration since it is nothing but an acknowledgment of payment. Counsel opined that the case of NWAOGU V. ATUMA (2013) NWLR (PT. 1364) 117 cited by the Appellant is not applicable as Exhibit D was not tendered as an instrument of title but as a receipt.
Lastly, counsel cited BENJAMIN V. KALIO (2018) ALL FWLR (PT. 920) 1 @ 17-19 PARAS D-C to the effect that what governs admissibility of any document is the evidence Act. Counsel therefore submitted that the Land Instrument Preparation Law cannot override the provisions of the Constitution and the Evidence Act. He urged that the issue be resolved in favour of the Respondent and for the appeal to be dismissed.
By means of reply, counsel to the Appellant stated that the Law Instrument Preparation Law has a commencement date of 30th August, 1917, and same applied to the entire Western Region. Counsel noted that what took effect from 1976 was the Revised Edition and urged that the arguments of Respondent be discountenanced.
RESOLUTION:
This issue revolves around the interpretation of the Land Instruments Preparation Law, Cap. 80, Laws of the defunct Bendel State as applicable to Edo State. I must say at this juncture that I am more persuaded by the arguments of learned counsel for the Respondent that the intendment of the law was to void agreements for payments of fees to non-lawyers for preparation of title documents and not necessarily to void the title document itself. This statue appears to be penal in nature since it is capable of depriving a citizen of his proprietary right. The principle of interpretation is that where a penal statute is capable of two interpretations, the interpretation which is favourabe to the accused is to be preferred and applied; see OLADELE V. STATE (1993) 1 SCNJ 60 @ 70.
It is also imperative to check the commencement date of the law so as to ascertain whether or not it is applicable to the instant appeal. In the final analysis, I do not share the view that because Exhibit D was not prepared by a legal practitioner it should be inadmissible and thereby defeating the Respondents title to the land in dispute. Such reasoning borders on technicality to the extreme which will defeat the ends of justice. To my mind, this issue ought to be resolved in favour of the Respondent.
CONCLUSION:
Having resolved all the issues in favour of the Respondent, this appeal is without merit and ought to be dismissed in its entirety and there will be no reason to disturb the unassailable judgment of the lower Court.
In sum, this appeal is adjudged unmeritorious and it therefore fails. Consequently, the judgment of the lower Court delivered on the 16th day of October 2008 is affirmed.
I assess costs at N50,000.00 in favour of the Respondent against the Appellant.
Appeal Dismissed.
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.: I have read the judgment of my learned brother PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE JCA. I am of the humble view that there is no merit in this appeal and that it should be dismissed.
I need to add a few words about the contentious Exhibit D which is a receipt for the sale of land issued by PW2 to the Respondent. It has no more legal status than as a receipt for the purchase of land. It was properly admitted as such.
The question of its compatibility with the provisions of the Land Instruments Preparation Law is irrelevant. This is because the Respondent did not tender it as an instrument passing title to him but one evidencing mere sale of property. There is a distinction between those two positions.
The Appellant in this case conceded that the land in dispute belonged to the Estate of J.E Uyigbe whose son made Exhibit D. Having read the record of appeal, I am inclined to agree with the learned trial judge that the Respondent proved his case of title and damages against the Appellant who had in my humble view no tangible evidence to rebut the case put up by the Appellant except to rely on perceived technical flaws in the case Of the Respondent.
Suffice it to say that the Respondent proved that he bought the land in dispute from PW1 who had sold it as the eldest son of his father whose title to the land was not seriously disputed at trial by the Appellant who bought from a complete stranger to the original owner of the Land. In the circumstances, this appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed by me.
The judgment of the trial Court delivered on 16/10/08 in Suit No. B/212/99 is hereby affirmed. I abide by the order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME, J.C.A.: I agree.
Appearances:
K.O. Obamogie, Esq. with him, A.C. Okurbo Esq., J.E. Ibiongbo, Esq. and C.C. Okpaleke, Esq. For Appellant(s)
S. Odiase, Esq.For Respondent(s)
