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DATA PROCESSING MAINTENANCE & SERVICES LIMITED & ANOR v. MR. ABIODUN AKERELE (2018)

DATA PROCESSING MAINTENANCE & SERVICES LIMITED & ANOR v. MR. ABIODUN AKERELE

(2018)LCN/12425(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 18th day of May, 2018

CA/L/340/2000

 

RATIO

DAMAGES: GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR THE AWARD OF DAMAGE

“The guiding principle and the basic object in the award of damages for a wrong or injury, is to compensate the wronged for the damage, loss or injury he suffered from the wrong, which is expressed as ” restitutio in integrum” in Latin; meaning to restore a party to the same position he was before the wrong: as far as the compensation could do so. NEPA v. Alli (1992) 1 NWLR (259) 279; SPDCN Ltd v. Udi (1996) 6 NWLRÂ (455) 483; Yusuf v. Mobolaji (1999) 12 NWLR (631) 374; Okeke v. Aondoakaa (2000) 9 NWLR (673) 501.” PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.

DAMAGES: EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

“Exemplary damages are usually awarded in a case in addition to actual damages, when a defendant acted and there was evidence of recklessness, malice or deceit in the wrong against the claimant and are ordinarily, punitive.
In the case of Odiba v. Muemue (1999) 6 SC, 157, (1999) 10 NWLR(622) 174, it was held by the apex Court: per Ogwuegbu, JSC, that exemplary damages may be awarded only in cases:
(a) of oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional acts by government servants;
(b) where the defendant’s conduct had been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which might well exceed the compensation payable to the Plaintiff;
(c) where expressly authorized by statute. See also Allied Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Akubueze (1997) 6 NWLR (509), 394; Odogu v. A. G. Federation (1996) 6 NWLR (456) 508, (1995) ALL NLR, 480, wherein Ogundare, JSC, held that exemplary damages must be claimed and proved before they can be awarded: Enanuga v. Hon. Sampson (2012) LPELR-8487, where it was held that to justify the award of exemplary damages, a claimant must show not simply that the defendant committed the wrongful act complained of, but that the defendant’s conduct has been highhanded, outrageous, oppressive, malicious or generally against the law, Onagoruwa v. IGP (1991) 5 NWLR (193) 593 @ 647-8; Eliochin Nig. Ltd v. Mbadiwe (1986) 1 NWLR (2014) 47 @ 67.”PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.

 

JUSTICES

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. DATA PROCESSING MMAINTENANCE & SERVICES (DPMS) LTD
(formerly IBM (Nig.) Ltd)
2. MR. J. P. BOISSIER – Appellant(s)

AND

MR. ABIODUN AKERELE – Respondent(s)

 

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):

This appeal is against the monetary awards by the High Court of Lagos State in a judgment delivered on the 30th September 1999 in Suit No.LD/2300/89 instituted by the Respondent against the Appellants for wrongful termination of employment. There are three (3) grounds contained on the Appellants’ Notice of Appeal dated 15th October 1999 and in the Appellants’ brief filed on the 30th April, 2004 a sole and concise issue is submitted to the Court for decision in the appeal as follows: –
“Whether on the evidence before the Court, the award of damages by the Lower Court was justified”

The issue was adopted in the Respondent’s brief filed on 6th April, 2006,

Being dissatisfied with some parts of the same judgment, the Respondent also filed a notice of cross appeal dated 13th December, 1999 (titled Notice of Appeal) which was later amended by the Amended Notice of Cross Appeal dated and filed on the 6th April, 2006.
I would consider the appeal now and later, the cross appeal.

The arguments of the Appellants on the sole issue in the appeal are that the High Court was wrong to have ordered for the payment of N6,678.50 as Respondent’s one month salary since the Appellants never disputed his entitlement to the sum in lieu of notice and that it was the Respondent who rejected it. That the Respondent did not ask for it in the case and the High Court was not entitled to award what was never asked for, on the authority of Jeric Nig. Ltd v. UBN (2000) 15 NWLR (691) 447 @ 464.

On the award for N50,000.00 as entitlement under the Provident Fund, it is contended that Exhibit ‘L’ did not say that the benefits due to the Respondent were received by the Appellants, but paid to the trustees of the DPMS Provident Fund which was not administered by the Appellants. Further, that there was no evidence to show that the Appellants were the trustees of the Fund who received the Respondent’s benefit.

The award of N400,000.00 exemplary damages is said to be unsustainable because the Respondent rejected the one month salary in lieu of notice offered by the Appellants when his employment was terminated and did not, of any time later, demand for it. In addition, since the Appellants did not receive and withheld the Respondent’s benefits from the Provident Fund, they could not be responsible for non-payment of same to ground the award of exemplary damages against them.

The Court is urged, in conclusion, to allow the appeal and set aside the awards made by the High Court.

For the Respondent, it is submitted that the averment by the Respondent in paragraph 43(viii) of the 6th Amended Statement of Claim that the Appellants collected his provident fund entitlements without his knowledge and consent, was not effectively but generally denied and so deemed admitted by the Appellants. British Airways v. Makanjuola (1993) 8 NWLR (311) 276 and Agbanelo v. UBN Ltd (2000) 4 SC (Pt.1) 233 were referred to on the submission and it further submitted that the Respondent gave evidence in line with the pleadings and tendered Exhibit ‘L’ in support thereof. It is the case of Counsel that the Appellants did not call evidence to challenge that of the Respondent or to distinguish the trustees of the Provident Fund from the 1st Appellant.

On the sum for a month salary in lieu of notice, attention of the Court is drawn to the Respondent’s claim for  compensation for the month of October, 1989 at page 13 of the Record of Appeal and it is said that the High Court was right to have made the award for being a sum withheld by the Appellants.

For the award of exemplary damages, it is submitted for the Respondent that withholding the salaries and the assured entitlements of the Respondent under the Provident Fund was a serious infraction of his right which is evidence grounding the propriety of the award. The Court is urged to uphold the award and in conclusion, to dismiss the appeal.

It is clear from the submissions by learned Counsel for the parties on the sole issue, that the awards complained about are not all for or as damages against the Appellants. While the sum awarded for or as exemplary damages is clearly an award in damages, the awards in respect of one month salary in lieu of notice and the sum for the Provident Fund, are/were made as entitlements due to and claimed by the Respondent which were the basis for the award of the exemplary damages. Put simply, damages are the sum of money which a person wronged, is entitled to receive from the wrongdoer as compensation for the wrong or injury suffered from the wrong.

The guiding principle and the basic object in the award of damages for a wrong or injury, is to compensate the wronged for the damage, loss or injury he suffered from the wrong, which is expressed as ” restitutio in integrum” in Latin; meaning to restore a party to the same position he was before the wrong: as far as the compensation could do so. NEPA v. Alli (1992) 1 NWLR (259) 279; SPDCN Ltd v. Udi (1996) 6 NWLR (455) 483; Yusuf v. Mobolaji (1999) 12 NWLR (631) 374; Okeke v. Aondoakaa (2000) 9 NWLR (673) 501.

In the Sixth Amended Statement of Claim, the Respondent’s claim in respect of the sum of N6,678.50 awarded by the High Court is at paragraphs 43(i) at page 10 and 49.1 at page 13 of the Record of Appeal, as salary and allowance for the month of October,1989 when his employment was terminated. The Respondent gave unchallenged evidence that the said salary for October 1989 was not paid to him by the Appellants. In its judgment, the High Court awarded the sum of “N6,678.50 representing one months (sic) salary of the Plaintiff.”

As may be recalled, the learned Counsel for the Appellants has only argued that the Appellants have not in any  manner, disputed the Respondent’s entitlement to the sum in lieu of notice, but that the Respondent rejected it and did not demand or ask for it. Since the argument by Counsel that the sum was not claimed by the Respondent in the case has been debunked by the pleadings of the Respondent referred to above, it is clear that the award of the sum by the High Court is unassailable in law. The complaint by the Appellants on the award of the sum, to which they did not dispute the entitlement of the Respondent, is misconceived.

On the award of N50,000.00 for the Provident Fund entitlement of the Respondent, his averment in paragraph 43(viii) of the Sixth Amended Statement is as follows: –

43. Plaintiff avers that the 1st Defendant Company is obliged by contract both express and impired to pay and provide him the following while he has been derived even after asking: –

(viii) Payment of the sum of N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira only) as sum due to him under the Staff Provident Fund Scheme. The Defendant further claims the sum of N350,000.00 (Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira only) for wrongful holding over  of the sum after the Plaintiff purposely and secretly requested and received the sum from the Trustees on or about 6th November, 1989 and negligently or deliberately prevented the receipt of same by the Plaintiff or his beneficiaries. Plaintiff shall rely on a letter dated 5th April, 1994 written to him by Royal Exchange Assurance Nigeria Plc.”

In his evidence in chief, which appears at page 38 of the Record Appeal, the Respondent gave evidence on the above pleading thus:-
“DMPS provident fund which was N50,000 then insured with Royal Exchange Assurance, by today it should be more than N400,000. 1st and 2nd defendant went behind me and collected the money without my knowledge up till today they have refused to pay me the money.”

Then Exhibit ‘L’ was put in evidence in support of the claim.

As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Respondent, the Appellants did not specifically deny the above positive pleadings by the Respondent that they, in fact “purposely and secretly requested and received the sum from the Trustees on or about 6th November, 1989 and negligently or deliberately prevented the receipt of same by the Plaintiff or his beneficiaries.”

The only general and impotent denial of the Respondent’s pleadings on the claim is contained in paragraph 12 of the Appellants’ Amended Statement of Defence dated 24th March,1995 which merely says:-
“12. With further reference to paragraphs 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48 and 49 of the Statement of Claim the defendants state that the claims made by the plaintiff are not due under his contract of service with the 1st defendant.”

The legal implication and consequence of failure by a party to specifically, clearly and pointedly deny a positive averment in the pleadings of his opponent is that, in law, he is deemed to have no answer to and so has admitted the said avernment. Akaose v. Nwosu (1997) 1 NWLR (482) 478; Meridien Trade Corp. Ltd. v. M. C. (W.A) Ltd. (1998) 4 NWLRÂ (544) 1: A.G. Anambra State v. C. N. Onuselogu Ent. Ltd. (1987) 9-11 SC, 197; Motunwase v. Sorungbe (1988) 12 SC (Pt.1) 130. The law also says that no fact which is admitted or deemed admitted needs further proof, Gbadamosi v. Kabo Travels Ltd. (2000) 8 NWLR (668) 243; N.A.S. Ltd. v. UBA, Plc. (2005) 14 NWLRÂ (945) 421; Veepee Ind. Ltd v. Cocoa Ind. Ltd (2008) 13 NWLRÂ (1105) 486; Jolasun v. Bamgboye (2010) 18 NWLR (1225) 285.

Since the Appellants did not specifically deny the facts pleaded in the Respondent’s pleadings and did not call evidence of the trial to challenge the evidence given by the Respondent in support thereof the award of the sum N50,000.00 as entitlement of the Respondent from the Provident Fund was made in line and accordance with the law on proof in civil cases.

The argument of Counsel in the brief of the Appellants that they did not receive the sum or that they are not the trustees who received it, not being evidence supported by pleadings, Olaniyan v. Adeniyi (2007) 3 NWLR (1020) 1; Olagunju v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (1149) 225; Nigeria Airways Ltd. v. Okutubo (2002) 15 NWLR (790) 376, is of no moment on the issue.

On the award of exemplary damages, the High Court had reasoned, in its judgment, of page 339 of the Record of Appeal.
“The plaintiff tendered exhibit L to show that his entitlement under the Provident Fund were collected by the defendants. The above evidence was unchallenged, that is to say it is established that one month salary due to the plaintiff on termination of  his appointment was not paid to him, and this was to have been paid to him in 1989, so also his entitlements under the Provident Fund were not paid to him.

It is clear that the plaintiff has been kept out of his money for ten years and the defendants have been using the plaintiff’s money. This is wrong. Parties are bound by the contract they freely enter into and an employer is duty bound to comply with the relevant provisions for such termination to the letter. This has not been the case. The plaintiff is thus entitled to exemplary damages and it is hoped this would deter the defendants and employers from withholding entitlements.”

Apparently, the reasoning is that because the Respondent was entitled to the one month salary and the sum from the Provident Fund which should have, but were not paid for ten (10) years, the award of the sum of N400,000.00 as exemplary damages was made.

Exemplary damages are usually awarded in a case in addition to actual damages, when a defendant acted and there was evidence of recklessness, malice or deceit in the wrong against the claimant and are ordinarily, punitive.
In the case of Odiba v. Muemue (1999) 6 SC, 157, (1999) 10 NWLR(622) 174, it was held by the apex Court: per Ogwuegbu, JSC, that exemplary damages may be awarded only in cases:
(a) of oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional acts by government servants;
(b) where the defendant’s conduct had been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which might well exceed the compensation payable to the Plaintiff;
(c) where expressly authorized by statute.
See also Allied Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Akubueze (1997) 6 NWLR (509), 394; Odogu v. A. G. Federation (1996) 6 NWLR (456) 508, (1995) ALL NLR, 480, wherein Ogundare, JSC, held that exemplary damages must be claimed and proved before they can be awarded: Enanuga v. Hon. Sampson (2012) LPELR-8487, where it was held that to justify the award of exemplary damages, a claimant must show not simply that the defendant committed the wrongful act complained of, but that the defendant’s conduct has been highhanded, outrageous, oppressive, malicious or generally against the law, Onagoruwa v. IGP (1991) 5 NWLR (193) 593 @ 647-8; Eliochin Nig. Ltd v. Mbadiwe (1986) 1 NWLR (2014) 47 @ 67.

In this appeal, the reason or ground for the award of the exemplary damages against the Appellants is that they failed/refused to pay the Respondent’s entitlements for ten (10) years and so kept him out of the money which was used by them.

With the unchallenged case presented by the Respondent on the entitlements which the Appellants did not pay for ten (10) years as at the time of judgment by the High Court, during which the Respondent was kept out of the benefits, the award of the exemplary damages in the sum of N400,000.00 in favour of the Respondent was quite reasonable in view of the dwindling value of the Naira during the period. It may be remembered that the law is that an appellate Court would be slow in interfering with the award/assessment of damages by a Lower Court; which involves the exercise of its judicial discretion: see FBN. Plc. v. Onukwugha (2005) 16 NWLR (950) 120; Okwejiminor v. Gbakeji (2008) 5 NWLR (1079) 172, and only interferes if the award/assessment of the damages is shown to be either on wrong principles of law or is manifestly too high or too low to be an erroneous estimation of the damages in the peculiar circumstances of the case. Elf. Nig. Ltd v. Sillo (1994) 6 NWLR (350) 258; Ijebu-Ode L.G. v. Adedeji Balogun & Co. Ltd. (1991) 1 NWLR (166) 136; Ojini v. Ogo Oluwa Motors Nig. Ltd (1998) 1 NWLR (534); UBN, Plc. v. Ntuk (2003) 16 NWLR (845) 183; Omiyale v. Macaulay (2009) 7 NWLR (1141) 597; O.M.T. Co. Ltd. v. Imafidon (2012) 4 NWLR (1290) 332.

The award by the High Court in the peculiar circumstances of the Respondent’s case, which included the fact the he outrightly rejected the termination of his employment and refused to collect the one month salary in lieu of notice and apply or ask for the entitlements from the Provident Fund on the ground that the termination was unlawful, none of the conditions or situations recognized by the law for interference of the Court exists in the appeal to warrant interference with the award.

In the final result, for the aforementioned reasons, I find no merit in the arguments of the Appellants on the award by the High Court of sums for one month salary, entitlement from the Provident Fund and exemplary damages in favour of the Respondent.
The Appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly.

Now to the Cross Appeal.
The initial Notice of Cross Appeal was dated and filed on the 13th November 1999, containing four (4) grounds, but on Amended Notice of Cross Appeal was filed later.

There are twelve (12) grounds contained on the Amended Notice of Cross Appeal dated 6th April, 2006 and in the Amended Cross Appellant’s brief dated and filed on the same date, two (2) issues were distilled therefrom for decision in the Appeal. They are:-

ISSUE 1: Whether by accepting the transfer of his employment from IBM United Kingdom to IBM Nigeria Limited (now 1st Defendant), the Plaintiff lost his rights to rely on the terms of his employment with IBM U.K. (Exhibit B) notwithstanding the written and oral representations and agreements between the Plaintiff, IBM United Kingdom Limited, IBM World Trade Corporation and the 1st Defendant?

ISSUE 2: Whether the Defendants lawfully terminated the Plaintiff’s contract of employment and if not, what is the quantum of damages accruing to the Plaintiff in the circumstances?”

The Amended Cross/Respondents’ brief dated and filed on the 18th March 2015, deemed on the 27th, September 2016, sets out the following issues for determination in the appeal: –

a. Whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to entertain the matter in the first instance when the Notice of Cross Appeal was not signed by a legal practitioner?

b. Whether the learned trial judge was right when he held that the employment of the Cross Appellant/Respondent was governed by Exhibit “E” and not by Exhibit “B” and since the termination of his employment was in accordance with Exhibit “E”, the termination was lawful?
 

c. If the answer to the above is yes:
i. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in rejecting the Cross Appellant/Respondent’s claim from damages which claims were premised on there being a breach of the contract of employment?
ii. If the answer to question (a) above is No: whether the Cross Appellant/Respondent is entitled to damages which could only be claimed under Exhibit “E” and not under Exhibit “B”. “

As can easily observed, issue (a) is an objection to the competence of the notice of Cross Appeal and the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain it. It is in the nature of a preliminary objection even though indicated to be an issue which has no bearing with any of the grounds of the cross appeal or any other ground filed by the Cross Respondent arising from the judgment by the High Court. Although not appropriately labeled, it is a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal envisaged by the provisions of Order 10(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011 (applicable at the time of filing the brief) and which the established principles of practice and procedure in the appellate Courts, allow the Cross Respondents to raise and argue in their brief. See Fayemi v. Oni (2010) 17 NWLR (1222) 326; Afribank Nig. Ltd v. Akwara (2006) 5 NWLR (974) 619, Dakolo v. Rewane-Dakolo (2011) 11 NWLR(1272) 22, F. B.N. Plc. v. Govt., Ondo State (2012) 11 NWLR (1312) 502. Being a preliminary objection to the competence of the Notice of Cross Appeal and of the Court, I would deal with it first.

The arguments of the Cross Respondents on the objection, citing Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 NSCC, 374 @ 379-80, on when a Court is competent to adjudicate over a case, Section 2 and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 2007 as well as Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 3 SC (Pt.II) 55 @ 62-4: SLB Consortium Ltd v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (1252) 317; FBN, Plc. v Maiwada (2013) 5 NWLR (1348) 44 and Nigerian Army v. Samuel (2013) 14 NWLR (1375) 466 on the requirement for Court processes to be signed by legal practitioners, are that the Notice of Cross Appeal was neither signed by the Cross/Appellant nor by any legal practitioner and so it is incompetent thereby depriving the Court of the jurisdiction to entertain the cross appeal, being the originating process that invokes the Court’s jurisdiction over the cross appeal.

In addition,Alawiye v. Ogunsanya (2013) 5 NWLR (1345) 570 @ 581-4 on how all processes to be filed in Court shall be signed and Okarika v. Samuel (2013) 7 NWLRÂ (1352) 19 @ 24 and Glaxo Smithkline Plc. v. Jiya (2014) LPELR-22902-(CA) on the competence of a process not signed by a legal practitioner, were ref erred to.

It is also submitted that the defect in the Notice of Cross Appeal has fatally affected the Amended Notice of Cross Appeal and the brief as an incompetent Notice of Appeal could not be amended and so the Court is stripped of jurisdiction to entertain the cross appeal. The Court is urged to so hold.

The Cross Appellant did not file a reply brief to react to or answer the objection. Notwithstanding this fact, the objection is to succeed on its sustainability in law and not the mere absence of an answer from or reaction by the Cross Appellant. See Agbabiaka v. Okojie (2004) 15 NWLR (897) 503 @ 522.

I have seen the initial Notice of Cross Appeal, which is of pages 345 to 347 which contains the date and signature columns. Apparently, although there is a signature scribbled or appended of the signature column, yet no name was set out as the person who signed the signature. Instead, what was written under the signature is “Plaintiff’s Counsel” and then followed by the name and address of the Law Firm. In the case of Alawiye v. Ogunsanya (supra) apex Court, per Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC, has explained how all processes to be filed in Court are to be signed, as follows:-
“All processes filed in Court are to be signed as follow:
(a) The signature of Counsel, which may be any contraption;
(b) The name of counsel clearly written;
(c) The party counsel represents;
(d) Name and address of Law Firm.
Once who signed the process cannot be ascertained, it is incurably bad and rules of Court that seem to provide for a remedy are of no use as a rule
cannot override the Legal Practitioners Act. There must be strict compliance with the law.”

See also SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (1252) 317: Aromire v Ajomogberin (2011) LPELR-3809 (CA): Oladimeji v. Prudent Stockbrokers Ltd.(2010) LPELR-4736(CA); Igwe v INEC (2012) LPELR-9834 (CA).

From the content of the Notice of Cross Appeal, since no name at all was set out to indicate the person who signed it, by the authorities cited above, it is an incompetent process and being the initiating process for the jurisdiction of the Court over the cross appeal, the defect has effectively deprived the Court of the power and authority to entertain and adjudicate over the cross appeal. As rightly submitted by the learned Counsel for the Cross Respondents, the subsequent Amended Notice of Cross Appeal predicated on the incompetent Notice of Cross Appeal was infested fatally, by the incompetence and could not cure the defect.

The law remains that an incompetent Notice of Appeal cannot be amended by a subsequent competent Amended Notice of Appeal as there was in law, no Notice Appeal to be amended.

Global Trans. Oceanico S.A. v. Free Ent. Ltd (2001) 5 NWLR (706) 426 @ 438; NNB, Plc. v. Declag (2005) 4 NWLR (916) 549 @ 574; Adelekan v. Ecu-Line (2006) 12 NWLR (993) 33 @ 56-7; Olarewaju v. B.O.N. Ltd. (1994) 8 NWLR (364) 622; SPDCN Ltd. v. Sam Royal Hotel Ltd. (2016) 8 NWLR (1514) 318; Colito Nig. Ltd. v. Daibu (2010) 6 WRN, 72 @ 119: Nwaigwe v. Okere (2008) 13 NWLR (1105) 445.

On the ground that the initial Notice of Cross Appeal is incompetent for not being signed by any identified or identifiable person, this Court is without the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate over the cross appeal and the Notice of Appeal and all the other processes predicated thereon, are hereby struck out.

In the final result, the appeal by the Appellants for lacking in merit, is hereby dismissed with costs assessed of One Hundred Thousand Naira (N100,000.00) in favour of the Respondent.
The cross appeal for being incompetent, is hereby struck out.

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: I was afforded the opportunity of reading the comprehensive judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A. and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached.

Exemplary damages contain an element of punishment usually awarded to teach the defendant a lesson or serve as a deterrent to both him and others, see the case of MARINE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES INC & ANOR V NATIONAL MARITIME AUTHORITY (2012) LPELR – 20618 (SC) where the Supreme Court in stating the conditions for the award of exemplary or aggravated damages held thus:
“In order to justify an award of exemplary or aggravated damages, it is not sufficient to show simply that the Respondent/Cross Appellant has committed the wrongful act complained of. It must be shown that their conduct was either high handed, outrageous, insolent, vindictive, oppressive or malicious and showing contempt of the Respondent???s rights or in disregard of every decent conduct of civilized men.”

From the facts of the case, the Appellants did not show any justifiable reason for converting the Respondent’s entitlement, his Provident Fund and his one month’s salary in lieu of Notice thereby keeping the Respondent out of reach of his money for ten (10) years. In my view, this is a clear case of oppression which will not be tolerated by the Courts.

For this and the other well considered reasoning in the lead judgment, I too dismiss the appeal and also strike out the cross appeal as being incompetent. I abide by any consequential orders made in the lead judgment.

ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, J.C.A.: My learned brother, MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JCA had obliged me in draft his lead judgment just delivered. I agree entirely with his Lordship that the appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. The cross appeal is also struck out for being incompetent.

I abide by the order as to costs and other consequential orders therein.

Appearances:

E. O. Akpata-Etomi (Mrs.) with him, O. F. OjoFor Appellant(s)

Respondent not represented.For Respondent(s)