CHIEF MICHAEL EMERAH & ANOR v. ADEKUNLE OLADOSUN & ORS
(2018)LCN/12347(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 7th day of December, 2018
CA/L/236/2009
RATIO
COURT AND PROCEDURE: WHERE AN ORIGINATING SUMMONS IF FILED
“The originating processes (the motion ex parte; the motion on notice; and the motion for leave to rely on the two further affidavits already filed) were thus signed by an identifiable legal practitioner whose name appeared under the signature as ‘Chief Afe Babalola, OFR, CON, SAN’, a natural person, who can be traced in the roll of legal practitioners kept at the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The said originating processes are accordingly, valid and competent vide the case of SLB Consortium v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (pt. 1252) 307 at 337 – 338 where it was held that processes filed in Court are to be signed by counsel with the name of counsel clearly written under the signature and who counsel represents with the name and address of the law firm. See also Williams and Anor. v. Adold/Stamm International (Nig.) Ltd and Anor. (2017) 6 NWLR (pt. 1560) at 19 – 20.” PER JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.
COURT AND PROCEDURE: DATE OF FIXING MOTION ON NOTICE
“The date of fixing the motion on notice which was filed within time was the responsibility of the Court below. Indeed, the Court below discharged the duty by fixing the application for hearing on 05.03.07 vide page 79 of the record. So, if the Court below fixed the application for hearing outside the statutory period of 14 days after the motion on notice was filed, the respondents who had no control over the scheduling of the case by the Court below cannot be penalised for the default of the Court below vide A.-G., Federation v. Ajayi (2000) 12 NWLR (pt. 682) 509, Enterprise Bank Ltd. v. Aroso (2014) 3 NWLR (pt. 1394) 256.” PER JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY
“Moreover, the breach is distinct from the criminal matter and had happened before the criminal matter went to Court and had nothing to do with res judicata. The argument on res judicata is accordingly, diversionary and intended to pull wool over the eyes of the Court, so to speak. See Yanaty Petrochemical Ltd. v. EFCC (2018) 5 NWLR (pt. 1611) 97 and Mohammed v. State (2015) 10 NWLR (pt. 1468) 496 at 512, where the Supreme Court held that the remedy of incarceration without trial beyond the constitutional and statutory limit is the enforcement of the incarcerated person’s fundamental right to personal liberty which has nothing to do with the criminal investigation and prosecution of the incarcerated person, therefore the filing of the action for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of the respondents during the pendency of the criminal case was not an abuse of the process of the Court.” PER JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. CHIEF MICHAEL EMERAH
2. MICHMERAH INTERNATIONAL LTD Appellant(s)
AND
1. ADEKUNLE OLADOSUN
2. OKECHI EMEKA EGWIM
3. LULU NDUBUKA
4. PETER H. HARRIS
5. KABIRU BELLO
6. CHIEF C.S. SANKEY
7. EMEKA EMUWA
8. MR. SAMSAM EBIE
9. MR. STEVE OBODOMECHINE
10. MRS. OLUSOLA FAGBURE
11. NIGERIA INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD. (CITIBANK) Respondent(s)
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
The appeal is from the judgment of the High Court of Justice of Lagos State (the Court below) by which it granted declaratory and injunction reliefs together with N5 million aggravated damages against the appellants in favour of the respondents for breaching the fundamental rights of the respondents.
The facts, in brief, were that the respondents had alleged in their application for the enforcement of their fundamental rights that the appellants instigated the 3rd respondent at the Court below to cause the arrest and detention of the 8th, 9th and 10th respondents at Apapa Central Police Station on 14.02.07 on a purely contractual transaction between the appellants and the 11th respondent, as well as the ‘threatened arrest, detention, molestation, harassment, intimidation and arraignment of the 1st – 10th respondents and incessant invasion of the business premises of the 11th respondent’ by the 3rd respondent at the Court below on account of the commercial/contractual dispute.
The fundamental rights dispute was fought on affidavit evidence from the respondents and the appellants. The Court below found as a fact that the appellants influenced/instigated the Inspector General of Police, the 3rd respondent at the Court below, to breach the said fundamental rights of the respondents over a purely commercial transaction upon which the Court below entered judgment for the respondents against the appellants as stated (supra) in the discussion.
Not satisfied with the judgment, the appellants filed an original notice of appeal with some grounds of appeal. It was subsequently amended with the leave of the Court and filed on 14.02.13. The appellants’ brief of argument was filed on 14.02.13 in which the appellants argued that having regard to the facts that the motion ex parte for leave to enforce the fundamental rights of the respondents filed on 19.02.07 and contained in page 85 of the record of appeal (the record) as well as the motion on notice filed on 19.02.07, and other processes were signed by an unidentifiable person for Afe Babalola SAN the Court below was wrong in relying on the incompetent processes to enter judgment for the respondents in pages 352 – 366 of the record citing in support the cases of Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (pt. 1043) 521, Oketade v. Adewunmi (2010) 8 NWLR (pt. 1195) 63.
The appellants also contended that the substituted service on the 2nd appellant, a company, and the substituted service on the 1st appellant without evidence of abortive effort at personal service, on the law firm of their counsel at Onitsha in Anambra State outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court below without the leave of the Court below first sought and had rendered the service of the processes on the appellants invalid, null and void and the proceedings including the judgment should be set aside on that score citing in support the cases of Mark v. Eke (2004) 5 NWLR (pt. 865) 54, Mv Arabella v. NAIC (2008) 4 ? 5 S.C. (pt. 2) 189, Agip v. Ezendu (2010) S.C. (pt. 2) 98, Wema Bank v. Odulaja (2000) 3 S.C. 83 at 87, N.B.N. v. Guthrie (1993) 4 SCNJ 1, Odutola v. Kayode (1994) 2 SCNJ 21, Ngige v. Achike (2005) 3 WRN 114, Mv Arabella v. NAIC (2008) 11 NWLR (pt. 10 97) 182, Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap. 407 LFN 1990.
The appellants further argued that the time between the granting of the leave to enforce the fundamental rights and the time the motion on notice was fixed for hearing was more than the 14 days stipulated by Order 1 (2) Rule (2) of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 1979 (FREPR) then applicable to the case, which rendered the application stale, therefore the application should have been struck out by the Court below citing in support the cases of The Queen v. Customary Court (Reprint) 1961 ANLR 840, Akinyede v. Isikalu (1975) NMLR 405.
It was also contended by the appellants that due to the pendency of the criminal case affecting the respondents which was adjourned sine die, it was an abuse of the process of the Court for the respondents to have filed the fundamental rights enforcement case at the Court below at the material time citing in support the case of ARC v. IDP (2003) 5 MJSC 104.
The appellants further contended that it was wrong in law for the respondents to sue jointly or as a group for the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed for each of them separately or personally by the constitution, therefore the action was a wrong joinder of actions/parties and should be held incompetent citing in support the cases of Okechukwu v. Etukokwu (1998) 8 NWLR (pt. 562) 290, CCB Plc v. Rose (1998) 4 NWLR (pt. 544) 37 at 44 – 47, RTFTCCN v. Ikwechegh (2000) NWLR (pt. 683) 140, Ukatta v. Ndinaeze (1997) 4 NWLR (pt. 499) 251 at 270 – 271; upon which the appellants urged that the appeal should be allowed and the decision of the Court below set aside and the action be dismissed or struck out as incompetent and an abuse of the Court process.
The respondents filed a joint brief of argument on 09.10.17, which was deemed as duly filed on 26.10.18. A preliminary objection to the appeal was argued interwovenly with the main appeal in the brief to the effect that grounds a, b, d, e, f, h, 6 and 7 of the amended notice of appeal did not arise from the decision of the Court below and are therefore incompetent and should be struck out citing in support the cases of International Offshore Construction Ltd. v. S.L.N. Ltd. (2003) 16 NWLR (pt. 845) 157 at 176, Lawson V. Afani Continental Co. Nig. Ltd. (2002) 2 NWLR (pt. 752) 58 at 626, Alubankudi v. A. ? G., Federation (2002) 17 NWLR (pt. 796) 338 at 360 ? 361.
The respondents argued, in the alternative, that assuming without conceding that the motion on notice was fixed for hearing after time had elapsed, the appellants’ participated in the proceedings until the ruling was delivered in the case without any complaint, therefore estopped them from complaining that the appellants did not raise any objection to the proceedings, nor sought to suspend the proceedings to await the outcome of the criminal case purportedly pending against them.
It was also argued that the appellants received the processes served on them through their learned counsel by substituted means and appeared and filed counter affidavit to the main application with written submission without any complaint and should not be allowed to complain on appeal.
It was further argued that no issue was raised at the Court below that the 11th respondent is not a juristic person, therefore the said issue should not be allowed to be raised in the appeal and that any ground of appeal that did not arise from the decision of the Court below such as grounds a, b, d, e, f and h of the amended notice of appeal filed on 14.02.13 are incompetent and should be struck out citing in support the case of Owena Bank Plc v. Olatunji (2002) 13 NWLR (pt. 781) 259 at 302 – 303.
The respondents contended in the amended brief that the amended notice of appeal being incurably defective, it should not have been amended as an incurably defective process cannot be amended citing in support the cases of N.N.B. Plc v. Denclag Ltd. (2005) 4 NWLR (pt. 916) 549, Nigerian Army v. Samuel (2013) 14 NWLR (pt. 1375) 466 at 484, Okarika v. Samuel (2013) 7 NWLR (pt. 1352) 19 at 37; consequently, the respondents contended that the Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and that all steps taken in the appeal are null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
The respondents contended that despite the ruling appealed against, the Attorney-General of the Federation through the Director of Public Prosecutions initiated criminal prosecution against the respondents in Charge No. FHC/ABJ/CR/122/08: F.R.N. v. Mikky Dons Nigeria Ltd. And Ors. which was later discontinued upon realisatiion that the prosecution was initiated in bad faith and that it was in the public interest to discontinue it upon which the charge was struck out thus making the appeal academic as there was no stay of execution of the decision of the Court below and the respondents never took any step to recover the judgment debt since 27.06.08; therefore the appeal should be struck out citing in support the cases of Shettima v. Goni (2011) 18 NWLR (pt. 1279) 413 at 455. Abe v. Unilorin (2013) NWLR (pt. 1379) 183.
It was also argued that the appellants did not link the issues formulated with the grounds of appeal rendering the issues so formulated incompetent citing in support the case of Okwuagbala v. Ikwueme (2010) 19 NWLR (pt. 1226) 54; upon which the respondents urged that the appeal should be struck out.
The appellants filed a reply brief on 29.01.18, which was deemed as properly filed on 26.10.18. The appellants withdrew ground (b) in page 2 of their amended notice of appeal and issues iii and ix in page 2 of their amended brief of argument which are hereby struck out.
It was contended by the appellants that they had applied for and obtained the leave of the Court on 10.07.17 to file, raise and argue new grounds of appeal on issues of law and jurisdiction not raised at the Court below, therefore the amended notice of appeal with the grounds of appeal are competent; more so, the grounds of appeal deal with jurisdiction and the competence or otherwise of service of the originating process on the appellants which can be raised at any stage of the proceedings even for the first time on appeal citing in support the case of Dapianlong v. Dariye (2007) 4 S.C. (pt. 3) 118 at 162 – 163.
The appellants also argued that the non-disclosure of the name of the signatory on the processes complained of is not an academic issue citing in support the case of Bala v. Dikko (2013) 4 NWLR (pt. 1343) 52; that the fact that the criminal case was withdrawn and struck out does not raise an issue of res judicata in civil matters; that a judgment unappealed against subsists and binds the parties citing in support the case of Olayinka v. Elusanmi (1971) NMLR 277; and that settlement or payment or not executing a judgment does not in any way foreclose or stop an appeal citing in support the case of Union Bank v. Edionseri (1988) 3 S.C. 409 at 422.
The appellants contended that since the notice of preliminary objection is not intended to dispose of the appeal, but some of the grounds of appeal, the respondents should have filed a motion on notice; not having done so, the preliminary objection is incompetent and should be struck out citing in support the cases of CBN v. Ubana (2017) 15 NWLR (pt. 1587) 151, FGP Ltd. v. Duru (2017) 14 NWLR (pt. 1586) 483, Odunukwe v. Ofomata (2010) 18 NWLR (pt. 1225) 404, Daniel v. INEC (2015) 9 NWLR (pt. 1463) 113 at 139, Audu v. Gideon (2015) 12 NWLR (pt. 1474) 495 at 514 – 515.
The appellants further contended that in view of the claim in pages 51 – 53 of the record coupled with the fact that the 3rd – 4th respondents at the Court below being federal agencies, the action should have been filed at the Federal High Court, not at the Court below, as only the former has jurisdiction in the case citing in support Section 251 (1) (p) (q), (r) and (s) of the 1999 Constitution and the cases ofKotoye v. Saraki (1994) 7 NWLR (pt. 357) 415, Ekagbara v. Ikpeazu (2016) 4 NWLR (pt. 1503) 411, Western Steel Workers Ltd. v. Iron and Steel Workers Union (1986) 3 NWLR (pt. 30) 617; that the appeal is not academic; and that the Court has the jurisdiction to deal with the appeal under Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act; consequently, the preliminary objection should be dismissed and the appeal allowed.
There is a signature on top of the name ‘CHIEF AFE BABALOLA, OFR, CON, SAN’ which is under the name ‘CHIEF AFE BABALOLA, SAN & CO.’ as the respondents’ learned counsel of Suites 15 and 16 Motorways buildings, opposite 7Up Bottling Co., Alausa, Ikeja, Lagos, in the motion ex parte for leave to enforce the respondents fundamental rights vide page 6 of the record of appeal (the record). Similarly, the motion on notice was so signed vide page 85 of the record; as well as the statement in support of the application vide page 142 of the record together with the motion on notice for leave to rely on the two affidavits already filed and served in the matter vide page 151 of the record.
Likewise, the motion for substituted service of the motion on notice and the other processes through courier by DHL company on the respondents at the Court below, now appellants, on their address at E4/7-10 New Auto Spare Parts, Nkpor, Onitsha, Anambra State vide page 195 of the record.
But the written address in support of the motion on notice for enforcement of the respondents’ fundamental rights was signed for Chief Afe Babalola, OFR, CON, SAN vide pages 269 – 237, 311 and 315 of the record and the reply address to the appellants’ address in pages 316 – 321 thereof and the reply address to the 3rd and 4th respondents written address at the Court below vide pages 332 – 334 of the record.
The originating processes (the motion ex parte; the motion on notice; and the motion for leave to rely on the two further affidavits already filed) were thus signed by an identifiable legal practitioner whose name appeared under the signature as ‘Chief Afe Babalola, OFR, CON, SAN’, a natural person, who can be traced in the roll of legal practitioners kept at the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The said originating processes are accordingly, valid and competent vide the case of SLB Consortium v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (pt. 1252) 307 at 337 – 338 where it was held that processes filed in Court are to be signed by counsel with the name of counsel clearly written under the signature and who counsel represents with the name and address of the law firm. See also Williams and Anor. v. Adold/Stamm International (Nig.) Ltd and Anor. (2017) 6 NWLR (pt. 1560) at 19 – 20.
The respondents’ written address and reply addresses at the Court below were signed for Chief Afe Babalola, OFR, CON, SAN, without identifying or disclosing the identity of the signatory of the processes. These processes were filed to assist the Court below arrive at justice in the case. They are not originating processes. The appellants did not protest or challenge the said processes at the Court below for being defective and incompetent. They contested the application which was argued and ruling delivered in the matter thus acquiescing in the defective state of the said processes. It would be wrong for the appellants to complain of the said processes on appeal. The objection that the respondents’ written address and reply address at the Court below are defective and incompetent therefore has no force and is hereby most respectfully rejected vide Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Bentworth Finance (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 9 NWLR (pt. 1625) 420.
The appellants did not protest the service of the processes on them. The appellants filed counter affidavit on 06.06.07 vide pp.212 – 258 of record challenging the application at the Court below without challenging the service of process on them in counter affidavit.
Destina Obajemu Esqr., appeared with Mr. Ofomata Emmanuel for the appellants who were 1st – 2nd respondents at the Court below without protest on 26.06.07 vide pages 256 – 260 of the record. The same Destina Obajemu Esqr. appeared for them on 26.07.07 without protest vide pages 261 – 267 of the record. Likewise, the proceedings of 17.01.08 where Destina Obajemu Esqr. for the appellants and adopted their written address without protest vide pages 341 – 349 of the record. Ruling was then delivered on 27.06.08 vide page 350 of the record.
In Supreme Court case of U.B.N. Plc v. Awmar Properties Ltd. (2018) 10 NWLR (pt.1626) 64 at 75 – 76, conditional appearance was entered, but without objection to the jurisdiction of the Court on service of processes, the Apex Court held per the lead judgment prepared by Rhodes-Vivour, J.S.C., that:
“The defendant entered conditional appearance. This is an appearance under protest and usually means an appearance to object to the Court jurisdiction to hear the case.
After the entry of conditional appearance, learned counsel for the defendant at no time objected to the Court’s jurisdiction. Proceedings proceeded.
The appearance of the defendant to the proceedings in the High Court was thus unconditional. The above explains why the entry of conditional appearances was worthless.”
See also the case of Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya and Anor. (1989) 3 NWLR (pt.109) 250 where the Supreme Court held inter alia that a defendant should object to the service of originating process upon entry of appearance in the case and move the Court to set aside the service of the originating process so that it will form an issue in the case, thereby giving the trial Court the opportunity to consider the issue and the appellate Courts an opportunity to review the decision of the trial Court thus fulfilling their role as appellate Courts.
It was further held in the case that if a defendant failed to do so and allowed the case to proceed with his participation, as in this case, he would be taken or considered to have waived the alleged irregularity in the case which would constitute a submission to the jurisdiction of the Court following Ezomo v. Oyakhire (1985) 1 S.C. 6 and Nwabueze v. Okoye (1985) 1 NWLR (pt.2) 195.
So it is with the appellants in this case who are estopped from challenging on appeal the service of the processes on them by substituted service in Anambra State when they submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court below without a whimper of protest and participated in the full blown trial of the action at the Court below. See alsoP.D.P. v. I.N.E.C. and Ors. (2018) 12 NWLR (pt.1634) 533 at 548 where the Supreme Court re-emphasised thus :
“When an originating process is served on the defendant and he has an objection to it, he is expected to either –
(a) Enter an appearance on protest, or
(b) Enter a conditional appearance, and
(c) File a notice of motion asking the Court to set aside the purported writ and service of same on the ground of originating process and service being invalid.
If the defendant does not follow the above procedure he cannot question the originating process or service on appeal.”
So much on the issue.
The reliefs sought in the application are for the enforcement of fundamental rights vide pages 130 – 132 of the record. That the 3rd respondent (Inspector General of Police) at the Court below and the 4th respondent (Attorney-General of the Federation) at the Court below appear to be agencies of the Federal Government did not deprive the Court below of the jurisdiction to entertain the fundamental rights action vide Grace Jack v. University of Agriculture Makurdi (2004) 5 NWLR (pt. 865) 208 where the Supreme Court held that both the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State (the Court below) have concurrent jurisdiction in matters of the enforcement of a person?s fundamental rights irrespective of the status of the respondent. See also Section 46 (1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and Order 1, 2(1) of the FREPR, 1979, then applicable to the case. The issue of jurisdiction is therefore not well taken. I am prepared to jettison it and so do accordingly.
Some of the reliefs sought in the application affected the invasion of the 11th respondent’s premises, an artificial person, who has the legal personality to seek to protect such an alleged invasion via the enforcement of fundamental rights over sanctity of property, movables and immovables. The seamless transaction relating to the alleged infringement of the respondents’ fundamental rights with their common interest intertwined warranted the filing of a joint application by respondents for the purpose of avoiding multiplicity and expenses of actions in this expeditious or fast-track system of justice, in my view vide Durbar Hotels Ltd. v. Ityough and Ors. (2017) 7 NWLR (pt. 1564) 256.
The juristic personality or otherwise of the 11th respondent was not raised at the Court below. It should have been raised at the earliest opportunity. Having not done so, it is my take that the juristic personality of the 11th respondent was not in contention in the case.
Besides, several applications for the enforcement of fundamental rights filed and pending against several persons in respect of the same matter, and on the same grounds, may be consolidated with others by order of the Court or Judge hearing the applications under Order 2 Rule 3 of the FREPR, 1979, then applicable to the case. The respondents were therefore right in filing a joint application for the enforcement of their fundamental rights which procedure encourages cost-saving, affordable and speedy dispensation of justice.
The fact that the preliminary objection would not dispose of the appeal as the challenge is to some of the grounds of appeal and should have been brought by way of motion on notice is a procedural irregularity and the parties having joined issues on it, does not lead to a miscarriage of justice and is hereby tolerated; likewise, the inelegant brief of argument vide KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Jamilat Aloma (2018) 1 NWLR (pt. 1601) 473 per the lead judgment prepared by the great jurist, Kekere-Ekun, J.S.C.
The appellants sought and obtained the leave of the Court to file an amended notice of appeal where they argued the new issues that did not arise at the Court below, showing the appellants were in order in canvassing the new issues for whatever they are worth.
The date of fixing the motion on notice which was filed within time was the responsibility of the Court below. Indeed, the Court below discharged the duty by fixing the application for hearing on 05.03.07 vide page 79 of the record. So, if the Court below fixed the application for hearing outside the statutory period of 14 days after the motion on notice was filed, the respondents who had no control over the scheduling of the case by the Court below cannot be penalised for the default of the Court below vide A.-G., Federation v. Ajayi (2000) 12 NWLR (pt. 682) 509, Enterprise Bank Ltd. v. Aroso (2014) 3 NWLR (pt. 1394) 256.
The dispute upon which judgment was entered for the respondents is on breach of fundamental rights which is a constitutional issue. It cannot be treated as academic or stale vide Ardo v. INEC (2017) 13 NWLR (pt. 1583) 450 at 478.
Moreover, the breach is distinct from the criminal matter and had happened before the criminal matter went to Court and had nothing to do with res judicata. The argument on res judicata is accordingly, diversionary and intended to pull wool over the eyes of the Court, so to speak. See Yanaty Petrochemical Ltd. v. EFCC (2018) 5 NWLR (pt. 1611) 97 and Mohammed v. State (2015) 10 NWLR (pt. 1468) 496 at 512, where the Supreme Court held that the remedy of incarceration without trial beyond the constitutional and statutory limit is the enforcement of the incarcerated person’s fundamental right to personal liberty which has nothing to do with the criminal investigation and prosecution of the incarcerated person, therefore the filing of the action for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of the respondents during the pendency of the criminal case was not an abuse of the process of the Court.
It was suggested in argument that the appellants should have sought for the suspension of the criminal proceedings to avoid a collision course with the fundamental rights action. The suggestion overlooked the fact that in granting leave to enforce the fundamental rights of the present respondents on 19.02.07, the Court below ordered that the leave should operate as a stay of all further actions by any or all of the respondents at the Court below and/or their agents in respect of the matter and of further interference with the fundamental rights of the present respondents pending the hearing and final determination of the motion on notice which was fixed for hearing on 05.03.07 vide page 79 of the record.
It was therefore unnecessary for the respondents to request for a stay or suspension of actions pertaining to the enforcement of their fundamental rights case at the Court below on account of the in-built safety-valve or gadget embodied in the order granting leave to enforce their said fundamental rights which was in accord with Order 1, 2 Rule (6) of the FREPR, 1979, to the effect that in granting leave the Court or Judge may direct that the order granting leave shall operate as a stay of all actions or matters relating to, or connected with, the complaint until the determination of the application.
The appellants did not appeal against the holding of the Court below that they breached the fundamental rights of the respondents and the award of damages for the breach. The said holding therefore stands and is conclusive and binding on the appellants vide Olayinka v. Elusanmi (supra); and rightly so, as the appellants were wrong to use the 3rd respondent (Inspector General of Police) at the Court below to breach fundamental rights of the respondents over a contractual/commercial dispute vide EFCC v. Diamond Bank Plc (2018) 8 NWLR (pt. 1620) 61, Diamond Bank Plc. v. Opara (2018) 7 NWLR (pt. 1617) 92.
In conclusion, I find no substance in the appeal and hereby dismiss it and affirm the decision of the Court below (Alabi, CJ, as he was) with N500,000 costs against the appellants in favour of the respondents.
UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.: I am in entire agreement with, and do not desire to add to the reasoning and conclusion in the leading judgment of my learned brother, Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh, JCA, which has just been delivered.
For the same reasons therein articulated, I equally join in dismissing the appeal.
GABRIEL OMONIYI KOLAWOLE, J.C.A.: I agree with the leading judgment of my learned brother, JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, JCA which has just been read in open Court.
I also agree that the appeal lacks merit and appeal be dismissed.
I agree with the consequential order made as to costs.
Appearances:
Mr. E.C. Nwosu For Appellant(s)
Mr. I.C. Uwa For Respondent(s)
