CHIEF EMEKA IHEDIOHA v. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY & ORS
(2018)LCN/12332(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Saturday, the 29th day of December, 2018
CA/OW/556/2018(R)
RATIO
COURT AND PROCEDURE: WHERE PRELIMINARY OR INTERLOCUTORY ISSUE IS ALLOWED TO DEFEAT THE PROGRESSION OF A CASE
“By virtue of this provision, a preliminary or interlocutory issue shall not be allowed to defeat the due progression of the proceedings pending at the trial Court. Since this interlocutory appeal is derived from the pending pre-election proceedings, a decision by this Court that this appeal can conveniently await the conclusion of the proceedings pending at the trial Court and be brought here after the final judgment of the trial Court is more in the keeping with Section 285(8) of the 1999 Constitution. This Court would be acting contrary to S.285(8) of the 1999 Constitution to proceed to hear this interlocutory appeal dealing with an interlocutory issue in the case, while the pre-election case lies prostrate or comatose.” PER EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: RIGHT TO APPEAL
“It creates a balance in the competing demands between two constitutional rights that arises in a situation of an appeal against an interlocutory decision in a pending trial proceedings. There is the fundamental and constitutional right of the parties in the trial proceedings, vested on them by Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, to have their cases determined within a reasonable time. That right is threatened when the trial proceeding are stopped or stayed following an interlocutory appeal. The right to appeal against the decision of the trial Court is equally vested by the Constitution in Section 241(1) and 242(1). Both rights are entitled to equal protection. The duty of the Court is to ensure that no party exercises any of these rights to the disadvantage of the other party.” PER EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.
INTERPRETATION: THE ‘NOSCITUR A SOCII’ RULE
“A more specific genre of this rule that a statute be read as a whole, is the Noscitur a Sociis rule which states that the sense in which a word is used depends on the subject matter and con. The meaning of the word is ascertained from its companions or associates. Under this rule, the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute can be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it. As the Supreme Court held in Ogualaji v. A-G Rivers State & Anor (1997) LPELR 2314 (SC), “It is the duty of Courts to try and get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.” In Matari v Dangaladima (1993) 2 SCNJ 122 the Supreme Court had held that: “The ordinary rules of construction of statutes, not only counsel, but also dictate the reading of the related provisions of the statute together, and as well as reading the statute as a whole. This enables arriving at a construction of the intention of the statute related sections and its objectives of the law matter- See Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. F.B.I.R. (1977) 3 S.C. 97. See also University of Ibadan v. Adamolekun (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 2013. Per Karibi-Whyte, JSC. (P. 19, Paras. C-E)”.” PER EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ADAMU JAURO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ABUBAKAR MUAZU LAMIDO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
CHIEF EMEKA IHEDIOHA Appellant(s)
AND
1. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY
2. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
3. HON. SAMUEL NNAEMEKA ANYANWU Respondent(s)
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Lead Ruling):
This appeal No. CA/OW/556/2018 was commenced on 4-12-2018 when the appellant herein filed a notice of appeal against the ruling of the Federal High Court at Owerri delivered on 21-11-2018 in Suit No. FHC/OW/CS/121/2018, granting the plaintiff’s application for leave to amend the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim in the said Suit. The notice of appeal contains 4 grounds for the appeal.
Following the entry of this appeal here on 11-12-2018, the appellant herein, by a motion on notice filed on 12-12-2018 applied for an order staying further proceedings in Suit No. FHC/OW/CS/121/2018 pending the determination of this appeal on the grounds that the trial Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that the Learned Presiding Judge has been biased and unfair against the appellant in the conduct of the trial proceedings before him.
The 3rd respondent on 27-12-2018 filed a notice of preliminary objection praying for this appeal to be struck out or dismissed on the ground that it is incompetent and an abuse of Court process as the issues raised in the appeal had already been raised by the appellant as 2nd Defendant the motion on notice applying for the striking out of the paragraphs and reliefs introduced in the amended of the Statement of Claim and the 1st respondent as 1st defendant in a preliminary objections to the competence of the suit at the trial Court.
The appellant filed his brief on 20-12-2018. The 1st respondent filed its brief on 27-12-2018. On 28-12-2018, during proceedings in this appeal before this Court, Learned SAN for the appellant indicated that he had just been served 1st respondent?s brief and 3rd respondent’s notice of preliminary objection and would therefore need to file a reply brief, and applied for adjournment to enable him do so.
This Court asked Learned SAN for the appellant about the status of the substantive case pending at the trial Court. Learned SAN informed this Court that following the entry of this appeal and the filing of the motion on notice applying to this Court for stay of the proceedings in the trial Court, the said proceedings has been adjourned sine die by the trial Court.
This Court then invited the parties herein to address it on whether it should not refuse to hear this appeal in keeping with paragraph 10(b) of the Court of Appeal Practice Direction 2013 and in view of Section 285(10) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Fourth Alteration) and order that the parties go back and continue with the proceedings at the trial Court to conclusion and rather include the grounds of this appeal in an appeal against the final judgment of the trial Court to avoid the dissipation of the 180 days prescribed by Section 285(10) of the 1999 Constitution (Fourth Alteration) as the time within which a pre-election case must be commenced, heard and decided and therefore prevent the frustration of the suit at the trial Court by piece meal interlocutory appeals against interlocutory decisions in the trial proceedings.
Learned SAN for the appellant and Learned SAN for the respondent applied that the matter be stood down for one hour to enable them prepare to address on the said issue raised by the Court. This application which was not opposed, was granted. Proceedings in this appeal was stood down for one hour. Upon resumption of the proceedings, the parties addressed this Court on the above issue.
Learned SAN for the appellant argued that the grounds of this appeal raise pure issues of law particularly grounds 1 and 2 which raise jurisdictional and constitutional issues, that the grounds also raise issues of fair hearing, that the grounds are substantial and not frivolous, that they are bound to have serious bearing on the proceedings pending at the trial Court, that the amendment introduces new reliefs long after the 14 days period prescribed by Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (Fourth Alteration) had expired. Learned SAN relied on the judicial decision inUBA PLC V. ABDULLAHI (2003) 3 NWLR which he said refused a similar amendment for the same reason and the judicial decision in SARAKI V. KOTOYE (1992) LPELR which he said held that if the ground of appeal is substantial, leave can be granted to bring an interlocutory appeal.
The Learned SAN further argued that Rule 10(b) of the 2013 Court of Appeal Practice Direction gives this Court the discretion to decide whether to expeditiously hear interlocutory appeals on grounds of pure law, that all briefs have been filed, that the appellant is willing to abandon filing a reply brief, if the 3rd respondent’s Preliminary Objection is withdrawn, so that the hearing of this appeal can immediately proceed, that paragraph 10(b) of the 2013 Practice Direction conflicts with Sections 240 and 241 of the 1999 Constitution in that it curtails or erodes the appellate jurisdiction vested on this Court by Section 240 and Section 241 of the 1999 Constitution and that there is nothing in the Constitution that precludes this Court from hearing any appeal or from exercising its appellate jurisdiction in any case and that this Court should expeditiously hear and determine this appeal, that if this Court refuses to hear this appeal, it should order the transfer of the proceedings pending at the trial Court to be continued by another Judge other than the one currently seised of the case.
Learned SAN for the 1st respondent adopted the arguments of Learned SAN for the appellant and urged that this Court should hear this appeal.
Learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent expressed no opinion on the issue and rather left it to the discretion of this Court.
Learned SAN for the 3rd respondent argued that paragraph 10(b) of the Court of Appeal Practice Direction has two parts, that the first part is the main provision that uses the word ‘shall’ to vest a mandatory obligation on the Court to refuse to hear any interlocutory appeal that can conveniently be taken in an appeal against the final judgment of the trial Court following its conclusion of the substantive case; that the second part is the provision that this Court can hear an interlocutory appeal, if the ground of appeal is one of pure law or jurisdiction, that all the grounds of this appeal are of facts and mixed law and facts, that their characterization as errors of law did not make them errors of law, that a consideration of the actual complain in each, show that non of them is purely a ground of law.
The Learned SAN further submitted that paragraph 10(b) is not in conflict with Sections 240 and 241 of the 1999 Constitution, that it is justified by Sections 285(8) of the 1999 Constitution (Fourth Alteration) which has curtailed the wide appellate jurisdiction of this Court by prohibiting the determination of issues of jurisdiction in the course of pending proceedings and deferring same to the conclusion of the proceedings, that by virtue of Section 285(8) of the 1999 Constitution, this Court which is merely rehearing the case from the trial Court cannot hear an interlocutory appeal on the ground of the lack of jurisdiction of the trial Court while the proceedings in the trial Court are pending, that non of the grounds of appeal raise any issue of fair hearing; that there is no basis for the oral application of Learned SAN for the appellant that this proceedings in the trial Court be transferred to another Judge other than the one now seised of the matter, that the oral application is a time wasting device, that there is nothing to show that the Judge currently presiding over the case at the trial Court has done anything wrong.
Another submission of Learned SAN for the 3rd respondent is that there is a pending motion on notice at the trial Court applying for the striking out of the reliefs introduced by the amendment which is the subject of this appeal, that Learned SAN for the appellant had completed his argument of this motion, that the 3rd respondent herein was to reply when the processes of this appeal was served on them, that the 1st respondent equally filed a similar motion, that the arguments made here in the appellant’s brief are the same arguments contained in their written argument of the said motion at the trial Court, that these facts are contained in pages 476 to 483 of Vol. 1 of the record of this appeal and pages 693 to 709 of the Vol. ii of the record of this appeal, that this appeal is an abuse of Court process.
Learned SAN for the appellant replied that the issue of jurisdiction raised in ground 1 of this appeal is a question of law. That a holistic reading of paragraph 10(b) shows that the word ‘shall’ used therein, should be read as may, as it states that it is for the Court to decide whether to hear or refuse to hear an interlocutory appeal. He again urged that this appeal be heard by this Court.
Let me now consider the merit of the above argument of all sides herein.
Paragraph 10(b) of Court of Appeal Practice Direction 2013 states that- “without prejudice to any of the foregoing the Court shall refuse to hear appeals arising from interlocutory decisions of the Court below where the matter deals with any of the issues listed in 3 above and the Court is of the opinion that the grounds raised in the appeal are such that the Court can conveniently be determined by way of an appeal arising from the final judgment of the Court below. Provided that where the grounds of the appeal deal with issues of pure law the Court may exercise discretion and determine it expeditiously.”
Interlocutory appeals challenging the ruling of the Court below is listed in paragraph 3(a) (ii) of the Practice Direction.
The intendment of paragraph 10(b) of Court of Appeal Practice Direction 2013 is to prevent the frustration of trial proceedings by appeals against any interlocutory decision of the trial Court in the trial proceedings before it. The experience is that some of these interlocutory appeals are legitimate and bona fide exercise of the litigant’s constitutional or statutory right of appeal. But most of them were not genuine and legitimate exercises of a right of appeal, as they were devised as stratagem to frustrate the progression of proceedings pending in the lower Court.
The experience also is that even a legitimate and a bona fide exercise of a right of appeal against an interlocutory decision, though not intended to frustrate the proceedings pending at the trial Court, end up also frustrating such proceedings as the natural outcome of the exercise of such right of appeal. The impact of these appeals in frustrating and in many cases completely defeating the cases pending in the trial Court was huge, massive and pervasive over time, bringing the Courts to disrepute and robbing them of a large measure of public confidence in their capacity to provide equal access to justice for all.
Paragraph 10b of the Court of Appeal Practice Direction 2013 vests in this Court the power to decide if an interlocutory appeal before it is such that can be conveniently await the conclusion of the entire proceedings at the trial Court and be brought in any appeal or together with any appeal against the final judgment of the trial Court following conclusion of the proceedings before it, the proviso therein also gives this Court the power to decide if such appeals on ground of pure law or jurisdiction can be expeditiously heard or not.
I agree with the submission of Learned SAN for the appellant that paragraph 10b as a whole by giving this Court the power to make the decisions stated therein as a basis for its decision to refuse to hear appeal or hear it expeditiously, vests this Court with the discretion to refuse to hear this kind of appeal or hear it expeditiously. If this Court decides that this appeal can conveniently await the conclusion of the proceedings pending at the trial Court and be brought thereafter as part of or together with an appeal against the final judgment of the trial Court, it must refuse to hear the appeal. Equally if it decides that an interlocutory appeal on ground of jurisdiction or pure law cannot be expeditiously heard, then it must refuse to hear the appeal.
The intendment of S.285(8), (9) and (10) of the 1999 Constitution (Fourth Alteration) is to ensure an expeditious trial and determination of pre-election cases, to ensure that pre-election trial and appeal proceedings do not last indefinitely and to prevent the delay and frustration of trials of pre-election cases by preliminary objections on jurisdiction and other interlocutory issues during such trials and thereby prevent interlocutory appeals before the conclusion of trial proceedings in a pre-election case pending in the trial Court.
To realise this intendment S.285(8) prohibits the determination of preliminary objections and other interlocutory issues before the conclusion of trial and requires that such determination be made along with the final judgment after conclusion of trial and S.285(10) and (11) limit the time for trial of pre-election cases and appeals after judgments in such cases.
The experience that informed this Fourth Alteration of the Constitution was that proceedings in election cases continued after the election, ad infinitum and in most cases remained pending after the expiration of the tenure of the office being contested for.
This was caused by the indiscriminate abuse of the use of preliminary objections and the raising of interlocutory issues during trials and appeals against every interlocutory decision. There was a clear failure of judicialism to provide an adequate response to this absurd situation, that continued across the nation for a long time creating a lot of complications, frustrations and untold hardships for litigants in pre-election cases.
I do not agree with the submission of Learned SAN for the appellant that paragraph 10b of the Court of Appeal Practice Direction 2013 curtails the appellate jurisdiction vested on this Court by Sections 240 and 241 on the 1999 Constitution. Paragraph 10b did not remove or abrogate the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain, hear and determine interlocutory appeals. It merely provides that the hearing of appeals should wait till after the entire proceedings in the trial Court is concluded and the final judgment rendered by the trial Court to avoid the abusive use of the interlocutory appeal process to frustrate the main proceedings still pending at the trial Court. It ensures equality of arms of the parties and equal access to justice.
It creates a balance in the competing demands between two constitutional rights that arises in a situation of an appeal against an interlocutory decision in a pending trial proceedings. There is the fundamental and constitutional right of the parties in the trial proceedings, vested on them by Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, to have their cases determined within a reasonable time. That right is threatened when the trial proceeding are stopped or stayed following an interlocutory appeal. The right to appeal against the decision of the trial Court is equally vested by the Constitution in Section 241(1) and 242(1). Both rights are entitled to equal protection. The duty of the Court is to ensure that no party exercises any of these rights to the disadvantage of the other party.
The Court would not allow a party to exercise his constitutional right of appeal in a manner that defeats the right of the other party in the trial proceedings to have the case determined within a reasonable time. Paragraph 10b helps the Court to manage the balancing of the enforcement of the two rights in interlocutory appeals. Paragraph 10b ensures that the trial proceedings is determined within a reasonable time and that a party aggrieved with an interlocutory decision in the course of the proceedings has the opportunity to appeal or have his appeal against such decision head.
Paragraph 10b of the Practice Direction is justified by Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution. It is equally justified by Section 248 of the 1999 Constitution which gives the President Court of Appeal the power to make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of this Court. Section 8(2) of the Court of Appeal Act 2004 gives the President, Court of Appeal the power to make rules regulating the practice and procedure of this Court. Section 8(1) of the Court of Appeal Act provides that the practice and procedure of this Court shall be in accordance with the Act and the rules of procedure of this Court. The 2013 Practice Direction was made by the President Court of Appeal pursuant to the power vested on her by Section 248 of the 1999 Constitution and Section 8(2) of the Court of Appeal Act 2004.
I will now consider if we should refuse to hear this appeal or hear it expeditiously within the terms of paragraph 10b of the 2013 Practice Direction of this Court. Section 285(10) of the 1999 Constitution (Fourth Alteration) has limited the time for the hearing of pre-election matters at the trial stage to 180 days from the date of the occurrence of the event. The exact reads thusly- A Court in every pre-election matter shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of filing of the suit. So the proceedings pending at the trial Court must be concluded within 180 days from the 1st of October 2018, the date of the primary election challenged by the Suit.
As it is, 180 days, computed from 1st October 2018, would end on 30th March 2019. So the parties have about 88 more days to conclude the pending trial proceedings. Learned SAN for the appellant has informed us that because of this appeal, the proceedings of the trial Court have been adjourned sine die. To continue this appeal proceedings here would further reduce the 88 days remaining for the trial proceedings to be concluded, so that by the time this appeal is determined, not much time would be left for the trial and conclusion of the proceedings at the trial Court. The question of the correctness or wrongness of the grant of leave to amend the writ of summon and statement of claim and the question of the legality or competence of the paragraphs of the amended statement of claim and reliefs introduced by the amendment, can conveniently await the conclusion of the case and final judgment by the trial Court and be brought here as part of the appeal or together with the appeal against the said final judgment.
As it is, the expeditious hearing of this appeal without further dissipating the 88 days remaining to try and conclude the case at the trial Court is not possible.
To ensure that the progression of the proceedings of a pre-election case is not obstructed, frustrated or hindered by preliminary and interlocutory issues of lack of jurisdiction of the trial Court, competence of the case or any process therein, Section 285(8) of the 1999 Constitution (Fourth Alteration) provides that:
“(8) Where a preliminary objection or any other interlocutory issue touching on the jurisdiction of the tribunal or Court in any pre-election matter or on the competence of the petition itself is raised by a party, the tribunal or Court shall suspend its ruling and delivered it at the stage of final judgment”.
By virtue of this provision, a preliminary or interlocutory issue shall not be allowed to defeat the due progression of the proceedings pending at the trial Court. Since this interlocutory appeal is derived from the pending pre-election proceedings, a decision by this Court that this appeal can conveniently await the conclusion of the proceedings pending at the trial Court and be brought here after the final judgment of the trial Court is more in the keeping with Section 285(8) of the 1999 Constitution.
This Court would be acting contrary to S.285(8) of the 1999 Constitution to proceed to hear this interlocutory appeal dealing with an interlocutory issue in the case, while the pre-election case lies prostrate or comatose.
It is in furtherance of Subsection (8) above that Subsection (11) of the same S.285 provides that an appeal from a decision in the course of a pre-election matter shall be filed after the date of the delivery of the judgment in the case. The exact reads thusly- ‘An appeal from a decision in a pre-election matter shall be filed within 14 days from the date of delivery of the judgment appealed against’. It is clear from a combined reading of the two subsections that appeals against interlocutory decisions in a pre-election case can only be brought after the delivery of the final judgment in the case following conclusion of the proceedings. The word ‘judgment’ in Subsection (11) must be read in relation to the words ‘final judgment’ in Subsection (8). It has to be so read to make the subsections consistent. If so read, the word judgment in Subsection (11) would ordinarily mean final judgment.
Therefore the time for appealing against the interlocutory decision in a pre-election case as well as the final judgment is within 14 days after the date of delivery of the judgment. The Subsections in S.285 of the 1999 Constitution (Fourth Alteration) must be read together so as not to defeat the object or intendment of that section. As Sir Vahe Bairamian said in his book Synopsis No.2 page 926- “It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statue for that best expressed the meaning of the makers and this exposition is ex visceribus actus? (from the bowels of the statue). The statute must be understood as a harmonious whole. A provision in the statute must be given a meaning that is consistent with other provision in the statute and furthers the object of the statute.”
A more specific genre of this rule that a statute be read as a whole, is the Noscitur a Sociis rule which states that the sense in which a word is used depends on the subject matter and con. The meaning of the word is ascertained from its companions or associates. Under this rule, the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute can be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it. As the Supreme Court held in Ogualaji v. A-G Rivers State & Anor (1997) LPELR 2314 (SC), “It is the duty of Courts to try and get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.”
In Matari v Dangaladima (1993) 2 SCNJ 122 the Supreme Court had held that: “The ordinary rules of construction of statutes, not only counsel, but also dictate the reading of the related provisions of the statute together, and as well as reading the statute as a whole. This enables arriving at a construction of the intention of the statute related sections and its objectives of the law matter- See Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. F.B.I.R. (1977) 3 S.C. 97. See also University of Ibadan v. Adamolekun (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 2013. Per Karibi-Whyte, JSC. (P. 19, Paras. C-E)”.
Another reason for our decision that this appeal can conveniently await the conclusion of the trial proceedings at the trial Court and can be conveniently brought here after the final judgment by the trial Court is that the complaints in grounds 1 and 4 of this appeal and the issues arising therefrom are already being litigated by the parties at the trial upon a motion on notice filed by the appellant herein on 25-11-2018 and a notice of preliminary objection filed on the 1st respondent on 26-10-2018. Hearing of the motion has commenced and is yet to be concluded. Grounds 1 and 4 of this appeal which seek to litigate those same complaints before this Court without waiting for the conclusion of the hearing of the said motion and notice of objection and the decision of the trial Court on them amount to a clear abuse of Court process.
There is nothing to show that the appellant would suffer any injustice if this appeal should wait till after conclusion of the pending trial proceedings at the trial Court and final judgment of the trial Court before it is brought and heard here.
The oral application by Learned SAN for the appellant that we order the reassignment or transfer of the proceedings pending at the trial Court to another Judge of that Court other than the one currently seised of the matter is refused.
There is no basis for such application. There is no ground of this appeal complaining about the impartiality of the current presiding trial Judge. If the appellant has any issue about the independence or the impartiality of the trial Court, he should raise it before the trial Court by a motion on notice to be dealt with in accordance with Section 285(8) of the 1999 Constitution (Fourth Alteration). For the above reasons this Court hereby refuses to hear this interlocutory appeal in keeping with Paragraph 10b of the Court of Appeal Practice Direction 2013 and in furtherance of Section 285(8) of the 1999 Constitution. It is hereby ordered that the appeal should await the conclusion of the trial proceedings pending at the trial Court and the final judgment of the trial Court in the proceedings, before it can be brought and determined here.
Therefore this appeal is hereby struck out and it is ordered that the proceedings pending at the trial Court should continue forthwith. That the decision in this appeal applies with equal force to appeal No. CA/OW/553/2018. The said appeal No. CA/OW/553/2018 is equally hereby struck out.
No order as to costs.
ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the ruling just delivered by my learned brother, EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, JCA. I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion contained therein. The fourth alteration to the constitution introduced time limitation for the disposal of pre- election matters. The trial Court has stayed and adjourned proceedings sine die because of the instant interlocutory appeal, hence defeating the objective of the 180 days limitation introduced by the fourth alteration.
I adopt the said ruling as mine and join my brother in striking out the appeal pursuant to Paragraph 10(b) of the Court of Appeal Practice Direction 2013. I abide by all consequential orders made.
ABUBAKAR MUAZU LAMIDO, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the ruling just delivered by my learned brother, EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, JCA. I am in entire agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein, I will also strike out this appeal pursuant to Paragraph 10(b) of the Court of Appeal Practice Direction 2013 and abide by all the consequential orders made.
Appearances:
K.C.O. Njemanze, SAN with him, L. M. Alozie (SAN), H.C. lgwe (SAN), C. K. Nabugu, Esq., K.C.
Okoroafor, Esq., B.O. Alozie, Esq. and L. A. Njemanze, Esq.For Appellant(s)
N. A. Nnawuchi, SAN with him, S. A. Anyalewechi, Esq., I.K. Ujah, Esq., M.O. Oguegbu, Esq.,
U.A. Nnawuchi, Esq., C.C. Nnnawuchi, Esq., for the 1st respondent.
Nwabueze Obasi-Obi, Esq. for the 2nd respondent.
Paul Erokoro, SAN with him, Uche Igbokwe, Esq., Prince I.K. Udeozor, Esq., C. I. Aska, Esq.,
G.N. Egbuluzor, Esq., Clement C. Esq., Rosaline Igbokwe, Esq., for the 3rd respondent.For Respondent(s)
