MRS. JOSEPHINE ARINZE v. UNION BANK PLC
(2018)LCN/11716(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 14th day of June, 2018
CA/B/147/2003
RATIO
WHERE PLAINTIFF CAN CONTINUE SUIT
It is my humble view that a Plaintiff can discontinue his suit against any or all the Defendant within a period of not more than 14 days after the receipt of defence from all or any of the Defendants by way of notice of discontinuance. But where the Plaintiff is desirous of withdrawing his suit after issue has been joined and outside the period of 14 days such notice of discontinuance would not be entertained except made by a motion on notice or summons. That is to say before issues are joined, a Plaintiff can by notice discontinue. Also, where issues are joined but within 14 days after the joining of issues. Finally, such Plaintiff can also discontinue after the expiration of 14 day but such application to discontinue must be by a motion on notice or summons. per MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI, J.C.A
THE ESSENCE OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction which is the authority a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it is very crucial in the process of litigation. Being very fundamental, it should be determined first and at the earliest opportunity. The position of the law is that issues touching on jurisdiction must be taken at the earliest opportunity and at any stage of the proceedings. This is because any step taken by a Court without jurisdiction would amount to a complete time wasting. per MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI, J.C.A
JUSTICES
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MRS. JOSEPHINE ARINZE Appellant(s)
AND
UNION BANK PLC Respondent(s)
MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This is an appeal against the Ruling of the High Court of Edo State, Uromi Judicial Division in Suit No. HCU/26/98 between MRS. JOSEPHINE ARINZE as Plaintiff and against (1) JUWA ANTHONY, (2) MATHEW OSARO ORIAKHI (3) UNION BANK PLC UROMI delivered on the 15th day of June 2000 in an application to discontinue the suit by the Plaintiff who is the Appellant in this Court against all the Defendants before the trial Court dated 10th day of March 2000 and filed on the 13th day of March 2000. See page 33 of the (Record of Appeal) I reproduce herein under the said Notice of Discontinuance by the Plaintiff/Appellant.
NOTICE OF DISCONTINUANCE
Take notice that the Plaintiff herein wholly discontinue her action in the matter against all the Defendant dated this 10th day of March 2000.
At the Court below, the Appellant vide his writ of summons under the undefended list filed on the 13/11/1998 sought for the following reliefs:
The Plaintiff claim against the Defendants jointly and severally is for the sum N2,290,000.00 (Two Million, Two Hundred and Ninety Thousand Naira) being the balance amount due and payale from the Defendants to the Plaintiff out of the money $30,000.00 U.S. Dollars which at the exchange rate of N85 to 1 USA in 1995 as agreed to by the parties gives N2,550,000.00 (Two Million, Five Hundred and Fifty Naira) only placed for safe keeping by the Plaintiff with the 3rd Defendants through the 1st and 2nd Defendants working as servants and employee of the 3rd Defendants at Uromi within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The money which was placed with the Defendants; for safe keeping was tampered with by the 1st and 2nd Defendants who made away with the sum of $36,000.00 U.S Dollars on 7/11/95 without the consent and authority of the Plaintiff and despite repeated demand the Defendants have failed and or refused to pay. The Plaintiff also claim interest on the said amount at the rate of 20% p.a. from 7/11/95 until the date of judgment and thereafter at 10% until the judgment is finally liquidated.
The 3rd Defendants joined issue with the Appellant on the foregoing claims. The 1st and 2nd Defendants neither entered appearance nor filed any process in defence.
The matter was set down for hearing. Prior to that date the 3rd Respondent filed a Motion on Notice dated 17th day of December, 1995 through which he asked the Court to strike out and or set aside the writ of summons and the Affidavit in support of claim or in the alternative an order striking out the name of the 3rd Defendant/Applicant from the writ of summons and Affidavit in Support of claim. The grounds upon which the application is predicated are:
(i) That the writ of summon served along with the Affidavit in Support of claim was not marked accordingly as undefended List as required under Order 23 Rule 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1988 as applicable to Edo State.
(ii) The said writ of summon disclosed no name and for address for service on the 1st and 2nd Defendants.
(iii) The 3rd Defendants/Applicant as indicated on the writ of summons and Affidavit in support of claim is not a juristic person that can sue or be sued.
(iv) The writ as issued on behalf of the Plaintiff/Respondent is defective and irregular as no order was sought to list same undefended.
Upon being served with the foregoing Notice of Preliminary Objection by the 3rd Defendant, the Plaintiff/Applicant filed the Motion dated 11th day of January 1999 seeking for an Order to amend the writ of summons and the Affidavit in Support of claim in the manner set out and underlined in Red in the Amended write of summons and Affidavit in Support of Motion as Exhibit AA and BB respectively and deemed them as duly filed and served the appropriate filling fees having been paid.
(b) Allowing the necessary endorsement to be made in line with Order 26 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules in the Open Court. See pages 17-22 of the Record of Appeal.
At the sitting of the trial Court on 25/7/99, the Court could not take any of the pending applications i.e. motion by the Appellant to amend the writ of summons and the motion to strike out the writ and hence an adjournment was granted at the instance of the Court to 2/9/99 for definite hearing. On the 13th day of March 2000 the matter come up the Plaintiff was present but his counsel was not in Court. Consequent upon an oral application by the Respondent counsel asking the Court to strike out the Motion by the Appellant to amend the writ of summons, same was granted by the Court and the Appellants application filed on 12/1/99 was struck out with N500.00 cost. The matter was adjourned to 23/3/2000 for hearing. (See page 24 of the records).
The matter again did not come up till 16th May 2000. On that date both the Appellant and counsel were absent. But the 3rd Defendant was represented. Maxinus Ahor (Advance Officer) and K.O. Ehigiamusor Esq. stood in for the 3rd Defendant. Mr. K.O Ehigiamusor addressed the Court and challenged the competence of the Notice to discontinue the suit by the Appellant on the ground that it was filed outside the 14 days allowed by the High Court Rules where issues have been joined by parties. He contended that the application by the Plaintiff is incompetent and that the appropriate step the Appellant ought to do was to come by way of a Motion on Notice or summons seeking the leave of the Court for extension of time to discontinue the suit. Having not done this, the Court should dismiss the suit by the Appellant. He relied on Order 29 Rule 3(2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rule of Edo State.
The matter was adjourned for ruling. On the 13th day of June 2000, the learned trial Judge in a considered ruling dismissed the suit by the Appellant. (See pages 23 to 30 of the Record of Appeal).
Dissatisfied with the said Ruling by the trial Court hence this appeal which is predicated on the initial Notice of Appeal dated and filed on 27/6/2000. The said Notice of Appeal was subsequently amended vide the order of this Court to that effect granted on 22/11/2004. The grounds of appeal are:
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
(1) The learned trial Judge erred in law in dismissing the case of the Plaintiff/Appellant instead of striking out same when the Plaintiff/Appellant had discontinued her case against all the Defendants.
(2) The learned trial Judge erred in law in dismissing the case of the Plaintiff against all the Defendants when there was a motion pending before the Court challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the case.
(3) The learned trial Judge misdirected himself in law when it held:-
In the instant case, the notice of withdrawal was incompetent having been filed more than 14 days after the statement of Defence was filed.
A suit withdrawn after issues have been joined should be dismissed and not merely struck out. 2 NWLR (Pt.101) 46 (1977) 4 SC. 29. (1967) 1 ALL NLR 329 referred to (Sic) 1 refer more specifically to ratio 4 quoted above. The case is on all forms (Sic) with the instant case and I am bound by it. Accordingly, I hold that the motion of discontinuance filed by the Plaintiff in this case lacks merit. This suit therefore should be dismissed and not merely struck out. The suit is hereby dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT
An Order setting aside the Ruling of the lower Court dismissing the case of the Plaintiff/Applicant.
Consequent upon the transmission of the Record of Appeal counsel from inner and outer bar representing the respective parties filed and exchanged their brief of argument.
In the Appellants brief of argument, the following two issues were formulated for the determination of the appeal
(1) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the case of the Appellant when the motion filed by the Respondent challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain that matter against it was still pending
(2) Whether having regard to all the circumstances of the case the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the case of the Appellant
In his own brief of argument, the learned counsel representing the Respondent formulated the following three issues for determination.
(1) What is the proper order the learned trial Judge ought to make where the Plaintiff discontinues suit after date fixed for hearing.
(2) Whether the trial Court was right in law in dismissing the suit which had been discontinued by a notice of discontinuance filed by the Plaintiff in view of the provisions of Order 29 Rule 1 of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules after issues have been joined by the parties.
(3) Whether the learned trial Judge failed to rule on the notice of discontinuance filed by the Appellant and denial fair hearing.
I have read all the processes by respective parties in this appeal. After considering the ground of appeal by the Appellant and comparing same with the two issues put forward by the Appellant for the determination of this appeal, I feel more comfortable with the two issues formulated by the Appellant for the determination of this appeal. In my view the two issues will also provide answer to the questions posed by the three issues contained in the brief of argument by the Respondent.
In my view the two issues by the Appellant in substance are interrelated and hence I have decided to consider them together.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL
(1) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the case of the Appellant when the motion filed by the Respondent challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the matter against it was still pending.
(2) Whether having regard to all the circumstances of the case the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the case of the Appellant
Having said herein before that the foregoing two issues are interrelated if not saying the same thing, I have decided to marry the substance of the two issues together and came up with the following question for the determination of this appeal. The question I consider pertinent is:
Whether having regard to all the circumstance of the fact of this case, the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the case of the Appellant
The argument of the learned senior counsel representing the Appellant is that since the motion of the Respondent challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the action was still pending, the lower Court ought not to have entertain any other thing as far as the matter was concerned without dealing with that motion first. He contended that the learned trial Judge ought to have resolved the issue of jurisdiction first before hearing the opposition of the Respondent in whatever form to the action of discontinuance of the entire action filed by the Appellant. He said jurisdiction being the radical and fundamental prerequisite for the adjudication and decisive of the question of adjudication, it is therefore of the utmost importance in the administration of Justice that where the issue of jurisdiction of the Court is raised and or is in issue, that issue must be disposed off first. He contended that this is so because if the Court is shown to have no jurisdiction, the result will be that the proceedings, however well conducted, are a nullity, and any decision reached by the Court is void. He relied on the cases of MATARI V. DANGALADIMA (1993)3 NWLR PART 281, 266 at 275 PARA E-F; UTB (NIG) LTD V. UKPABIA (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt.670) 570.
He contended that the motion by the Respondent contained on pages 8-11 of the record of appeal sought for an order striking out and or/and the affidavit in support of the claim, or in the ALTERNATIVE an order striking out the name of the 3rd Defendant/Applicant from the writ of summons and affidavit in support of the claim. Secondly the said motion was founded on the reason that:
(1) The 3rd Defendant/Applicant as indicated in the writ of summons and affidavit in support of claim is not a juristic person that can sue or be sued.
(2) That our solicitor as aforesaid informed me and I verily believe him that the statics of the 3rd Defendant/Applicant constitute a defect on the writ and the competence of the Court in assuming jurisdiction.
He argued that a non-juristic person cannot sue nor can same be sued, and no order of Court can be made against such a person. He relied on the case of FAWEHINMI V. NBA (2) (1989) 2 NWLR. Pt.105 558 at 640-641 Para. F A; HIFLOW FARM INDUSTRY V. UNIBADAN (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.290) 719-732 PARA. A-B and 737-738 PARA G-A.
He opined that if the application of the Respondent was considered the Court would have come to the conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the Appellant against the Respondent and consequently the matter would have been struck out.
He contended that when the matter came up on 13/3/2000 and the learned counsel for the Respondent sought for an order striking out the motion by the Appellant to amend the writ of summon dated 12/1/99 which was granted by the Court, what the Respondent would have done next was to move his motion filed on 17/12/98 challenging the jurisdiction of the Court adjourned to 28/3/2000 for hearing. He refered to pages 23 lines 26 to page 24 lines 1-20 of the Record. He submitted that it was amazing and flabbergasting in the extreme to note that when the matter came up on 16/5/2000, the Respondents counsel instead of moving his motion challenging the jurisdiction of the Court dated 17/12/98 proceeded to address the Court opposing the notice of discontinuance by the Appellant. The Respondent based his opposition on the following grounds:
(1) The application to discontinue the case was improper.
(2) The Plaintiff is absent.
The Appellant argued further that if the application to discontinue the suit was improper same ought to be struck out. If that is done then the application challenging the jurisdiction of the Court would be taken. He argued further that if the Appellants counsel was absent to move his application for discontinuance, the appropriate order the Court ought to make was an order striking out the notice of discontinuance. He reiterated that when an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court is raised, it ought to be resolved first. The failure of the Court to determine the Respondents motion challenging the jurisdiction of the Court is a fundamental breach which renders the Ruling which it subsequently gave in favour of the Respondent a nullity. He relied on the following cases: AFRO CONT. LTD. V. CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION INC. (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 813) page 303; NWOSU V. IMO STATE ENVIROMENTAL SANITATION AUTHORITY (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.135), page 688.
He urged the Court not to allow the ruling to stand but set aside and to resolve the issue against the Respondent.
On issue two he contended that from all the surrounding circumstances of this case, the learned trial Judge was wrong when he dismissed the case of the Appellant the way he did under Order 29 of the Bendel High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. Edict 1988. After reproducing Order 29 he argued that the Appellant sued three Defendants under the undefended list procedure. Out of the three Defendants, only 3rd Defendants (Respondent) filed a notice of its intention to defend the case and a preliminary objection to the suit while the 1st and 2nd Defendants filed no process. That being the case, the Plaintiff can in law rightly discontinue the action without the leave of Court. He relied on the case of OMO & 5 ORS. V. EPHRAIM AZUKA AMANTU & 2 ORS (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt.280) 187 at 195 para B-E.
He argued further that even if the notice of discontinuance is procedurally defective, the same cannot lead into a dismissal of the entire suit of the Appellant. It can only lead to the striking out of the defective notice of discontinuance. When this is done, the entire suit will still be infact. He submitted that if the suit ought to be dismissed, without conceding, it would be dismissed only against the 3rd Defendant.
In arguing the issues the learned counsel representing the Respondent submitted that the dominant issue before this Court is whether the trial Judge was right to have dismissed the case following a notice of discontinuance filed by the Plaintiff without leave of Court after issues have been joined and suit was set down for hearing. He contended that it is trite that after a case has been set down for hearing, the Plaintiff can only withdraw his claim or part thereof with the leave of Court. That the Appellant failed to do. He added that the suit was filed under the undefended list on 15/11/1998 and fixed for hearing on 17th December 1998. The 3rd Defendant (Respondent) filed his notice of infection to defend on 17/12/98. After several adjournments predicated on the absence of the counsel representing the Appellant, the motion filed on 12/1/99 by the Applicant to amend the writ was struck out for want of diligent prosecution. Thereafter the Appellant/Plaintiff filed the application to discontinue the suit without seeking for the leave of Court. In the light of the foregoing, he submitted that under Order 29 Rule (1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules a party can only discontinue an action not later than 14 days from the date after service of the defence on him without the leave of Court. Under Order 29 Rule 3 (1) a party cannot discontinue an action without leave of Court. In the situation at hand a mere notice of discontinuance as filed by the Appellant without leave as provided for under Order 29 Rule 3(2) would render the suit to be dismissed. He relied on the case of OMO V. EPHRAIM AZUKA AMATU & 2 ORS (1993) 3 ALNLR (Pt.280) 187 at 1990-1991 Ration 1,2,3 & 3; ERONINI V. IHEUKO (1989 2 NWLR Pt. 10 (page not provided); SHONEKAN V. SMITH (1967) ANLR page 350 at 353 -354; UMUANADU V. ATTORNEY GENERAL ANAMBRA STATE (2000) 14 NWLR (Pt. 686) page 90 at 98 and page 99 Para A-B. He submitted that the proper order to make is that of dismissal and not an order striking out. It is not for the Appellant counsel to dictate to the Court what order to make in consequence of his filing a notice of discontinuance as in his contention in pages 6 & 10 of his brief of argument. He relied on the case of AGHADIUNA V. ONUSOGU (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt.348) page 16 at 20 ratio 4.
He contended further that the Notice of Discontinuance was done in bad faith, having being filed after the first date fixed for hearing. He submitted that the Appellant should not be allowed to escape from the side door and avoid the contest. He added that the Plaintiffs contention in their first issue for determination is a clear manifestation of the fact that he is completely oblivious of the state of the law with regard to the principle governing discontinuance of action. He argued that the rule under Order 29 Rule 1 & 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1988 is very clear. It states that:
A party can only discontinue an action not later than 14 days from the date after service of defence on him without leave of Court.
He submitted that in the prevailing circumstances, the learned trial Judge has a say as to whether the pending action should be discontinued on terms or whether to refuse same. Taking the whole gamut of the matter into consideration, one cannot fault the trial Judge in the reasonable stance taken having exercised his discretions judicially and judiciously. He relied on the case of UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS V. AIGORO (1985) 1 NWLR Pt. 1 page 143 OR (1985) 1 ALL NLR. (Pt.1) page 58.
On the whole and considering the circumstances surrounding this case, he vehemently oppose all the contention by the Appellant and submit that a Plaintiff who had brought his adversary into Court in a suit filed under the undefended list and later filed a notice of discontinuance after proceeding have reached a certain stage should not be allowed to escape. Notice of discontinuance in the circumstance of this suit could attract only dismissal and not mere striking out. He submitted further that the trial Court was right in entering an order of dismissal. In his words he urged the Court to dismiss both issue one and two by the Appellant and uphold the ruling of the lower court.
I have carefully considered the argument by respective counsel from inner and outer bar. The pertinent question in the circumstance of this appeal is whether the trial Court can proceed to dismiss the suit of the Appellant after concluding that his notice of discontinuance of the suit is incompetent same having being filed after the 14 days allowed by the rules and without the leave of the trial Court sought and obtained
Before anything at all let me set out the prelude of the suit before the trial Court. The Appellant who is Plaintiff before the trial court filed a suit under the undefended list on 13th November 1998 against the Respondent and two others as defendants. The matter was set down for 17//12/98 for hearing. That same date, the 3rd Respondent filed his notice of intention to defend the action. He also filed an application challenging the competence and jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain the suit. By that he sought for an order striking out the suit by the Appellant.
The grounds of objection among others are:
(a) That the writ of summons served along with the affidavit in support of claim was not marked accordingly as undefended list as required under Order 23 Rule 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure Rules 1988) as applicable to Edo State.
The said writ of summons disclosed no name and or address for service on 1st and 2nd Defendants.
(b) The 3rd Defendant Applicant as indicated on the writ of summons and affidavit in support of claim is not a juristic person that can sue or be sued.
(c) The writ as issued on behalf of the Plaintiff/Respondent is defective and irregular as no order was sought to list same undefended.
The application was supported by a 13-paragraph affidavit, subsequently and to be precise, the Appellant on 12/11/99 filed an application to amend her writ of summons. Again, the Appellant filed a notice of discontinuance of his suit against all the Defendants on 13th March 2000. All these while the 1st and 2nd Defendants neither entered an appearance nor file any process in defence to the Appellants action. On the 13/3/2008 when the matter came up next, the Appellant were absent and hence their application to amend the writ of summons set down for hearing upon an oral application by the Respondent was struck out by the trial Court for absence of the Appellant and counsel. The matter was then set down for hearing on 28/3/2000. Again on 16/5/2000 when the matter subsequently came up the learned counsel to the Respondent took an objection to the notice of discontinuance filed by the Appellant on the ground of incompetence and stating that the Appellant ought to come by way of motion on notice for leave to discontinue the suit because the application to discontinue was filed after 14 days after issues has been joined between the Appellant and 3rd Defendant/Respondent. He contended that the Appellant has not complied with the provision of Order 29 Rule 1 & 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure Rule) Rule of Bendel State and hence the application to discontinue the suit is incompetent. The Court in his considered ruling delivered on 15/6/2000 up held the contention of the learned counsel representing the Defendant and dismissed the suit by the Plaintiff/Appellant and hence this appeal.
The question yarning for answer is whether the trial Court was right discountenancing the notice of discontinuance by the Appellant and dismissing the suit.
As I said before, the trial Court has pending before it on 16/5/2000, the notice to discontinue the suit, and the objection to jurisdiction and competence of the suit by the Respondent. The preliminary objection was not considered but rather the Court considered the oral application by the learned counsel representing the Respondent challenging the competence or other wise of the notice of discontinuance by the Appellant who were absent in Court on that date. His line of argument was channeled under Order 29 Rule (1) (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Bendel State. For purposes of better understanding, I herein under reproduce the said provision.
ORDER 29 Rules 1 & 2
WITHDRAWAL AND DISCONTINUANCE
(1) A party who has entered an appearance in an action may withdraw the appearance at any time with leave of the Court.
(2) The Plaintiff in an action may, without the leave of the Court, discontinue the action, or withdraw any particular claim made by him therein was against any or all of the Defendants at any time not later than 14 days after service of the defence on him or, if there are two or more Defendants, of the defence last served by serving a notice to that effect on the Defendant concerned.
(3) A Defendant may, without leave of Court.
(a) Withdraw his defence or any part of it at any time,
(b) Discontinue a counter claim, or withdraw any particular claim made by him therein as against any or all of the parties against whom it is made, at any time not later than 14 days after service on him of a defence to the counter claim last served, by serving a notice to that effect on the Plaintiff or other party concerned.
In the circumstance of the foregoing provisions. It is my humble view that a Plaintiff can discontinue his suit against any or all the Defendant within a period of not more than 14 days after the receipt of defence from all or any of the Defendants by way of notice of discontinuance. But where the Plaintiff is desirous of withdrawing his suit after issue has been joined and outside the period of 14 days such notice of discontinuance would not be entertained except made by a motion on notice or summons. That is to say before issues are joined, a Plaintiff can by notice discontinue. Also, where issues are joined but within 14 days after the joining of issues. Finally, such Plaintiff can also discontinue after the expiration of 14 day but such application to discontinue must be by a motion on notice or summons. It is not in dispute here and also glaring that the notice of discontinue by the Plaintiff/Appellant was after 14 days after the 3rd Defendant/Respondent had joined issues with the Plaintiff. By that token, notice to discontinue is no longer applicable. That is to say that the notice of discontinuance of the suit by the Plaintiff is incompetent. To this extent, I concur with finding of the trial Court as contained in pages 28-29, that the notice of discontinuance as incompetent.
The question now is what becomes the fate of the suit sought to be discontinued. In the circumstance of the fact of the instant appeal, what the Court ought to do was to strike out the incompetent application and set down the matter for hearing. It is trite that the proper approach which the lower Court ought to have adopted in the circumstance was to strike out the application and not order a dismissal of the suit of the Appellant. The learned trial Judge has more or less killed an ant i.e. (the application to discontinue the action by way of a notice of discontinuance) with a sledge hammer when he dismissed the entire suit. It therefore follows that for noncompliance with Order 29 what the Court ought to do was to strike out the application simpliciter and not dismissing the suit. The order of dismissal made by the Court in this instance, is like throwing away the baby and the birth water. See the cases of AMOO V. ALABI (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt.835) 537, 533; AFOLABI V. ADEKUNLE (1983) 2 SCNLR 141. Where the Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain an incompetent application, it also lacks the vires to dismiss the action. See MADUAFOKWA V. ABIA STATE GOVERNMENT & ORS (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt. 516) 563, 586. In the light of the foregoing, I have no hesitation in concluding that the learned trial Judge misdirected itself by dismissing the suit of the Appellant.
Another aspect of this appeal is the failure of the trial Court to consider the application by the Respondent challenging the competence of the suit by the Appellant.
In this appeal, the learned trial Judge, just after striking out the application by the Plaintiff/Appellant to amend his claim was cajoled to consider the notice of discontinuance and by that abandoned the challenge to its jurisdiction registered by the Respondent. In my view the Respondent deliberately did this so as to achieve the result he got. It is well settled and trite that the question of jurisdiction is so fundamental that the adjudicating Court should determine the issue first before embarking on any proceedings or any other application i.e. the notice of discontinuance. See KATTO V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt.214) 126; SUN INSURANCE NIGERIA PLC V. UMEZ ENGINEERINE CONSTUCTION COMPANY LTD (2015) LPELR 24737. Jurisdiction which is the authority a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it is very crucial in the process of litigation. Being very fundamental, it should be determined first and at the earliest opportunity. The position of the law is that issues touching on jurisdiction must be taken at the earliest opportunity and at any stage of the proceedings. This is because any step taken by a Court without jurisdiction would amount to a complete time wasting. See BARCLAYS BANK LTD V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1976) 6 SC 175; BRONIK LTD. V. WEMA BANK LTD (1983) 1 SCNLR 296; GALADIMA V. TAMBAI (2000) 11 NWLR (PT. 677) 1; EGE SHIPPING AND TRADING INDUSTRY V. TIGRIS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (1999) 14 NWLR (PT. 637) 70. Where a Court lack the jurisdiction to hear and determine a suit, the proceeding remains a nullity, ab initio, no matter how well conducted and determined. See MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 OLOBA V. AKEREJA (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 508.
Rather than determining the challenge to its jurisdiction filed by the 3rd Defendants/Respondent, the Court took an up step and jumped, and determined the notice of discontinuance and eventually dismissed the suit. To say a little, I am of the humble view that the learned trial Judge goofed in taking that step. The Court ought to and should have consider and determine the challenge to its jurisdiction first. I accordingly so hold. For the foregoing reasoning, finding and conclusions, I resolve the two issues against the Respondent and in favour of the Appellant.
In consequence therefore, I adjudge the appeal meritorious and I allow it.
Accordingly, the Ruling of the High Court of Edo State Uromi Judicial Division delivered on 15th of June 2000 dismissing the suit No. HCU/26/98 is hereby set aside. By this order, the suit is restored to the Court list and remitted to the Hon. Chief Judge of Edo State for reassignment to another Judge other than Hon. Justice A. Okunega for expeditious hearing and determination.
Parties to bear their cost.
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity of reading before now the judgment delivered by my learned brother M.N. ONIYANGI, JCA.
My Lord has carefully dealt with all the issues canvassed by both parties in this appeal. I align myself with the reasoning and conclusions reached therein.
Having resolved the issues against the Respondent in favour of the Appellant. It is also my ardent view that the appeal is meritorious and is hereby allowed. The Ruling of the High Court of Edo State Uromi Judicial Division delivered on 15th day of June, 2000 in Suit No. HCU/26/1998 between MRS. JOSEPHINE ARINZE AND UNION BANK PLC is hereby set aside and by this order the suit is remitted to the Hon Chief Judge of Edo State for reassignment to another Judge other than Hon. Justice A. Okunega for expeditious hearing and determination
I abide by the order as to costs in the lead judgment.
MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading In draft form, the Judgment Just delivered by my learned brother, Mudashiru Nasiru Onlyangi, JCA.
I agree with my learned brother that this appeal has merit and I also allow It on the terms set out in the leading Judgment.
Appearances:
CHIEF H.O. OGBODU, SAN with him, E.A. OMAMOGHOFor Appellant(s)
- ILUEMUNOSENFor Respondent(s)
Appearances
CHIEF H.O. OGBODU, SAN with him, E.A. OMAMOGHOFor Appellant
AND
- ILUEMUNOSENFor Respondent



