ZIAKADE PATRICK AKPOBOLOKEMI & ORS v. THE HON. CAPTAIN EMMANUEL IHENACHO & ORS (2016)

ZIAKADE PATRICK AKPOBOLOKEMI & ORS v. THE HON. CAPTAIN EMMANUEL IHENACHO & ORS

(2016)LCN/8504(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 20th day of April, 2016

CA/L/1253/2014

RATIO

PROCEDURE: ISSUE OF JURISDICTION; PURPOSE AND NATURE OF JURISDICTION
The issue of jurisdiction is a threshold issue in adjudication by a Court of law and as such, it is basically considered expedient to resolve same before proceeding to consider any matter presented to a Court on the merit. It therefore goes without saying that the determination of a matter by a Court will amount to a nullity if done without jurisdiction notwithstanding how right or correct the decision reached might be. The jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a matter is therefore fundamental to the extent that if a Court has no jurisdiction to hear or determine a case, the whole proceedings become null and void. In other words, jurisdiction is the basis on which any Court or tribunal tries a case because it is the authority it has to decide on a matter before it. The importance of jurisdiction to adjudicate on any matter by a Court cannot therefore be overemphasised. See AJAO v. ALAO (1986) 5 NWLR (PT 45) 802; UTIH v. ONOYIVWE (1991) 1 NWLR (PT 166) 166; (1991) 1 SCJN 25; GALADIMA v. TAMBAI (2000) 6 SCJN 190; A.G LAGOS STATE v. DOSUNMU (1989) 6 SC (PT 11) Page 1. YUSUF v.OBASANJO (2004) 5 SCM. 193.
Jurisdiction of Court is not conferred by the Court itself but by the constitution or a Statute. Consequently, no Court shall have the jurisdiction to go beyond the provisions of the enabling law, otherwise it will be ultra vires. See UGBA v. SUSWAM (NO 2) (2012) 6 SC (PT 11) 56 and ARJAY LTD v. AIRLINE MANAGMENT SUPPORT LTD (2003) 5 SCM 17 A.G RIVERS STATE v. A.G AKWA-IBOM STATE (2011) 8 NWLR (PT 1248) 31.
It is also trite law that in determining the jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a Suit, the primary and ultimate port of call is the writ of summons, the statement of claim and the reliefs sought therein. Consequently, when an issue of jurisdiction is being addressed, it must be determined on the basis of the plaintiffs averment in his statement of claim and not on the Defendants answer in the statement of defence. See A. G. KWARA STATE v. AGBASO (2010) 6-7 SC 85; OLOFU v. ITODO (2010) 12 SC (PT 1) 165 and the case of PDP v. SYLVA (2012) 13 NWLR (PT 1316) 85 at 127 where the Supreme Court held per RHODE VIVOUR JSC that:-
“Jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a Suit is resolve by scrupulous examination of the writ of summons, the statement of claim and reliefs claimed. No other document should be examined.
Also in FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. GOVERNMENT OF ONDO STATE (2012) 11 NWLR (PT 1312) 502 this Court held that it is the Claimants claim as endorsed in the writ of summons and or the statement of claims that determines whether or not a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it. PER SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
WORDS AND PHRASES: MEANING OF A PORT
Section 64 of the NIMASA Act 2007 defines “Port” to mean:-
Port’ means any place in Nigeria, navigable river or channel leading into such place having facilities for ships to moor, load or discharge including off shore cargo landing facilities, inland dry ports, harbor, berths, jetties, pontoons, or buoys and wharves within the limit of the ports and includes any place declared to be a port under this Act. PER SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
JUDGMENT: CONCURRING JUDGMENT; WHAT CONSTITUTES A CONCURRING JUDGMENT
In this regard, the case of NWANA v. FCDA (2004) 13 NWLR (PT 889) 128 is quite apt, wherein it was held that a concurring judgment compliments, edifies and adds to a leading judgment. It could at times be an improvement of the leading judgment when the Justices add to it certain aspects which the writer of the leading judgment did not remember to deal with. The Apex Court further held that in so far as a concurring judgment performs some or all of the above functions, it has equal force with or as the leading judgment in so far as the principle of stare decisis are concerned. It therefore follows that it is only where a supposed concurring judgment goes contrary to what is contained in the leading judgment that it can be termed a dissenting judgment. But the mere fact that a concurring judgment proffers in a more correct or positive way, what is contained in a leading judgment does not coat it with the garb of a dissenting judgment because a concurring judgment may provide further elucidation or expound on the content or intent of a leading judgment and this still qualifies it as a concurring judgment. See NWANA v. FCDA supra; NWANI v. BAKARI (2007) LPELR (7629) CA., ENANG v. UMOH (2012) LPELR (8386) CA. PER SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: ISSUES WHERE THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT WILL HAVE JURISDICTION OVER
What is more, the views expressed by NIKI TOBI JSC in EDEGBERO’S case supra on the confluence of party in litigation and subject matter of Litigation as being relevant in determining whether the Federal High Courts should have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain a suit is the current state of the law having gained much credence and judicial approval by the Supreme Court. In PDP v. SYLVA supra at page 138 of the Report, the Supreme Court held that:-
When the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is in issue, the following must co-exist:-
(a) The parties or party must be the Federal government or its agency
(b) Subject matter of litigation.
It added in Paragraph (E) therein that it is not enough only to have an agency of the Federal government before a Federal High Court will have jurisdiction. See also WEMA SECURITIES & FINANCE PLC v. NIGERIA AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (2015) 16 NWLR (PT 1484)93; In OBIUWEUBI v. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2011)7 NWLR (PPT1247)465 at page 492 the Supreme Court held per Rhodes Vivour JSC that:-
For the Federal High Court to have jurisdiction under Section 230 of the 1979 Constitution or in Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution the following must co-exist:-
(a) Parties or a party must be the Federal government or its agencies:
(b) Subject matter of litigation.
That is to say jurisdiction is a combination of parties and subject matter. The words used in this piece of legislation are plain as plain can be and have been interpreted by this Court on several occasions. See NEPA v. EDEGBERO (2002) 18 NWLR (PT 798) p. 79; OLORUNTOBA-OJU v. ABDUL-RAHEEM & 3 ORS (2009)5-6 SC (PT 11) P. 57; (2009) 13 NWLR (PT 1157)83.
Ironically their lordships relied on the case of NEPA v. EDEGBERO supra in reaching its decision and this no doubt means that the stance of NIKI TOBI JSC on confluence of party in litigation and subject matter of litigation in his concurring judgment has broadened the frontiers of our jurisprudence in the determination of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as prescribed by Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. In this regard, I make bold to assert that the current position of the law as expounded by the Supreme Court is not that, once the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party to a claim no matter the nature of the claim, the Federal High Court must assume jurisdiction. Rather the extant law is that, for the Federal High Court to assume jurisdiction under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, the dual requirements of party in litigation and subject matter of litigation must be satisfied. That is to say, that it is not enough that the Federal government or any of its agencies is a party in the suit, it must also be shown that the subject matter of litigation fall within the items enumerated in Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution. PER SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ZIAKADE PATRICK AKPOBOLOKEMI
BARRISTER CALLISTUS NWABUEZE OBI
HAJIA LAMI TUMAKA Appellant(s)

AND

THE HON. CAPTAIN EMMANUEL IHENACHO
INTERGRATED OIL AND GAS LIMITED
NIGERIAN MARITIME ADMINISTRATION AND SAFETY AGENCY Respondent(s)

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Ruling of the High Court of Lagos State delivered by S.B.A CANDIDE-JOHNSON J. on the 27th day of October 2014 in Suit No LA/ADR/91/2013 wherein the Appellants preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain the Suit was dismissed.

In brief, the facts of the case is that the 1st Respondent herein who was a former Minister of Interior is the Chairman/Chief of Executive of the 2nd Respondent (Integrated Oil and Gas Limited). Sometime in August 2012 the 2nd Respondent signed a Through put Agreement with PDR Ventures Ltd (PDR) wherein PDR agreed to store 3000349 metric tonnes of Diesel in a tanker farm owned by the 2nd Respondent at Ibafon Apapa, Lagos State. The said diesel was conveyed by a ship called MT GRACE and on arrival to Lagos with the said cargo of diesel, on the 29-8-2012, the said ship was boarded by the Nigerian Navy, the Department of Petroleum Resources and the Customs and Excise for inspection and clearance. Upon clearance, the aforesaid agencies accompanied the ship

to the Tank farm where the diesel was discharged and the ship allowed to depart therefrom. The said diesel was thereafter sold to the public.

However, about 12 days after the departure of the ship ?MT Grace?, the Appellants herein, together with the 3rd Respondent and officers of the Nigerian Police and other armed forces invaded the said, 2nd Respondent?s Tank Farm on the allegation that the diesel earlier discharged by ?MT Grace? was stolen. Five top staffers of the 2nd Respondent were arrested and detained at the 3rd Respondent?s office and later transferred to the office of the State Security Services (SSS) for interrogation.

?On 14-9-2012 the same group of persons returned back to the Tank Farm, got it sealed up and arrested the 1st Respondent who was subsequently released after interrogation. On the same date, the 3rd Respondent and the Appellants issued a press release to the effect that the 1st Respondent was arrested in connection with sea robbery and oil theft and which press release was reported in Thisday and Punch Newspapers as well as on the internet. These publications were considered libellous by the

Respondents who consequently commenced a Suit at the trial Court claiming damages and injunctive reliefs from the Appellants and the 3rd Respondent.

The Appellants herein reacted by filing a motion on notice supported by a written address challenging the jurisdiction of the Lagos State High Court to entertain the Suit. The 1st and 2nd Respondents in opposing the said motion, filed a counter-affidavit and written address. In a considered Ruling delivered on 27-10-14 the trial Court dismissed the Appellants objection to jurisdiction.

The Appellants were not satisfied with the Ruling and consequently filed a Notice of Appeal dated 30-10-2014 and filed on 4-11-2014.

Briefs of argument were subsequently filed and served by the parties and same were respectively adopted at the hearing of the Appeal on 4-2-2016. The 3rd Respondent did not however file any brief of argument.

In the Appellants brief of argument filed on 23-2-2015 but deemed properly filed and served on 24-2-2015 a single issue was formulated from the sole ground of Appeal as follows:-
In the light of the provisions of Section 251(1) of the Constitution of Federal

Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and other Acts vesting jurisdiction in the Federal High Court as variously interpreted by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal in several binding judicial precedents, whether the High Court of Lagos State has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the Suit?”

In the 1st and 2nd Respondents brief of argument dated and filed on 15-6-2015, the following sole issue was also formulated for determination. Viz:-
Whether the Lower Court was right by its decision dated 27th October 2014 in holding that the High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the Suit, considering in totality the provision of Section 251(1) (P,Q,R) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
The issues as formulated by the parties are no doubt similar in con by I will adopt that of the Appellant in the Resolution of this appeal.

Arguing on the sole issue, Learned Counsel for the Appellants referred to numerous authorities on the fundamental nature of jurisdiction in the process of adjudication and without which any decision reached by a Court amounts to a nullity.

It was also emphasised that

it is the claim before the Court that has to be examined, to ascertain whether or not it comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the Court. The following cases were cited in support. ADEYEMI v. OPEYORI (1976) 9-10 SC 311; WESTERN STEEL WORKS v. IRON & STEEL WORKERS (1987) 1 NWLR (PT 49) 284; TUKUR v. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT 117) 517; ALHAJI IBRAHIM ABDUL HAMID v. TALAL AKAR (2006) 1 SCM at 13.

It was further submitted that in the instant case, the 1st and 2nd Respondents claim as endorsed on the writ of summons is for damages for alleged tortiuous acts of the Appellants and the 3rd Respondent in the course of the exercise of their statutory duties over matters and connected with Nigerian Territorial waters and Federal Ports and their precincts. Therefore, the Lagos State High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claims because the Appellants and the 3rd Respondent are agents and agency respectively of the Federal Government and the claims are for a declaration and injunction or administrative actions/decision taken by the Appellants.
Reference was then made to Section 22(1) (f) (g) (h) (o) (p), (2) (a), (d) (f) (h)

of the NIGERIAN MARITIME ADMINISTRATION AND SAFETY AGENCY ACT, 2007, as well as Section 23(1) (2), (5) (a to j) of the said Act on the duties and functions of the 3rd Respondent. On the definition of a Port Learned Counsel referred to Section 64 of the NIMASA ACT 2007 to submit that the Oil Tank Farms at Ibafon claimed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents to have been entered and sealed off by the Agents of the 3rd Respondent is a Port within the meaning of Section 64 of the NIMASA ACT 2007 and the 3rd Respondent by virtue of Section 23(5) (j) has power to enter the said Tank Farm with the aid and assistance of other government Agencies responsible for security.

In this regard Learned Counsel referred to Section 251 (1) (g) (p) (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 1 (g) and (i) and 19 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.

It was then submitted that the fact that the 3rd Respondent and the Appellants are Agency and agents of the Federal Government is not in dispute going by Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 13 14 and 15 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents statement of claim in which case the Lagos State High Court has no jurisdiction to

entertain the Suit as presently constituted and had erroneously interpreted the decision in NEPA v. EDEGBERO (2003) FWLR (PT 139) 1556 given the lead judgement of OGUNDARE JSC on the interpretation of Section 230 (1) (q) (r) and (s) of the Decree 107 of 1993 which is similar to Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution and added to that is the contribution by NIKI TOBI JSC to the said judgment.

It was then argued that the concurring judgment of NIKI TOBI JSC regarding the confluence of party in litigation and subject matter of litigation did not feature in the lead judgment of OGUNDARE JSC and therefore it is not the decision of the Supreme Court in EDEGBERO?S case but at best a dissenting judgment going by the status of a concurring judgment as explained in the case of NWANA v. F.C.D.A. (2004) 13 NWLR (PT 889) 128 at 140; see also OSUN STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION v. ACTION CONGRESS (2010) 19 NWLR (PT 1126) 273.

On that basis it was submitted that the opinion of OGUNDARE JSC represents the decision of the Supreme Court in EDEGBERO?S case and the Learned Trial Judge was wrong to have relied on the contributions of TOBI JSC.<br< p=””

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Learned Counsel then submitted that the matters of jurisdiction in our Courts are generally approached from three dimensions, namely, territorial, subject matter and person. Vide ADETONA v. IGELE GENERAL ENT. LTD (2011) ALL FWLR (PT 569) 1025 at 1051.

On the Territorial aspect it was submitted that by the combined effect of Section 251 (1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 1 (1) and 19 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Decree No 59 of 1999 (now Act) the Federal High Court has exclusive, territorial jurisdiction because the matter arose from an administrative action taken within the Ibafon Tank Farm which is a Port.
In support of this assertion he cited the case of NICOTES SERVICES LTD v. LEKWUWA (2011) ALL FWLR (PT 554) 163 at 173-174.

On the subject matter approach to jurisdiction, it was submitted that the alleged arrest and interrogation of the 1st and 2nd Respondents staff and employees and the press release which gave birth to this Suit arose from and relate to the exercise of the executive and administrative functions of the 3rd Respondent and the Appellants under Section 22 and 23 of NIMASA ACT 2007 and covered by Section 251

(1) (p) (q) (r) of the 1999 Constitution. The following cases were cited in support. ANIAKOR v. NIGERIA POLICE FORCE (2014) 15 NWLR (PT 1429) 155 at 172; CHIEF M.A INEGBEDION v. DR. SELO-OJEMEN & ANOR (2013) ALL FWLR (PT 688) 907.

On the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court on persons, it was contended that the State High Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the 1st and 2nd Respondents in this Suit because the current position of the law is that where the Federal Government and/or any of its agencies is a party to any Suit, the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the action, notwithstanding the nature of the claim. Vide, ABIA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION v. CHIEF OKECHI KANU (2013) ALL FWLR (PT 696) 546 at 556 and NEPA v. EDEGBERO (Supra) where the Supreme Court held that once a party to Suit is the Federal Government or any of its agencies only the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the case notwithstanding the nature of the subject matter of the claim. This Court was then urged to allow the appeal.
Replying on the Appellants sole issue, Learned Senior Counsel for the 1st and 2nd

Respondents referred to and distinguished the following cases relied on by the Appellants; COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ORS v. HAIRAT ADERINSOLA BALOGUN & ORS. (2011) LPELR 4005 (CA); ANIAKOR v.NIGERIA POLICE FORCE (2014) 15 NWLR (PT 1429) 155 at 172; CHIEF M.A INEGBEDION v. DR. SELO-OJEMEN & ANOR (2013) ALL FWLR (PT 688) 907; (2013) 8 NWLR (PT 1356) 211; ABIA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION v. CHIEF OKECHI KANU (2013) ALL FWLR (PT 696) 546.

It was then contended that though the cases discussed the significance of jurisdiction to adjudication, they are however inapplicable to this case because the element of parties and subject matter of the action were identified before the Courts upheld the objections to jurisdiction.

In the instant case, it was conceded by Learned Senior Counsel that the 3rd Respondent is a Federal Government Agency thrust with the responsibility of the management and administration of Nigerian Waterways, so the authorities cited in support to prove that status by the Appellants are unnecessary.

He added that the substance of this appeal is whether the Federal High Court is vested with the

exclusive jurisdiction to determine all disputes in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party irrespective of the claim.

It was then submitted that it is not in dispute that the 1st and 2nd Respondents Suit is founded on allegations of tortiuous acts and this the Appellants agrees with but only contends that since an agency of the Federal Government is a party in the Suit, the proper Court to exercise jurisdiction is the Federal High Court by virtue of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution.

It was however contended that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is limited to the 18 major items listed under Section 251 (1).

Therefore, whenever the issue of its jurisdiction is being canvassed, attention should be focused on the concurrence and confluence of the two critical elements of party-in litigation and subject of ligation, failing which the State High Court is to assume jurisdiction as held in ONUORAH v. KADUNA REFINERY & PETROCHEMICAL CO. LTD (2005) 6 NWLR (PT 921) 393.

Learned Senior Counsel also analysed the decision in NEPA v.EDEGBERO (Supra) relied on by the Lower Court to argue that, though

the 3rd Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government, the relief sought by the 1st and 2nd Respondents does not fall within the items listed in Section 251 (1) as in the case of NEPA v. EDEGBERO where the matter arose out of the administrative action or decision of the Appellant, in which case it satisfied the two pronged test of subject matter of litigation and party in litigation to vest the Federal High Court with jurisdiction.

It therefore contrasts with the instant case where the Appellants are agents of the Federal Government but the subject matter of the Suit is not itemised in Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution.

It was therefore submitted that it was wrong for the Appellants to contend that once the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party to a Suit for declaration, damages or injunction, the Federal High Court would have exclusive jurisdiction notwithstanding the claim.

On the necessity for the requirement of party in litigation and subject matter of litigation to be satisfied before the Federal High Court can assume jurisdiction the following cases were referred to; ONUORAH v.KADUNA REFINERY & PETROCHEMICAL

CO. LTD. Supra; NATIONAL UNION OF ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS v. ROAD TRANSPORT EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA (2012) LPELR 7840 (SC); OMOTESHO v. ABDULLAHI (2008) 2 NWLR (PT 1072) 526 at 547; ALAMIEYESEIGHA v. IGONIWARI (NO 2) (2007) 7 NWLR (PT 1034) 524 at 579.

On the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act to the instant case, it was submitted that the law has no protection for Public Officers who acted or act outside the colour or scope of their statutory or Constitutional duties. Vide IBRAHIM v. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE (1998) 12 SCJN 255; U.I v. GOVERNMENT OF KWARA STATE (2012) LPELR 14326; HASSAN v. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (PT 1223) 574 at 621; OJEDIRAN v. GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE (2013) LPELR 21116 (CA); EZEANI v. NIGERIAN RAILWAY CORPORATION (2015) 3 NWLR (PT 1445) 139.

It was further submitted that by the definition of a Port under Section 64 of NIMASA ACT 2007, it does not include a Tank Farm as that of the 2nd Respondent which does not have the facilities for ships to moor and load or discharge, therefore the act of 3rd Respondent and its agents were outside the scope of their legitimate powers, but in

their personal capacities.

This Court was then urged to dismiss the appeal and uphold the Ruling of the Lower Court.

The Appellants reply to the submissions made by the 1st and 2nd Respondents is in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Appellants reply brief filed on 18-8-15 but deem properly filed on 4-2-2016. Therein Learned Counsel for the Appellants referred to Paragraph 5.2 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents brief of argument to submit that the case of COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION v. HAIRAT BALOGUN; INEGBEDION v. DR SELO-OJEMEN and ABIA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION, cited in the Appellants brief show that the reliefs sought were against the Federal Government agencies and arose from actions taken in the discharge of their executive functions and administration or management of the agencies in the instant case. Moreso that the 1st and 2nd Respondents conceded that their case is not based on contract but on tortuous acts arising from the exercise of the executive and administrative functions of the Appellants under Section 22 and 23 of NIMASA ACT 2007. This therefore confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court.

Further referring to

ONUORAHS case relied on by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, it was submitted that the said case was based on contract and not on tortuous acts arising from the exercise of executive functions and administration of the Federal government or any of its agencies as in this case and the same goes for other authorities cited by the 1st and 2nd Respondents which favours the Appellants herein.

On the issue whether the 2nd Respondents Tank Farm has facilities for ship to moor and load or discharge cargo and therefore qualifies as a Port. Learned Counsel referred to Paragraph 2.4 of the Respondents brief where it was stated that M.T Grace was accompanied by the Nigeria Navy and other Regulatory Agencies Officials to the Tank Farm where the M.T. Grace discharged diesel into the Tanks at the Tank Farm at Ibafon and as such they cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate.
They urged this Court to allow this appeal.

The main thrust of this appeal is whether the Lagos State High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the action instituted before it by the 1st and 2nd Respondents against the Appellants and the 3rd Respondent.

The issue

of jurisdiction is a threshold issue in adjudication by a Court of law and as such, it is basically considered expedient to resolve same before proceeding to consider any matter presented to a Court on the merit. It therefore goes without saying that the determination of a matter by a Court will amount to a nullity if done without jurisdiction notwithstanding how right or correct the decision reached might be. The jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a matter is therefore fundamental to the extent that if a Court has no jurisdiction to hear or determine a case, the whole proceedings become null and void. In other words, jurisdiction is the basis on which any Court or tribunal tries a case because it is the authority it has to decide on a matter before it. The importance of jurisdiction to adjudicate on any matter by a Court cannot therefore be overemphasised. See AJAO v. ALAO (1986) 5 NWLR (PT 45) 802; UTIH v. ONOYIVWE (1991) 1 NWLR (PT 166) 166; (1991) 1 SCJN 25; GALADIMA v. TAMBAI (2000) 6 SCJN 190; A.G LAGOS STATE v. DOSUNMU (1989) 6 SC (PT 11) Page 1. YUSUF v.OBASANJO (2004) 5 SCM. 193.

Jurisdiction of Court is not conferred by the Court itself but

by the constitution or a Statute. Consequently, no Court shall have the jurisdiction to go beyond the provisions of the enabling law, otherwise it will be ultra vires. See UGBA v. SUSWAM (NO 2) (2012) 6 SC (PT 11) 56 and ARJAY LTD v. AIRLINE MANAGMENT SUPPORT LTD (2003) 5 SCM 17 A.G RIVERS STATE v. A.G AKWA-IBOM STATE (2011) 8 NWLR (PT 1248) 31.

It is also trite law that in determining the jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a Suit, the primary and ultimate port of call is the writ of summons, the statement of claim and the reliefs sought therein. Consequently, when an issue of jurisdiction is being addressed, it must be determined on the basis of the plaintiff?s averment in his statement of claim and not on the Defendant?s answer in the statement of defence. See A. G. KWARA STATE v.AGBASO (2010) 6-7 SC 85; OLOFU v. ITODO (2010) 12 SC (PT 1) 165 and the case of PDP v. SYLVA (2012) 13 NWLR (PT 1316) 85 at 127 where the Supreme Court held per RHODE VIVOUR JSC that:-
?Jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a Suit is resolve by scrupulous examination of the writ of summons, the statement of claim and reliefs claimed. No other document

should be examined.?
Also in FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. GOVERNMENT OF ONDO STATE (2012) 11 NWLR (PT 1312) 502 this Court held that it is the Claimant?s claim as endorsed in the writ of summons and or the statement of claims that determines whether or not a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it.

In the instant case, the kernel of the Appellant?s complaint is that the Lagos State High Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Suit filed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents because the Appellants and the 3rd Respondent are agents and agency of the Federal Government and the Suit is based on the tortuous acts committed by the Appellants in the discharge of their executive and administrative functions. Therefore only the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Suit by virtue of Section 251(1) (g) (p) (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution.
The said Section 251 (1) (g) (p) (q) and (r) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides as follows:-
251 (1) ?Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may

be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters:-
(g)Any admiralty jurisdiction including shipping and Navigation on the River Niger or River Benue and their effluents and on such other inland waterways as may be designated by any enactment to be on international waterway, all Federal ports, (including the Constitution and powers of the Ports Authorities for Federal Ports) and carriage by sea;
(p) The administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(q) Subject to the provision of this Constitution, the operation an interpretation of this Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(r) Any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administration action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.?

It is not in dispute that the Federal High Court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine matters as listed in Section 251 (1) of the 1999

Constitution or as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly. However, though the Federal High Court enjoys such exercise of jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court on matters so itemised under Section 251 (1) (a) to (s). To all intents and purposes the exclusive jurisdiction is hedged within the confines of the aforementioned Section and as held in the case of EZE v. FRN (1987) 1 NWLR (PT 51) 506, the limited jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is not easy to scale over.

?In the instant case, the reliefs sought by the 1st and 2nd Respondents in the Lower Court as per their writ of summons filed on 12-2-13 are herein-below set out:-
The Claimant?s claim is for:
(1) Damages (including general, special and exemplary damages) of N90 billion, N349 million (ninety billion, three hundred and forty nine million naira) misfeasance in public office, malicious falsehood, conspiracy to injure economic interests, trespass to land, defamation, assault and false imprisonment.
(2) Interest on the said sum of N90 billion, N349 million (ninety billion, three hundred and forty nine million naira) at the rate of 25% per

annum from 14th September 2012 until the entire sum is paid to the Claimants.
(3) An Order of injunction compelling the Defendants to publish in the First Defendant?s website, the Guardian Newspaper, Thisday Newspaper and Punch Newspaper, a retraction of an apology for the defamatory statements that they made against the Claimants on 14th September 2012 and 15th September 2012;
(4) Further or other relief; and
(5) The costs of this action.

From the above set out reliefs claimed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents coupled with the averments in Paragraph 8 to 38 of their statement of claim. It is quite glaring and beyond doubt that the substance of their claim in the Lower Court hinges on the alleged tortiuous acts of the Appellants.

The Appellants on their own did not dispute this fact but strongly argued that the action taken by the Appellants borders or relates to their executive and administrative functions as conferred by Sections 22 and 23 of the NIMASA ACT 2007 and therefore falls under Section 251(1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution in which case it is the Federal High Court and not the Lagos State High Court that has jurisdiction

to entertain the Suit.

The question then is whether the Suit is based on tort simpliciter or whether the said tort was a product of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.

That the Appellants are agents of the Federal Government by virtue of their position in the 3rd Respondent which is an agency of the Federal Government is not in dispute. In the 1st and 2nd Respondents? statement of claim, it was averred in Paragraphs 4 to 7 as follows:-
”4. The First Defendant is a statutory body that is charged with the promotion of the development of indigenous commercial shipping in international and coastal shipping trade and the regulation and promotion of maritime safety, security, marine pollution and maritime labour.
5. The Second defendant was at the material times, the director general and chief executive officer of the First Claimant.
6. the Third Defendant was at all material times, the executive director maritime labour and cabotage services of the First Defendant.
7. The Fourth Defendant was at all material times, the head of public relations of the First

Defendant.”

As regards the issue whether the act of the Appellants complained of constitutes an executive or administrative action or decision by the Appellants who are agents of the 3rd Respondent.

The answer is not far fetched having been averred to in Paragraph 17 to 23 of the statement of claim and they are herein below set out.
17. The First Defendant is a statutory body and its agents, the Armed Forces, the Nigerian Police and the State Security Services, are organs of the government. The Second Defendant, the Third and the Fourth Defendant were public officers at all material times.
18. each material conduct of the Defendants, their agents and servants was in the purported exercise of public functions.
19. This is a case of targeted malice by the First Defendant and its officers and agents. They acted in band faith and /or recklessly in the exercise of their statutory functions in that:
a. They issued all the necessary permits which allowed M.T. Grace to discharged its cargo at Second Defendant?s oil tank farms;
b. The Nigerian Navy inspected M.T Grace and its cargo before it permitted her to proceed to the

Second defendant?s oil tank farms;
c. The First Defendant and the other government organs (including the Navy, the Customs and the Department of Petroleum Resources) inspected M.T Grace (including its documents, permits and cargo) on 29th August, 2012 and cleared it to discharge its cargo at the Second Claimant?s tank farm and then accompanied it to the said oil tank farm and were present from the time it started discharging the said cargo until the time it completed the discharge and left the premises of the second Claimant;
d. The First Defendant and the other government organs that issued the said permits in respect of M.T Grace and its cargo of diesel knew that she and her cargo were not owned by the Claimants and they also knew the ostensible origin of the cargo that she was discharging at the second defendant?s oil tank farms, and as such even if M.T. Grace was used to hijack vessels and steal file, there was no reasonable ground to suspect that the Claimant were part of a cartel that was involved in the hijack of vessel and theft of fuel. This contention is supported by the application by the owner of ?MT? Grace,

Danyomile Marine Services Limited to the Commanding Officer of the Naval Base, Beecroft Dockyard, Lagos for MT Grace to discharge 3,000 metric tonnes of diesel loaded from MT. Ralb of Awaritse Nigeria Limited at offshore into the Second Defendant?s tank farm, Ibafon, Lagos between 29th August 2012 and 28th September 2012 (This application is dated 28th August 2012 and was approved by Nigeria Navy) and the Department of Petroleum Resources permit dated 29th August 2012 clearing M.T Grace to load 3000.349 metric tonnes of diesel belonging to PDR Venture at Cotonou and to discharge it at the Second Claimant?s depot.
e. Even if the said cargo that M.T Grace was discharging at the Second Defendant?s said oil tank farm was stolen, there was no reasonable ground to believe that the Claimants knew that it was stolen before they accepted it. The First Defendant and the said government agencies well knew or ought to have known that the Second Claimant was entitled to rely on: (i) the said documents presented to it by PDR ventures Limited, (ii) the fact that Department of Petroleum Resources and other government agencies had examined the vessel and

her documents on 29th August 2012 before clearing it to discharge its cargo at the Second Claimants said oil tank farm; (iii) the fact that officers of these government agencies then accompanied the vessel to the Second Claimants said oil tank farm and were present from the time of the commencement of the discharge of the cargo to the completion of discharge of the cargo and the departure of the vessel;
f. There was no reasonable ground for suspecting that the Claimants were part of a cartel that was involved in the hijacking of vessels ad theft of fuel theft the said vessels were carrying;
g. Even if there was a reasonable ground for suspecting that the Claimant knowingly accepted stolen cargo(which is not the case), there was no lawful excuse for stealing off the Second Claimants said premises and for assaulting and humiliating the First Claimant and other persons on the said 13th and 14th September 2012.
20. The First Defendant, it servants and its agents exercised public power for improper and/or ulterior motives.
21. The actions of the First defendant, its servants and it agent were unlawful.
22. The First

Defendant, its servant and its agent intended to injure the Claimants. They also knew that their conduct was capable of causing loss to the Claimants or alternatively, they were reckless as to whether their conduct would cause loss to the claimants.
23. As a result of the conduct of the First Defendant, its servants and its agents, the Claimants have suffered considerable loss and damage.

From the above set out averments it is not in doubt that the Appellants were exercising their administrative and executive functions when they committed the acts complained of by the 1st and 2nd Respondents. In other words, the activities of the Appellants which resulted in the alleged injury to the 1st and 2nd respondents were carried out in the exercise of the executive and administrative actions as prescribed by Paragraph (r) of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution and this removes the Suit from the scope of jurisdiction of the Lagos State High Court and placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.

What is more Sections 22 and 23 of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act (NIMASA) 2007 exhaustively listed the

duties and powers of the 3rd Respondent for which the Appellants are the alter egos and any act done pursuant to the duties, functions and powers enumerated in the two Sections to my mind, constitute executive or administrative actions or decisions within the ambit of Section 251 (1) (p) (r) of the 1999 Constitution provided such acts are done within the territorial confines of the 3rd Respondent as prescribed by law. The scene of the act allegedly complained of was the 2nd Respondents tank Farm at Ibafon and their pleadings show that the ship M.T Grace navigated to and moored beside the Tank Farm to discharge its cargo of diesel.

Section 64 of the NIMASA Act 2007 defines “Port” to mean:-
Port’ means any place in Nigeria, navigable river or channel leading into such place having facilities for ships to moor, load or discharge including off shore cargo landing facilities, inland dry ports, harbor, berths, jetties, pontoons, or buoys and wharves within the limit of the ports and includes any place declared to be a port under this Act.
(Underling for emphasis)

From the above definition there is no doubt

that the 2nd Respondent’s Tank Farm at Ibafon, Lagos falls within the area or operational jurisdiction of the 3rd Respondent whose officers in the execution of the functions and duties as conferred on the 3rd Respondent by the Section 22 and 23 of the NMIASA Act engaged in the acts which are the subject of the action in the Lower Court.

For purposes of clarity I herein below set out some of the functions and powers of the 3rd Respondent as prescribed by the NIMASA Act 2007. Section 22(1) (f) (g) (h)(o)(p) and (2)(a) (f) (h) provides thus:-
2(1) The functions and duties of the agency shall be to:-
(f) Provide search and rescue services.
(g) Provide directions and ensure compliance with vessel security measures.
(h) Carry out air and coastal surveillance;
(o) Provide National Maritime Search and Rescue service;
(p) Provide Maritime Security, and 22 (2) (a) Inspect ships for the purposes of maritime safety, maritime Security, maritime labour and prevention of maritime pollution.
(f) Generally to perform any other duty for ensuring maritime safety and Security or do all matters incidental thereto;

(h) Perform any other prescribed functions relating to or incidental to any of the matters referred to in this Subsection.

Furthermore, some of the powers of the 3rd Respondent as prescribed in Section 23 (1) (2) and (5) include the following:-
”23(1) In addition to any other powers conferred on it by this or any Act, the Agency has, subject to this Act, power to do all things necessary for or incidental to or in connection with the performance of its functions.
(2) Without limiting the generality of Subsection (1) , the powers includes, subject to this Act,
(5) The Agency shall, in addition, have powers to:-
(a) Receive and consider any report of the commission of an offence;
(b) Stop, enter, board, inspect and search any Vessel aircraft and to detain any vessel on aircraft within the Nigerian Maritime zone;
(c) Demand the production of any other document and to inspect such license, permit record, certificate or other document or make copies or take extracts from such license, permit, record, certificate or document in relation to matters provided for under this Act;
(e) Exercise to right of pursuit;
(h)

Arrest any person whom it has reason to believe has committed an offence;
(j) Enter parts, terminate and vessels to monitor and investigate matters related to maritime labour, ship safety and security.?

The kernel of the 1st and 2nd Respondents? complaint is that their Tank Farm at Ibafon was entered into and sealed off by the 3rd Respondent and its officers with the support of a contingent of Policemen, Soldiers, Naval personnel, employees of a company called ?Global West Vessel Specialist Limited and other Security officers on the suspicion that the consignment of diesel discharged by the vessel MT. Grace into the 2nd Respondent?s Tank Farm was stolen from a vessel that was a victim of sea piracy and armed robbery on the Nigerian Territorial waters.

By the definition of a port in Section 64 of the NIMASA Act 2007 as well as the powers of the 3rd Respondent as conferred by the said Act it seems to me that it bears no further argument that the acts of the Appellants in the Tank Farm as well as the arrest of the 1st Respondent for interrogation constitute executive and administrative actions relating to a maritime issue

which brings it within the sphere of Paragraph (g) and (r) of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution.

In this regard the case of NEPA v. EDEGBERO (supra) which was the object of analysis, interpretation and rationalisation by the parties is quite relevant here because the Supreme Court therein made it clear that by the provisions of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the Federal High Court in civil causes and matters arising from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government, the operation and interpretation of the Constitution as it affects the Federal Government as well as any action or proceedings for a declaration an injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by the Federal Government. See also OBIUWEUBI v. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2011)7 NWLR (PT 1247)465 wherein the Apex Court held at page 514-515 that Section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution which is in pari material with Section 251(1)(p) of the 1999 Constitution vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in Civil causes and matters arising from administration, management and

control of the Federal Government and its agencies, the operation and interpretation of the Constitution as it affects the Federal Government and its agencies as well as any action, proceedings for declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government and its agencies. In PDP v. SYLVA (2012)13 NWLR (PT 1316) 85 at 138, it was emphatically held therein that Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in respect of the items listed in the Section. It is therefore my firm view that from the facts of this case as detailed in the statement of claim and the nature of reliefs sought therein, the proper Court with jurisdiction to entertain the suit is the Federal High Court and not the Lagos State High Court as held by the Lower Court in it’s ruling.
I am tempted to refer to one more authority on this issue, that is the case of ADETONA v. IGELE ENTERPRISES LTD (2011)7 NWLR (PT 1247)535 where the Supreme Court posited that even in Fundamental Human Right cases where the Constitution confers jurisdiction on both the Federal and State

High Courts, the State High Courts are still devoid of jurisdiction where the subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and vice-versa. At page 564 of the Report it was held thus:-
It has to however be noted that the exercise of this jurisdiction by the Federal High Court is where the Fundamental right threatened or breached falls within the enumerated matters on which that Court has jurisdiction. Thus Fundamental rights arising from matters outside its jurisdiction cannot be enforced by the Federal High Court. See TUKUR v.GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989)3 NSCC 225 (1989)4 NWLR (PPT 117)517. Equally, a High Court of a State shall lack jurisdiction to entertain matters of fundamental rights, although brought pursuant to Section 46(2) of the Constitution where the alleged breach of such matters arose from a transaction or subject matter which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as provided by Section 251 of the Constitution.

The point I seek to make here is that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court on matters listed in Section 251)1) of the

Constitution is held sacrosanct and jealously guarded by judicial authorities against encroachment by the State High Court. The same way the limited jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is under close watch and strongly hedged to avoid any intrusion or expansion into the sphere of jurisdiction of the State High Courts.
That brings me to one important issue that needs to be addressed and clarified given the strong argument presented on it by the Appellants.

It was contended in the Appellants brief that once the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party in a suit the Federal High Court would exercise jurisdiction notwithstanding the nature of the claim. In this regard they strongly relied on the lead judgment of OGUNDARE JSC in NEPA v. EDEGBERO supra. It was also argued that the concurring judgment of NIKI TOBI JSC which addressed the issue of Confluence of party in litigation and subject matter of litigation is not the decision of the Apex Court in EDEGBEROS case but that of OGUNDARE JSC who read the lead judgment and at best the said concurring judgment having featured what was not in the lead judgment should at best be regarded

as a dissenting judgment.. I however disagree with such postulation by the learned counsel for the Appellants. In this regard, the case of NWANA v. FCDA (2004) 13 NWLR (PT 889) 128 is quite apt, wherein it was held that a concurring judgment compliments, edifies and adds to a leading judgment. It could at times be an improvement of the leading judgment when the Justices add to it certain aspects which the writer of the leading judgment did not remember to deal with. The Apex Court further held that in so far as a concurring judgment performs some or all of the above functions, it has equal force with or as the leading judgment in so far as the principle of stare decisis are concerned. It therefore follows that it is only where a supposed concurring judgment goes contrary to what is contained in the leading judgment that it can be termed a dissenting judgment. But the mere fact that a concurring judgment proffers in a more correct or positive way, what is contained in a leading judgment does not coat it with the garb of a dissenting judgment because a concurring judgment may provide further elucidation or expound on the content or intent of a leading judgment

and this still qualifies it as a concurring judgment. See NWANA v. FCDA supra; NWANI v. BAKARI (2007) LPELR (7629) CA., ENANG v. UMOH (2012) LPELR (8386) CA.

What is more, the views expressed by NIKI TOBI JSC in EDEGBERO’S case supra on the confluence of party in litigation and subject matter of Litigation as being relevant in determining whether the Federal High Courts should have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain a suit is the current state of the law having gained much credence and judicial approval by the Supreme Court. In PDP v. SYLVA supra at page 138 of the Report, the Supreme Court held that:-
When the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is in issue, the following must co-exist:-
(a) The parties or party must be the Federal government or its agency
(b) Subject matter of litigation.
It added in Paragraph (E) therein that it is not enough only to have an agency of the Federal government before a Federal High Court will have jurisdiction. See also WEMA SECURITIES & FINANCE PLC v. NIGERIA AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (2015) 16 NWLR (PT 1484)93; In OBIUWEUBI v. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2011)7 NWLR

(PPT1247)465 at page 492 the Supreme Court held per Rhodes Vivour JSC that:-
For the Federal High Court to have jurisdiction under Section 230 of the 1979 Constitution or in Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution the following must co-exist:-
(a) Parties or a party must be the Federal government or its agencies:
(b) Subject matter of litigation.
That is to say jurisdiction is a combination of parties and subject matter. The words used in this piece of legislation are plain as plain can be and have been interpreted by this Court on several occasions. See NEPA v. EDEGBERO (2002) 18 NWLR (PT 798) p. 79; OLORUNTOBA-OJU v. ABDUL-RAHEEM & 3 ORS (2009)5-6 SC (PT 11) P. 57; (2009) 13 NWLR (PT 1157)83.
Ironically their lordships relied on the case of NEPA v. EDEGBERO supra in reaching its decision and this no doubt means that the stance of NIKI TOBI JSC on confluence of party in litigation and subject matter of litigation in his concurring judgment has broadened the frontiers of our jurisprudence in the determination of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as prescribed by Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. In

this regard, I make bold to assert that the current position of the law as expounded by the Supreme Court is not that, once the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party to a claim no matter the nature of the claim, the Federal High Court must assume jurisdiction. Rather the extant law is that, for the Federal High Court to assume jurisdiction under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, the dual requirements of party in litigation and subject matter of litigation must be satisfied. That is to say, that it is not enough that the Federal government or any of its agencies is a party in the suit, it must also be shown that the subject matter of litigation fall within the items enumerated in Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution.

Notwithstanding my stance on the issue as above analysed, I find that in this appeal the 3rd Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government and the Appellants are agents of the 3rd Respondent. The subject matter of litigation also falls within the ambit of Sections 251(1) (p) (q) (r) of the 1999 Constitution the Federal High Court therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit and not the Lagos

State High Court. On the whole, the sole issue is resolved in favour of the Appellants.

I therefore hold that this appeal is meritorious and it is accordingly allowed. The Ruling of the Lagos State High Court delivered by Justice S.B.A. CANDIDE JOHNSON on the 27th day of October 2014 is hereby set aside.

By virtue of the powers conferred on this Court by Section 15 of the Court Act and acting inconsonance with Section 22(3) of the Federal High Court Act 2005 (as amended). It is ordered that this suit presently pending in the Lagos State High Court be transferred to the Federal High Court Lagos Division, for assignment by the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court for accelerated hearing and determination
I make no order as to costs.

UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft form the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Samuel Chukwudumebi Oseji JCA.

I agree with his reasoning and final conclusions. However, I wish to add that
By virtue of paragraphs (q), (r), (s) of Sub-section (1) of Section 230 of the 1979 Constitution. Also Section 250(1), (q), (r)

and (s) of the 1999 Constitution, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in matters in which the Federal Government or any of its Agencies is a party. Consequently, a State High Court would no longer have jurisdiction in such matters, notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the action. See J.U.T.H v. Ajeh (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt.1016) page 490, Onuorah v. KRPC. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.921) page 393, Ministry of Internal Affairs v. Aliyu (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt.911) page 30, NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt.798) page 79
However, for the Federal High Court to have exclusive jurisdiction, the matter must be a civil matter arising from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its Agencies. The matter must arise from the operation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally the matter must arise from any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by the Federal Government, or any of its Agencies. JUTH v. Ajeh (supra) Onuorah v. KRPC (supra), NEPA v. Edegbero (supra) UNILORIN v. Olutola (1998) 12 NWLR

(Pt.576) page 72.

My learned brother has exhaustively discussed the issue in this lead judgment and nothing more can be said. This appeal is allowed. I abide by all the other consequential orders contained in the lead judgment.

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: I had the honour of reading in print the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Samuel Chukwuduembi Oseji, J.C.A., with which I agree with nothing useful to add.

Appearances:

Chief O.E.N Nwagbara with him, R. Iwuala and A.O EniayeyeFor Appellant(s)

I. A. Onyebuchi for 1st and 2nd Respondents. with him, A.O Coker (Miss), J.O Wewe (Miss), N.C Ezeanochie, A. Olarenwaju,
Chief Emeka Ngige (SAN) and Augustine O. Egwuatu, Esq. for 3rd Respondent.For Respondent(s)

Appearances

Chief O.E.N Nwagbara with him, R. Iwuala and A.O EniayeyeFor Appellant

AND