MOBIL PRODUCING NIGERIA UNLIMITED v. LAWRENCE DICKSON HOPE
(2016)LCN/8498(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 19th day of April, 2016
CA/C/243/2012
RATIO
WORDS AND PHRASES: MEANING OF FORGERY
The term forgery denotes the act of fraudulently making a false document or altering a real one to be used as if genuine. In other words, forgery means a false or altered document made to look genuine by someone with the intent to deceive. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, forgery denotes-
The act of fraudulently altering, authenticating, issuing, or transferring a writing without appropriate authorization.
SEE BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 8TH Edition, 2004 @ 677. PER IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A.
CRIMINAL LAW: DISTINCTION BETWEEN FORGERY AND FRAUD
It is trite, that while it is true that there is a distinction between fraud and forgery, and forgery contains elements that are not included in fraud, forgeries are a species of fraud. In essence, the crime of forgery involves the making, altering, or completing of an instrument by someone other than the ostensible maker or drawer or an agent of the ostensible maker or drawer. See Black’s Law Dictionary (supra) @ 677. PER IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: ON WHOM LIES THE BURDEN OF PROVING FORGERY
Indeed, it’s a trite and fundamental principle, that allegation of forgery tantamount to an imputation of crime. Thus, where a party denies making a document thereby alleging that it is forged, the burden of proving the alleged forgery rests upon him. And that since forgery is for all intent and purposes a crime, the onus of proof upon the party alleging same is proof beyond reasonable doubt. See Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act; EDOHOEKET v. INYANG (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1192) 25 @ 57 Paragraph BD; ESEWO v. UKPONG (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 608) 611; IKOLI v. OLI (1962) 1 SCNLR 307; AMAD v. ORISAKWE (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 924) 385. PER IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: DUTY OF COURT TO MAKE COMPARISON OF SIGNATURES IN DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS
By the authoritative decision of the Apex Court in ADENLE v. OLUDE (supra) vis–vis the provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act (supra), the Court below and indeed any trial Court for that matter, has a duty to take the initiative of making the necessary comparison of signatures in documentary exhibits before it before coming to a reasonable conclusion in the matter. See ADENLE v. OLUDE (supra) @ 432 Paragraphs A-E; TEICH v. NORTHERN INT-MARKET CO. LTD. (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 65) 441; R v. SMITH 3 C.A.R. 87; R. v RICKARD 13 C.A.R. 140; R. v APPEA (1951) 13 WACA 143; WILCOX v. THE QUEEN (1961) 2 SCNLR 296. PER IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PAUL OBI ELECHI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MOBIL PROD. NIG. UNLTD Appellant(s)
AND
LAWRENCE DICKSON HOPE
(Carrying on Business under the name & Style of HOHADA SPECIAL SERVICES) Respondent(s)
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The instant appeal is fall-out of the decision of the Akwa Ibom State High Court, holden at Uyo, delivered on April 30, 2012 in suit No. HEK/137/2012. By the said decision, the Court below, coram Andrew E. Okon, J; entered judgment for the Respondent (Plaintiff) against the Appellant (Defendant).
BACKGROUND OF FACTS
The Appellant is an Unlimited Liability Company duly registered under the relevant Laws of the Federal Government of Nigeria. Having been so registered, it carries on the business of oil production et al, with its head office at Mobil House, Lekki Express Way, Victoria Island, Lagos and branches throughout the Federation, including Ibeno within the jurisdiction of the Court below.
Contrariwise, the Respondent, a titled Chief and native of Eket in Akwa Ibom State, carries on business under the name and style of Hohada Special Services at No. 1 Mkpok Road, Eket within the jurisdiction of the Court below.
?The case of the Respondent is to the effect that the Appellant trespassed unto the Respondent’s piece of land lying and situate at Usan Uku, Mkpok, in Eket
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Local Government Area. Consequent whereupon, the Respondent’s economic trees were destroyed by the Appellant for the purpose of the Airstrip thereof. By the Amended Statement of Claim thereof, dated 21/03/03, pursuant to order of Court below granted on 09/04/03, the Respondent claimed against the Appellant the following reliefs:
a. Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited by Herself, Directors, Officers, Agents, Assigns or whosoever acting on her behalf from issuing bid instruction(s) and awarding contract(s) to members of the public, her contractors, or whosoever for the provision of grass cutting services or any other related service in the areas covering 1/4 perimeter fence, within bundwall of Tanks 6202; around bundwal (internal and external) concrete and Tank Bases of Tanks 5001, 5002, 5003 and 5004; North fence fire Training ground and fire water line (i.e. blocks 4, 5, 11 and 12) all at Qua Iboe Terminal, Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited, Qua Iboe Terminal, Ibeno, which formed the subject matter of the contract already awarded to the Plaintiff by the Defendant since 1984 and which contracts was
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to enure so long as the Defendant operates in Akwa Ibom State with periodic renewals which contracts covers an area of 3,545,639 sq. feet.
b. An order compelling the defendant to renew the contract as awarded to the plaintiff for grass cutting, weeding and weeds killing as contained in the terms of contract agreement entered into by the defendant and plaintiff.
c. Alternatively, an order compelling the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, the sum of N350 billion (Three Hundred and Fifty Billion Naira) as follows:
i. The sum of N171,935,905,200.00 (One hundred and seventy-one billion, nine hundred and thirty five million, nine hundred and five thousands, two hundred naira only) as Special damages.
ii. The sum of N100,000,000,000.00 (One hundred billion naira only) as Exemplary damages for the defendant’s contemptuous disregard of the plaintiff’s rights to the existing contract, and
iii. The sum of N78,064,094,800.00 (Seventy-eight billion, sixty-four million, ninety-four thousand, eight hundred naira only) as general damages for the breach of contract.
PARTICULARS OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
(i) Based on the approved review
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rates of N100 per square feet, the contract would have been renewed at the monthly rate of N354,563,900.00 (Three Hundred and fifty-four million, five hundred and sixty-three thousand and nine hundred naira only) whereof the plaintiff would have used the sum of N141,825,560.00 to execute same and made a profit of N212,738,340.00 (Two Hundred and Twelve million, seven hundred and thirty eight thousand, three hundred and forty naira only).
(ii) With the above, the plaintiff would have made a net earning of N2,552,860.080 for a calendar year and the sum of N165,935,905,200.00 as the net earnings for the period of 65 (sixty-five) years ,the defendant will be operating in Akwa Ibom State.
(iii) The sum of N6,000,000,000.00 being the amount the plaintiff was entitled from June 2000 to December 2002 following the defendant’s letter of 25/5/2002 approving the sum of N100 per square feet and which was not fully implemented. At the trial the plaintiff shall lead evidence to prove this head.
?On the hand, Amended Statement of Defence thereof, dated 24/10/03, granted on 27/11/03, the Appellant not only denied the Respondent’s claim in toto, but equally
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claimed against the Respondent by way of a set-off, viz:
AND BY WAY OF SET-OFF AND/OR COUNTER-CLAIM
24. The defendant hereby counter-claims against the plaintiff and repeats Paragraphs 1 to 23, of the Amended statement of Defence.
25. The defendant is an international company of known integrity and repute whose reputation and business are being damaged and injured by the publication of the forged letter by the plaintiff.
26. The plaintiff sued the defendant out of malice, obtained a Court order which it used to harass, intimidate and sometimes delay/stop the business activities of the defendant. The defendant/counter-claimed pleads the notice to janitorial services contractors to go back to work mentioned as Exhibit “B” by the defendant himself in his affidavit in support of Form 48, filed in this Court on 5/2/2003.
27. The defendant/counter-claimant has had to employ the services of Counsel and sponsor their travels including the travels and other expenditure of witnesses to debunk the plaintiffs claim and the forged letter, etc.
?28. The defendant on account of the above has suffered injury and damages and therefore
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counter-claims against the plaintiff as follows:
i) Expenditure on Counsel and/or witnesses, etc. . N10,000,000.00
ii) Loss of business, etc. . N89,000,000.00
iii) General Damages .. N111,000,000.00
N210,000,000.00 (Two hundred and ten million naira).
Parties filed their respective pleadings. The suit proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of which, the Court below delivered the vexed judgment on the said April 30, 2012, to the conclusive effect, thus:-
On the totality of the evidence before me including the Exhibits, the claimant has proved his case. The defendant has not proved its counter-claim and its ordered that it be hereby dismissed. The claimant’s claims are in the alternative. In Paragraph 19(a) and (b) of his amended statements of claim, the claimant made two main claims. In Paragraph 19(c) thereof. We made an alternative claim. The claimant is entitled to the main claims. The law is that where the main claim is granted the alternative cannot be granted. An alternative claim made in a case by a claimant against a defendant, cannot be granted along with or in
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addition to the grant of the main or principal claim made by the same claimant against the same defendant….
In the final result, it is ordered that judgment be and is hereby entered in favour of the claimant as follows:
1. It is ordered that the defendant be and is hereby compelled to renew the contract as awarded to the claimant for grass-cutting, weeding, and weeds killing as contained in the terms of contract agreement entered into by the defendant and the claimant.
2. The defendant shall pay to the claimant cost of N50,000.00. See pages 194 – 210 of the Record.
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Appellant filed in the Court below, the notice of appeal thereof on 16/10/12. The Respondent equally cross-appealed against the said judgment. The Respondent’s Amended Notice of Appeal was deemed filed on 10/11/15. The record of appeal was initially transmitted on 22/11/12 but deemed properly transmitted on 08/4/13. The Appellant brief of argument was filed on 15/04/13.
?The Respondent/Cross-Appellant’s brief was deemed filed on 10/11/15. The cross-respondent’s brief (to the cross-appeal) was filed on 10/11/15. The
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Appellant’s reply brief was filed 10/11/15 respectively.
On 18/02/16 when the appeal lastly came up for hearing, the learned counsel adopted their respective briefs, thus resulting in reserving judgment for delivery.
The Appellant’s brief, filed on 15/4/13, span a total of 28 pages. At pages 6 thereof, four issues have been raised to the following effect:
2.1 Whether the learned trial Court was right in holding that Exhibits “E” and “G” were not forged after finding that Exh. “D” also tendered by the Respondent was forged.
2.2 Whether the learned trial Court was right in holding that there is in existence a subsisting contract between the Appellant and the Respondent.
2.3 Whether the learned trial Court was right in holding that the Respondent had proved his case.
2.4 Whether the refusal of the learned Judge to allow the Appellant to file pleading subsequent to Reply in form of a Rejoinder and adduce evidence thereto had not occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
The issue No.1 is distilled from Grounds 3 & 5 of the Amended Notice of Appeal. It is canvassed at pages 6-10 of the brief. In a nutshell, it’s submitted,
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that the Court below did not avail itself of the provision of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 2011, as amended, to make a comprehensive analysis of the signature of the DW2. Reference was made to pages 645?675 of Volume 2 of the Record, to the effect that the DW2 admitted (in Exhibit AJ) signing Exhibits C, AF1 and AF2, respectively. He however denied signing Exhibits D, E and G.
Further submitted, that the Court below should have compared the signatures in Exhibits C, AF1 and AF2 with Exhibits D, E and G. See ADENLE v. OLUDE (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 413 @ 431-432 Paragraphs H – A.
It was contended that from Exhibit J, the evidence of DW2 remained unchallenged under cross-examination. Thus, that evidence must be accepted as the correct version of what the witness (DW2) said: See AMERICAN CYANAMID v. VITALITY PHARM. LTD. (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 171) 15 @ 28 F; 30 G; 35 G; et al.
That, where there has been an assertion and denial of fact in issue, onus rests on the party asserting. See NDOMA-EGBA v. A.C.B. PLC (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 944) 79 @ 102-103 D-A; ADIGHIJE v. NWAOGU (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209) 419 @ 458-459.
The Court is
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urged to resolve issue No. 1 in favour of the Appellant.
The issues 2 and 3 are have been canvassed together at pages 10 – 13 of the brief. They have been distilled from Grounds 1 and 2 of the Amended Notice of Appeal, respectively.
In the main, it is submitted, that the Court below was in error to have based the existence and formation of a contract between the parties on Exhibit “E”. Further submitted, that assuming Exhibits E and G were signed by the Appellant, the said exhibits could not amount to a contract of agreement in law, and did not raise any contractual obligation on the Appellant.
It was contended, that Exhibits E and G could not in law and in fact amount to a contract by virtue of Exhibits Q, R, S1 ? S7, which were the terms (of the) contracts duly entered into by the Appellant and the Respondent.
?Further contended, that by the provision of Section 128 (1) of the Evidence Act, oral evidence is inadmissible to vary, alter or contradict the contracts of a written contract, except where such evidence is aimed at establishing fraud, mistake of fact or law, or any other matter of which, if proved, would
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necessarily impeach or impugn the validity of such contract. See NICON v. BWER & INDUSTRY ENG. COY. LTD (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 1; et al.
The Court is urged upon to resolve both issue 2 and 3 in favour of the Appellant.
The issue No. 4 is distilled from Grounds 6 and 7 of the Notice of Appeal. Submitted in a nutshell, that Order 17 Rule 14 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009, allows the Defendant to file a pleading subsequent to Reply where he needs to deal with new issues or matters raised in the plaintiffs Reply. He must, however, seek leave of Court to do that. See OGUNDEOYIN v. ADEYEMI (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 403 @ 419 – 420 C – E; OGBODORO v. OMENUWOMA (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt. 906) 1 @ 16 A-D.
Finally submitted, that failure by the Court below to allow the Appellant to file a Reply in a form of Rejoinder and adduce evidence in support thereof, had led to a miscarriage of justice. See OGUNTAYO v. ADELAJA (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 150 @ 186-187 C-A.
On the whole, the Court is urged to resolve the issue No. 4 in favour of the Appellant.
Conclusively, the Court is urged to uphold and
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determine the appeal in favour of the Appellant.
On the other hand, the Respondent/Cross Appellant’s brief of argument, dated 24/10/13, was deemed properly filed on 10/11/15. It spans a total of 26 pages. At page 4 thereof, five issues have been raised for determination, viz:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that there was in existence a contract between the Applicant and the Respondent/Cross Appellant?
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that Respondent/Cross-Appellant has proved his case?
3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that Exhibit “D” which was pleaded, tendered and admitted without objection by the Appellant was a forgery being proved as required by law while also holding that Exhibits E and G were not forged?
4. Whether there was any miscarriage of Justice occasioned by the refusal of the trial Judge to allow the Appellant to file her pleading long after the Respondent has closed his case since July, 2005 when the effect was to overreach the Respondent?
5. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in making an order compelling the Appellant to renew
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the contract awarded to the Respondent/Cross Appellant for grass-cutting, weeding, and weeds killing without stating the rate at which same should be renewed when same was proved by the Respondent?
The issues 1 & 2 have been distilled from grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal and dully canvassed at pages 4 – 8 of the brief.
Submitted in a nutshell that Exhibits D, E, F and G were the basis for the parties’ contractual relationship. The said exhibits created a binding contract on them. The existence of that contract is allegedly strengthened by the Appellant’s letters of 31/03/97 (Exh. K), 26/09/84 and 06/11/84 (Exh. Z), respectively.
Further submitted, that these letters were admitted by the Appellant in the pleading thereof. That the contract is founded upon offer and acceptance with the required consideration, thought need not/be sufficient. See TSOKWA MOTORS NIG. LTD. v. U.B.N. LTD. (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 471) 145 H: et al.
?It is contended, that there is a binding contract between the Respondent and the Appellant based on the offer contained in Exhibits D and E, and an acceptance contained in Exhibit F as part of the
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compensation for the trespass committed by the Appellant against the Respondent’s land, economic trees and crops destroyed by the Appellant. The Court is urged to so hold. See TSOKWA MOTORS (NIG) LTD. v. U.B.N. LTD. (supra) @ 145 H; DELTA STEEL (NIG.) LTD v. ACT INC. (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt. 592) 53 @ 66 G – H; et al.
Conclusively submitted, that having voluntarily entered into the contract of “grass cutting and weed killing” with the Respondent in the stipulated terms, the Appellant cannot validly in law derogate therefrom, except in accordance with law. The Court is urged to resolve issues 1 and 2 in the affirmative, and in favour of the Respondent.
The issue No. 3 is distilled from Grounds 3 and 5 of the Notice of Appeal, and duly argued at pages 1-13 of the brief. Submitted to the effect, that in proof of the claim thereof the Respondent tendered a number of documents, including but not limited to Exhibits D, E, F, G, K and Z. That, although Exhibits K and Z were admitted upon minimal objection, Exhibits D, E and G, were admitted by the Court below without any objection by the Appellant. See pages 227 – 229 of Volume 2 of the
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Records.
Thus, contended that a party who failed to object to tendering of a document in law, cannot be heard to complain afterwards. See VSTCO LTD. v. XTODEUS TRADING CO. (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 296) 695 – 696 D ? A; et al.
Further contended, that the provision of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 2011, as amended, is not applicable to this case, as the Court is not bound to comply with the said provision where there are credible evidence to show thtat he signature on the disputed exhibits are in fact that of DW2. That, the Court below made references to Exhibits E and G. Exhibit 2 were not denied by the Appellant as hers. See ADENLE v. OLUDE (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 413 @ 430 D – H; AMADI v. ORISAKWE (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 924) 385 @ 397 E-H.
On the whole, the Court is urged to discountenance with the Appellant’s submission and resolve issue No. 3 in favour of the Respondent.
The issue No. 4 is distilled from Ground 6 of the Amended Notice of Appeal and duly canvassed at pages 13 – 18 of the brief.
Submitted, inter alia, on the issue that the main reason adduced by the Appellant was error and/or mistake of counsel. That
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since the Appellant’s Senior Counsel, Mrs. M. A. Essien, SAN, came into the case, the Court below did not put an end to further participation by the Law Firm of Orok Ironbar & Associates. Thus, contended that unless Chief Orok Ironbar filed an affidavit alleging the fact of blundering in the matter, the Senior Counsel cannot call in support the fact of the mistake of counsel as a reason for bringing the motion to further amend the Appellant’s statement of defence. See ONYEKE v. HARRICLEM (NIG) LTD. (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt. 556) 64 @ 71 D – E.
It is contended, that its only when the mistake of counsel involves procedural matters that the Court can allow necessary amendment, but where it is a self created mistake, the Appellant cannot be heard to complain. See AKANBI v. ALAO (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 118 @ 140 A; 154 C-D; C.P.C. v. I.N.E.C. (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 493 @ 571 C-D; IROEGBU v. OKWORDU (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 159) 643 @ 669 B – C; et al.
Further contended, that the reasons for the application in question not having been good and substantial, the Appellant was not entitled to be granted the indulgence by the Court below, when same was aimed
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at over reaching the Respondent and cause further delay in the trial of the case. See BAMISHEBI v. OJE (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 411) 1; AWACHIE v. CHIME (1990) 5 (Pt. 150) 302. The Court is urged to resolve issue 4 in the negative.
The issue No. 5 is distilled from Ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal, and duly canvassed at pages 18-20 of the brief. It is submitted in the main, that the Court below having found as proved, that the Respondent was awarded contract for grass-cutting, weeding and weeds killing at the rate of N100 per square feet by the Appellant, ought to have given judgment. Having failed to do so, the vexed judgment cannot be said to be complete as it does not reflect the Respondent’s claim as found, and proved before it. See Section 50 (1) & (2) of the Evidence Act CAP 112 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990; OGBORU v. IBORI (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 942) 319 @ 394-395 F-B; DIKE v. NUKE II (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 34) 14, et al.
Further submitted, that this Court has powers to make any order necessary to effect any amendment on any error or defect committed by the Court below in the vexed judgment. See Section 15, Court of Appeal Act 2004;
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Order 19 Rule 11 (1) & (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011; ATOCHUKWU v. ADINDU (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1297) 534 @ 562 F-A; ATOLAGBE v. SHORUN (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 300 @ 364 G – H; USUNG v. NYONG (2010) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1177) 83 @ 115 A; et al.
The Court is urged to equally resolve issue 5 in favour of the Respondent.
Conclusively, the Court is urged upon to dismiss the main appeal, and accordingly allow the cross-appeal.
The Appellant’s Reply brief filed on 10/11/15 spans a total of 11 pages. Pages 1-4 relate to Respondent’s issues 1 and 2. Pages 4-7 relates to Respondent’s issue 3. While pages 7 – 8 relate to issue 4 of the Respondent, respectively. Conclusively, the Appellant urged upon the Court to reject the arguments of the Respondent/Cross-Appellant, and accordingly allow the appeal.
I have accorded an ample regard upon the nature and circumstances surrounding the appeal, the extensive submissions contained in the respective briefs of argument vis–vis the records of appeal, as a whole. It is a common knowledge, as depicted by the Records, that the Court is faced with two distinct appeals, processes – (i) the main
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appeal itself; and (ii) the cross-appeal. I have deemed it expedient to determine both the main appeal and the cross-appeal separately.
1. THE MAIN APPEAL
I have opted to adopt the five issues raised and argued by the Appellant in the brief thereof for the ultimate determination of the appeal, anon.
ISSUE NO. 1
The first issue, distilled from grounds 3 & 5 of the Amended Notice of Appeal, raises the vexed question of whether or not the Court below was right in holding that Exhibits E and G were not forged after finding that Exhibit D (also tendered by the Respondent) was forged. The issue is distilled from grounds 3 & 5 of the Amended Notice of Appeal.
The vexed judgment is contained at pages 194-210 of the Court below. Most specifically, the issues relates to the finding of the Court at pages 205-206 of Volume 1 of the record to wit:
DW2 denied signing Exhibits D, E and G. He admitted signing Exhibits C, AF1 and AF2. In his evidence in Exhibit AJ, he took time to explain from page 13 ? 16 thereof why he could not have singed Exhibit D dated September 26, 1984. His reasons were that there are errors in
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English, punctuation and grammar in the letter and misspelling of his name, all of which I have personally seen in the letter. My view is that Exhibit D must have been forged. Those errors and defects are not apparent in Exhibits E and G. The defendant case is that the two Exhibits are forged and that DW2 did not make them. Where a party denies making a document which he alleged to have signed, such denial is tantamount to saying that the document is a forgery or a fake. In such a case, the burden of proof of the forgery rests on the party who alleges. Since forgery is a crime, the onus of proof on him who alleges is proof beyond reasonable doubt. See the case of Edohoeket v. Inyang (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1192) page 25 held 11.
In this case, the defendant denied that Exhibit E dated 26th September, 1984 and Exhibit G dated 6th November, 1984 are its documents. DW2 in his evidence denied them. He said he did not sign them. He had the opportunity of testifying in the case. He did not seek the leave of the Court to write or made his correct signature before the Court. He lost that opportunity but the defendant must prove the forgery beyond reasonable
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doubt.
It is evident from the records, that consequent upon the application of the Appellant’s counsel, the Court below moved on 19/11/2009 ordered that the Court would move to and sit at Maine, Portland, USA, to take the evidence of the DW2 (E.R. Sawtelle) who could not come to Nigeria to testify. As testified by the records at page 196:
On 20th January, 2010 a commission examined the defendant’s witness, Mr. E. R. Sawtelle at the Law Offices of pierce Atwood, Monument Square, Portland, Maine, USA, in my presence, the parties and their counsel and with full participation. When the Court sat again in Uyo on 4th March, 2010, the defendant’s counsel, Albert Ben Esq., applied that the evidence of the said E. R. Sawtelle be admitted as part of the records as the evidence of DW2, and since the claimant’s counsel, Idongesit Uwah (Miss) did not oppose the application, the Court made the order as follows:
It is ordered that the evidence of E. R. Sawtelle taken on commission in Portland, Maine; USA on 20th January 2010 and sent here from the office of Nigerian Consulate-General New York, USA, be and is hereby accepted as part of the records of
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this Court in this suit and in particular to be identified and referred to as Exhibit “AJ” for all purposes in this suit.
Parties are ad idem, as aptly found by the Court below at page 202, lines 23-25 of the record, to the effect that:
The most contentious of the Exhibits are Exhibits D, E and G, said by the defendant to have been forged by the claimant for the purposes of this case.
Instructively, the issues have been joined by the parties both in the pleadings and evidence adduced at the trial of the suit. In Paragraph 8 of the Amended Statement of claim thereof, the Respondent pleaded thus:
8. Although the plaintiff did accept the offer made by the defendant following the meeting above referred, the plaintiff later wrote by his letter of 30/10/84 for upward review of the contract rate to assist the plaintiff carry out the job effectively considering the anticipated cost of the contract whereof the defendant by her letter of 6/11/84 promised upward review of the rate annually. These letters are hereby pleaded.
See page 94 of Volume (1) of the record.
In response thereto, the Appellant pleaded in Paragraph 6 of the
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Amended Statement of Defence thereof thus:
a. Paragraph 8 is denied and in further answer thereto the Defendant states thus:
i) The letters dated 26/9/84 and 6/11/84 are provided by the plaintiff and are queried. However, even if true, they were subject to and were superseded by written contracts signed by the parties. The “Term Contracts” are hereby pleaded. The plaintiff is given notice to produce his copies at the trial hereof.
ii) Only one letter dated 26/9/84, was earlier provide by plaintiff to the defendant. The said letter while investigated the one dated September 26, 1984, was sprung on the defendant and tendered in Court. These letters, particularly the one dated September 26, 1984, are not from the defendant.
iii) As plaintiff accepted payment of compensation for his part of the airstrip land in money, he acted in bad faith in retaining suit numbers HEK/8/83 and if it exists, HEK/12/84, in Court. This conducts also estopps the plaintiff from insisting on continuing with the contract.
What’s more, in Paragraph 22 of the said Amended Statement of Defence thereof, the Appellant vehemently pleaded to the following
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effect:
22. The defendant refers to Paragraph 6 of this Amended Statement of Defence and again states clearly that the letter dated September 26th 1984, is unknown to it, did not emanate from it and it is a forgery.
PARTICULARS OF FRAUD
i) The letter of September 26th 1984 was deliberately so dated to confuse it with the one dated 26/9/1984, pleaded in Paragraph 7 of the Amended Statement of Claim.
ii) The letter and the signature thereof are forged.
iii) The letter from the defendant himself of 30th October, 1984 mentioned and referred clearly to the letter dated 26th September, 1984. No mention of the other letter of September 26, 1984 because it never existed. The plaintiff is hereby given notice to produce his copy of this letter at the trial thereof.
iv) The above misled the Court into admitting the letter of 26/9/84, as Exhibit ‘D’.
v) Tendering the said letter with the clear intent of influencing wrongly the decision of this Court.
vi) The format of the letter, value of the naira against the dollar in 1984, the language and other defects show that the letter is not from the defendant.
See page 30,
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lines 22 – 40 of the record.
Now, against the backdrop of the foregoing pleadings, especially Paragraphs 6 and 22 of the Amended Statement of Defence thereof, would it correct for the Appellant as it has done in the brief thereof that:-
3.1.16. The Appellant had not made the allegation that it was the Respondent who forged the signature of the DW2 on Exhibits “D”, “E” and “G”. What the Appellant, through DW2 said that he did not sign the signature ascribed to him in Exhibits “D, E and G”.
Most undoubtedly, the answer to the answer to the above question is in the negative. And I so hold.
At page 205, lines 25-32 of the Record, the Court below stated thus:
The defendant case is that the two Exhibits are forged and that DW2 did not make them. In such a case, the burden of proof of the forgery rests on the party who alleges. Since forgery is a crime, the onus of proof on him who alleges is proof beyond reasonable doubt. See the case of Edohoeket v. Inyang (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1192) page 25 Held II.
In this case, the defendant denied that Exhibit E dated 26th September, 1984 and Exhibit G dated 6th November, 1984 are its documents. DW2 in his evidence denied them. He said he did not sign them.
25
He had the opportunity of testifying in the case. He did not seek the leave or the Court to write or made his correct signature before the Court. He lost that opportunity but the defendant must prove the forgery beyond reasonable doubt.
I think I cannot agree more with the above cogent finding, which is obviously supported by the evidence on the record and trite fundamental principles of law.
The term forgery denotes the act of fraudulently making a false document or altering a real one to be used as if genuine. In other words, forgery means a false or altered document made to look genuine by someone with the intent to deceive. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, forgery denotes-
The act of fraudulently altering, authenticating, issuing, or transferring a writing without appropriate authorization.
SEE BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 8TH Edition, 2004 @ 677.
?It is trite, that while it is true that there is a distinction between fraud and forgery, and forgery contains elements that are not included in fraud, forgeries are a species of fraud. In essence, the crime of forgery involves the making, altering, or completing of an instrument by
26
someone other than the ostensible maker or drawer or an agent of the ostensible maker or drawer. See Black’s Law Dictionary (supra) @ 677.
Indeed, it’s a trite and fundamental principle, that allegation of forgery tantamount to an imputation of crime. Thus, where a party denies making a document thereby alleging that it is forged, the burden of proving the alleged forgery rests upon him. And that since forgery is for all intent and purposes a crime, the onus of proof upon the party alleging same is proof beyond reasonable doubt. See Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act; EDOHOEKET v. INYANG (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1192) 25 @ 57 Paragraph BD; ESEWO v. UKPONG (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 608) 611; IKOLI v. OLI (1962) 1 SCNLR 307; AMAD v. ORISAKWE (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 924) 385.
In the instant case, the Appellant denied most vehemently that Exhibits E and G, dated 26th September, 1984 and 6th November, 1984 were its documents. The Appellant’s star witness in that regard, DW2, in his evidence, denied both Exhibits E and G in question. As aptly found by the Court below, DW2 –
had the opportunity of testifying in the case. He did not seek the leave of the Court
27
to write or made (sis) his signature before the Court. He lost that opportunity but the defendant must prove the forgery beyond reasonable doubt.
See page 205-200 of Volume 1 of the Record.
With a possible defence, I do not think the above finding of the Court below is correct. My reason for so holding is not far- fetched. In the case of ADENLE v. OLUDE (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 413, the Appellant argued that it was for the plaintiff who had the duty to prove due execution of Exhibition C by DW1 to either call a handwriting expert to carry out investigation or invite the trial Court to compare the disputed signature in Exhibit C with any other signature before the Court which was proved or admitted to be that of DW1. Thus, the Appellant submitted that the Court of Appeal was in error to have expected the trial Court who is an umpire to take the initiative of making the necessary comparison. Whereupon it was held by Apex Court thus:
With due respect to the learned counsel, I find no merit in this submission. Exhibit D containing the admitted signature of DW1 was produced by the plaintiff/respondent. Exhibit F which also contains the
28
admitted signature of DW1 was produced by the defendant/appellant. These two exhibits formed part of the evidence before the learned trial Judge. All the necessary evidence upon which the learned Judge would have had to act pursuant to Section 108 of the Evidence Act in order to determine the credibility of DW1 on the denial of his signature in Exhibit C, was before the Court.
Per Uwaifo, JSC @ 431 Paragraphs F – H.
The Apex Court held further on the point that the Court of Appeal was correct in pointing out what the trial Court obviously failed to do to compare the admitted signature with the disputed signature of DW1. According to the Apex Court:-
In my opinion, the Court below was right in doing the necessary comparison. I have also compared the disputed signature in Exhibit C with that of DW1 in Exhibits D and F, and I am satisfied that the one in Exhibit C is so unarguably indistinguishable from that in Exhibit D as well as Exhibit F that the only reasonable conclusion is that it was also signed by DW1.
Per Uwaifo, JSC @ 492 paragraphs A – E.
By the authoritative decision of the Apex Court in ADENLE v. OLUDE (supra)
29
vis–vis the provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act (supra), the Court below and indeed any trial Court for that matter, has a duty to take the initiative of making the necessary comparison of signatures in documentary exhibits before it before coming to a reasonable conclusion in the matter. See ADENLE v. OLUDE (supra) @ 432 Paragraphs A-E; TEICH v. NORTHERN INT-MARKET CO. LTD. (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 65) 441; R v. SMITH 3 C.A.R. 87; R. v RICKARD 13 C.A.R. 140; R. v APPEA (1951) 13 WACA 143; WILCOX v. THE QUEEN (1961) 2 SCNLR 296.
In the instant case, notwithstanding the above erroneous finding thereof regarding the DW2’s alleged failure to seek leave at the time of giving evidence the Court did actually compare the controversial Exhibits E and G with other exhibits bearing the undisputed signatures of the DW2, Exhibit F, dated 30th October, 1984, the Respondent the General Manager of the Appellant for the contract and asked for consideration of the rates of services. In Exhibit F, a reference was made to the Exhibit E, dated 26th September 1984. In Exhibit G, a reference was made to Exhibit F, to the effect that the increment for the jobs
30
would be made yearly.
One of the letters not denied by the Appellant is Exhibit Z, dated March 31, 1997 and addressed to the Respondent to the effect thus:
? You are advised to continue with the contract on monthly basis until a new contract is formalized. This is based on our exceptions letters dated 26th September, 1984 and 6th November, 1984.
Interestingly, the letters dated 26th September 1984 and 6th November, 1984 are Exhibits E and G, denied by the Appellant. The finding of the Court below at page 207 lines 14 of the Record, is to effect that ?
Exhibits made in 1984 remained as reference points in Exhibit K made in 1997 and in Exhibit Z made in 2000 by the defendant is a strong conclusion that they were and have continued to be dependable documents of the defendant. It is therefore my view that Exhibits E and G are not forged. They are defendant’s documents.
In my considered opinion, the Court below was right in doing the necessary comparison of the exhibits in question within the contemplation of Section 101 of the Evidence Act 2011 (Section 108 of the Evidence Act, 1990). I have equally compared the
31
disputed signatures of DW2 in Exhibits E and G vis–vis Exhibits K and Z made in 1997 and 2000, respectively and I am of the considered opinion that Exhibits E and G were not forged. And I so hold.
In the circumstances the issue No. 1 ought to be and its hereby resolved against the Appellant.
ISSUES 2 & 3
The second issue raises the question of whether the Court below was right in holding that there is an existence or (subsisting) contract between the Appellant and the Respondent. The third issue on the other hand, raises the question of whether the Court below was right in holding that the Respondent had proved his case. Both issues have been distilled from grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal respectively.
Copiously alluding to pages 208-209 of Volume 1 of the Records, the Appellant submitted that the Court below was in error to have based the existence of Exhibit E and formation of a contract between the parties.
Further submitted, that exhibit neither amounted to a contract or agreement in law nor raised any contractual obligation on the Appellant.
?For ease of reference, the said Exhibit E is
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hereby reproduced:
Mobil Producing Nigeria
Bookshop House
50 BROAD STREET
PRIVATE MAIL BAG
12054
LAGOS NIGERIA
TEL. 600560, 600561
CABLE MOBIL OIL
26th September, 1984
Mr. Lawrence Dickson Hope
No.1 Road 1
Federal Housing Estate
MKPOK
Cross River State.
Dear Sir,
RE-HEK/8/83
LAWRENCE DICKSON HOPE v. MR. MICHAEL JERRETTE
GORDON, MOBIL PRODUCING NIGERIA
Following the last meeting with your goodself and our Executive Director, Chief Bade Ojoro at Mobil Airstrip, Eket on 20th August, 1984 on the above subject matter. We have agreed and have prepared packages of grass cutting, weeding and grass killing contracts for you, subject to renewal as long as Mobil Operates in Eket
We trust that you will agree with the above arrangement.
Very truly yours,
E. R. Sawtelle
E. R. Sawtelle
(General Manager)
Chairman & Managing Director: CARL J. BURNETT (JR). (USA) DIRECTORS: ROBERT H. ASHER (USA), HENRY K. HOLLAND, (JR. (USA), JOHN P. KEEHAN (USA), ALPHONSUS A. OLUKOYA, CHIEF AJIBADE OJORA, EDMUND R. SAWTELLE (USA)
?Consequent upon
33
Exhibit E, the Respondent wrote Exhibit F, dated 30/10/84, to the following effect:
No 1, Road 1,
Federal Housing
Estate,
Mkpok, Cross River State.
30h October, 1984.
The General Manager,
Bookshop House,
50/52 Broad Street,
Private Mail Bag 12054,
Lagos.
Sir,
RE: PACKAGES OF GRASS CUTTING, GRASS WEEDING AND WEED KILLING SERVICES CONTRACTS ? POOR RATES AT Q.I.T.
Thank you for your letter dated 26th September, 1984, which Mobil Enshrined Packages of Grass Control Services for me at Q.I.T. Under HOHADA SPECIAL SERVICES OF NIGERIA.
But I wish to inform you that the rates of these services need much consideration, to enable me meet the standard and settle with my workers when fur.
Thank Sir,
Lawrence D. Hope
(LANDLORD).
Whereupon, with particular reference to Exhibit F, the Appellant replied (vide Exhibit G), thus:
? ? ?
6th November, 1984.
Mr. Lawrence D. Hope
? ? ?
Dear Sir,
RE-PACKAGES OF GRASS CUTTING, GRASS WEEDING AND WEED KILLING SERVICES CONTRACTS-POOR RATES AT Q.I.T.
<br< p=””</br<
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Reference your letter dated 30th October 1984 on the above subject.
You are better advised to accept the packages. The increment for the jobs will be made yearly, and whenever Federal or State Government increases salaries or wages of its workers.
You should note that the packages will last as long as Mobil operates in your State.
Very truly yours,
E. R. Sawtelle
E. R. Sawtelle
(General Manager)
The above documents (Exhibits E, F and G) were pleaded along with Exhibits D, K and Z by the Respondent to be the very basis of the contract between the respective parties. These Exhibits were admitted in evidence by the Court below at the hearing of the suit without any objection by the Appellant.
However, in the Amended statement of Defence thereof, the Appellant pleaded that Exhibits D, E and G were forged. At page 10 Paragraph 3.1.16 of the brief. Thereof, the Appellant submitted thus:
3.1.16. The Appellant had not made the allegation that it was the Respondent who forged the signature of the DW2 on Exhibits “D”, “E” and “G”. What the Appellant through DW2 said was that he did not sign the signatures ascribed
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to him in Exhibits “D”, “E” and “G”.
As alluded under issue No. 1, having so alleged in the Amended Statement of Defence thereof, that Exhibits D, E, F and G were forged, the Appellant was duty bound to prove that allegation beyond reasonable doubt. See Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act (supra). Yet the Court below held that Exhibit D was forged:
My view is that Exhibit D Must have been forged. Those errors and defects are not apparent in Exhibits E and G.
I think, with possible deference, that conclusion is erroneous. The allegation of forgery not having been proved by the Appellant as duly required by law, it was erroneous for the Court below to hold as it did, that Exhibit D was forged. It is on record, that the PW2 testified under subpoena that after conducting a forensic analysis of Exhibits B, C, D, E, AF ? AF2, came to the conclusion that all of them delivered to him for analysis, were signed by one and the same person (DW2). The PW2 equally tendered the signature comparison charts, Exhibits AD and AE.
?I have no hesitation whatsoever, in holding that the evidence of PW2 is most credible, thus ought to have been
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accepted by the Court below without any reservation. Having critically, albeit dispassionately, scrutinized Exhibits C, E, G, K, Z, et al, I have no doubt in mind, that Exhibit D was signed by one person, i.e. DW2. If he was not the one who signed Exhibit D, one wonders who then could have signed it. This pertinent question had not been answered throughout the trial of the suit. The mandatory requirement of the law of evidence is that, he who asserts must prove. In my considered view, the Appellant’s failure to discharge the fundamental onus of proving the said Exhibits, especially Exhibit D, were forged as required by law, tantamount to resolving the doubt so created thereby in favour of the Respondent. And I so hold.
In the circumstance, there is every cogent reason for me to hold, that there is a binding contract between the Respondent and the Appellant based on the offer contained in Exhibits D and E, and the acceptance as contained in Exhibit F, respectively. See DELTA & STEEL (NIG.) LTD. v. ACT INC. (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt. 597) 53 @ 66 Para. G-H; TSOKWA MOTORS (NIG) LTD. v. UBN LTD. (supra) @ 145 Paragraph H, et al.
?
In the circumstance,
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both issues 2 & 3 ought to be and are hereby resolved against the Appellant.
ISSUE NO. 4
The fourth issue raises the question of whether or not the refusal of the Court below to allow the Appellant file pleading subsequent to Reply in form of a Rejoinder and adduce evidence thereto, has not occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The issue is distilled from Grounds 6 and 7 of the Notice of Appeal.
On June 21, 2010, the Appellant filed a motion on Notice in the Court below seeking the following reliefs:
1. An order of the Honourable Court granting leave to the Defendant to amen its Further Amended Statement of Defence in terms of the Schedule of Amendment attached hereto and marked Exhibit ‘A’ and as shown in bold in the 2nd Further Amended Statement of Defence Exhibit ‘B’ hereof.
2. An order of Court deeming the Defendant’s 2nd Further Amended Statement of Defence exhibited hereto as Exhibit ‘B’ as properly filed and served.
The second motion equally filed by the Appellant on said June 21, 2010 in the Court below sought the following reliefs:
1. An order granting the Defendant extension of time to file a pleading
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subsequent to Reply in the form of a Rejoinder.
2. An order of the Honourable (sic) granting leave to the Defendant to file a Rejoinder to the claimants reply.
3. An order of Court deeming the Rejoinder already filed and served as properly filed and served all necessary filing fees having been paid. See pages 41 – 52 of Volume 1 of the Record.
Both motions were heard on July 20, 2010 and adjourned to October 20, 2010 for separate rulings there on. On that date, rulings were indeed delivered. The first motion seeking amendment of statement of defence was duly granted.
However, regarding the second motion, seeking extension of time to file pleading subsequent to reply in the form of a rejoinder, was refused and accordingly dismissed to the following conclusive effect:
Having regard to all the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that the effect of the application is to overreach the claimant who closed his case more than six years ago. This case is already eight years on the case list and any attempt to get the claimant to reopen his case for no good reason will turn out to be a continued dog in the wheel of timeous
39
litigation.
In the final result, I hold that there is no merit in the application. It is ordered that it be and is hereby dismissed. The defendant shall pay costs of N7,000.00 the claimant.
The case is adjourned to 1st December, 2010 for mention.
HON. JUSTICE ANDREW E. OKON
(Judge)
20/10/2010
The Appellant’s failure to file the processes in question in good time was attributed, as it were, to the mistake of the counsel thereof. It was submitted by the Applicant, that the Court below was wrong in holding that the failure to file a rejoinder was a conscious and deliberate course of action and could not be attributed to the mistake or fault of counsel.
Indeed it’s a trite fundamental principle that the Court does not normally punish a litigant for the sin (mistake) of the counsel thereof. See AHMADU v. SALAWA (1974) 1 ANLR (Pt. 2) 318, SC 43; AKINYEDE v. THE APPRAISER (1971) 1 ANLR 162; BAWAJE v. ADEDIWURA (1976) 6 SC 147; OGUNDOYIN v. ADEYEMI (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 403 @ 419-420 Paragraphs G-E; AKANBI v. ALAO (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 3) NWLR 118 @ 154 Paragraphs F-G; OGBOGORO v. OMENUWOMA (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt. 906) 1 @ 16
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Paragraphs A-D.
In the instant case, it’s obvious from the records that contrary to the Appellant’s submission the firm of Orok Ironbar & Associates who’s been defending the Appellant from inception of the case were still very much in the matter albeit now being led by the senior counsel M. A. Essien, SAN. Thus, the coming in to the case of the learned senior counsel has not in any way brought to an end the participation of Orok Ironbar & Associates in the matter. See ONYEKE v. HARRICLEM (NIG.) LTD (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt. 556) 64 @ 71 Paragraphs D-E.
It is a well settled doctrine that the sin of counsel should not visited upon the client thereof does not amount to giving a blank cheque to parties. The application of that rule is not merely as a matter of course. Thus, it applies only where the mistake of counsel involves procedural matters that the Court can allow necessary amendment. However, where it is so obvious, as in the instant case, that the mistake of counsel is self created, the Appellant cannot be heard to complain. See AKANBI v. ALAO (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 118 @ 140 Paragraph A; 154 @ Paragraphs C-D; C.P.C. v. INEC (2011) 18
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NWLR (Pt. 279) 493 @ 571 Paragraphs C-D; ROEGBU v. OKWORDU (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 159) 643 @ Paragraphs B-C, et al.
Hence, the reasons for the application lot being good and substantial, the Appellant was not entitled to be accorded the indulgence by the Court below. Moreso, when the application was apparently aimed at overreaching the Respondent as rightly held by the Court below, thereby stultifying the trial of the case. See BAMISHEBI v. OTO (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 411) 1; OBINYIRIUK v. ALICHE (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 183) 87; AWACHIE v. CHIME (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 302.
Invariably, the term over reach denotes to circumvent, outwit or get the better of something by cunning or artifice:
It also means to defeat one’s object by going too far. It connotes smartness on the part of a party in the litigation to defeat his opponent by a thoroughly organized plan to frustrate the intention and intendment of the adverse party. An overreaching conduct is not fair or just.
See NIWA v. S.P.D.C. NIG. LTD (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1103) 48 per Niki Tobi, JSC @ 67-68 Paragraphs H-A.
In the circumstance, the issue No. 4 is hereby equally resolved
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against the Appellant.
Hence, having resolved all the four issues against the Appellant, I am of the firmly considered view that the instant main appeal is grossly devoid of merits. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed by me.
PAUL OBI ELECHI, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother Ibrahim Mohammed Musa Saulawa, JCA.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein.
Accordingly, I too, hold that this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.
JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the draft of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother I. M. M. SAULAWA, J.C.A. and I totally agree with his lordship’s reasoning and conclusions therein.
Allegations of crime in civil transactions must be proved beyond reasonable doubt failing which they would be appropriately discountenanced. See Section 135(1) Evidence Act, 2011 (138 (1) Evidence Act, (1990) and UKEJE v. UKEJE (2014) 58 NSCQR 487.
The forgery alleged herein by the appellant formed the fulcrum of its entire case but was not established
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as required by law as a comparison of the signatures in contention revealed.
For the more detailed consideration in the lead judgment, I equally find no merit in this appeal and I accordingly dismiss it.
?I adopt the consequential orders in the lead judgment.
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Appearances
O. O. LarryFor Appellant
AND
Jerry Akpan with him, Ufot Afia and
U. E. PhilipsFor Respondent
