FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY COMMISSION v. EMMANUEL OLATUBOSUN ORUNMUYI
(2016)LCN/8240(CA)
RATIO
LABOUR LAW: EMPLOYEMENT OF STATUTORY FLAVOUR; WHETHER THE COURT MUST CONFINE ITSELF TO THE TERMS OF CONTRACT OF SERVICE BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH PROVIDES FOR THEIR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
The fact that an organization or authority is a creation of statute does not elevate all its employees to that status or that the status of master and servant is no longer existent or that their employment or determination of their appointment must necessarily have a statutory flavour. The Court must confine itself to the terms of contract of service between the parties which provides for their rights and obligations. See Fakuade v. O.A.U.T.H (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt 291) 47. per. JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.
LABOUR LAW: BREACH OF CONTRACT OF SERVICE; WHETHER REINSTATEMENT IS ORDINARILY THE REMEDY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Reinstatement is not ordinarily the remedy for breach of contract of service. See Imoloama v. W.A.E.C (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt 265) 303. per. JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 4th day of March, 2016
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This is an appeal against the judgment delivered on 17th October, 2007 in Federal High Court sitting at Osogbo, Osun State. The Appellant was the Defendant at the Lower Court. The Respondent was the plaintiff.
The claim of the Respondent at the lower Court was for the following:
1. A declaration that the termination of the plaintiff’s employment is ultra vires, unfair, unjust, wrongful, in breach of his constitutional right of fair hearing bearing the rules of natural justice and pro tanto a nullity.
2. An order re-instating the plaintiff to his employment and paying him all his entitlements and due promotions from the date of the illegal termination.
The facts of the case are short. According to the Respondent, he was employed on the 8th August 1994 as a Road Marshal by the Appellant. He was promoted once.
On 21st September, 2005 he led a team to Ilesa – Osogbo highway. At about 5.30pm, he told the driver of their vehicle to follow a motorcyclist to the police station and terminated the patrol for that day.
While they were staying around the patrol vehicle, a surveillance team arrived.
After their usual formality of searching each other, the search of the vehicle indicated there was something unusual hidden in a part of the vehicle which could not be removed until the following day when a panel beater was called. That thing turned out to be N200 (two hundred naira) in various denominations.
A panel was constituted to try the members of the team. The panel sat for two days and on the third day pronounced the Respondent guilty and his appointment was terminated for corrupt practice.
It was on the basis of the report of the panel sent to the headquarters that he was given the letter of termination.
The defence witness said he discovered a small hole in the frame of the vehicle. He put his finger inside and felt a ramp inside the hole. He asked the Respondent what he put inside that hole and the Respondent said that he put nothing in there.
They could not remove the thing inside the hole.
When the panel beater opened up the area and they saw the N200 (two hundred naira) in the various denominations, he reported to the Sector Commander.
The lower Court entered judgment in favour of the Respondent.
It is against this judgment that the Appellant has appealed. On 2nd June 2008, the Appellant filed an initial notice of appeal containing six grounds of appeal. On 6th June, 2008, the Appellant filed another notice of appeal containing seven grounds of appeal. The Appellant filed a 2nd Further Amended Notice of Appeal on 11/4/2013 in this Court which was deemed duty filed and served on 17th September 2014. The Further Amended Notice of Appeal contains eight (8) grounds of appeal from which the Appellant presented the following five (5) issues for determination:
a. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit in the light of the contravention of the mandatory provisions of Sections 97 of the Sheriffs & Civil Processes Act
b. Whether the learned trial judge was right in holding that Section XI (E) of The Maintenance of Discipline (Amendment) 1997 is contrary to the provision of the Constitution and to that extent null, void and of no effect.
c. Whether the learned trial judge was right in holding that the termination of the employment of the Respondent was ultra vires, unfair, unjust,wrongful, in breach of the constitutional right of fair hearing and against the rules of natural justice and pro tanto a nullity.
d. Whether the employment of the Respondent had statutory flavour, thereby justifying the order by the learned trial judge ordering the reinstatement of the Respondent employment.
e. Whether on the evidence on record, the trial Court was right in granting the relief it granted against the Appellant.
The Respondent adopted the five issues for determination presented by the Appellant.
The appeal was therefore argued on the following briefs:
1. Amended Appellant’s Brief of Argument dated 8th April 2013 and filed 11th April 2013 settled by Babatunde Adewusi and Mazi Afam Osigwe.
2. Amended Respondent’s brief of argument dated 13th October 2014 filed 15th October 2014 but deemed duly filed and served on 2nd June 2015 settled by M.O. Agboola.
3. Appellant’s Reply Brief of Argument undated but filed on 2nd June 2015 settled by Mazi Afam Osigwe.
Arguing the appeal, learned counsel for appellant submitted that the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, guide the service of the processes of the Federal High Court and that the writ of summons in this matter was not endorsed for service on the Appellant outside jurisdiction and therefore void. Reliance was placed on Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Owners of the MV Arabella v. NAIC (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt 1097), Bello v. National Bank of Nig Ltd (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt 246) 206 at 217 – 218. Non compliance with the Act, it was submitted is not a mere irregularity but a fundamental defect which went to the root of the jurisdiction and competence of the Court.
Issues 2 and 3 were argued together.
It was submitted that the lower Court erred in law when it held that Section XI (E) of the Maintenance of Discipline (Amendment) 1997 was contrary to Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution FRN.
The constitutionality or otherwise of the said section, it was submitted was raised for the first time in the course of Respondent Counsel’s final address. The Respondent it was submitted is bound by his pleadings at the trial. We were referred to Onamade & Anor v. African Continental Bank Ltd (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt 480) 123 and Akaniwo v. Nsirim (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt 520) 255.
The duty of a judge,it was submitted, is not to make out a case for the parties different from what they pleaded and proffered in evidence themselves. Reliance was placed on Ngene v. Igbo (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt 203) 358 at 369 – 370.
Assuming without conceding that the constitutionality or other of Section 36 of the Constitution arose for determination, the holding of the lower Court would still not be supportable in law, it was submitted.
Regulation IX (E) (sic), it was submitted is a strict liability provision and the commission of the offence would entitle the Appellant to terminate the employment of the Respondent after a trial by the FDC.
It was submitted that the regulation removes the necessity for judicial determination before a person is convicted of a crime.
It is obvious that the allegations in respect of which the Respondent stood trial, it was argued, were not allegations based on commission of crimes but for acts of serious misconduct. The Court was referred to Exhibits E004 and E005 as well as pages 100-101 and 111 of the record. The allegation, it was submitted, was for breach of Regulations 11(a) and (e) of the Regulation on maintenance of discipline. That they were not for the commission of any crime. The Appellant, it was submitted, did not need to successfully prosecute the Respondent as erroneously inferentially held by the Court before commencing disciplinary actions against them. The Section, it was submitted, authorizes an employer to take disciplinary action against an officer whether or not criminal actions had been instituted against such an affected person in any Court of law in Nigeria or elsewhere.
It was submitted that the Respondent was tried for breach of Regulation 11 (a) and (e) of the Appellant’s Regulations on the Maintenance of Discipline. We were referred to page 108 of the record of appeal particularly Regulation 11(e). The allegations, it was submitted, qualify as “serious misconduct? under the “Public Service Rules.”
It was argued that the Respondent is neither challenging the powers of the Appellant to convene the FDC nor is he alleging that the FDC breached his right to fair hearing. But that the Respondent rather chose to allege in his address that the FDC exceeded its powers to discipline him by finding him liable for breach of the Service Regulations of the Appellant.
The Respondent it was submitted, failed to show in what manner the decision of the Appellant terminating his employment was ultra vires, unfair, unjust, in breach of the constitutional right of fair hearing and against the rules of natural justice and pro tanto a nullity. That the Respondent simply made allegation which is lacking in specifics in both his pleadings and oral evidence in Court.
It was submitted that it is not enough to aver that the decision of the Appellant terminating his employment was ultra vires, unfair, unjust, wrongful, in breach of the constitutional right of fair hearing and against the rules of natural justice and pro tanto a nullity. The Respondent must plead and give specific details of how the actions of the Appellant complained of are ultra vires, and null and void. Failure to do this will amount to taking the Appellant by surprise as it would be difficult for the Appellant to know what case to answer to at the trial.
The pleading, it was submitted, was lacking in specifics. The specifics, it was submitted, were only sought to be provided by counsel’s argument.
Counsel’s (address) argument no matter how beautiful, it was submitted, can never take the place of pleadings.
It was submitted that the Respondent had the burden of proving that the mode of the termination of his employment was as averred in his statement of claim. When an employee complains that his employment was wrongly terminated, it was submitted, he has the onus of placing before the Court the terms of the contract of employment before proceeding to prove the manner the said terms were breached by the employer.
The Respondent, it was submitted, had the added burden of proving that their trial by the FDC for violation of S11 (e) and (f) of the Regulation violated his constitutionally enshrined rights to be tried by a Court of law. This he failed to do.
It was submitted that the Court ought to have dismissed the case of the Respondent. It is not enough for the Respondent to merely state that his employment is governed by the Civil Service Rules.
On issue 4, it was submitted that the lower Court erroneously held that the employment of the Respondent was governed by statutory provisions because it took into cognizance the statutory nature of the Respondents employer instead of the nature of the Respondents employment.
It was submitted that a contract of employment with statutory flavour must have the following ingredients:
1. The employer must be a body set up by statute
2. The establishing statute must make express provisions regulating the employment of the staff of the category concerned especially in matters of discipline.
It was submitted that where the contract of employment is determinable by the agreement of the parties giving notice or paying salary in lieu of notice, there would be no question of the contract having statutory flavour. The fact that the other party is a creation of statute does not make any difference. We were referred to Idonoboye-Obu v. NNPC (2003) 1 SC (Pt 1) 40 at 58 and Fakuade v. Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospital Complex Management Board (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 29) 47.
Exhibit MOI 1, it was submitted, provides in paragraph 1 that the employee or the Commission may terminate his employment by a full month’s notice or payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice. Thus the Respondent’s employment was such that either of the parties could terminate same at will. Therefore, the employment of the Respondent lacked statutory flavour. The Respondent, it was submitted, had woefully failed to prove that his employment was one with statutory flavour. The Respondent, it was further submitted, did not plead or lead evidence to the effect that his appointment belongs to a pensionable cadre.
On issue 5, it was submitted that if the lower Court had evaluated the evidence led by the Appellant in its entirety, it would not have come to the conclusion to set aside decisions of the Appellant and granting the relief sought.
It was submitted that the Court departed from the pleadings as well as the evidence led by the parties in arriving at its decision.
On issue 1, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellant was trying to give evidence in paragraph 5.1.5 at page 7 of the appellant’s brief by stating that the appellant “reside and carry on business outside the area of jurisdiction of the Federal High Court sitting at Osogbo.” That there was nothing like that on the record.
It was submitted that the Federal High Court had jurisdiction throughout Nigeria and the expression
“out of jurisdiction” under the then extant Federal High Court Rules has been defined to mean “outside the Federal Republic of Nigeria”. We were referred to Order 13 Rule 31 of the Federal High Court Rules 2000 applicable when this suit was tried.
The writ of summons in this suit, it was submitted, as endorsed on page 2 of the record had two (2) addresses; one at Abuja and the other alternative address introduced by or was “Old Ikirun Road, Osogbo.”
The Appellant, it was submitted, was served at Osogbo. This is evident from the record at page 8 where the Appellant’s counsel J. J. Ogidi Esq. filed a memorandum of appearance and marked same with the address of the Appellant at Osogbo showing that the alternative address existed and was utilized.
It was submitted that this was not the case of “a writ of summons for service out of the state in which it was issued” as envisaged by Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. The writ, it was submitted, was issued at the Osogbo Division of the Federal High Court and served on the Appellant through its address in Osogbo.
It was submitted that the Appellant having accepted service at the Osogbo address and having filed an unconditional memorandum of appearance endorsed with the Osogbo address and having participated in the trial to the end cannot any longer complain of non- compliance with the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
It was submitted that a party who was served with a writ not properly endorsed for service outside jurisdiction, who filed unconditional appearance and participated actively in the proceedings by taking further steps as in this case, would be deemed to have waived his right to complain and is in law precluded from doing so. We were referred to Ibrahim v. Balogun (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt 610) 25, Skenconsult Nig. Ltd v. Ukey (1981) 1 SC 6, Ezomo v. Oyakhire (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt 2) 195 all referred to and followed in Job Charles (Nig) Ltd v. Okonkwo (2002) FWLR (Pt 117) 1067 at 1089.
The High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2000, it was submitted permitted government agencies to be served at their address within jurisdiction, it was submitted. This was what happened in this case.
Arguing issues 2 and 3, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the scholarly voyaye of the Appellant into strict liability offence was irrelevant because it was a novel issue which was not raised at the lower Court and was not properly raised in this Court. Apart from this, this case is not dealing with criminal offence per se but regulations that affect the civil right of the plaintiff to be heard.
It was submitted that the pre-sumption of guilt of all members of the team even where only one member of the team fails to declare the money on him is clear infringement of the right to fair hearing.
It was submitted that the Appellants appeal to the Public Service Rules 2005 amounts to giving the case a new colouration which is indeed totally irrelevant. That it was never the case of the Appellant that the termination of the Respondent was under the Public Service Rules.
The appointment of one member of the team, it was pointed out, was not terminated. That this supported the position of the Respondent that the termination of his appointment was not only unconstitutional but unfair.
The Respondent, it was submitted, challenged his termination and the entire process leading to it including the regulation relied upon, the evidence led on it and the vires of those who awarded him the punishment.
It was submitted that when a party claims to have acted under a law, the onus is on him to satisfy the Court that the law was complied with. This, it was submitted, is particularly so in case of termination of a statutory pensionable employment like the one held by the Respondent in this case. We are referred to P.H.M.B. v. Ejitagha (2000) FWLR (Pt 9) 1510.
It was submitted that the Respondent?s rank being SRM, the Sector Commander’s punishment was limited to reduction in rank as the highest over an SRM. Yet by the evidence of the Appellant’s witness, the FDC awarded termination of employment and the Appellant confirmed the illegality by using it as the basis for terminating the employment of the Respondent.
Therefore, the respondent’s allegation (of ultra vires) is clearly made out, it was submitted.
The plaintiff, it was submitted, by his evidence showed that he had neither reached retirement age nor spent the appropriate number of years in service. This evidence, it was submitted, was not controverted.
It would have been idle, it was submitted for the (plaintiff) respondent to be challenging the FDC award simpliciter, since both the FDC and Sector Commander who set it up are agents of the same principal. On the other hand, the Defendant cannot confirm a clearly illegal and wrongful award for from nothing, nothing comes.
On issues 4 and 5, it was submitted that both the pleading and evidence at the lower Court showed that the Respondent’s employment had statutory flavour.
The Respondent’s case, it was submitted, simply is that he holds pensionable statutory employment and had sufficiently laid those facts before the Court.
Learned counsel for the Respondent maintained that the only witness called by the Appellant did not controvert the evidence of the appellant leaving the Respondents case that he held pensionable civil Service appointment uncontroverted.
Therefore the proper remedy is the re-instatement ordered by the lower Court.
In the appellant’s Reply Brief of Argument, issue 1 which deals with Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act was again re-argued at length. With respect to learned counsel for the Appellant, a reply brief shall deal with new points arising from the Respondent’s brief. A reply brief is not supposed to be a re-argument on point already argued by the Appellant to which the Respondent responded. See Order 18 Rule 5 of Court of Appeal Rules 2011.
Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act is for the benefit of the Defendant. The endorsement to the writ required by Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act informs the Defendant that a writ has been issued in another state. This means that a defendant can waive the requirement for endorsement. If a defendant takes steps in the proceedings after becoming aware of the irregularity he is deemed to have waived his right to insist on the proceedings being set aside. See Odua Investment Co. Ltd v. Talabe (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt 523) and Panalpina World Transport Holding AG v. Ceddi Corporation Ltd & Anor (2011) LPELR-4827.
It is too late in the day for the Appellant to rake up this issue on appeal after it had fully participated in the trial from beginning to the end. It is for this reason that I am in total agreement with learned counsel for the Respondent that appellant having filed an unconditional memorandum of appearance and having participated in the trial till the end can no longer complain of non-compliance with Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
Issue (a) is therefore resolved in favour of the Respondent.
In my view the other issues which call for determination in this appeal are issues (c) and (d). These are: (c) whether the learned trial judge was right in holding that the termination of the employment of the Respondent was ultra vires, unfair, unjust, wrongful in breach of the constitutional right of fair hearing and against the rules of natural justice.
d) Whether the employment of the Respondent had statutory flavour, thereby justifying the order by the learned trial judge ordering the reinstatement of the Respondent to his employment.
Where an employment is governed by rules and regulations backed by statute, such as Civil Service Rules as to how the employment is made and determined, a person who claims to be a public servant and seeks the protection of those rules and regulations must show that he was employed subject to those rules and regulations otherwise he cannot rely on them as protecting his employment.
b) An employment with statutory flavor, though basically creating a service relationship goes beyond the notion of ordinary master and servant whose contractual obligation can anyhow be effectively brought to an end albeit in breach of contract for which the only remedy is damages.
c) The fact that an organisation or authority which is an employer is a statutory body does not mean that the conditions of service of its employees must be of special character which make the employment one with statutory flavour. See Idoniboye- Obu v. N.N.P.C (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt 805) 589 at 620.
The fact that an organization or authority is a creation of statute does not elevate all its employees to that status or that the status of master and servant is no longer existent or that their employment or determination of their appointment must necessarily have a statutory flavour. The Court must confine itself to the terms of contract of service between the parties which provides for their rights and obligations. See Fakuade v. O.A.U.T.H (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt 291) 47.
In Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 9) 599 the appointment and termination of the status and office of Professor which the Appellant held was protected by Sections 7, 13, 14 and 15(b) of the University of Lagos Act.
Reinstatement is not ordinarily the remedy for breach of contract of service. See Imoloama v. W.A.E.C (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt 265) 303.
Although the Respondent pleaded and testified that his appointment was terminated by a letter dated 16th May, 2006; the lower Court in its judgment at page 94 of the record pronounced a termination of appointment by FDC – null and void. That pronouncement since it was neither based on the pleadings and evidence before the Court went to no issue.
Earlier at page 93 of the record of appeal, the lower Court claimed to have looked at the statement of defence and documents attached to it to find that the employment had statutory flavour. I think here too the lower Court was not correct in its approach to the case. The documents attached to the statement of defence were not evidence. As they were not tendered by any of the parties in Court, it was not proper for the Court to look at them. A trial is a public demonstration before the Court the cases of the contending parties. And the function of the Court is to decide between the parties on the basis of what has been demonstrated and tested in court. See Duriminiya v. COP (1961) NNLR 70.
The Respondent was appointed by a letter dated 16th May 1994. The letter of offer of appointment Exhibit F001 reproduced immediately hereunder reads as follows:
Our Ref: FRSC/RSI/PF/JS/0/24
16th May, 1994
Orunmuyi E.O
c/o Mr Segun Orunmuyi
C99 Otapete Street
Ilesa Osun State.
16th May, 1994
Dear Sir/Madam,
OFFER OF APPOINTMENT
Further to your application for employment and subsequent interview, I write on behalf of the Federal Road Safety Commission to offer you an appointment as Driver/Mechanic on Grade level/Salary RSS-12/1 with effect from the date of assumption of duty,
2. The offer of appointment is subject to your:
(i) Being declared medically, physically and mentally fit by a qualified Medical Officer acceptable to the Commission;
(ii) Submitting your birth certificate or a sworn declaration of age in lieu thereof;
(iii) Submitting four (4) recent passport photographs of yourself.
3. The appointment shall be on a probation for two years provided that if in the opinion of the Commission a staff appointment on probation should be terminated, the Commission shall have power to take action accordingly.
4. In the event of a misconduct on your part, the Commission reserves the right to dismiss you from its service.
5. During the period of probation the appointment is terminable on either side by a month’s notice in writing or a month’s salary in lieu of such notice. After confirmation, the appointment is terminable with three months notice or three months salary in lieu of notice.
6. While you remain in the service of the Commission, the Commission reserves the right to deploy you to any part of Nigeria.
7. The Conditions of service including the fringe benefits are as approved by the Federal Government and/or the Commission from time to time.
8. Your duties will be determined by the head of your Department or by the Commission from time to time.
9. If you accept this offer, please indicate by signing the enclosed duplicate copy of this letter and affix a postage stamp thereto and return same together with the required documents to reach the undersigned not later than 30 days of the date of this letter.
After 30 days, this offer will lapse if not already formally accepted.
Yours faithfully,
Head of Administration.
For: Corps Marchal &Chief Executive.
Federal Road Safety Commission.
The appointment was terminated by a letter dated 15th May, 2006:
Exhibit E006. Exhibit E006 reproduced below reads as follows:
Our Ref: FRSC/XSR11/A&S/DISC/TA/Vol.3/32
15 May, 2006
EO Orunmuyi (SRM) M9408-01543
MO Idowo (SRM) M9801-04216
OO Ademola (SRM) M9009-00543
ufs:
The Sector Commander
Federal Road Safety Commission
Osun State Sector Command
RS11.1
Osogbo
TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT
References:
A. FRSC/RSIIHQ/ADM/SM/D/Vol.2/26 dated 7th Dec, 2005
B. FRSC/XRSHQ/A&S/DISC/IM/Vol.3/36 dated 18th April, 2006
1. Your services with the Federal Road Safety Commission are no longer required. Your appointment is hereby terminated with immediate effect.
2. You are to handover all FRSC properties in your possession including Uniforms and Identity Card to the Sector Commander, who will clear you of same and any other indebtedness to the Commission.
3. You are advised to report to ACM (F&A) RSHQ, Abuja for your entitlements, if any.
ENGR & BG IBRAHIM
ASSISTANT CORPS MARSHAL
ACM (ADMINISTRATION I: SUPPLIES)
for: CORPS MARSHAL I: CHIEF EXECUTIVE
It is clear from Exhibit E006 reproduced above that the appointment was terminated. This was envisaged by both parties. It was envisaged that the appointment is terminable. This is why it was provided in paragraph 5 of Exhibit E001 that after confirmation of appointment either party could terminate it by a three months notice or three month’s salary in lieu of notice. Exhibit E002 tendered by the Respondent shows that his appointment was confirmed by letter dated 24th February 1999.
Paragraph 3 of Exhibit E006 advised the Respondent to report in Abuja for his entitlements.
On the face of Exhibits E001 and E006 reproduced above, it cannot be suggested that the termination of the employment was ultra vires, unfair, unjust, wrongful in breach of the constitutional right of fair hearing and against the rules of natural justice and to that extent null and void.
I therefore resolve issue C in favour of the Appellant.
As I pointed out earlier, the lower Court found that the appointment had statutory flavour on the basis of the statement of defence and documents attached to it.
This was wrong. In my view no scintilla of evidence was adduced by the Respondent to show that the appointment had statutory flavour. There was therefore no basis for the order re-instating the Respondent in the employment of the Appellant.
Issue (d) is also resolved in favour of the Appellant.
Issues (c) and (d) having been resolved in favour of the Appellant, the appeal is allowed.
The judgment of the lower Court in suit No FHC/05/23/06 delivered on 26th July 2007 is hereby set aside. The claim of the Respondent in that Court is hereby dismissed as prayed.
No costs awarded.
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.: I agree.
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.: I agree.
Appearances
Babatunde Adewusi with him, Mazi Afam OsigweFor Appellant
AND
M. O. AgboolaFor Respondent
