BHS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF LAGOS STATE & ORS
(2016)LCN/8132(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 27th day of January, 2016
CA/L/914/2012
RATIO
COURT: JURISDICTION; THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABSENCE OF A COURT OF LAW TO ENTERTAIN OR ADJUDICATE OVER A MATTER AND HOW JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED
Now, the issue, the meaning, the crucial or/and fundamental nature, the legal consequence of any defect in or absence of jurisdiction of a Court of law to entertain or adjudicate over a matter have all been firmly settled decades ago, stated and restated in 16 more judicial authorities than can easily be quantified such that they are now common knowledge in all superior Courts of record in the country, to require any further restatement in subsequent cases. All that is required of the principles laid own in all those authorities, is their application to the facts and circumstances of later cases which admit of such application and not copious repetitions of the principles before their application to the peculiar facts of the later cases. Suffice it to say here that the jurisdiction of a Court of law is vested or conferred on it either by the Constitution or/and the relevant statute/s establishing it and so not an issue that is to be implied or assumed or can be donated by the parties, expressly or otherwise. Ojokolo v Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (1961) 377, Shitta-Bey v A.G. Federation (1998) 10 NWLR (570) 392, Oyakhire v Umar (1998) NWLR (542) 438, Braithwaite v C.D.M. (1998) 7 NWLR (557) 307. per. MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
COURT: JURISDICTION; HOW THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT CAN BE INVOKED IN CIVIL ACTION AND THE DEFINITION OF DISPUTE
I must state that these provisions, in addition to being concise and precise, are plain, clear and unambiguous in words, con and purport. That is the verdict of the apex Court, per Onnoghen, JSC in the lead judgment in the case of A.G. Abia State v. A.G. Federation (supra) also reported in (2007) 2 SC, 146, when he stated that:
“The provisions of Section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution, which confers original jurisdiction on this Court, is very clear and unambiguous. It is clear from the above that for the original jurisdiction of this Court to be invoked in a civil action; (a) the action must be between the Federation and the State(s) or between States, and there must be a dispute between the Federation and a State or States; (b) the dispute must involve a question of law or fact or both; and (c) the dispute must pertain to the existence or extent of a legal right.” The erudity and proficient Lawlord did not stop there, but defined what a “dispute” is in the con of the provisions when he said:
“It has been held by this Court vide Belgore, JSC (as he then was) in A.G. of the Federation v A.G. of Abia State (2001) 11 NWLR (PT.725) 689 at 737, inter alia, that the term dispute as used in Section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution”…, involves acts of argument, controversy, debate, claims as to rights whether in law or facts, verying opinion, whether passive or violent of any disagreement that can lead to public anxiety or disquiet” per. MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
COURT: JURISDICTION; THE DISPUTES IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT CAN EXERCISE ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
In the recent case of A.G., Rivers State v A.G., Akwa Ibom State (2011) 3 MJSC 1 at 84-5 F-E, the apex Court has held:
“It is clear from the wording of the provision of Section 232 of the Constitution that the original jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court is limited to where there is real dispute between the Federation and a State or between States inter se. It follows therefore, that the Supreme Court cannot exercise its original jurisdiction to determine the following, among others:
(i) Dispute on any criminal matter pursuant to its original jurisdiction:
(ii) Any dispute arising between individuals;
(iii) Any dispute between persons and Federal Government;
(iv) And dispute between persons and a State Government;
(v) Corporate or statutory body cannot invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
(vi) That a corporate body/institution/organization cannot be made a party to a suit which is initiated in the Supreme Court;
(vii) Any dispute between Local Government and another or between a Local Government and a State and or between a Local Government and Federal Government. ” per. MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
COURT: JURISDICTION; WHETHER ANY SUIT IN WHICH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IS SUED TRANSLATE AUTOMATICALLY TO THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT
As demonstrated earlier, the mere fact that 2nd-4th Respondents are agencies of the Federal Government, does not translate automatically to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court but the subject matter of the suit must come within those stipulated in the Section for that Court to have the requisite jurisdiction. In the case of Ministry for Works v Tomas Nig. Ltd. (supra) the point was emphatically when it was held that:
“There is nowhere in the Constitution or any other enactment where it is stipulated that any suit in which the Federal Government Ministry, agency, functionary or parastatal is sued is justiciable in the Federal High Court except those cases specified in Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. An action against an agent of the Federal Government unless it is as regards “the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies” or for “a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision. per. MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
IBRAHIM SHATA BDLIYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
BHS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED Appellant(s)
AND
1. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LAGOS STATE
2. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION
3. TAFAWA BALEWA SQUARE MANAGEMENT BOARD
4. BUREAU OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES Respondent(s)
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By way of originating summons dated the 30/10/09 and filed on the 5/11/09, the 1st Respondent had dragged the Appellant before the Lagos State High Court (Hereafter to be called Lower Court) seeking for the determination of the questions and reliefs set out therein which are as follows:
“1. Whether the Race Course (‘hereinafter referred to as Tafawa Balewa Square”) is Crown Land which became vested in the Governor of Lagos State as the success or in title to the Commissioner for the Colony of Lagos who is the registered owner of Tafawa Balewa Square.?
2. Whether by virtue of Section 4(1) of the States (Creation and Transition Provisions) Decree No. 14 of 1967, title in the Tafawa Balewa Square vested in the Governor of Lagos State.?
3. Whether ownership of the Tafawa Balewa Square remains vested in the Governor of Lagos State notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1(1) of the Tafawa Balewa Square Act Cap. 11 Laws of the Federation Nigeria 2004 which only vested authority over the management control of the Tafawa?Balewa Square in the Federal Government?
4. Whether ownership of Tafawa Balewa Square remains vested in the Governor of Lagos State having regard to the succession of the Government of Lagos State to the registered title over Tafawa Balewa Square and unbroken chain of ownership by virtue of which the property become vested in the Governor of Lagos State.?
5. Whether if questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 above are answered in the affirmative is illegal for the defendant to take any step to re-develop, rehabili.. manage or finance the redevelopment, rehabilitation or management the Tafawa Balewa Square without acquiring valid title from the Governor of Lagos State.?
RELIEFS SOUGHT
1. A declaration that Tafawa Balewa Square is Crown Land which become vested in the Governor of Lagos State as the successor in title to Commissioner for the Colony of Lagos who is the registered owner of Tafawa Balewa Square.
2. A declaration that by virtue of Section 4(1) of the States (Creation Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 14 of 1967 , title in the Tafawa Balewa Square is vested in the Governor of Lagos State.
3, A declaration that ownership of the Tafawa Balewa Square remains vested in the Governor of
Lagos State notwithstanding the provisions Section 1(1) (a) of the Tafawa Balewa Square Act Cap Law of the Federation on Nigeria 2004 which only vested authority over management and control of the Tafawa Balewa Square in the Federal Government.
4. A declaration that ownership of the Tafewa Balewa Square…vested in the Governor of Lagos State having regard of the succession the Governor of Lagos State to the registered title over Tafawa Belewa Square and the unbroken chain of ownership by virtue of which properly became vested in the Governor of Lagos State.
5. A declaration that it is illegal for the defendant who has no title from the Lagos State Government to take any step to re-develop, rehabili… manage or finance the redevelopment, rehabilitation or management of the Tafawa Balewa Square without acquiring valid title from the Governor of Lagos State.
6. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, its agent, privies or anybody whatsoever from laying claim and/or further trespassing unto the Tafawa Balewa Square for the purpose of repairing rehabilitating, redeveloping, managing or financing the repair rehabilitation,
re-development or management of the Tafawa Balewa Square.”
After receipt of the summons, the Appellant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection (NPO) challenging the jurisdiction of the Lower Court to adjudicate over the matter and the 1st Respondent, expectedly, opposed the objection by way of a counter affidavit. Before the objection by the Appellant was heard?on their application, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents were joined in the matter and later, the 4th Respondent was also joined, on its own application; all as Defendants to the action.
Meanwhile, the originating summons was converted to a writ of summon at the instance of the 1st Respondent pursuant to which pleadings were filed and exchanged by and between the parties. In its statement of defence filed on the 24/4/2012, the Appellant raised the objection questioning the jurisdiction of the Lower Court to entertain the matter. The 2nd-4th Respondents also raised the same objection in separate Notices of Preliminary objection, which were all heard together and in a Ruling delivered by the Lower Court on the 8/10/12, overruled.
?Not satisfied with the decision by the Lower Court to overrule its
objection and to assume jurisdiction over the matter, the Appellant brought the present appeal vide a Notice and Grounds of Appeal (Notice of Appeal) filed on the 22/10/12, but dated the 19/10/12.
From the four (4) grounds of the appeal, two (2) issues were distilled and said to call for decision by the Court in the Appellants’ brief settled by A. O. Agbola, Esq. and filed on the 9/1/13. They are:
“(1) Whether the Learned trial Judge was right in assuming jurisdiction whilst relying only on the Writ of Summons and Statement of claim of 1st Respondent without considering the contents of the pleadings and affidavits exchanged by the parties? (Ground 2),
(2) Whether the learned trial Judge has jurisdiction to entertain the Claimant/1st Respondent’s action? (Ground l, 3 & 4)?
While the 1st Respondent adopted the above issues in the brief settled by the learned senior counsel and Solicitor General of Lagos State Mr. Lawal Pedro, SAN and filed on 28/3/13, the 2nd and 4th Respondent in their respective briefs, formulated a sole issue which is said to arise for determination in the appeal. The 2nd Respondent’s brief was filed on 28/3/13 while
the 4th Respondent’s brief was filed on the 20/5/13, but both were deemed filed on the 5/17/15; at the oral hearing of the appeal by the Court. The single issue raised in the two (2) Respondents’ briefs is:
“Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right when she held that she has jurisdiction to entertain the suit (Grounds 1, 3 & 4).’
The 3rd Respondent did not file a brief of argument in the appeal and learned counsel who appeared for it at the hearing, said the 3rd Respondent does not oppose the appeal.
The aforenamed briefs of argument were adopted by the learned counsel for the parties as the arguments in support of their respective positions in the appeal, which the Court was/is urged to uphold in the determination of the appeal.
Since the two issues are clearly derivable from the grounds of the appeal and represent the grievances of the Appellant against the decision by the Lower Court, I intend to use them in determining the appeal.
Issue 1: Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right in assuming jurisdiction whilst relying only on the Writ of Summons and Statement of claim of 1st Respondent without considering the
contents of the pleadings and affidavits exchanged by the parties?
The Appellant’s submissions on the issue are that the Lower Court was wrong in law by saying that?it was to determine the issue of its jurisdiction by examining the statement of claim and not the defence put up, relying on Nnonye v Anyichie (2005) 1 SC, 94 at 104 and Gold Mark Ltd. v Ibafon Co. Ltd. (2012) 3 SC (Pt. 111) 72. Learned counsel said where a law is referred in a statement of claim, the Court has a duty to examine that law in determining its jurisdiction and that even if no statement of claim was filed, the Appellant could have challenged the jurisdiction of the Court by way of Notice of Preliminary Objection, citing Arjay Ltd v. Airline Management Support Ltd. (2003) SC. 1 at 12.
The Court is urged to resolve the issue against the Respondents.
For the 1st Respondent, it was submitted, on the authority of Opiti v Ogbeiwi (1992) 4 NWLR (234) 184 at 195 and Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC, 31 at 49, that the law is that when considering an objection to its jurisdiction, the first consideration of the Court are the writ of summons and the statement of claim and
does not consider the defence or any other process.
Relying on Henry Stephens Engr. Ltd v Yakubu Nig. Ltd. (2009) 5-6 SC (PT.1) 60, it was submitted that the reason for that position of the law is that in considering an application which seeks to dismiss an action in limine, the Defendant/Applicant would be deemed to have admitted the facts in the statement claim but still states that nonetheless, the action ought to be dismissed or struck out. In addition, in such a situation, it was argued Court would only consider a statute along with the statement of claim if the objection was based on the statute, for instance; limitation law or ouster clause in a statute.
The learned solicitor General and SAN, said the objection by the Appellant was not based on the statutes referred to in the parties’ pleadings, and in the alternative, even if it was, the Lower Court would still have arrived at the same decision since under Section 39 of the Land Use Act, it has jurisdiction over State land. The case of Adetayo v Ademola (2010) 3-5 SC (Pt.1) 87 at 108-9 was referred to and the Lower Court was said to be right to hold that it has the jurisdiction to
entertain the action.
The 2nd and 4th Respondent did not address the issue in their respective briefs.
From the arguments of the learned counsel for the Appellant on the issue, it is clear they are not limited to the precise issue he has submitted to the Court for decision, but has veered off to the issue of whether the jurisdiction of a Court can be challenged by way of a preliminary objection or motion on notice an issue or point which was not canvassed by the parties before or pronounced on by the Lower Court. The law is known that a party cannot at appeal stage, raise and canvass an issue or point not placed or raised before the Lower Court and upon which no pronouncement was therefore made by it, without the sanction of the Court, first sought and obtained. A party cannot at will, properly raise a new or fresh issue or point not in dispute, not canvassed before and not decided by a Lower Court in an appellate Court, except it is a genuine issue of jurisdiction of the Lower Court to entertain a suit (which has been properly and validly raised in the Appellant’s issue 2). See Mgt Enterprises Ltd. v Otusanya (1987) 2 NWLR (55) 179, Jadesimi v
Okotie-Eboh (1996) 2 NWLR (429) 128, Nnanna v Onyenakuchi (2000) 15 NWLR (690) 338.
?In discountenancing the arguments of learned counsel on the said issue or point, I would emphasize that the law is not in doubt that the jurisdiction of a Court to entertain or adjudicate over a suit or matter brought before it may and can generally, validly be challenged or questioned in or by way of a preliminary objection or motion on notice as a point of law that will be decisive of the suit. See Fadare v A.G., Oyo State (1982) 4 SC. 1, SPDCN Ltd. v Airline Mgt Support Ltd (supra), Owners v Insurance (2008) 5 SCNJ, 109 at 125.
Now, back to the valid issue raised and argued by the Appellant in respect of the relevant materials a Court should or has a duty to consider in the determination of whether it has the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate over a suit, particularly as was the case before the Lower Court, on ground of the subject matter of the claim.
I should, as a foundation, refer to the position and decision of the apex Court; the Supreme Court, which lays down the general principles of law that bind all authorities and persons in Nigeria; the Courts more
especially, as a constitutional judicial policy provided for in Section 287 (1) of the 1999 Constitutional (as altered), on the issue. In the recent case of Elelu Habeeb v A.G., Federation (2012) ALL FWLR (629) 1011 at 1047, Mohammed, JSC (now Hon CJN) in the lead judgment of the apex Court had stated, inter alia, that:
“It is a fundamental principle that jurisdiction of a Court of law is determined by the plaintiff’s claim; that is to say, it is the claim before the Court that has to be looked at or examined to ascertain whether it comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the Court. Where the action is commenced by way of writ of summons, it is the case as stated in the writ of summons and the statement of claim. Where the action is commenced by originating summon, it is the questions, reliefs and supporting affidavit that determine the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine same.”
Then Apex Court, in the case P.D.P. v Sylva (2012) 13 NWLR (1316) 85 at 127, paragraph D-E, per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, again in the lead Judgment, had tersely stated that:
“Jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a suit is resolved by scrupulous
examination of the writ of summons, the statement of claim and the reliefs claimed. No other document should be examined. “(Underlined supplied).
These pronouncements are an affirmation of the earlier position of the apex Court enunciated in several decisions relied on by this Court in the case Igwe v Ezconachie (2010) 7 NWLR (1192) 61 at 86 paragraph B-G, to hold, per Ariola, JCA (now JSC), that:
“In an action commenced by writ of summons or motions, the processes to be considered are the summons or motions and the affidavit in support or statement accompanying the application which will contain the facts relied upon by the applicant. In other words, in consideration or determination of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a matter brought before it, the statement of defence or counter affidavit of the defendant or respondent has no relevance and should not never be considered. (Underline supplied)
?In the premises of the above weighty and binding premises of the law from the final Court in the land, the Lower Court simply restated and dutifully abided by the extant law when it stated that
“Let me also reiterate that in a
determination of jurisdiction, the trial Court ought to examine the substantive claim before it and not the defence put up.?
By the “substantive claim before it”, the Lower Court meant the claims as set out in the statement of claim filed by the 1st Respondent before it in the suit which were in line with, but superceded, the writ of summons.
?The above position of the law is applicable to any or all of the ways by which a Court’s jurisdiction can be challenged by a defendant to an action because until an action was properly filed, commenced or initiated by any of the methods provided for by the Rules of a Court and it was officially taken cognizance of by the Court and the initiating process/es duly served on the Defendant to put him on notice thereof in order to enable him take steps or action he considers necessary in reaction thereto, the issue of raising an objection to question or challenge the jurisdiction of the Court before which the suit was filed or initiated, either way of a motion or preliminary objection, would not arise. In other words, until a suit was properly filed and the initiating processes duly served on a Defendant, he
would not be formally aware of its existence in order to enable him react to it in any way or manner he may deem necessary. Because the Rules of Procedure for all trial Courts of record in the country, now provided for the filing of a writ of summons along with the statement of claim, a Defendant cannot and would not formally become aware of a suit filed against him, until the said processes were duly served on him as provided by the Rules and other relevant statutory provisions (as the case may be). That was the only time; that is, after becoming aware of the suit, would it be possible for him to take any informed and proper step to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court before which the suit was filed. Thus, in any way the jurisdiction of a Court was the jurisdiction of a Defendant to an action, the only relevant and material documents it would consider and examine in the determination of the objection, are the writ of summons and/or statement of claim, or as the case may be, the affidavit in support of an originating summons, which take the place of pleadings, filed by the plaintiff. See, addition, F.B.N. Plc. v Abraham (2008) 18 NWLR (1118) 172, Godwin v
Ikwey (2010) 16 NWLR (1219) 309 at 322, Emeka v Okadigbo (2012) 5-7 MJSC, 159, Oduko v Govt., Ebonyi State (2009) 4 SCNJ, 76.
The argument by the learned counsel for the Appellant is therefore not correct that even without a statement of claim, a defendant can file a Notice of Preliminary Objection and file an affidavit in support exhibiting facts, which a trial Court would have to consider in the determination of whether it had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain a matter brought before it.
It must be noted that preliminary objections are ordinarily based on points of law and aimed at termination the action in limine and as such, affidavits are not usually filed in support of the objections. Rather, addresses written or oral are delivered to the Court in support of the objection in which relevant authorities; statutory and/or judicial are referred to and relied on to demonstrate the want or absence of jurisdiction on the part of the Court to adjudicate over the suit in question. It is a matter of course which needs no specific mention, that in the course of determining the objection, the Court would consider any statutory provision/s and/or judicial
authorities cited and relied on by the parties. It was not suggested by the learned counsel for the Appellant here that the Lower Court did not do so in the Ruling appealed against. The argument of learned counsel on the point is therefore of no moment in this appeal.
On the authority of the cases referred to above, my answer to the Appellant’s issue 1 is that the Lower Court was right in its statement that in the determination of the objection to its jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the 1st Respondent raised by the Appellant, its duty was to consider and examine the claims before it as the relevant document or material, and not the defence put up by the Appellant. The issue is resolved against the Appellant.
Issue 2: Whether the learned trial Judge has jurisdiction to entertain the Claimant/1st Respondent’s action?
Before a review of the submissions by the learned counsel for the Appellant on the issue, which in substance, is the same with the 2nd and 4th Respondents’ sole issue 1, observed that the two (2) Respondents have argued the said issue in support of the Appellant and against the Ruling by the Lower Court. As stated earlier at
hearing of the appeal, counsel for the 3rd Respondent had openly told the Court that they do not oppose the appeal. The position taken by the 2nd and 4th Respondents who have no cross appeal to argue the appeal in support of the Appellant and against the Ruling by the Lower Court, is against the known position of the law, Now, that the traditional role of a Respondent to an appeal, who did not file a cross appeal or Respondent’s notice, is to support the decision appealed against in the appeal and not to fight it by asking the appellate Court either in a brief of argument or orally, to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of a Lower Court. See Atanda v. Ajani (1989) 3 NWLR (111) 511, Ajomale v Yardu?at (No2) (1991) 5 NWLR (191) 266, Adefulu v Oyesile (1989) 5 NWLR (122) 377, Elochum v Mbadiwe (1986) 1 NWLR (14) 47. In the recent case of Fiicharles Organ v N.L.G. Ltd (2013) LPELR – 2094 (SC), it was held that:
“A respondent to an appeal who neither files a cross appeal, nor a respondent’s notice, will not be allowed to even file a brief of argument attacking the judgment appealed against or be allowed to present oral arguments in the
course of the hearing of the appeal.”
This position of the law enunciated by the apex Court, has fully taken care of both the briefs of argument filed and oral arguments by the 2nd and 4th Respondents, attacking the Ruling of the Lower Court and praying the Court that the appeal be allowed in favour of the Appellant. Since both are not permitted or allowed by law, the said briefs would consequently, be discountenanced in the determination of the issue 2 and the appeal.
Appellant’s submissions:
According to learned counsel, the issue in the suit before the Lower Court was ownership of land and between the Lagos State Government and the Federal Government or its agencies on the basis of the grounds of the objection by the Appellant and since the land in dispute was not subject of a certificate of occupancy granted by the Lagos State Governor, the Lower Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Court is urged to distinguish the suit from cases such as Sadikwu v Dalori (and not Dabiri as set out in Appellant’s brief) (1996) 5 NWLR (447) 151, Onyema v Oputa (1998) 3 NWLR (60) (sic) 259, Adetayo v Ademola (2010) 3-5 SC (Pt.1) 87 and
Goldmark Nig. Ltd v Ibafon Co. Ltd (supra) which are said to suggest that all cases relating to title to land are triable by the State High Court, “were given per incuriam as the provision of Section 49 of the Land Use Act and the caveat to Section 39(1) the Land Use Act” were not considered in the cases. In addition, that the issue in the suit before the Lower Court was not considered in those cases and they were decided on different facts and issues. He maintained that the real issue in the suit was the claim or dispute between the Federal Govt, and Lagos State over which the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 232 of the Constitution and not the Lower Court. It was the contention of learned counsel that the Lower Court had found that the matter before it is principally for the determination of the ownership of Tafawa Balewa Square as between the Federal Govt. and the Lagos State Govt. and thereby depriving itself of the jurisdiction to adjudicate over it. Further, that it was immaterial that the matter was initially commenced against the Appellant alone, since the other parties were joined, putting it beyond doubt that the claims were
against the Federal Govt.
In the alternative, it was argued that even if the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over the suit, by virtue of Section 251(a) (q) and (r) of the Constitution, it is the Federal High Court and not the Lower Court that has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the lease between the Appellant and 3rd and 4th Respondents who are Federal Govt. agencies, involves the payment of money to the Federal Govt. The cases of Madukolu v Nkemdilim (1962) ALL NLR (PT 3), 581 at 589-90; on jurisdiction generally, Tukur v Govt of GG State (1989) 9 SC, on jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Elelu-Habeeb v A.G. Federal (2012) 2 SC (PT 1) 145 at 161 on the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court where agencies of Federal Govt. were sued, were referred to and the Court is urged to distinguish the case of Adetayo v Ademola (supra) and hold that the Federal High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the land was acquired by the Federal Govt. prior to the enactment of the Land Use Act, 1978.
?In another vein, it was argued the 1st Respondent lacks the locus standi to institute the action before the Lower Court not
being the successor to the crown that acquired the land in question before independence and before the creation of Lagos State in 1967. The case of Mustapha v Govt. of Lagos State (1987) 1 NSCC, 632 was cited on the provisions of Section 6(6) (d) of the 1979 Constitution and it was submitted that the Court is bound by the decision in NEPA v. Adegbenro (2002) 2 SC (PT11) 119 as to which Court has
jurisdiction where the acts of the Federal Govt. or its agencies are being challenged. A.G. Lagos State v A.G. Federation (2003) 6 SC (Pt.1) 24 at 63 was referred to and the Court is urged to hold that any challenge to the ownership of Federal land is only maintainable at either Supreme Court or the Federal High Court, depending on the composition of the parties.
In conclusion, it is prayed that the appeal be allowed as the Lower Court has no jurisdiction to determine the matter before it. For the 1st Respondent, it was argued that since reliefs were sought against the Appellant, 3rd and 4th Respondent, in the suit before the Lower Court, who are neither a State nor the National Assembly, the Supreme Court under Section 232(1) lacks the original jurisdiction
to entertain the action. A.G. Abia State v A.G. Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (763) 264 at 367-7 was cited and it was further submitted that the substance of the claim in the suit was directed at the Appellant and Respondents who are legal entities with the power to sue or be sued in respect of their actions or performance of their statutory duties in any High Court and so the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over the suit. A.G. Ondo State v A.G. Federation was referred to.
Then, citing and relying on Sections 39 and 51 (2) of the Land Use Act, it was argued that it is the Lower Court and not the Federal High Court that has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain an action for title to land irrespective of whether the land was held by the Federal Govt. or any of its agencies or that they are parties to the action. Achebe v Nwosu (2003) 7 NWLR (878) 103 at 128-9 and Adetayo v Ademola (supra) were also relied on for the position. In further submission, it was said that apart from land causes and matters, the Federal High Court does not have jurisdiction in all matters involving the Federal Govt. agencies and reliance was placed on the decision of this
Court in Ministry for Works v Tomas Nig. Ltd (2002) 2 NWLR (752) 740 at 788.
The appeal is said to be devoid of merit, in conclusion, and the Court urged to dismiss it.
Now, the issue, the meaning, the crucial or/and fundamental nature, the legal consequence of any defect in or absence of jurisdiction of a Court of law to entertain or adjudicate over a matter have all been firmly settled decades ago, stated and restated in 16 more judicial authorities than can easily be quantified such that they are now common knowledge in all superior Courts of record in the country, to require any further restatement in subsequent cases. All that is required of the principles laid own in all those authorities, is their application to the facts and circumstances of later cases which admit of such application and not copious repetitions of the principles before their application to the peculiar facts of the later cases. Suffice it to say here that the jurisdiction of a Court of law is vested or conferred on it either by the Constitution or/and the relevant statute/s establishing it and so not an issue that is to be implied or assumed or can be donated by the
parties, expressly or otherwise. Ojokolo v Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (1961) 377, Shitta-Bey v A.G. Federation (1998) 10 NWLR (570) 392, Oyakhire v Umar (1998) NWLR (542) 438, Braithwaite v C.D.M. (1998) 7 NWLR (557) 307.
I have earlier in this judgment under issue 1, demonstrated the law that in the determination of a challenge or objection to its jurisdiction to entertain a matter or suit brought before it, a Court is to consider the claims as made by the plaintiff or claimant in the writ of summons and statement claim, as the only relevant and material document for the purpose. The Lower Court had in the Ruling appealed against, set out and considered the claims of the 1st Respondent, as claimant, in paragraph 30 of the amended statement of claim which were as follows:
“1. A Declaration that by virtue of the provisions of Section 2(1) of the Lagos Racecourse Management Ordinance, 1897, handing over agreement dated 16th October 1944 registered as No: 25 Vol. 63 at page 25 at the Land Registry Office Lagos, Tafawa Balewa Square Act 1961, Crown (State) Land Act Laws of the Federation and Lagos 1958 and Section 2(3) of the Constitution (Miscellaneous
provisions) No:2) Decree, 1967, title to the property known as Tafawa Balewa Square formerly known as “Racecourse” is vested in the claimant.
2. A Declaration that by virtue of the provisions of the Tafawa Balewa Square Management Act Cap T1 Laws of the Federation 2004, it was the transfer of functions to wit: management and control of the buildings, monuments and structures situate in the forms “Racecourse” now called Tafawa Balewa Square and not the title to the land that was reverted to the Federal Government of Nigeria in 1973.
3. A Declaration that having transferred the capital of Nigeria to the Federal Capital Territory Abuja and the non usage of the Tafawa Balewa Squarely formerly known as “Racecourse” for National Independence celebrations, Military National Parades, National Garden of Remembrance or other National official functions of the Federal Government, the claimant is entitled to the reversion of the management and control of the Tafawa Balewa Square.
4. A Declaration that the proposed plan of the defendant to convert World Class Business Centre” is contrary and in breach of the statutory usage of the land and therefore
unlawful.
5. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant, its agents or privies whatsoever from developing Tafawa Balewa Square into a World Class City Business Centre or repairing, rehabilitating, managing or financing the repair, rehabilitation, redevelopment or management of the Tafawa Balewa Square.”
The Lower Court had made the following finding after setting out the above claims:
“It is evident to this Court from the nature of the claims reproduced above that the kernel of controversy, centers around who has a better title to the subject property or whether the FGN has valid title to same”
Then citing and relying on the authorities of A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation, A.G. Abia v A.G. Federation (2007) 6 NWLR (1029) 164, the Lower Court had found that the “chief complaints of the claimant are against the 1st Defendant” a body corporate capable of being sued in its own name and is not a Federation State, For that reason and the authority of Agbekoni v Kareem (2008) ALL FWLR (406) 1970 at 1987-8, among others, it concluded that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction to exercise in the suit before it.
Is the Lower” Court right in that conclusion? To answer the question, a look at the provisions of Section 232(1) of the Constitution which vests the apex Court of the land the original jurisdiction in question in this appeal, and their interpretation and proper application by that Court in other cases, are necessary. Section 232 (1) of the Constitution are concisely and precisely in the following terms:
“The Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other Court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute between the Federation and a State or between States if and in so far as that dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends.”
I must state that these provisions, in addition to being concise and precise, are plain, clear and unambiguous in words, con and purport. That is the verdict of the apex Court, per Onnoghen, JSC in the lead judgment in the case of A.G. Abia State v. A.G. Federation (supra) also reported in (2007) 2 SC, 146, when he stated that:
“The provisions of Section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution, which confers original jurisdiction on this Court, is very
clear and unambiguous. It is clear from the above that for the original jurisdiction of this Court to be invoked in a civil action; (a) the action must be between the Federation and the State(s) or between States, and there must be a dispute between the Federation and a State or States; (b) the dispute must involve a question of law or fact or both; and (c) the dispute must pertain to the existence or extent of a legal right.” The erudity and proficient Lawlord did not stop there, but defined what a “dispute” is in the con of the provisions when he said:
“It has been held by this Court vide Belgore, JSC (as he then was) in A.G. of the Federation v A.G. of Abia State (2001) 11 NWLR (PT.725) 689 at 737, inter alia, that the term dispute as used in Section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution”…, involves acts of argument, controversy, debate, claims as to rights whether in law or facts, verying opinion, whether passive or violent of any disagreement that can lead to public anxiety or disquiet”
Then in the case of A.G. Kano State v A.G. Federation (supra) Mahmud Mohammed, JSC (now Hon CJN) had held, while dealing with the same provisions of Section
232(1) in the lead judgment that:
“Any complaints against the Government of the Federation or any person who exercises power or authority on its behalf like the Inspector-General of Police as asserted by the learned senior for the plaintiff in his address before this Court, are completely outside the jurisdiction of this Court.”
His lordship had expatiated the above position when he said;
“However, quite contrary to the requirements of Sections 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the dispute disclosed in the plaintiff’s statement of claim is a dispute between the Government of Kano State and its agencies and the Government of the Federal and its agencies, particularly the police and the Federal Ministry of Information through the Inspector General of Police and the Minister of Information in their capacities as persons exercising power or authority on behalf of the Government of the Federation …. certainly if the plaintiff has any dispute with the Inspector General of Police and the Minister of Information for their respective roles in the various declarations they made on the Hisbah Laws, the operation of the Hisbah Corps and the arrest and
detention of the officials of the Hisbah Corps, the proper
venue for the settlement of such dispute does not lie in invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court. The venue for the settlement of such dispute lies elsewhere in various Courts of first instance whose original jurisdictions are clearly outlined in the same 1999 Constitution”
The clear principle laid down in the above authorities is that the original jurisdiction of the apex Court under Section 232(1) cannot be invoked over a dispute in respect of the acts or performance of the duties of the Federal Govt through or by its agencies, which are legal entities that can sue or be sued, since they are not the Federation or a State in the Federation.
?A calm reading of the reliefs sought by the 1st Respondent in the suit before the Lower Court would reveal that their foundation is the complaint against the Appellant’s proposed plan to convert the Tafawa Balewa Square to a World Class City Business Centre alleged to be contrary and in breach of the statutory usage of the land and so unlawful. The Appellant was admittedly put in possession of the land in question vide a lease agreement
entered into between it and the 3rd and 4th Respondents; agencies of the Federal Govt. acting in the performance of their statutory duties. Each of the 3rd and 4th Respondents, is a creature of Statute, vested with legal capacity to sue or be sued in its own name for any complaint against the performance or discharge of its statutory duties or functions. Inspite of the garnishing of the reliefs claimed by the 1st Respondent with the semblance of a claim for title, the other reliefs 2nd-4th are not genuine claims for declaration of title of the land in question, but rather for a reversionary right of management and control of the Square which the 3rd and 4th Respondents had transferred to the Appellant in the contract between them. That is undoubtedly not a dispute as defined above by the apex Court, that arises between the 1st Respondent as representing Lagos State, and the Federation, used in the provision of Section 232(1), to call for and warrant the invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the suit. The fact that the 2nd Respondent was joined in the suit as representing the Federal Government did not alter the real nature, substance and
character of the claims by the 1st Respondent which are primarily against the acts or performance of the statutory duties or functions of the 3rd and 4th Respondents in transferring the management and control of the square in question, to the Appellant which the 1st Respondent claims reversionary interest in. In the recent case of A.G., Rivers State v A.G., Akwa Ibom State (2011) 3 MJSC 1 at 84-5 F-E, the apex Court has held:
“It is clear from the wording of the provision of Section 232 of the Constitution that the original jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court is limited to where there is real dispute between the Federation and a State or between States inter se. It follows therefore, that the Supreme Court cannot exercise its original jurisdiction to determine the following, among others:
(i) Dispute on any criminal matter pursuant to its original jurisdiction:
(ii) Any dispute arising between individuals;
(iii) Any dispute between persons and Federal Government;
(iv) And dispute between persons and a State Government;
(v) Corporate or statutory body cannot invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
(vi) That a
corporate body/institution/organization cannot be made a party to a suit which is initiated in the Supreme Court;
(vii) Any dispute between Local Government and another or between a Local Government and a State and or between a Local Government and Federal Government. ”
Clearly, item (vi) stipulated above applies to and has taken the suit filed by the 1st Respondent against the Appellant and the 3rd and 4th Respondents, out of the purview of the original jurisdiction of the apex Court under the provisions of Section 232(1) of the Constitution. In the premises of the decision by the apex Court itself, which has effectively taken the wind out of the sail of the argument that it has original jurisdiction over the suit before the Lower Court, as constituted, the Lower Court was right that the said jurisdiction cannot be invoked over the claims and the parties against whom they were made in the suit before it. I am in complete agreement with it on that finding.
?The next point or sub-issue argued by the Appellant under the issue 2 is that because of the presence of 3rd & 4th Respondents’ in the suit which also involved payment of revenue or
money to the Federal Government, the suit before the Lower Court is triable by the Federal High Court pursuant to Section 251 (a) (q) and (r) of the Constitution. It is also argued that the suit challenges the validity of the executive or administrative actions of the Federal Government and agencies leasing the land in question to the Appellant and so it was maintained, the Federal High Court has jurisdiction over the suit, the fact that it involves land notwithstanding.
The provisions of Section 251(1) (a), (q) and (r) of the Constitution, upon which the arguments by the Appellant are predicated, are as follows:
“(a) relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a Person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party;
(q) subject to the Provisions of this Constitution, the operation and interpretation of this Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(r) any action or Proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government
or any of its agencies; and
The opening words of Section 251(1) that “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution” sound and would appear overriding and over-whelming in respect of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, as a first impression, but what followed clearly shows that there is a limit imposed in the items set out in the paragraphs over which the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Constitution in respect of the jurisdiction conferred on other Courts established by the Constitution. The exclusive jurisdiction vested and conferred on the Federal High Court under Section 251(1) is therefore one that is circumscribed, limited and confined to the items (a) (r) set out therein and the jurisdiction of any other Court under the Constitution to entertain an action or matter involving any one or more of those items stipulated and specifically listed in the subsection, is undoubtedly excluded and so ousted. See: NDIC v Okem Ent. Ltd (2004) 10 NWLR (880) 107, Ladoja v INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (1047) 119, Oladipo v Nig. Customs Service Board (2009) 12 NWLR 563 at
585.
Before considering the items (a) and (q) and (r ) of Section 251 (1) specifically relied on by the Appellant, I should say that before and following the statement by the Ogundare, JSC in NEPA v Adegbnro (supra), which suggested (or rather stated) that once a suit involved or was against the Federal Government or any of its agencies, irrespective of the subject matter of the suit, it was the Federal High Court that had exclusive jurisdiction, there have been divergent positions taken in later cases, especially by this Court. In some cases, the Court had “stucked” to the position that the exclusive iurisdiction of the Federal High Court under Section 251(1) (p) (q) & (r ) was to be and was determined by the parties only and that when the Federal Government or any of its agencies was a party, then the Federal High Court had exclusive jurisdiction. See Adebileye v NWPA (1998) 12 NWLR (517) 219, Univ of Abuja v. Ologe (1919) 2 NWLR (591) 333, Daru v Umar (2013) LPELR 12190 (CA).
In other cases, the Court had relied on the contribution of Tobi, JSC, in the same case; NEPA v Adegbenro where he stated that:
“In construing Section 230 (1) of the
1979 Constitution (now Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution) two important matters arise. They are the parties in the litigation as well as the subject matter of the litigation. The Court must consider both.” to hold that even where the Federal Government or any of its agencies was a party to an action, the Federal High Court would only have exclusive jurisdiction over the action if the subject matter falls within the items listed in Paragraphs (a) – (r) of Section 251 (1). See NNPC v SLB Consortium Ltd (2008) LPELR (4614) (CA), Bamak ? Pharmacy v A.M.A.C. (2010) LPELR – 3850 (CA).
This later position is one that is discernable from the provisions of the section, when after mentioning the Federal Government or any of its agencies, it sets out the subject matters over which the Federal Government or any of its agencies could be sued and the Federal High Court would have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate over, Thus, it is only when the acts or items set out in Paragraph (p) (q) and (r ) are the subject matter of an action against the Federal Government or any of its agencies, that the Federal High Court was vested with the
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate. It follows therefore, in the determination of whether the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over an action under the provisions of Section 251 (1) (p) (q) and (r ), both the parties and the subject matters are crucial factors or materials to be taken into account or considered. If the subject matter of an action does not fall or come within any of the listed items, the Federal High Court would not have the exclusive jurisdiction provided for under Section 251 (1) (p), (q) and (r). The Supreme Court has luckily affirmed the position in cases decided after NEPA v Adegbenro which include Adhebe v Nwosu (supra), Jack v Univ of Agric, Makurdi
(2004) 1 SC (PT11) 100, Onuorah v K.R.P.C. Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (921) 393, Adetayo v Ademola (supra). By these extant authorities, the law now is that the mere fact an action is against the Federal Government or any of its agencies, does not automatically vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court to adjudicate over or entertain it. For the Federal High Court to properly have the requisite jurisdiction over such an action, the subject matter of the suit must be
within the items specifically set out in the Paragraphs of Section 251(1) of the Constitution to which the jurisdiction was limited. Kekere-Ekun, JSC, in the recent case of James v INEC (2015) 12 NWLR (1474) 538 at 587, had restated the law on the issue by stating that:
“It is not in doubt that the 1st Respondent, the Independent National Electoral Commission, is an agency of the Federal Government. However, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents, the section does not confer a blanket jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in respect of matters in which an agency of the Federal Government is a party.
This Court in Ohakim v. Agbaso (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt.1226) 172 at 236 – 237, paras, G-D per Mohammed, JSC (now CJN) out the matter succinctly when he stated thus:
“The fact that the action was against the Respondents who are no doubt agents of the Federal Government of Nigeria does not ipso facto bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, unless and until the other requirements of the law touching on the subject matter of the claims, is also satisfied. In other words, the
subject matter the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court before the Court can assume jurisdiction in a case against the Federal Government or any of its agencies.”
His Lordship restated the principles on the issue, as laid down in: Madukolu v Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 587 at 595; (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 and reiterated that one of the conditions to be satisfied is that the subject matter of the case must be within the jurisdiction of the Court.”
More recently, in the case of Wema Securities and Finance Plc. v N.A.I.C. (2015) 16 NWLR (1484) 93 at 135-6 paragraphs F-A, per Nweze, JSC, had emphasized that:
“For the avoidance of doubt, the prevailing jurisprudence on the actual question before this Court under issue two – and this is evident in the cases cited above – is that in considering the issue of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under Section 251 (1) (supra), both the status of the parties (that is, whether it is the Federal Government or any of its agencies) and the subject matter of the claim (that is, whether it relates to any of the enumerated items in the said section) have to be looked at, Obiuweubi v CBN (supra) 20, C-F;
Oloruntoba-Oju v Abdul-Reheem and Ors, (supra) NWRTW and Anor v RTEAN and Ors. (supra); PDP and Anor v Sylva and Ors. (supra) 52-53, G-E; Ocholi Enojo-James v INEC and Ors. (2015) LPELR-24494 (SC) 56-57; Ohakim v Agbaso (supra) 172, 236-237, G-D; Kakih v PDP and Ors (supra) 374, 414, F-G; Ahmed v Ahmed and Ors. (supra) 274, 335, C-H.
It is hoped that counsel would, henceforth, stop, hampering the smooth administration of justice and efficient management of cases, both at the Federal High Court and State High Courts, by their irksome recourse to their time-worm objection to the jurisdiction of these Courts based on the interpretation of Section 251(1) (supra), now rested by the above decisions of this Court.”
The apex Court has said enough on the issue and it is hoped that counsel would take heed to the exhortation of the learned Lawlord in rushing to challenge the jurisdiction of either the Federal High Court or the State High Court on the basis of the provisions of Section 251 (1) of the Constitution without due regard to the extant position of the law.
?Learned counsel has also argued that the Lower Court does not have jurisdiction over the
land in dispute since it is not subject of a certificate of Occupancy granted by the Government of Lagos State, but held by the Federal Government and “Federal Land”, which, according to him, Section 49 of the Land Use Act says should not be affected by the provisions of the Act. Section 49 of the Land Use Act provides that:
“7. Nothing in this Act shall affect any title to land whether developed or undeveloped held by the Federal Government or any agency of the Federal Government at the commencement of this Act and, accordingly, any such land shall continue to vest in the Federal Government or the agency concerned.
2. In this Section “agency” includes any statutory corporation or any other statutory body (whether corporate or unincorporated) or any company wholly-owned by the Federal Government.”
The above provision was made to preserve and give effect to the preamble to the Act which stipulated its object as follows:
“to vest all land comprised in the territory of each State (except land vested in the Federal Government and its agencies) solely in the Governor of the State, who would hold such land in trust for the
people
The provisions of Section 49 above do not say that the High Court of a State where the Federal Government or any of its agency holds title to land there under shall not have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute arising from such holding or title in the land vested in the Federal Government or any of its agencies. The provisions only maintain the title of the Federal Government and its agencies in the land comprised in the territory of each State, for the purposes of the Act such that it was exempted from the land put under the sole control of the Governor of the State and over which he can grant title by way of certificate of occupancy. By the provisions of Section 39(1) of the Act, jurisdiction is vested in a State High Court in respect of proceedings in which title to land under the control of a State Governor is in issue.
Although the provisions of Section 49 above do not specifically say that a State High Court does not have jurisdiction in actions relating to Federal land within the State, because the Act is part of the Constitution by virtue of the provisions of Section 315 (5) (d), it is subject to the provisions of
Section 251(1) of the Constitution such that if any dispute arises between the Federal Governor or any of its agencies which comes or falls within any of the items listed in Paragraphs (p) (q)and (r ) thereof in relation to such land, then the Federal High Court would seem to have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain it. It all depends on the peculiar facts of the dispute in a particular case.
I have carefully read the facts set out in the twenty nine (29) paragraphs upon which the claims sought in paragraph 30 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended statement of claim dated 13/3/12 were premised, but did not see any of the acts said to have been done by the 2nd-4th Respondents in their administration or management, or any executive or administrative action or decision taken by them, which the 1st Respondent seeks to challenge the validity of in the action. I am unable to find facts in the 1st Respondent’s pleadings which would fit into any of the items (p), (q) and (r) of Sections 251 (1) of the Constitution to properly invoke the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court over the suit. As demonstrated earlier, the mere fact that 2nd-4th Respondents are
agencies of the Federal Government, does not translate automatically to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court but the subject matter of the suit must come within those stipulated in the Section for that Court to have the requisite jurisdiction. In the case of Ministry for Works v Tomas Nig. Ltd. (supra) the point was emphatically when it was held that:
“There is nowhere in the Constitution or any other enactment where it is stipulated that any suit in which the Federal Government Ministry, agency, functionary or parastatal is sued is justiciable in the Federal High Court except those cases specified in Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. An action against an agent of the Federal Government unless it is as regards “the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies” or for “a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision. In the instant case, even if the appellant is an agent of the Federal Government, the suit has nothing to do with these points. (N.N.P.C. v Okwor (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt.559) 637 referred to)?
See also Aso
Motel Kaduna Ltd. v Deyemo (2006) 7 NWLR (978) 87. Because the facts of the 1st Respondent’s pleadings did not bring the claims sought in the suit within the items set out in Paragraph p), (q) and (r) of Section 251(1) of the Constitution, I agree with the Lower Court that the Federal High Court does not have the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the suit or that it possesses the requisite jurisdiction to do so.
Learned counsel has also argued that the revenue of the Federal Government was in issue and so under Paragraph (a) of Section 251(1), the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction, However because the facts pleaded do not show that acts were done by the 2nd-4th Respondents which would or have affected any revenue accruable or deductible from the Federal Government account, there is no basis for the application of the paragraph in the suit.
In the result, the issue 2 is resolved against the Appellant.
Since the two (2) submitted by the Appellant have failed for lacking in merit and resolved it, the appeal is left devoid of merit. It is dismissed and accordingly, the Ruling by the Lower Court assuming jurisdiction over the case
filed by the 1st Respondent is hereby affirmed.
JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY. J.C.A.: My distinguished Lord, Garba, J.C.A., obliged me a copy of the well-reasoned Judgment just delivered.
I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at.
For the elaborate reasons in the said leading Judgment, I too, shall enter an order dismissing this Appeal.
I abide by the consequential orders in the said leading Judgment.
UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft form, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Mohammed Lawal Garba, JCA.
I am in total agreement with the reasoning and final conclusion contained therein.?I have nothing more to add.
?I abide by the necessary orders contained in the lead judgment and adopt them as mine in dismissing this appeal.
TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE, J.C.A.: I entirely agree.
IBRAHIM SHATA BDLIYA, J.C.A.: I agree.
Appearances
A. O. Agbola with him, M. V. Chinwuba and S. T. AgbajeFor Appellant
AND
S. Y. Kolawole (Mrs) (DCL, MOJ Lagos) with her, O. G. Okeke (PSC) for 1st Respondent
I Imhanze with him, B. O. Olusanya (Miss) for 2nd Respondent
A. M. Kusamotu with him, Y. Akingbade (Mrs) for 3rd Respondent
O. Badewole (Mrs) with her, D. Salisu (Miss), F. T. Salami (Miss) for 4th RespondentFor Respondent
